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Functioning of teh Public Accounts Committee of teh National Assembly of Pakistan 2002-2011, Dissertation faisal hayat

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M.Phil thesis presenting a comparative study of the functioning of the Public Accounts Committee of Pakistan during 2002-2006 (when a Government member was Chair) and 2008-2011 (when the Opposition …

M.Phil thesis presenting a comparative study of the functioning of the Public Accounts Committee of Pakistan during 2002-2006 (when a Government member was Chair) and 2008-2011 (when the Opposition Leader was PAC Chair). Contains a good literature review including Pakistani academics, extensive questionnaires and interviews with "inside" stakeholders, and compares to frameworks previously presented by McGee and Stapenhurst on effective or ideal PACs. The Study contains some surprising information. eg:


. the financial statements of the government of Federal Government of Pakistan have been prepared by the Controller General of Accounts and audited by the Auditor General of Pakistan each year, but never scrutinized by a PAC "except perhaps once."

. Pakistan has had a number of periods of military rule during which there was no Parliament. At least 6 adhoc PACs were appointed to carry out the PAC function during such periods, and they were functional for just over 16 years (vs 22.5 years for elected PACs)

. It took over 500 days to form the 12th (government led) PAC, but only 150 to form the 13th

. Even when the PAC was led by a government member, 80% of respondents felt the PAC should be chaired by an opposition member.

. When the PAC was chaired by a government member, PAC recommendations were "seldom" or "never" implemented in 80% of cases, whereas when the opposition leader chaired the PAC, recommendations were "frequently" implemented. This is contrary to the argument generally advanced for having a government Chair.

. Many other interesting findings, some controversial observations about the Auditor General of Pakistan, and a Conclusions chapter with 40 recommendations for making the PAC in Pakistan more effective

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  • 1. IThe Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly ofPakistan: A Comparative Study of Its Functioning during periods;2002-2006 and 2008-2011Submitted byFaisal HayatNDU-GPP/M.P-09/F-060Supervised byDr. Usman MustafaDepartment of Government & Public PolicyNational Defence University, Islamabad-Pakistan
  • 2. IITo my parents,
  • 3. IIIAcknowledgementForemost, my sincere gratitude to my Supervisor, Dr. Usman Mustafa for his continuoussupport to my M Phil research for his patience, motivation, enthusiasm and immenseknowledge. Defiantly, it was his guidance that helped me all the course of research andwriting of this Dissertation.My special gratitude also goes to Dr. Ilhan Niaz, for his unlimited support in reviewingmy initial chapters. My special thanks to Dr. Bashir Hussain, Dr. Sarfraz Hussain Ansariand Asif Shah for their technical support, encouragement and insightful comments.My sincere thanks to Honourable Nadeem Afzal Gondal, Chairman PAC, HonourableYasmeen Rehman, Member PAC and Honourable Riaz Fatyana, Member PAC for theirprecious time and continued support to my research. I am equally thankful to all othermembers for their interviews and response to my research questionnaires.My utmost gratitude to PAC Secretariat, especially Moosa Raza Afandi, AdditionalSecretary, Najma Saddiquee, Joint Secretary, Muhammad Mushtaq, DS Legislation,Roomana Kakar, Deputy Secretary, Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, Sharafat Ali,Section Officer, Salamat Ali, Section Officer and Shabbir Ahmed, Assistant, Haji HattarLibrarian-NA for facilitating my access to PAC, for their briefings and providing withnecessary data.I am so grateful to Mohammad Mohsin Khan former Controller General of Accounts andDeputy Auditor General Pakistan for his technical support and guidance. I found him thebest guide with technical knowledge about auditing, financial oversight and PACoperations among the persons I accessed for this study.I am so grateful to my friends Hassan Choukhia, Afzal Tarar, Muhammad Maqsood,Shahzad Rao, Bilal Maghrani, Asad Kamal, Iqbal Haider, Imran Haider and Sohail Ikramfor their encouragement and morale support.I importantly thank my family especially my parents, brothers, sisters, wife, nephews andnieces who missed my company most of the time and sometimes on very specialoccasions.In the end I cannot forget to acknowledge the contribution of Ahmed Bilal Mehboob andAasiya Riaz (PILDAT) who give me assignment to work for the most effectivecommittee of the National Assembly of Pakistan and I eventually got the idea to work onthe functioning of PAC. PILDAT assignment was done in a couple of weeks aftercounting number of meetings of the National Assembly and Senate standing committeesand declaring PAC the most effective committee of the National Assembly on meeting
  • 4. IVfor maximum number of times but my research just started to further investigate theoperations of PAC.
  • 5. VTable of ContentsTable of Contents---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IVList of Figures------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VIList of Abbreviations----------------------------------------------------------------------------------IXAbstract-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------XIChapter 1Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------1Chapter 2Literature Review--------------------------------------------------------------------------9Chapter 3Methodology and Theoretical Framework-----------------------------------------22Chapter 4The Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC-------------------------------------28Chapter 5Colliding Facts------------------------------------------------------------------------61Chapter 6Challenging the Past-----------------------------------------------------------------101Chapter 7The culture of governance in Pakistan--------------------------------------------142Chapter 8Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------160Chapter 9Making PAC Effective--------------------------------------------------------------161Cited References------------------------------------------------------------------------------167Annexure---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------176
  • 6. VIList of FiguresFigure 3.1. Survey Population and Response Rate 23Figure 4.2. PAC Organogram 38Figure 4.3. Channels of supervision 39Figure. 4.3 Process MAP of PAC 46Figure 4.4. Sitting Arrangement of PAC Meeting 47Figure 4.5. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points 49Figure 4.6. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points 49Figure 4.7. AG relationship with PAC 54Figure 5.1. Comparative Delay 60Figure 5.2. Performance of MIC 64Figure 5.3. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA 66Figure 5.4. Details of the Audit Reports examined byMr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA 68Figure 5.5. Backlog Status 69Figure 5.6. General Comparison of 12th & 13th PAC 70Figure 5.7. Excess budget Statements examined by 12th PAC 80Figure 5.8. Excess budget Statements examined by 13th PAC 84Figure 5.9. Audit Paras Discussed V/S Directives Passed 89Figure 5.10. Compliance Rate in Per centage 90Figure 5.11. Quality of Clearance 90Table 6.2. A perception of the respondent about the of the Best Chairof 12thand 13thPAC 100Table 6.3.Tthe perception of the Capacity of Committee Staff of12thand 13thPAC 101
  • 7. VIITable 6.4. Availability of Research Facility 101Table 6.5. Government Response to Committee Recommendations 102Table 6.6. Government Implements Committee Recommendations 103Table 6.7. Institutionalization of practices 103Table 6.8. Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases 104Table 6.9. Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws 104Table 6.10. Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contraveneadministrative guidelines 105Table 6.11. Resistant to Political Pressure 106Table 6.12. PAOs found hiding facts 106Table 6.13. Adoption of latest Financial Oversight Developments 107Table 6.14. The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principlesrequired to meet its objective 107Table 6.15. Adherence to financial control of resources 108Table 6.16. The policy of waste prevention 109Table 6.17. The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources 109Table 6.18. Representation of Political Parties 110Table 6.19. Ministerial Exclusion 111Table 6.20. PAC focus on holding the government accountable for itsspending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets 112Table 6.21. Committee focus on administration of policy 112Table 6.22. Reference to examine the Public Accounts 113Table 6.23. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 114Table 6.24. Power to call independent witnesses 114Table 6.25. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed
  • 8. VIIIexpenditures of government Organizations receiving funds fromthe government and all state corporations 115Table 6.26. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specificreviews or tasks 116Table 6.27. Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountablefor administrative, performance even after they have left office 117Table 6.28. Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 117Table 6.29. Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 118Table 6.30. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 119Table 6.31. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitiveor national security issues 119Table 6.32. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to theLegislative Auditor’s Act 120Table 6.33. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 121Table 6.34. Power to choose subjects for examination without governmentdirection and advice 121Table 6.35. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committee 122Table 6.36. Powers to take Suo-Moto actions 123Table 6.37. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take action 123Table 6.38. Powers to take action on media review 124Table 6.39. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporategovernance arrangements 124Table 6.40. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 125Table 6.41. Close working relationship between members fromdifferent political parties 126
  • 9. IXTable 6.42. Advance preparation of members 126Table 6.43. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/Accounts/Grants 127Table 6.44. Quick and in time decisions 128Table 6.45. Close working relationship with Auditor General 128Table 6.46. Provision of independent technical expertise and researchsupport for hearings 129Table 6.47. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with Backlog 129Table 6.48. Strategic prioritization of items for committee review,with time limits for stages of committee work like consideration ofdepartmental replies, reporting, implementation reports 130Table 6.49. Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 131Table 6.50. Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliamentand stays active between sessions 131Table 6.51. Televised public hearings 132Table 6.52. Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 133Table 6.53. Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 133Table 6.54. Having committee members with at least 2 years of priorCommittee experience 134Table 6.55. Having committee members with prior administrative orbusiness experience 134Table 6.56. Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate inhearings outside the normal legislative session 135Table 6.57. Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 136Table 6.58. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee
  • 10. Xrecommendations 137Table 6.59. Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action hasbeen taken to implement the committee’s recommendations 137Table 6.60. Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanismssuch as the budget committee 138
  • 11. XIList of AbbreviationsAGP Auditor-General of PakistanANP Awami National PartyAPAC Adhoc Public Accounts CommitteeCAA Civil Aviation AuthorityCCAF-FCVI The Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation-LaFondation canadienne pour la vérification integréeCEO Chief Executive OrderCDA Capital Development AuthorityCGA Controller General of AccountsCoD Charter of DemocracyCPA Commonwealth Parliamentary AssociationDG Director GeneralICG International Crisis GroupJCPA Australian parliament’s Joint Committee of PublicAccountsKPMG KPMG is a global network of professional services firmsproviding Audit, Tax and Advisory services.MIC Monitoring & Implementation CommitteeMMA Muthida Majlis-e-AmalMNA Member of National Assembly of PakistanMQM Mutihida Qaumi MovementNA National Assembly of PakistanPAC Public Accounts CommitteePAKPK Provincial Assembly of Khyber PukhtunkhawaPAO Principal Accounting OfficerPML Pakistan Muslim LeaguePML-N Pakistan Muslim League-NawazPPP Pakistan People’s PartyPTA Pakistan Telecommunication AuthorityUK United KingdomUSAID United States Aid for International DevelopmentWBI World Bank InstituteOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment)INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme Audit InstitutionsRETA Regional Technical Assistance
  • 12. XIIAbstractThe Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PAC) is astanding committee of the National Assembly- a legislative oversight committee thatholds the government to account for its use of public funds and resources by examiningthe public accounts. Naturally a probing and regulating body, it performs financialoversight while, examining the effectiveness of government programmes in achievingtheir objectives. The PAC has an independent financial oversight role on NationalAssembly’s behalf of the government and the public services. In performance of this task,it is largely dependent on the information provided by the Auditor General in its auditreports that reach the PAC vide Article 171 of the Constitution. In addition PAC takessuo motu action on issues of public importance and also written public complaints.The overall objective of the study is to identify the major problems, discrepancies andfailures relating to the performance of PAC, while counting the successes of PAC. Inorder to achieve this objective a comparative study of functioning of the Public AccountsCommittee of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the periods: 2002-2006 and2008-2011 is being done through this studyThe study is largely based on McGee’s thought expressed in the Overseers and theframework as defined by World Bank working paper by Stapenhurst, et.al., “ScrutinizingPublic Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public Accounts Committees” toassess the performance of the PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan.The study revealed that PAC operations were restricted to years of backlog, inefficientbureaucracy and political posturing. PAC is independent according to its mandate but stillleans heavily on the Auditor-General to prioritize areas of review. PAC has become aplatform to regulate the excess budget grants and to recommend settlement of paras. Thecompliance rate is as low as 12 per cent on an average while 88 per cent of actions werepending. (Monitoring and Implementation Committee 2012) The PAOs or the ministriesare continually violating the directives of PAC thus breaching the privilege of theparliamentary committee. Leader of the Opposition who was the Chairman of PACaccording to Charter of Democracy resigned (November 27, 2011) on personnel stakes
  • 13. XIIIwhile keeping the Office of the Leader of the Opposition burying the best practice offinancial oversight process, a sacred trust put on the shoulders of Opposition under theCharter of Democracy.The study also revealed that the state was spending much more on the institutions of auditand financial oversight than their outputs the reported recoveries, financial managementand the impact on good governance. The study observed that certain audit practices likehighlighting of paras and audit sampling were quite ambiguous, and at the discretion ofthe Auditor General.
  • 14. 1Chapter 1Introduction1.1 BackgroundThe State is a major form of human political organisation that performs the criticalfunctions of establishing and sustaining order and collecting taxes, which, if not carriedout effectively, can lead to anarchy. Although states were greatly developed in earlierperiods of history with defined political setups, courts, tax systems and administrations,democratic norms and constitutionalism are relatively recent phenomena (Niaz, 2010). InSouth Asia, for example, rulers had a free hand over the resources of the state and thepeople that resulted in chaotic conditions and wastage of taxes. In contrast, aftergenerations of political development, the British realised the importance of the properhandling of state funds in order to combat fraud and corruption and to get the most fromthe tax money. In 1857 a small group of the members of Parliament lead by Sir FrancisBearing, recommended the creation of a committee to oversee the government accountsto the parliament. William Gladstone, the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer,initiated reforms and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was established through aresolution to structure and function in 1861 (Government of UK 2012). The practiceproved so effective that most of the commonwealth and other countries have adopted it(McGee 2002).In India, the Montague-Chelmsford Reform set the first PAC in 1921, chaired by theFinance Member of the Executive Council and assisted by the finance department torestrict the contradictory opinion and public criticism of the Executive (McIntyre, 1977).The system continued till 1949.In Pakistan, the first PAC was constituted on May 3, 1948 by Presidential approval toadopt the Pakistan Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Rules (May 3, 1948) under section38(3) of Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Pakistan ProvisionalConstitutional Order, 1947. However, its meeting never took place (NA, 1985). The PACof the National Assembly of Pakistan is based on the basic Westminster Model of
  • 15. 2Democracy approach1whereby the Executive-led government is accountable toParliament and the Parliament exercises oversight over the Executive-led Government(USAID, 2009). The approach is largely based on learning lessons from the best practicesof tried and tested values among different democracies. In such a parliamentary system,various committees are formed to overcome the legislative burden.In addition to this, the institution of PAC in Pakistan existed even when parliamentremained dissolved, a minimum of six (6) adhoc PACs have functioned during militaryrule which accounts for about half of Pakistan’s history. The PAC was normally chairedby the Finance Minister till 1977 with the exception of Noor-ul-Amin, MNA,2whochaired 5thPAC and then 2ndadhoc PAC during Ayub Khan’s Marshal Law period (NA,1985). In UK, since the origin of PAC, it is a convention that a Treasury Minister sits inthe committee meeting but does not participate in the debate (Government of UK, 2012).Under General Zia, A.G.N. Kazi and Ghulam Ishaq Khan were the 4thand 5thChairmen ofthe adhoc PAC, respectively, Shahibzada M. Ali Shah, MNA, was appointed as theChairman PAC when General Zia established a democratic government during his rule(Saeed, 1998).Benazir Bhutto came into government in 1989 and appointed Hakim Ali Zardari, MNA,from government party as the Chairman PAC. During the Benazir-Nawaz governments,normally the PAC was chaired by the ruling party MNAs. On 25thAugust 2000,Musharraf formed 6thadhoc PAC and appointed H.U. Beg3as the chairman. While,Musharraf held elections to give people a democratic government in 2002. The regimeestablished a proto-PAC to carry out the functions that would otherwise be performed by1The Westminster system is a democratic parliamentary system of government modelled after the politics of theUnited Kingdom. This term comes from the Palace of Westminster, the seat of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.The term, ‘Westminster model of democracy’ was developed by political scientist Arend Lijphart. The termWestminster model interchangeably with majoritarian mode is used to refer to a general model of democracy. SeeArend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, p.9. This model of democracy isdefined as concentration of executive power in one party and bare majority cabinets, cabinets dominance, two-partysystem, majoritarian and disproportional systems of elections, interest groups pluralism, unitary and centralizedgovernment, concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature, constitutional flexibility, absence of judicialreview, a central bank controlled by the executive.2Noor-ul-Amin, MNA, was also from government party. He also has been Prime Minister of Pakistan from (December7, 1971 to December 20, 1971) and Vice President of Pakistan from (1970-72).3Mr.H.U.Beg had an illustrious career in the civil service, holding various key positions for about five decades. Heserved as secretary at several federal ministries and autonomous bodies and was the longest serving finance secretary.Mr. Beg was a long serving distinguished member of the FAST-NU BoG. He was also chairman of the KASB Bank.He passed away on December 9, 2009.
  • 16. 3the PAC in a parliamentary environment. Apparently, it was not any ideal condition,however, being Parliament in abeyance, it is regarded a good practice in Internationalcommunity. McGee (2002) acknowledges the existing of proto-PAC during Musharrafregime saying the Government of Pakistan recognises the importance of PAC in goodgovernance and sound public sector accountability. However, the first Adhoc PAC wasfirst established in Pakistan in 1962 releasing the importance of public sectoraccountability by Gen. Ayub Khan (NA, 1985).The 12thPAC was thus formed on 3rd November 2003 and Malik Allah Yar Khan, MNA,from the government party was appointed chairman (National Assembly Secretariat,2007). Generally it is observed that having a Government member as a chair couldindicate a lack of independence on the part of PAC from executive and consequently lackof effective accountability and oversight. However, it is observed that in the Australiancontext that a chair from the government can advocate that the PAC’s recommendationsbe implemented by the government. Clearly this question of both the independence andthe implementation is empirical and can only be addressed by studying the actualactivities of the PACs (McGee, 2002).The 13thNational Assembly first met on 17 March, 2008 but the PAC was formed on 19September, 2008 with a delay of six (6) months and two (2) days. Ch. Nisar Ali, MNAand the Leader of Opposition in National Assembly of Pakistan, was asked to chair PACfor the first time in Pakistan as a Leader of the Opposition as is the practice in theWestminster democracies respecting the Charter of Democracy (NA, 2007:Charter ofDemocracy, Rule 15).The purpose of the PAC in the parliamentary system of Pakistan is to identify wastage ofnational wealth, tackling poor performance of departments and making the best use ofpublic funds, but the committee has become a probing body. Reports of the AuditorGeneral of Pakistan (AGP) and accounts of the Federal Government are referred to it fora review. The review was not conducted in a timely and efficient manner causing a big
  • 17. 4backlog.4The big backlog diverted the focus of successive PACs towards violationsconcerning the previous government rather than focusing on the present one. The moderndemocracies benefit from PAC in over-sighting their on-going projects and policies toboost their delivery in a more efficient way but the case in Pakistan is different due to thebacklog and lopsided accountability meted out to the previous government’s projects. Asan example, the PAC of British Parliament has issued 62 reports in 2006-07 whichmainly include the work of government from major projects such as the Thames Gatewayand the preparations for the 2012 Olympics, administrative processes like helpingcompanies achieve their tax obligations and the implementation of child support reforms,social issues like legal aid and anti-social behaviour, as well as timeless value for moneyconcerns such as procurement and employment programmes. These democracies areworking on Value for Money and Audit Performance concepts with a 90% of compliancerate (Government of UK, 2012).In case of Pakistan, during every period of democratic government the political leaderspoliticised the civil servants for mostly ulterior motives. The original breaches in thefunctional divisions of the state were made by elected representatives during the earlyyears of Pakistan. Heedless, the politicians used and abused the apparatus to secure theirpersonal power and wealth and drew the higher bureaucracy and the armed forces intopolitics while punishing opposition leaders and dissenters through repressive legislation,ordinances and the repeated imposition of governor’s rule (Niaz, 2010).With theelevation of Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat to cabinet post and the rise of Ayub Khan,to the post of army chief, the politicians opened the corridors of corruption, mal-practices, poor governance and the worse of all welcoming military to enter the politics(Bhutto, 1973).The three military takeovers, bureaucratic overstretch, introduction of local governmentsystem at the cost of civil administration and unstable political governments of 1990s,caused lasting harm to the state machinery. All these circumstances and the eventsundermined the purpose of creation of PAC to oversight the institutions. The4PAC had formed three sub committees to deal this backlog of the last PAC. When Ch. Nisar Ali resigned as aChairman of PAC, they were up-to 2008 in dealing with the AGP reports and paras. (Please check the exact date thatthey had cleared the back log to.
  • 18. 5politicisation of civil servants and the institutions badly affected the good governance;hence, PAC remained ineffective across the history of Pakistan always struck with bigbacklogs, on the mercy of inefficient civil servants and political posturing. The Studywill, however, focus the functioning of the PAC during the governments from 2002 to2011.1.2. Statement of the ProblemIt is the responsibility of a state to provide its citizens with freedom from poverty,freedom from servitude and a quality of life free from injustice and tyranny. Corruption isthe worse obstacle in achieving these objectives. It hampers development process of acountry. Once in practice, corruption encircles all sectors of state into its sphere on thecost of citizen’s rights. Transparency International reported a loss of Rs. 8500 billion incorruption, tax evasion and bad governance during the first four (04) years of recent PPP-led coalition government (The Jang 2012). While, during the Musharraf period suchlosses reported were Rs. 2576 billion only in five scams of Privatization, Bank of Punjab,Petroleum, Stock Exchange and Sugar Scandal only (APSN 2009). These figures create aterrible impression of governments when state institutions like PAC, the legislativeoversight body, were functioning. Why were these losses not avoided or minimised? TheMusharraf regime formed adhoc PAC realising the importance of financial oversight overinstitution in time when National Assembly remained dissolved but does it meantanything. In a scenario, the functioning of PAC in both eras is important to be discussedunder this study.1.3. HypothesisThe hypothesis of this study is that under both governments, the Musharraf Regime andthe Pakistan People’s Party-led Coalition Government, the operations of the PAC wererestrained by years of backlog, bureaucratic inefficiency and political posturing.1.4. Objectives of the StudyThe overall objective is to identify the major problems, discrepancies and failures, whilelisting the successes of PAC keeping in mind its mandate according to the Rules and
  • 19. 6Procedures of the National Assembly of Pakistan. The effort is to achieve this objectivethrough conducting a comparative study of functioning of the Public AccountsCommittee of the National Assembly of Pakistan during the periods: 2002-2006 and2008-2011. However the specific objectives are; To explore which one of the selected PAC remained most active/effective duringits respective periods based on quality of clearance provided its capacity To outline obstacles in review process of public spending and government controlof public funds which PAC performs in cases related to the use of public assets,resources and funds under two selected governments To study the process of enquiry on evaluating financial management performanceto identify wastes and poor governance To ascertain whether reports, recommendation and directives of PAC have anyinfluence in improving the performance of the institutions, strengthening internalcontrol and preventing re-occurrence (addressing of the weaknesses pointed outon the system by AGP, PAC, PAO) To formulate a set of policy recommendations on the basis of major findings, inthe end to help make the process of legislative oversight effective enhancingaccountability and transparency1.6. Significance of the studyAfter a thorough review of the relevant data, it is observed that there is little workavailable on the functioning of PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan, while, it’sfunctioning is requisitely public, awareness of the performance of state organs concerningaccountability and oversight of state institutions can restore public confidence inGovernment. A thorough study of the comparative functioning of PAC in the selectedperiods is significant to this study. After the completion of this study, the research will beable to fill the gaps in the existing literature on functioning, especially comparativefunctioning, of PAC during two comparative/consecutive governments.
  • 20. 7Secondly, major findings and recommendations of this research will be helpful for theinstitutions specially governmental and non-governmental organisations working andinterested in good governance and the operation of PAC in Pakistani jurisdictions.1.7. Justification of the StudyAlthough, PAC is working for the last 64 years, it has achieved few of the assignedobjectives given its mandate. The idea of good governance in the state has largely fadedaway; political institutions have weakened as a result of adversities and unethicalpractices of insincere and disloyal leaders across the history of Pakistan. Constitutionaldemocracy was never given a chance to flourish while the political leaders politicised thecivil servants to use them for illegal and abusive practices. On the other hand, stateresources and properties were competitively grabbed by one or the other among thecircles of politicians. Those in power had tried their best to get the most from theirposition and access to the state resources. The PAC, in the previous governmentsremained under government control5, so was its oversight over state finances. Under thepresent government, PAC only functioned to criticise the political rivals and policies ofthe previous government. The moment, it cleared the back log and was ready to starttaking up issues that arose during the tenure of the present government, the AGP waschanged and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan resigned as a Chairman PAC leaving the committee toits fate.1.8. Limitations of the studyAlthough PAC is working since 1948 but the main aim of this research is to compare andidentify the better functioning of one government over other during year 2002-2006 and2008- 2011. The study do not systematically examine the functioning of PAC during theother governments in different times other than selected for this study and terminateswith the resignation of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan as its Chairman on November 27, 2011.5PAC was mostly chaired by Finance Ministers or the Members of Parliament who belong to government party or thetrusted and obliged persons of the government (Bureaucrats etc.). While, in Commonwealth and other countries, it is apractice that PAC will be chaired by the Opposition Leader which happened for the first time during recent PPPP-ledgovernment, Who give a chance to Opposition Leader Ch. Nisar Ahmed, respecting international practices to chair theCommittee.
  • 21. 81.9. Organisation of the studyChapter 1 is a Brief Background of the study. Chapter 2 is a Literature Review andprovide the sum of net practices related to the functioning of PAC. Chapter 3 isMethodology and the Theoretical Framework of the study. Chapter 4 discusses theStructure, Functioning and Role of PAC and is a brief guide for Members, Secretariat,Auditor General, PAOs and general public to know about the process of PAC operations.Chapter 5 & 6 examine and compare different traits of the PAC during two periods.Chapter 5 in detail consists of major observations of the study during selected periodwhile Chapter 6 is the discussion of the results of the survey conducted for this study andprovides the perception of the respondents. Chapter 7 is a discussion of the majorfindings bases on the theoretical framework set in the Methodology. Chapter 8 is aConclusion of the study and Chapter 9 is a set of Recommendations for making theprocess of legislative financial oversight effective while enhancing transparency andaccountability. The next chapter is a detailed review of the literature.
  • 22. 9Chapter 2Literature Review2.1 IntroductionAlthough there is big accumulation of literature pertaining to the formation, functioningand operations of Public Accounts Committees (PACs) across commonwealth and non-commonwealth (McGee 2002; Wehner 2003, Gay and Winetrobe 2003, Stapenhurst,Sahgal, Woodley and Pelizzo 2005; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2007; Jacobs, Jones andSmith 2007; Jacobs and Jones 2009), very little investigation is made of the comparativefunctioning of PAC in Pakistan. The study observes the comparative functioning of 12th(2002-2006) and 13th(2008-11) PACs of the National Assembly of Pakistan realizing thegap existing in the entire literature. PAC, primarily being a financial oversight committeeof any Parliament, plays a vital role in implementing Public Sector Accountability beinga significant component of the parliamentary machine ensuring governments functions,their working practices, policies, actions, course of execution and use of public monies(McGee 2002:31). No democratic government can properly function unless anappropriate accountability is not carry out (Funnell and Cooper 1998; Watson 2004).However, Jones and Stewart (2008).deemed accountability could be an outcome of theallocation of praise or blame.PAC in Pakistan has always been an important standing committee of the legislature (NA1885), realizing the importance of financial oversight of public monies, adhoc PACswere constituted when National Assembly remained dissolved in Pakistan. However, theoperations of PACs across the history of Pakistan were only formalities (NA 1885). Areview of literature (ICG 2010, 2004; Shafqat 2010; Niaz 2010; Chaudry 2011 and Altaf2011) holds that arbitrary transfers of state servants, bureaucratic inefficiency andpolitical posturing were major restrictions in the way of good governance in Pakistan.This weak structure of governance never allowed oversight and accountability institutions
  • 23. 10like Public Accounts Committee to properly function in order to strengthen parliamentaryoversight of resources and the governance.2.2 PAC Role as an InstitutionAldons (1985); and Griffiths (2006) described PAC, naturally a standing committee ofthe parliament, is regarded as a key financial legislative oversight committee assigned thejob of compliance of its directives and maintaining efficiency and good governance ofdepartments and agencies under its ambit. PAC’s major responsibility has been toinvestigate the financial oversight of the resources allocated to a programme at budgetproposal level. Whereas the PAC plays an ex post facto oversight process at a secondarylevel to check the regularity in spending of allocated monies as Wehner (2003) describes.During the early nineteenth, the PACs were associated entirely with the public finances;to examine government expenditures, mainly based on the information provided in theAuditor General Reports, naturally working in close relationship with the AuditorGeneral, making certain that public money sectioned by the legislature had beenappropriately, economically and efficiently spent on defined projects and programmes.PAC had another obligation of the non-enforcement limitations of PAC especially inPakistan due to absence of supportive financial legislation under Article 79 of theConstitution, like the Financial Management Practices Act that exists in South Africawhere a government agency can be fined or an official jailed for violation for financialrules. The audit courts in Europe and African countries are good examples ofenforcement of financial oversight.2.3 Modern Methods of Accountability- Audit Performance and Value forMoneyMulgan (2001) and Guthrie and Parker (1999), have introduced the development ofperformance auditing for the purpose of getting rid of old technical accounting methods,while focusing on its prospective of resistance to political influences. They startedundertaking performance auditing work, while, other are exercising powers to examinebudget estimates, described as an ex-ante facto. Now, they better spotlight modernconcepts like value for money which is economy; the minimizing of costs of resources
  • 24. 11utilized for an activity with regard to appropriate quality, efficiency; is the ratio betweenoutputs and inputs, the maximum outputs from minimum inputs, and effectiveness; is therelationship between the intended impact and the actual impact of an activity or product(Johnson, 2010 and The House of Commons, 2005). However, the concept ofparliamentary accountability somehow remained a controversy and debate. Among theconventional forms of accountability, was the concept of ministerial responsibility, whereministers were directly accountable to parliamentary inquiries. Walter (2006).holds thatthe concept remained under political test as governments re-defined and to a largerdegree abated the ministerial responsibility. The reason for lack of appropriate focus onperformance audit is the AGP’s concentration on compliance with authority audits thathave to be done in absence of an effective internal audit structure in the Governance setup in Pakistan.2.4 Conventional AccountabilityThe findings reported by CCAF-FCVI are consistent to the finding of Simon McInnesresearch during the mid-1970s. In his research, McInnes examined the provincialexperience regarding legislative scrutiny of public expenditures. His study focused on thestandard functioning and proceeding of PAC, the role of AG in accountability processand the relationship between PAC and AG, while discussing external factors whichinfluence PAC in performing its activities. McInnes (1977:39) significantly found thatPAC of one province was varying from the PAC of other province in many ways.McInnes added that most of the PACs were functioning on conventional methods in 1975and there was not any established system of proceedings.Mulgan (1997) also challenged this concept, according to him, this is a pluralistic modelof accountability where accountability is a multi-dimensional phenomenon starting withthe new public management theory during the late 20thcentury. However, regardless ofboth the value of financial oversight committees to public sector accountability and thevarying political and administrative atmosphere that facilitates its function andstrengthens governance, there is a big gap in academic research on the functioning ofPACs in this prospective, including both common wealth and non-common wealthcountries, particularly in Pakistan. Normally, the existing works available are of a
  • 25. 12descriptive nature compiled by practitioners and politicians engaged in the PAC process(McGee, 2002 and Watson, 2004) or by surveys conducted in the fields (KPMG, 2006and Stapenhurst et al., 2005).In a broader sense, a very significant academic study was by Degeling, Anderson andGuthrie (1996) who carried out a content analysis of reports of the Australianparliament’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) between the period 1914 and1932 to study the activities involved in constituting the status and focus of a PAC. Theyestablished that it was difficult to understand activities and outcomes of a PAC simplywith regard to purposes of its progenitors. They concluded that future studies are buildinga link among accountability, accounting practices and PACs may be studied in ananalytical context of the concerned social and political environments (Degeling et al.,1996: 47 and Jacobs and Jones 2009). While comprehending the earlier analysis of JCPAinto a study of demise in the early 1930s of JCPA and Victorian PAC, the study groupholds that both functionaries glided significantly from their deliberated job of financialoversight to a legitimizing role.Wehner (2003) and Newberry and Pallot (2005), in their studies highlighted the effects ofexternal factor on the functioning of PACs. Wehner (2003) arguments that regardless ofbeing a significant part of parliamentary structure and scrutiny process, the PACs arelargely dependent on external factors like political environment and resource provided.The work of Newberry and Pallot (2005) recommended a pessimistic liaison amongPACs, accounting practice, and issues of parliamentary accountability. They furtherargue that the introduction of the Public Finance Bill in New Zealand dilutedparliamentary oversight and control of spending in New Zealand. It highlighted asignificant question on the nature and independence of parliamentary finances and thefunctions of PAC. A WBI survey of 51 PACs conducted by Pelizzo et. al., (2006)resulted that broader mandate and freedom to set agenda were the successive factors of aPAC. They also reported that 90% of Chairs acknowledged the authority of self-initiationof agenda and choosing issues without any government meddling, was a successive factorin PAC practices.
  • 26. 132.5 Relationship of PAC and Auditor GeneralMcGee (2002) produced a very effective publication on financial oversight andaccountability discussing the role of PAC and Auditor General with support ofCommonwealth Parliamentary Association. He worked to come-up with possible ways toimprove upshots through an effective use of PACs, while strengthening Auditor General.His core identifications include; capacity building, independence, and informationexchange. Realizing the significance of the departmental capacity of the overseers for aneffective financial oversight of the government expenses, He upholds that the ability ofthe three prime oversight institutions including the Parliament, the PAC and the AuditorGeneral to accomplish their oversight functions should be strengthened to the maximum.He further says that it is also under the procedural ambit of PAC to work on thestrengthening of AG office to ensure effective accountability. AG office is regarded asthe main source of information for PAC working was also endorsed by Wehner (2003).McGee (2002:31) also described that initially, PACs were constituted to ensure theparliamentary follow up of Audit reports and compliance of its own Directives because ofa more common remit of PAC legal jurisdictions with Auditor General. He furtherendorsed, while identifying the weakness of all three institutions involved in the financialoversight process that better results can be achieved with the provision of requiredstaffing, resources, trainings and in time information. McGee also emphasizes that theindependent role of Auditors General from partisan and political influence is a successivefactor in its business. In order to perform its duties impartially, independence is the corevalue for the Auditor General. McGee focused that availability of information and itsexchange among stakeholders was a successive factor in carrying out the business of aPAC, he further stresses on the need of information exchange and sharing ideas whilekeeping PAC fashioned with latest developments, changing standards and best practices.The PAC and the Auditor General have a critical relationship in the course of publicsector accountability (Coghill, 2004; Jones and Jacobs, 2006; McGee, 2002; Stapenhurstet al., 2005). Across the common wealth and non-common wealth jurisdictions PAC andthe Auditor General operate in coincidence and both are critical to financial oversight andaccountability holds (Jacobs and Jones 2006). Coghill (2004) argued that while
  • 27. 14accommodating rapport between PAC and an Auditor General are indispensable. He saysthat this relationship might not overlap, necessarily transpiring effective governance as aresult when AG listen the views of PAC but never claim a caption of such views.However, the point of significance is the trust of both Auditor General and PAC inimplementing and upholding a nonpartisan behaviour in their mutual trades. PAC shouldbe independent of the AGP in so far as the process of determining the nature of reviewprocess prioritization. PAC can seek advice but decide on its own criteria rather thanAGPs irrespective of agreement or disagreement. In fact PAC should dictate the criteriaof prioritization. An effective decision support MIS is required in this case.2.6 Agenda Setting-Who are the main ActorsThis study also profited from the studies of Kingdon (1984 and 2003). He describes thatsetting of policy agenda can leave critical inferences on the successive policy debatersand the out springs. It is of significant that the agenda setter or the resource provider orthe source of inquiry to PAC has a greater role in shaping its role and it behaves as a toolof governance and accountability of that political set up. It is very important to reason outits focus of sources of inquiry necessarily in time. Despite a big resurgence in PACfunctioning in Pakistan since the late 2000, such activities have a limited scope becauseof restraint resource supply or local political culture.A central point of investigation in the PAC is how and by whom the agenda of PACproceedings is set and managed. It is also equally important to be aware of how differentinstitutional actors took part in the operations of efficient and effective public sectorgovernance and accountability, the roles of individual actors and their effects onoutcomes (Kingdon 2003; Ryan 1998). Kingdon (2003) describes that there are twoimportant factors which facilitate agendas to be set; the actors themselves, and theprocesses involved in agenda setting. Deepening Kingdon’s (1984) work, Ryan(1998:520) differentiate between the political agenda and the policy agenda, while,defining political agenda as comprising on the broad issues which comes under thejurisdictions of government functionaries and which are the basis of their functions, thepolicy agenda relates to matters concerning policy formulation. In the Pakistani financialreporting ambit, the main actors are PAC and the Auditor-General, while in developed
  • 28. 15countries like Canada and Australia main actors include PACs, AG, and the organizedaccounting professionals, all of whom seek to influence the Australian or Canadianpolitical agenda, describes Ryan (1998). Political agenda is one of the significant areasbecause PACs rarely address matters of policy overtly although; their activities arepatiently impinged on public policies.An important question raised in this study is of the key actors that influence the politicalagenda ‘who sets the agenda with respect to public sector accountability?’ The scope andmandate of the PAC has a prospective that the agenda might be set by a number ofdissimilar sources. KPMG (2006) reported that other than a routine role of following upof Auditor General’s Reports and the matters sometimes referred by the parliament ,certain PACs took suo-moto actions on major issues of public importance, publiccomplaints, media reviews, showing powers to initiate self-enquiries. However Jacobs etal. (2007) observed the relationship between AG and PAC largely depends on thejurisdiction of that democratic setup. He also observed that PACs have the powers ofparliamentary review of audit reports but nearly half of the PACs are given the right torefer matters to AG. While only few democracies give PAC the right to have a say in theappointment of AG.Jacobs et al. (2006) concluded that significant insights of the political and institutionalinfluences on PAC can be observed from its enquiries and operations and the judgmentthat had control on its agenda. Jacobs et al. raised their apprehension on taking seriousthe degree of independence to the functioning of PAC and the need for transparentoversight, governance and accountability work of the PACs.2.7 Independence of the PACsThere are other fundamental points of concerns about the independence of the PACs incommonwealth countries. Jacobs et al. (2007) found that the government chairs inAustralian and New Zealand were 80%, while 70 % of the PACs in their study have agovernment party majority. Another big number of PACs were found with ministerialmembership. However, McGee (2002) observed that a more than two third PACs of thecommonwealth countries were chaired by opposition party members. McGee (2002) also
  • 29. 16noted that government member chair have an effect of lack of independence of PAC fromexecutive, hence a lack of accountability and efficient oversight. McGee (2002: 66)however, examined that a government member chair can better influence on theimplementation of PAC recommendation. Obviously, this is a critical question of bothimplementation and independence that require a deep study of the activities of aparticular PAC. It might also be constructive to discuss the careers of PAC chairs as is itoften recommended being the chair of a PAC is a facilitating thing to the ministry. Thispossibility remained the cornerstone of PAC history in Pakistan, from 1951 to 2000; thePAC was chaired by Finance Ministers or the Finance Ministers for State. Mr H.U Beg,Chairman 6thadhoc PAC was a former Finance Secretary.2.8 Relationship between Accountability and GovernanceAnother study of Canadian PACs was carried out by CCAF-FCVI initially in 2004, whileits final research report published in 2006. The report investigated accountability andgovernance relationships among public oversight committees, legislative auditors, andsenior government managers, with particular focus on the functioning of PACs in relationwith these institutions. The report comes up with a structure of core powers and practicesto help strengthen the effectiveness of PACs. The report identified four significant factorsin Canadian PACs: i) each PAC is unique; ii) PACs must try to avoid partisanship to beeffective; iii) PACs should operate independently of government and should be curiousenough to ask probing questions; and iv) PAC proceedings can play a meaningful public-education role. However, the report does not investigate any specific differences at PAClevel leaving it ambiguous that what are the powers of PACs in specific jurisdiction.Hence, the comparison of individual PACs looks impossible. The report also detects thatthere found no single model PAC because of the variances in structures and democraticcultures of the legislatures and administrations of the diverse jurisdictions. However,CCAF-FCVI reported a substantial disparity among the relationships between thelegislative auditor and PAC and between Principal Accounting Officers and PAC, in themandates of the committee, in the conduct of business, in reporting to the legislatures, infollow-up of committee’s recommendations and in the rate of compliance.
  • 30. 17The institutions of PACs are the landmark of effective financial accountability andgovernance in the public sector. Public accounts committee is the oldest and the mostsignificant standing committee in any parliamentary committee system due to itsresponsibility and the set of powers it exercise, hence, it has a critical role in ensuringpublic sector accountability and effective governance.2.9 Assessment of PAC PerformanceIn the recent studies include Stapenhurst et al (2005), a working paper on the assessmentof PAC performance, thus deepening McGee’s (2002) analysis of PACs. The reportexplores PAC success and identifies factors affecting its performance. The study wasbased on data collected by WBI in 2002, where a survey questionnaire was sent to 51parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia, Australasia, Canada and the UnitedKingdom. The WBI report observed that availability of information and non-partisanwere critical success factors of the PACs as ascribed by McGee. The survey also resultedthat two other factors were equally important including the institutional design of thePAC, and the PAC’s operational model. The report observed the extant ofinstitutionalization and the nature of powers and mandate of a PAC directly contribute toits effectiveness. The results of the survey reached to the conclusion that a greater focusof PACs on government’s financial activity and accountability were important rather onthe assessment of the content of the government’s policies. The study holds that the PACempowered to probe all past and present government expenses was at a best practice,however, PAC better benefit from examining ongoing projects. PACs should also beempowered to making departments and government implement its directives. Mostimportantly, the report pays greater focus on close working relationship of AuditorGeneral with PAC. The report further proves that the behaviour of PAC members and thefunctioning of the committee are successive factor other than the institutional design of aPAC. The practices identified by Stapenhurst et al, further include, a non-partisan fashionand consensus among members, preparation of Members prior to a meetings, keeping ofthe transcripts of meetings by PAC secretariats and publishing of Committee conclusionsand recommendations on PAC website and in press and involving the public and themedia. The paper also gives in its end the 17 aspects of an ideal committee.
  • 31. 18Jacobs et al, found that there were three categories on the result of their investigation of148 reports produced by PACs in around nine Australian Jurisdictions over a period offour years’ time. The categories comprising firstly, those PACs for which the primeagenda was the follow-up of Auditor-General reports, secondly, the PACs for which self-initiated inquiries was the principal activity and thirdly the PACs who pay equalconcentrations to Auditor General reports and the self-initiated inquiries. The thirdcategory being an interesting and exceptional case with a balance between follow-upenquiries and self-initiated enquiries was regarded the best practice. He concluded thatthe inclination of interpreting a balance of activity between both the PAC and the AG is apositive sign of independence constitutionally provided.A need assessment report of the USAID (2009) observed that the operations of PAC ofthe National Assembly of Pakistan were restricted by a backlog of nine (09) years.However, the 12thPAC, previous to the recent one inherited a backlog of twelve (12)years. The USAID assessed that this “backlog” issue is the mountain which makes thereal forward journey of the PAC difficult to embark upon. The report argued that itsignificantly impedes with the committee functioning and absorbs its attention from morecurrent issues and is likely to continue to do so for some time. The report also added thatthe situation causes an overall workload which far exceeds the PAC’s work capacity. TheAGP has expressed concern that this could lead to PAC fatigue, the report described. Thereport also found that the use of sub-committees was the best tool to deal with thebacklog. The report also recommended that backlog could also be dealt with by attendingonly to those matters which could lead to recovery of monies for the State and byengaging extra staff to clear the backlog.2.10 Classification of the range of structures, responsibilities and workingpractices of a PACA report was published by KPMG jointly with La Trobe University, on PACs ofAustralia and New Zealand in 2006. The purpose of the report was to classify the rangeof structures, responsibilities and working practices, and is regarded by Rick Stapenhurstand Cindy Kroon as the first exhaustively comparative work of PACs in all Australianand New Zealand jurisdictions. Premise of the study is that “one size does not fit all”; the
  • 32. 19structure, terms of proceedings and the operational models vary from one PAC to anotherand there is no set of unique practices to follow in constituting an effective PAC.However, a number of operations and working practices adopted or developed byindividual jurisdictions can be matching and beneficial to other jurisdictions. The studygroup observed a variance in rules, practices, and outcomes, differentiating each PACfrom other.Stapenhurst and Kroon (2008) conclude after observing various studies that no ideal PACexists, but there are a number of good practices of PACs that can be adopted by otherPACs to improve and to be more effective. They also believed that the existing literaturediscusses numerous practices, but none of them identifies working practices of individualPACs. They resulted that there was no study that investigated data of individual PAC andpractices adopted to be unique.2.11 Governance and Accountability Crisis in PakistanInternational Crisis Group-ICG, in 2004 reported the state of devolution of power inPakistan during Musharraf regime. The study reported the political tactics, a militaryruler adopted to enhance his military rule on the cost of state institutions. The overt aimof the Devolution of Power Plan was to empower the impoverished but in practice, theplan undercut the established political parties and provincial powers were drained away,doing no effort for corruption or accountability at local level. The report noted that apartfrom strengthening democracy, the reforms, strengthened military rule, raising risks ofinternal conflict and institutional clash. The core objective of regime legitimacy andsurvival was enriched utilizing the Local governments to; i) depoliticize governance; ii)create a new political elite to challenge and undermine the political opposition; iii)demonstrate the democratic credentials of a regime to domestic and external audiences;iv) undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional provisions for provincialpolitical, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. ICG also reported that District Nazismpoured public funds and other state resources to boost pro-Musharraf rallies during thepresidential referendum in April 2002 and to support the PML-Q’s parliamentarycandidates in the 2002 national elections. By that time, PAC was somehow functional,
  • 33. 20but was assigned with a big backlog of past 12 years; no attention was paid to oversightthese mega corruptions scandals.A recent study from a Pakistani author Ileana Niaz, appeared in 2010. The study is basedon fabulous amount of original sources and a strongly argued analysis of the sixty yearsof Pakistan’s governance. The study attempts to enlighten Governance crisis in Pakistanin historical and philosophical requisites. Niaz argues that the exercise of power hasreasserted and produced deterioration among the attitudes of ruling elites because ofSouth Asia’s native orientation. He further his argument that during the past sixty yearsof independence from British rule the mind set and attitude of state functionaries andpolitical Jirga’s has been turning out to be more arbitrary, proprietorial and delusional.Niaz fears the consequential corrosion in the intellectual and ethical superiority of thestate machinery has become a moral hazard to Pakistan. A decline is noticed, author says,in the capacity of state to prosperous and uphold good governance according to itsdescribed constitutional mandates. The study reported the worse political andbureaucratic behaviour towards Pakistani state saying that rulers are treating state as theirpersonal estate while the servants of the state are tuned to be personal servants of thepowerful members of the executive. He concludes that this arbitrary exercise of powerhas been materialized as an overriding rule and discouraging the institutional andpsychological moralities and practices originally inherited from British Empire.Another recent study ‘Political Administrators’ is a story of the civil service of Pakistan,written by Aminullah Chaudry in 2010. The author, describing the politicization of civilservants says since everything is possible in Pakistan, it didn’t surprise him, being DGCAA and Secretary Aviation, performing superhuman feat of hijacking an airborneaircraft carrying the chief of army staff, on the orders of the then Prime Minister.Chaudry describes that out of sixty five years since independence, for the thirty-threeyears, the country has been ruled by military dictators. For the remaining thirty years, it isobserved that the politicians ranging from the autocratic to the corrupt; from the inept tothe clueless. He augmented that these fluctuations between dictatorship and democracycould have been absorbed by a country with a functional and reasonably neutral civilservice. He added that Pakistan inherited well-oiled machinery called bureaucracy from
  • 34. 21British but within no time its Pakistani successors forged an alliance with the army andactively undermined the democratic process. Chaudry goes ahead saying that after breakup of Pakistan in 1971, the bureaucracy aligned with Zulfqar Ali Bhutto and on the eventof the coup of 1977, putting all its weight behind General Ziaulhaq. He further arguesthat this flip-flop continued through the so called democratic regimes of Benazir Bhuttoand Nawaz Sharif, and the military regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf. He concludesthat the institutional decays occasioned by these shenanigans did incalculable andpossibly irreversible damage to the civil service in Pakistan resulting bad governance atlarge.Another story of Pakistan’s dismal governance is written by Saima Iltaf (2011). In herstudy, she uncovers the bureaucratic inefficiencies. Her study is about the forces of acountry which are set in motion when huge monies flow into the coffers of countries likePakistan whose decision makers never consider themselves accountable to their people.The story is a routine of government offices, the bureaucrats and their decision making.She discusses the attitudes of these decision makers towards good governance anddevelopment.The literature discusses the different traits of different PACs in common wealth and non-commonwealth jurisdictions but there found a very little work on the functioning of PACof the National Assembly especially during the recent government. However, the presentstudy assessed the comparative performance of PAC during Musharraf regime and thePPP-led Coalition government. The next chapter is a Methodology and TheoreticalFramework of the study.
  • 35. 22Chapter 3Methodology and Theoretical Framework3.1 MethodologyThe present study deals with comparative functioning of the PAC in the selected period(2002-2011). The Study is based on Qualitative Research and as it is a study of twoconsecutive periods, the research design is a Penal Study. Consequently, the approachadopted was primarily analytical and chronological with an element of interpretation. Inan effort to compare the functioning of 12thand 13thPAC to their mandates as set in theRules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in National Assembly, 1992, and the Rulesof Procedure and Conduct of Business in National Assembly, 2007, respectively(National Assembly of Pakistan, 1992 and 2007). The study orients towards explaininghow PAC is working as a probing body rather an accountability institution holdingexecutive authorities/spending ministries and revenue earning agencies of theGovernment accountable for performance in terms of its mandate.3.1.2. Survey ResearchA survey was conducted to articulate comparative views of the parliamentarians of 12thand 13thNational Assembly adopting World Bank Institute’s instrument used in itsappraisal of 51 democracies in 2002 (Stapenhurst et. al., 2005.) with certain changessuitable to local parliamentary ambiance. Naturally, the present study being comparativeone, same indictors were chosen for assessing both 12thand 13thPAC of the NationalAssembly of Pakistan. Hence two Questionnaires were used having same indicators butdifferent time period; one for 12thPAC and the other for 13thPAC. A total of 75Questionnaires were sent to the whole population consisting Members of PAC, PACStaffers, AG Office, Media persons and other stakeholders for this study. However,greater importance was given to those members who served both PACs, staffer whoserved both PACs and media persons who observed the operations of both PACs. TheQuestionnaires were personally distributed with the request to fill and return to the wholepopulation of the 12thand the 13thPAC. However the response rate remained 57 per cent.
  • 36. 23The population and response of the members of 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure3.1. The maximum response was received from the 13thPAC which was 54 per cent as of30 per cent of 12thPAC.Figure 3.4. Survey Population and Response RateA total population of 75 persons was selected for this study that include 41 MNAs, 10PAC Secretariat Staff Members, 12 from Auditor General Office, 8 media persons and 4others. The total response for the whole population remained 57 per cent making a totalof 32 respondents out of which include 13 MNAs, 6 PAC Secretariat Staff, 5 from AGoffice, 6 media persons and 2 other.3.1.3. InterviewsBesides, the questionnaires were distributed to the concerned stakeholders of PAC;twenty one semi-structured interviews were also conducted from the members of thePAC, staffers of the PAC, AGP and media persons. The details of the personsinterviewed are as under;1. Mr. Nadeem Afzal Chan, Chairman PAC2. Mrs. Yaseem Rehman, MNA, Member PAC3. Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi, MNA, Member PAC4. Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA, Member PAC01020304050607080TotalPopulation12th PACResponse of12th PACTotalPopulation13th PACResponse of13th PACTotalPopulation ofBothTotalresponse ofBoth183231041134 26 4106626 31254 2 4 48 62 1 2 1 4 234104122753230% 54% 57%MNA Staff AG Media Others total % of Total Response rate
  • 37. 245. Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, Member PAC6. Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zafar, MNA, Member PAC7. Bagum Shahnaz Sheikh, MNA, Member PAC8. Mr. Moosa Raza Afandi, Additional Secretary, PAC9. Ms. Najama Saddiqui, Joint Secretary, PAC10. Mr. Muhammad Mushtaq, Deputy Secretary-Legislation11. Mr. Muhammad Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, PAC12. Sayed Fayyaz Hussain Shah, Deputy Secretary, National Assembly13. Mr. Muhammad Mohsin Khan Former Controller General of Accounts,Government of Pakistan and former Advisor to PAC.14. Mr. Sharafat Ali, Section Officer, PAC15. Mr. Salamat Ali, Section Officer, PAC16. Mr. Inamulhaq, Section Officer, PAC17. Agha Muhammad Asif, Superiendent/ Section Officer, PAC18. Mr. Muhmamd Shbbir, Assistant, Main PAC Branch19. Mr. Haji Hattar, Librarian, NA Library20. Mr.Muhammad Arshad, Audit Officer-PAC Auditor General of Pakistan21. Mr. Rouf Kalasra, Anchor Person22. Mr. Tahir Khalil, Media Person23. Mr. Saddique Sajjid, Media Person3.1.4. Documentary Sources of InformationThe basic sources used for this study are declassified PAC records held by the PACSecretariat, private papers, audit report issued by AGP, PAC reports. The study benefitedfrom a number of reports produced by International Institutions such as WBI, CPA andUSAID on the subject. A number of laws, books, papers, reports, newspapers and otherdocuments were also surfed and examined to compare the performance of PAC duringselected governments.
  • 38. 253.1.5. Focal Discussions and PAC MeetingsPAC meetings were regularly attended during the course of this research to empiricallyobserve the functioning and operations of PAC and to observe the participation of PAOsand the AG. Internal Meetings of PAC (Pre-PAC) and its meetings with differentdelegations like USAID etc were also attended to better understand its operations. In thisconnection, the department of GPP requested the Joint Secretary PAC for a permission toobserve the operations of PAC and to attend its meetings which was permitted by PACSecretariat. Later On, Nadeem Afzal Chan, the new Chairman, facilitated a lot in researchactivities and made easy access to data and practical activities of PAC during hisChairmanship.3.2. Theoretical FrameworkThe theoretical framework of this study is mainly based on two recent and importantworks; McGee’s (2002), ‘the Overseers’ and the World Bank Policy Research WorkingPaper ‘Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of Public AccountsCommittees’ written by Stapenhurst et al., (2005). McGee dealt with the two veryimportant aspects of financial oversight namely the Auditor General and the PublicAccounts Committee, while the World Bank paper further deepened McGee’s analysis ofPAC.3.2.1 The Overseers- by McGee DavidMcGee’s work was based on the views of a study group organized by CommonwealthParliamentarians Associations (CPA) that investigated practices across thecommonwealth concerning roles and functions of PAC and AG and their relationship.The Study assessed the working practices of PACs and whether they are delivering asimportant guarantors of good governance (McGee, 2002). The main individualconclusions and recommendations of the Study are annexed (See Annex-I)The study group tried to distil the practices into checklists of deliberations forParliaments, recognizing that there is no one organizational form that a PAC will takeconsidering social, economic and political factors across countries. The group also
  • 39. 26discussed and tried to define a modern rationale for PACs which is necessitated by and isbased on the international dimension that results from a greater inter-dependability ofnations that has brought in its wake greater challenges to good government (Stapenhurstet. al, 2005).McGee (2002) identified potential courses of action to improve outcomes through moreeffective use of PACs. Three major finding of the study include: Capacity Building: the need to improve the ability of Parliaments andtheir PACs to carry out their functions by being provided with adequateresources, training and access to relevant expertise Independence: that they be free from political or legal constraints thatcould inhibit them from carrying out their duties diligently Information Exchange: that PACs have the means to exchangeinformation and ideas so as to keep them up-to-date with importantdevelopments, changing standards and best practices as they emerge3.2.2 Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performance of PublicAccounts Committees by World Bank InstituteWorld Bank working paper by Stapenhurst, et.al., While, defining the greater successesof PAC, identifies impending factors effecting PAC performance based on the datacollected by World Bank Institute in 2002 on a Survey Questionnaire sent to 51 PACs ofCommonwealth including UK, Canada, Asia and Australia. The paper identifiedimminent factor for a PAC was focus on government’s financial activity rather than itspractices, the power to investigate all past and present government expenditures, thepower to follow up on government actions in response to its recommendations, and itsrelationship with the Auditor General. They give a comprehensive framework forassessment of PAC performance, consisting of very important three dimensions; Activity level - the measurement of events and input resources used such as: keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reports, costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involved.
  • 40. 27 Output level - the immediate visible results of work the committee does like: recommendations made, followed up and implemented Outcomes level - durable improvements in public administration such as: increased economy, efficiency or effectiveness of government programs better compliance with laws or regulations, improvements in financial and control structures, such as prosecution ofwrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditor more accurate, timely government information enhanced public awareness of government programs enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management ofprogramsAlong with these indicators the study also discussed, whether PAC infect dealt with theissues of importance reaching to its root cause or it generally investigate the symptoms ofthe problems such as corruption. The study also gages the deterrence effect of PAC onthe attitude of PAOs or the departments. They argued this an aspect of performance“relevance”. They also described an “Ideal Committee” (See Annex-II).The present study incorporated both these works by McGee and the WBI to check theperformance of 12thPAC (2002-2006) and 13thPAC (2008-2011) of the NationalAssembly of Pakistan. The study focuses on the comparative functioning of both PACsduring the governments, the Musharraf Regime and the Pakistan People’s Party-ledCoalition Government. The study finds some winning points on the basis of a comparisonon equal indicators and sees whether any of two PACs institutionalized thosedevelopments. The next chapter is the Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC, a guidefor Members PAC, PAC Secretariat, Auditor General, PAOs and other stakeholders.
  • 41. 28Chapter 4The Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC4.1 IntroductionThe present chapter the Structure, Functioning and Role of PAC, is a guide for Membersof PAC, PAC Secretariat, Auditor General, PAOs and other stakeholders The PublicAccounts Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PAC) is an institution thatoversight financial matters of state on parliament’s behalf. PAC carries out examinationof the accounts of the Federal Government, complied by the Controller General ofAccounts (CGA) and the Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP). The present PAC is the 13thPublic Accounts Committee of Pakistan since its formation on 14thApril, 1948 (PAKPK,2011).The structure and functioning practices of PAC are primarily patterned after Westminsterapproach. In the recent decade, it seemed, the PAC has adopted a number ofinternationally recognized best practices to make its working effective. The efficiency ofthe current PAC is credited to the practice of the appointment of the Leader of theOpposition as its Chairman, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, under charter ofdemocracy signed by the leaders of the two major political parties of Pakistan; BenazirBhutto and Nawaz Sharif (Charter of Democracy, Rule 15).The 18thamendment have widened the scope of PAC oversight over state corporations,trading and manufacturing concerns, development schemes and projects, autonomous andsemi-autonomous bodies, putting under the ambit of Auditor- General (Rehman 2012).4.2 BackgroundPAC is a standing committee of the lower house, the National Assembly of Pakistan likemany other countries. PAC was established to exercise under rules 51 and 52 of theManual of Business in the Legislative Assembly of undivided India adopted as verbatimin the constitution Assembly (Legislature) Rules with some minor variations in 1948(NA, 1985). The Rules 51(1) stated;
  • 42. 29“As soon as may be after the commencement of the first session of the Assembly, aCommittee on Public Accounts shall, subject to the provisions of this rule beconstituted for duration of the Assembly for the purpose of dealing with theappropriation accounts of the Government of Pakistan and the reports of theAuditor General thereon and such other matters as the Finance Ministry mayrefer to the Committee”. (NA, 1985, P.76)4.5 Oversight PerspectivesParliamentary Control over public monies in Pakistan is exercised at two levels (NationalAssembly Secretariat, 200?), first is the proposal stage, where government on the end ofevery fiscal year comes forth with a budget proposal to get through the financial jiggle ofthe public representatives in order to implement its programmes and policies forupcoming year by overseeing the policy preparation. Second is the control over theexpenditure of public money. Here, PAC plays a watchdog role of oversight andexamines the accounts of the Federal Government compiled by the CGA and audited bythe AGP. The process assigns responsibility to the public representatives to keep a checkon public expenditures by overseeing the execution and implementation of a givenpolicy. This is an ex post facto responsibility.In order to assess Parliamentary control over public monies, two inter-related universallyaccepted background oversight perspectives of PAC are vital (USAID, 2009).4.5.1 The nature and extents of the PAC oversight rolesGenerally determined a predominant oversight committee in Westminster democracies,the PAC provides a critical oversight function in the legislative process within its definedLegislative Oversight ambit to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of allgovernment and public agencies. Key functions include; Providing a plausible and autonomous review process of public spendingand governments control of public funds through the examination of appropriationaccounts and audit reports Investigating the use of public assets, resources and funds
  • 43. 30 Making sure the process of enquiry has greater focus on evaluatingfinancial management performance (rather than on policy) Ensuring its reports, recommendation and directives are influential, usingits powers and authority Challenging the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements.4.6 The Committee System in the Parliament of PakistanThe best practice around the world is that the legislative oversees the performance of theexecutive through a mechanism of Standing Committees. A great number of moderndemocracies have provision in their constitutions and parliamentary rules and proceduresfor setting up Standing Committees to review the financial and administrative operationsof the executive departments and agencies.The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan is based on the basic structure ofWestminster and the lessons learned from the best practices of committee systems of thedeveloped democracies (NA, 1985). A good effort remained always there to copy theAmerican committee system (Hussain 2012). Across the parliamentary democracies,different committee systems are in practice to lessen the legislative burden of the houseand to provide technical support based on a detailed discussion at committee level. InPakistan, the system of Standing Committees is governed by the Rules and procedure andConduct of Business in the National Assembly, 2007. The Public Accounts Committee isa Standing Committee which plays a vital role in financial oversight and accountability ofthe executive.The Committee System in the Parliament of Pakistan consist of thirty five (35) Senatestanding committees and forty six (46) National Assembly standing committees includingPAC, one (01) Select Committees of the National Assembly, nine (09) parliamentarycommittees and eleven (11) Special Committees consisting of members both from theSenate and the National Assembly (NA, n.d) . The number of committee in theParliament of Pakistan varies from time to time depending on the need and requirementof the parliamentary process. The Secretary National Assembly controls all the Standing
  • 44. 31and other committees, then, there are Joint Secretaries, each one of them control the twomajor branches, Standing Committees Branch-I and Standing Committees Branch-II,sharing the assignment of half of the standing committees of the house.Legislative committees in the parliamentary system of Pakistan are regarded as the corefunctionaries and are contributing a lot in the legislative business.4.6.1 Difference among PAC and Other Standing CommitteesConstitutionally, the Public Accounts Committee is a standing committee like otherstanding committees of National Assembly but it has certain powers and responsibilitieswhich distinguish this committee on other standing committees of the National Assemblyof Pakistan. The major points of distinction include; All standing committees of National Assembly deal with the affairs oftheir respective ministry, while the PAC ambit all ministries/departments/agenciesworking under Federal Government. Further, review of performance ofgovernment agencies under the standing committees other than PAC isdiscretionary whereas PAC has to look into each audit observation that maypertain to all the Ministries. The PAC had a responsibility of legislative oversight of public monies toregulate spending of ministries/departments/agencies while other standingcommittees are concerned with general affairs of ministries. The control overpublic monies gives PAC a pre-eminent position in the committee system of theNational Assembly of Pakistan. The main purpose of the creation of PAC was to ensure the parliamentaryfollow up on Auditor General’s reports to regulate public spending (McGee,2002). The jurisdictions of PAC are more in common with Auditor- General’sambit than does that of the other committees (McGee, 2002). PAC recommendations are regarded its Directives which are binding onministries, departments and agencies, while other Standing Committees of
  • 45. 32National Assembly can only give recommendations to National Assembly whichare not binding rather a set of suggestions.4.7 PACs in PakistanSince its formation in 1948, the recent PAC is the 13thone. While, six (06) adhoc PACshave also functioned in Pakistan. The adoption of adhoc PAC shows the importance offinancial oversight in the country. A brief detail of the PAC background is given in theintroduction. The list of Chairs of PAC is annexed (Se Annex-III). PAC have functionedfor a total period of twenty two (22) years, six (06) months and two (02) days, while, theadhoc PAC remained functional for a total of sixteen (16) years and seven (07) days.6Although PAC existed across the history of Pakistan, sometimes it remained lesseffective. Its development is associated with time and changing circumstances. PAC islargely transforming its role from a probing body to its supervisory role increasingefficiency and effectiveness of programs to achieve her defined objectives (Rehman,2012). Being a standing committee, the PAC has the power to investigate and examine allthe issues referred to it by the legislature and the issues of public importance (Rehman,2012).4.8 Audit Reports of PACPAC after a complete scrutiny of audit paras prepared by AG and referred to PAC byNational Assembly is laid back to National Assembly in a form of annual audit report ofPAC. Such reports contain directives of PAC for compliance.4.8.1 Audit Reports completed and laid before the NATill to date, PACs and the APACs together have completed and laid before the NationalAssembly thirty (30) Audit Reports. The report of the Year 1993-1994 is ready forprinting. The report of monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC for the years2011 is sent for approval to the main PAC. (See Annex-III)6The information is obtained from termination letters of different governments found in the file containingletters of Assemblies Termination available at Library of the National Assembly of Pakistan and the PACreports also available at NA library.
  • 46. 334.8.2 Pending Audit ReportsA total of eight (08) audit reports are still pending. Three reports (1998-1999, 2002-2003,2003-2004) were assigned to Special Committee II, chaired by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA.While, three reports (2004-2005, 2006-2007 and 2007-2008) were assigned to SpecialCommittee III chaired by Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA. The audit reports of the years2009-2010 and 2010-2011 were being examined by the main PAC. (See Annex-IV)However, another four (04) reports (1981-1982, 1982-1983, 1983-1984 and 1985-1986)were still in backlog list.4.9 Role of Adhoc PACs (APAC)When National Assembly remained dissolved in Pakistan, the Chief Executives, whilerealizing the importance of financial oversight of the public monies, introduced proto-PACs (APAC). Consequently, Adhoc PACs were invariably set up, during the interimgovernments to examine the Federal Accounts and the Auditor General Reports (NA,1985). The First APAC was introduced by Yahya Khan, the then Chief Marshal LawAdminister, on 3rdmarch, 1960 (NA, 1985). A minimum of six (06) APAC havefunctioned in Pakistan (PAKPK, 2011). The sixth and the last APAC was constituted on25thaugust, 2000 (Finance Division, 2000). It was validated by the Chief Executive(CEO, 2001). So for APACs have produced four (04) Reports.4.10 Functions of PACPAC performs its functions under powers as given by the Rules of Procedure andConduct of Business in the National Assembly (2007) and the Constitution of the IslamicRepublic of Pakistan.4.10.1 Powers of PACThe PAC scrutinizes the Appropriation Accounts of the Government provided in thereports of the Auditor General of Pakistan. It is the duty of the committee to satisfy itselfwhile doing so according to the current mandate of the PAC under the Rules of Procedureand Conduct of Business in the National Assembly (2007) ( See Annex-IV). PAC hasadditional and more specific powers to perform its tasks, such as power to examine the
  • 47. 34public accounts, the comments on the public accounts, and all reports drafted by theauditor general. The PAC has the power to conduct, directly or indirectly, investigations;to receive all documentation it considers necessary to adequately perform its functions; toinvite government members to attend its meetings and to respond to PAC members’questions; to publicize its own conclusions; to report to the legislature; and to suggest togovernment how to modify its course of action when necessary.4.10.2 Basis of PAC FunctioningThe PAC is designed to better examines the accounts for the appropriation of sumsgranted by the National Assembly for the expenditure of the government policies andprogrammes for the annual finance accounts, the report of the Auditor-General ofPakistan and other matters of public importance referred by the Minister for Finance(NA, Rule 203(1)). The PAC scrutinizes the appropriation accounts of the governmentand the reports of the Auditor-General of Pakistan to its best satisfaction that the moneysdisbursed in the accounts were legally available and applicable to the service or purposeto which they have been applied or charged (NA, Rule 203(2)a). The PAC also confirmsthat the appropriate authority is governing the expenditure (NA, Rule 203(2)b). The PACensures while its oversight process that every re-appropriation has been made inaccordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rules framed by Ministry ofFinance (NA, Rule 203(2)c).4.10.3 Examining the Statement of the AccountsThe PAC is mandated to examine the statement of the accounts showing the income andexpenditure of state corporation, trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns andprojects together with the balance sheets and the statements of the profit and lossaccounts which the president may have required to be prepared or are prepared under theprovision of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular corporation tradingor manufacturing scheme or concern or projects under the report of the Auditor-Generalof Pakistan (NA, Rule 203(3)a). It is also under its constitutional mandate to examine thestatement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the Auditor-General of
  • 48. 35Pakistan either under the directions of the president or under the act of Parliament (NA,Rule 203(3)b).4.10.4 Annual Financial Statements (Finance Accounts of the Federal Government)Finance Accounts are required to be reviewed by PAC (NA Rule 203) now called AnnualFinancial Statements of the Federal Government. The two key accounts prepared by theController General of Accounts, certified by the Auditor-General and submitted to thePresident are (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 171):1. Appropriation Accounts2. Annual Financial Statements of the Federal Government (former FinanceAccounts).These accounts are certified by the Auditor-General. The AGP gives an Opinion on boththe accounts. The opinion on the Finance Accounts/Annual Financial Statements has alsoto be reviewed by PAC conforming to international best practice. The AGP can give thefollowing types of opinion on both the accounts.a) Unqualified Opinion: The accounts present a true and fair picture of thegovernment account balances shown in these accounts.b) Qualified Opinion: The accounts present a true and fair picture subject to thefollowing observations: (These are stated)c) Adverse Opinion: The accounts do not present a true and fair picture and assuch cannot be relied upon.d) Disclaimer: AGP is unable to give an opinion because (various reasonsgiven) e.g. non-production of record or other inabilities. This is a serioussituation that PAC needs to look into like the previous one.Important points to note regarding Finance Accounts/Annual Financial Statements are:a) They are prepared every year by Controller General of Accounts and submitted bythe Auditor-General every year under Article 171 to the President and laid beforethe Parliament.b) They are forwarded to PAC by AGP for review under Article 203 of the PACRules.c) They have to be examined by the PAC but have not been examined so far exceptperhaps once. There is no reason for this although PAC has been verbally advisedin the past that these must be reviewed.d) The Annual Financial Statements, as against the Appropriation Accounts thatcontain only an account of the expenditure under various grants contain thefollowing information:
  • 49. 36i) Statement of Cash Receipts and PaymentsThis contains Total Receipts in Federal Consolidated Funds and PublicAccount as well as Payments out of both Federal Consolidated Fund andPublic Account. It contains the opening cash balance of the Government plusreceipts minus disbursements and the closing cash balance.ii) Statement of Cash Flows (during the financial year)This contains:a) Cash Flows from Operating Activitiesb) Cash Flows from Investing Activitiesc) Cash Flow from Financing Activitiesd) Net increase/decrease in cashiii)Statement of Comparison of Budgeted and Actual amounts of Receipts(Revenue and capital) and payments by the Functions ( General PublicService, Defence Affairs, Economic Affairs, Public Order & Safety Affairs,Education Affairs and Services, Health affairs and Services, Housing andCommunity Amenities, Recreation Culture and Religion, Social Protection,Environmental Protection).iv)Statement of Comparison of Budget & Actual Expenditure by Divisions ofthe Federal Ministries.v) Statement of Appropriation of grants by OBJECT DIVISION-WISE (Payand allowances, operating expenses, purchase of assets, repairs/maintenance,loans write-off, retirement benefits etc.)vi)Statement of Appropriation of Grants by OBJECT on accounts of expenditurecharged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund.vii) A Balance Sheet of the Federal Government is also available in the AnnualFinancial Statements.viii) In note 30 of the Annual Financial Statements the Auditor-General has statedthat these are one of the principal accounts certified by him and submittedunder Article 171 of the Constitution to the President.
  • 50. 374.10.5 Presidential ObligationThe PAC also consider the report of the Auditor–General of Pakistan in case where thepresident may have required him to conduct the audit of any receipt or to examine theaccounts of stores and stocks (NA, Rule 203(3)c).4.10.6 Excess SpendingIn a case when any amount of money is spent on any service during a financial yeargreater than the actual amount granted by the National Assembly for that purpose, PACexamine and scrutinize such matters on the basis of related facts according tocircumstances of that excess and issue its recommendations (NA, Rule 203(4)). PACwork on zero saving, zero excess basis which means appropriate money should beallocated to policies and programmes (PAC Officer, 2011). The practice of wrongestimates given by ministries at proposal level and excess allocation to supplementarygrants that is not spent to the concerned program in due time is regarded as an aspect ofbad governance.4.10.7 Time period for submission of ReportsThe PAC is obligatory to submit its reports to the Parliament within a period of one yearfrom the date of its reference to the committee by the same house (NA, Rule 203(5). Thecommittee can also seek its extension from the National Assembly up to certain periodand if granted then to submit on the extended date specified in the motion. However,PAC will request for an extension in the time for the presentation of the report to beasked for before the expiry of the time allowed under the rule. In practice, it happens veryrare. A general condemnation may be given is by the house on submission of delayedreport (PAC Officer, 2011).4.10.8 Continuity of the ProceedingsIn case of dissolution of the assembly, any report, memorandum or note that theCommittee may have prepared, or any evidence that the Committee may have takenbefore dissolution, shall be liable to be made available to the new Committee (NA, Rule204). However, other than anything contained in mandate, the public Accounts
  • 51. 38Committee will proceed from the stage where the previous Committee left theproceedings before the dissolution of the Assembly (NA, Rule 205).4.10.9 Magisterial Powers of PACIn general provision of the standing committees of the National Assembly, PAC hascertain magisterial powers: Powers to take evidence or call for papers, records or documents;PAC have power to require the attendance of persons, production of documents orrecords if it is considered necessary for the discharge of its duties considering ithas no harm to national security. In case of a question of the relevancy of adocument or a person, the final authority is speaker of NA to decide (NA, Rule227(1)). Summoning a Witness; PAC have the power to summon a witness by anorder signed by Secretary to appear before the committee (NA, Rule 227(2)). Invitation or Summon to a member or Person; PAC have power toinvite any member or person relevant or who has an interest in relation to anymatter under consideration in PAC and to hear expert evidence and to hold publichearing (NA, Rule 227(3). Power of Civil Court; PAC have powers, subject to clause (3) of Article66, vested in civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1998 (Act V of 1908) forenforcing the attendance of any person and compelling the production ofdocument (NA, Rule 227(4).These powers enable PAC to fix responsibility on any person or department to producewitness or to appear before PAC. In case of non-implementation, PAC has certain powersto refer such cases to NAB, FIA or police or to write displeasure against concerneddepartment/PAO to Prime Minister.
  • 52. 394.10.10 Rule PositionGeneral rules of standing committees of the National Assembly along with the specificrules provided to PAC are practiced for its functioning given in the Rules of Procedureand Conduct of business in the National assembly, 2007 and the Constitution of theIslamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 as amended time by time.4.10.11 Status of PACIdeally, PAC is regarded as an important standing committee of parliament as it has theresponsibility of financial and audit oversight; therefore, it plays an effective role incurbing corruption and recovering amounts wrongly spent by the Ministry/Division. Theimportance of PAC has grown over the time due to the responsibility assigned to it beinghighly technical, specialized and sensitive in nature.Figure 4.5. PAC OrganogramSource: PAC Organogram as discussed with PAC OfficersSecretaryNational AssemblyAddl. Secretary( Committees)Addl. Secretary(PAC)Joint Secretary(PAC )ImplementationCellDSSO SOBranchPAC(Main Branch)DSSO SOBranchSpecial CommitteeIIDSSOBranchSpecial CommitteeIIIDSSOBranchAddl. Secretary(Admin)Addl. Secretary(Ligeslature)Addl. Wings of PACAddl. Wings of PAC
  • 53. 404.10.12 Constitutional Link-Reference to PACAnnual Audit Reports along with Accounts are submitted by the Auditor- General ofPakistan to the President under Article 171 of the Constitution. X The Federal Ministerfor Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs then presents the report to the NationalAssembly (NA, Rule 171). The Speaker of the National Assembly refers them for adetailed scrutiny to the PAC (NA, Rule 177). The AGP refers such reports to thePresident on an annual basis.4.11 Sub-Committees of PACThe PAC is empowered to appoint one or more Sub-Committees, each having the powersof the whole committee, to examine any matter referred to it (NA, Rule 224).Subsequently, the report of sub-committee after approval by the whole committee will beconsidered to be the report of PAC.Sub-committees of PAC are sometimes assigned a whole report to review, while, manysub-committees are constituted to review only few paras who meet once or twice. Sub-committees of PAC have been useful tools to update its business. The culture ofinheritance of big backlog to every committee has been a practice in Pakistan. The use ofcommittees and especially the sub-committees in parliamentary system of Pakistan isgaining importance.Although the 12thPAC constituted many sub-committees but their role remained lesseffective. They were expected to be the major tools in clearing the backlog of twelveyears but the sub-committees of the 12thPAC produced only one report for the year 1995-1996.4.11.1 Constitutions of Sub CommitteesThe sub-committees of the PAC work on the same Rules of NA and the Constitution ofPakistan which provide for functioning of PAC.
  • 54. 414.11.2 Channels of SupervisionThe channel of supervision of the PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan is as underand is depicted at Figure 4.2.Figure 4.6. Channels of supervisionSource:. Channels of supervision as discussed with PAC Officers4.11.3 PAC relationship with the Auditor-GeneralPAC is a tool of parliament to ensure governmental accountability. The informationrequired for the functioning of PAC is provided by Auditor- General that ensures theadequate use of public resources by its audit. The relationship between PAC and AuditorGeneral is intertwined and both are essential components of the democraticaccountability (McGee, 2002). Despite their close working, Auditor- General sends itsreports to the President being the office of the Executive. President refers its reports toParliament from where they are referred to PAC. McGee Study Group (2002) expressedthat the Auditor General should be a Parliament’s office due to its working association,independent from Executive.Nevertheless, PAC is not confined only to Auditor General Reports. PAC can pursuematters of public concern regardless of the consideration that these matters are the subjectof Auditor General Report or not.SpeakerChairman (PAC)SecretaryAdditional SecretaryJoint SecretaryDeputy SecretarySection OfficerSuperidententAssistant
  • 55. 424.12 Assessment of PAC MandateThe Mandate of PAC (See Annex-IV) is largely consistent with a common practice thatthe apprehensions heaved in the reports of Auditor General, the Supreme AuditInstitutions, are regarded as the main basis of PACs work and mainly establishedoversight concerns about the spending of public monies by the government or itsagencies. The mandate necessitates certain practices and procedures by the PAC whichconform in fundamental respects with established international practices (USAID, 2009).Considering a very short democratic history of Pakistan, generally the PAC’s operationalrules are sufficient for its ability to perform as an efficient and effective Public AccountsCommittee (USAID, 2009). An important function of the Committee is to determine thatmoney granted by Parliament has been spent by Government within the scope of thedemand. The implications of this phrase are that any money spent against some grantmust not be more than the actual amount granted, the expenditure brought to accountagainst a particular grant must be of such a nature as to warrant its record against thegrant only, and the grants should be spent on purposes which are set out in the detaileddemand and they cannot be spent on any new service not contemplated in the demand(USAID, 2009). The functions of the Committee extend, however, beyond the formalityof expenditure to its wisdom, faithfulness and economy. The Committee thus examinescases involving losses, nugatory expenditure and financial irregularities. When any caseof proved negligence resulting in loss or extravagance is brought to the notice of theCommittee, it calls upon the Ministry/Department concerned to explain what action,disciplinary or otherwise, it had taken to prevent a recurrence (PAC officer, 2011). Insuch a case it can also record its opinion in the form of disapproval or pass stricturesagainst the extravagance or lack of proper control by the Ministry or Departmentconcerned.The Committee is not concerned with questions of policy in the broad sense though it iswithin its jurisdiction to point out whether there has been extravagance or waste incarrying out that policy (USAID, 2009). While, as for as modern practices are concerned,PACs are working to introduce efficient policies to save national resources (McGee,2002).
  • 56. 43While scrutinizing the Reports of the AGP on Revenues Receipts, the Committeeexamines various aspects of Government’s tax administration. The Committee, thus,examines cases involving under-assessments, tax-evasion, non-levy of duties, mis-classifications etc., identifies the loopholes in the taxation laws and procedures andmakes recommendations in order to check leakage of revenue.4.13 General Practices of PAC4.13.1 The Chair of PACPAC has a chairperson to preside over its meeting and to perform other functions.4.13.1.1 Method of Appointment of Chairman PACThe chairman of a standing committee is elected by the committee amongst its memberswithin thirty days of its election in the presence of the Secretary National Assembly (NA,Rule 216).4.13.1.2 Government/ Opposition ChairmanSince its formation in Pakistan, PAC was normally chaired by Finance Ministers,Chairman State Bank, (Conflict of interest situations) members of parliament from thegovernment party. However, in the last decades, PAC remained active up to its extent butas the notion in Australia is that chair from a government is more likely to makedepartment implement committee recommendations, was not a case in Pakistan. Underthe Charter of Democracy signed by the Leaders of major political parties of Pakistan, itwas also agreed that in future the Chairman of PAC would be the leader of the opposition(Charter of Democracy, Rule 15). Respecting an international convention practicedaround the commonwealth countries, Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, Leader of the oppositionwas honoured to chair 13thPAC for the first time in Pakistan as a Leader of theOpposition. He has a versatile personality with an excellent experience of being membersof PAC in the last governments.
  • 57. 444.13.1.3 Role of ChairmanThe Chair is extremely important in ensuring the effective operation of PAC (McGee,2002). Apart from his formal powers of the position, the chair is a principlerepresentative of the PAC to the house and the public (McGee, 2002). His role in PAC ismuch further than his duties of presiding over the PAC meetings. He is regarded a publicfigure and his statements are expected in that prospective even outside parliament.4.13.1.4 Resignation / Removal of Chairman/Members PACThe rules provided for the removal of the PAC chair are the same as provided for otherstanding committees of National Assembly under its rules. A members or chairman canresign from his membership by submitting a written resign to the Speaker NationalAssembly (NA, Rule 218).4.13.2 Membership of PACThe Committee consists of 23 Members; all are the members of the National Assembly,lower house in the Parliament of Pakistan and the Minister for Finance as its ex-officiomembers (NA, Rule 202), who is normally the Federal Minister of Finance and Revenue.The membership is usually proportionate to party membership in the house with its chairfrom the opposition, the Leader of the House. The distribution of seats depends on thedistribution of seats in the legislature that mean PPP-led governments along with itsalliances occupy more seats in PAC than Opposition. However, a cabinet members beinga member of the committee is not regarded a good practice in common wealth (Syed,2007).An international convention that counter balance the majority by giving theChairpersonship to Leader of the Opposition is practiced for the first time in Pakistan bythe present government. This was the case in two-thirds of the PACs studied by McGee(2002). The chairpersonship of the PAC to the opposition implies two basic functions;firstly, it re-equilibrates the balance of power between the government and theopposition. Secondly, their symbolic function is the fact that the chair of the PAC beingmember of the opposition indicates the willingness of both the majority and the minorityto operate within the PAC in a perfectly bipartisan manner (Syed, 2007). However,
  • 58. 45making implementation of PAC recommendation is a challenge for Leader of theOpposition which is his core duty to make sure (McGee 2002).4.14 Implementation Cell of PACThe sixth Adhoc PAC chaired by Mr. H.U Beg forwarded a set of recommendations in itsreport for the year 1999-2000. The APAC realized the lack of any mechanism thatevolves to ensure follow up of the decision made by the committee. The reportrecommended setting up an Implementation section temporarily to monitor theimplementation of PAC directives further to give it permanent status by incorporationnecessary provisions in the relevant law (APAC, 2002).Implementation Cell of PAC was formed by Gen. Musharraf in December, 2002 toensure the implementation of PAC recommendations and directives.4.14.1 Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PACA sub-Committee was constituted by the 13thPAC to review the compliance on PACdirectives under the Convenership of Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, MNA. Later theConvenership was shifted on to Yasmeen Rehman, MNA to carry forward the follow upprocess of monitoring and implementation. The MIC focused more on implementationand compliance.4.14.2 Present Tenure of PACThe PAC is formed to work along with the recent government for a period of five (05)years. The PAC will dissolve with the termination of National Assembly.4.15 Process Mapping of PACPAC wing works as secretariat of PAC. The process mapping of PAC is depicted atFigure 4.3. The main steps in the processing of PAC include: Scheduling and holding PAC Meetings Issuing agenda for PAC Meetings Handling of briefs for PAC Members sent by AG
  • 59. 46 Sending of PAC directives to concerned departments/agencies and ,recording of feedback on compliance Keeping record of the proceedings of PAC Maintaining record of recoveries Maintaining of data of members Referring of cases by PAC to FIA and NAB Handling of correspondence with PAOs, AGP, CGA and other agencies.4.15.1 Role of PAC WingPac wing plays a vital role in the carrying out of PAC functioning. PAC wing facilitate itsmeeting, provide Members necessary research, coordinate with AG office, PAO ofMinistries and follow up to PAC directives for compliance.4.15.2 Meeting ProceduresDifferent steps of PAC meeting procedures are as given in details below. Also see Figure4.3.4.15.3 Meeting SchedulePAC wing categorize paras of different ministries on alphabetical order for anexamination by PAC. The list is finalized and sent to Chairman. On the instruction ofChairman, the Additional/Joint Secretary makes a consensus with Auditor General Officeand PAO of concerned ministry on their availability for a meeting on issue of importanceor important paras. A date of the meeting is decided as per the agreed scheduled. TheSection Officer issues notices for the meeting.4.15.4 Pre-PAC at PACMembers of PAC and the staff hold informal pre-meetings to set the agenda of the PACmeetings. Such meetings are regarded significant in mutual discussions, agenda setting ofPAC and preparation of members for meeting ahead.
  • 60. 47Pre-PAC at AGFigure. 4.3 Process MAP of PACPAC Reports after NA DebateAudit ReportsAudit ReportsParliamentPresidentAGPFinance MinistryOther CommitteesPublic Complaints(Suo-Moto)Media ReviewMinistryImplementationFurtherInformationImplementation of PACDirectionsPAC SecretariatFollow up on Directives and PAC ReportsAuditReportsforPACReviewPAC Chairman & MembersDACPAO/MinistrySchedule PAC MeetingUpdate BriefsHighlighted ParasFortnightUpdatePAC MeetingPACReportsIssue Notificationsof MeetingsPre-PAC at PACReportPreparedReportReceivedActionablePointsSource: Process Mapping [the Diagram is adopted with minor changes from ASP-Aid, USAID briefing to PAC Members on May 17, 2012]NextPACMeeting
  • 61. 484.15.5 Pre-PAC meeting at Auditor General OfficeThe Auditor General and PAO of the concerned Ministry hold a pre-PAC meeting todevelop understanding prior to actually appearing before PAC. This is the last stage ofconsensus building between AG and the Ministry (PAC Officer, 2012).4.15.6 Agenda for PAC MeetingsPAC Wing, on instructions of Chairman, drafts an agenda of a meeting to be distributedamong the participants. The agenda carry the detail business of the meeting. In practiceAgenda is pre-decided by AG office.4.15.7 Meeting Set upThe Chairman sits in a very prominent chair along with members sitting on his bothsides. PAO sits in opposite to Chairman along with his staff. While the AG sits on oneside joined by his staff and opposite to his sits PAC staff. The Media, Visitors andadditional staff of any party sits on the back chairs. The existing sitting arrangement ofPac meetings is depicted in Figure 4.4.Figure 4.4. Sitting Arrangement of PAC Meeting4.15.8 Proceedings of MeetingWhen the meeting starts, The Auditor General is ordered by Chairman to read the auditparas and the Chairman gives chance to PAO to reply. The PAO have to make the PACCGP
  • 62. 49members satisfy by his argument, failing to what he will prove guilty. The PACsometimes give a second chance to PAO to make his argument clear in next meeting,normally audit paras are decided in the first meeting.4.15.9 Meeting in Public or PrivatePAC has a greater influence on ministries and departments. In cases, when it is difficultto hold any meeting at PAC secretariat (Parliament House), PAC members and stafftravel to different department to hold more efficient meeting during the availability ofmore witness and documentations.4.15.10 Minutes of the Meetings / Actionable PointsDuring the meeting, PAC wing, normally the Section Officer takes the minutes of themeetings / Actionable Points. The actionable points of the meeting finalized by the PACwing are sent to Chairman for a review. The actionable points include; Audit Paras Answers of PAO and the Auditor General Decisions of the Committee4.15.11 Official Procedure for approval of Actionable PointsIn case of a main PAC meeting, Section Officer (SO) of Main PAC takes theminutes/Actionable Points of the meeting. After finalizing the minutes/Actionable Pointsof meeting, these are referred to Deputy Secretary (DS) for a review. The DS review theActionable Points and send to Joint Secretary (JS). The JS finalize and send to AdditionalSecretary (AS). The finally reviewed Actionable Points by the AS are sent to the AuditorGeneral office for Vetting. After vetting from the Audit, the Actionable Points are sent tothe Chairman PAC for approval for issuing to all concerned ministries etc. The officialprocedure of approval of Actionable Points in Main PAC is depicted at Figure 4.5.
  • 63. 50Figure 4.5. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points at Main PACSource: Discussion with PAC OfficersIn case of a Special Committee meeting, Section Officer (SO) of that committee takes theminutes/Actionable Points of the meeting. After finalizing the minutes/Actionable Pointsof meeting, these are referred to concerned DS for a review. The DS review the/Actionable Points and forward to JS. The JS finalize and forward to AS. The Points ofAction finally reviewed Actionable Points by the AS are sent to the Auditor Generaloffice for Vetting. After vetting from the Audit, the Actionable Points are sent to theConvener Special Committee PAC. The Actionable Points finally reviewed by theConvener Special Committee PAC are sent to the Chairman PAC for approval for issuingto all concerned. The official procedure of approval of Actionable Points in Sub-Committee is depicted at Figure 4.6.Figure 4.6. Official Procedure for Approval of Actionable Points at Sub-CommitteeSource: Discussion with PAC Officers4.15.12 Finalization of ReportWhen all the paras of a year are examined and Actionable Points finalized, theActionable Points are given the shape of an annual PAC report. Internal meeting of PACare called to discuss the prepared report in detail to examine errors before it is sent to theHouse. When in an internal meeting, the members have reviewed the report to theirsatisfaction. It is sent to AG office for his Vetting. The AG office gives its Vetting reportand the report is printed and laid before the National Assembly.SO DS JS ASVetting Reportof AuditChairman PACSO DS JS ASVetting Report ofAuiditConvenerSpecial COmmitteePACChairmanPAC
  • 64. 514.16 Departmental Accounts Committee (DAC) for PACDAC was established by Ministry of Finance on 4thDecember, 1984 and re-establishedon 13thFebruary, 1998. DACs were activated and de-activated by different governmentson need basis. DAC are established in all government ministries, departments andagencies to overcome the burden of PAC. DAC meetings are held among the followingrepresentatives; PAO of the concerned Ministry Audit Representative Representative of the Ministry of Finance4.16.1 Role of DACThe Ministry of Finance defines the role of DAC to watch the processing of relevantAudit Inspector Reports (AIR) and decide upon appropriate measures to accelerate theirfinalization (APAC, 2002). DAC meetings settle maximum paras in case action has beentaken on audit observations, to the satisfaction of AGP, to lesson burden on PAC toexamine only paras of vital concern and recoveries of huge amounts or punishments tohigher officers (NAS, 200?). DAC are working at both federal and provincial levels.DACs help Auditee organization clearly identify potential paras in AIR with increasedconcentration in preparing response to draft paras on urgent basis (PAC Brief, 95). Theresults of DAC meetings have been encouraging and are proving to useful screeningforums (APAC, 2002).4.16.2 Role of Principal Accounting Officer (PAO)PAO is the focal person and competent authority in the process of financial oversight andaccountability. PAOs are the head of DAC and chair its meetings to settle paras of lesserimportance. The effective role of POAs can help overcome corruption, hence, veryimportant to PAC functioning. PAC schedules its meeting after a consensus with POA oftheir availability. He is regarded as the implementation pillar in the process. Whilereleasing their importance in financial oversight, the Prime Minister has strictly directed
  • 65. 52POAs to regularly appear at PAC meeting in a well prepared fashion (PM Secretariat,2009).4.17 Resources allocated to PACThere are two sets of resources available to PAC for its operations; finances and staffingallocated and the resources of information to carry the business of PAC. The first sort ofresources include the number of staff, the research facilitators and the equipment’s,particularly computer facilities, need to be made available (McGee, 2002)Secondly, the resources of information available to PAC include; Audit reports Media Suo-moto Actions Public ComplaintsIn the above resources, Audit reports are the main basis of PAC functioning and provideabout ninety five per cent (95 per cent) of information (PAC, 2009). PAC continualitymonitors the daily press and electronic media and takes sou-moto action of issues ofgreater public concern. Ch. Nisar Ali, during his Chairmanship of PAC give ear to manypublic complaints sent to PAC by the citizen of Pakistan.4.18 Audit Briefs for PAC MembersThis is audit document prepared by Auditor General Office. This is to facilitate theMembers of PAC for the meeting ahead. A brief contain: Subject of Audit Para Audit Objectives in detail Ministry’s updated replies Minutes of Current DAC meeting Audit Comments
  • 66. 53The Audit Briefs are regarded very helpful to members, who have less time to study theparas and related information in details. In routine, the Briefs are provided to the PAC onthe prior evening to a meeting. The members normally get them on the day of meeting.The Members when interviewed replied that briefs could be helpful if provided at leasttwo weeks earlier to a meeting (PAC officer, 2012).4.19 Directives/Recommendations in PAC ReportsThe main PAC and its sub-committees after a thorough discussion on each Audit paragive their directions which as per rule are called recommendation of the committee.These recommendations after approval from the House are considered as directions of thecommittee.4.19.1 Types of PAC DirectivesAs for as the recent practices of PAC are concerned, audit reports of PAC are mainlybased on audit paras and PAC directives are largely issued on these paras other thangrants. The PAC give different sorts of directives to PAOs/ministries;1. To recover the amount2. To further inquire into the matter3. To constitute an IDC on the issue4. To fix responsibility5. To pursue the court case6. To hold another DAC7. Can constitute a Sub-Committee8. Can refer the case to FIA/NAB/Police9. To place the name of a person in ECL10. To pend/defer the audit para11. To take disciplinary actions against person accused12. To settle the audit paras13. To provide the original record of any issue14. To summon the concerned persons15. To invite the special invitees concerning the issue
  • 67. 5416. To lodge an FIR17. Can recommend to the Prime Minister18. To blacklist the Companies19. To regularize the excess grants20. To settle the saving of grants21. To direct for Special Audit of any organization22. To take Suo-motu action on any issue23. Can recommend sever action for non-compliance24. To implement the recommendations of DAC25. To take action on public complaints26. Take action on media review27. And many other that suits the nature of case and legal point of view.4.20 Follow-up of PAC ReportsThe 6thAdhac PAC started the process for follow up to its directives. They use to writeletters to ministries and received replies. During the 12thPAC, follow up process alsocontinued and the MI Cell remained functional. However, the proper follow up startedduring 13thPAC. A review committee convened by Dr. Azra Fazal Bachehou, MNA, wasformed for this purpose that worked for nearly six month. Its Convenership was shifted toYasmen Rehman, MNA and rapid meetings took place. The committee strategized thefollow up for compliance on PAC directives. The committee held its meeting outsideParliament premises at the offices of CDA, PTA in Islamabad and for some departmentsat Lahore and Karachi. The process of preparation of Actionable Points for Follow upCommittee is the same as of the Main PAC or Special Committees of PAC. TheCommittee had laid its report for the year 2010 before the National Assembly.4.21 Responses by Ministries/PAOsThe Follow up by the MI Committee has accelerated the recovery process and ministriesare seen active and responsible to respond to PAC Directives. They appear at PACmeeting and answer questions.
  • 68. 554.22 Recovery StatusAs a result of continuous follow up, PAC has recovered 115 billion rupees which isregarded remarkable recovery so for effected (PAC, 2011) (See Annex-VI).4.23 Module of PACThe proposed introduction of a computerized Management Information System (MIS)module to be used for the PAC is a significant development. It will promote theCommittee’s efforts to improve its levels of efficiency. This system, once introduced andfully implemented, will become the operating centre of the PAC Branch with nearly overhalf of its work being facilitated through the module. The Computer qualified staff andthe members will better benefit from the system (Mughal, 2012).4.24 Auditor General relationship with PACAuditor General of Pakistan is the basic source of information to PAC. The committeerelies about 95per cent on the information provided by the AG office in the form of AuditReports. Historically, the PAC was created to ensure parliamentary follow up on AuditorGeneral’s reports (McGee, 2002).The AG submits its reports to the President being an executive officer. (Intention is not tosubmit to him for accountability but perform a post office function under theConstitution) The Federal Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary affairs, on behalfof President causes the accounts and reports to be laid t in the National Assembly. TheSpeaker thus refers the report to Secretary PAC for its scrutiny (AG Office, 2012). TheAG relationship with PAC is depicted at Figure 4.7. The relationship between AG andPAC is exclusively reciprocal, the AG reporting solely to the PAC and the PAC relyingexclusively on AG’s reports as a source of its inquiries (McGee, 2002).
  • 69. 56Figure 4.7. AG relationship with PACSource: As discussed with AG office OfficerIn General, regardless of the closeness of the relationship, the principal way in whichexpression is given to the Auditor General’s position as an Officer of Parliament is theworking relationship with the PAC. This involve providing PAC with material that formsthe basis of its inquiry work, being the source of information to committee, in turnreceiving suggestions from PAC as to the work programme that Auditor General mayundertake and report to PAC the compliance and the recoveries.4.24.1 Reporting by Auditor GeneralThe field officers of Auditor General pay audit to ministries/departments/agencies tooversee their financial handlings. The information provided by these field officers is themain basis of audit paras of Auditor General Reports. Due to lack of capacity, it isdifficult for AG office to audit 100 per cent cases. It took target sampling of high riskcases and a sample of 2-5 for process. A higher level officer of Ag office is responsiblefor identifying high risk cases, hence the sampling. However, the officers at AG officeresponded their sample was always representative.4.24.2 Highlighting of Audit Paras for PAC reviewOut of all the paras published in the audit reports, the AG office put an effort to highlightsome of the important paras to lessen the work of PAC. The criteria for highlighting andunhighlighting of audit paras are based on a manual process taking place at DAC andPre-PAC meeting at AG. .AG President National Assembly PAC
  • 70. 574.24.3 Role of Audit General in PAC MeetingsOther than audit reports, the Auditor General provides an update before a PAC meetingthrough the Audit Briefs based on the findings of DAC meetings and the Pre-PACmeeting at AG office. The AG is the sole witness to illustrate the details of audit parasand defend the PAOs before PAC.4.24.4 Implementation Cells of Audit DepartmentCompliance Cells of Audit Department were established at Federal and Provincial levelfor the compliance, implementation and follow up of the directives/actionable Points ofPublic Accounts Committees. The Implementation Cell at Federal Auditor General wasestablished to play its role as follow (PAC 2012: F.1(1)/2012/PAC.Imp/Followup/(Audit): Monitoring of outstanding PAC directives shall be a continuous processrequiring close liaison with the Departments/Ministries/Organizations The Compliance Cell Shall function under the direct supervision ofDeputy Director PAC of AG The Compliance Cell shall prepare computerized lists of all theoutstanding PAC directives and reconcile the same with respective auditeedepartment On the basis of information data prepared by the Compliance Cell, actionplan shall be prepared and circulated to the concerned PAOs/Executive Heads toarrange DAC meetings to review implementation status of PAC’sdirectives/actionable points PAC’s directives not promptly responded by the auditees shall beincorporated in the compliance reports to be submitted to PAC Secretariat/PAOsconcerned
  • 71. 58 The Compliance Cell shall maintain a Register for all PAC’soutstanding/current directives (year wise) for the purpose of regular monitoringand supervising the implementation Monthly progress report shall be submitted by the Compliance Cellthrough Deputy Director (PAC) to Director General for implementation/furtherorders Monthly report shall be included in the Calendar of returns for submissionto Deputy Director PM & E Cell of the Director General in the first week of eachcalendar month for approval and onward transmittal to Apex office.On the basis of above functioning, the Implementation Cell of Audit Department maykeep PAC aware of the compliance of its directives. PAC can also ask for a compliancereport any time to be submitted.4.25 PAC StaffRecently, PAC is headed by an Additional Secretary. The next in command include aJoint Secretary, Deputy Secretaries, Section Officers, Assistants, Clerks, computeroperators and Naib-Qasids. The staff members know well about PAC functioning.4.25.1 The powers and duties of PAC officers and employeesOfficers and employees of PAC provide secretarial assistance to the committee. Theterms of reference of PAC staff are as under:- To arrange to convene sittings of the Committee after seeking convenienceof the Chairman or as per directions from the Chairman Obtaining / gathering of information including preliminary material/ briefnotes on the relevant subjects from different sources including Office of AGPR,the concerned Ministry, Public Sector Undertakings, newspaper clippings,Internet, etc. Sending intimations/agenda papers for the sittings of the Committee to theChairman and Members of the Committee
  • 72. 59 Correspondence with concerned Ministry / Organisations on relevantmatters To study/examine the replies to Parliamentary Questions, relevantnewspaper clippings, material gathered from the Internet and other sources on thesubjects under examination To prepare Lists of Points on the relevant subjects for writtenreplies/evidence/post-evidence purposes To draft Original Reports on subjects selected and examined by theCommittee To arrange for consideration/ adoption, presentation, printing andcirculation of such Reports To scrutinize Action Taken Replies received from the Ministry, draftAction Taken Reports and arrange for their consideration/ adoption, presentation,printing and circulation To arrange for putting of various Reports presented to the House, on theInternet To prepare Action Taken Statements for the purpose of laying of the samein the Houses To process the representations received from Members/ Agencies andindividuals as per existing practice Day-to-day work relating to the Committee Secretariat.The next chapter is a detail of observations of the two selected periods the 12thand 13thPAC called the colliding facts.
  • 73. 60Chapter 5Colliding Facts5.1 IntroductionThe present chapter Colliding Facts deals with the major comparative facts of 12thand13thPAC. As the chapter go ahead it counts down PAC working practices, successes,failures and results while highlighting the obstacles and hurdles that PAC faced in theway of review process of financial oversight of appropriation accounts/financialstatements. These facts and practices exercised by two selected PAC show the efficiencylevel of one committee over the other committee. This chapter will discuss when bothPAC were allocated almost equal inputs (resources), why there is a difference in output.5.2 Composition of PACGenerally, the PAC is composed of a set of members and a Chairman with extensiveexperience or a man with an ability to conduct the financial oversight business.5.2.1 Membership of 12th & 13thPACsThe 12thPAC consisted of a total of nineteen (19) members and an Ex-officio memberthe Minister of State for Finance (PAC, 2007). The committee was dominated with ten(10) Government Members and the Chairman was also from the Government party. Theother Members include four (04) from PPPP, three (03) from MMAP, One (01) eachfrom MQM and PML-N (PAC 2012).The 13thPAC consisted of a total of twenty two (22) members and an Ex-officio member,the Minister –in-Charge for Finance and Revenue. The membership consists of five (05)members from PML-N, seven (07) from PPPP, four (04) members from PML, two (02)from MQM, two (02) independent, and 0ne (01) each from ANP and MMAP (PAC2006). The members seem to be derived on equal proportion of all parties present in thehouse. (for complete list of 12thand 13thPAC ( See Annex-V). The turnover inmembership is noticed but most of the members in the recent PAC are found associatedsince its formation.
  • 74. 615.2.2 Delay in Composition of PACThe 12thPAC first meet on April 10, 2004 with a delay of twenty three (23) days, four(04) months and one (01) year from the day of Government formation on November 16,2002 (PAC 2004).The 13thPAC first meet on September 19, 2008 with a delay of three (03) days and five(05) months from the day of Government formation on March 16, 2008(PAC 2008). Thecomparative delay of 12thand 13thPAC is depicted in Figure 5.1.Figure 5.61. Comparative Delay5.2.3 Sub-Committees / Special CommitteesIn Pakistani jurisdiction where every PAC inherited years of backlog, the tool to use Sub-Committees/Special Committee proved very helpful to clear the backlog. Particularly inPakistani PAC scenario, the backlog has been a major concern for the two selectedCommittee although none of them was successful to clear this menace. The idea was tomake a maximum use of sub-committees to clear the backlog in order to update theoperations of PAC. Hence, both 12thand 13thPAC constituted sub-committees for thispurpose.5.2.4 Sub-Committees of 12thPACIn order to deal with the inherited backlog, the 12thPAC constituted four (04) Sub-Committees (National Assembly Secretariat, 2007a). The sub Committees were convenedby; Kanwar Khalid Younis, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee I051015202512th PAC 13th PACDaysMonthsYear
  • 75. 62 Lt. Col (R) Ghulam Rasool Sahi, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee II Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee III Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA, Convener, Sub-Committee IVSub-Committee I, on its formation was convened by Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan Jatoi,MNA, but later on Dr. Abdul Ghaffar became a Federal Minister and the convenershipwas shifted on to Kanwar Khalid Younis, MNA (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004b).The Committee consisted of five (05) members and was assigned to clear the backlog oftwo (02) years for the years 1990-91 and 1998-99 (National Assembly of Pakistan,2004a). However, this sub-committee remained unable to complete her assignment. Thereport for the year 1990-91, was later completed by a Special Committee constitutedunder 13 PAC and Convened by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA. The report for the year 1998-99 was also assigned to Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, and was under review process themoment Ch. Nisar abolished Special Committees two month earlier to his resignation.While talking about the performance of PAC in Pakistan, it was generally observed thatmany audit report appeared before three to four PACs but didn’t reach to any conclusion.Sub-Committee II, on its formation was convened by Mr. Muhammad Wasi Zafar, MNA,but later becoming a Federal Minister, the covenership was shifted on to Lt. Col (R)Ghulam Rasool Sahi, MNA (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004c). The Committeeconsisted of five (05) members. This sub-committee was assigned to clear the backlog oftwo (02) years; 1991-92 and 1997-98 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) but theassignment was not completed during 12thPAC. These reports were later completed bythe 13thPAC. The report for the year 1991-92, was later reviewed by 13thPAC underchairmanship of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan. However the report for the year 1997-98 was latercompleted by a Special Committee formed by the 13 PAC under Convenership of MianRiaz Hussain Perzada, MNA.Sub-Committee III of the 12thPAC was convened by Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, (NationalAssembly of Pakistan, 2004a) who has been very active member in both 12thand 13thPAC. This Sub-Committee remained, although it was assigned a backlog of two (02)years 1992-93 and 1995-96 on June 21, 2004 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a) butit successfully finalized the deliberations of only one report for the year 1995-96 on
  • 76. 63September 18, 2007 (PAC, 2007 b) till the dissolution of National Assembly, hence, thePAC tenure. The Sub-Committee III has four (04) members and it held 72 meetings muchmore than any other Sub-Committee of 12thPAC.Sub-Committee IV was formed under Convenership of Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNAand three (03) other members (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2005). Earlier this Sub-Committee was formed under the Convenership of Ch. Wajahat Hussain, MNA (NationalAssembly of Pakistan, 2004a). The Sub-Committee was assigned to clear the backlog forthe year 1994-95 (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2004a). He, however, never attended asingle meeting. Under his Convenership this Sub-Committee remained inactive when itwas later on shifted to Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA, who continued its working butdidn’t completed a single report. Its assignment for the year 1994-95 was later completedby a Special Committee of 13thPAC under Convenership of Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada,MNA.5.2.5 Sub-Committees of 13thPACIn order to deal with the inherited backlog of twelve (12) years Audit Reports, the 13thPAC constituted three sub-committees; Special PAC-I or the Implementation Committee,Special PAC-II and Special PAC-III (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011a) other thansome short term Sub-Committee formed for specific issues and maximum for three tofour meetings.The Special Committees of 13thPAC were convened by; Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, MNASpecial PAC-I, Convened by Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, was assigned the responsibility ofeighteen (18) Ministries, the Committee worked as a Monitoring and ImplementationCell of PAC, the task has been completed (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b). ThisCommittee had functioned as a Monitoring and Implementation Committee of 13thPAC.Special PAC-II, Convened by Zahid Hamid, MNA, and Special PAC-III, Convened by
  • 77. 64Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, MNA, with responsibility to clear the backlog of three yearseach. The reports for which were submitted (Ahmed, 2011). Both Special Committees areagain assigned to clear the backlog of three years each for the years 1998-1999, 2002-2003, 2003-2004 to Special Committee II and 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2007-2008 toSpecial Committee III (Ahmed, 2011). Special Committees are good tools of PAC toupdate its business.Other than the above said Special Committees formed, the 13thPAC also constitutedtwenty five (25) other committees to examine 4-5 paras for a two-three meetings (Ali,2011).5.3 Performance of Sub-Committees5.3.1 Sub-Committees of 12thPACOut of four (04) Sub-Committees constituted by 12 PAC, only the sub-Committeeconvened by Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA, completed its report assigned to it on June 21,2004 for the Years 1995-96 and finalized its deliberations on September 18, 2007(National Assembly of Pakistan, 2007b).In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the year 1995-96, the committeereviewed one hundred and Eighty Six (186) grants and took up a total of One Thousandand Sixty Nine (1069) Audit Paras (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02).The remaining three Sub-committees examined some paras of their assignments but noneof the report was completed. The remaining work was shifted to the 13thPAC as per theRules of Procedures and Conduct of Business of the National Assembly 2007 (NA, Rule205).5.3.2 Sub-Committees of 13thPACOut of four (04) sub-committees constituted by 13thPAC, the first Monitoring andimplementation committee convened by Dr. Azra Fazal Pachuho, MNA with three othermembers on January 13, 2009 was given the time span of six (06) months to review
  • 78. 65compliance on Actionable Points but the committee never meet for a single time whenthe task was assigned to Mrs. Yaseem Rehman, MNA (PAC, 2011. 2010).5.3.3 The Monitoring & Implementation Committee (MIC) Convened by Mrs.Yasmeen Rehman, MNA reportedThe Committee held a total of sixty (60) meetings and examined sixty six (66) Grants and1678 Audit Paras in its two (02) reports for the years 2010 and 2011 (PAC, 2011:V-VI(2010) and 2011). The report contained Paras discussed during the Calendar year 2010and 2011 and Actionable Points of this committee (National Assembly of Pakistan,2011b). The performance of MIC is depicted at Figure 5.2 as given below.Figure 5.2. Performance of MICThe Committee formulated a strategic plan to make it more effective, meaningful andpurposeful. The salient points include:- To name Committee as the Monitoring & Implementation Committee of PAC To review the compliance of nine years PAC Reports for the years 2005-2006,2000-2001, 1999-2000, 1996-1997, 1995-1996, 1988-1989, 1987-1988, 1986-1987, 1985-1986 To direct the Principal Accounting Officers (PAOs) to ensure their presence in themeetings of this Committee24 36 6058 8 6692875016780200400600800100012001400160018002010 2011 TotalMeetings Grants Audit Paras
  • 79. 66 To call the concerned agencies (NAB, FIA, Police) to attend the meetings andrespond on the Audit Paras of any Ministry/Division/Department which arealready under their investigation To direct all the ministries to submit lists of the Audit Paras which are underinvestigation by NAB/FIA/Police. To directed each Ministry/Division/Department to nominate a focal person forNAB/FIA/Police cases to enhance speedy communication on such issues To ensure recoveries be made from the defaulting Ex-Parliamentarians andGovernment Officers/Officials well in time5.3.4 Implementation on Directives of MIC on Suo-Moto ActionsThe Directives issued by MIC on Suo-Moto Actions were implemented in a number ofcases; In case of misbehaviour of Secretary Communication to a Members of Parliament,the Secretary apologized before the Committee (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b).The FBR has instituted an inquiry to look the issue of missing of 2500 containers fromKarachi without payment of duty & taxes by FBR (National Assembly of Pakistan,2011b). The Secretary railway was transferred from his position on non-compliance ofPAC Directive and non-cooperation to Audit Department on Robbery of PakistanRailways scraps material case, Concerned agencies like NAB/FIA/Police were called inrelation to every Ministry where the Audit Paras are under investigation (NationalAssembly of Pakistan, 2011b). Special Audit of PTA was in Process because ofCommittee’s instructions to Auditor General (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011b).Focal persons for NAB and FIA cases have been nominated in allMinistries/Divisions/Departments and import of diesel oil in the garb of lube oil by theFBR were implemented.5.3.5 The Special PAC-II Convened by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, ReportedThis Committee examined Audit Reports for the years 1990-91, 1992-93, and 2001-02(National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02). The committee constituted onJune 1, 2010 and meet for 45 days (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02).
  • 80. 67The Committee as a whole reviewed a total of Five Hundred and Forty Three (543)grants and a total of Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty five (3745) Audit Paras tocomplete its three reports (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-III (2001-02).In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1990-91, the committeereviewed One Hundred Ninety Seven (197) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011,V-III (2001-02), 2011, V-I (1990-91). The committee took up a total of Twelve Hundredand Eighty Five (1285) Audit Paras.Figure 5.3. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNAIn the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1992-93, the committeereviewed One Hundred Ninety (190) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-II(1992-93). The committee took up a total of Fourteen Hundred and Sixty Six (1466)Audit Paras.In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 2001-02, the committeereviewed one hundred and fifty six (156) grants (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011,V-III (2001-02). The committee took up a total of Nine Hundred and Ninety Four (994)Audit Paras. The details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Zahid Hamid, MNA, aredepicted at Figure 5.3.197 190 15654312851466994374545 45 45 135050010001500200025003000350040001990-91 1992-93 2001-02 Total of Three YearsNumber of Grants Audit Paras No of Meetings
  • 81. 685.3.6 Special Committee III Convened by Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA,ReportedThis Committee examined Audit Reports for the years 1994-95 and 1997-98 (NationalAssembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV (1994-95). The committee constituted on June 1, 2010and meet for sixty five (65) days to complete its reports (National Assembly of Pakistan,2011, V-IV (1994-95).The Committee as a whole reviewed a total of Three Hundred and Forty Eight (348)grants and a total of Two Thousand Six Hundred and Forty Two (2642) Audit Paras tocomplete its three reports (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV (1994-95).In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the years 1994-95, the committeereceived a total of One Hundred Eighty Six (186) grants and Three Hundred and Nine(309) paras of which Fifty Six (56) paras and two (02) grants were referred to Monitoringand Implementation Committee of PAC (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-IV(1994-95).In the course of reviewing Appropriation Accounts for the 1997-98, the committeereceived a total of One Hundred Sixty Six (166) grants and Two Thousand, FourHundred and Forty Five (2445) paras of which Fifty Six (56) paras and two (02) grantswere referred to Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC (National Assemblyof Pakistan, 2011, V-V (1997-98). During the course of completion of report thecommittee meets for 65 days (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011, V-V (1997-98). Thedetails of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA, are depictedat Figure 5.4.5.4 BacklogBacklog in PAC, are the pending Audit Reports of previous years need to be reviewed bythe committee.
  • 82. 695.4.1 Total Backlog InheritedThe 12thPAC inherited a backlog of nine years Audit Reports (PAC, 2007 b). While, the13thPAC inherited a backlog of twelve (12) years Audit Reports containing more than24000 audit paras to deal with (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2011 (2008-09) as isdepicted in Figure 5.5.Figure 5.4. Details of the Audit Reports examined by Mr. Riaz Hussain Pirzada, MNA5.4.2 Total backlog dealt withThe 12thPAC dealt with only a Backlog of two (02) years for the years 1995-96 and 200-2001 as is depicted in Figure 5.5. Its other report were still pending, the momentgovernment dissolved and the backlog was shifted to 13thPAC as per the Rules ofprocedures and Conduct of Business 2007 of the National Assembly (NA, Rule 205).The 13thPAC inherited a backlog of 12 years. The committee devised its strategy to dealwith this big backlog and constituted three sub-committees of four to five membersassigning them separate years of pending paras to review. The 12thPAC dealt with abacklog of nine (09) years as is depicted in Figure 5.5.184 1643482 2 42532389264256 56 11265 65 1300500100015002000250030001994-95 1997-98 Total of Three YearsNumber of Grants Reviewed Number of Grants Referred to MICNumber of Audit Paras Number of Audit Paras Referred to MICNo of Meetings
  • 83. 70Figure 5.5. Backlog Status5.4.3 Reports Examined, laid in the house and debated uponThe Audit Reports which are referred to PAC by the National Assembly are examined byPAC, the final reports of PAC are laid back in the National Assembly for a debate.5.4.3.1 Reports Examined by 12thPACThe 12thPAC finalized a total of Two (02) Audit Reports for the Years 1995-96 and2000-01. The 12thPAC laid these reports on the floor of the house but none of them wasdebated see Figure 5.6.5.4.3.2 Reports Examined by 13thPACThe 13thPAC examined a total of nine (09) Audit Reports for the years 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1997-98, 2001-02, 2005-06, 2008-09 and 2010. The 13thPAC laidall the nine reports on the floor of the house but only one report was debated upon seeFigure 5.6.Figure 5.6. General Comparison of 12th & 13th PAC912290102012th 13thBacklog Inherted Backlog Dealt With1 1 2 3 6 9170 186 356 3701162 153263081069737730386697973586 72 158 56 282 338020004000600080001000012000Main PAC Sub-Committees Total Main PAC Sub-Committees Total12th PAC 13th PACAudit Reports Examined Total Grants Examined Paras Discussed Meeting Held
  • 84. 715.5 Number of PAC meetings held/ Sub-CommitteesPAC is the most active Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Pakistan.During the recent two governments, the PAC remained very active and efficient to clearbig backlogs and workloads.The 12thPAC meets for a total of eighty six (86) days in its four years term. While it’sSub-Committees meet for seventy two (72) days making a total of one hundred and fiftyeight (158) days see Figure 5.6.The 13thPAC meets for a total of fifty six (56) days in the last four years. While its Sub-Committees meet for two hundred and eighty two (282) days making a total of threehundred and thirty eight (338) days see Figure 5.6.5.6 Role of ChairThe position of the Chair of the PAC requires a very active and technical person withprior experience of financial oversight and accountability. In an interview for this study,Rizvi (2012) said the chairman of the PAC should have a balanced approach, having nopolitical biasness, must be up straight and honest to his job and most importantly have ahigh level of integrity. Same views were expressed by Rehman (2011), she said thatChair must be a very neutral person, nonpartisan and perform his duties honestly. Shealso said that Chairman should behave in an integral manner, being equal to all as he isthe Guardian of the State Exchequer. Fatyana (2011) said the role of the Chairman shouldbe very transparent and he must be a courageous, decisive, bold, impartial andimportantly the most senior opposition party parliamentarian.5.6.1 Malik Allah Yar Khan, Chairman, 12thPACThe 12thPAC was chaired by Malik Allah Yar Khan (NA-58, Attock-II, Punjab, PML)who was a very noble person, wise and a simple Parliamentarian. The survey resultshowed he was a very regular to PAC meeting and attended 93 per cent of the totalmeeting. However, under his Chairmanship PAC scrutiny speed of budgetstatements/appropriation Accounts/grants was very slow. A minimum of 41 per cent ofthe respondents responded somehow sufficient while another 59 per cent of the
  • 85. 72respondents said the scrutiny speed was insufficient as it was required to clear thebacklog. While talking about the quality of clearance, the 12thPAC meets for 54 per centmore than the 13thPAC but it recovered only Rs. 100 Million, it produced only two auditreports, it took a few sou-moto actions on the issues of Stock Exchange Crisis-2005 andSuger Crisis-2006. Under his chairmanship, members were reluctant to financialoversight. The whole process was a formality. The Government seemed involved ininfluencing the PAC operations and the relationship between PAC and AG was not muchstrong. The Chairman seemed less acquainted with the international oversight practices,even a member of that period said the Chair was not well aware of the functions andpowers of PAC provided by the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of theNational Assembly. A media person who use to observe the proceedings of 12thPACwhile showing his dissatisfaction said that a moment there was some worse things fromPAOs or AG, he used to say “hum to gee aap k huq main dua her ker sakty hainn” meanhe can do nothing but to pray for their rightful or good. Only 35 per cent of therespondents seemed satisfactory of his leadership qualities. Out of the 19 Excess BudgetGrants examined for the years 2000-01, 17 were regulated and only two differed.5.6.2 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman, 13thPACThe 13thPAC was chaired by Ch. Nisar Ali Khan (NA-53, Rawalpindi-IV, Punjab, PML-N). Ch. Nisar is regarded as a very active, vibrant and a man with prior PAC experience.He has already served six (06) PACs and was the most senior opposition partyparliamentarian, ideally considered the best man during the 13thPAC period for this job.Under Charter of Democracy, it was decided that chairman of the PAC would be theLeader of the Opposition. The practice was for the first time adopted in Pakistan whichproved so effective, 100 per cent of the respondent showed their satisfaction.Ch. Nisar Ali was very regular to PAC meetings he attend 80 per cent of committeemeetings during his chairmanship. When asked about confidence in chair 75 per cent ofthe respondents believed in his leadership. However, under his chairmanship PACscrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriation Accounts/grants remained very fast. Aminimum of 61 per cent responded sufficient while another 39 per cent of therespondents said the scrutiny speed was somehow sufficient as it was required to clear the
  • 86. 73backlog. He made a best use of Special Committees he constituted to clear the backlog.While talking about the quality of clearance, the 13thPAC meets for 54 per cent less thanthe 12thPAC but it recovered Rs. 115 Billion (See Annex-VI) as compared to only 100million recovered by the 12thPAC. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, however, took many suo-motonotices on the issues of public important such as alleged corruption in EOBI, underprecedent price hike of oil and gas, CDA projects, Military Land Act 1937 (A-1 Landissue), Purchase and misuse of vehicles by government departments, Missing of record ofallotments of plots, written off of loans during last 8 years and disregard of rules,procedures and regulation for their award, irregular appointments by various departments,Illegal occupation of Railways land by forces, allotment of railways land to Royal PalmClub, Hajj Scandal, National Assembly/Senate Co-operative Housing Society Scam,Land Scam of CDA land allotments, irregular payments of Steel Mill for housingallowances, un-authorized occupation of Government accommodations and sale ofEmbassy Building in Tokyo. He also took notice of certain public complaints and mediaissues. He was a good team leader and had a good control over the committee room. Thedirect observation of the PAC proceeding show that Ch. Nisar had a hand on experienceand knowledge of PAC mandate, international practices and PAC powers. As it wasobserved in PAC functioning during his tenure, he seemed applying every best practice ofthe Commonwealth and other non-commonwealth countries rather some practices likesuo-moto which are rare in the world, remained a business of PAC remained a workingpractice during his period. Generally, a big number of Members felt comfortable inworking with him from different parties. Rehman (2012) said she learned a lot from hischairmanship and wished him to re-take the charge of his position. She also said that if hehas not resigned, till now, PAC would have dealt with the remaining backlog. She alsotold that he trusted all of the members and always agreed with what other memberssuggest him. Rizvi (2012) said that Ch. Nisar Ali enjoyed a full monopoly over the rest ofmembers. He never cares for any consensus of members and his decisions were a singleman decisions.Ch. Nisar Ali also abolished Special Committees of PAC without any consensus of othermembers, it was observed (Ahmed 2012). The Special Committees were a good tool to
  • 87. 74clear backlog. The abolishing of Special Committees was a start of Ch. Nisar Ali Khan’sreverse role for PAC, finally the resignation.General public shared their novel experiences of Ch. Nisar period. A media person saidhe had excellent auditing skill and can easily judge gaps or discrepancies of a paras.Many people expressed that he is the one who can force PAOs to implement PACdirectives and was a man of courage who can take actions. But his resignation raised verycritical questions, if he has been chairing, despite there have been no action, norecoveries but at least he would have done one good thing to this nation and the state ofclearing big backlog which was absolute to be finished during his period. Such backloggives nothing but waste PAC time and resources further diverts PAC attention from theundated bad governance issues. Even worse of all, the entire backlog is keeping PACrestricted to discuss ongoing projects, to work on concepts like value for money andperformance auditing.Ch. Nisar Ali, as a chairman PAC has played very effective role. He pays specialattention to public complaints sent to the PAC, the practice has become a convention ofPAC. He is regarded bold in taking individual decision of National Interest. He has goodgrip on accountability. While, being a leader of the opposition, he has a counter check onthe government.5.7 PAC Wing CapacityPAC wing capacity comparatively remained the same during both periods. It most of thetime depended on the formation of Sub-Committees and staff was provided according tothe requirements. The 13thPAC had a total staff of thirty four (34). Whereas ten (10) ofthem are officials of BPS-17 and the rest of the twenty four (24) are officers of BPS-16 orbelow. The survey results showed a minimum of 30per cent of the respondents seemedsatisfied with the committee staff to support PAC during the 12thPAC while 22.7per centfound satisfied during the 13thPAC. Another 40.9per cent of respondent were somehowsatisfied during the 13thPAC. However, 70.0 per cent of respondent were dissatisfiedwith the staff available to support the committee during 12thPAC and 36.4 per cent wereof the same view during the 13thPAC. Across the tenure of both PACs in this study, 25.0
  • 88. 75per cent asked the staff was sufficient, 28.1 per cent said that the staff was somehowsufficient and 46.9 per cent said the staff as a whole was insufficient to support the PAC.Talking about the research capacity of PAC secretariat, only 10.0 per cent of therespondent seemed satisfied with the research facility provided to PAC members during12thPAC. A majority of 90.0 per cent respondent grieved that there was no such facilityavailable. While responding to the same question for the 13thPAC, 22.7 per centresponded the research facility was sufficient, 4.5 per cent found it somehow and 72.7 percent experienced the research facility as insufficient. Overall 18.8 per cent of therespondents believe it was sufficient, 3.1 per cent argued the facility was somehowprovided while 78.1 per cent across both the eras lacked any research availability toperform their job effectively. It was noted that there were no special researchers availablefor PAC to help members prepare for meeting.The response to the question of provision of independent technical expertise and researchsupport to Members for hearings during the 12thPAC remained largely negative 10.0 percent saying not important while 90.0 per cent saying not applicable at all. However,during the 13thPAC period it somehow improves 36.4 per cent saying very important, 4.5per cent saying somehow important, 22.7 per cent saying not important while 36.4 percent saying the practice is still not applicable. Jointly talking about both PAC periods25.0 per cent responded saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important,18.8 per cent saying not important while 53.1 per cent saying the practice was notapplicable.Although during the 13thPAC period survey results say the provision of research andtechnical expertise was somehow important in practice there was no such facility.Members study the Audit Briefs and Ministries replies during the meeting which wereless fruitful. Moreover, few of the PAC staff had good audit skill to technically find faultsin audit briefs and to set PAC meeting agenda at PAC Secretariat. PAC staff found veryhard working, industrious, dedicated and experienced and can fruitfully contribute to asuccessful PAC if it is utilized properly.
  • 89. 765.8 Role of Audit Department for PACThe Audit Department has a key role as a major source of information to PAC for itsoperations (McGee, 2002). However, the role of AG for PAC is very much dependant onthe role of Chairman of PAC. During the periods of less effective Chairman like MalikAllah Yar Khan, the role of AG remained less effective, while during the Chairmanshipof Ch. Nisar Ali Khan the AG played a very active role.The role of AG during the 12thPAC was more a routine and smooth. AG enjoyed amonopoly over the agenda setting and leading PAC on its desired path. Along with theChairman, the members were also less experienced and less active to understand andjudge the bureaucratic tactics of AG and the PAOs. The 12thPAC held more meetingsthan the 13thPAC excluding the sub-committees meetings which were more during 13thPAC, the performance of 12thPAC remained restricted to bureaucratic tactics of AGalong with the political posturing, bureaucratic inefficiency and years of backlog. Theeffectiveness of AG speaks its volume in the reports of the 12thPAC. In a single sitting of12thPAC for the report of the year 1995-96, 180 paras were settled for ministry ofInformation Technology and Telecom Division (National Assembly of Pakistan, 2007).The AG in routine give short details of the paras under discussion, the members werenever briefed of the condition, criteria, cause, effect, conclusion and recommendations ofthe bad governance in certain cases rather AG always aimed at getting through theweakest paras of small amounts before the committee.During the 13thPAC period, the role of AG for PAC remained effective because of theeffective role of Chairman and the Members. The Monitoring and ImplementationCommittee of the 13thPAC played an effective role to control the monopoly of AG overPAC operations. The committee focused more on compliance and frequently asked forcompliance reports. As a result, AG established Compliance Cells at Federal andProvincial Levels for full compliance of PACs directives. Moreover, the 13thPACestablished three (03) special committees and the main committee called frequentmeetings and AG was required to respond to these meetings. It required a lot of home
  • 90. 77work of AG office to support these meetings. The AG office managed to hold DAC, pre-PAC at AG office, preparing of Audit Briefs and to attend PAC meetings was aburdensome for AG office to deal with nine (09) year backlog. The PAC members andstaff showed their confident in AG successfully accomplishing all tasks of PAC. Theservices of AG were also acknowledged when Prime Minister of Pakistan, ChairmanPAC and a couple of Members visited AG office and appreciated its efforts and servicesto parliamentary oversight of federal funding.Till 12thPAC, actionable points were sent to concerned DGs for vetting that take time,actionable points were delayed as long as three months period and in most of the casesthese actionable points were sent back with no changes. These delaying tactics werechecked by a senior officer of AG office who himself took the initiative and startedvetting actionable points himself during the 13thPAC period (Ahmed 2012).The AG always had tried to limit the operations of PAC to the minimum and to exert itspressure through different tactics to maintain its monopoly (Ahmed 2012). The tacticsnormally played by AG include sending Audit Briefs late to PAC Secretariat, big role ofAG in un-highlighting of valuable paras and expert presentation skills of presenting factsin a way things go unnoticed to members.5.9 Number of issues other than audit reports dealt withBoth PACs are observed dealing with issues of public importance other than the issuesthat appeared in the Audit Reports.5.9.1 Issues other than audit reports dealt with by 12thPACThe 12thPAC took notice of issues of Public importance5.9.1.1 Stock Exchange Crisis-2005The PAC noticed all the stakeholders majorly the chairman and MGs of three Stockexchanges, Chairman, SECP and the Representative from Investment department ofMinistry of Finance to brief the Committee about the crisis. The Secretary SECP, briefedthe PAC that the reason behind the market decline was the deliberate manipulation that
  • 91. 78need a probing. It was also revealed that the down fall in the index was due to substantialdecline in share prices of OGDC, PTCL, PSO, POL, NBP and PPL. The push reportedwas OGDC 44 per cent, PTCL 15 per cent, PSO 3 per cent, POL 2 per cent and NBP 4per cent (PAC, 2007. 2000-01)The PAC suggested that the proposed task force will determine the factors that causedcrash identifying the persons and institutions responsible. The PAC seems eager to takeaction against the accused persons found involved in malpractices.The PAC directed that the matter should be submitted to the standing committee onFinance and revenue for further deliberations (PAC, 2007. 2000-01). The PAC alsodirected SECP to revisit its rules and procedure to avoid such happening in future (PAC,2007. 2000-01).5.9.1.2 Sugar Crisis-2006The PAC took up the Sugar crisis prevailing in 2006. The Secretary, Ministry of Food,Agriculture and Livestock briefed the PAC that the consecutive decline in Sugar canyield of about 12 per cent in 2004-05 and 6 per cent in 2005-06 was the main reason. Theyield of sugar cane in 2005-06 was about 48.8 million tons, whereas on average its yieldremained 47.6 million tons between 1996-2006 (National Assembly Secretariat, 2007.2000-01).Secondly, the rapid increase in Sugar prices in local as well as in International market hassprouted the crisis. The other reasons attributed to the Sugar prices in Pakistan includeincrease in ex-mill price aligned with import parity, increase in raw material by 40 percent, reluctant importers.The PAC observed that Economic Coordination Committee-ECC allowed mill owners toimport duty free sugar and 20 owners imported 400,000 tons duty free raw sugar., afterpurification, it casted Rs 21022 per kg that can be easily sold on market price. While, theMillers sold this sugar at a price exceeding Rs. 42 per kg and use to pay tax at control rateof Rs. 29 per kg, violating ECC decision.
  • 92. 795.9.2 Issues other than audit reports dealt with by 13thPACThe 13thPAC remained very active in taking notice of issues of Public importance.Besides examination of Auditor General‘s Reports, the 13thPAC took notice of issues ofpublic importance pertaining to following Ministries/Division:- Missing of files/record regarding allotment of Plots/Flats (M/o Housing andWorks) Purchase and misuse of vehicles by Government Departments Written off loans during last 8 years and disregard of procedure, rules andregulation for awarding of loans by the commercial Banks/National Bank ofPakistan, including under Saeban Loan Scheme Irregular Appointment of Consultants by various organizations Misuse of Military Land Act 1937 (A-1 Land issues) Land Scams regarding CDA allotment of Plots/Encroachment etc Hajj arrangements for Pakistan Pilgrims in Makkah & Madina in 2010 Reported sale of Pakistan Embassy building Tokyo, Japan in 2007 on athrowaway price Un-authorized occupation of Government accommodation Irregular payment in Steel Mills of House Rent Allowance in addition toprovision of official accommodation Alleged corruption in EOBI Unprecedented price hike of Oil and Gas Construction of Islamabad Expressway and installation of five overhead bridges Pakistan Railway Land under illegal occupation of Army/Rangers/Janbaz forceetc. Allotment of Railway land to Royal Palm Club National Assembly/ Senate Co-operative Housing Society Scam
  • 93. 805.10 Excess Budget Statements Examined5.10.1 Excess Budget Statements examined by 12thPACThe 12thPAC examined a total of fifty four (54) excess grants for its two reports for theyears 1995-96 and 2000-2001 see Figure 5.7. The Committee successfully regulated sixtythree (63) per cent, a total of thirty four (34) excess grants during its entire period offunctioning. The Committee also regulated another thirteen (13) per cent, a total of seven(07) excess grants subject to verification of figures by the Audit Department. However,the Committee differed twenty four (24) per cent, a total of thirteen (13) excess demandsas is depicted at Figure 5.7.The 12thPAC as a whole for its two (02) reports regulated a total of Rs.121,770,163,750/- and regulated another sum of Rs. 101,418,692/- subject toreconciliation of figures from Audit Department and differed a total amount of Rs.4,152,085,486/-.Figure 5.7. Excess Budget Statements examined by 12th PAC5.10.1.1 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2000-2001Out of nineteen (19) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 12th PAC for theyear 2000-2001, the Committee regulated sixty eight (68) per cent, a total of thirteen (13)excess grants see Figure 5.7. The Committee also regulated twenty one (21) per cent, a1935541321344 3 7211 130204060Main PAC (2000-01) Sub-Committee (1995-96) Total of 12th PACTotal Excess Grants ExaminedTotal Excess Grants RegulatedTotal Excess Grants Regulated Subject to Verification of Audit Dept.Total Excess Grants Differed
  • 94. 81sum of four (04) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. On the otherhand, the Committee differed eleven (11) per cent, making a total of two (02) excessgrants. The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 83,720,275,327/- against thirteen (13)excess grants of seven (07) ministries including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry ofCommerce, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of InformationTechnology & Telecommunication, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas,Finance Division and Economic Affairs Division. The Committee also regulated a totalamount of Rs. 81,951,700/-, subject to verification of figures by the Audit Department foranother for (04) excess grants for three (03) ministries including the Ministry ofCommerce, Kashmir Affairs & Northern Areas Division and State & Frontier RegionsDivision. While it differed a total amount of Rs. 3,246,530,526/-, against two (02) excessgrants demanded by two (02) ministries including the Ministry of Pakistan Railways andthe Ministry of State and Frontier Regions.5.10.1.2 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1995-96The report for the year 1995-96, reviewed by Sub-Committee Convened by Mr. RiazFatyana, MNA, regulated sixty (60) per cent, making a total of twenty one (21) excessgrants from a total thirty five (35) excess grants examined see Figure 5.7. The Committeealso regulated another nine (09) per cent, making a total of three (03) excess grantssubject to verification of Audit Department. However, this Committee differed twentynine (29) of per cent, making a total eleven (11) excess grants. The Committee regulateda total of Rs. 38,049,888,423/- against twenty one (21) excess grants for twelve (12)ministries including the Ministry of Culture Sports and Tourism, Ministry of Defence,Economic Affairs Division, Election Commission of Pakistan, Ministry of Environment,Finance Division, Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas-KANA Division,Ministry of Railways and SAFRAN Division. The Committee also regulated anotheramount of Rs. 1,946,699/-, subject to verification of figures from the Audit Departmentfor three departments including Housing & Works, Interior and Population WelfareDivision. While, the Committee differed a total amount of Rs. 905,554,960/- againsteleven (11) grants demanded by six (06) ministries including Commerce Division,
  • 95. 82Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,Ministry of Labour & Manpower, SAFRAN Division and Ministry of Social Welfare &Special Education.5.10.2 Excess Budget Statements examined by 13thPACThe 13thPAC reviewed a total of four hundred and thirty six (436) excess grants duringthe examination of its nine (09) reports. The Committee successfully regulated ninety(90) per cent, a total of three hundred and ninety one (391) excess grants see Figure 5.8.Another seven (07) per cent of excess grants, making a total of thirty (30) excess grantswere recommended to be regulated subject to verification of record by Audit Departmentwhich is very likely. However, the 13thPAC differed three (03) per cent of excess grants,making a total of fifteen (15) excess grants as is depicted at Figure 5.8.The 13thPAC as a whole for its eight reports regulated a total of Rs. 280,337,016,700/-and regulated another sum of Rs. 30,580,047,216/- subject to reconciliation of figuresfrom Audit Department and differed an amount of Rs. 224,043,621,257/-.5.10.2.1 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1991-1992Out of eighty seven (87) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC forthe year 1991-1992, the Committee regulated seventy seven (77) per cent, a total of sixtyseven (67) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated fifteen (15) percent, a sum of thirteen (13) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.Although, the Committee differed eight (08) per cent, making a total of seven (07) excessgrants.The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 22,465,163,445/- against sixty seven (67) excessgrants demanded by twenty six (26) ministries including Ministry of Interior, Ministry ofEducation, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Federal Board of Revenues,Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Ports & Shipping, Ministry of Food,Agriculture and Livestock, Wafaqi Mohtasib, Ministry of Finance, Ministry ofCommerce, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministryof Housing & Works, Ministry of States & Frontier Regions, Ministry of Industries &
  • 96. 83Production, Special Education & Social Welfare Division, Ministry of Culture, Ministryof Kashmir & Northern Affairs, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development,Establishment Division, Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Environment, Ministryof Population Welfare, Prime Minister Secretariat and Planning & DevelopmentDivision.The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 4,391,480,534 /-, subject toverification of figures by the Audit Department against thirteen (13) excess grants for six(06) ministries including the Ministry of Water & Power, Ministry of Labour, Manpower& Overseas Pakistanis, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of ReligiousAffairs & Minorities Affairs, Ministry of Labour & Manpower. While it differed a totalamount of Rs. 1,813,385,337/-, against seven (07) excess grants demanded by for (04)ministries including the Ministry of Water & Power, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry ofStates & Frontier Regions and Ministry of Railways.5.10.2.2 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2005-06Out of seventy two (72) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC forthe year 2005-06, the Committee regulated ninety three (93) per cent, a total of sixtyseven (67) excess grants see Figure 5.8. However, the Committee differed seven (07) percent, making a total of five (05) excess grants.The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 19,205,310,742/- against sixty seven (67) excessgrants demanded by thirty seven (37) ministries including the Ministry of Commerce,Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs, Ministry of Defence,Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Education, Establishment Division, Ministry ofEnvironment, Civil Secretariat, Federal Board of Revenue, Federal Tax OmbudsmanSecretariat, Finance Division, Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry ofIndustries, Production and Special Initiatives, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications, Ministry of Interior,Board of Investment, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry ofLabour and Manpower, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Ministry
  • 97. 84of Minorities Affairs, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Planning andDevelopment Division, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Science and Technology,Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, Ministry of States and FrontierRegions, Statistics Division, Ministry of Textile Industry, Ministry of Tourism, WafaqiMohtasib Secretariat and Ministry of Water and Power.While the committee differed a total amount of Rs. 24,403,185,812/-, against five (05)excess grants demanded by five (05) ministries including the Ministry ofCommunications, Economic Affairs Division, Earthquake Reconstruction andRehabilitation Authority (ERRA), Postal Services and Supreme Court of Pakistan.5.10.2.3 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2008-09Out of fifty seven (57) excess grants reviewed by the Main Committee of 13th PAC forthe year 2008-09, the Committee regulated eighty four (84) per cent, a total of forty eight(48) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated fourteen (14) per cent, asum of eight (08) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. However, theCommittee differed two (02) per cent, making a total of one (01) excess grants.The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 197,187,406,880/- against forty eight (48) excessgrants demanded by twenty seven (27) ministries including the Ministry ofCommunications, Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Defence, Ministryof Education, Establishment Division, Federal Board of Revenue, Federal TaxOmbudsman Secretariat, Finance Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry ofIndustries & Production, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior,Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources,Planning and Development Division, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Science andTechnology, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Statistics Division, Ministry ofTextile Industry, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, PakistanAtomic Energy Commission, National Accountability Bureau and Ministry of OverseasPakistanis.
  • 98. 85Figure 5.8. Excess Budget Statements examined by 13th PAC87 72 5721666 54 3515549166543667 67 4818264 47 331444916653917 5 1 13 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1513 0 8 21 2 5 2 9 0 0 0 30174 144 114432132 108703109832130872010020030040050060070080090010001991-92 2005-06 2008-09 Total 1990-91 1992-93 2001-02 Total 1994-95 1997-98 Total GrandTotalMain PAC Special PAC-II Special PAC-III Total of13th PACTotal Excess Grants ExaminedTotal Excess Grants RegulatedTotal Excess Grants DifferedTotal Excess Grants Regulated Subject to Verification of Audit Dept.Grand Total
  • 99. 86The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 25,670,336,632/-, subject toverification of figures by the Audit Department against eight (08) excess grants for onlyfive (05) ministries including the Ministry of Food & Agriculture Economic AffairsDivision, Establishment Division, FATA Secretariat and Social Welfare and SpecialEducation.. While it differed a total amount of Rs. 197,187,406,880/- against one (01)excess grants demanded by Ministry of Postal Services.5.10.2.4 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1990-91Out of sixty six (66) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for theyear 1990-91, the Committee regulated ninety seven (97) per cent, a total of sixty four(64) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated three (03) per cent, asum of two (02) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 7,985,797,173/- against sixty four (64) excessgrants demanded by twenty for (24) ministries including the Ministry ofCommunications, Central Board of Revenue, Civil Secretariat (FATA), Ministry ofCommerce, Council of Islamic Ideology, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs,Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Establishment Division, Finance Division,Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry ofHealth, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry of Industries & Production, Ministry ofInformation & Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs andNorthern Areas, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Ministry of Population Welfar,Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission, Ministry of Religious Affairs and MinoritiesAffairs, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Ministry of Social Welfare and SpecialEducation, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat and Ministry of Water and Power.The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 78,135,866 /-, subject to verificationof figures by the Audit Department against two (02) excess grants for the Ministry ofHealth and Economic Affairs Division.
  • 100. 875.10.2.5 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1992-93Out of fifty four (54) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for theyear 1992-93, the Committee regulated eighty seven (87) per cent, a total of forty seven(47) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated nine (09) per cent, a sumof five (05) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department. However, theCommittee differed four (04) per cent, making a total of two (02) excess grants.The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 8,070,578,131/- against forty seven (47) excessgrants demanded by twenty four (24) ministries including the Ministry of CabinetDivision, Central Board of Revenue, Ministry of Culture and Sports, Ministry ofTourism, Ministry of Defence, Economics Affairs Division, Ministry of Education,Establishment Division, Civil Secretariat (FATA), Finance Division, Ministry of Food,Agriculture & Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry ofHousing & Works, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior,Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Labour, Manpower and OverseasPakistanis Division, Planning and Development Division, Ministry of Petroleum andNatural Resources, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of States and FrontierRegions, Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariatand Ministry of Water and Power.The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 25,670,336,632/-, subject toverification of figures by the Audit Department against five (05) excess grants for threeministries including the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health and Ministry of SocialWelfare and Special Education, . However, it differed a total amount of Rs.197,187,406,880/- against two (02) excess grants demanded by Ministry ofCommunications and Ministry of Defence.5.10.2.6 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 2001-02Out of thirty five (35) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-II of 13th PAC for theyear 2001-02, the Committee regulated ninety four (94) per cent, a total of thirty three(33) excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee also regulated six (06) per cent, a sumof two (02) excess grants subject to verification of Audit Department.
  • 101. 88The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 3,326,246,701/- against thirty three (33) excessgrants for only fifteen ministries including the Ministry of Cabinet Division, Ministry ofCommerce, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Food, Agriculture &Livestock, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Housing & Works, Ministry ofIndustries & Production, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Ministry ofInterior, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour, Manpowerand Overseas, Ministry of Population Welfare, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Zakat andUshr and Ministry of Water and Power.The Committee also regulated a total amount of Rs. 290,620,020/-, subject to verificationof figures by the Audit Department against two (02) excess grants for the Central Boardof Revenue and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,5.10.2.7 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1994-95Out of forty nine (49) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-III of 13th PAC for theyear 1994-95, the Committee regulated hundred (100) per cent, a total of forty seven(49) excess grants see Figure 5.8.The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 5,035,910,874/- for excess grants for twenty one(21) ministries including Cabinet Division, Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism,Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of LocalGovernment and Rural Development, Economic Affairs Division, FATA Secretariat,Finance Division, Foreign Affairs Division¸ Ministry of Health, Ministry of Information& Broadcasting, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Industries and Production, Ministry ofKashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and OverseasPakistanis Division, Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights and Parliamentary Affairs,Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Narcotics Control Division,Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and Ministry of Special Education and SocialWelfare.
  • 102. 895.10.2.8 Excess Budget Statements for the Year 1997-98Out of fifty four (16) excess grants reviewed by the Special PAC-III of 13th PAC for theyear 1997-98, the Committee regulated hundred (100) per cent, a total of sixteen (16)excess grants see Figure 5.8. The Committee regulated a total of Rs. 17,060,602,754/-against excess grants of thirteen (13) ministries including Ministry of Commerce,Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Environment, Ministry ofLocal Government and Rural Development, Economic Affairs Division, FATASecretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finance Division, Labour, Manpower andOverseas Pakistanis Division, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Zakat, Ushr and MinoritiesAffairs, Ministry of Postal Services and Ministry of States and Frontier Regions.5.11 Quality of ClearanceAs the PAC in Pakistan during the last many years have been dealing with backlog, theclearance of backlog remained the main concern. Another aspect of it is that such backlogdiverts the attention of PAC in paying its attention to the misappropriations in the on-going recent projects. The practical approach could be to deal with selective backlog, theissue of greater value where big amounts of monies are involved and the chances of morerecoveries. Hence, the quality of clearance stands how wisely one committee deals withyears of backlog considering the importance of time and the work pending.5.11.1 Number of Audit Paras DiscussedThe main committee of the 12thPAC discussed a total of 6308 audit paras whereas it sub-committee discussed a total of 1069 audit paras. Hence, the 12thPAC discussed a total of7377 audit paras during its tenure as is depicted at Figure 5.9.The main committee of the 13thPAC discussed a total of 3038 audit paras, where as itssub-committees discussed a total of 6697 audit paras making a total of 9735 audit parasdiscussed during the 13thPAC period as is depicted at Figure 5.9.
  • 103. 90Figure 5.9. Audit Paras Discussed V/S Directives Passed5.11.2 Directive PassedThe Main PAC of the 12thPAC passed a total of 967 directives - its sub-committeepassed a total of 456 directives. The 12thPAC as a whole passed a total of 1423 directiveswith a per centage rate of only 19. While, the Main PAC of the 13thPAC passed a total of1681 directives, its sub-committee passed a total of 3238 directives. The 13thPAC as awhole passed a total of 4919 directives with a per centage rate of 51 as is depicted atFigure 5.9 and Figure 5.11.Figure 5.10. Compliance Rate in Per centage5.11.3 Per centage of directives implemented by institution concernedThe rate of compliance during both 12thand the 13thPAC periods remained very low.During the 12thPAC, the compliance rate observed at rate of less than 10 per cent while737797351423491919 5102000400060008000100001200012th PAC 13th PACAudit Paras Discussed Directives Passed % of Directives Passed914918602040608010012th PAC 13th PAC% of Directives Implemented % of Action Pending
  • 104. 91the compliance rate for 13thPAC little more than 12thPAC being 14 per cent (AGP2011). The Compliance rate is depicted at Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11.Figure 5.11. Quality of Clearance5.11.4 Per centage of Actions PendingAssessing the PAC compliance record, it was found that more than 90 per cent of actionswere pending till the point of time 12thPAC was dissolved. While, on assessing thereports of the Compliance Cell of Audit Department, on an average 86 per cent of actionswere still pending to the end of 2011 (AGP 2011) as is depicted in Figure 5.10 and Figure5.11.5.12 Amount of money saved or recoveredBeing the guardians of good governance and financial control over resources, amounts ofmoney saved or recovered remained the main objective of any PAC.5.12.1 Recoveries Made by 12th PACThe 12thPAC directed recovery amount of Rs 169.775 million out of which a sum of Rs101.492 million was realized (PAC, 2007. 2000-01).5.12.2 Recoveries Made by 13th PACThe efficiency of the PAC in recent years may also be gauged from the fact, the amountof recoveries made from various Government Organization, which were Rs. 5.12 billion020004000600080001000012000Audit ParasDiscussedDirectivesPassedDirectivesImplementedRate ofCompliance in%ActionPending12th PAC13th PAC
  • 105. 92in 2000-2001 and only Rs.3.93 billion in 2006-07, have gone up to Rs.19.43 billion in theyear 2008-09 and Rs. 24.967 billion in 2009-2010. For the 1st & 2nd quarters, 2010-11recovery is Rs. 17.723 billion and for the month of January, 2011 only it is Rs. 6.06billion. Approximately, Rs.115 Billion have been recovered so far as a result of PACdirectives(PAC 2011) (Annex-VI).5.12.3 Major Areas of Recoveries Loss due to investment in Stock Exchange in violation of Prime Minister‘sinstructions – Rs 4.14 Billion (M/o Planning and Development) Un-necessary purchase of LPG plant by OGDCL- Rs. 576 million (M/oPetroleum and Natural Resources) Misappropriation of PC poles - Rs. 39.685 million (M/o Water and Power) Undue advantage of US $. 1244 million allowed to a contractor (M/o Water andPower) Non-recovery of standard rent from un-authorized occupants Rs. 83.3 million(M/o Housing and Works) Expenditure on account of pay and allowances of work charged establishment ofPak-PWD in excess of the permissible limit Rs. 160.1 million. (M/o Housing andWorks) Non-recovery of water charges from the residents Rs. 158.4 million (M/o Housingand Works) Non-retrieval of 20,000 acres of land costing – Rs. 100 billion (M/o Housing andWorks) xii Loss of Rs. 12.742 million on account of short recovery of Railway‘s dues owingto irregular adjustment of school fund (M/o Railways) Un-justified procurement of imported vehicles Rs. 16 million (M/oCommunications) Non-taxation of commission/interest income under normal law Rs. 9.543 million(Federal Board of Revenues) Loss of revenue due to non-initiation of timely proceedings Rs. 1,063.543 million(Federal Board of Revenues)
  • 106. 93 fraudulent drawl of sales tax refund Rs. 20.00 billion (Federal Board of Revenues) Non/short-realization of sales tax, additional tax and penalty Rs. 1352.088 million(Federal Board of Revenues) Inadmissible refund of sales tax Rs. 140.002 million (Federal Board of Revenues) Loss of potential earning of Rs. 1,889 million due to unnecessary detention of aWagon in Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila (M/o Railways)5.13 PAC Meeting out of Parliament PremisesDuring 12thPAC, no PAC meeting was held outside parliamentary premises, however,during the 13thPAC, the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of the PACConvened by Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, held meetings out of Parliament House,such meetings were held at the department of Capital Development Authority (CDA),Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and a couple of meetings at Lahore andKarachi. Yasmeen Rehman, Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for this study thatnow PAC meetings are open to media and general public and they are doing efforts tosolve entry problem of those interested.5.14 Average Attendance of MembersOn an average the attendance of members during the 12thPAC remained 10.46 membersper sitting. Normally the 12thPAC consisted of 18 members. Some of the membersremained members across the tenure, while some came and left the committee after shorttime.While, on an average the attendance of the members during the 13thPAC remained 10.35members per sitting. Normally the 13thPAC consisted of 22 to 23 members. Most of themembers seemed consistent while some attended one are two meetings.5.14.1 Effective MembersThere are many factors in the functioning of a PAC to check the effectiveness of amember. During both of the committees being observed in this study, on an averagemembers seemed effective both in term of their participation and contribution in thequality of clearance. However, a member can be judged on the basis of his or her
  • 107. 94attendance in the committee meetings, participation in committee debates, membership insub-committees and the financial oversight capacity.5.14.1.1 Members Effectiveness of 12thPACWhile discussing the effectiveness of members, Malik Allah Yar Khan, Chairman PAC,remained the most active participant, hence most effective in the main PAC. He attendeda total of eighty (80) meetings out of eighty six (86) meetings held across the committeetenure with a per centage of ninety three (93) meetings.Prof. Aasiya Azeem, Member, stood second effective members; she attended seventy one(71) meeting with a per centage of eighty two (82) meetings. Syed Qurban Ali Shah,Member, remained the third most effective members, who attended sixty five (65)meetings, a seventy six (76) per cent of total meeting.Five (05) members attended 60-75 per cent meetings, seven (07) members attended 40-59per cent meetings, four (04) members attended 10-39 per cent meetings and one (01)attended less than 10 per cent meetings. While, Ch. Wajahat Hussain, Member, remainedmembers of the committee across its tenure but he never attended any single (01)meeting.Riaz Fatyana, Member, attended fifty eight (58) meeting of Main PAC. He was also theConvener of a sub-committee and attended its 72 meeting. Overall he attended 130Meetings during the 12thPAC period. He also produced a report of its sub-committee forthe years 1995-96.5.14.1.2 Effective Members of 13thPACMrs. Yasmeen Rehman, Members, 13thPAC, remained the most effective members in themain PAC. She attended fifty four (54) meetings out of fifty six (56) meeting of mainPAC with an attendance of ninety six (96) per cent. She also remained the Convener ofSpecial Committee-I of PAC and attended its nine (09) meetings. She also attended thirtyseven (37) Meeting of the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC. Hence,she attended a total of one hundred (100) meetings in all. She also contributed two (02)reports of the Monitoring and Implementation Committee of PAC. She took six
  • 108. 95international study tours and represented PAC of the National Assembly of Pakistan atdifferent international forums, workshops and conferences.Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman and Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, Member, stood second,each of them attended forty five (45) meetings, making eighty (80) per cent of allmeetings held. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Chairman, being the Leader of the Oppositionremained most effective and active chairman. Mian Riaz Hussain Perzada, was also theConvener of Special Committee-III. He attended its forty five (45) meeting. Hence, heattended a total of ninety (90) meetings.Mr. Zahid Hamid, Member, remained third most effective member, who attended fortythree (43) meeting making seventy seven (77) per cent of all meeting held so for 13thPAC. He was also the Convener of Special Committee-II and attended its fifty four (54)meetings. Overall, he attended a total of ninety seven (97) meetings.A total of six (06) members attended 50-75 meetings, another four (04) membersattended 20-49 per cent meetings, five (05) members attended 15-19 per cent meetingsand twelve (12) members attended less than ten (10) per cent meetings. While, ten (10)members attended less than five (05) meeting, of what three (03) members attended onlytwo (02) meetings and five (05) members of them attended only a single (01) meeting.Sardar Ali Muhammad Khan Mahar was the member of 13thPAC who never attended asingle meeting.5.15 Performance of Monitoring & Implementation CommitteePerformance of any PAC can be measured on the basis of rate of compliance and theimplementation of its directives. Hence, Monitoring and Implementation Committees areimportant to measure the output of a committee.5.15.1 Formation of Implementation CellOn its constitution during the 6thAdhoc PAC under H.U. Beg, the Implementation Cellwas merely a correspondence office. The Cell wrote letters to ministries and departmentsfor compliance on PAC Directives but this correspondence was never taken serious. Theformation of mere Implementation Cell without a Monitoring Committee was naturally
  • 109. 96less effective. However, it was a start on the way to implementation or compliance ofPAC directives.5.15.2 Implementation Cell under 12thPACDuring the 12thPAC period, Implementation Cell was headed by a Section Officer, butthe operations of Implementation Cell were restrained with an additional assignment ofassisting two sub-committees each headed by Riaz Fatyana, MNA and Kanwar KhalidYounis, MNA. Due to its work load of two sub-committees, the implementation Cell wasunable to perform its basic functioning. The implementation Cell spent as less as 10 percent of its time to implementation follow up and 90 per cent of its time to Sub-Committees in its effort to clear backlog and preparing audit reports (Shah 2012). TheStaff seems in trouble and the status of Implementation Cell fading while its staffperforming the duties of supporting other committees who were working on clearingbacklog. To perform both duties realizing the importance and sensitivity ofimplementation work and the dedication required to clear the backlog was underminingthe importance of Implementation Cell said the officer who was on duty that time. Onmaking Cell operational, only 10 per cent of implementation work was impossibledepending on the resources and political setup of that time. Overall the Cell, lack anypower to take action to implement PAC directives, he embarked. However, thecompliance rate during the 12thPAC period was as low as below 5 per cent which wasonly because of non-existing of Monitoring and Implementation Committee.5.15.3 Review Committee of the 13thPACThe 13thPAC on its constitution formed a review committee on 13thJanuary, 2009 forperiod of six (06) month, the review committee was Convened by Dr. Azra FazalPechecho, MNA, to review the compliance of actionable points of PAC (NationalAssembly Secretariat, 2010:VI(2010). However, under this committee no meeting washeld till the termination of its period. Hence, no progress was made under this committee(PAC 2011).
  • 110. 975.15.4 Monitoring and Implementation Committee of 13th PACOn formation of Monitoring and Implementation Committee on 5th October, 2009,Under the Convenership of Yasmeen Rehman, MNA, the implementation andcompliance process accelerated. The MIC took internal meeting to formulate strategicplan for an effective follow up and implementation process. The MIC took dozens of suo-moto actions and most of them were implemented with positive responses as a whole.MIC, naturally lack authority to give its directive, however, in certain cases it passeddirectives which include i) in case of full recovery, the committee settles the audit para,ii) in case of full compliance, the committee settles the audit para, iii) in case of non-compliance, the committee deferred the para till next meeting with directions to PAO tomake compliance during the given period.The MIC made a follow up strategy for an effective compliance, under this strategy, theMIC or the Implementation Cell wrote regular letters to the ministries for compliance tocertain directives and calls were made. The Compliance Cell of Audit Department alsoreported the rate of compliance to MIC on need basis as there were only lists of non-compliance which was the only performance of these Compliance Cells of AuditDepartment. However, the MIC was a sword of domical always hanging over the AG andMinistries.The MIC had prepared its two (02) reports; the report for the year 2010 laid before theNational Assembly while the report for the year 2011 is ready to be laid. The MIC held atotal of twenty four (24) meetings, examined fifty eight (58) grants and nine hundred andtwenty eight (928) audit paras (PAC, 2011. V-VI (2010) for its report for the 2010, whileit held a total of thirty six (36) meetings, examined eight (08) grants and seven hundredand fifty (750) audit paras.5.16 Impact of Foreign ToursDuring both selected PACs periods members and secretariat staff went on differentforeign study tours and benefited a lot out of them. During the 12thPAC, there were rare
  • 111. 98study tours. A minimum of 3-4 study tours were noted to be held to different countriesincluding UK and Canada.However, the 13thPAC took a number of study tours to attend international conferences,briefings or workshops to different courtiers including Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lankaand UK. The Members and staff who went on these study tours responded that they havebenefited a lot out of these tours. Chan (2012) says that we were able to present oursuccesses at international forum when we attended a PAC related Conference at Thailandand got our work acknowledged there which give us confidence and courage to workmore. Rehman (2012) said that she learned the concepts of Value for Money and AuditPerformance only when she attended PAC workshops at UK. However, she told there isno such idea in our PAC. She also astonished that for the first time she realized that ourcompliance rate was very low and we were mere on traditional methods of follow upwhen she was told by Britain PAC Chair that they have 90 per cent compliance rate andthey use very modern methods and there was no question of non-compliance. Theyfurther told that 10 per cent non-compliance was reasoned and there were some technicalproblems in that said Yasmeen Rehman, a PAC member.Ahmed (2011) a staff member of PAC and head of MIC who have been on study trips toBangladesh and Thailand told that the trips boosted his explore of follow up strategiesand better understanding of PAC operations.5.17 Donor AssistantThe practice of donor assistant to PAC was rarely noted. The only funding during theentire selected period of study was received by World Bank of an amount of US 240000$ during the 12thPAC period (Shabbir 2012). The funding was purposed to be spent onfour areas including conducting of workshops, study tours of members and staff toabroad, hiring of consultant and purchase of equipment’s like computers, laptops, printer,multimedia projectors and other related necessaries.Under this project, a 2-3 days’ workshop was conducted, two (02) members including theChairman Malik Allah Yar Khan went on a study tour and the PAC purchased three (03)
  • 112. 99laptops, three (03) printers, four (04) desktop computers and one (01) multimediaprojector (Shabbir 2012).However, due to lack of consensus between PAC and the World Bank on hiring ofconsultant, the project was cancelled and the remaining money was returned back. While,USAID provided with some computers. printers and laptops during 12thand 13thPACperiods (Shabbir 2012).5.18 IT progress of PACThere is a proposal of introducing a latest computerized MIS module for the use of PAC,the programme can enhance the efficiency of the committee. While during the 12thPACperiod, there was no IT progress except some computers for typing notices formeetings(Shabbir 2012).The chapter ahead is based on the perceptions of the respondents to a survey conducted toassess the performance of PAC during two different governments.
  • 113. 100Chapter 6Challenging the Past6.1 IntroductionA survey was conducted for this study adopting World Bank Institute’s instrument usedin its survey of 51 democracies in 2002 with certain changes suitable to localparliamentary ambiance. Naturally the present study being comparative one, sameindictors were chosen for assessing both 12thand 13thPAC of the National Assembly ofPakistan. Hence two Questionnaires were used having same indicators but different timeperiod; one for 12thPAC and the other for 13thPAC. The population for theseQuestionnaires includes the Members of selected PACs, PAC Secretariat Staff, AuditorGeneral Office and Media. However, greater importance was given to those memberswho served both of the selected PACs like Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, and Riaz Fatyana,MNA, staffer who served both PACs and media persons who observed the operations ofboth PACs. The Questionnaires were sent to whole population however the response rateremained 57 per cent.The questionnaires briefly discuss the structure, powers and practices of PAC during twoselected periods. The responses to the questionnaires describe the performance of twoselected PACs on winning points providing hints to analyse whether these winning pointswere according to the PAC mandate and if not? Did the winning PAC put its effort toinstitutionalize them?The chapter is based on the results of the survey Questionnaires distributed to obtain theperception of the stakeholders of the 12thand the 13thPAC. (See Annex-VII for 12thPACand Annex-VIII for 13thPAC Survey Instruments)6.1. General Structure of PACThis section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chairof the PAC regarding the general structure of 12thand 13thPACs.
  • 114. 1016.1.1. The best Chair of the PACWhen a question was asked about the best Chair, 20 per cent of the total respondentduring 12th PAC and 18.2 per cent of the total respondent during the 13th PACresponded that Governing Party Chair was the best one, while, 80 per cent during the12th PAC and 81.8 per cent during the 13th PAC responded that an Opposition PartyChair was the best. However, an overall of 18.8 per cent favoured the Governing partyChair and 81.2 per cent showed their confidence in an Opposition Party Chair duringboth the 12th PAC and the 13th PAC. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.1.Table 6.62. A perception of the respondent about the of the Best Chair of 12thand 13thPACDifference Era Governing Party Chair Opposition Party Chair12th PAC 20.0% 80.0%13th PAC 18.2% 81.8%12th & 13th PAC 18.8% 81.2%6.1.2. The Capacity of the PAC staffA minimum of 30 per cent of the respondents seemed satisfied with the committee staffto support PAC during the 12thPAC while 22.7 per cent found satisfied during the 13thPAC. Another 40.9 per cent of respondent were somehow satisfied during the 13thPAC.However, 70.0 per cent of respondent were dissatisfied with the staff available to supportthe committee during 12thPAC and 36.4 per cent were of the same view during the 13thPAC. Across the tenure of both PACs under this study, 26.0 per cent asked the staff wassufficient, 28.1 per cent said that the staff was somehow sufficient and 46.9 per cent saidthe staff as a whole was insufficient to support the PAC. The population and response ofthe 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.2.
  • 115. 102Table 6.63.Tthe perception of the Capacity of Committee Staff of 12thand 13thPACDifference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient12th PAC 30.0% 0% 70.0%13th PAC 22.7% 40.9% 36.4%12th & 13th PAC 25.0% 28.1% 46.9%6.1.3. Research Facility availableOnly 10.0% of the respondent seemed satisfied with the research facility provided toPAC members during 12thPAC. A majority of 90.0 per cent respondent grieved that therewas no such facility available. While responding to the same question for the 13thPAC,22.7 per cent found the research facility sufficient, 4.5 per cent found it somehow and72.7 per cent experienced the research facility as insufficient. Overall 18.8 per cent of therespondents believe it was sufficient, 3.1 per cent argued the facility was somehowprovided while 78.1 per cent across both the eras lacked any research availability toperform their job effectively. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.3.Table 6.64. Availability of Research FacilityDifference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient12th PAC 10.0% 0% 90.0%13th PAC 22.7% 4.5% 72.7%12th & 13th PAC 18.8% 3.1% 78.1%6.2. Successes of PACThis section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chairof the PAC regarding the successes of 12thand 13thPACs.
  • 116. 1036.2.1. Government responds to committee recommendationsA minimum of 20.0 per cent of the response to the 12thPAC was that governmentresponds favourably to Committee recommendations, 70.0 per cent said governmentseldom respond to committee recommendations and 10.0 per cent said that governmentnever respond at all. In a response to this question for 13thPAC, 81.8 per cent saidgovernment favourably responds to committee recommendations and 18.2 per cent said itresponds seldom. The overall response for both the governments remained 62.5 per centsaid government respond frequently, 34.4 per cent said seldom and 3.1 per cent said thatgovern never favourably responds to PAC recommendations. The population andresponse of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.4.Table 6.65. Government Response to Committee RecommendationsDifference Era Frequently Seldom Never12th PAC 20.0% 70.0% 10.0%13th PAC 81.8% 18.2% 0%12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 34.4% 3.1%6.2.2 Compliance rate of PACs recommendationsOn a question whether government implements committee recommendations, for the 12thPAC, 30.0 per cent said governments implements on committee recommendationsfrequently and 70.0 per cent said it implements seldom. In case of 13thPAC, 45.5 percent said frequently and 54.5 per cent said seldom. In an overall response, 40.6 per centsaid frequently and 59.4 per cent said government seldom implements on PACrecommendations. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted atFigure 6.5.
  • 117. 104Table 6.66. Government Implements Committee RecommendationsDifference Era Frequently Seldom12th PAC 30.0 % 70.0%13th PAC 45.5% 54.5%12th & 13th PAC 40.6% 59.4%6.2.3 Changes in legislation as a result of PAC recommendationThis factor remains seldom across both the PACs. Only a minimum of 10.0 per centresponded it was frequent for 12thPAC, 70.0 per cent said it was seldom and 20.0 percent said never any changes were adopted as result of committee work. Another very lowrate of 18.2 per cent responded it was frequent during the 13thPAC, 59.1 per centresponded seldom and 22.7 per cent responded it was never observed. Jointly for both thePACs, 15.6 per cent observed such adoption frequently, 62.5 per cent observed seldombut 21.9 per cent never observed any such change being adopted. The population andresponse of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.6.Table 6.67. Institutionalization of practicesDifference Era Frequently Seldom Never12th PAC 10.0 % 70.0% 20.0%13th PAC 18.2% 59.1% 22.7%12th & 13th PAC 15.6% 62.5% 21.9%6.2.4 Rate of improvements in the integrity of government information or databasesHundred per cent of the respondents for the 12thPAC said that improvements in theintegrity of government information or data bases were seldom. In case of 13thPAC, 63.6
  • 118. 105per cent said such improvements were frequent and 36.4 per cent said it was seldom. Thepopulation and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.7.Table 6.68. Improvements in the integrity of government information or data basesDifference Era Frequently Seldom12th PAC 0% 100.0%13th PAC 63.6% 36.4%12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 56.2%6.2.5. Legal action taken against officials who contravene lawsConsidering the response rate for the 12thPAC, 22.2 per cent said that legal action wasfrequently taken against officials who contravene laws, 55.6 per cent said that such actionwas taken seldom and 22.2 per cent said that such action were never taken. In case of 13thPAC, 45.5 per cent said frequently but 54.5 per cent said seldom. As a whole, for the twoconsecutive governments during 12th PAC and 13th PAC, 38.7 per cent said such actionwere taken frequently, 54.8 per cent said seldom and 6.5 per cent said there were no suchaction taken. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure6.8.Table 6.69. Legal action was taken against officials who contravene lawsDifference Era Frequently Seldom Never12th PAC 22.2% 55.6% 22.2%13th PAC 45.5% 54.5% 0%12th & 13th PAC 38.7% 54.8% 6.5%
  • 119. 1066.2.6 Disciplinary action taken against officials who contravene administrativeguidelinesDuring the 12th PAC and the 12thPAC, 20.0 per cent responded that disciplinary actionwas taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines were frequentlyobserved while 80.0 per cent said such actions were seldom observed. However, duringthe 13th PAC and the 13thPAC, 59.1 per cent frequently observed such actions to betaken and 40.9 per cent seldom observed. An overall response for both Governmentsremained 46.9 per cent frequently observed, 53.1 per cent seldom observed. However, thepractice was observed. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depictedat Figure 6.9.Table 6.70. Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelinesDifference Era Frequently Seldom20.012th PAC 0% 80.0%13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%6.2.7. Resistance to political pressureUnder Musharraf Government, the 12thPAC, 30.0 per cent of the respondents said thecommittee frequently resisted political pressure exerted on it, 50.0 per cent said it seldomresisted and 20.0 per cent said committee never successfully resisted. While, 59.1 percent respondent to the 13thPAC said during the 13th PAC, PAC successfully resisted topolitical pressure if any time it was exerted on it. Another 40.9 per cent said suchresistant was seldom. As a whole for both PACs, 50.0 per cent say that PAC strongly andsuccessfully resisted to any political pressure exerted on it, 43.8 per cent said it wasseldom but 6.2 per cent said PAC lack capacity to resist political pressure. The populationand response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.10.
  • 120. 107Table 6.71. Resistant to Political PressureDifference Era Frequently Seldom Never12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%13th PAC 59.1% 40.9% 0%12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 43.8% 6.2%6.2.8. Rate of avoiding facts by Principal Accounting OfficersThe survey resulted 70.0 per cent of PAOs were found hiding facts before PAC duringthe 12thPAC but 30.0 per cent responded PAOs were fair and they never hide factsbefore the committee. During the 13thPAC, 54.5 per cent argued PAOs frequently hidefacts, 27.3 per cent said PAOs hide facts seldom but 18.2 per cent showed a full belief inPAOs saying that they were fair and transparent. The overall survey result showed that59.4 per cent of the respondents say the PAOs frequently hide facts, 18.8 per cent sayseldom while 21.9 per cent voted in the favouring fair attitude of PAOs. The populationand response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.11.Table 6.72. PAOs found hiding factsDifference Era Frequently Seldom Never12th PAC 70.0% 0% 30.0%13th PAC 54.5% 27.3% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 59.4% 18.8% 21.9%6.2.9. Adoption of latest oversight developmentsDuring the 12thPAC, the survey observed that there was a practice of adopting latestoversight practices but rarely frequent as 30.0 per cent say it but the practice wasobserved seldom by 70.0 per cent of the respondents. During the 13thPAC, latest
  • 121. 108oversight developments were mostly practiced as 77.3 per cent responded so, another22.7 per cent said it happens seldom. Jointly for both PACs, 62.5 per cent said it happensfrequently while 37.5 per cent said the practice was seldom. The population and responseof the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.12.Table 6.73. Adoption of latest Financial Oversight DevelopmentsDifference Era Frequently Seldom12th PAC 30.0% 70.0%13th PAC 77.3% 22.7%12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%6.2.10. Institutionalized of guiding principlesDuring the 12thPAC period, 50.0 per cent responded the Committee frequentlyinstitutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective andrest of the 50.0 per cent said the practice was seldom. While, during the 13thPAC 72.7per cent believed the practice was frequent but 27.3 per cent said the practice wasseldom. However, the survey resulted that since 2002-2011, 65.6 per cent believedpractice was frequent but 34.4 per cent believe it was seldom. The population andresponse of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.13.Table 6.74. The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles required to meet its objectiveDifference Era Frequently Seldom12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%13th PAC 72.7% 27.3%12th & 13th PAC 65.6% 34.4%
  • 122. 1096.2.11. Adherence to financial control of resourcesThe survey resulted that there was an adherence to financial control of resources during12thPAC but response was 50.0 per cent as frequent and 50.0 per cent as seldom.However, committee’s adherence to financial control was more frequent as 90.9 per centsaid so while 9.1 per cent said it was seldom. As a whole, 78.1 per cent responded thepractice was frequent but 21.9 per cent believe it was seldom. The population andresponse of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.14.Table 6.75. Adherence to financial control of resourcesDifference Era Frequently Seldom12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%13th PAC 90.9% 9.1%12th & 13th PAC 78.1% 21.9%6.2.12. Policy of waste preventionA total of 30.0 per cent responded the Committee frequently follows the policy of wasteprevention, 50.0 per cent responded the practice was seldom and 20.0 per cent respondedas there was no such practice during the 12thPAC. The survey resulted there was suchpractice during the period of 13thPAC but 54.5 per cent responded as frequent and 45.5per cent as seldom. As a whole, 46.9 per cent observed the practice frequently, 46.9 percent seldom and 6.2 per cent responded PAC lack such practice during the entire periodunder this study. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted atFigure 6.15.
  • 123. 110Table 6.76. The policy of waste preventionDifference Era Frequently Seldom Never12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%13th PAC 54.5% 45.5% 0%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 46.9% 6.2%6.2.13. Economical use of resourcesThe survey result for the 12thPAC promoted the practice of economical use of resourcesbut response rate was 50.0 per cent as frequent and 50.0 per cent as seldom. However, thesurvey found that practice was frequent during the 13thPAC as 95.5 per cent say so whileonly 4.5 per cent said the practice was seldom. The population and response of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.16.Table 6.77. The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resourcesDifference Era Frequently Seldom12th PAC 50.0% 50.0%13th PAC 95.5% 4.5%12th & 13th PAC 81.2% 18.8%6.3. Composition of PACThis section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chairof the PAC regarding the composition of 12thand 13thPACs.6.3.1. Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committeeBalanced representation of all major parties in the house remained the major concern ofPAC during both governments. During the 12thPAC survey, 81.8 per cent responded the
  • 124. 111practice was very important while 18.2 per cent responded the practice was somewhatimportant. However, during the 13thPAC, response rate was hundred per cent as beingvery important. Overall for both PACs, 90.9 per cent response was very important and9.1 per cent was somewhat important. The response to the balanced representation of allmajor political parties on the committee of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure6.17.Table 6.78. Representation of Political PartiesDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 81.8% 18.2%13th PAC 100% 0%12th & 13th PAC 90.9% 9.1%6.3.2. Exclusion of ministerial membershipAn important factor was having a membership of PAC being a minister. During the 12thPAC 80.0% of the respondents believe the practice was very important while 20.0 percent respondent it was not important factor to an effective PAC. During the 13thPAC,72.7 per cent of respondents believed the practice was very important, 4.5 per cent said itwas somehow important but 22.7 per cent believed the factor was not much important.Overall 75.0 per cent responded the practice was very important, 3.1 per cent saidsomehow important while 21.9 per cent thought the practice was not important to anyparliamentary oversight. The response to the ministerial membership of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.18.
  • 125. 112Table 6.79. Ministerial ExclusionDifference EraVery Important Somewhat Important NotImportant12th PAC 80.0% 0% 20.0%13th PAC 72.7% 4.5% 22.7%12th & 13th PAC 75.0% 3.1% 21.9%6.4. Powers of PACThis section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chairof the PAC regarding the powers of 12thand 13thPACs.5.4.1. Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending oftaxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assetsThe response to the question of PAC’s Clear focus on holding the governmentaccountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assetsduring the 12thPAC remained 40.0 per cent said it was very important and 60.0 per centsaid it was somehow important. While, response during the 13thPAC was; 81.8 per centvery important and 18.2 per cent somehow important. As a whole for the Pakistani PACduring the selected period of this study for the years (2002-2011) remained as 68.8 percent very important and 31.2 per cent as somehow important. The population andresponse to committee’s focus on holding the government accountable for its spending oftaxpayer’s money and its stewardship over public assets of the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.19.
  • 126. 113Table 6.80. PAC focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and itsstewardship over public assetsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 40.0% 60.0%13th PAC 81.8% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 68.8% 31.2%6.4.2. PAC focus on administration of policyWhile responding to a question 30.0 per cent of the respondent replies as the practice ofClear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad wassomehow important, 50.0 per cent replied it was not an important and 20.0 per cent saidthe practice was not applicable at all for the 12thPAC. However, in the case of 13thPAC,63.6 per cent responded it was an important practice and 36.4 per cent responded it wassomehow important. The survey as a whole resulted for both PACs remained as 43.8 percent very important, 34.4 per cent somehow important, 15.6 per cent not important and6.2 per cent not applicable. The population and response to the committee focus onadministration of policy of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.20.Table 6.81. Committee focus on administration of policyDifferenceEraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important NotApplicable12th PAC 0% 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%13th PAC 63.6% 36.4% 0% 0%12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 34.4% 15.6% 6.2%
  • 127. 1146.4.3. Reference to examine the Public AccountsSurvey response to the question of having a permanent reference to examine the PublicAccounts during the 12thPAC remained as 40.0 per cent responded as very important,60.0 per cent responded as somehow important. During the 13thPAC response for thesame practice was observed very important by 71.6 per cent and somehow important by28.4 per cent. Overall the response for both periods was 55.8 per cent very important tand 44.2 per cent as somehow important. The population and response to the power tohave a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts of the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.21.Table 6.82. Reference to examine the Public AccountsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 40.0% 60.0%13th PAC 71.6% 28.4%12th & 13th PAC 55.8% 44.2%6.4.4. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative AuditorWhile investigating committee’s permanent reference to examine all reports of theLegislative Auditor, the survey resulted as 91.8% responded as very important factor,8.2% as somehow important factor for the 12thPAC. However, during the 13thPAC,80.0% responded very important factor and 20.0% responded as somehow importantfactor. The overall response for two PACs remained 85.9% very important and 14.1%somehow important. The population and response to the power to have a permanentreference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor of the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.22.
  • 128. 115Table 6.83. Reference to examine all reports of the Legislative AuditorDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 91.8% 8.2%13th PAC 80.0% 20.0%12th & 13th PAC 85.9% 14.1%6.4.5. Power to call independent witnessesOn a question of power to call independent witnesses, 30.0 per cent of the respondentsaid was very important factor, 50.0 per cent said it was not an important factor while20.0 per cent said it not an applicable factor during the 12thPAC. While observing thispower during the 13thPAC, 77.3 per cent said the factor was very important, 18.2 percent said somehow important and 4.5 per cent said not applicable. The overall resultantfor both periods remained 62.5 per cent very important, 12.5 per cent somehowimportant, 15.6 per cent not important and 9.4 per cent believed the practice was notapplicable at all. The population and response to the power to call independent witnessesof the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.23.Table 6.84. Power to call independent witnessesDifference Era Very Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 30.0% 0% 50.0% 20.0%13th PAC 77.3% 18.2% 0% 4.5%12th & 13thPAC62.5% 12.5% 15.6% 9.4%
  • 129. 1166.4.6. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expendituresof government Organizations receiving funds from the government and allstate corporationsA maximum of 90.0 per cent of the respondents for the 12thPAC responded the factorwas very important and 10.0 per cent said the power factor was somehow important. Theresponse for the 13thPAC for the same question remained as 81.8 per cent said the powerfactor was very important and 18.2 per cent said somehow important. The overallresultant for both PACs remained 85.9 per cent as very important and 14.1 per cent assomehow important. The population and response to the committee power to investigateor review all past, current and committed expenditures of government Organizationsreceiving funds from the government and all state corporations of the 12thand 13thPACis depicted at Figure 6.24.Table 6.85. Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of governmentOrganizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporationsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 90.0% 10.0%13th PAC 81.8% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 85.9% 14.1%6.4.7. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasksThe response to the question of power of a PAC to request the legislative auditor toperform specific reviews or tasks remained as 10.0 per cent said somehow important,70.0 per cent not important and 20.0 per cent responded as not applicable for the 12thPAC. However, the response for the 13thPAC remained 59.1 per cent responded as veryimportant, 22.7 per cent somehow important and 18.2 per cent responded as notimportant. On the other hand, a total of 40.6 per cent responded the practice was veryimportant, 18.8 per cent responded somehow important, 34.4 per cent responded notimportant and 6.2 per cent responded the practice was not applicable at all. The
  • 130. 117population and response to the committee power to request the legislative auditor toperform specific reviews or tasks of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.25.Table 6.86. Power to request the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasksDifference Era Very Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 0% 10.0% 70.0% 20.0%13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2% 0%12th & 13thPAC40.6% 18.8% 34.4% 6.2%6.4.8. Compelling officials to attend and be held accountable for administrativeperformanceThe responses to this question of power to compel officials to attend and be heldaccountable for administrative, performance even after they have left office for the 12thPAC were mixed one 50.0 per cent said it was very important awhile another 50.0 percent regarded it not important. While responses for the 13thPAC remained 81.8 per centsaying it very important power of the committee and another 18.2 per cent saying itsomehow important. The overall 71.9 per cent said the practice was very important tocommittee powers, 12.5 per cent regarded it somewhat important and 15.6 per centthought it of no importance to PAC powers. The population and response to thecommittee power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative,performance even after they have left office of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure6.26.
  • 131. 118Table 6.87. Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, performance evenafter they have left officeDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important12th PAC 50.0% 0% 50.0%13th PAC 81.8% 18.2% 0%12th & 13th PAC 71.9% 12.5% 15.6%6.4.9. Power to compel witnesses to answer questionsResponding to the question of PAC power to compel witnesses to answer questions, 65.0per cent said it was very important, 35.0 per cent said it was somehow important in caseof 12thPAC. While in case of 13thPAC 87.3 per cent said it was very important and 12.7per cent said it was somehow important. On a whole, 76.1 per cent said it importantduring both PACs and another 23.9 per cent said it somehow important. The populationand response to the committee power to compel witnesses to answer questions of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.27.Table 6.88. Power to compel witnesses to answer questionsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 65.0% 35.0%13th PAC 87.3% 12.7%12th & 13th PAC 76.1% 23.9%6.4.10. Power to make recommendations and Direct ActionsComing to the question of powers to make recommendations and direct action, 40.0 percent said it was very important, 10.0 per cent said somehow important and 50.0 per centsaid the practice was not applicable during the 12thPAC as the committee only pass
  • 132. 119recommendations but it rarely took direct actions. In case of 13thPAC, 45.5 per centresponded as very important, 36.4 per cent somehow and 18.2 per cent regarded notapplicable due to lack of direct action. However, overall for both PACs, 43.8 per centresponded as very important, 28.1 per cent somehow important and 28.1 per centregarded not applicable. The population and response to the committee power to makerecommendations and direct actions of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.28.Table 6.89. Power to make recommendations and Direct ActionsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable12th PAC 40.0 % 10.0% 50.0%13th PAC 45.5% 36.4% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 43.8% 28.1% 28.1%6.4.11. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releasesOn the matter of power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 20.0 per centsaid it was very important, 30.0 per cent somehow and 50.0 per cent responded therewere never any press conferences or press releases issued during the 12thPAC period.However, during the period of 13thPAC, 63.6 per cent responded the practice was veryimportant, 18.2 per cent responded somehow important and another 18.2 per centresponded not important practice. As a whole, 50.0 per cent say the practice wasimportant, 21.9 per cent say the practice somehow important, 12.5 per cent say thepractice was not important and 15.6 per cent regarded the practice was irreverent. Thepopulation and response to the committee power to hold press conferences and issuepress releases of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.29.
  • 133. 120Table 6.90. Power to hold press conferences and issue press releasesDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 20.0% 30.0% 0% 50.0%13th PAC 63.6% 18.2% 18.2% 0%12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 21.9% 12.5% 15.6%6.4.12. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or nationalsecurity issuesSurvey response for the 12thPAC remained as 40.0 per cent said it was very important,50.0 per cent said as somewhat important and 10.0 per cent said it was not important. Incase of 13thPAC, 77.3 per cent said it very important, 18.2 per cent said it somehowimportant while 4.5 per cent said it not at all important factor. In the case of Both PACsthe response remained 58.7 per cent saying very important, 34.1 per cent sayingsomehow important and 7.2 per cent saying not at all important. The population andresponse to the committee power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive ornational security issues of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.30.Table 6.91. Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issuesDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important12th PAC 40.0% 50.0% 10.0%13th PAC 77.3% 18.2% 4.5%12th & 13th PAC 58.7% 34.1% 7.2%
  • 134. 1216.4.13. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the LegislativeAuditor’s ActThe survey response to the question of PAC power to review proposed legislation oramendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act remained 60.0 per cent saying veryimportant and 40.0 per cent saying somehow important while talking about the 12thPAC.However, in case of 13thPAC, the response remained as 81.1 per cent saying veryimportant and 18.9 per cent saying somehow important. While talking jointly about bothPACs, 70.6 per cent of the respondents said the practice was very important and 29.4 percent said the practice was somehow important. The population and response to thecommittee power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the LegislativeAuditor’s Act of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.31.Table 6.92. Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s ActDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 60.0 % 40.0%13th PAC 81.1% 18.9%12th & 13th PAC 70.6% 29.4%6.4.14. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budgetWhile responding to the question of PAC powers to review the Auditor’s budget, 20.0 percent the respondents said the practice was very important, 30.0 per cent said it wassomehow important while 50.0 per cent said the practice was never given anyimportance. In case of 13thPAC, 40.9 per cent said the practice was very important, 22.7per cent said somehow important, 18.2 per cent said not important and another 18.2 percent said the practice was not applicable. Jointly talking about both the PACs, 34.4 percent said very important, 25.0 per cent said somehow important, 12.5 per cent said notimportant and 28.1 per cent said the practice was never applicable. The population andresponse to the committee power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.32.
  • 135. 122Table 6.93. Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budgetDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 20.0% 30.0% 0% 50.0%13th PAC 40.9% 22.7% 18.2% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 34.4% 25.0% 12.5% 28.1%6.4.15. Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction andadviceCalculating the response to the question of PAC power to choose subjects forexamination without government direction and advice, the response for the 12thPACremained 70.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying somehow importantand 20.0 per cent saying not important. On the other hand, while talking about the 13thPAC, the response remained 81.8 per cent saying very important and 18.2 per cent sayingnot important at all. However, the joint response for both selected periods remains as 78.1per cent saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important and 18.8 per centsaying not important. The population and response to the committee power to choosesubjects for examination without government direction and advice of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.33.Table 6.94. Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and adviceDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important12th PAC 70.0% 10.0% 20.0%13th PAC 81.8% 0% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 78.1% 3.1% 18.8%
  • 136. 1236.4.16. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committeeWhile responding to the question of PAC power to compel ministers to appear before thecommittee for the 12thPAC, 50.0 per cent said the practice was very important, 10.0 percent said as somehow important and 40.0 per cent said the practice was never applicable.In case of 13thPAC, 63.6 per cent said the practice was very important while 36.4 percent said the practice was at all not applicable to the Pakistani jurisdictions. Looking at ajoint result for both selected PACs, 59.4 per cent said very important, 3.1 per cent saidsomehow important while 37.5 per cent said the practice was never important at all. Thepopulation and response to the committee power to compel ministers to appear before thecommittee of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.34.Table 6.95. Power to compel ministers to appear before the committeeDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable12th PAC 50.0% 10.0% 40.0%13th PAC 63.6% 0% 36.4%12th & 13th PAC 59.4% 3.1% 37.5%6.4.17. Powers to take Suo-Motu actionsThe question of PAC powers to take Suo-Motu actions the response meet with 90.0 percent saying it very important and 10.0 per cent saying somehow important during theperiod of 12thPAC. While in the case of 13thPAC, the response remained 95.5 per centsaying very important, 4.5 per cent saying somehow important. Looking at the jointresultant for both PACs 92.8 per cent said the practice was very important and 7.2 percent said somehow important. The population and response to the committee powers totake Suo-Motu actions of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.35.
  • 137. 124Table 6.96. Powers to take Suo-Motu actionsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 90.0 %t 10.0%13th PAC 95.5% 4.5%12th & 13th PAC 92.8% 7.2%6.4.18. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take actionIn a response to the question of powers to listen to Public Complaints and take actionduring the 12thPAC 59.1 per cent said the practice was very important while another 40.9per cent said it was not important. In case of 13thPAC 70.0 per cent said very importantwhile 30 per cent said the practice was not important. The accumulative response of bothPAC resulted 62.5 per cent saying very important while 37.5 per cent saying notimportant. The population and response to the committee powers to listen to PublicComplaints and take action during the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.36.Table 6.97. Powers to listen to Public Complaints and take actionDifference Era Very Important Not Important12th PAC 59.1% 40.9%13th PAC 70.0% 30.0%12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%6.4.19. Powers to take action on media reviewOn clicking option to answer question of powers to take action on media review 20.0 percent regarded it very important, 20.0 per cent somehow important while 60.0 per centsaying not important to 12thPAC practices. On the other hand responses for the 13thPACremained as 59.1% saying very important, 36.4% saying somehow important and 4.5%
  • 138. 125saying practice was not important. Jointly, in case of both PACs 46.9% saying it veryimportant, 31.2% saying it somehow important while 21.9 per cent saying it notimportant to PAC practices. The population and response to the committee powers to takeaction on media review of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.37.Table 6.98. Powers to take action on media reviewDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important12th PAC 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%13th PAC 59.1% 36.4% 4.5%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 31.2% 21.9%6.4.20. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangementsAs much of 40.0 per cent responded the influence of PAC on the adequacy of thecorporate governance arrangements was very important practice during the 12thPACperiod while 60.0 per cent said it was not important. In case of 13thPAC 59.1 per centsaid the practice was very important, 22.7 per cent saying somehow important while 18.2per cent saying it not important.Table 6.99. Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangementsDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important12th PAC 40.0% 0% 60.0%13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 53.1% 15.6% 31.2%Discussing results for both PACs 53.1 per cent found saying very important, 15.6 percent saying somehow important while 31.2 per cent saying not important at all. The
  • 139. 126population and response to the influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporategovernance arrangements of the 12thand 13thPAC are depicted at Figure 6.38.6.4.21. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutionsIn a response to the question of influence of PAC recommendations/ directives oninstitutions during the 12thPAC period 20.0 per cent said the practice was very important,20.0 per cent said somehow important and 60.0 per cent said the practice was no moreimportant. In case of 13thPAC period 59.1 per cent said the practice was very importantand 40.9 per cent said the practice was somehow important. While talking jointly aboutboth PACs 46.9 per cent said the practice was very important, 34.4 per cent saidsomehow important while 18.8 per cent said the practice was not important as is depictedat Figure 6.39.Table 6.100. Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutionsDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important12th PAC 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%13th PAC 59.1% 40.9% 0%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 34.4% 18.8%6.5. General Practices of PACThis section covers the perception of the population respondents regarding the best chairof the PAC regarding the general practices of 12thand 13thPACs.6.5.1. Close working relationship between members from different political partiesThe response rate for the question of close working relationship between members fromdifferent political parties during the 12thPAC 90.0 per cent said the practice was veryimportant while 10.0 per cent regarded it not important. In case of the 13thPAC period77.3 per cent said the practice was very important and 22.7 per cent said somehow
  • 140. 127important. The joint response rate for both PACs remained 81.2 per cent said veryimportant, 15.6 per cent said somehow important while 3.1 per cent said the existing ofclose working relationship among different political parties was never important as isdepicted at Figure 6.40.Table 6.101. Close working relationship between members from different political partiesDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important12th PAC 90.0% 0% 10.0%13th PAC 77.3% 22.7% 0%12th & 13th PAC 81.2% 15.6% 3.1%6.5.2. Advance preparation of membersSurvey results for the 12thPAC showing response for the above question remained 20.0per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent saying somehow important, 20.0 per centnot important while 50.0 per cent saying the practice not applicable at all. Looking at theresults for 13thPAC, 22.7 per cent said the practice was very important, 18.2 per cent saidsomehow important, 54.5 per cent saying not important while 4.5 per cent saying thepractice is still not applicable at all as is depicted at Figure 6.41.Table 6.102. Advance preparation of membersDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important NotApplicable12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0%13th PAC 22.7% 18.2% 54.5% 4.5%12th & 13th PAC 21.4% 14.1% 37.3% 27.2%
  • 141. 1286.5.3. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/GrantsDuring the 12thPAC, 40.0 per cent of the respondents responded committee scrutinyspeed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants was sufficient and another60.0 per cent responded it was somehow better. In views of the respondents for the 13thPAC, 59.1 per cent respondent sufficient and 40.9 per cent responded the scrutiny speedof budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants was somehow sufficient. As awhole for both PACs, 46.9 per cent said it was sufficient and 53.1 per cent said it wassomehow better as is depicted at Figure 6.42.Table 6.103. PAC’s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations/ Accounts/GrantsDifference Era Sufficient Somehow12th PAC 49.9% 59.1%13th PAC 60% 40%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%6.5.4. Quick and in time decisionsA minimum of 30.0 per cent of respondent to a questionnaire for 12thPAC against thesame questions as for 13thPAC think, PAC took quick and in time decisions, 50.0 percent think it took somehow decisions and 20.0 per cent think it didn’t took any in timedecision. In case of 13thPAC, the response remained as 59.1 per cent think it sufficient,22.7 per cent think somehow and 18.2 per cent think it was not like that. Overall for boththe tenures 50.0 per cent said it was sufficient, 31.2 per cent said somehow it wassufficient and 18.8 per cent seemed dissatisfied. The population and responses to thequestion, Does the PAC took quick and in time decisions during the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.43.
  • 142. 129Table 6.104. Quick and in time decisionsDifference Era Sufficient Somehow Insufficient12th PAC 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 50.0% 31.2% 18.8%6.5.5. Close working relationship with Auditor GeneralWhile answering to the question of relationship of PAC with AG the responses for the12thPAC remained 70.0 per cent saying very important and 30.0 per cent sayingsomehow important. During the 13thPAC the relationship seemed deteriorating as 59.1per cent said the relations was very important and 40.9 per cent said somehow important.Jointly overall during the two PACs the response remained as 62.5 per cent saying veryimportant and 37.5 per cent saying somehow important. The population and responses tothe working relationship of PAC with Auditor General during the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.44.Table 6.105. Close working relationship with Auditor GeneralDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 70.0 per cent 30.0%13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%12th & 13th PAC 62.5% 37.5%6.5.6. Provision of independent technical expertise and research support forhearingsThe response to this question during the 12thPAC remained largely negative 10.0 percent saying not important while 90.0 per cent saying not applicable at all. However,
  • 143. 130during the 13thPAC period it somehow improves 36.4 per cent saying very important, 4.5per cent saying somehow important, 22.7 per cent saying not important while 36.4 percent saying the practice is still not applicable. Jointly talking about both PAC periods25.0 per cent responded saying very important, 3.1 per cent saying somehow important,18.8 per cent saying not important while 53.1 per cent saying the practice was notapplicable. The population and responses to the question of provision of independenttechnical expertise and research support for hearings of the 12thand 13thPAC is depictedat Figure 6.45.Table 6.106. Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearingsDifference EraVeryImportantSomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 0% 0% 10.0% 90.0%13th PAC 36.4% 4.5% 22.7% 36.4%12th & 13thPAC25.0% 3.1% 18.8% 53.1%6.5.7. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with BacklogThe response to the formation of sub-committees to deal with backlog for 12thPAC meetwith 20.0 per cent saying very important and 80.0 per cent saying somehow important.During the 13thPAC responses remained 59.1 per cent saying very important and 40.9per cent saying somehow important.Table 6.107. Formation of Sub-committees to deal with BacklogDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 20.0% 80.0%13th PAC 59.1% 40.9%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 53.1%
  • 144. 131While talking about both PAC periods, survey meet the responses 46.9 per cent sayingvery important and 53.1 per cent saying somehow important. The population andresponses to the question of formation of Sub-Committees to deal with backlog of the12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.46.6.5.8 Strategic prioritization of items for committee reviewIn terms of 12thPAC, only 20.0 per cent of the respondents said the strategicprioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committeework like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports wasvery important while responding to the question of strategic prioritization of items forcommittee review however 80.0 per cent said the practice was not important. On theother hand in terms of 13thPAC period 40 per cent responded very important, 18.2 percent said somehow important while 40.9 per cent said the practice was not important. Ajoint response for both selected PAC periods remained 34.4 per cent said very important,12.5 per cent said somehow important and 53.1 per cent said the practice was no moreimportant. The population and responses to the question of strategic prioritization ofitems for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee work likeconsideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports of the 12thand13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.47.Table 6.108. Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of committee worklike consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reportsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important12th PAC 20.0% 0% 80.0%13th PAC 40% 18.2% 40.9%12th & 13th PAC 34.4% 12.5% 53.1%
  • 145. 1326.5.9. Transcripts keeping of hearings and meetingsThe response to the question of keeping transcripts of all hearings and meetings meetwith 100.0 per cent across both PAC periods. The population and responses to thequestion of keeping transcripts of all hearings and meetings of the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.48.Table 6.109. Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetingsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important12th PAC 100.0% 0%13th PAC 100.0% 0%12th & 13th PAC 100.0% 0%6.5.10. PAC tenureAlthough there was always a big delay in the formation of PAC, the responses to thequestion of committee life and staying active between the session meet with a mixresponse of 20.0 per cent saying very important, 60.0 per cent saying somehow importantand 20.0 per cent saying not important at all during the 12thPAC period. For the 13thPAC the response was 100.0 per cent saying the practice was very important. Thepopulation and responses to the question of Committee appointed for the life of theLegislature or Parliament and stays active between sessions of the 12thand 13thPAC isdepicted at Figure 6.49.Table 6.110. Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament and stays active between sessionsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable12th PAC 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%13th PAC 100.0% 0% 0%12th & 13th PAC 75.0% 18.8% 6.2%
  • 146. 1336.5.11. Televised public hearingsTelevised public hearing was never very important during both PAC periods however, forthe 12thPAC 10.0 per cent of the respondents said the practice was somehow importantwhile other 90.0 per cent said it was not applicable at all. In case of 13thPAC period 18.2per cent said the practice was somehow important while 18.2 per cent it was notapplicable. The Joint response for both PAC periods meet with 15.6 per cent respondingsomehow important while 85.9 per cent said not applicable in Pakistani PAC set up. Thepopulation and responses to the question of televised public hearings of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.50.Table 6.111. Televised public hearingsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Applicable12th PAC 0% 10.0% 90.0%13th PAC 0% 18.2% 81.8%12th & 13th PAC 0% 15.6% 85.9%6.5.12. Report to the legislature annually and debate on ReportDuring the period of 12thPAC, 50.0 per cent of the respondents believed the practice wassomehow important while 10.0 per cent said it was not important, another 40.0 per centthe practice was not applicable at all. While during the 13thPAC period 77.3 per centregarded the practice very important, 4.5 per cent somehow important while on the otherhand 18.2 per cent found saying the practice was given no important. The joint responseremained 53.1 per cent saying very important, 18.8 per cent saying somehow important,15.6 per cent not important while 12.5 per cent saying the practice was not applicableacross both PACs of the selected periods. The population and responses to the question ofreport to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.51.
  • 147. 134Table 6.112. Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debatedDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 0% 50.0% 10.0% 40.0%13th PAC 77.3% 4.5% 18.2% 0%12th & 13th PAC 53.1% 18.8% 15.6% 12.5%6.5.13. Response to recommendations from the governmentThe responses to the 12thPAC period say there was never any comprehensive response torecommendations from the government regarding very important however 30.0 per centof them say it was somehow important but 70.0 per cent grieved the practice was neverimportant. While turning to the 13thPAC 22.7 per cent of the responses clicked for veryimportant, 59.1 per cent somehow important but still 18.2 per cent were critical sayingnot important. Looking at joint responses 18.2 per cent found saying very important, 50.0per cent saying somehow important while 34.4 per cent saying not important. Thepopulation and responses to the comprehensive response to recommendations from thegovernment of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.52.Table 6.113. Comprehensive response to recommendations from the governmentDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important12th PAC 0% 30.0% 70.0%13th PAC 22.7% 59.1% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 18.2% 50.0% 34.4%6.5.14. Prior experience of Committee MembersThe practice was somehow important during the 12thPAC period as 20.0 per cent of therespondents said so, on the other hand 30.0 per cent saying not important and 50.0 per
  • 148. 135cent saying practice was not applicable. During the 13thPAC period 4.5 per cent saidvery important, 36.4 per cent somehow important and 59.1 per cent not important. On anaverage for both PAC periods 3.1 per cent said very important, 31.2 per cent saidsomehow important, 50.0 per cent said not important and 15.6 per cent said the practicewas not applicable. The population and responses to having committee members with atleast 2 years of prior Committee experience of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure6.53.Table 6.114. Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experienceDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 0% 20.0% 30.0% 50.0%13th PAC 4.5% 36.4% 59.1% 0%12th & 13th PAC 3.1% 31.2% 50.0% 15.6%6.5.15. Prior administrative or business experience of MembersA total of 80.0 per cent of the respondents for the 12thPAC period responded the practiceof have a minimum of two years prior experience as somehow important while 20.0 percent saying it was not important. In case of 13thPAC period 22.7 per cent of therespondents said it was somehow important, 54.5 per cent said not important while 22.7per cent even the practice was not applicable.Table 6.115. Having committee members with prior administrative or business experienceDifference Era Somewhat Important Not Important Not Applicable12th PAC 80.0 per cent 20.0% 0%13th PAC 22.7% 54.5% 22.7%12th & 13th PAC 40.6% 43.8% 15.6%
  • 149. 136A joint response to this question remained 40.6 per cent saying somehow important, 43.8per cent saying not important while 15.6 per cent saying it a not applicable practice. Thepopulation and responses to having committee members with prior administrative orbusiness experience of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.54.6.5.16. Incentives for membersOnly 10.0 per cent of the total respondents for 12thPAC period said the practice of extrapay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside the normallegislative session while 90.0 per cent said the practice was not applicable. Responses tothe 13thPAC practices maintained 36.4 per cent saying somehow important and another63.6 per cent saying not applicable. The joint response concluded at 28.1 per cent sayingsomehow important but 71.9 per cent saying not applicable. The population andresponses to the question of extra pay or other incentives for members to participate inhearings outside the normal legislative session of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted atFigure 6.55.Table 6.116. Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside the normal legislativesessionDifference Era Somewhat Important Not Applicable12th PAC 10.0% 90.0%13th PAC 36.4% 63.6%12th & 13th PAC 28.1% 71.9%6.5.17. Suitable meeting place for media and publicAbout half of the respondent making 50.0 per cent of all saying the suitability of meetingplace was very important during 12thPAC period, 10.0 per cent saying somehowimportant, 20.0 per cent saying not important while another 20.0 per cent saying thepractice was not applicable. However, during the 13thPAC period 54.5 per cent sayingthe practice was very important, 22.7 per cent saying somehow important, 18.2 per cent
  • 150. 137saying not important while 4.5 per cent saying not important. Joint response for bothPAC periods under this study remained 53.1 per cent saying very important, 18.8 per centsaying somehow important, another 18.8 per cent saying not important and 9.4 per centsaying not applicable. Yasmeen Rehman, Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview forthis study that now PAC meetings are open to media and general public and they aredoing efforts to solve entry problem of those interested. Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,Convener, MIC, expressed in an interview for this study that now PAC meetings are opento media and general public and they are doing efforts to solve entry problem of thoseinterested. The population and responses to question of meeting place suitable for mediaand public access to hearings of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.56.Table 6.117. Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearingsDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 50.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0%13th PAC 54.5% 22.7% 18.2% 4.5%12th & 13thPAC53.1% 18.8% 18.8% 9.4%6.5.18. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committeerecommendationsWhen asked about the incentives to encourage administrative action on committeerecommendations 30.0 per cent of the respondents said the practice was not importantduring the 12thPAC period while another 70.0 per cent said it was not applicable at all.However, when asked about the 13thPAC period 40.9 per cent said the practice was notany more important while 59.1 per cent said the practice was overall not applicable. Onthe other hand in a joint response for both PAC periods 35.5 per cent holds the practicewas not important and 64.5 per cent the practice was never applicable. The populationand responses to question of incentives to encourage administrative action on committeerecommendations of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.57.
  • 151. 138Table 6.118. Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendationsDifference Era Not Important Not Applicable12th PAC 30.0% 70.0%13th PAC 40.9% 59.1%12th & 13th PAC 35.5% 64.5%6.5.19. Follow-up proceduresAlthough the effective follow up is very essential the response rate for 12thPAC periodparticularly remained very low 20.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 per cent sayingsomehow important and 70.0 per cent saying not important. During the 13thPAC period59.1 per cent of the respondents found saying effective follow up was very important,22.7 per cent saying somehow important and 18.2 per cent saying not important. Thejoint resultant of the survey of both PACs remained 46.9 per cent saying very important18.7 per cent saying somehow important and 34.4 per cent saying not important. Thepopulation and responses to question of effective follow-up procedures to determine ifaction has been taken to implement the committee’s recommendations of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.58.Table 6.119. Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken to implement the committee’srecommendationsDifference Era Very Important Somewhat Important Not Important12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 70.0%13th PAC 59.1% 22.7% 18.2%12th & 13th PAC 46.9% 18.7% 34.4%
  • 152. 1396.5.20. Relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanismsWhile talking about 12thPAC good relations with other parliamentary oversightmechanisms such as the budget committee 20.0 per cent saying very important, 10.0 percent saying somehow important, 20.0 per cent saying not important and 50.0 per centsaying not applicable at all. While discussing the same question for 13thPAC period 40.9per cent of the respondents found saying very important, 4.5 per cent somewhatimportant, 18.2 per cent saying not important while 36.4 per cent saying not applicable atall. The joint responses for both PAC periods under this study showed 34.4 per centsaying very important, 6.2 per cent saying somehow important, 18.8 per cent saying notimportant and 40.6 per cent saying the practice was not applicable. The population andresponses to question of good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanismssuch as the budget committee of the 12thand 13thPAC is depicted at Figure 6.59.Table 6.120. Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms such as the budget committeeDifference EraVery Important SomewhatImportantNot Important Not Applicable12th PAC 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 50.0%13th PAC 40.9% 4.5% 18.2% 36.4%12th & 13thPAC34.4% 6.2% 18.8% 40.6%6.6. ConclusionThe survey results clearly indicated performance difference on win-lose criteria basisbetween two selected PAC periods. The survey demonstrates major event such as thechange of government, under the charter of democracy, leader of the opposition chairingthe PAC for the first time in Pakistan, public awareness and international politicalinfluences. In almost all the questions, there is a clear difference in committee practicesand exercise of power. The results also show the 13thPAC under PPP-led Coalition
  • 153. 140Government performed better than the 12thPAC under Musharraf regime. However, thedetailed discussion on the findings of this study is provided in the next chapter.
  • 154. 141Chapter 7The Culture of Governance in Pakistan7.1 IntroductionThe chapter ‘The culture of Governance in Pakistan’ is a discussion about the attitude ofthose rulers and the servants of the state who on every mistake and wrong done blame thestate being an innocent democracy of only 65 years. Hence, these mistakes and blundersare natural to happen. They forget that they are living in a global village where everyexperience and practice is shared and it requires leadership and political will to changethe attitudes and the political system not centuries of evaluation. Having well awarenessto a political system, the concepts of democracy, the makeup of institutions, the economicsystems, the bureaucratic styles, the judicial systems and importantly for this study theauditing systems and the financial oversight patterns, what it requires is theimplementation of the state rules and compliance to law for good governance.Most of the institution of the state and systems like democracy and good governance arenever entertained on the basis of this misperception that Pakistan is an innocentdemocracy. The rulers of the state and the servants of the state both kept themselves inthe learning process across their careers, many of them came and many like them wentbut very few learned from the history and the ruthless experiences (Niaz 2010) anddelivered to state. The big chunk of them played with the state resources and institutionsmare to get maximum benefit out of it and to strengthen their powers and strong hold ofauthorities for themselves and to let their out springs penetrate into the culture of powerof Pakistan.The culture of financial oversights in Pakistan has not properly flourished due to unstablecivil governments and frequent military rules (Chaudry 2011). However, all of themacknowledged the need of a financial oversight; the first PAC was established in 1951and all the military rulers introduced proto-type PACs called Adhoc PACs in theirrespective periods (NA 1985). But the Institution of PAC remained a white elephant for a
  • 155. 142state where rulers and the servants lived above the law and institution. The concepts oftransparency and accountability were a distant dream. According to a recognizedpractice, the financial oversight took place at two levels; firstly at budget level whenannual budget is passed in the legislature is an ex-ante oversight process and secondly atPAC level when financial oversight took place during the life of a project or when theproject is complete as an ex-post oversight process as discussed in chapter 4 page 2-3.The second level of financial oversight is as important as is the first level that is a budgetlevel. Pakistan is such a state where extra spending is allowed other than the initialbudget allocated and the supplementary grants. Here PAC works as a supportinginstitution to regulate the extra spending grants which are excess grants of departmentsand agencies and not as an institution to recover such extra spending while settingmeasures for good governance in future what is the actual purpose of the institution. Thestudy observed that the operations of the institution of PAC in Pakistan were mere aformality. The compliance rate observed on an average of ten per cent (AGP 2012) that isequal to none and the recovery rate was as low as only 100 million rupees recoveredduring the 12thPAC (PAC 2007) and 115 billion recovered during the 13thPAC as wereclaimed by both of them (PAC 2011). However, in actual, these amounts were no moreany tangible recoveries. While in international corruption rankings, Pakistan appears inthe bottom ten countries.7.2 Application of McGee ThoughtsThis section applies McGee’s school of thoughts to the PAC of Pakistani jurisdiction tocheck the success factor of the 12thand the 13thPAC.7.2.1 Capacity BuildingThe financial oversight capacity of both the members and the staff is somehow traditionalbased on manual methods. The members investigate issues on the basis of their commonlogic and wisdom. There was no programme to train the members and the staff about themodern developments of financial oversight, computer skills, agenda setting skills andthe investigating skills like reaching to the root cause of the problem. The USAID and theWorld Bank occasionally arrange trainings or workshops for the capacity building of
  • 156. 143PAC Secretariat and the Members but both the members and the staff responded theybenefited little out of these trainings. Trainings conducted include computers and ITskills, basic concepts and processes in public financial management and auditing. Acrossthe two selected periods of 12thand 13thPAC, there were only 8 to 10 trainings arrangedfor the secretariat staff and only 2 or 3 such trainings for members.7.2.2 IndependenceThe impartiality and non-partisanship of the chairman is the sign of independence of anyPAC, during the period of 12thPAC, the committee was chaired by a Governmentmember, who was comparatively less independent as was the chairman of the 13thPAC,who was an opposition party member and leader of the opposition. Another factor thatrestricted the independence of the 12thPAC was being three (03) ministers as itsmembers, however, during the 13thPAC, the same factor was found as Mian RiazHussain Pirzada became a minister but he still continued the committee membership andtwo (02) parliamentary secretary remained the members.However, another factor completely ensures independence as the both the 12thand the13thPACs had an equal party proportion of members. Overtly, these is no politicalpressure because both of the selected PACs for this study have equal proportion ofpolitical parties and in case of 13thPAC, Leader of the Opposition was the chair butcovertly, there seem many political pressures on members and the chairman. The 13thPAC was operating on a very fast speed to clear the backlog in order to update itsoperations but suddenly, it stopped its working, dissolved the special committeeconstituted for this purpose and Ch. Nisar Ali Khan resigned the chairmanship of thecommittee. His sudden resignation was a result of political pressure to restrain PACoperations.However, till the end of the selected period of this study, no court of the state ever tookany Suo-Motu or challenge to PAC decision. Federal Services Tribunal-FST, also respectPAC directives. PAC recommendations or directives are final and never changeable.Although, the National Assembly have started debating PAC reports but still the househave not challenged the directive of this committee. PAC had a stable prestige, the
  • 157. 144committee is never blackmailed and never any case of bribing of PAC staff orapproaching members is reported so for.However, the PAC is least independent in agenda setting for its meeting. In practice thePAC Chairman only select the year of a report to be discussed and the ministry. The restof the business of agenda setting is finalized by Auditor General. The Auditor General isthe sole authority to select paras, AGP is the sole authority of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras. The process of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras is the coretactic that Auditor General uses to undermine the transparent financial oversight process.There is no defined criterion of highlighting or un-highlighting of paras. The populationand sampling that Auditor General took in case of Pakistan for Federal Auditing is as lowas 2-5 per cent but the question is whether this 2-5 per cent of sampling is representativeor not. The worse of all is that highlighting or un-highlighting of paras is among that 2-5per cent and highlighted paras are of trees robbery, stolen Television and of fewthousands amount. In a way the prestigious committee that works on behalf of theNational Assembly of Pakistan and its each meeting cost no less that 4.5 to 5 millionwaste resources and time of members and other stakeholders discussing paras sometimeof 5 thousand only or in routine less than a million. It was observed that the parasamounting one billion or near one billion were un-highlighted.The PAC mandate also ensures its independence (NA, Rule 205) providing continuity ofits agenda. The agenda of all the standing committees lapses on dissolution of NationalAssembly but the agenda of PAC is considered continuous and the coming PAC will startwhere the previous left the business. The unfinished work of one PAC is continued by thesecond to complete it.All Federal Departments and Institutions give supreme justification to PAC, appearbefore it on its call and respond to its directives. Investigating Agenizes like FIA, NAB,Police appear for PAC hearings and respond to its directives.7.2.3 Information ExchangeThe PAC had a weak structure of information exchange, its secretariat staff and membersget rare chance of attending any national or international workshops where Chair and
  • 158. 145Members or staff are invited to share information. The PAC of the National Assembly ofPakistan is a poor member to international caucuses or financial oversight forums likeCPA. On an average PAC receives two to three invites annually from internationalworkshop or conference. PAC rarely organized any forum to invite other partners ordemocracies to share experiences. PAC also lack any research set up where researcherscan search out latest developments and inform to members and staff to apply in localjurisdictions. Hence, there is no proper set up of providing information about the newdevelopments and international practices.PAC has a manual and traditional ways of working, new practices and developments areadopted on need basis which mostly arise in the minds of Members or the Chair.However, across both the selected periods, there was no organized structure ofinformation sharing except some members went to study tours abroad. They learnedmany new practices from there and shared their working practices which wereacknowledged at Thailand, UK, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These study tours weresupported by donors and PAC secretariat do not have any such programme.Other factor of information sharing like IT system, IT wing, IT module systematic recordroom and researchers were not properly available rather most of them were missing.7.3 Application of Stapenhurst at.al Framework of PAC Performance AnalysisThis section applies Stapenhurst at.al Framework of PAC Performance Analysis to thePAC of Pakistani jurisdiction to check the success factor of the 12thand the 13thPAC.7.3.1 Activity levelThe 12thPAC inherited a backlog of twelve (12) years while, in contrast, the 13thPACinherited a total of nine (09) years of backlog. This backlog is a big hurdle to update theoperations of PAC. The PAC proceedings in this concern require dedicated chairman andmembers furnished with a diligent staff. The 12thPAC held a total of eighty six (86)meetings in its four years period. While it’s Sub-Committee meet for seventy two (72)days making a total of one hundred and fifty eight (158) days of meetings see Figure 5.6.While, the 13thPAC held meetings for a total of fifty six (56) days till November, 2011
  • 159. 146when Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, resigned from its chairmanship. While its Sub-Committeesmeet for two hundred and eighty two (282) days making a total of three hundred andthirty eight (338) days of meetings see Figure 5.6. The PAC during both the selectedperiods have extensive staff and resources to carry the business although less technicalbut able to perform required duties.7.3.1.1 Keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reportsAlthough the 12thPAC meet more times than the 13thPAC but it dealt with only two (02)audit reports. While on contrast, the 13thPAC, dealt with nine (09) years of backlog. The13thPAC took dozens of sou-moto actions on issues of public importance as compared to12thPAC that took only two (02) Suo-Motu actions on the issues of sugar crisis and stockexchange crisis. The pace of 13thPAC can be admired if Ch. Nisar has not resigned ithave finished the total of twelve (12) years backlog till the end of this government. EachPACs constituted four (04) sub-committees to clear the backlog and 13thPAC benefited alot out of them its sub-committees finalized six (06) audit reports. While, only one reportwas finalized by a sub-committee of 12thPAC for the year 1995-96.7.3.1.2 Costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involvedOn an average, a meeting of PAC cost as much as 4.5 to 5 million of rupees that includetraveling, hotel stays, dining, one day salaries of all participants, TA/DAs and the valueof work which these individuals have done if meeting is not held. On an average, aminimum of two hundred (200) people attend a meeting. It is to concern that does PACmake recoveries that cover its spending or these meeting are another blessing in disguiseto PAO or ministries. Realizing the importance of institutions like PAC, all thestakeholders to this process pay least attention to the waste of resources that is its verylow compliance rate 13 per cent on an average for the last two PACs from 2002 to 2011.7.3.2 Output levelThe outcomes of PAC circles of business is the quality of clearance which include theimmediate visible results of work the committee does like recommendations made,
  • 160. 147directives issued, Suo-Motu actions taken on public complaints, follow up andimplementation or rate of compliance.The 12thPAC discussed a total of 7377 audit paras out of which the committee passed1423 directives. While the 13thPAC discussed a total of 9735 audit paras and passed atotal of 4942 directives. Collectively, the PAC for both selected periods for this studydiscussed a total of 17112 audit paras and passed 6342 directives as a whole.After a continued follow up of MIC of PAC by writing direct letters to ministries andthrough phone calls, as much as 128 PAC directives were implemented during the 12thPAC whereas the 13thPAC was successful in making implementation of 688 of itsdirectives. Hence, a total of 816 directives were implemented. In a way the compliancerate for the 12thPAC period remained 9 per cent and the same remained for the 13thPACas 14 per cent. However, the 1295 actions were pending when 12thPAC dissolved withthe dissolution of 12thnational Assembly and 4231 actions were pending when Ch. NisarAli resigned the PAC in November, 2011. The 13thPAC took dozens of sou-moto actionson issues of public importance as compared to 12thPAC that took only two (02) Suo-Motu actions on the issues of sugar crisis and stock exchange crisis.Hence, the output level for the PAC in Pakistani jurisdiction remained very low, its mainoutput factor, the compliance rate is as low as an average of 12 per cent for the entiretime periods for the years 2002 to 2011(AGP 2011).7.3.3 Outcomes levelAs an outcome of PAC operations there seemed very little improvements in publicadministration on a shorter period of time. The state require from the existence ofinstitutions like PAC to operate in a way as its mandate provides to increase economy,efficiency and effectiveness of government programme where federal funds are spent.The transparent and efficient operations of PAC can defiantly strengthen economy of acountry but such institutions in Pakistan have been subject to taboos. These inviolablepractices have restrained the core institution that work for good governance, transparencyand accountability. Durable improvements in public administration for a shorter period oftime are as under;
  • 161. 148 The 13thPAC made a total recovery of Rs.115 Billion in its four years periodwhile the 12thPAC make as much as Rs. 100 Million of recovery during itsregime. While the corruption level in Pakistan is 1000 times higher than theselittle amounts that recovered. Transparency International reported a loss of Rs.8500 billion in corruption, tax evasion and bad governance during the first four(04) years of recent PPP-led coalition government (The Jang, 2012). While,during the Musharraf period such losses reported were Rs. 2576 billion only infive scams of Privatization, Bank of Punjab, Petroleum, Stock Exchange andSugar Scandal only (APSN , 2009). The corruption level during the previousgovernments of Nawaz Shareef and Banizeer Bhutto were no less than theirfellow governments the Musharraf regime and the PPP-led Coalition government. Departmental Accounts Committee (DAC) was established7to discuss audit parasbetween the representatives of audit office and the concerned ministry for arrivingon an agreed position. The DAC is a development in financial oversight processto help PAC quickly accomplishing the conclusion. DAC meetings have beenconsidered encouraging and proving to be useful filtering point. Therepresentative of the DAC meeting includes a representative from Auditdepartment, a representative from the Ministry of Finance and the PAO of theconcerned ministry. However, DAC without a representative of PAC isineffective. The PAOs/ Ministries are now rather regular to appear before PAC for hearings.Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gailani also wrote a letters to all ministries/PAOswith instruction to regularly appear before PAC is a sign of improvement inpublic administration. The Auditor General created Federal and Provincial Implementation Cells forcompliance on PAC directives, follow up and recoveries. However, the results ofthese Cells are still pathetic considering the compliance rate of 12 per cent.7The DAC was constituted on the instruction of Ministry of Finance orders issued on December 12, 1984 and February13, 1998.
  • 162. 149 PAC give directions of Special Audit of National Rural support programme(NRSP) and Rural Support Programmes Network (RSPN). Both of these NationalProgrammes were earlier not under the ambit of audit. PAC took a number of Suo-Motu actions on issues of public concern against highups of the country. NAB and FIA were called to PAC meeting.7.3.3.1 Better compliance with laws or regulationsThe culture of arbitrary transfers of PAO/concerned official of ministries had a badimpact on the rate of compliance of PAC directives. These officials are deployed for ashorter period of few months and very rare more than a year. This arbitrariness overlapsthe sense of responsibility and bureaucrats are less concerned with compliance. It is veryrare that an official appeared twice before PAC for the same ministry. The newlyappointed bureaucrats had a definite excuse of being ignorant of the previous cases of badgovernance in a newly joined department or ministry. Hence, there is no trend ofcompliance, the average 12 per cent compliance for the period of 2002 to 2011 is verylow rate but it is still better given circumstances of arbitrariness.The major stakeholder in the financial oversight process, the Auditor General also founda hurdle in compliance of PAC directives. It created its compliance Cells but there is noresult out of them. It is the inability of Audit Office while having Implementation Cellsfilled with staff but no compliance. In case Auditor General do audit transparently,highlight and un-highlight paras on fair basis there is no reason that PAOs or ministriesgo an inch ahead of PAC directive. Auditor General in Pakistan rather being an executiveofficer of the legislature had become a party to the bad governance. The Auditor Generalhad time and again tried to suppress the committee by having a full control of agendasetting for PAC and sometimes as in case of 12thPAC of Malik Allah Yar Khan, AGenvoys come to chairman for his preparation for PAC meeting ahead. The practice is verydangerous. The AG office uses this practice a good tool to influence the chairman.Another continued effort of AG office during every government remained to send Auditoffice staff to PAC secretariat on deputation to completely dominate the PAC secretariat.
  • 163. 150On the other hand, PAC is always busy in discussing and reviewing audit reports.However, Ch. Nisar had promoted MIC under Yasmeen Rehman who made the processaccelerate; prior to her the follow up process was restricted only to correspondence.7.3.3.2 Improvements in financial control structures, such as prosecution ofwrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditorThe improvements in financial control structure were very weak. The PAC always setpoor deterrence on ministries while its powers mandated by National Assembly are ratherstrong. The PAC can pose a good deterrence and can refer cases of wrong doers to NABor FIA for detailed investigation. The role and credibility of NAB, FIA and Police areambiguous in the financial oversight matters. The PAC has big lists of directives thatPAC give to these inquiring agencies to prosecute certain accused but the compliance rateis again very low. Auditor General sent a minimum of fifty (50) cases to NAB for aninquiry without consulting PAC for what it had not drafted audit paras (Ahmed 2012). Itis again a monopoly over the powers of PAC and AG cannot directly refer these cases toNAB till they are brought to PAC. Hence, these institutions do not transparentlycooperate with PAC. While being the officers of these institutions senior bureaucrats,their presentation methods are mostly confusing PAC members and they can easily hidefacts.Although, Auditor General in Pakistani Jurisdictions is a strong institution, and a sourceof information to the parliament about transparency in money spent the parliamentsectioned during the annual budget. However, the Auditor General’s role is not meetingout the level of corruption of Pakistan. Its sampling method and the highlighting criteriaare ambiguous and not public. Even the PAC members are not aware of the method theAuditor General adopts for these two function. The audit officers are bribed at field levelfor high value paras and the paras are settled at different level from the field audit to theDAC. These settlements are mostly negative and the 2 per cent or 5 per cent as the auditoffice say is drawn from the remaining cases which are not settled. On its final stage, atDAC level and during the preparation of audit briefs at Pre-PAC level at AG office, theofficers mutually decide the fate of a para being highlighted or un-highlighted.
  • 164. 1517.3.3.3 Strict directions to NAB and FIA of no excuse to wrong doers / criminals forfinancial issuesPAC issues it directives on behalf of National Assembly, the supreme legislative body ofthe state; there is no reason that any department or institution goes an inch ahead of itsdirectives. Generally speaking, the directives of PAC are final and un-changeable.Logically there is no excuse in any directive to favour any person or department but theseis a question of credibility of institutions like NAB, FIA and Police that most of the timeignore these directives.7.3.3.4 Accurate, timely government informationThere is another aspect that there are no proper investigation procedures available toinvestigate financial scams. These institutions lack enough forensic accountants andspecial prosecutors to deal with financial matters with special criminal training who knowwhat exactly to look for. These investigating agencies require well trained andspecialized professional prosecutor staff who can find proof and evidences. Despiteexisting of all these institutions and departments, most of the big corruption scams nevercome to surface. The white collar crime has become so suffocated that prosecutingagencies fail to identify the criminals.7.3.3.5 Enhanced public awareness of government programsAn effective and efficient PAC can enhance public awareness of government programmebut the case is contrary in Pakistan. PAC meetings are nearly restricted to publicespecially after the Musharraf Regime Emergencies and Marshal Law period had createdthe Red-Zone and No Go Area for general public. Media is playing good role to unleashthing to public but still common man is partially informed of government programme.The Good Governance strengthening institutions like PAC is always dealing with bigbacklogs. This backlog never let PAC investigate or discuss government programme,PAC discussed only audit paras which are related to previous governments, hence of nouse to common man.
  • 165. 1527.3.3.6 Enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management ofprogramsSince PAC is always dealing with previous backlog and it never discussed the state ofmanagement of government programme. The people never know the status of on-goingprogrammes. Hence, thing are always strange and common man only hear the scams ofprevious government while strengthening solidarity with the ruling elite and mocking atthe previous government.PAC can enhance people with legislative knowledge about the state of the managementof government programs only when it had finished with the backlog and would beworking on value for money and audit performance. The idea looks a distance dream tocoming governments.7.3.4 ImpactAcross the history the operations of PAC had merely been a formalities and fools play.However, the 13thPAC took a good start and deepened PAC operations andinstitutionalized many practices to strengthen its practices. PAC under Ch. Nisar Ali, asits Chairman, hardly was able to finish the backlog if Ch. Nisar had not resigned but hisresignation put PAC back to the point zero. To discuss under this framework, one can saythat PAC in Pakistan is still at activity level and there is no output, outcomes are stillawaited in the coming government if there is some efficient Chairman and the goodimpact of PAC operations is a distance dream in Pakistan.7.4 Points of WinningThe observations of PAC functioning and the survey conducted showed that 13thPACremained ahead of 12thPAC. Some of the critical points are as under;7.4.1 Successes of PAC While talking about the successes of PAC, 81.8 per cent responded theGovernment responds favourably to 13thPAC recommendations while only 20.0per cent said the 12thPAC received such response from government.
  • 166. 153 45.5 per cent responded the Government frequently implemented 13thPACrecommendations while 30 per cent responded government frequentlyimplemented on 12thPAC recommendations. 18.2 per cent responded the 13thPAC institutionalized certain practices as a resultof its working but only 10 per cent responded saying the 12thPAC frequently didso. 63.6 per cent of the respondents for 13thPAC said there were frequentimprovements in the integrity of government information or data bases but nonesaid so for 12thPAC. 45.5 per cent of the respondents to a question for 13thPac said legal action werefrequently taken against officials who contravene laws while only 22.2 per centsaid it was frequent for 12thPAC. 59.1 per cent responded disciplinary action was taken against officials whocontravene administrative guidelines during 13thPAC period while only 20.0 percent said the practice was frequent during 12thPAC. Another 59.1 per cent said the 13thPAC successfully resisted political pressureexerted on it but only 30 per cent responded it was frequent during 12thPAC. 54.5 per cent of respondents said the Principal Accounting Officers found hidingfacts before 13thPAC while 70 per cent responded the practice was frequentduring 12thPAC. 77.3 per cent the 13thPAC adopted and practiced latest oversight developmentsbut only 30.0 per cent responded the practice was frequent during 12thPACperiod. 72.7 per cent of the respondent said the 13thPAC institutionalized certain guidingprinciples which were required to meet its objective while 50.0 per cent of therespondent said for 12thPAC. 90.9 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC is adherence to financialcontrol of resources while only 50.0 per cent said so for 12thPAC. 54.5 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC follows the policy of wasteprevention while 30.0 per cent believed the 12thPAC did so.
  • 167. 154 95.5 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC promotes practices ofeconomical use of resources but only 50.0 per cent said it was the quality of 12thPAC.7.4.2 Composition of PAC A total of hundred per cent of respondents believed that 13thPAC had a balancedrepresentation of all major political parties on the committee while 81.8 per centsaid it was the case in 12thPAC. 72.2 per cent of the respondents said the membership of the 13thPAC excludeministers of the Government while as much as 80 per cent said so in case of 12thPAC.7.4.3 Powers of PAC 81.8 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC had clear focus on holding thegovernment accountable for its spending of taxpayer’s money and its stewardshipover public assets while only 40 per cent said it was so during 12thPAC. 63.3 per cent of the respondents said clear focus on administration of 7policy andnot on whether policies are good or bad was very important during 13thPACwhile no one said it was an important practice during 12thPAC. 71.6 per cent of the respondents found saying 13thPAC have a permanentreference to examine the Public Accounts while only 40.0 per cent believed the12thPAC do so. 77.3 per cent of the respondents said power to call independent witnesses wasvery important to 13thPAC while only 30.0 per cent said that the practice wasimportant to 12thPAC. 59.1 per cent of the respondents believed the 13thPAC had power to request (butnot compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks but nonesaid it was very important to 12thPAC. 81.8 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC had power to compel officialsto attend and be held accountable for administrative, performance even after they
  • 168. 155have left office while only 50.0 per cent of the respondents said so in case of 12thPAC. 87.3 per cent of the respondents said that 13thenjoyed power to compel witnessesto answer questions while 65.0 per cent said it an important practice during 12thPAC. 63.6 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC had power to hold pressconferences and issue press releases while only 20.0 per cent said this power wasvery important to 12thPAC. 77.3 per cent of the respondents believed it was very important to the 13thPAChaving power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or nationalsecurity issues while 40 per cent said for in case of 12thPAC. 81.1 per cent responded the power to review proposed legislation or amendmentsto the Legislative Auditor’s Act was very important to 13thPAC while 60 per centsaid it was also very important to 12thPAC. 40.9 per cent responded that the power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budgetwas very important to 13thPAC while only 20 per cent said it very important caseto 12thPAC. 81.1 per cent of the respondents believed the power to choose subjects forexamination without government direction and advice was very important to 13thPAC while 70.0 per cent said so for 12thPAC. 95.9 per cent of the respondents believed the powers to take Suo-Motu actionswere very important to the 13thPAC while 90 per cent said so for the 12thPAC. 70 per cent of the respondents said the powers to listen to Public Complaints andtake action was very important to 13thPAC while 59.1 per cent same was a caseto 12thPAC. 59.1 per cent of the respondent regarded the powers to take action on mediareview was very important to 13thPAC while only 20 per cent said so for 12thPAC. 59.1 per cent of the respondents said the influence of 13thPAC on the adequacy ofthe corporate governance arrangements was very important while 40 per cent saidso for 12thPAC.
  • 169. 156 59.1 per cent of the respondents said the influence of 13thPACrecommendations/Directives on institutions while 20 per cent said this factor wasvery important to 12thPAC.7.4.4 General Practices of PAC 77.3 per cent of the respondents said close working relationship between membersfrom different political parties were very important during 13thPAC however, 90per cent of the respondents said it was very important during 12thPAC. 22.7 per cent of the respondents said the practice of advance preparation ofmembers before hearings, Members receives Audit Briefs well in time was veryimportant to 13thPAC while 20 per cent said it was so to 12thPAC. 60 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC’s scrutiny speed of budgetstatements/appropriations/ Accounts/Grants were sufficient while 40 per cent ofthe respondents said so to 12thPAC. 59.3 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC took quick and in timedecisions while 30 per cent said it was sufficient to 12thPAC. 59.1 per cent of the respondents said the 13thPAC had close working relationshipwith Auditor General while 70 per cent said so during the 12thPAC. 59.9 per cent responded formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog wasvery important to 13thPAC while 20 per cent said it was very important to 12thPAC. 40 per cent of the respondents said the strategic prioritization of items forcommittee review, with time limits for stages of committee work likeconsideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports was veryimportant to 13thPAC while only 20 per cent said it was a case of greaterimportance to 12thPAC. 100 per cent of the respondents said that it was very important to 13thPAC thecommittee should be appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament andstays active between sessions while only 20 per cent said so for 12thPAC.
  • 170. 157 77.3 per cent of the respondents said that it was very important to 13thPAC toreport to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated while therewas no such practice during 12thPAC. 22 per cent of the respondent believed the 13thPAC received comprehensiveresponse to recommendations from the government but the no respondent for 12thPAC was sure to this practice. Only 4.5 per cent of the respondents said having committee members with at least2 years of prior Committee experience was very important to 13thPAC whilethere was no response to this question for 12thPAC being very important. 22.7 per cent of the respondents of 13thPAC said having committee memberswith prior administrative or business experience was very important while 80 percent of the respondents of the 12thPAC believed it was very important. 36.6 per cent of the respondents believed in extra pay or other incentives formembers to participate in hearings outside the normal legislative session werevery important to 13thPAC while only 10 per cent responded it was important to12thPAC. 40.9 per cent of the respondents said the incentives to encourage administrativeaction on committee recommendations were not important to 13thPAC while 30per cent of the respondent to 12thPAC said the practice was not important. 59.1 per cent of the respondents believed the effective follow-up procedures todetermine if action has been taken to implement the committee’srecommendations were very important to 13thPAC while only 20 per cent of 12thPAC think it was very important. 40.9 per cent of the respondents believed good relations with other parliamentaryoversight mechanisms such as the budget committee were very important to 13thPAC while 20 per cent believed it was also very important to 12thPAC.7.5 Institutionalization of Winning Points.Ch, Nisar Ali khan, Chairman 13thPAC seemed acquainted with latest development andmodern practices. He knows the peculiar function of PAC and occasionally applies everysuitable practice but unfortunately these developments and practices were not made a
  • 171. 158permanent part of PAC operations. However, as a convention most of the practices areworking in the recent PAC under Nadeem Afzal Chan the new Chairman. The nextchapter is a conclusion of this study.
  • 172. 159Chapter 8ConclusionThe study concludes that the PAC operations are always restrained to years of backlog,inefficient bureaucracy and political posturing. The institutions like PAC are the corefunctionaries of good governance of a country and in the recent years this institution hasscored extensive prestige and status while maintaining its deterrence on otherdepartments and ministries. The financial oversight is the basis of transparency andaccountability of a state but in Pakistan, the operations of PAC have merely beenformalities.It seems part of political tactics that PAC is always dealing with previous backlog. TheCharter of Democracy gives another benefit to major political parties of this country bygiving the Chairmanship of PAC to the Leader of the Opposition. It is a good practice butit had two dimensions depending on the culture of power and governance in Pakistan; theopposition party will oversee only the audit reports of their respective government andsecondly, the government can easily complete its programmes as the performance ofthese programmes will be discussed during the coming government when ruling partywill be sitting on opposition bunches.The arbitrary transfers of the servants of the state are reason of non-compliance to PACdirectives. None of the civil servants is worried about the PAC inquiries and thedirectives as most probably he would be transferred to some other position before thesecond meeting of PAC. Besides civil servants, the implementation cell of PAC and theImplementation Cells of auditor department are an eye wash. The follow up process isgenerally correspondence and the use of phone calls is rare. Till the time compliance rateis raised to above 50 per cent PAC operations are considered failing.An independent and transparent PAC can have a good financial control over stateresources but strengthening of institutions like PAC would leave deterrence for weakdepartments and ministries.
  • 173. 160Chapter 9Making PAC EffectiveThis chapter is a set of recommendations for making the process of legislative financialoversight effective to enhance the process of accountability and transparency. The majorareas to be strengthened for an effective PAC include learning skills on how to evaluatethe Audit Paras? How to grill down the facts? How to strengthen management system ofPAC? How to choose valued paras and important issues? A list of recommendations is asunder;1. The PAC members may adopt CCCER Model, while discussion any audit objections.PAC can play an effective role in applying CCCER Model in its proceedings in waysgiven below; That all criteria are mentioned very clearly in the audit para (Which rules etc.have been violated?) The systemic cause of the condition/irregularity is indicated. This aspectsconcerns looking into failure of internal controls. The effect is also mentioned especially when it has a rolling impact (e.g. delayin one project causing delays in linked projects). Recommendations in the audit report are systemic, measurable andimplementable; and are stated to enable the PAO to take specific focusedaction.The CCCER Model is annexed as Annex-X.2. Controlling arbitrary transfers of PAOs /civil servants would help increase the rate ofcompliance. PAOs may be given security of tenure of minimum of three years torealize the responsibility. The arbitrary transfers are a big excuse of PAOs forviolating PAC directives. PAOs should be there to face their inquiries them self nottheir substitutes mates.3. A Federal Investigation Services may be established with its officers recruitedthrough CSS exam. The professionals of this group may be trained the skills of howto prove the white collar crime.
  • 174. 1614. Specialised Criminal Training Institute should be formed to give special trainings andto produce professional prosecutors with technical knowledge to exactly reach to theroot cause and they should know what exactly need to be look for. Such traininginstitutions should give training like Francis Accountant, Criminology and FinancialProsecutions.5. Special Committee consisting of separate members of Technocrats from Senate andthe Senators who have interest in Financial Oversight should be constituted to dealwith the Backlog and the Main PAC of the National Assembly would work on theValue for Money, Audit Performance and more focus on implementation andcompliance on the update cases of corruption.6. Looking at the compliance rate and the years of PAC activity wasted in dealing withbacklog, PAC should revisit legal requirement and considerations that cause the PACto engage backlog issue. It could be done by investigating only the issues of greatervalue for money. National Assembly can be requested to grant a criteria-basedimmunity from the pre-2008 era on the justification that this otherwise compromisesthe PAC’s effectiveness in dealing with current issues and concepts of value formoney and audit performance.7. Audit Department should send the Audit Briefs directly to PAC members, concernedPAOs, media and PAC Secretariat. The Audit Briefs should also be uploaded on bothAuditor General and National Assembly website for public knowledge andawareness. The practice will help members better understand the technicalities ofparas. The important issue will be discussed on media and newspapers prior tomeeting. This mechanism will make PAC more transparent and accountable.8. It should be the responsibility of relevant ministry to prepare draft Actionable Pointsand provide to PAC within three (03) days. The suggested process can evolve draftingof Actionable Points at ministry level, correction by PAC, vetting by AG andfinalization of report of PAC. The Ministry of Railways do this practice on voluntarybasis and send draft Actionable Points to PAC Secretariat. The study observed that
  • 175. 162due to overwork of preparation of Actionable Points, the PAC staff cannot efficientlyperform their defined work of getting compliance on PAC Directives.9. Non-compliance related major issues (the list is already prepared at PAC Secretariat)should be put on PAC agenda as soon as possible and disseminated among members,ministries, media and public while putting it on Auditor General and PAC website.It is also suggested that all subjugated cases should be mentioned in the list ofpending major issues. After completing these lists, a group of PAC Members maymeet with Chief Justice of Supreme Court to discuss the urgency of cases. SupremeCourt may be requested to put such cases on priority basis.10. All the CFAOs-Chief Finance & Accounts Officers should regularly submit theirmonthly recovery statements to PAC.11. Attendance of Auditor General should be made compulsory and mandatory.12. PAC needs to develop its secretariat with organized system of researchers, IT experts,strong administration and an Implementation Cell, etc. Rather having ImplementationCell it’s good to create Monitoring and Implementation Committee that looks morepowerful and threatening to criminals.13. All letters issued from PAC Secretariat should be signed by the head of PAC. Thereare two benefits attached to this suggestion; one that Head may be well aware ofevery correspondence among PAC Secretariat and other institutions, second, it willregulate PAC agenda.14. Actionable Points may be properly approved by the Chairman PAC rather at a lateralstage of approving the whole report. The suggestion will help eliminate the chancesof wrong interpretation of Directives.15. Approved copies of all Actionable Points should be sent to All PAC members, AGand concerned ministries/departments for compliance.16. PAC officers/staff should hold Pre-PAC meeting at least three (03) days prior to PACmeeting. It was observed as Auditor General and PAOs hold DAC and Pre-PAC
  • 176. 163meetings at AG office, they are well prepared to better present them. It was observedthat Members and PAC staffs in most cases pay a look at Audit Briefs during themeeting facilitating AG and PAOs strengthening their argument.17. PAC staff may never be demoralised at meeting places especially the lower one. Inorder to boost their confidence and role in oversight process. It is also suggested thatMembers hold frequent meetings with staff to discuss issues faced by them and toresolve them at earliest. The demoralised and depressed staff can badly effect thetransparent operations of PAC.18. The electronic media should be allowed for live coverage of PAC proceedings. Incase live coverage not possible at Parliament premises, the better place for PACmeeting is Jinnah Convention Centre. The place is accessible for both media andpublic.19. The practice of Public Question/Answer Session in PAC meetings can prove fruitfulin addressing public grievances. The practice however, will make PAC an effectivepublic accountability forum as for as a threat for PAOs of facing the actual victim.20. All the notifications of PAC should be written/issues after a consensus of all membersor at least of a quorum and not only the decision of Chairman.21. PAC should reserve some time for the agenda of Non-Compliance/ImplementationCell of PAC to be discussed in the first hours of every meeting.22. Office of the Auditor General should also be accountable as aMinistry/Division/Department before PAC.23. Individual public complaints should be given top priority to resolve their problems. APublic Complaints Cell with tool free may be established to listen to publicgrievances.24. PAC should have record room with organised cataloguing of files for an easy accessof members and staff.25. PAC staff should at least be computer literate.
  • 177. 16426. PAC Secretariat staff of Grade 1-16 may also be sent abroad on study tours alongwith members and senior staff.27. A minimum of 10 per cent of the money recovered should be given to PAC staff asincentive to accelerate the recovery process as it is in NAB, FIA or Traffic Police.The practice will develop interest and competition among officers to work more toeffect recoveries.28. PAC may take notice of the expenditures of PAC meetings. It may count expenses ofeach meeting on the end and shift on to the responsible along with other recoveries.29. The Chairman PAC may hold meetings with all Federal Secretaries/PAOs every threemonth to discuss the implementation status of PAC recommendations/Directives.These meetings will help building liaison among PAC and PAOs.30. Experienced PAC staff may never be arbitrarily transferred substituting new one. Thestaffs require rich and deep experience of auditing and oversight.31. PAC need to engage sufficiently qualified financial oversight experts to keepMembers and PAC Secretariat abreast with the latest financial oversight andaccountability practices.32. PAC need an advanced automation Centre, donor help can be sought for this purposeto boost automation system of PAC.33. PAC should strengthen its working relations especially with Budget Committees andothers related to financial matters or the matters related to PAC operations. Thisrelationship will help ensure continuous and efficient working of committee system inthe National Assembly of Pakistan.34. Reports of the PAC, when laid before the house may be thoroughly discussed uponfor house recommendations and an effective parliamentary review.35. Effort should be made to transparent Anti-Corruption institutions like FIA, NAB andPMIC.
  • 178. 16536. Donor agencies and other capacity building organisation focus more on the capacitybuilding of members. Arranging capacity building workshops and distributingbriefing papers carrying best audit and accountability practices, telling them auditskilled and technicalities of financial matters.37. Along with the members of PAC, the staff of the PAC secretariat also requires totrained on modern financial oversight practices and required IT skills to facilitatePAC operations. Pac staffing should be career oriented that mean officials with PACexperiences and knowhow should be employed to PAC secretariat and they should beworked upon for capacity building and professionalism.38. No PAO/ Ministry may be allowed to appear before the PAC unless it held DAC.39. PAOs should appear before PAC while well prepared to answers PAC questions.40. The DAC meetings should also include a representative of the PAC along with therepresentative of Ministry of Finance, AG and PAC.
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  • 188. 175Annex-IThe main individual conclusions and recommendations of McGeeThe International Dimension: There should be greater direct contact between Parliaments, especially PACs, and international financial institutions. The CPA include good government as a subject of the theme or sub-theme of its conferencesAuditors General: The Auditor General should be an Officer of Parliament independent of the Executive The appointment process for an Auditor General should involve consultation with a wide range of stakeholders An Auditor General should only be removed from office on limited grounds that are specified in advance by law Auditors General should actively participate in international Auditors General associations Auditors General should actively introduce themselves and their services to all parliamentary committees, not just PACs Auditors General have a role in approving internal audit standards Central banks should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandate in the same way as other public sector agencies The Auditor General should take account of the views of PACs in framing their work programs Parliaments should be involved at the pre-Budget stage in determining the resources to be allocated to the Auditor General Auditors General and their staff must have appropriate legal protections conferred on them to enable them to carry out theirduties PACs should keep under review any proposals to change the Auditor General’s audit mandate Any company receiving public funding to deliver public services should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandatein respect of those services Auditors General should present their reports in an attractive form and devise active communications strategies Auditors General should take steps to measure their own performance The main of PACs work should be guided by the work of the Auditor GeneralPublic Accounts Committees: Parliaments should regard the PAC as their pre-eminent committee Senior opposition figures must be associated with the PAC’s work There should always be sufficient experience and seniority among the membership of the PAC Specially structured training be provided to PAC members It is crucial that the Chairperson of the PAC has the qualities to ensure that the PAC works effectively PACs must be adequately resourced to carry out their functions PACs, while not being bound to act unanimously, should strive for some consensus in their reports PACs should promote greater public awareness of their role PACs should consider using subcommittees for specific inquiries The Internet should be used to disseminate information on PACs Procedures for follow-up action in recommendations in PAC reports are critical Parliament should hold an annual debate on the work of the PAC PACs in smaller and developing parliaments need improved access to information technology A rational local method of allocating funding to PACs needs to be put in place to ensure that they have adequate resources Smaller Parliaments need to take innovative steps to expand the pool of personnel available to serve on the PAC Special attendance allowances, rather than a special salary, should be considered for PAC attendance Links between PAC websites should be developed The CPA should explore the potential for the use of a news group to encourage information exchange on PAC matters The CPA should examine what options exist for conferences of associations of PACs A compendium of Commonwealth PAC practice be established to be managed by a CPA branch or ParliamentResearch should be undertaken into establishing a basis for making international comparisons of PAC performance
  • 189. 176Annex-IIAn “Ideal Committee” by Scrutinizing Public Expenditures: Assessing the Performanceof Public Accounts Committees by World Bank Institute• The Committee is small; committees seem to work well with 5-11 members, none of whom should begovernment Ministers;• Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC’s work, and probably chair the Committee;• The Chair is a senior parliamentarian, fair minded and respected by parliament;• The Committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament;• The Committee is adequately resourced, with an experienced clerk and a competent researcher(s)• There is clarity on the Committee’s role and responsibilities;• The Committee meets frequently and regularly;• Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript and summary minutes are quickly available forpublic distribution;• A steering committee plans the Committee’s work in advance and prepares an agenda for each meeting tothe full Committee;• The typical witness is a senior public servant (the “accounting officer”) accompanied by the officials thathave a detailed understanding of the issues under examination;• The Auditor’s Report is automatically referred to the Committee and the Auditor meets with theCommittee to go over the highlights of the report;• In addition to issues raised by the Auditor, the Committee occasionally decides to investigate othermatters;• Committee strives for some consensus in their reports;• The Committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament at least annually;• The Committee has established a procedure with the government for following up its recommendationsand is informed about what, if any, action has been taken;• In all its deliberations, the Committee uses the Auditor as an expert advisor;• Parliaments hold an annual debate on the work of the Committee.
  • 190. 177Annex-IIIList of Chairmen PAC (1947-2011)National Assembly of PakistanSr # Name of Chair Date ofConstitutionDate ofTerminationDurationDD-MM-YY1stPAC Never meet2ndPAC Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,MoS for Finance05-09-1952 21-10-1954 16-01-023rdPAC Mr. Mohammad Ali,Finance Minister14-12-1954 07-06-1955 21-06-004thPAC Syed Amjad Ali, FinanceMinister05-11-1956 27-10-1958 22-11-011stAdhocPACMr. Muhammad Shoaib,Finance Minister03-03-1960 00-00-1962 27-09-015thPAC Mr. Noor-ul-Amin, MNA 13-07-1965 13-11-1965 00-04-002ndAdhocPACMr. Noor-ul-Amin, MNA 13-11-1965 25-03-1969 12-04-043rdAdhocPACMr. Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash,Finance Minister10-08-1970 14-04-1972 04-08-016thPAC i) Dr. Mubashir Hassan,Finance Ministerii)Rana M. Hanif Khan,Finance Minister22-06-1974 10-06-1977 18-00-034thAdhocPACMr. A.G. Kazi, GovernorSBP19-11-1978 16-04-1981 27-05-025thAdhocPACMr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan 25-08-1982 00-12-1985 05-04-037thPAC Sahibzada M. Ali Shah,MNA18-08-1985 29-05-1988 11-09-028thPAC Mr. Hakim Ali Zardari,MNA05-03-1989 06-08-1990 01-05-019thMr. Hamza, MNA 28-08-1991 18-07-1993 20-11-0110th Rao M. Hashim Khan, MNA 28-08-1995 05-08-1996 08-00-0111thMr. Hamza, MNA 12-05-1997 12-10-1999 00-05-026thAdhoc Mr. H.U. Beg 25-08-2000 16-11-2002 22-03-0212thMalik Allah Yar Khan,MNA10-04-2004 07-11-2007 27-07-0313thChaudry Nisar Ali, MNA 19-09-2008 27-11-2011 08-02-03Total Duration of Adhoc PACs 07 Days and 16 YearsTotal Duration of PAC 02 Days-06 Months and 22Years
  • 191. 178Annex-IVReports of the PAC (1947-2011)Sr # Report Year ChairmanYear ofPublicationReport Status1. 1947-48 to 1979-80Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,MoS for Finance1985 Laid2. 1947-48Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,MoS for Finance1985 Laid3. 1948-49Mr. Ghayasuddin Pathan,MoS for Finance1985 Laid4. 1949-50 Mr. M Ali, Finance Minister - Laid5. 1950-51 Mr. M Ali, Finance Minister - Laid6. 1951-52Syed Amjad Ali, Ministerfor Finance- Laid7. 1952-53Syed Amjad Ali, Ministerfor Finance- Laid8. 1953-54Syed Amjad Ali, Ministerfor Finance- Laid9.1954-55, 1955-56 and1956-57Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,Minister for Finance-1957-58 and 1958-59Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,Minister for Finance- Laid1959-60 and 1961-62Mr. Muhammad Shoaib,Minister for Finance- Laid10. 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 Mr. Noor ul Aminn, MNA - Laid11. 1965-66Mr. Muzaffar AliQizilbash, Minister forFinance-12. 1966-67, 1967-68Mr. Muzaffar AliQizilbash, Minister forFinance1971 Laid13. 1968-69, 1969-70Dr. Mubashir Hassan,Minister for Finance- Laid14. 1970-71A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan-15. 1971-72A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid16. 1972-73A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid17. 1973-74A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid18. 1974-75A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid19. 1975-76A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid20. 1976-77A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of PakistanLaid21. 1977-78A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid
  • 192. 17922. 1978-79A.G. N. Kazi, GovernorState Bank of Pakistan- Laid23. 1979-80 Ghulam Ishaq Khan 1985 Laid24. 1980-81 Ghulam Ishaq Khan - Laid25.1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85Sardar Muhammad Ali Shah 1987 Laid26. 1985-86, 1986-87, 1987-88 Mr. Hamza, MNA - Laid27. 1988-89 Mr. Hamza, MNA - Laid28. 1989-90Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leaderof the Opposition- Laid29. 1990-91 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid30. 1991-92 Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA 2010 Laid31. 1992-93 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid32. 1993-94 Mr. Hamza, MNA Complete Ready for Printing33. 1994-95Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,Convener2011 Laid34. 1995-96 Mr. Riaz Fatyana, Convener 2007 Laid35. 1996-97 Mr. H.U. Beg 2001 Laid36. 1997-98Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,Convener2011 Laid37. 1998-99 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener PendingReferred to SpecialCommittee II38. 1999-2000 Mr. H.U. Beg 2002 Laid39. 2000-01Malik Allah Yar Khan,MNA2007 Laid40. 2001-02 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener 2011 Laid41. 2002-03 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener PendingReferred to SpecialCommitteeII/Pending42. 2003-04 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener PendingReferred to SpecialCommittee II43. 2004-05 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener PendingReferred to SpecialCommittee II44. 2005-06Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leaderof the Opposition2010 Laid45. 2006-07 Mr. Zahid Hamid, Convener PendingReferred to SpecialCommittee II46. 2007-08Mian Riaz Hussain Pirzada,ConvenerPendingReferred to SpecialCommittee III47. 2008-09Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, Leaderof the Opposition2011 Laid48. 2009-10 PendingUnder review processof Main PAC49. 2010-11 PendingUnder review processof Main PAC50.Monitoring &Implementation CommitteeReport 2010Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,Convener2011 Laid51.Monitoring &Implementation CommitteeReport 2011Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,ConvenerComplete Ready for Printing
  • 193. 180Annex-VPAC Mandate-Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly202 Composition: The standing Committee on Public accounts shall consist of not more than twenty threemembers to be elected by the Assembly and the Minister for Finance shall be its ex-officio member.203. Functions; (1) The committee shall examine the accounts showing the appropriations of sumsgranted by the Assembly for the expenditure of the Government, the annual finance accounts of the Government, thereport of the AGP and such other matters as the Minister for Finance may refer to it.(2) In Scrutinizing the appropriation accounts of the Government and the reports of the AGP thereon it shall bethe duty of the Committee to satisfy itself(a) that the money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available for, and applicable tothe service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged(b) that the expenditure confirms to the authority which governs it; and(c) that every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf under rulesframed by the Ministry of Finance(3) It shall also be the duty of the Committee(a) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of state corporations, trading andmanufacturing schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance sheets and statements of profit and lossaccounts which the President may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the provision of the statutoryrules regarding the functioning of a particular cooperation trading or manufacturing scheme or concern or project andthe report of the AGP thereon(b) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the AGP either under the directions of the President orunder an Act of Parliament; and(c) to consider the report of the AGP in cases the president may have required to conduct the audit of any receiptor to examine the accounts of stores and stocks.(4) of any money has been spent on any service during a financial years in excess of eth amount granted by theAssembly for that purpose, the Committee shall examine with reference to the facts of each case the circumstancesleading to such an excess and make such recommendation as it may deem fit(5) the report of the Committee shall be presented within a period of one year from the date on which referencewas made to it by the Assembly unless the Assembly, on a motion being made, directs that the time for the presentationof the report be extended to a date specified in the motion;Provided that extension in the time for the presentation of the report shall be asked for before the expiry of eth timeallowed under the rule.204 Unfinished work of the Committee:- Any report, memorandum or note that the Committee may haveprepared, or any evidence that the Committee may have taken before the dissolution of the assembly, shall be madeavailable to the new Committee.205 Continuity of the Proceedings:- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the public AccountsCommittee may proceed from the stage where the previous Committee left the proceedings before the dissolution of theAssembly
  • 194. 181Annex-VIList of Members of 12thand 13thPACSr. 12thPAC 13thPAC PositionName of Member Pol. Party Name of Member Pol. Party1. Malik Allah Yar Khan,MNAPML Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA PML-N Chairman2. Lt. Col. (R) Ghulam RasulSahi, MNAPML Mr. Nadeem Afzal Chan,MNAPPPP Member3. RAi Mansab Ali Khan,MNAPML Mr. Noor Alam Khan, MNA PPPP Member4. Dr. Abdul Ghaffar KhanJatoi, MNAPML Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah,MNAPPPP Member5. Sardar Ashiq HussainGopang, MNAPML Mrs. Rukhsana Bangash,MNAPPPP Member6. Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA PML Mrs. Yasmeen Rehman,MNAPPPP Member7. Mr. Muhammad SafdarShakir, MNAPML Rana Muhammad FarooqSaeed Khan, MNAPPPP Member8. Mr. Ali Akbar MazharWains, MNAPML Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira,MNAPPPP Member9. Maj. (R) Tanvir HussainSyed, MNAPPPP Begum Shehnaz Sheikh,MNAPML Member10. Prof. Aasiya Azeem, MNA PML Khawaja Mohammad Asif,MNAPML-N Member11. Ch. Wajahat Hussain PML Mr. Zahid Hamid PML-N Member12. Mr. Kunwar KhalidYounus, MNAMQM Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA PML-N Member13. Makhdoom ShahMahmood HussainQureshi, MNAPPPP Mr. Muhammad PervaizMalik, MNAPML-N Member14. Ch. Qamar Zaman Kaira,MNAPPPP Mr. Riaz Fatyana, MNA PML Member15. Syed Qurban Ali Shah,MNAPPPP Mr. Hamid Yar Hiraj, MNA PML Member16. Mr. Liaqat Baloch, MNA MMAP Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi,MNAMQM Member17. Hafiz Hussain Ahmed,MNAMMAP Mr. Asfandyar Wali, MNA ANP Member18. Maulana Abdul GhafoorHaidri, MNAMMAP Mrs. Asyia Nisar, MNA MMAP Member19. Ch. Nisar Ali Khan, MNA PML-N Mr. Saeed Ahmed Zafar,MNAIND Member20. -- -- Mian Riaz Hussian Pirzada,MNAPML Member21. -- -- Mr. Wasim Akhtar, MNA MQM Member22. -- -- Mr. Noor-ul-Haq Qadri,MNAIND Member23. Mr. Omer Ayub KhanMinister of State forFinancePML Minister-in-Charge forFinance & Revenue-- Ex-Officio
  • 195. 182Annex-VIIRecovery Status since 2000-2011
  • 196. 183Annex-VIIISurvey QuestionnaireAssessment of 12thPAC (2004-07)Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of PakistanThe purpose of this questionnaire is to compare the functioning of 12th and 13thPAC, identify factors that can improve the success of the Public AccountsCommittee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the financial accountability of the Government of Pakistan.1. Who was the best Chair of the PAC from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)2. Is the Committee staff sufficient to support PAC? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____3. Is there sufficient Research Facility available to Members Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____4. Do you think, PAC took quick and in time decisions? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____5. Are you satisfied with the PAC‘s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____Accounts/Grants6. What were the causes of delay in the formation of 12thPAC? ..............................................................................................7. Did the 12thPAC achieve any of the following types of results or successes? If so, please indicate how often:7.1 Government responds favorably to Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.2 Government implements Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.3 Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.4 Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.5 Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.6 Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.7 The Committee successfully resisted political pressure exerted on it frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.8 The Principal Accounting Officers found hiding facts before PAC frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.9 The Committee adopted and practiced latest oversight developments frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.10 The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.11 The Committee is adherence to financial control of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.12 The Committee follows the policy of waste prevention frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.13 The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____8. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices ofCommittee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been during the 12 PAC? Please circle the appropriate number rating each
  • 197. 184factor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors that aremissing in the space at the end of this question.Some possible success factors 1=Very important2=Somewhat important3=Not Important4=Not ApplicableComposition of the Committee8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 1 2 3 48.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 1 2 3 4Committee Powers8.3 Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 1 2 3 4taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad 1 2 3 48.5 Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts 1 2 3 48.6 Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 1 2 3 48.7 Power to call independent witnesses 1 2 3 48.8 Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government, 1 2 3 4Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations8.9 Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks 1 2 3 48.10 Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, 1 2 3 4performance even after they have left office8.11 Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 1 2 3 48.12 Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 1 2 3 48.13 Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 1 2 3 48.14 Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues 1 2 3 48.16 Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 1 2 3 48.17 Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 1 2 3 48.18 Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice 1 2 3 48.19 Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 1 2 3 48.20 Powers to take Suo-Motu actions 1 2 3 48.21 Powers to listen Public Complaints and take action 1 2 3 48.22 Powers to take action on media review 1 2 3 4
  • 198. 1858.23 Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements 1 2 3 48.24 Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 1 2 3 4Committee Practices8.25 Close working relationship between members from different political parties 1 2 3 48.26 Advance preparation of members before hearings 1 2 3 4Members receives Audit Briefs well in time8.27 Close working relationship with Auditor General 1 2 3 48.28 Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings 1 2 3 48.29 Formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog 1 2 3 48.30 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of 1 2 3 4committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports8.31 Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 1 2 3 48.32 Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament 1 2 3 4and stays active between sessions8.33 Televised public hearings 1 2 3 48.34 Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 1 2 3 48.35 Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 1 2 3 48.36 Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience 1 2 3 48.37 Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience 1 2 3 48.38 Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 1 2 3 4the normal legislative session8.39 Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 1 2 3 48.40 Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations 1 2 3 48.41 Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken 1 2 3 4to implement the committee’s recommendations8.42 Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms 1 2 3 4such as the budget committeeOther important success factors for 12th PAC:8.43…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 48.44………………………….…........................................................ 1 2 3 48.45…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 4
  • 199. 1869. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 9, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results during the 12thPAC?Why?#1 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………..............................................................................................#2 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………............................................................................................#3 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?……….............................................................................................10. Of those factors in Question 9 that do not currently apply to 12th PAC (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and practicesmight make committee more effective? Please list them, and explain why..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11. Are there any documents that describe the strength of 12thPAC, best practice on a winning ground in comparison with 13thPAC? If so, could youplease attach copies, or list them and let me know where they can be obtained?………………………………............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………12. Please describe the Role of Chair in two or three lines.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………13. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make.………………………………......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................………………………………......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after thestudy is completed
  • 200. 187Annex-IXSurvey QuestionnaireAssessment of 13thPAC (2008-11)Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly of PakistanThe purpose of this questionnaire is to compare the functioning of 12thand 13thPAC, identify factors that can improve the success of the Public AccountsCommittee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the financial accountability of the Government of Pakistan. The time period of this study terminates with theresignation of Ch. Nisar Ali khan on 27thNovember, 2011.1. Who was the best Chair of the PAC from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)2. Is the Committee staff sufficient to support PAC? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____3. Is there sufficient Research Facility available to Members Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____4. Do you think, PAC took quick and in time decisions? Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____5. Are you satisfied with the PAC‘s scrutiny speed of budget statements/appropriations Sufficient _____ Somehow _____ Insufficient_____Accounts/Grants6 What were the causes of delay in the formation of 13thPAC? .............................................................................................7. Did the 13thPAC achieve any of the following types of results or successes? If so, please indicate how often:7.1 Government responds favourably to Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.2 Government implements Committee recommendations: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.3 Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.4 Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.5 Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws: frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.6 Disciplinary action was taken against officials who contravene administrative guidelines: frequently_____ seldom_____ never___--7.7 The Committee successfully resisted political pressure exerted on it frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.8 The Principal Accounting Officers found hiding facts before PAC frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.9 The Committee adopted and practiced latest oversight developments frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.10 The Committee institutionalized certain guiding principles which were required to meet its objective frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.11 The Committee is adherence to financial control of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.12 The Committee follows the policy of waste prevention frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____7.13 The Committee promotes practices of economical use of resources frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____
  • 201. 1888. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices ofCommittee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been during the 13thPAC? Please circle the appropriate number rating eachfactor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors that aremissing in the space at the end of this question.Some possible success factors 1=Very important2=Somewhat important3=Not Important4=Not ApplicableComposition of the Committee8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 1 2 3 48.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 1 2 3 4Committee Powers8.3 Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 1 2 3 4taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad 1 2 3 48.5 Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts 1 2 3 48.6 Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor 1 2 3 48.7 Power to call independent witnesses 1 2 3 48.8 Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government, 1 2 3 4Organizations receiving funds from the government and all state corporations8.9 Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks 1 2 3 48.10 Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative, 1 2 3 4performance even after they have left office8.11 Power to compel witnesses to answer questions 1 2 3 48.12 Power to make recommendations and Direct Actions 1 2 3 48.13 Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases 1 2 3 48.14 Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues 1 2 3 48.16 Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act 1 2 3 48.17 Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget 1 2 3 48.18 Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice 1 2 3 48.19 Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 1 2 3 48.20 Powers to take Suo-Motu actions 1 2 3 4
  • 202. 1898.21 Powers to listen Public Complaints and take action 1 2 3 48.22 Powers to take action on media review 1 2 3 48.23 Influence of PAC on the adequacy of the corporate governance arrangements 1 2 3 48.24 Influence of PAC recommendations/Directives on institutions 1 2 3 4Committee Practices8.25 Close working relationship between members from different political parties 1 2 3 48.26 Advance preparation of members before hearings 1 2 3 4Members receives Audit Briefs well in time8.27 Close working relationship with Auditor General 1 2 3 48.28 Provision of independent technical expertise and research support for hearings 1 2 3 48.29 Formation of Subcommittees to deal with Backlog 1 2 3 48.30 Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of 1 2 3 4committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports8.31 Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings 1 2 3 48.32 Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament 1 2 3 4and stays active between sessions8.33 Televised public hearings 1 2 3 48.34 Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated 1 2 3 48.35 Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government 1 2 3 48.36 Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience 1 2 3 48.37 Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience 1 2 3 48.38 Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 1 2 3 4the normal legislative session8.39 Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings 1 2 3 48.40 Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations 1 2 3 48.41 Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken 1 2 3 4to implement the committee’s recommendations8.42 Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms 1 2 3 4such as the budget committeeOther important success factors for 13th PAC:8.43…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 48.44………………………….…........................................................ 1 2 3 4
  • 203. 1908.45…….........…............................................................................ 1 2 3 49. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 9, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results during the 13thPAC? Why?1 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………..........................................................................................2 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………..........................................................................................3 ….………......…................ what has this helped you to do?………..........................................................................................10. Of those factors in Question 9 that do not currently apply to 13th PAC (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and practicesmight make committee more effective? Please list them, and explain why..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................11. Are there any documents that describe the strength of 13th PAC, best practice on a winning ground in comparison with 12thPAC? If so, could youplease attach copies, or list them and let me know where they can be obtained?………………………………............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………12. Please describe the Role of Chair in two or three lines.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………13. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make.………………………………......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................………………………………...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after thestudy is completed
  • 204. 191Annex-XCCCER MODEL Condition: Assertion of facts based on evidence (Oral, documentary, testimonial, visual) reflecting anundesirable state of affairs, a violation of criteria, in the organization being audited and that comeswithin the purview of audit. A favorable condition can also be reflected in the audit findings as areason for audit opinion. In such cases auditors may like to give recommendations the implementationof which would be necessary for sustaining those conditions. Condition takes the form of audit finding. Criteria: Primary and secondary legislation (Constitution, Enactments, Presidential Orders, Orders ofthe Governors), rules, codes, procedures, standards, professional norms, best practice, principles,concepts, policy statements, plans, vision, objectives, goals ,targets, benchmarks, anything thatprovides a guideline or direction to certain course of action. Cause: Cause is the reason for the existence of condition with reference to a systemic situationlike failure of internal controls. Cause of a condition could also be an immediate cause like forexample a theft taking place because the security person was sleeping. The auditor should be moreinterested in what led to such a situation. It could be one person operating three or two shifts andabsence of: any control procedures or better management practice like outsourcing security.Sometimes, even when procedures exist, lack of effective communication can become cause of controlfailure. Effect: Effect relates to the issue of materiality and significance of audit finding or condition. Materialfinding may not always relate to a monetary limit. A failure of a disaster recovery program or a criticalillness or disease or epidemic prevention program is critical, irrespective of monetary values or thepopulation it is effecting. Effect is however the most important stepping stone towards creating animpact of the auditing finding and gives relevance to the recommendation also. Conclusion: Conclusion is basically the opinion the auditor forms about the condition on which tobase the suggested a course of action. The opinion should be based on well considered evidence thatshould surface after the application of the criteria, cause and effect relating to the condition.Conclusion is the most sensitive area of audit reporting and should be thoroughly discussed with theauditee. It is the conclusion that has to be ultimately justified and defended in the PAC. The conclusionmust be clearly related to the other elements of cause, criteria reflecting the condition. Recommendation: The recommendation should specific and not vague e.g. Improve controls. Itmeans nothing., identify measurable actions, should generally specify timelines One criteria is that thePAO should take the recommendations forward to come up with an implementation plan with actionstations and timelines.

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