занятие 2 неограйсианство


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занятие 2 неограйсианство

  1. 1. Введение в современнуюлингвистическую прагматику Занятие 2, 18.10, ОТиПЛ МГУ Виталий Долгоруков НИУ ВШЭ, фак-т философии, ИГИТИ Наталья Зевахина, НИУ ВШЭ, фак-т филологии (направление лингвистики)
  2. 2. Часть I. Неограйсианство и скалярные импликатуры
  3. 3. Нео-грайсианство Реинтерпретация максим Грайса:  Максимы Хорна  Максимы Левинсона Скалярные импликатуры  Сердце нео-грайсианства  Экспериментально тестируемые  Нет единой теории
  4. 4. Максимы ХорнаQ PrincipleMake your contribution sufficient; say as much asyou can (given R)Quantity-1, Obscurity Avoidance, and AmbiguityAvoidanceR PrincipleMake your contribution necessary; say no morethan you must (given Q)Quantity-2, Brevity, Maxims of Relation, andOrderliness
  5. 5. Максимы Левинсона Q-heuristic: What isn’t said, isn’t. I-heuristic: What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified. M-heuristic: What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal.
  6. 6. Скалярные импликатуры Подмаксима-1 первой максимы количества/ информативности (Говори настолько информативно, насколько это требуется) Порождение скалярных импликатур основывается на априори существующих шкалах, состоящих из множества языковых выражений, ранжированных от менее информативных к более информативным. Например, <some, all>, <might, have to>, <warm, hot> и др.
  7. 7. Стандартный рецепт для порождения скалярных импликатурBonnie took some of the pears.i. Вместо того, чтобы произнести (1), Говорящий мог бысделать более сильное утверждение:(1*) Bonnie stole all the pears.Почему же он так не сделал?ii. Наиболее правдоподобное объяснение состоит в том,что Говорящий не верит, что (1*) истинно: BelS (1*).iii. Говорящий может иметь мнение о том, истинно ли(1*): BelS(1*)  BelS ((1*)).iv. Из (ii) и (iii) следует BelS ((1*)): Говорящий верит, чтоБонни не взяла все груши.
  8. 8. Терминология Шаг ii называется слабой импликатурой (weak implicature); Шаг iii – Competence Assumption (предположение о компетентности Говорящего); Шаг iv называется сильной импликатурой (strong implicature).
  9. 9.  i. Weak implicature: BelS () ii. Competence: BelS ()  BelS ( ) iii. Strong implicature: BelS ( )
  10. 10. Pouscoulous 2006
  11. 11. Стандартный рецепт для других количественных импликатурA: Вышла ли книга Сидорова?B: Он вычитал ее. (2)i. Вместо того, чтобы произнести (2), B мог бы сделатьболее сильное утверждение:(2*) Да, она вышла.Почему же он так не сделал?ii. Наиболее правдоподобное объяснение состоит в том,что B не верит, что (2*) истинно:BelB (2*).iii. B имеет мнение о том, истинно ли (2*) : BelB (2*) BelB ((2*)).iv. Из (ii) и (iii) следует BelB ((2*)): B верит, что книгаСидорова еще не вышла.
  12. 12. Альтернативы Одна из проблем в теории скалярных импликатур Как они порождаются? Какой длины и сложности они должны быть? Верно ли, что существуют контекстуальные и дефолтные шкалы? На уровне высказывания Релевантность Субституциональность
  13. 13. Релевантность Дискурсивные цели – общие цели собеседников; Интересы Слушающего; Общие интересы.
  14. 14. Субституциональность? Horn Chierchia, Fox, Katzir и др. (MIT группа) Hirschberg, Geurts, Pouscoulous, Noveck и др.
  15. 15. Более общая проблема Дефолтизм или контекстуализм?
  16. 16. Chierchia 2004, 2006
  17. 17. Chierchia 2004, 2006
  18. 18. Вложенные импликатуры? Контекстуалисты: доказывают, что они не существуют; Дефолтисты: утверждают и доказывают, что они существуют.
  19. 19. Монотонность
  20. 20. Проблема симметричности(3) Exampleα: John read three books.SI:  (John read four books)Potential alternatives:β: John read four books.γ: John read exactly three books.Symmetry problemFor any sentence S for which we would like to derive a SIusing an alternative S1, there is always another potentialalternative, S2 = S &  S1 which, if taken into account, wouldprevent the desired inference from arising.
  21. 21. РешенияHorn (1972) Alternatives are scale-mates. They are either monotonic, or non-monotonic.To derive the SI in (3), we must be able to negate β but not γ. On Horn’sassumptions, this is accomplished by including the former but not the latterin the set of scale-mates: three and four are scale-mates; three and exactlythree are not.Gazdar (1979)“Scales are, in some sense, ‘given to us’”.Atlas & Levinson (1981)Alternatives should be from the same semantic field, of the same brevity,and lexicalized to the same degree.Hirshberg (1985)Alternatives are salient in a particular context.
  22. 22. Conversational Condition (Matsumoto 1995)The choice of W instead of S must not be attributedto the observance of any information-selectingMaxim of Conversation other than the QualityMaxims and the Quantity-1 Maxim (i.e., the Maximsof Quantity-2, Relation, and Obscurity Avoidance,etc.)
  23. 23. Matsumoto 1995Informativeness requirementS must entail WFunctional alternative requirementS and W must belong to the same semantic field(Atlas and Levinson 1981)S and W must form a salient scale in a givendiscourse (Hirshberg 1985)
  24. 24. Matsumoto 1995Possible Horn scalesThey satisfy the informativeness requirementOr equally, the notion of Horn scale might refer to theset of all scales that can license a Quantity-1implicature at least in some context Functional Horn scalesThey satisfy both the informativeness requirement andthe functional alternative requirement in a given contextC Logical entailment is neither a necessary condition(<spaniel, dog>), nor a sufficient condition ({Sephardic,Ladino, Spanish}) on Horn scales
  25. 25. Katzir 2007CONVERSATIONAL PRINCIPLE (alternative-sensitive):do not assert  if there is another sentence ’  A() such that botha.   , andb.  is weakly assertableWEAK ASSERTABILITYA structure  will be said to be weakly assertable bya speaker S if S believes that  is true, relevant,and supported by evidence. (i.e., following Maximsof Quality 1 and 2, and Relation).
  26. 26. Katzir 2007Complexity is based on the idea that we can transform into a structure that is no more complex if we restrictourselves to (a) deleting elements in , and (b)substituting elements in  with other elements from anappropriately defined source.SUBSTITUTION SOURCE (Katzir (2007))Let  be a parse tree. The substitution source for ,written as L() is the union of the lexicon of thelanguage with the set of all subtrees of .Substitution source is a collection of objects that areavailable for further syntactic operations.
  27. 27. Matsumoto’s exampleMatsumoto’s example is captured by SubstitutionSource:: It was warm yesterday, and it was a little bit morethan warm today.Implicature: It was not a little bit more than warmyesterday.Matsumoto’s conclusion: Brevity is not aninformation-selecting maxim. It does not choosebetween statements with different meanings.
  28. 28. Fox and Katzir 2009Let S, S1, S2 be three sentences. We will say that S1 and S2 aresymmetric alternatives of S if both S1, S2  S, andS1  S   S2F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing scalar items in S withtheir scale mates}A = C  F(S)C is a set of contextually determined sentences.F(S) restricts alternatives and is needed to avoid a symmetryproblem.
  29. 29. Fox and Katzir 2009Relation of at-most-as-complex-asS C S’ if S can be derived from S’ by successivesubstitutions of sub-constituents of S’ with elementsof the substitution source for S’ in C, SS (S’, C).SS (X, C), the substitution source for X in contextC, is the union of the following sets:a. The lexiconb. The sub-constituents of Xc. The set of salient constituents in C
  30. 30. Focus and scalar inferences Alternatives for both SI and AF are determined inthe same way. The set of alternatives in both cases is acontextual restriction of the focus value of thesentence (that is, computing SI involves AF). Contextual restriction is subject to a constraintthat prevents it from breaking symmetry. Focus values are determined based on structuralrather than semantic (type-theoretic)considerations.
  31. 31. (4) John did some of the homework.Implicature:  (John did all of the homework)SIA (S) =  { Si: Si  NSI (A,S)}F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing scalar items in S withtheir scale mates}(5) John only introduced Mary to Sue.Inference:  (John introduced Jane to Sue)EXCA (S) =  { Si: Si  NAF (A,S)}OnlyA (S) = S  EXCA (S)F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing focused items in Swith their focus alternatives}Claim: FSI (S) = FAF (S)
  32. 32. Differences between Focus and SIs Intonation: focus is always intonationally marked (in spoken language). Contextual dependency: focus alternatives are always context-dependent. Scalar implicatures can be either weak or strong. When they are weak, they have nothing in common with focus. Monotonicity does not hold for focus. Psycholinguistic plausibility: focus assertion excludes other alternatives in 100% cases, it does not vary from speaker to speaker. Focus is a semantic phenomenon whereas scalar implicature belongs to pragmatics.
  33. 33. Similarities between Focus and SIs Substitution In order to compute a scalar implicature, a hearer has to ‘focus‘ on a constituent in question. Zondervan (2010) experimentally showed that focused items increase triggering scalar implicatures compared to non-focused ones though not drastically.
  34. 34. ЛитератураChierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena and thesyntax/ pragmatics interface. In A. Belletti (Ed.), Structures and beyond, pp.39–103. Oxford University Press.Chierchia, G. (2006). Broaden your views: implicatures of domain wideningand the “logicality” of language. Linguistic inquiry 37: 535–590.Chierchia, G., D. Fox, and B. Spector (to appear). The grammatical view ofscalar implicatures and the relationship between semantics and pragmatics.In C. Maienborn, K. von Heusinger, and P. Portner (Eds.), Handbook ofsemantics. Mouton de Gruyter.Fox, D. and R. Katzir (2010). On the characterization of alternatives //Natural Language Semantics 19: 87–107.Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition, and logicalform. New York: Academic Press.Geurts, B. (2010). Quantity implicatures. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2010.Harnish, R. (1976), Logical Form and Implicature. In T. Bever, J. Katz and T.Langendoen (Eds.)(1976), An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Abilities, NewYork: Crowell, pp. 464-479.
  35. 35. ЛитератураHirschberg, J. (1985). A theory of scalar implicature. Ph.D. thesis,University of Pennsylvania.Horn, L. R. (1972). On the semantic properties of the logical operators inEnglish. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles.Horn, L. R. (1984). Towards a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature. In D. Schiffrin (Ed.), Meaning, form, anduse in context: linguistic applications, pp. 11–42. Washington: GeorgetownUniversity Press.Horn, L. R. (2006). The border wars: a neo-Gricean perspective. In K. vonHeusinger and K. Turner (Eds.), Where semantics meets pragmatics, pp.21–48. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Katzir, R. (2007). Structurally-defined alternatives // Linguist and Philos(2007) 30: 669–690.Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings. Cambridge,Massachusetts: MIT Press.Matsumoto, Y. (1995). The conversational condition on Horn scales.Linguistics and philosophy 18: 21–60.
  36. 36. Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson
  37. 37. Часть II. Неограйсианство и Релевантность
  38. 38. Introduction: 1. Pragmatics; Part I.Relevance and Meaning: 2. The mappingbetween the mental and the public lexicon;3. Truthfulness and relevance; 4. Rhetoricand relevance; 5. A deflationary account ofmetaphors; 6. Explaining irony; Part II.Explicit and Implicit Communication: 7.Linguistic form and relevance; 8. Pragmaticsand time; 9. Recent approaches to bridging:truth, coherence, relevance; 10. Mood andthe analysis of non-declarative sentences;11. Metarepresentation in linguisticcommunication; Part III. Cross-disciplinaryThemes: 12. Pragmatics, modularity andmindreading; 13. Testing the cognitive andcommunicative principles of relevance; 14.The why and how of experimentalpragmatics; 15. A pragmatic perspective onthe evolution of language.
  39. 39. Истоки теории релевантности Теория импликатур П.Грайса «Модулярная теория сознания» Дж.Фодора
  40. 40. Grice -> Relevance theory«Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt towork out in detail one of Grice’s central claims:that an essential feature of most humancommunication is the expression and recognitionof intentions (Grice 1989: Essays 1–7, 14, 18;Retrospective Epilogue)» [Sperber D., Wilson D.Relevance Theory // G. Ward, L. Horn (eds)Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004,p.607]
  41. 41. Недостатки грайсианства с точки зрения теории релевантности Слишком много принципов Никак не объясняются систематические нарушения максим Анализ иронии и метафор как нарушения максимы качества
  42. 42.  «Relevance, and the maximisation of relevance, is the key to human cognition.»
  43. 43. Кодовая и инференциональная модели коммуникации
  44. 44.  «The goal of inferential pragmatics is to explain how the hearer infers the speaker’s meaning on the basis of the evidence provided»
  45. 45.  Effecteffort Explicatureimplicature Echoic utterances and irony
  46. 46.  Principles of relevance
  47. 47. «Мы считаем, что решающее значение вобработке новой информации (в особенностипередаваемой с помощью языковых средств)имеет объединение ее с контекстом —адекватноизбранным множеством фоновых допущений,извлеченных из памяти дедуктивногоустройства». [НЗЛ,224]
  48. 48.  Презумпция оптимальной релевантности (а) Набор допущений {I}, который коммуникант намеревается довести до сознания адресата, является достаточно релевантным для того, чтобы потребовать от адресата приложения необходимых усилий для обработки остенсивных стимулов. (б) Остенсивные стимулы, используемые коммуникантом, являются наиболее релевантными из тех, которые могли быть использованы для передачи {I}.
  49. 49.  Принцип релевантности«Любой акт остенсивной коммуникациисодержит презумпцию своей собственнойоптимальной релевантности».
  50. 50.  a.Peter: How far is Nottingham from London? b.Mary: 120 miles. c.Mary: 118 miles.
  51. 51.  Mary, of Peter, who has just tripped over his own feet: Peter’s just like Rudolf Nureyev
  52. 52.  Peter is very clumsy. Peter is not at all like Rudolf Nureyev.
  53. 53.  a. Peter bought a paper before leaving. b. Peter purchased a newspaper prior to departure.
  54. 54.  More generally, relevance theory sheds light on the cognitive effects of style. Some stylistic effects are not deliberately achieved: for example, the speaker’s choice of vocabulary may betray her social or political attitudes. Such attitudes may also be deliberately communicated. To take just one illustration, modern English speakers who prefer the form of words ‘he or she to the more economical form ‘he’ communicate that, for them, choice of the more economical form would carry unwanted implications
  55. 55.  a. I have no brothers or sisters. b. I have no siblings.
  56. 56. The differences between (a) and (b) are straight-forwardlyexplained on the assumption that the relative brevity of theword ‘sibling’ is not enough to offset the increase inprocessing cost resulting from its infrequency, so that (a) ismore economical overall.An anomaly in Grice’s framework is thus removed.
  57. 57. ЛитератураШпербер, Д., Уилсон, Д. Релевантность //Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. Вып.23: Когнитивныеаспекты языка. М., 1988. С. 212—257Blakemore D. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.Blakemore D. Linguistic Meaning and Relevance: The Semantics and Pragmatics ofDiscourse Markers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.Carston, Robyn and Seiji Uchida (eds.) (1998). Relevance Theory: Applications andImplications. Amsterdam: BenjaminsGabbay D.M. (ed.) Agenda Relevance. A Study in Formal Pragmatics, Elsevier, 2003.Robyn Carston & Seiji Uchida (eds.) Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications.John Benjamins, Amsterdam: 283-93.Happe F. Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test ofrelevance theory // Cognition, 48.2, 1993 pp. 101–19,http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/readinggroup/Happe%201993.pdfLeech G. N. Principles of Pragmatics. London, 1983.van Rooij R., Franke M., de Jager T. Relevance in Cooperation and Conflict,(2009) Journal of Logic and Computation (toappear),http://staff.science.uva.nl/~vanrooij/JointRelevance.pdf
  58. 58. Saul J. What is said and psychological reality: Grice’s project and relevancetheorists’ criticisms // Linguistics and Philosophy 25, 2002, pp. 347–72,http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/project/wine/dosdevices/z:/mit/lugia/MacData/afs.course/24/24.954/OldFiles/www/files/saul.gricecritics.pdfSperber D., Wilson D. Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Harvard UniversityPress, 1986. (Second edition 1995. Blackwell, Oxford.)Sperber D., Wilson D. Precis of Relevance: Communication and Cognition//Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Vol.10, 1987, pp. 697-75.Sperber D., Wilson D. Linguistic form and relevance // Lingua. Vol. 90, 1993, pp. 1-25, http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Linguistic-form-and-relevance.pdfSperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson.(2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading //Mind & Language 17: 3–23,http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/PragmaticsModularityMindReading.pdfSperber D., Wilson D. Relevance Theory // G. Ward, L. Horn (eds) Handbook ofPragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 607-632Stainton, Robert J.(1994). Using non-sentences: An application of relevance theory //Pragmatics and Cognition 2: 269–84,http://works.bepress.com/robertstainton/114/Wilson D., Sperber D.Truthfulness and relevance // Mind 111, 2002, pp. 583–63,http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/wilson_sperber.pdfWilson D. Relevance and lexical pragmatics // Italian Journal of Linguistics Rivista diLinguistica Vol. 15, 2003, pp. 273-291,http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/publications/WPL/04papers/wilson.pdf