Addressing Operational Inefficiency
in Punjab Government
Provincial Information & Analysis Unit,
I&C Wing, S&GAD
1
Problem Statement
Service Delivery Gap
1947 1995 2009
Service Delivery
Expectations
Actual Service
Delivery
Source: WDI, W...
Service
Delivery Gap
Resource Gap
Federal Govt.
Operational
Efficiency Gap
Capacity
Willingness to
Work
Institutional
Desi...
Which one is the Binding Constraint?
ResourceShortage
HRCapacity
Willingnessto
Work
InstitutionalDesign
Service-delivery
d...
So is Capacity a Binding Constraint?
• Government sector teachers are paid 5 times
more than private sector teachers
Sourc...
• Government sector teachers are more educated
and better trained than private sector teachers
Source: Leaps Project
6
• Yet children in private schools are 1.5-2.5
years ahead of children in government schools
Source: Leaps Project
7
• If we look at students that switch schooling
regime (private to public or vice versa)
• The same child performs worse wh...
Service
Delivery Gap
Resource Gap
Federal Govt.
Operational
Efficiency Gap
Capacity
Willingness to
Work
Institutional
Desi...
Probability of being caught
(increases with information)
𝑃 F = 𝑝𝜏 ∙ 𝑝 𝛼
Probability of being punished
(decreases due to co...
Service
Delivery Gap
Resource Gap
Federal Govt.
Operational
Efficiency Gap
Capacity
Willingness to
Work
Institutional
Desi...
𝑈 M = 𝑤𝑠 + 𝑤𝑝 − 𝑒 𝑞 𝑝 + 𝜇
+ 𝛽 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜏 𝑝 𝛼) − δ ∙ 𝑝𝜏 𝑝 𝛼
𝑄
𝑞 𝑝
Utility Function of a Public Sector Manager
Allocative Dis...
Where We See Allocative Distortion
• Irrigation & Power
– Unequal distribution of water
• Education
– Teacher absence
• He...
How to Differentiate Employee
Performance in Presence of Other Gaps
Average
performance
Theoretical limits of service deli...
WHERE will allocative
distortion show up?
1. Amount of unaccounted water
2. Dry tails
3. Reporting discrepancies
4. Missin...
Developing an Evaluation System
Work
Breakdown into
Activities
Process
Mapping
Responsibility
Assignment
Key
Performance
I...
Making Government Work
http://mgw.punjab.gov.pk
21
Current Progress
• WBS nodes: 7,312
• Process maps: 3,427
• Process steps: 34,448
• Managers identified: 2,520
• KPIs deve...
Way Forward?
Role of Key Performance Indicators in
Wider Punjab Good Governance
Initiative
23
Appendices
• KPI progress
• Other interventions
– Citizen Feedback Model
– Litigation Monitoring System
– CM Directives
24
Citizen Feedback Model
• Aim: Decrease Petty corruption
• Model: Gather feedback through phone calls
from the citizens who...
Proposed Interventions
• Service provider is made bound to provide Cell# of the citizen
availing the service
• Manager/ Se...
Role of PIAU
Step1: Development of Paper Based Data Capture at Service
Delivery Node
Step2: Development of Online Data Ent...
Intervention Cycle for Services
Development of
Data Entry
Forms at
Service Delivery
Node
System for
Online Data
Entry Syst...
Online Data Entry
29
Feedback Entry
30
MEAs Online Data entry
31
Litigation Monitoring System
• Current System
– Court summons are forwarded to relevant departments.
– Summons sometimes i...
Entering Cases
For priority cases
Has case been sanctioned
by Law department?
May be different from
concerned
department
P...
Updating Cases
Select existing case from
database
Y/N (In case date was
postponed without hearing)
Did gazetted officer re...
CM Directives Monitoring System
• Current System
– Computerized Diary number issued for CM Directives but not used to
trac...
CM Directives
36
CM Directives
37
Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
19...
Health Expenditure Per Capita
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
HealthExpenditurepercapita(inUSD)
Bangladesh ...
The Problem of Collusion
• Collusion is an exogenous variable
– Society
– Patronage-based politics
• Organizations are a s...
Political-Administrative Interaction
• Government operating at two levels – De facto
and De jure
– De jure
• National lead...
Incentives of Politicians
National/
Provincial
leadership
Local
leaders
Local
leaders
Local
leaders
Local
leaders
De jure
...
Incentives of Politicians
• National party leadership desires national/ provincial
seat
– Needs popular support for succes...
Incentives of Politicians
• Local leader desires role in government
– Bargains using patronage-based vote bank that
can be...
Incentives of Politicians
Maintenance of patronage-based
vote bank
• Patronage-based distribution of
public goods
• Long-t...
Interaction of Politicians with
Administration
• Incentives create a market for exchanging
political favours for public go...
Trade of Public Goods for Political
Protection
Local
leader
s
National/
Provincial
leadership
Patron of local leader Polit...
Institutional Design
• 18th Amendment
• Medium Term Development Framework
• Valuation of rural land
• Review of PLGO
• LRM...
Learning and Educational Achievements
in Punjab Schools (LEAPS)
• Rigorous academic study carried out by Tahir Andrabi
(Po...
Information Failure in Observing
Employee Performance
UNOBSERVABLE
PORTION
OBSERVABLE
PORTION
OBSERVED
PORTION
COMPLETE
IN...
Empirical Support of Low Service-delivery
as a result of Information Failure
• Health service in Delhi, India
– Public-sec...
The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in
Delhi, India – Das and Hammer (2005)
• 205 doctors in Delhi assessed by interviewe...
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a
Field Experiment in Indonesia
• To study the impact of increasing top down monitori...
Corruption in Obtaining Driving Licenses in India
(Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna and Mullainathan, 2006)
• Study undertaken in ...
Information Services
• KPI should not be looked into in isolation
• It will help Business Process Improvement for all
dept...
56
CIVIL SECRETARIAT
LAHORE
CM SECRETARIAT
ITD, AIWAN-E-IQBAL
COMPLEX
MOST ISLAMABAD
NTC RACE COURSE
LAHORE
Comm. Tower
Co...
Linkages
• GATEWAY Portal: $3 million with Microsoft
– Dashboard for CM is only front-end
– What is the right information ...
RHC Barana
HR-MIS / PIFRA
• HR-MIS for ALL Depts. (ITD & PIFRA)
– PIFRA data currently being obtained in real-time
from AG office and...
... Linkages: Result Based Mgmt. (RBM)
• RBM is a public sector management philosophy
and approach that focuses on achieve...
Case Study: Mohatir’s ICU
• New Remuneration System 1993
• Public Sector Agencies given freedom on
policies/procedures, ak...
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Making Government Work - Improving Service Delivery in Punjab by deploying Performance Management System

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How the Provincial Information & Analysis Unit (PIAU) pitched for the Performance Management System mapping KPIs of over 300,000 government officials across Punjab, project was deployed in 2010.

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  • RBM slides
  • Riots, law and order, transparency international. Wapda installations attacked?
  • Multiple constraints on performance, but not all constraints are equally binding. Most binding constraint has to be removed first.
  • Principal-agent problem, hidden information, hidden action
    Job market slide
    Principal cannot observe all information, action. Employee full info set- theoretically only known to him. Government wants to increase information. ACRs are not best record of performance. ACR: is a measure of the time spent with the person. Correlation direct. Nicely the time spent, not looking at work he did. Not necessarily related to work he does. Optimal contract. High risk, high pay job – weaker monitoring, public service requires greater monitoring. Contract mode not the best mode. Organizational memory, expertise, unique skills.
  • Political patronage -> if caught
    Information economics -> build step-wise
    Graph of each evidence paper
    No of distorted slots.
  • Unaccounted water – cusecs
  • Department wise – wbs on this many pages
    Process maps – pages
    RAM – pages, # of managers identified, activities identified.
    Work done so far / work to be done
    Citizen feedback model
  • RBM
  • How collusion operates in society. Political + social. Nepotism data. Developed societies, insurance cover given by state – fair trial, disease and sickness. Our society: use support network to get fair trial, ensure services. Asim Khwaja, firms in KSE
  • Making Government Work - Improving Service Delivery in Punjab by deploying Performance Management System

    1. 1. Addressing Operational Inefficiency in Punjab Government Provincial Information & Analysis Unit, I&C Wing, S&GAD 1
    2. 2. Problem Statement Service Delivery Gap 1947 1995 2009 Service Delivery Expectations Actual Service Delivery Source: WDI, World Bank and Structured Interviews with Ministers, Secretaries and Field Officers2
    3. 3. Service Delivery Gap Resource Gap Federal Govt. Operational Efficiency Gap Capacity Willingness to Work Institutional Design Policy Framework Institutional Framework Causes of Service Delivery Deficit Source: Basic Theory of Informational Economics, Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions, Edward P Lazear 3
    4. 4. Which one is the Binding Constraint? ResourceShortage HRCapacity Willingnessto Work InstitutionalDesign Service-delivery deficit Binding constraint? If constraint is non-binding, improving it won’t decrease deficit Maximumservice-deliverycapacityin currentenvironment 4
    5. 5. So is Capacity a Binding Constraint? • Government sector teachers are paid 5 times more than private sector teachers Source: Leaps Project 5
    6. 6. • Government sector teachers are more educated and better trained than private sector teachers Source: Leaps Project 6
    7. 7. • Yet children in private schools are 1.5-2.5 years ahead of children in government schools Source: Leaps Project 7
    8. 8. • If we look at students that switch schooling regime (private to public or vice versa) • The same child performs worse when in a government school than when in a private school Source: Leaps Project 8
    9. 9. Service Delivery Gap Resource Gap Federal Govt. Operational Efficiency Gap Capacity Willingness to Work Institutional Design Policy Framework Institutional Framework Causes of Service Delivery Deficit Source: Basic Theory of Informational Economics, Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions, Edward P Lazear 9
    10. 10. Probability of being caught (increases with information) 𝑃 F = 𝑝𝜏 ∙ 𝑝 𝛼 Probability of being punished (decreases due to collusion) Utility Function of a Public Sector Manager 𝑈 M = 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑤𝑠 + 𝑤𝑝 salary perks & privileges 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝑒 𝑞 𝑝 ‘units’ of public goods delivered 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸(𝜋) 𝑄 𝑞 𝑝 sum of units of public goods converted into private goods Q = total units in control expected return on each unit 𝑃 S = 1 − 𝑃(F) Probability of success Probability of failure Expected Return of Allocative Distortion Reward of succeeding 𝐸 𝜋 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝑃 S − δ ∙ P F Cost of failure (via allocative distortion) 10
    11. 11. Service Delivery Gap Resource Gap Federal Govt. Operational Efficiency Gap Capacity Willingness to Work Institutional Design Policy Framework Institutional Framework Service Delivery Gap Resource Gap Federal Govt. Operational Efficiency Gap Capacity Willingness to Work Collusion Information Failure Institutional Design Policy Framework Institutional Framework Causes of Service-delivery Deficit  11
    12. 12. 𝑈 M = 𝑤𝑠 + 𝑤𝑝 − 𝑒 𝑞 𝑝 + 𝜇 + 𝛽 ∙ (1 − 𝑝𝜏 𝑝 𝛼) − δ ∙ 𝑝𝜏 𝑝 𝛼 𝑄 𝑞 𝑝 Utility Function of a Public Sector Manager Allocative Distortion Can be increased with improved monitoring 12
    13. 13. Where We See Allocative Distortion • Irrigation & Power – Unequal distribution of water • Education – Teacher absence • Health – Non-provision of medicines – Medical staff absence 17
    14. 14. How to Differentiate Employee Performance in Presence of Other Gaps Average performance Theoretical limits of service delivery outcomes Performance spectrum of employees working in similar environment Compare top- performing and lowest-performing employees with reference to average performance 18
    15. 15. WHERE will allocative distortion show up? 1. Amount of unaccounted water 2. Dry tails 3. Reporting discrepancies 4. Missing gauges WHOis doing it? 1. Superintendent Engineer (SE) 2. Divisional Canal Officer (XEN) 3. Sub-divisional Canal Officer (SDO) WHAT are departments doing? HOW are they doing it? 1. Making Changes in Water Distribution 2. Ensuring Channel Safety Against Damage 3. Regulation of Irrigation Channels 4. Monitoring of Outlet Performance Ensuring Equitable Water Distribution How to Define the Best Indicators?Example Irrigation 19
    16. 16. Developing an Evaluation System Work Breakdown into Activities Process Mapping Responsibility Assignment Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) System Development Secretary’s Dashboard 20
    17. 17. Making Government Work http://mgw.punjab.gov.pk 21
    18. 18. Current Progress • WBS nodes: 7,312 • Process maps: 3,427 • Process steps: 34,448 • Managers identified: 2,520 • KPIs developed for 6 departments – Health – Higher Education – Schools Education – Irrigation & Power – Board of Revenue – Home (Punjab Prisons) • Data collection started for – Higher Education – Irrigation & Power 22
    19. 19. Way Forward? Role of Key Performance Indicators in Wider Punjab Good Governance Initiative 23
    20. 20. Appendices • KPI progress • Other interventions – Citizen Feedback Model – Litigation Monitoring System – CM Directives 24
    21. 21. Citizen Feedback Model • Aim: Decrease Petty corruption • Model: Gather feedback through phone calls from the citizens who received a service from the government office • To be implemented in 7 districts for 5 services. – Registration of Property – Provision of Free Medicine in Emergency – Surgical Procedures – Issuance of MLC – Pension cases 25
    22. 22. Proposed Interventions • Service provider is made bound to provide Cell# of the citizen availing the service • Manager/ Senior Office of the Provincial government calls the citizens in a systematic fashion to know about their experiences. • Over time the telephonic feedback will generate patterns of service provider’s behavior. • Such patterns once analyzed will throw up worst service delivery nodes. • It is believed that once the worst service delivery nodes are identified, the service managers can be sorted out through administrative actions like transfers and/ or targeted investigations. • The intervention explained so far captures non-collusive corruption only. Therefore, supplementary intervention was introduced. 26
    23. 23. Role of PIAU Step1: Development of Paper Based Data Capture at Service Delivery Node Step2: Development of Online Data Entry System Step3: Development of Feed back Capturing Forms • DCO: Forms will be generated to enter the feedback • Call Center: A representative random sample of transactions are selected for gathering feedback. Step 4: Development of Online Data Entry system of the Collected Feedback Step 5: Development of System to detect Collusive Corruption Step6: Analysis of Patterns (to be put up to concerned departments, CS and CM) 27
    24. 24. Intervention Cycle for Services Development of Data Entry Forms at Service Delivery Node System for Online Data Entry System Development of Feed back Call Forms System for Online Data Entry of the Collected feedback Development of System to Detect Collusive Corruption & In- efficiency Revenue Registration of Property Completed Completed Completed Completed Completed Health Services Provision of Free Medicine in Emergency Completed Completed Completed Completed Minor Surgical Procedures Completed Completed Completed Completed Issuance of MLC Completed Completed Completed Completed School Education Pension & Leave Cases In Progress In Progress 28
    25. 25. Online Data Entry 29
    26. 26. Feedback Entry 30
    27. 27. MEAs Online Data entry 31
    28. 28. Litigation Monitoring System • Current System – Court summons are forwarded to relevant departments. – Summons sometimes incorrectly sent to wrong department • Need Gap – The Law department is unable to effectively monitor litigation activity because of delayed intimation/responses from relevant departments – Delayed response to court summons (due to lack of coordination) results in adverse judgments and expiration of appeal windows • Solution – Litigation Monitoring System - track status of cases to help streamline the monitoring process for the Law and concerned departments – Value Addition • Availability of quick snapshots will help Secretaries identify gaps, timely escalation of overdue cases will improve response time and assigning of responsibility will become easier in case of lapses • Status – Development work for the initial release of the software is underway 32
    29. 29. Entering Cases For priority cases Has case been sanctioned by Law department? May be different from concerned department Post-admittance, evidence, arguments, etc. Once the case is entered, it will appear on the Solicitor/AG’s dashboard and a law counsel will be assigned to the case 33
    30. 30. Updating Cases Select existing case from database Y/N (In case date was postponed without hearing) Did gazetted officer represent the department? Immediately flags to Solicitor/AG office Option to attach scanned documents Person representing department •When next hearing date passes and case is not updated, case is flagged automatically •The case proceedings will be updated by law counsel. The Litigation officer will be able to view and comment on updates 34
    31. 31. CM Directives Monitoring System • Current System – Computerized Diary number issued for CM Directives but not used to track implementation progress of Directives • Need Gap – Increase in volume of directives has rendered it difficult to track progress on directives – No pre-emptive information on delays, response always reactionary • Solution – Online CM Directives Monitoring System - tracks the entire activity that takes place on a particular Directive once it is issued – Value Addition • Shorten the response time • Improve coordination between departments • Ensure relevant departments receive directive • Status – Preliminary software version under testing 35
    32. 32. CM Directives 36
    33. 33. CM Directives 37
    34. 34. Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 38
    35. 35. Health Expenditure Per Capita 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 HealthExpenditurepercapita(inUSD) Bangladesh India Pakistan Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 39
    36. 36. The Problem of Collusion • Collusion is an exogenous variable – Society – Patronage-based politics • Organizations are a subset of society – Behavior dictated by society instead of vice-versa – Minimum level of collusion given in society – Change requires external intervention • Pakistan – High societal dependence on beradri – High nepotism – Social network guarantees insurance against shocks – Khwaja, Mian (2005) study of loans data on 90,000 firms from 1996-2002 find politically-linked firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50% higher default rates 40
    37. 37. Political-Administrative Interaction • Government operating at two levels – De facto and De jure – De jure • National leadership, CM, CS, Administrative Secretaries, Commissioners, DCOs – De facto • Service managers – SHOs, Patwaris, Headmasters, Bulldozer operators, etc • Each tier faces different incentives – Policy for improvement of one tier will not necessarily affect the other if they have competing incentives 41
    38. 38. Incentives of Politicians National/ Provincial leadership Local leaders Local leaders Local leaders Local leaders De jure De facto Patronage-based votes Party-based votes 42
    39. 39. Incentives of Politicians • National party leadership desires national/ provincial seat – Needs popular support for success – Bargains for as many votes as possible – Two types of votes available • Patronage-based votes via local politicians • Party-based votes via public popularity – Negotiates with local politicians for patronage-based votes using party-ticket • Stronger party-based votes, more bargaining power • Party-based votes can only be increased by provision of public goods 43
    40. 40. Incentives of Politicians • Local leader desires role in government – Bargains using patronage-based vote bank that can be used with any party – Desires to get seat without making extra effort to gain more votes (by providing public goods) – Only do as much work as is required to maintain patronage-based vote bank • Provide public goods only to patrons (i.e. convert them into private goods) – Land tenure security, coercive force (police), health services, etc 44
    41. 41. Incentives of Politicians Maintenance of patronage-based vote bank • Patronage-based distribution of public goods • Long-term capture of position in government (without permanent alignment to political party) Maximization of party-based votes (i.e. gain support of popular masses) • Equitable distribution of public goods • Long-term sustainability of party appeal Locally elected representatives MNAs MPAs DE FACTO (LOCAL) POLITICIANS DE JURE (NATIONAL) POLITICIANS PM CM Party leaders 45
    42. 42. Interaction of Politicians with Administration • Incentives create a market for exchanging political favours for public goods – Administrator uses political favours to lower probability of being held accountable – Politician uses public goods as private goods for community leaders of patronage-based voters 46
    43. 43. Trade of Public Goods for Political Protection Local leader s National/ Provincial leadership Patron of local leader Political protection Public goods traded as private goods Service Delivery tier Senior public managers 47
    44. 44. Institutional Design • 18th Amendment • Medium Term Development Framework • Valuation of rural land • Review of PLGO • LRMIS • Punjab Health Sector Reform Programme • Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme • Punjab Resource Management Programme 48
    45. 45. Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) • Rigorous academic study carried out by Tahir Andrabi (Pomona), Jishnu Das (World Bank), Asim Khwaja (Harvard), Tara Vishwanath (World Bank) and Tristan Zajonc (Harvard) • 112 villages (having at least 1 private school) studied for 4 years (2003 to 2007) in districts – Attock – Faislabad – Rahim Yar Khan • Sample – 823 schools – 5,000 teachers – 12,000 children tested in Urdu, Math and English – 2,000 households 49
    46. 46. Information Failure in Observing Employee Performance UNOBSERVABLE PORTION OBSERVABLE PORTION OBSERVED PORTION COMPLETE INFORMATION SET (only known to employee him/herself) 50
    47. 47. Empirical Support of Low Service-delivery as a result of Information Failure • Health service in Delhi, India – Public-sector doctors are more competent, but exert less effort • Civil works (roads) in Indonesia – Missing funds decreased from 27.7% to 19.2% by increasing to monitoring. • Driving licensing in India – 2/3rd people obtaining licenses are not qualified to drive 51
    48. 48. The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India – Das and Hammer (2005) • 205 doctors in Delhi assessed by interviewers acting as patients • Same doctors observed a month later in clinical practice • Observation – Public sector doctors more competent than private sector ones, but exert lesser effort than their counterparts • Policy Insight – To improve medical services for the poor greater emphasis needs to be laid on changing the incentives of public providers rather than increasing competence via training 52
    49. 49. Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia • To study the impact of increasing top down monitoring on corruption. • Setting: – 608 villages in Indonesia were selected where roads were to be built. Out of these, some villages were selected randomly and told that their funds usage will be audited by central authority. The missing funds ( reported usage- actual usage) were taken as an indicator of corruption. The change in percentage of missing funds before and after the intervention was studied. • Finding: – The missing funds decreased from 27.7% to 19.2% . • Policy Insight: – The knowledge that a tighter level of monitoring is being exercised by the superiors reduces corruption. However, this must be complimented with higher chances of being punished. 53
    50. 50. Corruption in Obtaining Driving Licenses in India (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna and Mullainathan, 2006) • Study undertaken in India to observe the process of obtaining driving licenses by following 822 individuals through the application process • Observations – 1/3rd of those that obtained a License did not take the driving test; all on average paid 2.5 times more that the requisite fee and 2/3rd were unqualified to drive – Extra legal payments were unavoidable and not paid directly to corrupt bureaucrats, but to “agents” – Process fails to implement the social goal it was implemented for 54
    51. 51. Information Services • KPI should not be looked into in isolation • It will help Business Process Improvement for all depts. • Enterprise Service Bus: – Get data from 36 Districts & 38 Departments – Give services to public/employees • Resultantly, the existing systems of departments improve, e.g. Health: – DHIS + PHSRP MIS – Clerks bring Flash Drives from Districts to Lahore – Amalgam of 5 systems with duplications
    52. 52. 56 CIVIL SECRETARIAT LAHORE CM SECRETARIAT ITD, AIWAN-E-IQBAL COMPLEX MOST ISLAMABAD NTC RACE COURSE LAHORE Comm. Tower Comm. Tower Comm. Tower W ireless Link W ireless Link Satellite dish Digital Cross Connect (Dxx) (1 Mbps) Digital Cross Connect (Dxx)(1 Mbps) Digital Cross Connect (Dxx)(128Kbps) Digital Cross Connect (Dxx)(1 Mbps) BRI ISDN BRI ISDN INTER - LAN CONNECTIVITY (THREE SITES) These Links will be used for internet Access, inter departmental communication, Email, Messaging
    53. 53. Linkages • GATEWAY Portal: $3 million with Microsoft – Dashboard for CM is only front-end – What is the right information for the indicators? Where is it going to come from? – PITB has requested PIAU for Enterprise Service Bus • The Urban Unit – Established wireless networking* with PIAU for their GIS data needs (e.g., Health data for PHSRP) – CS + Secretaries would have GIS Decision Support System * All Wireless Network Equipment has been procured & installed but not yet operational since TUU’s Vendor defaulted
    54. 54. RHC Barana
    55. 55. HR-MIS / PIFRA • HR-MIS for ALL Depts. (ITD & PIFRA) – PIFRA data currently being obtained in real-time from AG office and ported to ITD system – Transfer/Enquiry/Promotion orders for employees NOT to be issued until first updated in system – Pilot: Higher Education & Sialkot CDG 59
    56. 56. ... Linkages: Result Based Mgmt. (RBM) • RBM is a public sector management philosophy and approach that focuses on achievement of goals and objectives for improved result delivery: • Strategic planning • Systematic implementation • Effective resource usage • Performance monitoring, measurement & reporting • Evaluation to improve result delivery – Next tranche of $150 million from PRMP – Being dove-tailed formally with PIAU •Thomas, Kosha, Malaysia: “Integrated Results Based Management,” 2008 Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results,Annual Publication •The World Bank/IBRD, “Designing and Building a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System, A Tool for Public Sector Management,” A Workshop for Government Officials and Their Development Partners, 2000
    57. 57. Case Study: Mohatir’s ICU • New Remuneration System 1993 • Public Sector Agencies given freedom on policies/procedures, akin to businesses • Five Central Agencies for reform: – Implementation Coordination Unit (ICU JPM) within PM’s Office – Malaysian Administrative Modernization And Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), Economic Planning Unit(ECU), Public Sector Department (PSD) • Annual Contract System with Employees – Goals set at beginning of year – Remuneration dependent upon performance/goals • Program Based Budgeting

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