Luck: how do we evaluate the UN System? Has the UN and the UN SC made a difference? 3 Qs: 1 - has SC succeeded in getting members to make real commitments to decisions? 2 - has SC carried out ops competently and efficiently? 3 - has SC made a real difference to maintaining peace & secy? What is the SC charged with doing that the League did not do? Focus Group I: answer basic questions
UN was name for anti-Axis alliance – was in operation during WWII P3/4/5 – FDR: US, UK, Russia, China represented ¾ of world’s population Dumbarton Oaks produced blueprint for UN, Security Council Big issue at Yalta: Stalin wanted all 15 Soviet republics to have UNGA seats – got 3
UNSC, GA – GA resolutions non-binding Ambivalence between US, others over how wide P5 veto power should be – US initially wanted some limitations Procedural votes to require 7 to pass, other matters 7 votes with no P5 vetoes -- disagreement over what was ‘procedural’ -- ended up that veto applies to peaceful settlement, new members, appt of SG, Charter amendment System rapidly devolved into bipolar rivalry – 1949 Chinese civil war left KMT govt ruling over only Taiwan Chapter 7 resolutions to be enforceable
Focus Group II: What are the main points Luck identifies about each type of tool? What criteria of evaluation does he use? How does he evaluate it? Do you agree/disagree? Why?
Initially: faced Soviet expansion, decolonization instability, Israel/Palestine Early pattern of response set tone for institution Most rely upon Ch. VI, not Ch. VII, but resort to force remains in background, available Peacemaking: Art. 1; since end of CW, UN-led negotiations to end civil wars -Angola, Mozambique, SA, East Timor -difficult cases remembered more easily than successes: Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, Kashmir, Korea Peacekeeping: worked at Suez ‘56; UNFICYP has succeeded; UNPROFOR failed at Srebrenica, Zepa -problems: high demand since end of CW, high cost Peacebuilding: reintegrating combatants, rule of law, police training, human rights, governance, capacity building
How did the Korean War start? Soviets boycotted UNSC sessions because of RoC seat UNSC passed Res 83 – recommending members aid RoK Sovs said UNSC didn’t have authority, as N-S Korean fighting was internal/civil war UN Charter negotiated before ICBM nukes - need for pre-emption? Was I.2.4 restriction on use of force already obsolete? How has ch. VII worked? Post-CW: Kuwait Why is Art. 51 important? Kosovo, Iraq interventions were justified under Art. 51 -self-defence: must notify UNSC first -so what counts as self-defence? whatever a member wants to say it is? -Russia’s argument against US invoking Art. 51 for Syria intervention
43: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Why these choices? Rôle of diplomacy short of war – meets UN charter obligation to resolve disputes peacefully whenever possible CW UN diplomacy often hamstrung by US-Soviet rivalry -UNSC Res 181 (‘63) – voluntary arms embargo against SA govt – became mandatory ‘77 UNSC Res 418 -UNGA ‘62 – end transport, political links– ’68 end sport culture links – voluntary and oppo to ending ec links -UNGA ‘73 – Apartheid Convention – apartheid as crime against humanity Post-CW activism – diplomacy becomes much easier Who do sanctions and embargoes hurt? Are they better than war? -US sanctions against SA: Comp Anti-Apartheid Act 1986 – to ‘91 Kuwait sanctions (Op Desert Shield) – good faith attempt to force S Hussein to withdraw Oil For Food – way to mitigate impact of Iraq sanctions on civilian population Willingness to implement is key
What are the promises and problems of each? GA - leverage in SC - Uniting For Peace Resolution UNGA Res 377 (1950) -UNGA can meet, make reccs for peace when UNSC fails to reach P5 unanimity – 10 UNGA special sessions held ECOSOC – Peacebuilding Commission intergovernmental coop – Burundi 2007 ICJ – founded ‘46, judges elected by UNSC, GA UN-NATO coop since early 90s – 2008 Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation -NATO support for UN-backed AU ops in Darfur -UNSC Res 1973 (2011) on Libya supported by NATO – protect civilians from attack -UN-mandated disaster relief in Pakistan ’0 - delivery of World Food Programme ships protection from Somali pirates No official standing for NGOs at UN SC draws on NGOs as knowledge base Eminent person diplomats: UN Goodwill Ambassadors -Sharapova, Drogba, Zidane, Jolie
The united nations and the security council
Towards Collective Security
The United Nations System
Collective Security for a
Nuclear Age: Basic Questions
• How and what did the victorious allies learn
• How was the UN system as designed in
1945 similar to and different from the
League’s approach to collective security?
• How was the UN Security Council similar to
and different from the League Council?
TCS Topic 3
The road to the San Francisco
Peace Conference 1945
• UN: already in operation during WWII
• Preparatory conference at Dumbarton
• San Francisco: only initial allies invited
– USSR – Kuomintang tensions
– France included
• Yalta meeting of P3 – February 1945
TCS Topic 3
San Francisco Treaty:
• Governance structure resembles League
• Security Council: 5 permanent members, 6
• UNSC permanent members’ (P5) veto
• Collective enforcement of Security Council
decisions: Chapter VII
TCS Topic 3
Security Council tools
• Peace operations
• Military enforcement
• Sanctions, embargoes, other diplomatic
• Enlisting and empowering partner
TCS Topic 3
• Veto power of the permanent SC
• Restriction on use/threat of force
• Chapter VII and Article 51
• ‘Uniting For Peace’ General Assembly
resolution - coalitions of the willing?
TCS Topic 3
Chapter VII enforcement
• Art. 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Arts. 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
• Art. 41: The SC may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members …to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
• Art. 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.
TCS Topic 3
Ch. VII: collective security vs.
Art. 43: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available
to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.
Art. 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
TCS Topic 3
Sanctions, embargoes and
The Cold War years
Post-Cold War sanctions and embargoes
Post-Cold War diplomacy
Adverse consequences of sanctions
TCS Topic 3
Enlisting and empowering
• What are the Security Council’s limitations?
– General Assembly – Uniting For Peace Res.
– ECOSOC, Peacebuilding Commission
– International Court of Justice
– Regional bodies: NATO, EU, AU, etc.
– Non-state actors: CSOs, eminent persons, etc.
TCS Topic 3