Slideshare uses cookies to improve functionality and performance, and to provide you with relevant advertising. If you continue browsing the site, you agree to the use of cookies on this website. See our User Agreement and Privacy Policy.

Slideshare uses cookies to improve functionality and performance, and to provide you with relevant advertising. If you continue browsing the site, you agree to the use of cookies on this website. See our Privacy Policy and User Agreement for details.

Like this presentation? Why not share!

- Trend of Next-Gen In-Vehicle Networ... by FFRI, Inc 519 views
- MR201411 SELinux in Virtualization ... by FFRI, Inc 942 views
- MR201402 effectiveness of unknown m... by FFRI, Inc 505 views
- MR201502 Intel Memory Protection Ex... by FFRI, Inc 583 views
- FFR EXCALOC by FFRI, Inc 432 views
- Mr201210 window 8 app_container_san... by FFRI, Inc 273 views

634 views

432 views

432 views

Published on

In malware analysis fuzzy hashing algorithms such as ssdeep are being introduced in recent years.

(IMHO) However, we don’t consider the effective usage of them enough • In this slides, we evaluate an effectiveness of classification of malware similarity by fuzzy hashing Background and purpose.

No Downloads

Total views

634

On SlideShare

0

From Embeds

0

Number of Embeds

4

Shares

0

Downloads

34

Comments

0

Likes

2

No embeds

No notes for slide

- 1. FFRI,Inc. Fourteenforty Research Institute, Inc. FFRI, Inc http://www.ffri.jp Monthly Research Consideration and evaluation of using fuzzy hashing Ver2.00.01
- 2. FFRI,Inc. • Background and purpose • Basis of fuzzy hashing • An experiment • The result • Consideration Agenda 2
- 3. FFRI,Inc. • ‘fuzzy hashing’ was introduced in 2006 by Jesse Kornblum – http://dfrws.org/2006/proceedings/12-Kornblum.pdf • In malware analysis fuzzy hashing algorithms such as ssdeep are being introduced in recent years • (IMHO) However, we don’t consider the effective usage of them enough • In this slides, we evaluate an effectiveness of classification of malware similarity by fuzzy hashing Background and purpose 3
- 4. FFRI,Inc. • In general, cryptographic hashing like MD5 is popular and it has the attributes as follows: (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function) – it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message – it is infeasible to generate a message that has a given hash – it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the hash – it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash • Cryptographic hashing is often used for identify the same files • On the other hand, it is unsuitable to identify similar files because digests are completely different even if 1 bit is altered in the other file • In DFIR, this need exists and fuzzy hashing was developed to solve this problem Basis of Fuzzy hashing(1/4) 4
- 5. FFRI,Inc. • Fuzzy hashing = Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing(CTPH) = Piecewise hashing + Rolling hashing • Piecewise Hashing – Dividing message into N-block and calculating hash value of each blocks • Rolling Hash – A method to calculate hash value of sub-message(position 1-3, 2-4…) fast – In general, if calculated values are the same, it is a high probability that original messages are identical Basis of Fuzzy hashing(2/4) 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 a b c d e f g h Calculating a hash value for each N chars(N=3)
- 6. FFRI,Inc. • Fuzzy hashing(CTPH) – When rolling hash generates a specific value at any position, it calculates cryptographic hash value of the partial message from the beginning to the position – Generate a hash value by concatenating all (partial) hashes Basis of Fuzzy hashing(3/4) 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 a a a b b b c c ①calculating rolling hash, and the result is the specific value (trigger) ②calculating a hash value of this block by cryptographic hash ③calculating rolling hash value from position 4(trying to determine a next block)
- 7. FFRI,Inc. • Fuzzy hashing(CTPH) – With almost identical messages, it would calculate a hash value of identical partial message stochastically – We can identify partial matches between similar messages Basis of Fuzzy hashing(4/4) 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 a a a b b b c c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 b b b a a a d d a823 928c 817d 928c a823 1972 Hash values for each block 238c7d 8c2372 Hash value for entire message
- 8. FFRI,Inc. • In general, usage of fuzzy hashing is proposed as follows: – Determining similar files(i.e. almost identical but MD5s aren’t matched) – Matching partial data in files • This time, we evaluate determining similar malware by fuzzy hashing • We make it clear “how effective it is in actually” and “what we should consider if we applying it” for the above An experiment(1/2) 8
- 9. FFRI,Inc. • Preparation – Preparing 2,036 unique malware files in MD5s collected by ourselves – Calculating(fuzzy) hash values by ssdeep and similarity of all of each files • nCr: 2,036C2 = 2,071,630 combinations • Determining similar malware – Extracting all the pairs whose similarities are 50%-100% – Determining if the detection name of files in a pair is matched for each similarity threshold An experiment(2/2) 9 A B C … A 90 82 54 B 76 62 C 46 … similarity of each malware files(%) 80%+ ・A-B ・A-C 80%+ ・(A)Trojan.XYZ – (B)Trojan.XYX ・(A)Trojan.XYZ – (C)WORM.DEA Matched Not matched
- 10. FFRI,Inc. • The higher the threshold is, the higher matching rate of detection name we get – Up to the threshold of 90% it keeps around 50-60% matching rate The result 10 Thenumberofpairswhose similarityareabovethreshold Threshold of similarity(%)
- 11. FFRI,Inc. • Dividing “matched” pairs into a group who has “generic” in its name and the others • “matched(Generic)%” shows the same trend with the matching rate above -> The higher the threshold is, the more malware are detected as “generic” The rate detected by the name “Generic”? 11 Thenumberofpairswhose similarityareabovethreshold Threshold of similarity(%)
- 12. FFRI,Inc. • A meaning of the result depends on if the AVV uses fuzzy hashing for generic detection – If they use fuzzy hashing for generic detection • The result is natural – If not • By using fuzzy hashing, we may obtain a similar result to the generic detection • If we use fuzzy hashing for generic detection, 90%+ similarity might be required with known malware (fuzzy) hash values Consideration 12
- 13. FFRI,Inc. • E-Mail: research-feedback@ffri.jp • twitter: @FFRI_Research Contact Information 13

No public clipboards found for this slide

×
### Save the most important slides with Clipping

Clipping is a handy way to collect and organize the most important slides from a presentation. You can keep your great finds in clipboards organized around topics.

Be the first to comment