Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
0
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×
Saving this for later? Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime – even offline.
Text the download link to your phone
Standard text messaging rates apply

The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring. Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies

508

Published on

Published in: Technology, Economy & Finance
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
508
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
14
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. 6th Annual Economic Freedom of the Arab World Conference The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring.Opportunities and Challenges for Free Market Policies  FI, FNF, IRF & the Lebanese Economic Association  Beirut, Lebanon  October 20-21, 2011
  • 2. Session 4: The Economic Implications of the Arab Spring – Regional and International Aspects : October 21, 2011 How to turn a political regime change into a long run economic success. Promises of the Arab Spring and the hard lessons from Eastern Europe Andrew C. Kondratowicz ack@aster.pl The Lazarski University and University of Warsaw , Poland
  • 3. The background Over twenty years ago an abrupt political regime switchover took place in Poland [June 1989] – and then spread to other then-communist countries of the region [East- and Central-Europe = ECE] – and then even further to various parts of the then Soviet Union. For the record (in reference to the Arab Spring): – Poles tried to rebel against the communist regime in 1956, 1968/70, 1976 and 1981 – with a very limited and mostly short- lived efects. – The 1989 regime breakdown was NOT an immediate and direct effect of a "revolution going to the streets of Polish cities and towns" – it may be thought of as a cummulative effect of a series of "uprisings" and also a number of external geo-political factors 3
  • 4. The background, continued Nevertheless, 1989 was a breakthrough. As a result of the initial political stimulus many other changes followed. As far as the economy is concerned: – on the one hand, they pertained to changes in economic processes, policies, and institutions – on the other, they resulted in better economic outcomes (eg. as measured by GDP per capita or wealth) and in a change of economic structure of these countries (eg. private/public sector proportion or income distribution). 4
  • 5. The background, concluded Today, the economic transformation of many ECE countries (including Poland) is generally considered a great success, but the experience is not uniformly positive over the entire group. ____ It is worth noting here, that many of the changes ECE witnessed over the past 20+ years have been captured by the EFI – these are policies and formal institutions. But some of them, notably the informal institutions, have been captured only to a small extent or not at all by the EFI. 5
  • 6. A note on “institutions”In the context of the above it is good to recall thedefinition of institutions (by Douglass North): Institutions are:1. [formal] rules,2. enforcement characteristics of rules, and3. norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction.1 & 2 = formal institutions3 = informal institutions (beliefs, taboos, …, “culture”)
  • 7. Dont ask too much from institutions - economic freedom is not a panacea! captured by EFI A note on the relationship between classical factors of production, economic intitutions and broadly defined informal institutions:efficiency of classical factors influence (+/-) economic 1. The (neo)classical economics : Y=F(A, K, L) full picture 2. The institutional economics: Y=F(A, K, L, formal institutions) 3. A synthesis of economics and other social sciences: Y=F(A, K, L, formal & informal institutions) 7
  • 8. The purpose Now, as similar [though far from identical] processes of abrupt political changes started in some countries of the Arab World it is worth examining their similarities and dissimilarities vis-à-vis the ECE "revolution" and see whether any lessons from the ECE countries experience may be useful for analyzing the present and the possible future of the Arab nations in question 8
  • 9. Data on economic performance, political regime and economic freedom needed to support the above narrative Who we are in ECE: a short presentation of basic EFI figures on Poland and the ECE countries and their comparison with the AW needed (see details in other presentations & in the Fraser Institute Report 2011) A thorough comparison of the starting point (at the beginning into transition) in terms of EFI, Democ/Autoc indicators (POLITY IV), and basic economic indicators would be a good thing, but due to the limited time frame I will present only a few of them here. 9
  • 10. Doubts: WHY talk about ECE? despite the fact that today most of the ECE belong to the EU (1/3 of EU countries are ECE)Answer 1: because of the historical past - which is less and less important in the areas of economic performance and formal institutionsAnswer 2: there are many remaining differences vis- à-vis WE – notably in the informal institutions 1
  • 11. Table 1.EFI ranks and values, 2009 – Poland and its "neighbours" 11
  • 12. TABLE 2 EFI values and ranks for EE14 1990-2009, chained ; Part I: values for EE14 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 1 Albania 4,24 4,87 6,04 6,1 6,4 6,87 6,6 7,06 7,23 7,38 7,38 7,54 2 Slovak Rep 5,54 6,16 6,49 6,47 6,81 7,36 7,67 7,56 7,56 7,55 7,53 3 Hungary 5,39 6,14 6,55 6,82 6,82 7,39 7,5 7,39 7,34 7,32 7,38 7,47 4 Estonia 5,7 7,36 7,42 7,5 7,58 7,57 7,84 7,81 7,77 7,55 7,45 5 Bulgaria 4,23 4,58 5,27 5,79 6,38 6,6 6,54 6,94 7,08 7,17 7,18 7,21 6 Lithuania 5,1 6,28 6,32 6,77 6,74 6,68 7,11 7,09 7,15 7,08 7,02 7 Romania 4,54 3,9 5,19 5,25 5,75 6,04 6,01 6,82 6,73 6,95 6,72 6,93 8 Poland 4 5,3 6,19 5,97 6,3 6,26 6,71 6,78 6,8 6,85 6,88 6,9 9 Czech Republic 5,79 6,48 6,55 6,66 6,82 6,85 6,7 6,69 6,92 6,87 6,8210 Latvia 5,19 6,62 6,66 6,97 6,83 6,89 7,18 7,21 7,03 6,88 6,7311 Russia 4,49 5,27 5,15 5,57 5,64 5,93 6,37 6,36 6,5 6,57 6,512 Croatia 4,91 6,1 6,07 6,21 6,31 6,42 6,4 6,47 6,58 6,54 6,4913 Slovenia 4,76 6,36 6,49 6,47 6,56 6,55 6,41 6,49 6,47 6,52 6,4614 Ukraine 3,72 4,7 4,8 5,39 5,29 5,55 5,6 5,68 5,76 5,6 5,69 mean (μ) 4,48 5,00 6,04 6,13 6,40 6,55 6,65 6,88 6,90 6,96 6,91 6,91 12
  • 13. GRAPH 2EFI values and ranks for EE14 1990-2009, chained ; part I: values for EE14 13
  • 14. 14
  • 15. EFI and its 5 areas for Poland, values (and ranks), 2006 - 2009 1. (govt) 2. (property r.) 3. (money) 4. (intl) 5. (regulation) Overall EFIyear: value (rank) value (rank) value (rank) value (rank) value (rank) value (rank)2006 5.34(110) 5.81(63) 9.31(33) 6.85(69) 6.76(73) 6.81(74)2007 5.50(112) 5.79(69) 9.22(38) 7.02(64) 6.78(74) 6.86(74)2008 5.59(104) 5.94(60) 9.21(34) 7.03(62) 6.72(80) 6.90(65)2009 5.63(95) 6.25(48) 9.32(33) 6.84(60) 6.95(64) 7.00(53) 15
  • 16. EFI values and its 4 areas, Poland. 2006 – 2009 (without area 4 = access to sound money)7.507.00 7.02 7.03 6.95 6.85 6.84 6.76 6.78 6.72 1. (rząd) Govt6.50 2. (własność) Property r. 6.25 Intl 4. (hz) Regulation 5. (regulacje)6.00 5.94 5.81 5.79 5.59 5.635.50 5.50 5.345.00 16
  • 17. Emerging economies of ECE:economic freedom vs economic performance: Economic freedom has increased, but what about economic performance? In most of ECE there has been a dramatic change in economic prosperity: 25 years ago average monthly salary in Poland was below $20 now is well above $1000 Those post communist countries that are considered transformatonal failure have also failed in improving EFI 17
  • 18. Some examples of weak performers among post-communist economies (in terms of EFI) Ukraine is a notable negative exception Russia another one, although with some improvement in EFI over reacent years Chinas EFI is improving >Russia! non-EU Balkan economies (5) are doing worse than EE14 (except for Montenegro & Macedonia) ex-Soviet republics from Asia are doing well ( 7.0) except non-measured Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan which are considered transformational fiascos (as is Belarus) 18
  • 19. A threat of unfinished and reversed reforms Oleh Havrylyshyn in Divergent Paths in Post- Communist Transformations (2006) classified the above as countries of either limited / reversed reforms or as gradual but delayed reforms. In both groups the likelihood of rent-seeking activities of new olygarchs was very high; in some cases it ended up in what he called "the state capture" by those olygarchs colluding with one another (a menace to the Arab Spring?). 19
  • 20. 1. The starting point of the ECE transition: There was no blueprint "which way to go", no previous experience.It was the "sailing onto unchartered waters" A. There was no economic transformation theory B. There was no macroeconomic stability (equilibrium) internally C. There was a broadly understood stability externally (i.e. on the global scale) – except that created by the breakdown of the communist system itself
  • 21. • The A + B + C above were construed in economic terms• But they are also valid from a political perspective• All in all, the starting point AD 1989 was: A+B+C economically A+B+C politically
  • 22. 2. Actions that changed the realityI. Ownership structure & the allocation mechanism changed = privatization of the economy & market-driven allocationII. Economic policies changedIII. Formal economic institutions changedIV. Informal economic institutions changed ??? I+II+III by-and-large captured by EFI IV to a large extent NOT captured by EFI
  • 23. 3. Situation AD 2011 (post-transformational):Several ECE have been doing relatively well interms of economic performance (both LR & SR)Q: How are they doing in terms of"performance" of their informal institutions?A: Not so good! And this is a less-known story.
  • 24. 4. So called "civilizational deficits"that still haunts Polish social and political life [re: J.Kleer (2011)] – look into the mirror!1. Low degree of social / mutual trust a. (The) people do not trust the government / the state b. The government / the state does not trust (the) people2. No social coherence in the sense of "common values" or "common group mentality" (re Fernand Braudel) a. The past & its meaning highly debated / no settled view of natl history b. Limited ability to reach compromise(s) c. Low level of "social" tollerance (of various kinds, eg. religious) d. Hostile perception of "others"3. Low participation in active democracy (low turnout at elections, deficient universal suffrage)4. Large fluctuations in the set of political parties ( short-lived)5. ....
  • 25. A digression (and an example): How long can some informal institutions stay unchanged? PO <40% PO 40% PiS<40%Germany Russia PiS 40% AustriaThe map of Polish parliamentary elections 2011 – two major political parties PO = CivicPlatform & PiS = Law & OrderPolitical “partitions” of Poland (1795-1918) = no Poland,its territories taken by Prussia [Germany], Austro-Hungarian Empire & Russia
  • 26. Q: So, is the battle of QUICKLY changing theinformal institution all lost?A: Not necessarily – reference to the work ofpolitical scientists (Helmke & Levitsky, 2003) =======
  • 27. SOURCES OF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (from Helmke and Levitsky, 2003) Source of Change Mechanism of Pace of Relevant Informal Change Change Institutions Formal Institutional Change in design Often relatively Reactive: complementary, Change of formal institution rapid accommodating, competing Formal Institutional Change in Reactive and Change effectiveness Variable spontaneous: substitutive of formal institution and competing Cultural Evolution Change in societal Very slow Spontaneous values Change in Status Change in distribution Usually slow Spontaneous Quo Conditions of power; new round of bargaining Updating of Beliefs/ Tipping over Rapid Spontaneous Mechanism for Coordination**) An alternative mechanism emerges
  • 28. 5. Now, a cherry on top:What about the Arab Spring?How do the Arab economies and societies oftoday compare with those of ECE?o The starting point: A+B+C = better knowledge of "transformation theory" + unstable +unstableo The actions to be taken i. Ownership structure & the allocation mechanism (?) ii. Economic policies (?) iii. Formal economic institutions (?) iv. Informal economic institutions – this is the biggest question mark! What could be a "role model" for the Arab World? What values will be accepted / adopted in the SR & LR?
  • 29. Replicability of the ECE/post-communist experience: full, limited, none,?• Can the East European experience be helpful to Arab countries today?• Can the „captured state‟ scenario happen in the Arab countries?• Will we see convergence or divergence of economic freedom levels and institutions in general within the group of the Arab countries?• Can the “Arab experience” (as it evolves) tell us anything about relationship between democracy and economic freedom? (on top of what we know from Hayek/Friedman Hypothesis verified statically by Lawson and Clark and dynamically by Coyne and Sobel)
  • 30. Final remarks I International economic ramifications are today not as good for the Arab transforming economies, as they were for Poland/ECE 20+ years ago – the world economy was then more stable. Global political situation may be actually working for the Arab countries – they are new big players on the scene. This creates opportunities. Economic experience of the post-communist transformation is around - perhaps some lessons may be learned (technically). 30
  • 31. Final remarks II1. Polish/ECE most impotant lesson: Gradualism in reforming has its beauty, but ... "Political time" for reforms is short." Use it while you can.2. The deeper the crisis, the longer the political window of opportunity for reforms (i.e. of social acceptance of dramatic changes).3. Later, the Olsonian [re: Mancur Olson] redistributive coalitions re-emerge and they block reforms (since their vested interested are hurt). 31
  • 32. Final remarks III A comprehensive change in formal institutions and policies is a necessary condition for economic success (and it shows in the EFI scores), but Informal institutions are crucial for solidifying the early changes / successes – if they do not change we get "unfinished transformation" (like some former USSR Republics) or regime reversals. 32
  • 33. Final remarks IVThe ROW – especially the EU – has been helpful (in Poland & theECE):1. Provided some funding when it was especially needed2. Provided some technical assistance when it was especially needed3. Provided a "role model" for many Poles and ECE citizens4. Provided common institutions for the entire region, thus decreasing the transactions costsWill it work the same/similar way for the Arab countries? 33
  • 34. Final remarks V1. "The money from the EU" has been important but not crucial for Polish/ECE reforms – these funds come much later.2. Nevertheless, the early debt cancellation (by 50%) by the Clubs of Paris and London were crucial for stabilizing the economies in crisis.3. So was the technical assistance (in building modern economic institutions) in the early phases of transformation4. Therefore, foreign aid cannot and should not be underestimated 34
  • 35. Final remarks VI Informal institutions must change in order to solidify the early reforms (i.e. the changes in policies and formal institutions) It has been believed until recently, that informal institutions generally are very slow to change Fortunately, recent research shows that some of them may change relatively quickly – this is a chance for the Arab countries It remains to be seen if their societies be willing and able to do it. 35
  • 36. THE END 36

×