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  • Question 5: Current Global Financial Crisis & its Implication onInternational Financial Institution. The case of South East Asia (SEA)RegionTable of Contents1.0 Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 22.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 23.0 Objectives .............................................................................................................................. 34.0 Literature Review................................................................................................................... 35.0 Causes ................................................................................................................................... 56.0 Impacts .................................................................................................................................. 7  Cambodia ................................................................................................................................ 7  Indonesia .............................................................................................................................. 10  Malaysia ................................................................................................................................ 13  Singapore .............................................................................................................................. 16  Thailand ................................................................................................................................ 19  Vietnam................................................................................................................................. 217.0 Solutions / Recommendations ............................................................................................. 248.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 259.0 References ........................................................................................................................... 26 1
  • 1.0 AbstractThis paper is to study the the causes for the serious financial crisis in the world were economic crises inthese countries and regions. The reason why the crisis could spread so rapidly to various countries inSoutheast Asia was that under the circumstances of integration of world economy and formation ofregional economic blocs, circulation of goods and capital was closely related among different countriesor regions, and therefore what happened in one country directly affected situations elsewhere. Thefinancial crisis also impact on the financial institutions in Southeast Asia, such as the financial crisislead to the bank in Southeast Asia decline in foreign exchange reserves and foreign exchange earnings,lower interest rates, exchange rate fluctuations, stock market crash and reduce foreign aid, and so on.So the developing countries need draw lessons from the financial crisis. Measures should be taken tomaintain necessary control of the scale and distribution of foreign investment, to adjust arrangement ofproducts in line with the demand of international market, and to reinforce management of the financialmarket. 2.0 IntroductionSoutheast Asia’s economies have been hit hard by the world recession. On the positive side, theregion’s financial system, having learned from the financial crisis of 1997–98, has to a large degreeavoided the types of high-risk lending and derivative investments that caused so much damage in theWest. On the negative side, the global financial crisis has resulted in a serious drop in the region’sexports, thereby posing a threat to Southeast Asia’s main engine of growth. The decline in exports andthe resulting fall in the GDP growth rates for a number of countries in Southeast Asia—notably Thailand,the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia—have come in the middle of a long and incomplete transitionprocess from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance. Other countries, such as Vietnam, haveretained authoritarian governance but depend on continued high growth to maintain support for thegovernment. The impact of the global recession on exports, therefore, threatens political stability in anumber of the countries in the region.According to some research, since the financial crisis happened, the capital markets of SEA countriesare affected as follows:1. The less loss of regional financial institution. SEA countries learned the lessons from the financialcrisis in 1997 and make it stricter in trading controlling of purchasing credit derivatives by financialinstitutions. Therefore, only a small number of financial institutions purchase the part of the financialproducts which involving subprime mortgage, and the investment scale is not large. 2
  • 2. Increased volatility in regional financial market. On the one hand, the developed countries of thefinancial market turmoil will direct aggravate regional financial market turmoil; On the other hand, thecontinued instability in the international market from the psychological level will also impact long-termexpectations of economic entities in the SEA economies, regional asset price adjustment will furtherinfluence the stability of the financial markets.3. The subprime crisis led to the depreciation of the dollar which makes the shrink of the value offoreign exchange reserves in SEA countries (1). Some scholars think that the financial system is good,only the individual countries is obvious financial overheating, but there is no overall situation ofinfectious phenomenon (2). The existing financial system in Southeast Asia area is robust, the overallimpact of the financial crisis on the financial system in Southeast Asia is small. 3.0 ObjectivesThe objective of this study is to investigate the impact of global financial crisis on SEA countries.Second, is to determine the causes of the global financial crisis and lastly is the recommendation thatcan use to recover the economy of these countries. 4.0 Literature ReviewThe financial crisis had erupted the whole Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia,Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and others. Although the so-called contagion of the Asian crisis to therest of the world seemed had gone into a remission by the end of 1998. The global financial crisis hasthus dramatically changed the external economic environment surrounding Cambodia. According toChan Sophal and Kao Kim Hourn (1999), Cambodia experienced a decline in private capital inflows in1997. However, the scale and the speed of the decline were modest relative to the experience of thecrisis countries. For instance, net private capital inflows to Cambodia declined from $170 million in 1996to around $150 million in 1997. Second, the crisis has gradually been putting pressure on the bankingsector in Cambodia; one of the most notable developments was the decline of foreign currencydeposits after mid 1997. The decline of foreign currency deposits continued from July 1997 to August1998. According to Andrew Maclintyre (1999), Indonesia’s financial sector suffered from very seriousweaknesses, and these did indeed compound the country’s economic problems as the crisis took hold.Leonardo Martinex- Diaz (2006) said that Indonesia engage with the IMF from the eve of the 1997financial crisis to the aftermath of the six year program. IMF’s influence on the policy debate within 3
  • Indonesia arises. The engagement with the IMF expanded policy space when the policymakersinteracting with the Fund were dominant groups within strong governments, groups that could use theFund’s leverage to secure their political survival and bolster their position against rival interests withinand outside government. According to Mohamed Ariff and SyarisaYantiABubakar (1999), it was said that the effect ofcrisis to Malaysi had shown that rapid and high economic growth is largely not sustainable in the longrun, particularly if it is not accompanied by an equal buildup of governance institutions at the firm andnational levels. Rises in unemployment and inflation are the main channels through which the socialimpact of the crisis has been transmitted because it is through these channel that real householdincome declined. The crisis induced slowdown in economic growth has had an inevitable impact onMalaysia’s social sphere as well. The contraction in GDP resulted in the retardation of employmentgrowth, and the rise of unemployment and retrenchment levels. NgiamKee Jin (2000) said that, although Singapore has weathered the crisis better than manyAsian Nations, its close integration with the regional economies means that it could not walk awaycompletely unscathed. Indeed, during the financial turmoil. The Singapore dollar depreciated againstthe major currencies of the US, Japan and Europe but rose sharply against most Asian currencies,particularly the Indonesian rupiah, Thai bath, Malaysian ringgit and Korean won. Singapore has learntseveral lessons after this crisis. The primary lesson is that Singapore has withstood the currency stormlashing the Asian region because of its strong economic fundamentals. The other lesson is that theflexibility of both exchange rate and wages in Singapore has enabled it to weather the Asian financialcrisis better than most Asian economies by adopting a managed exchange rate system to prevent anover valuation of the Singapore dollar. According to Sauwalak Kittiprapas (2002), the crisis forced the Thai government to devalue thebaht in 1997, and the consequent change in exchange rate policy led to further shock responses andeconomic collapse. The immediate adverse effects of the baht devaluation were a greater external debtburden and increases in the capital outflow. The financial sector was seriously affected: fifty six financecompanies closed down and non-performing loans (NPLs) rose considerably. Following the provision ofthe IMF loan, tight fiscal and monetary policies were imposed. These effects from currency depreciationsoon spread to other Asian economies in which weak economic institutions were already overburdenedbefore the Thai crisis. The Thai economic turmoil then quickly turned into a region wide contagion. Thefinancial and economy financial crisis had resulted the employment and incomes into an increase inpoverty and social problems. 4
  • Le Thi Thuy Van (2009) stated that Vietnam’s economy had already entered a period ofmacroeconomic instability when it was hit by the global financial crisis, causing the broader economicenvironment to deteriorate further. Domestically, Vietnam economy was negatively impacted by surginginflation and worsening twin deficits in both fiscal and current accounts in recent years. OverallVietnam’s economic fundamentals remain relatively weak, with serious fiscal and trade deficit and lowoverall efficiency. The stimulus package, though relatively small compared to those of several othercountries, demonstrated the government’s determination to pull economy out of the global turbulence. 5.0 CausesThe Asian financial crisis was a period of financial crisis that gripped much of Asia beginning 1997 andthis situation raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion. It also viewedas a serious threat to the stability of the region financial system. According to John(1998), there are twobasic problems or issues that caused to the financial crisis. First, the shortage of foreign exchange hascaused Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and other Asian countries facing the problem of currencydevalued. The value of currencies across the region had collapsed. Second, the inadequatelydeveloped financial sectors and mechanism for allocating capital had troubled the Asian economies. Basically, the Asian financial crisis was initiated by two rounds of currency depreciation starting in1997. The first round is a precipitous drop in the value of Thai baht (in July 1997) about 20 percentagainst the dollar, as a result of intense pressure in the foreign exchange market, followed by theIndonesian Rupiah, Philippines Peso, and also Malaysia Ringgit. While for the second round, thedownward pressure of the region economy hit the South Korea Won, Singapore Dollar, and some othercountries in the Asian region. Before the Asian financial crisis happened, the economies of Southeast Asia maintained highinterest rates that attractive to foreign investors which looking for a high rate of return. The regionaleconomies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and some other SEA countries experience highgrowth rates in the late 1980s and early of 1990s. By the way, Morris said that the borrowing of privatesector had increasing especially in short term. As a result, the loans to Thai corporation frominternational banks doubled from 1988 to 1994. Thailand foreign debt reached to $89 billon of whichwas owned by private corporations. As a result, the Thai Baht had been declared to be devalued onJuly 2, 1997. The devaluation of the Bath made Thailand exports become cheaper and this situationpressuring other countries to devalue their currencies too to maintain competitiveness. However, thecurrency speculators as well as Thailand residents were intended to sell the Baht and buy US Dollar 5
  • and this causing and worsening the capital flight out of the country that makes the Thailand governmentwas running out of its foreign reserves and losing market confidence in maintaining the currency valueand financial stability. In addition, Indonesia’s rupiah came under the attack and had to be devaluedabout 90 percent over the financial crisis period. The interest rates had been increased and the capitalflight from Indonesia was accelerating. Besides that, lack of enforcement of prudential rules and inadequate financial system is anotherfactor that leads to financial crisis in Asia. In other words, the weaknesses in Asian financial systemwere the important cause of the crisis. These weaknesses were caused largely by the lack of incentivesfor effective risk management created by implicit or explicit government guarantees against failure. Theweaknesses of the financial sector were masked by rapid growth and accentuated by large capitalinflows, which were partly encouraged by pegged exchange rates. The problems were resulting fromthe limited availability of data and lack of transparency of the current situation of the economy, hinderedthe market participants from taking a realistic view of economic fundamentals. Furthermore, the problems of governance and political uncertainties had worsened the crisis ofconfidence and caused the reluctant of foreign creditors to sell over the short-term loans, and led todownward pressures on currencies and stock markets. In general, the market failures were the main reasons that led to the financial crisis. Theeconomists had suggested that there are three critical ways that caused to the Southeast Asian capitalmarkets. First, there are too much capital rushed in the market and this lured by the prospect ofcontinued growth and the country is searching for new places to invest the overflowing capital. Thefinancial capital continued to flow into the real estate sectors even though when the economies of theparticular country starting to be unstable. Secondly, the capital market and the banking system couldnot distribute the funds into productive users. This means, the funds was allocated wrongly because toomuch funds went into real estate and too little went into productive investments and this led tostagnation of the growth in the country. Lastly, is too much capital rushed out from the country, or toofast. The outflows of the funds led to recession of a particular country and will caused to financial crisis. 6
  • 6.0 Impacts  Cambodia Cambodia has been growing quite robustly, with GDP growth averaging around 11% over the previous 3 years before the global financial crisis. The impacts of the global financial crisis has a wide spillover effect on Cambodia’s economy, trickling down to many layers – global, macro, sector, labour market and household. Impact on the macroeconomic To help us understand the severity of the impacts of the financial crisis on the macroeconomic, we use the Multiplier Model. This Multiplier Model is a helpful tool for us to forecast the potential impacts of the financial crisis on the overall economy. The concept of the multiplier model explains that injecting an additional dollar of spending into the economy will cause output to increase by more than a dollar because there is a chain reaction of spending. Inversely, taking an additional dollar of spending out of the economy will cause output to decrease by more than a dollar. The size of the change depends on the economy’s multiplier.Aggregate expenditure sources 2006 2007 2008/e 2009/p Value in million USD at current pricesInvestment (Implemented) CDC,CIDS 1142 1351 3608 3640Government expenditures MEF 969 1248 1388 1815Export of goods MEF 2800 3050 2922 2847Tourism receipts MOT 1049 1400 1620 1709Change in million USD at current pricesInvestment CDC 46 211 2256 32Government expenditures MEF 121 280 140 427Export of goods MEF 447 250 (129) (75)Tourism receipts MOT 217 351 220 89TOTAL CHANGE IN CIDS 831 1092 2487 474EXPENDITURES,NominalTOTAL CHANGE IN OUTPUT CIDS 885 1162 2647 504(INCOME), NominalValue in million USD at constant 200 pricesDEFLATOR in US$, % Change CIDS 7.1% 9.1% 16.2% (1%)TOTAL CHANGE IN OUTPUT CIDS 596 620 401 360(INCOME),RealREAL GROWTH RATE (%) CIDS 10.8% 10.2% 6% 5.1% 7
  • Using this model, the cumulative impacts of the financial crisis is an increase in expenditure of US$486million, which will marginally increase output (income) by US$518 million, decelerating real GDP growthto 5.1% in 2009 from an estimated 6% in 2008 (Table 3). The extraordinary increase in public spendingwill help cushion the economy at this level. Table 3 Results of multiplier modelNotes: *Some figures estimated by CIDS based on most updated data from ministries; ** Multiplier of1.064 times total change in expenditures; e = estimated, p = projected; MEF = Ministry of Economy andFinance; MOT = Ministry of Tourism; CDC = Council for the Development of Cambodia A number of institutions including government, private and international organizations havepublished different estimates for GDP growth in 2009, ranging from 4.8% to 6.0% (see Table 4). CIDSestimate of 5.1% growth in 2009 based on the multiplier model lies at the middle of this range. Thedifference in estimates among the leading institutions is largely attributed to the different assumptionson how much the financial crisis will impact the level of investment and exports. More importantly tonote is that all institutions project that the pace of growth in 2009 will slow. Table 4 Comparison of GDP growth estimates for 2008 and 2009 Institution 2008 2009 ADB 6.5% 6.0% CIDS 6.0% 5.1% EIC 7.0% 6.0% Government (SNEC) 6.8% 4.8% IMF 7.0% 4.8% World Bank 6.7% 4.9% To measure the severity of the impact of the financial crisis on Cambodia’s macroeconomic, wecompare the potential incomes of two scenarios: without external shock and with external shock. In thescenario of without external shock from the global crisis, we assume that the real growth path will followa trend ranging from 10.2-10.8%, as in the past. In the scenario with external shock, the growth pathfollows the estimations made from the Multiplier Model above; that is, 2008 faces a growth of 6.0% and2009, 5.1%. 8
  • Impact on SectorsTo help weight and identify the sectors most likely affected by the financial crisis, the Research Teamdeveloped a Vulnerability index, which looks at how vulnerable a sector is to the financial crisis inrelations to the sector’s exposure to or dependency on foreign capital and foreign output markets.Sectors that are most vulnerable to the global crisis are those with a high concentration of FDI andthose that export their products:  Capital source: What percentage of the sector’s capital consists of foreign direct investment? Sectors that have a high concentration of foreign direct investment will likely be affected by the global financial squeeze.  Output market: What percentage of the sector’s output is for export? Sectors that depend primarily on foreign markets may face difficulties as global demand shrivels. The Asian crisis has been adversely affecting Cambodia’s economy slowly but steadily. Thespill-over effects of the crisis have come through two channels—the realignment of foreign exchangerates and the slowdown of economic growth in the crisis countries. Export growth, which had beenvirtually unaffected until the end of 1997, appeared to slow in the first semester of 1998. Interviews withsome enterprises revealed severe competition in the regional market and a sharp decline of exports.Although imports at the macro level have not shown an obvious increase, interviews with enterprisesrevealed a severe impact on some import competing enterprises such as cement beverage and plasticmanufacturers. Some domestic sectors, such as the tourism industry, have been suffering fromstagnation in arrivals, notably from ASEAN and East Asian countries, since July 1997. Consumers, bycontrast, enjoyed a decline of dollar- or riel-denominated prices of Thai products in Phnom Penhmarkets until January 1998. The benefits from cheaper imported products, however, turned out to beshort lived because of the recovery of the baht after February 1998 and inflation affecting Thai productsin baht terms. The most vulnerable sectors are textiles and clothing, construction, tourism, and real estatedue to their high exposure to foreign capital and dependency on export markets. Due to its link withinternational commodity prices, the crop sector may also feel the blow even though exports make up asmall portion of output. Slowdown in economic growth and income levels will impact SMEs by reducinglocal demand, but likely with a time lag and less severe than the export sector. However, SMEs that aremore vulnerable to the crisis include: those driven by demand from consumers who profited from theproperty market boom (i.e. car retailers, high-end restaurants); and those related to or supporting theconstruction sector or textile and clothing sector. 9
  •  IndonesiaThe global financial crisis transmitted to the Indonesian economy began in mid September 2008; it hasbeen shown among other by plunged in stock market prices, deeply depreciated rupiah, and significantincrease of government bond yield. Deleveraging process in the global financial markets has beencaused the global liquidity dry up that pushed the investors to rearrange their portfolio, includingIndonesia. Repricing process faced by investors with huge hike in risk perception had pushed capitaloutflows from emerging markets. Regional stock market prices had been severely corrected, regionalbond markets demanded for higher yield, and huge capital outflows had put a tremendous pressure tomost currencies in the region. Last three months of 2008 sent the strongest sense of crisis to the country, as worrying signswere spotted everywhere, from the financial market to the real sector of the Indonesian economy.Economic growth in the last quarter fell short of the previously estimated 5.7%. It was much lower: 5.2%for the fourth quarter of 2008, with export growth dropping to the lowest level since 1986 (1%).Impacts on capital flows (including stock markets and financial intermediaries)According to the latest data from Bank Indonesia (2009), FDI was still increasing in the quarter toDecember 2008, whereas portfolio investment had continued its declining trend since the previousquarter. Most of the foreign capital flow went to government securities, reaching a peak in the secondquarter of 2008. During the last three months of 2008, a massive sell-off of government bonds andBank Indonesia certificates by foreign investors put the capital and financial account of the balance ofpayments in deficit. Prices of government securities have dropped owing to suddenly unfavourable emergingmarkets conditions as pure financial contagion occurred when negative market sentiment and changedperception of risks set in. At the same time, the rupiah was already under depreciation pressure, andthis produced a second blow for government bond prices. With these price drops, investors demandedhigher yields. The yield spread was increased from 411 basis points at the end of September 2008 to716 at the end of the year (January data still recorded an increase to 754). At the end of October 2008,the 10-year tenor government bonds had even reached their highest peak of 20.96%. The governmentwas forced to postpone the issuance of a new series of government bonds indefinitely. SUNs (government securities) yields declined towards the end of the year when the centralbank cut the benchmark interest rate in early December. With inflationary pressure eased further, 10
  • foreign holdings of SUNs at the end of the year increased slightly. Nevertheless, during the last threemonths of 2008, foreign holdings of SUNs dropped from US$11.1 billion to $8 billion. Foreign ownership of SBIs (Bank Indonesia certificates) is always more volatile than is the casefor government securities. A huge drop of SBI foreign holdings occurred in October 2008, recorded atIDR6082 trillion, after being IDR20,366 trillion in the previous month. For the period October-December2008, foreign holdings of SBI certificates fell drastically, from US$2.2 billion to $772 million. While in the corporate bond market, local investors were far more dominant, with 96% (of totalcorporate bond capitalization/IDR67.74 trillion) of ownership. Foreign investors controlled around 4%(2.71 trillion). During 2008, corporate bond issuance occurred only in the first half of the year, worthapproximately 11.9 trillion. This value was an extreme decline (61.94%) from total corporate bondsissuance in 2007, worth 31.27 trillion. There were three cases of corporate defaults in 2008, and manycompanies postponed their bond issuance plan, such PT PLN (the state electricity company) and BankDanamon, Tbk. At least two factors were pointed out as the reasons why bond issuance by privatesector dropped sharply in 2008: i) the high domestic inflation rate up to September 2008;6 and ii) thelooming uncertainties from the global crisis, reflected in the declining appetite of investors in capitalmarkets, especially in emerging markets. The possibility of adverse impacts may come also as a majority of foreign creditors ofIndonesian banks and corporations are from Singapore (31.6% of Indonesian private sectoroutstanding external loans), the Netherlands (19.6%), Japan (13.6%) and the US (6.5%). Anotherpossibility of disruption in foreign capital flows will come from the fact that most creditors do not haveany ownership ties to the Indonesian side. Per September 2008, approximately 30.8% of outstandingprivate external short-term loans came from holding companies and/or affiliated businesses which theamount to mature in 2009 will be US$22.6 billion. It is argued that ownership ties to creditors will keepflows of external loans moving. Rollover and refinancing risks are more likely to occur to debtors withoutownership ties to creditors. The rupiah had been under deep depreciation pressures and fluctuated greatly even aftermeasures were put in action. In a year, the rupiah lost 16.9% of its value and up to 2 March 2009 it hadalready depreciated almost 10% from its value at the beginning of the year. Central banks’ foreignexchange reserves had depleted by around US$7 billion in September-October owing to marketinterventions to prevent rupiah depreciation. Bank Indonesia appears to have abandoned marketinterventions since November 2008 and allowed the currency to be relatively free-floating. 11
  • A depreciated value of the rupiah would increase banks’ risks. However, with banks’ net openposition (NOP) at 6.2% (of their capital) 13 up to December 2008, the banking sector seemed to copewith this, even if the rupiah is depreciated further by IDR5000 (Bank Indonesia, 2009d). The sale of SUNs by foreign investors could also adversely affect banks particularly as theIndonesian banking sector is the largest holder of tradable SUNs (IDR265 trillion as of 30 November2008). The government took some action to buy back SUNs in the market in order to stop prices fromsliding downward during 2008. Until the end of Semester 1 2008, SUN prices were down 15%. TheIndonesian banking sector lost approximately 1.4 trillion as a result of marked-to-market14 of banks’holdings of tradable SUNs (6.6% of total SUN holding in the banking sector). The remaining SUNs heldby banks are held-to-maturity kinds. Compared with banks’ revenues, reaching up to 220 trillion, thisloss would seem trivial.Impact on tradeExport performance has continued to decline since the second semester of 2008. There are tworeasons for this: first, drops in commodity prices since mid-year; second, weakened external demandafter September 2008. Falling demand, especially from main destination countries, has clearly taken its toll onIndonesian export performance. ASEAN is Indonesia’s biggest trade partner (20.34% of total non-oiland gas export market), followed by the European Union (EU) (16.55%). For individual countries, Japanand the US had the biggest share of the country’s export market, accounting for 12.7% and 12.44%,respectively, in January 2009. China has become an important trading partner and had a 7.36% sharein Indonesia’s export market. As export performance deteriorated, import numbers began to show signs of slowdown; aftersurging significantly up to the third quarter of 2008, imports started to tumble. All categories of importedgoods declined in January 2009. The biggest drop was for imports of raw materials/auxiliary goods,which declined 38%. Coupling this drop with the decline in capital goods imports (-17%), these numberscould be reflecting worsening conditions in real/manufacturing industry activities. 12
  • Imports by economic category, 2008-2009 Value (US $ m) (cost, insurance and freight)Economic category Jan 2008 Dec Jan 2009 Change of % change of % share in 2008 * ** Jan 2009 Jan 2009 imports over Dec over Jan total, Jan 2008 2008 2009Total imports 9608.1 7699.9 6342.6 -1357.3 -33.99 100.00Consumption goods 648.4 499.1 477.9 -21.2 -26.30 7.54Raw materials/ 7354.5 5007.5 4535.6 -471.7 -38.33 71.51auxiliary goodsCapital goods 1605.2 2193.3 1328.9 -864.4 -17.21 20.95Notes: *Preliminary figures; **Very Preliminary figures Source: CBS (March 2009) This worrying sign from imports, coupled with several indicators from business associationssuch as that sales of motor vehicles and electronic products plunged in the last quarter of 2008, mayreflect further weakening of the real/business sector. Worsening developments in export–importtransactions in the fourth quarter of 2008 clearly reflected latest trade balance data. Fortunately, therewas a significant decline in deficits of income balance as a result of reduced government dividendpayment to foreign oil/gas contractors.  MalaysiaThe current global financial crisis has been described as the toughest challenges to the world economysince the great depression. The financial crisis was originated from the bursting of US housing burble,led to a severe financial turmoil and eventually spread throughout the world. During this period, besidesmulti-billion bailout plans in US and other European countries, many economies have implementedaggressive fiscal and monetary policies to avoid further slip into deep recession. The South East Asiacountries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia have also been infected bythe financial contagion from US. Manufacturing, trade, investment and GDP growth rates slow downdue to the falling demand in developed economies. Malaysia international trade is highly related to developed nations such as US, EU and Japanand also it neighbouring countries of ASEAN. According to statistic from MATRADE, Malaysia’s majortrading partners in 2007 were US, Singapore, Japan, People Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand. Iftrade flows of Malaysia with developed and developing nations of China and ASEAN are also taken intoconsideration, the extent of exposure of the Malaysian economy with crisis affected developed anddeveloping countries will be quite important. 13
  •  Impact on the banking systemBased on Goh and Lim (2010), the impact of the crisis on the Malaysian banking system was relativelymodest as domestic banks had negligible exposure to US subprime loan products. Also, domesticbanks have strengthened and built significant buffers during the decade after the AFC. At year end2008, the banking systems risk-weighted capital ration (RWCR) and core capital ratio (CCR) weremaintained at high levels of 13.1% and 10.6% respectively (see Table 4). Non performing loans were athealthy levels. They peaked during the Asian financial crisis at 18.5%, since then the ratio has declinedto 2.6% in 2008. Nevertheless, given the weak business environment and an expected rise inunemployment, the banking systems non performing loans are expected to rise. With the slowdown ofdomestic economic activities, overall loan applications in the country showed a declining trend. Loanapplications slowed down for both the business and household sectors. Table 4: Banking System Health Indicators 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Non-performing Loans 3- 11.5 10.2 8.9 7.5 5.8 4.8 3.2 2.6month classification (% ofnet total loans)Risk-Weighted Capital 13.0 132 13.8 14.4 13.7 13.5 13.2 13.1Ratio (RWCR)*Core Capital Ratio (CCR) 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.4 10.7 10.7 10.2 10.6Note: *The RWCR is an indication of how much losses or bad asset write-offs a financial institution cantakeSource: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, February 2009  Impact on KLSEAccording to Syarisa Yanti, (1999), the controversial move to implement currency and capital controlsseems to have been vindicated by subsequent positive developments. By imposing the controls, theeconomy was helped in the short-term by forcing the return of some RM 12 billion worth of depositsparked abroad and conversely by preventing foreign portfolio funds, estimated at 23 per cent of KLSEcapitalization, from being repatriated. The controls further enabled the easing of interest rates withoutfear of negatively affecting the ringgit, and this subsequently enabled the reflation of the economy totake place. 14
  • The KLSE indices more than doubled from 300 prior to the imposition of the controls, to morethan 600 in February 1999, even breaking through the 800-point psychological barrier in July 1999. Inthat sense, it could be argued that the controls have helped to bring about a measure of stability in theMalaysian economy, although it is not the only factor. So far, the Malaysian capital controls have had apositive psychological impact, at least on domestic business and consumer confidence. Even the large-scale currency black market that was foreseen, did not eventually materialize, due to a strong balanceof payments and rising foreign exchange reserves. Care must nevertheless be exercised when usingthe stock market indices as a measure of the health of the real economy. The stock market is drivenprimarily by investor sentiments, and as events in the early days of the crisis have demonstrated,investor sentiments do not necessarily run parallel with the real economy, in a sense that stock marketrallies can occur even when the economic situation is not favourable, and vice versa. Notwithstandingthis, the level of robustness in the stock market can usually provide some general indication of thefuture outlook of the economy as it rests on investor and business confidence in the economy.  Impact on Monetary policyBased on Ariff (1999), the statutory reserve ration (SRR) requirement was reduced to 4 per cent inSeptember 1998. Interest rates also declined precipitously with the interbank (three-month) rates fallingfrom approximately 11 per cent in September 1998 to 6.4 percent in February 1999. The base lendingrate (BLR) for commercial banks declined from 11.96 percent in March 1998 to 8.05 pr cent in March1999. In order to stimulate the economy and to reach a growth rate of at least 1.0 per cent, BankNegara had set a loans growth target of 8.0 per cent to be achieved by the end of 1998. Unfortunately,the target was not achieved and overall, loans growth still remains sluggish. To a certain extent, this isdue to an overly cautious stance by banks and a depressed demand for credit. While loans growth isneeded to stimulate the economy, the compulsion on banks to achieve a set target may inadvertentlyresult in loans being extended to companies of doubtful credit standing or for nonviable projects. In thelong run, this may have adverse implications for the asset quality of banks.  Impact on TradeIn the early days of the crisis, trade was dampened as export demand by economies across the regionfell. Recently though, export growth in U.S. dollar terms has shown some signs of recovery, and in fact,since the last quarter of 1998, has become positive. The improvement in external demand is largelyboosted by the weak ringgit. In the short term, this is acceptable, although it remains to be determinedwhether this strategy is sustainable in the long run, especially in the event of the currency peg removalor a revision of the current RM3.80 exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. Imports, in U.S. dollar terms, 15
  • increased for the first time, after many months of continuous fall, in December 1998. In particular,imports of intermediate goods have increased. Although these are implications for the trade balance,this development is favourable light as it indicates rising external and domestic demand.(Abu Bakar,1999)  SingaporeAfter Singapore separated from Malaysia and became independent in 1965, its small domestic marketand lack of natural resources necessitated an outward-oriented growth. It started to diversify away fromdependence on entrepot trade, and developed its industrial sector based on export-oriented growth andforeign direct investments. Singapore is experiencing the sharpest economic downturn in over two decades, one that iseven severe than that experienced during the Asian financial crisis. While the impact of the Asian crisison Singapore was felt quickly, the impact of this global financial crisis was delayed and started to biteonly in the third quarter of 2008.Impact on Banking Sector: Toxic AssetsThe most direct channel of financial shock is distribution of toxic financial assets by US financialinstitution to the rest of the world. Singapore, being a regional financial centre and aiming to catch upwith the sophistication of the Anglo-Saxon financial model, naturally had its fair share of toxic assets.The bigger and more sophisticated domestic banks in Singapore invested in collateralized debtobligations (CDOs) and other structured products, with DBS, the largest domestic bank, taking the lion’sshare at $2.4 billion, OCBC with $430 million and UOB with $392 million (Straits Times, August 25,2007). While these amounts are substantial, they did not materially weaken the capital base of thesebanks. Singapore targeted financial wealth management as one of the pillars in the development of itsfinancial market. The export boom in Asia coupled with the big run-up in commodity prices brought ahuge amount of funds into the country. Singapore was competing with Switzerland to be a worldfinancial wealth management centre; private bankers and fund managers sprung up like wildmushrooms after a spring shower. The total assets under management in Singapore rose from $150billion in 1998 to 720 billion by the end of 2005. Funds sourced from the Middle East and South Asiaexpanded by 30% and 56% respectively. 16
  • Many financial institutions have already compensated the less sophisticated investors whowere affected by the toxic structured notes. Hong Leong Finance paid $57.6 million to 2048 investors;this is the highest amount of compensation paid out. According to MAS, the total settlements fordecided cases amounted to $105 million (Channel News Asia, July8, 2009). According Roberto (2007), Singapore’s banking sector is strong and has improved since theAsian crisis. Between 1997 and 2007, its loan-to-deposit ratio dropped from 121% to 74%. Its ratio ofshareholders’ equity to total assets has declined from a high of 9.9% in 1001 to 6.8% in 2007 due to asharp rise in total assets. A MAS 2008 report showed the equity to total assets ratio of local banks at8.5 and their ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets at 14.3% in the third quarter of 2008. Whilst the baking sector has remained strong and healthy, it is not completely immune to riskaversion as evidenced in a number of banking activity indicators. The year on year growth rate of loansto non bank customers of domestic banking units (DBUs) fell from about 26% in May 2008 to about 7%by March 2009, with the steepest falls after November 2008. Overall, the interbank market was notbadly affected and continued to function relatively smoothly but the three month interbank rate spikedup from 1% to 2% between July and September 2008. It recovered and dropped to below 1% byNovember 2008 and rose again slightly in December and thereafter returned to normal.Equity Market and Portfolio Investment FlowsThe most severe and immediate impact of the global financial crisis on Singapore is on its equitymarkets have grown by leaps and bounds in line with its policy of financial liberalization and thedeepening and boarding of its capital markets. Its stock market capitalization grew from $98 billion in1991 to $776 billion in 2007 before falling to $385 billion in 2008 (see Table1). In terms of marketcapitalization to GDP, this ratio rose from 130% in 1991 to 319% in 2007. No information exists on the foreign share of Singapore’s stock market; some estimate it to be40% or 50%. The average stock market capitalization of Singapore was $500 billion between 2005 and2008 (see Table1) while the foreign reserves of the country stood at $250 billion in 2008. Gross inflowof portfolio investments from foreign sources recovered strongly after 2002 though they remain highlyvolatile – jumping from $391 million in 2002 to $7.5 billion in 2003 and reaching a peak $28billion in2007 before plunging to an outflow of $6.5 billion in 2008 – a swing of more than $34 billion in one year. 17
  • Table1: Banking and Capital Market IndicatorsS$ billion 1991 1995 1999 2005 2007 2008GDP Current Price 75.3 118.2 144 199.4 243.2 257.4Bank Assets 136.1 224.6 326.3 425.2 582.9 668.5Loans to Non-bank Customers 64 109 147.2 183.1 233.3 272.1Stock Market Capitalization 97.8 292.5 470.8 420.9 776.1 384.7Bond Market Debt N.A. 23 43 136.8 171.3 N.A.OutstandingStock Market Turnover 30.5 97.4 196.9 205.2 604.6 386.6New Issues of Debt Securities 1.9 3.8 9.3 20 30 N.A.New Issues Equity 1.9 1.7 6.3 11.7 22.6 N.A.Weaker Financial and Corporate SectorsThe non-performing loans (NPLs) of local banks operating in the region have gone up. If domestic andother global loans were added to these regional loans, the NPL ratio for Singapore banks was 8percent in March 1999, up from 7.6 percent in December 1998 and 6.6 percent in September 1998. However, the Deputy Prime Minister, BG Lee Hsien Loong, told Parliament on July 6, 1999 thatthe NPL levels did not threaten the financial health of any of the local banks because they had set asidesubstantial provisions and the collateral backing of these regional loans exceeded the regional NPLsoutstanding. The NPLs were high because local banks only wrote them off when all avenues to recoverthe loans had been exhausted and also because of the broad classification of NPLs.Currency ContagionAfter Thailand’s long battle against currency attacks, the Thai baht was finally freed on July 2, 1997from its peg to the US dollar. The baht fell by over 15 percent immediately, and by about 80 percent bythe year-end. The Singapore dollar was not spared the contagion effects. From a high of S$1.43 perUS dollar on the day before the float of the Thai baht, the Singapore dollar went all the way down toS$1.75 per US dollar on January 7, 1998, a decline of 18.3 percent over the six month period. However, the other regional currencies depreciated much more during the same period,ranging from 70 percent for the Indonesian rupiah to 35 percent for the Philippine peso. Therefore,although the Singapore dollar depreciated against the US dollar and other major currencies, it 18
  • appreciated sharply against the regional currencies. As a result, Singapore’s nominal and real effectiveexchange rates was relatively stable both before and during the crisis.  ThailandAccording to Chirathivat (2007), Thailand, not that close to the epicenter of the crisis, but like Asia as awhole, has also been affected, lesser by the turmoil of the US and European financial sectors, but morewith subsequent global slowdown in demand that had sharply been shrinking the Thai economy interms of tumbling exports, sharp reducing growth and employment prospects, clearly shown since thelast quarter of 2008. It is clear that Thailand has not “decoupled” from the global economy, in particular,those developed markets, as the country has become even more export-oriented reliance since therecovery of the last Asian financial crisis, so the sharp slowdown of these exports causes real concernsabout the nature of prosperity depending solely on the external sector. The current context of the crisisalso gives rise for the discussion on the way Thailand is also part of the global imbalances in recentyears and that there is an increasing need for the country to focus more on domestic and regionaldemand of finished goods.  Impact on Thai Banking IndustryThe current global financial crisis, although it has spread to Europe and a few Asian countries that haveclose financial ties with the U.S. such as China and Japan, but the impact that it has on Thailand canbe considered insignificant. This recent crisis would cause more severe impacts on the automobilemanufacturing industries, as well as the export businesses as a whole since there are many U.S. brandname factories in the country especially on the Eastern seaboard adjacent to the gulf of Thailand. Financially, investments from the Thai banks in U.S. financial firms are minimized to merely 1to 2 percent of the total assets compared to a more significant amount of investments made by theChinese or the Japanese banks in those U.S. firms. Since the Asian financial crisis has been alleviatedand faded away in early and mid 2000s, the BOT has already been imposing strict measures onbanking activities. This includes limited investments on foreign financial and non-financial firms tocontrol both systematic and unsystematic risks. The BOT had experienced the shock in the Asian financial crisis in 1997 in terms of policiesinefficiencies, inadequate information system, the inability to implement policies to control exchangerate risks, and the inability to control the NPLs. Apart from those deficiencies, the poor riskmanagement coupled with the lack of management transparency had caused proneness to failure 19
  • given a financial crisis takes place. Having learned from all these weaknesses, the BOT hasimplemented and established barriers by imposing rules and regulations on the domestic financial andbanking conducts. (Sigkhabhand, n.d.)  Impact on Thai EconomyAccording to Gartner (2010), In Thailand, the stock crisis caused a property crisis. The bahtdepreciated by 50% in February 1998 which means that debts in terms of US dollars doubled in value.It seems clear that this had huge impacts on the Thai economy. A lot of Thai companies were bankruptbefore the currency crisis, but the sharp depreciation of the baht, caused by investor panic, furtherincreased the burden of their foreign liabilities. In 1998, a lot of Thai financial institutions failed. It wasthe pegged exchange rate, rather than the devaluation itself, that caused the crisis. The combination ofa lack of currency reserves after unsuccessfully defending a domestic currency and the breaking ofpromises to let an exchange rate float makes a country’s economy vulnerable to panic. After thedevaluation of the baht, Thai export growth rates decreased and the value of exports fell 1% in 1996 (adecline of about 26% compared to 1995). Thailand’s output decreased by 10% in 1998 but in 1999increased exports again led to economic growth of 4.4%. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)helped Thailand with an aid package valued about USD 17.2 billion. In return, the Thai government hadto cut expenditures to create a budget surplus. Furthermore, the Bank of Thailand had to toughen up itslending criteria and keep currency reserves at a certain level. This restrictive monetary policy led to asharp increase in interest rates. The IMF has been criticized for the strict conditions of this aid package.Several economists argue that some of the IMF-measures might have been counterproductive in termsof restoring confidence  Impact on inflation and unemploymentTwo sensitive economic indicators reflected the impact of the financial crisis. The inflation rate and theunemployment rate have risen. The former resulted from depreciation, while the latter was due to thesluggishness of the economies. Inflation rates have risen amongst two of the four dragons, Taiwan andKorea, while Hong Kong and Singapore have decreased their inflation rates. Since the Hong Kongdollar is linked to the U.S. dollar, it depreciated less, as did the Singapore dollar. The four tigers havedifferent profiles because their currencies have been greatly depreciated, so all of them have acorrespondingly high inflation rate. Unemployment relates closely to economic recession, and as 1998was the most serious year of the recession, with the exceptions of Taiwan and China, all the East Asiancountries have seen an increase in their unemployment rates. These countries have also seen areduction in industrial productivity and economic growth. (Yu, n.d.) 20
  •  VietnamThe crisis that is raging globally does not spare Vietnam. A higher level of exposure of the nationaleconomy to the rest of the world, however, also has a negative side. When the regional and globaleconomy enters the recession phase, Vietnamese economy also suffers. In 1997, when the financialcrisis hit Asia Pacific region, Vietnam was negatively affected. But this time around, the severity ishigher in scope and scale for at least two reasons. Vietnam has been more exposed to the rest of theworld than it was 10 years ago. And unlike the last crisis, the developed countries which have been the sources of fund andmarket for other countries - have all been in deep trouble. At the same time, inherent problems of theVietnamese economy including weak physical infrastructures, underdeveloped legal and financialsystems as well as serious corruption are contributing to the graveness of the economic difficulties thatVietnam is facing today. The efforts by the government to curb inflation which including higher interest rates and cut ofgovernment spending, especially for big projects further affected key sectors of the economy includingbanking, real estate, stock markets as well as businesses for money was less available or moreexpensive to borrow. This then shows that weaknesses of the Vietnamese economy are from within.They have been multiplied by difficulties from outside when the crisis hit the world.Decreased RemittanceIn 2007, money remittance via the central bank, Hanoi arm has reached VND383.8 trillion by the end oflast year, rising by nearly 19 percent against a year earlier. Of the total, interbank electronic moneyremittance recorded VND151.6 trillion, up 6.3 percent. Remittances from overseas Vietnamese reachedabout US$3.8 billion in 2007, an increase of 20 percent over 2006. Remittances by exported laborsamount to about USD 2 billion annually in the same period. According to Pham Thi Nga (2009), the director of remittance department of Vietcombank, saythat remittances through the bank reached USD 200 million, a 12 percent decrease as compared to thesame period of 2008. East Asian Bank reported a 16 percent decrease and Sacomrex 14 percent.Banks report the reduction of remittance from Taiwan, Malaysia, Czechoslovakia, and Middle Eastwhere Vietnamese laborers are working while money sent from the United States, Canada, Australia,and Europe by Vietnamese became less and irregular. 21
  • Budget and Depreciation of VNDFewer revenues and more funds for stimulus packages are increasing the budget deficits. Thegovernment plans to boost spending this year by 23 percent (almost 100 trillion dong, or $8 billion,about 6 percent of GDP). Of this, about $1 billion will subsidies loans to cash-strapped exporters. Commercial banks in February lent a combined VND93 trillion ($5.3 billion) to businesses atdiscount rates under a government loan subsidy programme, according to the central bank. Thegovernment said it would spend VND300 trillion (US$17 billion) this year to halt a slowdown ineconomic growth amid the global financial crisis. The amount, almost a quarter of the country’s $71billion GDP, would be used to develop infrastructure, spur exports, and fund other social securityprojects, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said in a statement on the governments website accessedin March 2009. The spending is part of the governments VND491 trillion ($28 billion) overall budget for thisyear, which is 23 percent higher than last years. In the statement issued after a two-day cabinetmeeting in late March, the government said it would quickly deploy VND60 trillion ($3.4 billion) raised byselling government bonds to boost production and exports. “The spending will help boost economicgrowth and investors confidence,” Cao Sy Kiem (2009), president of the Vietnam Association for Small-and Medium-sized Enterprises, said in a telephone interview from Hanoi Wednesday with Thanh Nien(Youth) Newspaper. Scenario for 2009 (billion USD, 2007 value) 2007 2008 2009 2009 compared to 2008Exports 54.7 58.5 52.6 -10%Imports 64.2 74.7 64.6 -15%Imports for domestic productions 48.2 51.1 52.8 3%Imports for domestic consumptions 16.1 23.6 11.8 -50%and savingsTrade balance -9.6 -16.2 -12.0 -30%Savings 29.6 34.1 32.4 -5%Final consumptions 50.5 57.0 57.0 0%GDP 70.6 74.9 77.4 3.4%% GDP 6.1% 3.4%Source: Vu Quang Viet, at Government budget income was 52.9 thousand billion, equivalent to 13.6 percent of estimatedbudget for the whole year, a 28.1 percent decrease while expenditures amounted to 63.3 thousand 22
  • billion. According to Tran Dinh Thien (2009), the Director of the Institute of Vietnamese Economy,budget deficits may rise to between 9 percent and 10 percent and this might rekindle the threat ofhyperinflation and depreciation of the Vietnamese Dong.Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) DecreaseFDI also decreased sharply. In 2008, Vietnam attracted about USD 64 billion new FDI. But the rate ofrealization is low, because of (i) the scarcity of credits, (ii) stricter conditions for credits in theinternational financial markets, and (iii) bottlenecks in the infrastructure, institutions and workforce. New foreign direct investment commitments were 185 million dollars in January, down about 90percent from a year earlier, according to the Planning and Industry Ministry. The registered FDI for thefirst two months of 2009 amounted to more than USD 5.3 billion, equaled to 70 percent of FDI attractedin the first two months of 2008. EIU estimates that FDI will decrease 70 percent for 2009. By the end of March, total FDI reached USD 6 billion, a 40 percent decrease as compared tothe previous year. To be more specific, licenses to 93 new FDI projects were granted with the total fundamounting to USD 2.2 billion, a 72 percent and 70 percent decrease in terms of capital and number ofprojects respectively. Yet, 34 new FDI projects by investors who have already been doing business inVietnam were launched with USD 3.8 billion, a 70 percent decrease in term of number of projects, but a34 percent increase in term of capital. On March 31, Phan Huu Thang (2009), General Director of theDepartment for FDI (MPI) stated that the new volume of registered FDI in January was USD 200 million,a 8.5 percent reduction as compared to the same period in 2008 and 18 percent decrease as comparedto December 2008. By February 20, the number of FDI projects decreased 65 percent with theregistered funds amounting to USD 1.5 billion, a 69 percent decrease as compared to the same periodin 2008. 23
  • 7.0 Solutions / RecommendationsTo overcome the problems or impacts implicate on the region, there are some recommendations aresuggested by the economists. The first one is tightening the fiscal policy. For this policy, the countries which suffered in thefinancial crisis need to focus on reducing the countries’ reliance on external savings and takeappropriate actions to restructuring and recapitalized the banking systems. Besides that, the funds orresources will need to be reallocate or redistribute from the unproductive expenditures like mentionedabove to those needed or productively in order to minimize the social costs of the crisis. ‘ResiliencePackage’ was introduced by Micheal and Jaya (2010) associated with four goals: 1) saving jobs, 2)enhancing the competitiveness of firms and workers, 3) income relief for the lower classes, and 4)strengthening physical and social infrastructure. It is also important to reduce government spending andcutting down the public expenditures to further reduce budget deficit. Besides, monetary policy also another important measures to be implemented to resolve theproblems from financial crisis. The policy is implementing to effectively control inflation and stabilize themacro-economy. This policy must be firm enough to resist the excessive currency depreciation, andwhen the fundamental policy weaknesses are addressed and confidence of the foreign investors isrestored the interest rates can be allowed to return to more normal levels. The adoption of a managedexchange rate system is important as the exchange rate could be adjusted promptly to suit with thecurrent situation of a county’s economy. Besides, an adjustable wage system should be establishedthat allows for wage reductions in difficult times such as during the recession period. In simple words,the monetary policy purpose is to maintain a balance between inflation, export competitiveness andgrowth, and also the exchange rate policy. Good corporate governance and the creditability of policy makers help to maintain investors’confidence throughout the crisis. The governance must be improved in the public and corporate sectorby strengthening the accountability and transparency. Moreover, International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays an important role to help to overcome thefinancial crisis. IMF pledged almost $120 billion into the official rescue package as an effort to containthe crisis, by enabling the affected nations to avoid default, and tying the packages to reforms andrestores the Asian currencies, banking, and financial system. In general, the role of IMF helps inresolving the financial crisis is prevent outright default on foreign obligation, limit the currencydepreciation, limit inflation, rebuild foreign exchange reserves, and also reform the banking sector. 24
  • A sustainable development solutions need to be developed to stimulate the economy andprotect the environment and social justice. The economic restructure towards efficiency includingplanning and development is important as well as the administrative reform to increase thetransparency and professionalism in governmental management. Lastly, the efforts of boostingproductions and businesses, strengthening efforts, stimulating investment and consumption willguarantee the social security. 8.0 ConclusionThe financial crisis of the South-East Asian (SEA) countries engendered by the currency and financialinstability has had important repercussions on the world economy. The SEA region is in trouble offinancial crisis which is caused by economic structure problem, history problem and other reasons. Thedebt crisis has a big impact on other international financial institution. All those methods mentionedabove can help SEA to get out of the financial crisis. So the developing countries need to draw lessonsfrom the financial crisis facing by SEA. Measures should be taken to maintain necessary control of thescale and distribution of foreign investment, to adjust arrangement of products in line with the demandof international market, and to reinforce management of the financial market. Besides, SEA has got thisfinancial problem for quite a long time, so if SEA want to solve the financial crisis thoroughly, thegovernment should prepare a long-term plan and try their best to implement it. Lastly, the currentpolicies need to be revisited and a more appropriate and robust strategy put in place. As the reform orresolve method is implemented correctly and effectively, the financial crisis could be eliminated in orderto promote the prosperity of the country. 25
  • 9.0 ReferencesChew, V. (2009). Asian financial crisis, 1997-1998. Retrieved 15/05/2012, from, I. I. a. A. (2009). Global economic crisis and Indonesia. Retrieved 15/05/2012, from indonesia.htmlderyant, b. (2008). Impact of Global Economic Crisis in Indonesia. Retrieved 16/05/2012, from Green*, R. K., May Miller-Dawkins+. (2010). The Global Economic Crisis and Developing Countries: Impact and fromärtner, A. (NA). The Asian economic crisis and the current global economic crisis: A comparison with special focus on Thai economic policy. from, U. (NA). The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 - 1998 and the Behavior of Asian Stock Markets. Retrieved 15/052012, from, G. S. K. a. M. L. M. (2010). The Impact of the Global FInancial Crisis: The Case of Malaysia. from (NA-a). "The Global Financial Crisis: Its Impact on Vietnam". Retrieved 15/05/2012, from (NA-b). The international banking crisis: impact on Thailand’s financial system and policy responses. Retrieved 17/05/2012, from, D. K. (1998). THE 1997-98 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS. Retrieved 15/05/2012, from 26
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