Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
Daisy’s underwear & Massive data capture in europe
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×

Saving this for later?

Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime - even offline.

Text the download link to your phone

Standard text messaging rates apply

Daisy’s underwear & Massive data capture in europe

691
views

Published on

http://kitetoa.com/

http://kitetoa.com/

Published in: Technology, Business

0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
691
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
3
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Daisy’s underwear A (US) military vision of the networks and the world The content of this PPT is in English. I wanted to be kind to our American friends from the NSA and spare them the time needed for a translation from French into English. The content is CC, you’re free to spread the word if you like. DISCLAIMER : Part of this presentation was given before the mass release of the Edward Snowden files. It was just after the first paper in the Guardian. I have updated the content. The “what can we do now ?” part is brand new. @_reflets_ 2013 
  • 2. Meet my friend Daisy The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), is a United States Department of Defense (DoD) combat support agency composed of military, federal civilians, and contractors. DISA provides information technology (IT) and communications support to the president, vice president, secretary of defense, the military services, the combatant commands, and any individual or system contributing to the defense of the United States. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 3. Daisy and her knowledge database  A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away, Daisy had a knowledge database stored on a Netscape Web server. DISA’s (her real name) aim was to secure the US military networks (and more). However, this Web server was secured like shit… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 4. Daisy exposed… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 5. What was in Daisy’s underwear ?  All the network projects, all the Army’s/Gov communication problems, everything was there. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 6. What was learned from Daisy’s underwear   They created the necessary environment so that Wikileaks could receive the diplomatic cables and the Reuters video.  The US wanted to know everything about their citizens.  Networks have diplomatic implications.  US military networks are as rotten as private companies’ networks.  @_reflets_ 2013 The neocons had shitty ideas. They were undersized when “global war on terrorism” started.
  • 7. Shitty ideas  9/11 : a breakpoint. The NeoCons had an agenda. It helped. They started a huge Net Centric plan. The “Warfighter” was going to get all the information needed to take the good decision.  And guess what ? A secret, is a secret. A shared secret isn’t a secret anymore… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 8. Paul did it, not Manning, not Julian, not Edward…  Paul Wolfowitz, deputy Defense secretary in the Bush administration is one of the key guys for the Net Centric plan.  http://www.kitetoa.com/Pages/Textes/Textes/Texte s12/20101208-wikileaks-cablegate-comment-lafuite-a-ete-rendue-possible-par-les-faucons-dewashington-et-non-par-wikileaks.shtml @_reflets_ 2013
  • 9. Meet the Global Information Grid ! @_reflets_ 2013
  • 10. Anyone, anywhere, anytime  The GIG is defined as a global interconnected end- to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.  The GIG comprises many systems that interoperate to provide the right info to the right places when needed. (…) allow vast amounts of information to be readily accessed by anyone, anywhere, anytime. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 11. GIG, connecting people…   Like the Department of Homeland Security (see the MOU here : http://www.kitetoa.com/Images6/armeeUS/Wikileaks/hsd.jp g)  Or NATO… (see the MOU here : http://www.kitetoa.com/Images6/armeeUS/Wikileaks/natom ou.jpg)  At this stage of this speech, are you surprised by the PRISM project ?  @_reflets_ 2013 The GIG had to be connected to any useful information source. It is just a small part of the GIG…
  • 12. The Achilles heel  Is PRISM news ?  Not for us.  On May 203, Paul Wolfowitz created Talon (http://www.kitetoa.com/Images6/armeeUS/us-talon-memo.pdf). This database would collect the following categories of information :        @_reflets_ 2013 non-specific threats to DoD interests; Suspected surveillance of DoD facilities and personnel; elicitation attempts, suspicious questioning, or other suspected intelligence collection activities focused on DoD interests; tests of security; unusual repetitive activity; bomb threats; and any other suspicious activity and incidents reasonably believed to be related to terrorist activity directed against DoD personnel, property, and activities within the United States.
  • 13. Talon…  « Non validated » information on strange behavior of American citizens…  raw information reported by concerned citizens and military members regarding suspicious incidents. Information in TALON reports is non-validated, may or may not be related to an actual threat, and by its very nature may be fragmented and incomplete. The purpose of the TALON report is to document and immediately disseminate potential threat information to DoD personnel, facilities, and resources… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 14. Talon would have been inserted into… The GCCS-J  “GCCS-J is widely used by all the combatant commands, all Service GCCS programs, USCG, DIA, NSA” @_reflets_ 2013
  • 15. Please meet the GCCS-J  The Global Command & Control System – Joint (GCCS-J) service offers vital connectivity to systems used to plan, execute and manage military operations for both joint and multinational operations. GCCS-J fuses select C2 capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable system by exchanging imagery, intelligence, status of forces, and planning information. GCCS-J is focused on meeting emerging operational needs through sustainment and synchronization support to operational baselines (Global, COP I3 and JOPES) and subject matter experts to assist with critical operation and the GCCS-J Family of Systems (FoS).  GCCS-J is a Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) system for achieving full spectrum dominance, consisting of hardware, software, procedures, standards, and interfaces that provide a robust, seamless C2 capability to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), National Military Command Center (NMCC), Combatant Commanders (CDRs), Joint Force Commanders, and Service Component Commanders. It is a suite of mission applications fusing select C2 capabilities into a comprehensive, interoperable system by exchanging imagery, intelligence, status of forces, and planning information. GCCS-J is the principal foundation for dominant battlespace awareness, providing an integrated, near real-time picture of the battlespace necessary to conduct joint and multinational operations. It offers vital connectivity to the systems the joint warfighter uses to plan, execute, and manage military operations.  The GCCS-J modernization vision is focused on continuing to decompose applicable existing applications into services, limiting local deployment, and continuing to expose data and scale services to support an enterprise implementation; reducing overall sustainment cost through use of more cost effective and appropriate COTS and HW products; and increasing the use of agile development practices. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 16. GCCS-J is the real GIG   So that the « warfighter » can make the good move at any time, based on good intelligence.  GCCS is the tool for C2 (C2 : ”the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission”)  @_reflets_ 2013 Used by the US Army Ok… But PRISM ?..
  • 17. Fear ! We need PRISM. Kitties are dangerous @_reflets_ 2013
  • 18. Where is Waldo PRISM ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 19. Hey ! Waldo PRISM spotted here… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 20. WTF ? OMG… Google & PRISM ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 21. What’s that PRISM anyway ?  There are a few PRISM in the Army…   PRISM Portable Resource for the Investigation of Suspected MANPADS [MANPADS denotes Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems] Planning Research and Intelligence Scalable Modeling (PRISM)  PRISM Input Tool (© Mitre Corporation)  There is a PRISM in Israel : Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center THE PROJECT FOR THE RESEARCH OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS (PRISM)   @_reflets_ 2013 Our PRISM is probably this one : Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM), a subsystem of collection management mission application. A Web-based management and synchronization tool used to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of theater operations. PRISM creates a collaborative environment for resource managers, collection managers, exploitation managers, and customers.
  • 22. Please define : PRISM  Where applicable, requests for SIGINT support should be entered into approved systems such as PRISM, for approval by the designated signals intelligence operational tasking authority (SOTA).  Collection Management Mission Application (CMMA). CMMA is accessed through JWICS and SIPRNET and comprises a tailorable suite of interoperable automated tools designed to enhance the collection planning, execution, and ISR battle management capability of CCMDs, subordinate joint forces, and components. CMMA includes PRISM, which is used in collection planning, operations, and managing of intelligence collection assets that are deployed to all CCMDs and USFK. Source : Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations 05 January 2012 @_reflets_ 2013
  • 23. The Rand Corporation gives some clues  The Rand Corporation talks about PRISM in 2007: A Strategies-to-Tasks Framework for Planning and Executing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations This report proposes ideas to improve ISR collection planning and execution through implementation of a strategies-to-task framework for collection planning. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 24. Collect intelligence  Currently used to integrate collection requests from the JFC and various components and, with other tools, generate the daily collection deck.  Looks like PRISM is a tool you can use ton integrate demands for intelligence and collect MANY kind of data. Not only the one from Google, Facebook, etc.  Remember GCCS-J : there are many networks, many sources. Not only PRISM. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 25. Let’s collect intel  JOINT ISR PLANNING SYSTEMS  Two joint ISR planning systems—the collection management mission application and the Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM)—help facilitate access to joint resources. PRISM, a subsystem of collection management mission application, is a Web-based management and synchronization tool used to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of theater operations. PRISM creates a collaborative environment for resource managers, collection managers, exploitation managers, and customers. In joint collection management operations, the collection manager coordinates with the operations directorate to forward collection requirements to the component commander exercising tactical control over the theater reconnaissance and surveillance assets. A mission tasking order goes to the unit responsible for the collection operations. At the selected unit, the mission manager makes the final choice of platforms, equipment, and personnel required for the collection operations based on operational considerations such as maintenance, schedules, training, and experience. The Air Force uses the collection management mission application. This application is a Web-centric information systems architecture that incorporates existing programs sponsored by several commands, Services, and agencies. It also provides tools for recording, gathering, organizing, and tracking intelligence collection requirements for all disciplines. http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_55.pdf @_reflets_ 2013
  • 26. Recap :  The PRISM you’ve read about in the Media seems to be a small part of a bigger PRISM which in turn, is a small part of a huge stuff used by the Army, the Government and the Intelligence community : the GCCS-J.  Let’s have a look at the big picture once again… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 27. Have a another look : @_reflets_ 2013
  • 28. PRISM ? There are easier ways to snoop…  When the Guardian published it’s paper on PRISM, we knew at Reflets.info that there was an easier way to check what kind of lolcats you are sharing…  That is because we had been reporting on Deep Packet Inspection for 3 years  We had unveiled what France was doing with Amesys, Qosmos, Alcatel and others.  We new this technology existed and was probably used on a large scale. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 29. Echelon : so 20th century…  We don’t want to tap fax machines  This is the 21th century guys…  Let’s head for the backbones dudes… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 30. I iz in yar BackBoNe…  “We hack network backbones – like huge internet routers, basically – that give us access to the communications of hundreds of thousands of computers without having to hack every single one”. Edward Snowden @_reflets_ 2013
  • 31. How’s PRISM working ?   The journalists who had THE PowerPoint presentation only released a 5 pages over 41.  Too bad.  But we could guess. Even if the NSA had one, the agency didn’t need to have an access into the companies databases. Big routers and backbones are easier to tap.  @_reflets_ 2013 We didn’t know when the Guardian published the initial story.... A few months after the initial story, we know that this is exactly what has been going on here…
  • 32. Tools, cables, routers  Remember… The NSA has Narus and… so many backbones to tap. Even if the US government said he was going to drop PRISM (the one your read about in the Press), they would still have all the tools to see what’s in your last email. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 33. What about France ?  Do we have a PRISM-like system ?  Well…  We invented Deep Packet Inspection (Université Pierre et Marie Curie)  We « own » many interesting backbones @_reflets_ 2013
  • 34. Flower Pilgrim : like a virgin  About the initial PRISM release in the Guardian, Fleur Pellerin said she is awaiting “explanations” from the US Gov. about this “alarming” news.  Oh Wait… Who said on Jan 1, 2013 : “The Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) expertise is indeed unique and covers the production, installation and maintenance of submarine cables. This is a strategic activity to connect overseas territories and the African continent with broadband. There is also an issue related to cyber surveillance and homeland security. We support a solution that maintains the integrity of ASN and its national roots. Let me remind you that any equity takeover would in any case be subject to a review of the Treasury under the decree on foreign investment in France.” @_reflets_ 2013
  • 35. In France… We spy from abroad  Le Monde 11/06/2013 : In France, the DGSE in the heart of a program of Internet monitoring “The French authorities argue that the [DGSE spying] sites are, for the most part, based abroad, which exonerated the DGSE to respond to French law”. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 36. can I h4Z a #PrismBurger ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 37. Amesys  Amesys with the help of the French Gov. sold a countrywide spying system (Eagle) to Kaddafi (In fact, to Abdallah Senoussi, a convicted terrorist).  Amesys was rewarded with the “buying” of Bull  Once the deal with Libya was published in the press (thank’s to Reflets.info), Bull sold it’s Eagle activity to the guy in charge of this activity.  He called the new company Advanced Middle East Systems (AMESys). Eagle is now called Cerebro, like in the X-Men… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 38. The new AMESys What kind of country wants a « Nationwide passive interception solution » ? 1) 2) 3) 4) A democracy A police state A dictatorship I don’t know Multiple answers can be provided here… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 39. Eagles everywhere  France sold Eagles (we get paid)  If France (DGSE) can use them (Backdoor) :  We can spy anyone on Earth.  While not having to bother with French laws.  We can spy on governments who bought Eagles.  Eagles are in : Libya Morocco Emirates Qatar Gabon Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia @_reflets_ 2013
  • 40. Alcatel cables and Amesys  Alcatel was leader of the consortium who built EIG.  Alcatel owns the routers (remember Flower Pilgrim ?)  The EIG cable lands in Tripoli, Libya (happy Eagle owner)  The EIG cable lands in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (supposed happy Eagle owner)  The EIG cable lands in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates (supposed happy Eagle owner)  Another cable (FLAG Alcatel-Lucent Optical Network) lands in Qatar (happy Eagle owner)  Another cable (Atlas Offshore) lands in Morocco (happy Eagle owner)  The ACE (African Coast to Europe) cable installed by Alcatel lands in Gabon (happy Eagle owner)  Jan, 2011 : Alcatel-Lucent announced that it has completed the deployment of the first gigabit passive optical network (GPON) in Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan (supposed happy Eagle owner) @_reflets_ 2013
  • 41. What eslse ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 42. Let’s go back to…  Our good friend Daisy @_reflets_ 2013
  • 43. Networks… Networks…  Tell me where is your network going through, I’ll tell you who’s your friend or foe.  Do Networks have diplomatic implications ?  Yes, they do…  <subliminal>Remember Amesys…</subliminal> @_reflets_ 2013
  • 44. Bahrain and the cables…   Did you wonder why ?  the U.S. military has a very important military base in this small country. And of course, in many other neighboring countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.)…  Defense Information System Network (DISN) South West Asia and DISN-Pacific : “Network management is performed by the Bahrain RNOSC on a 7 x 16 basis and transfers to the Europe RNOSC after hours and anytime the Bahrain RNOSC needs assistance”.  @_reflets_ 2013 Did you notice nobody talks of Bahrain and its demonstrations repressed in blood ? But there is more
  • 45. Satelites @_reflets_ 2013
  • 46. Links… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 47. Oh-Oh… Wait… France (Istres) is here too DISN-E : Defense Information System Network Europe @_reflets_ 2013
  • 48. Now I guess I’m an unlawful combatant  Am I aiding Osama Bin Laden by revealing those maps ?  Oh Wait… He’s dead.  Must be OK then. Let’s see more… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 49. Good news, the ultimate spying tools are not perfect  Army’s networks are unsecure.  This is good news  Because what you don’t want is an ultimate tool for worldwide surveillance that would be perfect. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 50. How secure are the USA military networks ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 51. Shit happens everywhere even @mil  When presenting the “Unclassified But Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) Backbone” at a “Certification Decision Briefing” in 2003, there were a few bugs left pending…  Let’s have a look ! @_reflets_ 2013
  • 52. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 53. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 54. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 55. Problem ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 56. OK… now, let’s go to War !  The Iraq war began on March 20, 2003 with the invasion of Iraq (the "Operation Iraqi Freedom") by the coalition led by the United States.  Guess what… Seven days before, on March 13, the Office of the Chairman at the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested a secured line with the government of Turkey. They didn’t have one…  Reason why they asked for this line ? Captain Obvious probably told them that they needed an approval to fly over Turkey… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 57. Press 2 ! @_reflets_ 2013
  • 58. C4n I Haz a PhoN3 L1n3 pleAz ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 59. Wait… A war ? Two Wars ? Three wars ? Stop it ! We don’t have the bandwidth !  9/11 led to the Afghan war (OEF), the Iraq war (OIF) and the infamous global war on terrorism (GWOT).  The USA did not have the bandwidth for such a plan. Problem… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 60. Fucking Bandwidth  Upgrades since 9/11/01 have more than tripled the amount of DISN services bandwidth pre-positioned to support Warfighter STEP entries. (Jan 2003)  Domain growth from 60 IDNX nodes to 213 nodes in 7 months (From October 2002- April 2003 – in the 2004 report : US DISA GWOT & OIF LESSONS LEARNED).  BANDWIDTH FUELS TRANSFORMATIONAL WARFARE (FOUO) (Jan 2004) Finding: Strategic C4ISR requires high bandwidth to support today’s net-centric warfare. Deployed forces are dependent upon bandwidth to disseminate large data and imagery files, conduct VTC’s and collaborative planning with command personnel around the globe, and receive real-time intelligence information on the battlefield. Recent OEF/OIF/GWOT operations in the Central Region that were enabled by exponential increases in conventional bandwidth clearly demonstrated the value and feasibility of net-centric operations, but greater flexible response in providing bandwidth across all echelons of the GIG, especially at the tactical level, are needed in support of GWOT’s current and probable missions. Context: Current Military Satellite (MILSAT) constellation does not have the capability to provide sufficient bandwidth to support strategic C4ISR requirements. MILSAT only provided approximately 20% of the C4ISR bandwidth required in support of OEF/OIF/GWOT missions. The remaining 80% had to be acquired from commercial sources. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 61. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 62. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 63. Iridium and the coalition From: Moriarty, Patrick Col Sent: Monday, March 31, 2003 6:20 AM To: Staton, Charles Col; Depalma, Evelyn; Sabin, Roger; Higgins, Frank COL; Lee, Gary COL; Fiedler, George Col; Bashore, John; Geist, Michael; 'Miller, Marcus Col (S)' Cc: Ponturiero, Augustine J. LCDR; Reilly, Daniel Maj Subject: FW: PROVISION OF SECURE EMSS (IRIDIUM) TO UK - LESSONS IDENTIFIED All, A couple of weeks ago, we (LCDR Ponturiero Wg Cdr Goslin) went through a goat rope trying to get Iridium handsets to the Brits. As Wg Cdr Ian Goslin points out, the success of making this happen was directly attributable to personalities and not processes. Ian believes we (DOD and DISA) need to take advantage of the valuable lessons learned in making this provisioning happen and establish a clear process with clear delineation of responsibilities so that the next time we need to provision to one of our coalition partners, we aren't as screwed up as "Hogan's Goat.” Attached is Cdr Goslin's proposed solution, or starting point for a solution. As he states, "The key features of the new process need to address the areas that caused greatest difficulty in providing EMSS service to the UK i.e. a lack of a single US advocate for the request; no timely identification of who could/should authorize the request; unclear legal authority to provide the service; and difficulty in actually paying for the service." @_reflets_ 2013
  • 64. Radars… SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN A GWOT ENVIRONMENT Findings: The Joint Spectrum Management Element (JSME) was stood up late in the planning process for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Stand up of the JSME must take place in the earliest phases of the OPLAN planning process. Trained spectrum managers are required at the component and JTF levels to functionally interact with adjacent and higher level spectrum managers. Radars used by maritime and land forces during OIF were not deconflicted amongst each other and resulted in unresolved Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). During OIF CFLCC had to establish a complex numbering scheme in order to track frequencies as units moved through phase of the operation. Finally, Multi-emitter platforms: AWACS, JSTARS, and Commando Solo were not completely cleared to operate in Host Nation (Turkey). The EMI was so severe that it affected the capability for shipboard radars to monitor the airspace for self-protection. (US DISA GWOT & OIF LESSONS LEARNED) 2004 - Booz Allen Hamilton @_reflets_ 2013
  • 65. Sharing…  The warfighter (CENTCOM J3 and CENTAF) stated operational need to have instantaneous information sharing with certain carefully selected coalition partners. This meant giving these partners physical access to particular workstations attached to the SIPRNET, and logical access from these workstations to a small number of key servers that are also attached to the SIPRNET.  This type of direct access by coalition partners to machines on U.S. Secret networks had never been done before.  Errors were made and some non-releasable data was posted and shared even with all of the processes in place to prevent it. The real time policy monitoring capability was helpful in quickly and thoroughly cleaning up/resolving the spill. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 66. Shit… We’re shooting at each other, dude…  You may not remember, but in the early stage of OEF, OIF, coalition members used to shoot each other. They called it “Fratricide” .  The US Army tried to act : @_reflets_ 2013
  • 67. 2005… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 68. Actions : 12 or 24 months  But the Army was not quick to act. OIF started in 2003.  The Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) was issued on April 2005 and the actions would take place 12 or 24 month later. Like « Analyse contributing causes of OEF and OIF MCO fratricide events »… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 69. More problems ? @_reflets_ 2013
  • 70. Data leaks someone ?  Data leaks also happen in the most secretive parts of the US Army.  Let’s have a look… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 71. Emails, longins, … @_reflets_ 2013
  • 72. Telephone numbers, computer names, IP address… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 73. Don’t fool yourselves, they know what is going on @_reflets_ 2013
  • 74. More personal data… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 75. Maps… (DISA’s main building) @_reflets_ 2013
  • 76. OK, OK… But…What can we do (now) to protect our privacy on the Net ?  Well… Nothing. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 77. Dude, wait… cryptography rules !  What if we set some hard cryptography everywhere ?  Cryptography is generally not implemented on the end points (computers). Hack the computer and get the info.  Governments did authorize the use of cryptography but did pass some laws to force users give the keys in the case of an investigation.  Did you hear about the Patriot Act ? Cryptography may well be a Maskirovka… @_reflets_ 2013
  • 78. OK. Then let’s all use friendly associative Internet acess providers !  Right.  But… Remember, they tap the backbones. At some point, your data will flow through the taped networks.  Your data is stored on servers you don’t control.  Even if you did control those servers… : intelligence community do not bother what our conception of legality is, it responds to it’s own laws. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 79. We are screwed…  Sorry… We can’t help you…  You can help yourself by telling your government you did not not put him in charge for that kind of paranoid activities.  You can help yourself learning how the network works and why “context” is important for privacy. @_reflets_ 2013
  • 80. Why is all this important ?   It’s politics.  It’s a choice about what world we want to live in.  It’s important for our kids’ future (what if Marine Le Pen’s children get their hands on this tools in an hypothetical future ?).  It’s about fundamental human rights.  @_reflets_ 2013 It’s the work of paranoid people. Do you want a paranoid guy in charge of your country ? It’s about you or your friends being accused of something you guys did not do.
  • 81. Thank you Questions someone ? @_reflets_ 2013