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  • 1. Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution DANIEL GARBERT HE SUBJECT of this conference is Teaching New Histories ofPhilosophy. I have been studying the history of philosophy for someyears now, trying to push the limits of the older approaches to thesubject. I have also been teaching it for quite a while too. It is strange,then, that I have found it difficult to combine the two. In my graduateseminars I have been proselytizing for newer approaches, but I havefound it difficult to figure out how to introduce some of these newerapproaches into my basic lecture courses. While my own scholarlywork in the history of philosophy has evolved considerably over theyears, I don’t know that I teach the Meditations to undergraduates andbeginning graduate students that much differently now than I did25 years ago. Shocking. So, inspired by this conference, I havedecided to try to put the different pieces of my life together in acourse that I am teaching right now. The main theme of this paperwill be a description of the outline of the course and its conceptionand will include some remarks about how it actually worked inpractice. (As I write this paper I am at the beginning of the semester;by the time of the conference itself I shall be somewhere in themiddle of the term.) Before I begin talking about the course, Iwould like to talk a bit about what these new histories of philosophyare that we are supposed to be teaching. There is a tendency in these kinds of discussions to talk in thesingular about the new history of philosophy, as opposed to the oldhistory of philosophy. This, of course, is nonsense. There never wasa single, old history of philosophy against which my generation ofyoung Turks was reacting in the late 1970s and 1980s; nor is there asingle new history of philosophy that we intended to replace it with.(This parallels a theme in my course as well: there was neither a singlescholastic philosophy nor a single new philosophy in the early 17thcentury either.) For that reason it is important to read the title of this 1
  • 2. DANIEL GARBERconference carefully: it is about teaching new histories of philosophy,and not the new history of philosophy. What my generation of historians of philosophy was reactingagainst was a bundle of practices that characterized the writing ofthe history of philosophy in the period: the tendency to substituterational reconstructions of a philosopher’s views for the viewsthemselves; the tendency to focus on an extremely narrow group offigures (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Humein my period); within that very narrow canon the tendency to focuson just a few works to the exclusion of others—those that best fit withour current conception of the subject of philosophy; the tendencyto work exclusively from translations and to ignore secondary workthat was not originally written in English; the tendency to treatthe philosophical positions as if they were those presented bycontemporaries; and on and on and on. In the prospectus for theCambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Michael Ayersand I wrote the following passage, which drew fire even before thevolume was finished: …[O]ur view of philosophy as a discipline has in large part been shaped by a standard account and critique, in many respects tendentious and oversimplified, of the various philosophical positions for which the great names of the early-modern period are the supposed spokesmen. Commentators in the analytic tradition in particular, writing very much out of their own philosophical interests and preconceptions, have often lost sight of the complex context in which seventeenth-century philosophy was written. In doing so, they have not only distorted its achievements but have denied themselves the tools necessary for the interpretation of the very words and sentences they continue to read and expound. We ourselves were surely guilty of some exaggeration here; whatwe presented was a kind of cartoon version of the “analytic”history of philosophy as it existed at that time. Not all historiansof philosophy were like that even in the period. Even so, the oldhistory of philosophy was a useful demon to posit, even if it didn’taltogether fit the practice. 2
  • 3. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION We were up to something different, something that other scholarsworking in the history of philosophy were not doing at the time—atleast not those who were working in English. We were rebels then,sometimes striking out on new paths, boldly going where no one hadgone before—at least not for a long time. Sometimes we wererecovering older and forgotten secondary literature. Most of all wewere doing something different from what we had been taught as thehistory of philosophy: intellectual parricide. It was heady stuff. Myown particular heresies in the history of philosophy derived from myacquaintance with the history of science. I was a graduate student atHarvard, enamored of Quine’s program for naturalizing everything.At the same time I was assisting in a course in which we were readingDescartes. Reading about Descartes, I learned of his importance forthe history of science. This was particularly interesting to me, givenmy Quinean tendencies. If Descartes was both a philosopher and ascientist, then how did he turn up as the villain in Quine’s story ratherthan the hero? This made me curious to read some of Descartes’sscientific writings and to try to figure out how they related to his morestraightforwardly philosophical writings. I had the feeling that Quinewas reacting to the Descartes of lore and legend and not to the real,flesh-and-blood philosopher. At the same moment, I was becominginterested in the philosophy of John Locke and discoveredthe wonderful essays of Maurice Mandelbaum.1 Mandelbaum madethe convincing case (convincing to me, in any case) that Locke’sphilosophy had to be read in the context of the mechanicalphilosophy as developed by Robert Boyle. All of this stirred myimagination. I began reading more and more in the history ofscience, trying to link the history of science to the history of philos-ophy. (A coconspirator in this enterprise but from the other directionwas Raine Daston, then a graduate student in the Department ofHistory of Science at Harvard, and part of this conference.) This took me in a number of directions. First of all, it convinced meof the importance of reading the whole corpus of a philosopher andnot just the more obviously philosophical bits. Second, it took meoutside the great philosophers and into a literature in the history ofscience, figures generally considered not very relevant to the historyof philosophy. It also took me to other aspects of the background. Forexample, when working on Descartes, I became curious about what 3
  • 4. DANIEL GARBERDescartes learned in school and how his later thought was affectedby it. More generally, I became more and more curious about thescholastic background to 17th-century philosophy. This, in part, iswhat led me to some of the non-English literature in the history ofphilosophy. Much of what I was interested in also interested othercommentators, such as Martial Gueroult, or Henri Gouhier, orEtienne Gilson. From them I also was led to other non-Englishliterature that my teachers had not told me about. But it also led mefarther afield, outside texts and ideas and into the world. One of theimportant trends of history of science in the 1980s and 1990s was itsinterest in the social background to science. There was the extremegroup that thought it was all sociology and that content andargument had no interesting role to play in the process. (This isn’tstrictly true, insofar as argument itself can be given a sociologicalgloss.) But whether or not you thought that it was all sociology, itwas hard not to be impressed by the increasing role that sociologicalfactors were playing in histories of science. To focus on texts andthe transmission of ideas began to seem downright old-fashioned. Ibegan to wonder if as a historian of philosophy I shouldn’t be payingmore attention to those sorts of factors as well. And so, I made somestabs at trying to integrate aspects of these more sociologicalapproaches into my work in the history of philosophy. Which brings us back to a central question: what are the “new”histories of philosophy anyway? What characterized the new attitudethat my generation brought to the study of the history of philosophywas the more serious emphasis on the “history” in the history ofphilosophy. We were (and still are, I suppose) accused of neglectingthe “philosophy” part, of being “mere” historians of ideas (or evenantiquarians) as opposed to real philosophers. This is not the placeto defend the philosophical importance of the approaches to thehistory of philosophy that I favor, and I do think that they arephilosophically significant. My interest in making the history ofphilosophy more genuinely historical did lead me in the direction ofmy colleagues in history and in the history of science and did lead mein the direction of research that, at least on the surface, didn’t lookas if it had much immediate philosophical payoff. But just as thereis no single correct way of approaching the history of a period or aplace or an event, there is no unique way of making the history of 4
  • 5. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONphilosophy historical. In this way the new histories of philosophy inmy domain constitute a grab bag of different approaches thathave in common only the idea that the history of philosophy shouldgrapple with philosophy in a seriously historical way. Whateverthat means exactly. But how can that be translated into an undergraduate course?There are constraints on what can be done. Students (andcolleagues) have expectations that certain texts and authors will becovered. One can stray outside the canon from time to time andperhaps supplement canonical authors with other, more obscuretexts, but there is a legitimate expectation that as the historian ofphilosophy in a department of philosophy, I will teach the studentswhat they need to know about Descartes and Leibniz and Hume inorder to prepare them for other courses in philosophy. A secondconstraint is student interest. I may be fascinated by the minutiaeof 17th-century epistolary practices, or by Sir Kenelm Digby’seccentric theories of the dense and rare, or by the organization ofsocial services in Paris in the 1630s, but I can’t necessarily expect thatstudents who sign up for a class in the Department of Philosophywill feel the same way. Another constraint is language. Fewundergraduates (not to mention graduate students) feel comfortableworking in foreign languages such as French and German, and ithas been a long time since you could count on your students to beable to read, write, and speak Latin. What I decided to do was a course on philosophy and science in the17th century called Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution. Thecore of the course is a reading of some of the canonical writers of theperiod. On the syllabus are the following: Descartes, Bacon, Galileo,Boyle, Locke, Leibniz, and Newton. This by itself is hardly innovative.What is new about this part of the course is this. Now, the olderhistories of philosophy read philosophical figures such as Descartes,Locke, and Leibniz in isolation from their scientific contemporaries.This course, of course, puts them together with some importantscientific texts. In addition, I am asking the students to read scientifictexts written by people who are generally considered philosophers,such as Descartes’s Le monde and some of Leibniz’s dynamic writings. This is a new history of philosophy, in a way, but kind of an old newhistory of philosophy—something that was being done years ago. But 5
  • 6. DANIEL GARBERwhile I am using some canonical texts from the history of philosophyand the history of science, I am trying to reorient them in a significantway. In recent years a certain master narrative of the period hasemerged. On that narrative, the rise of the so-called mechanicalphilosophy is seen as the main alternative to the Aristotelianphilosophy of the schools; the scientific revolution is seen as a battlebetween these two titans, with the mechanical philosophy winning inthe end. (On this, see Westfall or Dijksterhuis.) On this view of theperiod, characters such as Descartes and Galileo and Bacon representa united front against the Aristotelianism of the schools, attemptingto substitute explanations in terms of size, shape, and motion forexplanations in terms of substantial forms and real qualities of theiropponents. This is not entirely false; it is, for example, very closeto the way in which Descartes presents himself and his ownhistorical situation. But it is a kind of caricature of the real historicalsituation. There are, on one hand, significant differences betweendifferent strains of Aristotelianism, though they do have a great dealin common. But it isn’t too much of an exaggeration to see theAristotelianism of the schools as a kind of unitary opponent. On theother hand, there were considerable differences among theopponents of Aristotelianism. In addition to the mechanical philoso-phers, there were Platonists, and alchemists, and magicians, andthose, like Fludd, who were very difficult to put into a single category.In a genuine history course, I would emphasize the variety of thescholastic traditions and the variety of the alternatives availablethrough much of the 17th century. But there isn’t time to do thathere: in a course offered in a department of philosophy I still feelsome obligation to cover a certain number of canonical texts. Mystrategy is to use a smaller number of the canonical texts to tell adifferent story, teaching many of the same texts but giving them arather different spin and trying as much as possible to include somebackground material that is a bit different. The story I want to tell is this. There is such a thing asAristotelianism, as codified in the textbooks that every educatedperson had to study. There are differences among Aristotelians, butthere is also a common heritage, something that every educatedperson could be assumed to know, if not necessarily to believe. Andit was against this that a number of people in the period reacted. 6
  • 7. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONBut—and this is the crucial thing—they didn’t always react against itin the same way. Descartes maintained the form of scholastic learningin many ways, but the content he poured into that form was verydifferent. He questioned the senses and made them subordinate toreason, and he substituted for a world grounded in the senses a worldof purely geometrical bodies governed by laws of nature—a worldbuilt by a solitary thinker. Bacon, too, rebelled against the schools,but in a very different way. His conception of science was groundedin natural histories, observations sorted into tables and then siftedinto empirical regularities—a conception of science suited for acorporate science situated in a scientific society. And Galileo, too,rejected the Aristotelian model, but in a different way still. His viewof the world starts not from the classroom and the Aristoteliantextbook, but from the arsenal. Largely uninterested in thefoundations of philosophy or the theory of method, Galileoattacked problems in understanding nature with the tools of themathematician, which included optics, astronomy, and above all,mechanics. The point is that these three fathers of modernphilosophy—Descartes, Bacon, and Galileo—don’t represent a singlealternative to the Aristotelian philosophy, mechanical philosophy orotherwise: they are competing programs, alternative ways of seeingthe brave new world of post-Aristotelian thought. The so-calledmechanical philosophy arises only later, in the thought of RobertBoyle. Boyle took these competing accounts (and others as well),put them together, and dubbed the result the mechanical orcorpuscular philosophy. By setting aside points of difference amongcompeting camps of anti-Aristotelians and by emphasizingcommonalities, Boyle created a new program in the 1660s. Even then,it wasn’t the only alternative to the Aristotelian program around. Itwas visible, though, and it did capture the imagination of otherphilosophers such as Locke and Leibniz, who in different wayselaborated on it. But it was also rather short-lived. By the late 1680s,there was a new kid on the block, Isaac Newton, whose programrepresented a serious repudiation of the mechanical philosophythat Boyle had cobbled together. This is my story. It isn’t altogether original, of course. The texts Iam teaching are much the same as the texts that have been taughtfor years in courses of this sort, though I am orienting them a bit 7
  • 8. DANIEL GARBERdifferently, telling a different master narrative than is usually taught.But if there is an innovation, it is in where I begin the story. I wantto begin by giving the students some sense of what it was like to be astudent in 1600 or so, what an educated person could have beenexpected to know, the classroom experience that they could havebeen expected to share. If I were more theatrically inclined, I coulddress in an academic robe and lecture them in Latin while theycopied my lectures into their copybooks with quill pens. But I am not,so I have to content myself with lecturing in my normal academicgarb in English. We began by discussing the early-17th-centuryclassroom: who was there, how old they were, what they did in theclassroom. Here I am greatly aided by my vade mecum: LaurenceBrockliss’s superb book French Higher Education in the Seventeenthand Eighteenth Centuries.2 This I supplemented with a translation ofthe Jesuit Ratio studiorum of 1599, which I found on the Internet ata Jesuit site.3 I think that students are quite interested in finding outhow students of the past lived, what it was like to sit in the classroom,how they were taught and learned. What is remarkable is howlittle things had changed. It was amusing to watch them as I stoodon the dais, lecturing them in fixed seats, describing how theirearly-17th-century counterparts attended classes in similar circum-stances. Even the discussion section existed in the period. Largeclasses divided into sections of 10 each, led by an advanced student(a decurion), who drilled them and corrected their lessons. The Ratio studiorum gives an outline of the curriculum. Using theRatio studiorum, we talked about what it meant to study philosophy inthe period, the general contents (logic, physics or natural philosophy,metaphysics, and ethics), the period of time spent on philosophy (twoyears at the University of Paris, three in the Jesuit schools), and thefact that the physics seemed to take up the bulk of the curriculum.We also talked about the place of mathematics in the curriculum andthe way in which it was studied as a supplement to the physicscurriculum. But for any real content, one has to go to the textbooksthemselves. In a way, this is easy: many textbooks of the periodsurvive. A number of them are also available on the Internet. Forexample, through the Web site Early English Books, one candownload a complete copy of Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s widely usedtextbook the Summa philosophiae quadripartita, first published in 1609 8
  • 9. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONbut widely reprinted. (The edition I used was Cambridge, 1648.) Theproblem, of course, is that it is in Latin, as were almost all ofthe classroom materials. The compromise I made is this. I madeavailable to the students the table of contents of the “physics” sectionof Eustachius’s textbook in Latin. Thanks to the Internet, it was easyto post it on the course Web site for them to download. In addition,I posted the tables of contents of two mathematics textbooks:Bartholomaeus Keckermann’s Systema compendiosum totiusmathematices hoc est geometriae, opticae, astronomiae, et geographiae (pub-lished in Oxford, 1661, though it is the record of a course given in1605) and Petrus Galtruch’s Mathematicae totius (London, 1683),also in Latin. Both are later than my target period but representativeof what would have been taught in the mathematics part of thecurriculum earlier in the century. Even though they are in Latin, itwas easy enough to go through them in class and show students thegeneral structure of the physics as it was taught. In Eustachius Iemphasized the distinction between the general part of physics andthe discussion of particulars (cosmology, terrestrial physics, etc.),particularly the fact that living things and their souls were discussedas a part of the physics unit. In the mathematics textbooks Iemphasized how little pure mathematics they get. Galtruch givesabout 30 pages of elementary arithmetic (whole numbers, fractions,ratios, and a couple of pages on logarithms) followed by 20 pages ofpure geometry and 30 of practical geometry. Keckermann dispenseswith the arithmetic altogether and begins with about 70 pages ofgeometry. Neither treats algebra. In both, the emphasis is on “mixedmathematics,” what we might call applied mathematics: optics,geography, astronomy, and music. This gives us the bare outline of the course in natural philosophyand the supplementary course in mathematics. However, toappreciate the new philosophies that follow, it is necessary to have amore detailed knowledge of the course. For this the Latin ofEustachius was a real obstacle. After some searching about on theWeb, I found in Early English Books two texts that looked like theymight be appropriate. The first was a curious book by one DanielWiddowes (or Woodhouse) called Natural Philosophy, or, a Descriptionof the World and of the several Creatures therein contained (London, 1631).This is a short book, a paraphrase/translation/adaptation of a 9
  • 10. DANIEL GARBERbook published about 50 years earlier: Rerum naturalium doctrinamethodica by Wilhelm Adolf Scribonius (1579). Widdowes gives a whole course in natural philosophy in just 65pages, with very short definitions and copious dichotomies, in thestyle of Ramus. This isn’t exactly what a textbook would have lookedlike, but I had high hopes that it would quickly give students an ideaof what the world looked like to an educated person in 1600. Itdidn’t work, for a number of reasons. First of all, it was just too shortand didn’t give enough detail. But more important, it didn’t have thestyle of argument one finds in a textbook of the period, the constantreferences and appeal to authorities. Much better in this regard, Ifound, is a book by Daniel Sennert, Thirteen Books of Natural Philosophy(London, 1660). The first eight of those books turn out to be atranslation of his Epitome naturalis scientiae. (The other five books aretranslations of later essays on natural philosophy.) While not exactlya textbook, the Sennert is rather close in both form and content towhat would have been used in a classroom. Sennert, of course, wasan original thinker of the period, an alchemist, an atomist, and aphysician who had his own distinctive point of view. But in the Epitomehe is less the original thinker and more the teacher, transmitting thebasics of Aristotelian natural philosophy to the student. Again,through the miracle of modern Internet wizardry, I was able todownload the book, and post generous selections on the courseWeb site for students to download. We used Sennert as the basisof discussions of some of the basic issues in scholastic naturalphilosophy: matter and form, the four causes, the concept of motion,the distinction between the celestial and terrestrial realms,the four elements, etc. But with the text, they could see somethingabout the style of philosophizing that would be difficult tocommunicate through a lecture. Sennert typically begins any discussion by canvassing the variety ofopinions that others held, citing their views and comparing thembefore finally arriving at his own. The cast of characters is somewhatdifferent than one finds in Eustachius, for example; Sennertconstantly cites Aristotle, with whom he agrees most often, butScaliger seems to come up rather often as well. But even so, theconstant citation of authorities, the idea that philosophy is done inthe context of a deep tradition, and the scholastic method of 10
  • 11. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONweighing what others have said before expressing one’s own positionall come out loud and clear. This, as much as the content, is whatthese young students were expected to absorb. And it is this, asmuch as the content, that the revolutionaries of the 17th centurywere reacting against. So there it is: my attempt to teach one of the new histories ofphilosophy, ironically enough by trying to teach the old philosophyin the old-fashioned way, trying to return to early-17th-centurypractice in the teaching of philosophy. For your reading pleasure I am including an appendix with thesyllabus of the course. The supplementary materials can be foundon the Web, on the Blackboard site for my course, and can bedownloaded at will.4 11
  • 12. DANIEL GARBER APPENDIX: COURSE S YLLABUS PHI332, SPRING 2003 PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONThis course will focus on philosophy and the scientific revolution ofthe 16th and 17th centuries. We will read a mixture of philosophicaltexts, scientific texts, and contemporary philosophical texts. We willdiscuss both the relations between what we now call science and whatwe now call philosophy in the period of the scientific revolution,as well as the way in which these historical episodes are reflected inmore recent literature in the philosophy of science. The material isdivided into the following five parts.1. We will begin with a survey of what an educated person would have believed about the physical world circa 1600–1650, a view of the world grounded largely in the philosophy of Aristotle. We will try to use contemporary materials to re-create something of the classroom experience during that period. This will constitute a kind of baseline against which we will be able to measure some of the innovations that we will examine later in the course.2. We will then look at a group of three important innovators in natural philosophy from the early 17th century: Descartes, Bacon, and Galileo. While all three rejected the traditional Aristotelian teaching of the schools, they represent different and largely incompatible programs for natural philosophy.3. We will then turn to some of the writings of Robert Boyle and John Locke. While Descartes, Bacon, and Galileo represent competing visions for natural philosophy, Boyle represents an attempt to consolidate a number of different alternatives to Aristotelianism into one coherent program—what he called the corpuscular or mechanical philosophy. Locke represents a philosophical elaboration of this program, which came to dominate natural philosophy in the later part of the 17th century.4. We will end the historical part of the course with a discussion of the magisterial systems of Leibniz and Newton, which draw on the mechanical philosophy but step well beyond. 12
  • 13. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION5. The final unit of the course will treat the larger historical and philosophical questions of what a scientific revolution is and whether the changes that took place in 17th-century Europe constitute such a revolution. We will read and discuss Thomas Kuhn’s seminal Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The following books are on order for the course and will beavailable at the Princeton University Store:RequiredBacon, Francis. The New Organon. Cambridge University Press, paperback.Boyle, ed. Stewart, Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle. Hackett, paperback.Descartes (ed. Stephen Gaukroger). The World and Other Writings. Cambridge University Press, paperback.Galileo (tr. Drake). Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. Anchor Books, paperback.Galileo (tr. Drake). Two New Sciences. Wall and Emerson, paperback.Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, paperback.Leibniz (Ariew and Garber, eds.). Leibniz: Philosophical Essays. Hackett, paperback.Locke. Essay concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press, paperback.Newton (ed. H. S. Thayer). Newton’s Philosophy of Nature. Macmillan USA, paperback.SupplementaryCohen, I. B., and George Smith, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Newton. Cambridge University Press, paperback.Cottingham, John, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge University Press, paperback.Jolley, Nicholas, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge University Press, paperback.Machamer, Peter, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Galileo. Cambridge University Press, paperback. 13
  • 14. DANIEL GARBERPeltonen, Markku, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Bacon. Cambridge University Press, paperback. Some additional material will be available at the Blackboard Website. All required reading will be in English, though some foreign-language materials may be made available for students who wouldlike to use them.PapersThere will be two papers due during the term—a shorter one (fourto six pages) due on March 12—and a longer one (seven toeight pages)—due on April 14. Students will have a choice amongseveral topic questions. In addition, there will be a take-homefinal examination, due on May 13. There is a grade penalty of 1 point(on a scale of 100) per weekday to a maximum of 10 (or one fullletter—for example, from A– to B–) for unexcused lateness.Readings Week 1 (Feb. 3/5) Introduction: what every smart person knew in 1600 Reading: Texts on Blackboard Web site in Course Documents, under“Scholastic Textbooks, etc.” Read the Widdowes and Sennert in theirentirety; the other documents will be discussed in class. (Don’t worrythat some of the reading is in Latin: it will be explained in class.) Printout all except the Jesuit “Order of Studies” and bring it to class. Week 2 (Feb. 10/12) Introduction, continued (M). Descartes’s New Philosophy (W) Reading: Discourse on the Method I–III (on Web) The World: Treatise on Light (in Gaukroger, ed., The World and Other Writings and on Web) Other selections to be announced. Week 3 (Feb. 17/19) Descartes, continued. 14
  • 15. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONWeek 4 (Feb. 24/26)Bacon’s New MethodReading:Great Instauration and New Organon (in Sargent, ed., SelectedPhilosophical Works)New Atlantis (in Selected Philosophical Works and on Web)Other selections to be announced.Week 5 (March 3/5)Bacon, continued (M).Galileo’s New Sciences (W)Reading:1. Observational astronomy: Starry Messenger (in Drake, ed., Discoveries and Opinions)2. Copernicanism and theology: Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (in Discoveries and Opinions)3. Matter theory: Assayer (in Discoveries and Opinions, pp. 272–9), Two New Sciences, day 1.4. Motion: Two New Sciences, days 3 and 4, selections to be announced.First paper topic distributed: March 3Week 6 (March 10/12)Galileo, continued.First paper due: March 12Week 7 (March 24/26)Boyle and the Mechanical Philosophy (M)Reading:Origin of Forms and Qualities (in Stewart, ed., SelectedPhilosophical Papers)Locke and the Philosophical Elaboration of the MechanicalPhilosophy (W)Excerpts from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding,selections to be announced. 15
  • 16. DANIEL GARBERWeek 8 (March 31/April 2)Locke, continued (M).Leibniz (W)Readings:Excerpts from Ariew and Garber, eds., Philosophical Essays,selections to be announced.Week 9 (April 7/9)Leibniz, continued.Week 10 (April 14/16)NewtonExcerpts from Thayer, ed., Newton’s Philosophy of NatureSecond paper topic distributed: April 14Week 11 (April 21/23)Newton, continued (M).Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (W).Second paper due: April 23Week 12 (April 28/30)Kuhn, continued.Take-home final examination distributed: April 30Take-home final examinations: Due May 13 (dean’s date). 16
  • 17. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION NOTES1. Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.2. Oxford University Press, 1987.3. The translation used can be found on the course Web site mentioned below, with complete directions for accessing it.4. The Web site is on the Princeton Blackboard site. To get there, go to To the left of the main log-in box, there is a button that reads “preview.” Press it. Then follow the links: click the “Courses” tab on the top of the page; then click “Spring 2003,” then “Humanities,” then “PHI,” then the “Preview” button to the right of the “PHI332” entry. That gets you into the course Web site. On the course Web site, click “Course Documents,” and within that, “Scholastic textbooks etc.” That will give all of the texts that I mentioned in this essay. 17