Attracting and Maintaining Institutional Investment: Panel Session 2

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Slides from the second afternoon panel session at the Eversheds event: Attracting and Maintaining Institutional Investment in Renewable Energy - 2nd July 2012

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Attracting and Maintaining Institutional Investment: Panel Session 2

  1. 1. Institutional Investment Workshop:“Credit Issues Surrounding Offshore Wind Project Financing” Michael Wilkins Managing Director Infrastructure Finance Standard & Poor’s July 2, 2012 Permission to reprint or distribute any content from this presentation requires the prior written approval of Standard & Poor’s. Copyright © 2011 Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC, a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
  2. 2. Agenda • S&Ps Energy Sector Ratings & Outlook • Strong Growth of Global Offshore Wind Power Provides Investment Opportunities • Funding Sources - Increasing Availability of Single Asset Project Financing • Investment Barriers • Favourable Regulations Are The Key To Increasing Investment Permission to reprint or distribute any content from this presentation requires the prior written approval of Standard & Poor’s.2.
  3. 3. S&P’s Energy Sector Ratings Europe, Middle-East, Africa (EMEA) Utilities Long-term Ratings Distribution Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Apr-12 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC © Standard & Poors 2012 • Weakened financial risk profiles due to high investment levels • More challenging and uncertain operating environment and weak economic fundamentals • And sovereign-induced ratings pressure • However, sector ratings remains largely investment grade
  4. 4. S&P’s Energy Sector Outlook Distribution Europe, Middle-East, Africa (EMEA) Utilities Outlook Distribution Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Apr-12 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Watch Neg Negative Stable Positive Watch Pos Developing Watch Dev © Standard & Poors 2012• Mainly driven by stabilization in outlook for regulated entities (non-GIIPS) and negative transition of many unregulated entities in recent years (i.e. downgrade + stable outlook)• However, still a fairly high share of negative outlooks, indicating near to medium-term pressure on utility ratings – Weaker macro-economic environment could accelerate downgrade activity – Sovereign downgrades likely to continue to be a factor
  5. 5. Strong Growth of Global Offshore Wind Power Provides Investment Opportunities• Countries are increasingly relying on offshore wind power• Factors behind industry’s growth:  Fuel Diversification  Climate change mitigation  More recently, job creation
  6. 6. Funding Sources - Increasing Availability of Single Asset Project Financing To date, most European wind projects sponsored by utilities and funded on their balance sheets However, recent developments likely to change the investment climate: • Electricity Market Reform (ERM) in the UK likely to increase off-balance sheet funding by utilities • Projects under construction begin to attract private investor attraction E.g. The €1.5bn Meerwind project in Germany, developed by Blackstone Group L.P. • Nonrecourse debt financed exclusively with loans and participation from state lending org. or multilateral E.g. The €5bn support scheme from German state-owned KfW Bankengruppe to Meerwind and €280m from KfW and €500m from EIB to Global Tech 1 project • Basel III provisions could restrict bank lending to projects with the strongest credit quality and short tenors only.
  7. 7. Investment Barriers Wind Resource Regulation Capital Structure Investment Risks Technology Operation & Design & Maintenance Construction Interconnection
  8. 8. Favourable Regulations Are Key To Increasing Investment* Offshore wind and most renewable energy projects owe their existence to regulatory support* Diverse incentive policies effective in attracting offshore wind projects to the U.K., Germany, and Denmark but not yet in the U.S.Determining sustainability of support schemes:• Size: We view FITs and other incentives that are • Control mechanisms: The absence of caps on considerably above market cost to be at the installed capacity allows for uncontrolled growth, greatest risk of cutbacks, especially in times of which then translates into subsidy payments that economic stress and budgetary controls may be too high• Affordability: Countries in which subsidies • Grid management: Ineffective management of represent a higher proportion of GDP are the most the electricity grid may increase the cost of back- at risk of regulatory changes up energy supplies considerably
  9. 9. www.standardandpoors.com Copyright © 2011 by Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (S&P), a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of S&P. The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P, its affiliates, and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions, regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages. Credit-related analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P’s opinions and analyses do not address the suitability of any security. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain non–public information received in connection with each analytical process. S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain credit-related analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&Ps public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees. STANDARD & POOR’S, S&P, GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL and RATINGSDIRECT are registered trademarks of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC. Permission to reprint or distribute any content from this presentation requires the prior written approval of Standard & Poor’s.9.
  10. 10. WindForce  2012  –  Offshore  financing  Recent  trends  in  the  financing  of  offshore  wind  farms  Bremen  –  28  June  2012  Dr  Jérôme  Guillet  
  11. 11. Recent  trends  in  the  financing  of  offshore  wind  farms   Table  of  contents   1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind   2.  Selected  equity  transacGons  in  offshore  wind   3.  What’s  the  best  route?       Confidential
  12. 12. Green  Giraffe  Energy  Bankers  is  a  specialist  advisory  bouEque  focused  on  renewable  energy   We  have  an  unparalleled  track  record  in  successfully  closing  deals  for  our  clients  •  18  professionals  in  London  (UK),  Utrecht  (NL)  and  Paris  (FR)   Completed  advisory  missions  for  over  2,000  MW  of  proposed  capacity  •  Project  &  structured  finance,  M&A,  legal  &  contracGng  experGse   Bankability evaluation of  a   Acquisition of  a  stake in an Tendering strategy of   Non-­‐recourse refinancing Evaluation  of  a  potential Evaluation  of  a  stake in a   10%  stake in the  Gwynt y   offshore  wind  farm turbine  manufacturer on   of  a  solar PV  portfolio stake in an offshore  wind   solar PV  project Môr offshore  wind  farm offshore  wind  project farm•  Priority  given  to  a  limited  number  of  clients   576  MW Undisclosed Undisclosed 24  MW 210  MW 8  MW Highland Group   Advisor  to  C-­‐Power  to   UK North America Europe Spain Holdings Germany France raise  project  finance  debt     2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011     325  MW     Bid  for a  49%  stake in the   Acquisition of  a  stake in an Financial  advisory   Financial  advisory   Acquisition of  a  stake in Evaluation  of  a  stake in the   Gunfleet Sands  offshore   offshore  wind  farm services -­‐ offshore  wind services  – state  waters   solar PV  portfolio Belwind offshore  wind       wind  farm offshore  wind  project farm   172  MW Undisclosed Undisclosed 25  MW 41  MW 165  MW       UK 2011 Europe 2011 US 2012 US 2012 Italy 2012 Belgium 2012   Belgium   2010     Our  clients  trust  us  on  a  wide  variety  of  long  term  missions  across  Europe  and  North  America   Non-­‐recourse financing Non-­‐recourse financing of   Non-­‐recourse financing of   Non-­‐recourse financing of     the  Gemini  offshore  wind   of  25%  stake in  Walney the  Northwind offshore   the  Gode Wind  2  offshore   farms   offshore  wind  farm wind  farm wind  farm Advisor  to  WindMW  to   216  MW 252  MW 600  MW 92  MW   raise  project  finance  debt       288  MW     The  Netherlands UK Belgium Germany         Non-­‐recourse  financing  of   Non-­‐recourse financing of   Non-­‐recourse financing Non-­‐recourse financing of the  Cape  Wind  offshore   an onshore wind  farm and sale  of    a  portfolio  of   the  Block  Island offshore       wind  farm solar PV  assets wind  farm 468  MW Undisclosed 16  MW 30  MW Blackstone  is                              “Financial  Sponsor  of  the  Year”     Germany     2011   US Europe France US Confidential
  13. 13. Recent  trends  in  the  financing  of  offshore  wind  farms   Table  of  contents   1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind   2.  Selected  equity  transacGons  in  offshore  wind   3.  What’s  the  best  route?       Confidential
  14. 14. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  how  big  is  it?   Currently  operaGonal  projects   Offshore  wind  project  finance  trends  Source:  GGEB   A  European  story   A  massive  need  for  capital,  and  thus  for  PF  •  Total  of  3,813  MW  installed  capacity  as  of  end-­‐2011   •  Projects  under  construcGon  see  commiged  investments  of  EUR  15  billion  over   the  next  2-­‐3  years.    •  UK  (2,094  MW)  and  Denmark  (857  MW)  are  sGll  the  market  leaders   •  Around  30%  of  the  near  term  pipeline  has  been  project  financed  (compared  •  866  MW  connected  in  2011,  afer  883  MW  in  2010  and  577  MW  in  2009  –  the   to  10%  in  the  early  years)   first  3  years  of  industrial-­‐scale  acGvity   •  Total  investment  of  EUR  80  billion  or  more  is  expected  over  the  decade  •  Significant  pipeline  of  offshore  wind  projects  beyond  2012    with  18  wind   •  Developers,  and  to  an  increasing  extent  uGliGes,  will  need  to  rely  on  PF  to   farms  (over  5,000  MW)  currently  under  construcGon  and  over  18,000  MW   fund  that  investment  pipeline   fully  consented     Confidential
  15. 15. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  the  overall  context   A  wild  ride  Typical  project  finance   Leverage   Maturity   Pricing   Maximum  condiGons  -­‐  offshore   post-­‐compleGon   underwriGng  2006-­‐2007   60:40   10  years   150-­‐200  bp   50-­‐100  M  2009   70:30   15  years   300  bp   30-­‐50  M  2010-­‐2011     65:35   15  years   250-­‐300  bp   50-­‐75  M  Current  market   70:30   10  years   275-­‐375  bp   30-­‐50  M  •  Banks  are  refocusing  –  again  -­‐  on  known  clients,  core  countries  and  strategic  sectors  of  acGvity   •  The  good  news  is  that  offshore  wind  is  unambiguously  “strategic”  for  many  banks  today   •  Countries  where  offshore  wind  is  developing  are  seen  as  “safe”  and  core  for  most  banks  (Germany,  Benelux,  UK)    •  Margins  are  shooEng  up  again     •  This  reflects  an  increase  in  the  banks’  cost  of  funding  rather  than  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  risk   •  The  underlying  long  term  cost  of  money  is  falling  (in  a  mirror  image),  so  the  overall  cost  of  debt  has  not  increased  that  much  •  Structures  are  currently  less  aggressive  (raGos,  maturity,  covenants)  than  in  2011   Confidential
  16. 16. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  past  deals   Early  deals  –  4  transacGons  just  before  and  afer  the  financial  crisis    •  Q7  (also  known  as  Princes  Amalia)  (2006,  the  Netherlands,  120  MW,  Vestas  V80,  EUR  219  M  financing)   •  The  very  first  deal  –  set  a  number  of  precedents  (debt  sizing  principles,  mulG-­‐contract  construcGon  risk  taken  via   heavy  due  diligence  and  conGngent  funding,  10-­‐year  O&M  package)   •  3  MLAs,  3  addiGonal  banks,  plus  key  support  from  EKF  •  C-­‐Power  phase  1  (2007,  Belgium,  30  MW,  Repower  5M,  EUR  126  M  financing)   •  ConsolidaGon  deal  –  a  more  aggressive  version  of  the  Q7  structure  (longer  tenor,  some  merchant  risk)   •  Confirms  that  new  turbines,  even  very  large  ones,  are  bankable   •  1  MLA,  3  addiGonal  banks,  no  mulGlateral  •  Belwind  phase  1  (2009,  Belgium,  165  MW,  Vestas  V90,  EUR  544  M  financing)   •  First  deal  post-­‐financial  crisis  –  allowed  to  confirm  that  the  early  structures  were  sound  (construcGon  risk,  some   merchant  risk)  while  increasing  the  size  thanks  to  heavy  mulGlateral  involvement   •  3  MLAs,  EIB  and  EKF,  no  syndicaGon  –  heralded  the  “club  deal”  period  •  Boreas  (2009,  UK,  194  MW  offshore,  Siemens  3.6-­‐107,  GBP  340  M  financing)   •  First  UK  deal,  with  a  large  number  of  banks  (14  altogether)   •  No  construcGon  risk,  but  funding  under  the  UK  ROC  regime,  with  some  merchant  risk     Confidential
  17. 17. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  past  deals   Early  deals  –  Pioneers-­‐precedent-­‐setng,  but  with  a  small  number  of  players    •  Successful  structures  –  and  really  non  recourse!   •  DD  +  ConGngent  mechanism  structure  to  bear  construcGon  risk  validated  in  subsequent  deals   •  ConstrucGon  risk  with  mulG-­‐contract  structure  validated  and  repeated   •  Repeated  with  several  different  turbines,  sponsors  and  regulatory  regimes   •  All  early  projects  built  within  agreed  budget  and  Gmetable,  and  now  operaGng  to  full  saGsfacGon  •  A  fairly  small  number  of  players  involved   •  Only  a  small  number  of  insGtuGons  actually  took  construcGon  risk   •  Heavy  reliance  on  a  small  number  of  mulGlaterals  (EKF,  EIB)   •  The  same  advisors  and  people  in  almost  every  deal  •  A  difficult  market  context   •  No  syndicaGon  market  for  what  are  fairly  large  deals  –  thus  a  need  for  *everybody*  on  each  deal   •  Lack  of  precedents  at  a  Gme  banks  were  retreaGng  to  favored  clients  and  familiar  risks   Confidential
  18. 18. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  past  deals   2010-­‐2011  –  the  market  maturing  •  C-­‐Power  phase  2  (2010,  Belgium,  325  MW,  Repower  6M,  EUR  913  M  financing)   •  Aggressive  structure  building  on  exisGng  precedents  (18  year  financing,  70:30  leverage,  mulG-­‐contracGng   construcGon  strategy  with  conGngency  structure,  use  of  a  6MW  turbine)   •  7  MLAs,  EKF,  Euler-­‐Hermes,  EIB  •  Borkum  West  2  (2010,  Germany,  200  MW,  Areva  M5000,  EUR  510  M  financing)   •  First  deal  in  Germany,  and  first  deal  with  (relaGvely  recent)  Areva  5MW  turbines;  building  on  precedents   (construcGon  risk  with  conGngency  structure)  but  slightly  less  aggressive  terms  (leverage)   •  4  MLAs,  7  addiGonal  banks,  EIB  and  NRW  •  Meerwind  (2011,  Germany,  288  MW,  Siemens  3.6  MW-­‐120,  EUR  884  M  financing)   •  First  transacGon  with  construcGon  risk  for  Siemens  turbines,  first  with  a  private  equity  investor,  and  first  under   the  new  KfW  offshore  wind  programme   •  7  MLAs  (including  London-­‐based  banks),  EKF,  KfW  •  Globaltech  1  (2011,  Germany,  400  MW,  Areva  M5000,  EUR  1047  M  financing)   •  First  deal  for  a  400  MW  wind  farm  and  beyond  EUR  1  bn,  supported  by  the  KfW  programme   •  4  MLAs,  12  addiGonal  banks  (including  several  newcomers  to  offshore),  EIB,  KfW  •  BalEc  1  (2011,  Germany,  48  MW,  Siemens  2.3  MW,  EUR  138  M  financing)   •  3  commercial  banks  &  EIB  in  post-­‐compleGon  refinancing  of  the  first  German  commercial  wind  farm   Confidential
  19. 19. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  past  deals   The  banking  market  is  there  if  the  transacGons  are  well  structured  •  It  is  possible  to  close  billion-­‐euro  transacEons   •  4  billion-­‐euro-­‐scale  deals  in  one  year,  including  2  in  Germany  in  the  exact  same  Gme  frame   •  More  than  30  banks  are  now  acGve,  and  more  than  20  have  construcGon  risk  exposure   •  A  number  of  different  public  financing  insGtuGons  can  be  tapped  –  none  is  indispensable  •  A  consensus  is  slowly  emerging  on  how  to  structure  deals   •  MulG-­‐contracGng  structures  with  a  small  number  of  counterparGes  (2-­‐7)  and  strong  due  diligence   •  Early  involvement  of  banks  or  bank  advisors  in  contractual  negoGaGons,  with  input  and  control  on  specific  issues   (warranty  exclusions,  LD  caps,  interface  definiGon  &  matrix,  availability  of  vessels  and  other  criGcal  path   equipment,  project  management,  shareholding  retenGon  clauses)   •  Debt  sizing  rules  and  underlying  operaGonal  assumpGons  are  becoming  more  consistent  across  deals   •  Specific  focus  on  appropriate  long  term  O&M  arrangements  There  is  enough  money  for  good  projects  •  Non  recourse  finance  requires  a  specific  discipline  and  approach  to  project  risks  •  Sponsors  which  cannot  or  do  not  want  to  follow  that  discipline  will  not  raise  non  recourse  debt   Confidential
  20. 20. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  recent  deals   2012  -­‐  Recent  deal  acGvity  has  been  centered  on  the  UK  Gunfleet  Sands  (2012,  UK,  86  MW  (Marubeni’s  50%),  Siemens  3.6MW,  GBP  158  M  financing)  •  First  non-­‐recourse  financing  of  a  minority  stake  in  an  offshore  project  •  Confirmed  appeGte  of  Japanese  insGtuGons  for  the  sector  (NEXI  risk,  funded  by  SMBC  and  Mizuho)  Lincs  (2012,  UK,  270  MW,  Siemens  3.6MW,  GBP  425  M  commercial  financing)    •  First  non-­‐recourse  financing  including  construcGon  risk  in  the  UK  •  Largest  amount  of  commercial  bank  risk  to  date  OFTO  transacEons    •  Robin  Rigg  (2011,  180  MW,  Transmission  Capital  Partners,  GBP  65  M)  •  Gunfleet  Sands  (2011,  172  MW  Transmission  Capital  Partners,  GBP  49  M)  •  Barrow  (2011,  90  MW,  Transmission  Capital  Partners,  GBP  34  M)  •  Walney  1  (2011,  184  MW,  Macquarie-­‐Barclays  Infra  Fund,  GBP  105  M)   Markets  are  sEll  open  –  including  for  15  year  deals   The  proporEon  of  offshore  wind  investment  being  financed  is  actually  increasing,  despite  the  gloom   11  
  21. 21. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  recent  deals   2012  -­‐  Recent  deal  acGvity  has  been  centered  on  the  UK  Gunfleet  Sands  (2012,  UK,  86  MW  (Marubeni’s  50%),  Siemens  3.6MW,  GBP  158  M  financing)  •  First  non-­‐recourse  financing  of  a  minority  stake  in  an  offshore  project  •  Confirmed  appeGte  of  Japanese  insGtuGons  for  the  sector  (NEXI  risk,  funded  by  SMBC  and  Mizuho)  Lincs  (2012,  UK,  270  MW,  Siemens  3.6MW,  GBP  425  M  commercial  financing)    •  First  non-­‐recourse  financing  including  construcGon  risk  in  the  UK  •  Largest  amount  of  commercial  bank  risk  to  date  OFTO  transacEons    •  Robin  Rigg  (2011,  180  MW,  Transmission  Capital  Partners,  GBP  65  M)  •  Gunfleet  Sands  (2011,  172  MW  Transmission  Capital  Partners,  GBP  49  M)  •  Barrow  (2011,  90  MW,  Transmission  Capital  Partners,  GBP  34  M)  •  Walney  1  (2011,  184  MW,  Macquarie-­‐Barclays  Infra  Fund,  GBP  105  M)   Markets  are  sEll  open  –  including  for  15  year  deals   The  proporEon  of  offshore  wind  investment  being  financed  is  actually  increasing,  despite  the  gloom   12  
  22. 22. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  some  diverging  trends   Market  segments  –  A  geographical  split     Market  segments  –  2  corporate  splits    •  The  UK  market   •  UEliEes  vs  IPPs   •  Long  delays  on  potenGal  deals  and  no  construcGon  risk   •  UGliGes  did  not  really  need  project  finance  (whereas   taken  unGl  Lincs  (parGal  construcGon  risk)   IPPs  did  and  had  to  accept  market  terms)   •  Large  gap  between  expectaGons  of  (uGlity)  investors  and   •  Project  finance  is  seen  as  more  complex,  more   what  the  market  was  willing  to  do   expensive,  and  more  Gme-­‐consuming  –  and  not  really   •  Bad  image  of  PF  generated  by  focus  of  banks  on  relaGvely   non-­‐recourse  (at  least  in  the  eyes  of  the  raGng  agencies)     minor  technical  glitches  (ie  grouGng  issues)   •  Project  finance  requirements  for  early  deals  were  seen   •  A  lot  of  side  acGvity  on  the  OFTO  refinancing  side   as  especially  annoying  by  uGliGes  (intrusive  due   diligence,  desire  by  banks  to  influence  contractual   structure)  and  generally  incompaGble  with  their  own   way  of  miGgaGng  project  risks  •  The  conEnental  market   •  Large  scale  transacGons  with  construcGon  risk  have   •  Investors  looking  for  money  vs  higher  IRRs   become  a  regular  occurrence   •  Amongst  investors  going  the  project  finance  route,  not   •  Increasing  number  of  banks  and  sponsors  with  the  right   everybody  has  the  same  objecGves  or  the  same  ability   experience  and  track  record   to  negoGate  terms  with  banks   •  Range  of  commercial  terms  is  widening,  as  actors  seek   •  Some  investors  have  successfully  obtained  more   favorable  terms  from  the  banking  market  –  notably   different  objecGves:   leverage  and  pricing   •  Raising  funds   •  As  the  market  broadens,  investors  will  increasingly  be   •  Increasing  leverage  and  returns   able  to  extract  more  compeGGve  terms  –  if  they  have   •  ConstrucGon  period  remains  “hard  work”   the  right  project  and  market  approach   Confidential
  23. 23. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  the  contractual  structures   PF  transacGons  are  always  heavily  contracted     Equity   Debt  Major  contracts  include:     Sponsor(s)   Lenders  •  permits,  licenses,  authorisaGons,  etc…   Dividends   Debt  Service  •  construcGon/supply  contracts   O  &  M   Project     Electricity   Payments     Company   Support/  •  electricity  sales  contracts  (and,  if   WarranEes   applicable,  green  cerGficates  /  RO   Turbine     Power     contracts)   Marine  construcEon   Supply   Electricity   Purchaser   ConstrucEon     Deliveries   Contracts  •  O&M  contracts   Electrical  Works   Licenses   ObligaEon  to  buy     renewable   CerEficaEon  that   electricity  •  financing  documents   FoundaEons   producEon  is     “renewable”     Tariff  for  such   electricity   Regulatory   ConstrucEon   AuthoriEes    permits  Wind  and  offshore  wind  in  parEcular  are  quintessenEal  examples  of  comprehensive  contractual  structures   Confidential
  24. 24. 1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind  –  risk  analysis   Offshore  wind  adds  new  risks  to  tradiGonal  PF  risks  •  Regulatory  /  poliEcal  risk  –  no  to  permitng  risk,  yes  to  (some)  regulatory  change  risk  •  Price  /  market  risk  –  no  to  volume  risk,  yes  to  (some)  price  risk  •  Counterparty  risk  –  increasing  agenGon  as  projects  grow  in  size  •  Technology  risk  –  core  risk,  but  banks  have  shown  willingness  to  bank  new  turbines  •  Wind  risk  –  easier  offshore  than  onshore;  wake  effect  is  key  worry  •  ConstrucEon  risk  –  sGll  the  toughest  risk  (mulG-­‐contracGng),  not  done  in  London  market  yet  •  OperaEng  risk  –  taken  on  the  basis  of  long  term  O&M  agreements  with  WTG  manufacturers     Oops,  ovality!    Offshore  wind  is  one  of  the  most  complex  industries  to  be  project-­‐financed   Confidential
  25. 25. Recent  trends  in  the  financing  of  offshore  wind  farms   Table  of  contents   1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind   2.  Selected  equity  transacEons  in  offshore  wind   3.  What’s  the  best  route?       Confidential
  26. 26. 2.  Selected  equity  transacEons  in  offshore  wind   Notable  equity  transacGons  in  recent  years  •  Gode  Wind  1  (2007,  DE,  80  turbines,  90%  sold  by  PNE  Wind  to  Econcern)   •  Sale  of  a  permiged  project  to  an  investor  explicitly  focusing  on  non  recourse  financing   •  Project  purchased  back  by  PNE  Wind  following  bankruptcy  of  Econcern  •  Boreas  (2009,  UK,  194  MW,  Siemens  3.6  MW,  50%  sold  by  Centrica  to  TCW)   •  Poryolio  (which  also  included  a  36  MW  onshore  wind  farm)  sold  as  fully  operaGonal  assets   •  TransacGon  simultaneous  with  financial  close  of  a  long  term  non  recourse  refinancing  of  the  poryolio  •  Walney  (2010,  UK,  367  MW,  Siemens  3.6  MW,  24.8%  sold  by  DONG  to  PGGM/Ampere)     •  TransacGon  closed  before  final  construcGon  of  the  project  (which  was  already  well  under  way)   •  Deal  includes  compleGon  commitments  by  DONG   •  First  equity  sale  to  a  pension  fund     •  TransacGon  designed  from  the  start  to  allow  for  refinancing  of  the  minority  stake  (sGll  pending)  •  Nysted  (2010,  DK,  166  MW,  Bonus  2.3  MW,  50%  sold  by  DONG  to  PensionDanmark)     •  TransacGon  amount  of  EUR  94M,  valuing  the  project  at  1.15  MEUR/MW   •  One  of  the  first  offshore  wind  projects,  with  a  10  year  track  record   •  Show  uGliGes  are  willing  to  take  long  term  O&M  risk  on  the  basis  of  a  good  track  record     17        
  27. 27. 2.  Selected  equity  transacEons  in  offshore  wind   Major  equity  transacGons  in  recent  years  •  Anholt  (2011,  DK,  400  MW,  Siemens  3.6  MW,  50%  sold  by  DONG  to  PensionDanmark  &  PKA)   •  TransacGon  closed  before  construcGon  started   •  DONG  provides  a  15  year  O&M  contract  and  a  compleGon  guarantee   •  At  DKK  6  billion  (EUR  805  M  –  4.03  MEUR/MW)  it  is  the  largest  equity  transacGon  to  date  in  the  market    •  Nördlicher  Grund  (2011,  DE,  80  turbines,  100%  sold  by  Eolia  to  Blackstone)     •  Announced  on  the  same  day  as  Blackstone  closed  the  financing  of  Meerwind   •  Project  sold  with  permits  but  an  otherwise  early  stage  of  development   •  Demonstrates  appeGte  of  some  financial  investors  for  full  development  risk    •  Gunfleet  Sands  (2011,  UK,  172  MW,  Siemens  3.6  MW,  50%  sold  by  DONG  to  Marubeni)     •  TransacGon  announced  at  at  GBP  200  M  (EUR  230  M),  ie  a  price  of  2.65  MEUR/MW   •  Project  sold  afer  compleGon   •  TransacGon  confirms  growing  interest  in  offshore  wind  from  Japanese  investors  •  Borkum  Riffgrund  (2011,  DE,  277  MW,  Siemens  3.6  MW,  100%  sold  by  EK  to  DONG;  50%  then  sold  to  Lego)   •  Purchase  of  permiged  project  by  DONG    at  EUR  30  M,  ie  EUR  0.9  MEUR  /MW   •  Sale  of  50%  to  private  investor  at  DKK  4,700  M  (EUR  630  M  -­‐  4.66  MEUR/MW)  shows  development  premium     18    
  28. 28. 2.  Selected  equity  transacEons  in  offshore  wind  –  some  lessons   The  investor  market  is  there  (also)  if  the  transacGons  are  well  structured  •  A  wider  range  of  investors  beyond  uEliEes  than  people  assume   •  Infrastructure  funds  and  pensions  funds  (PensionDanmark,  TCW,  PGGM)   •  Private  equity  groups  (Blackstone,  etc)   •  CorporaGons  with  specific  strategies  (LEGO,  Colruyt,  Marubeni)   •  ….  And  many  more  sniffing  around  the  sector  •  ValuaEons  are  actually  relaEvely  consistent   •  Permiged  projects  –  development  cost  +  premium  @  200kEUR/MW   •  Contracted  projects  –  construcGon  cost  @  3.5MEUR/MW  unlevered  (or  1.2  MEUR/MW  levered)   •  OperaGonal  projects  –  linked  to  regulatory  framework  and  IRR  target  of  investors  (8-­‐10%)  •  Trade  off  between  construcEon  risk  and  returns  now  closely  examined   •  As  more  assets  are  operaGonal,  the  universe  of  investors  grows  and  IRR  targets  are  going  down   •  A  number  of  investors  are  now  looking  to  take  construcGon  risk  to  improve  returns  (to  double  digits)   •  A  “bankable”  deal  is  also  one  which  many  investors  can  find  agracGve   Confidential
  29. 29. Recent  trends  in  the  financing  of  offshore  wind  farms   Table  of  contents   1.  The  project  finance  market  for  offshore  wind   2.  Selected  equity  transacGons  in  offshore  wind   3.  What’s  the  best  route?       Confidential
  30. 30. 3.  What’s  the  best  route?   Banks  focus  on  interfaces  between  key  tasks  as  much  as  those  between  contracts    Several  completely  different  industries   Sponsor(s)   Lenders  •  Turbine  manufacture   Due    •  FoundaGon  /  steelwork  supplies   diligence   Project    •  Electricals   management   O  &  M   Project    •  Cabling     Company   Interfaces   Support/  •  Marine  construcGon  work   WarranEes   Turbine     Marine  construcEon  •  No  obvious  general  contractor   Supply   ConstrucEon     Contracts  And  yet  banks  do  take  construcEon  risk   Electrical  Works   Direct  agreements  •  Focus  on  project  management   FoundaEons  •  Focus  on  key  interfaces  •  Understanding  of  criGcal  path  items   Regulatory   ConstrucEon   AuthoriEes  •  Heavy  involvement  in  contract  negoGaGon    permits   The  higher  risks  borne  by  the  banks  impose  different  development  and  contractual  approaches     Confidential
  31. 31. 3.  What’s  the  best  route?   How  raGng  agencies  look  at  non-­‐recourse  debt  for  offshore  wind  remains  a  contenGous  isue  •  RaEngs  agencies  have  a  negaEve  view  on  non-­‐recourse  debt   •  They  consider  that  uGliGes  will  not  walk  away  from  a  strategic  project  and  thus  debt  is  not  really  non-­‐recourse   •  In  countries  where  power  is  sold  to  the  market,  uGliGes  which  provide  PPAs  are  considered  to  have  a  long  term   liability  under  the  project  and  this  is  counted  against  them  by  raGngs  agencies   •  Finally,  certain  uGliGes  have  covenants  in  their  corporate  credit  faciliGes  which  prevent  them  from  doing  project   finance  if  they  control  the  project  (and  uGliGes  typically  prefer  to  control  projects)  •  UEliEes  have  gone  toward  equity  soluEons   •  Use  of  UJVs  or  IJVs  which  allow  pro  rata  consolidaGon  of  project  equity   •  Sale  of  minority  stakes  (up  to  49.9%)  in  projects  •  This  comes  in  addiEon  to  the  other  perceived  issues  of  non  recourse  debt   •  More  expensive   •  Intrusive  involvement  of  mulGple  external  parGes   •  No  results  (UK  market  percepGon)   Confidential
  32. 32. 3.  What’s  the  best  route?   There  are  actually  plenty  of  routes  open  •  Non  recourse  debt  for  greenfield  projects   •  The  “full  scope  “project  finance  version,  allowing  significantly  lower  equity  commitments   •  It  is  available,  but  requires  to  go  through  a  specific  discipline   •  Subject  to  raGng  agencies  percepGon  (as  discussed  separately)  •  Non  recourse  refinancing  of  operaEonal  projects   •  Available  now  that  more  projects  are  actually  operaGonal  and  have  good  track  records   •  Simpler  than  greenfield  as  all  construcGon  contractual  &  management  issues  have  been  resolved   •  May  take  the  form  at  some  point  of  poryolio  refinancings  (and  allow  for  sale  of  minority  stakes  in  these  as  well)    •  Sale  of  minority  stakes  in  projects,  pre-­‐  or  post-­‐compleEon   •  Allows  to  recycle  capital  invested  in  exisGng  projects  into  new  ones  without  loss  of  operaGonal  control   •  Recent  transacGons  have  shown  there  is  appeGte  from  many  types  of  investors  for  these  assets   •  Most  interested  investors  to  date  prefer  to  avoid  construcGon  risk,  but  that  will  change   •  Allows  capture  of  value  through  long  term  O&M  arrangements  or  PPAs   Confidential
  33. 33. 3.  What’s  the  best  route?   The  coming  fights  between  lenders,  investors  and  contractors  •  How  intrusive  is  the  due  diligence?   •  Review  of  interfaces,  sub-­‐contracts,  logisGcs  and  project  management  –  irrespecGve  of  contractual  structure   •  Review  of  technology,  supply  chain,  quality  control  processes,  key  personnel,  sub-­‐contractor  creditworthiness  •  How  involved  are  the  banks  (or  relevant  advisors)  in  contract  negoEaEon?   •  Requirement  for  a  number  of  PF-­‐standard  clauses   •  More  explicit  warranty  and  interface  language   •  Decision  on  number  of  contracts   •  Responsibility  for  vessels   •  Parent  company  guarantees  or  performance  bonds  •  How  strict  are  the  financial  covenants?   •  Detailed  informaGon  –  and  at  Gmes,  validaGon  of  decisions   •  Share  retenGon  clauses   •  Debt  sizing  principles  •  What  are  the  terms  and  condiEons  for  long  term  O&M?   •  Tenor,  scope,  liability,  fixed  price,  counterparty   •  OpGons  to  exit  afer  a  few  years   Confidential
  34. 34. 3.  What’s  the  best  route?   Project  finance  for  offshore  wind  is  not  just  about  leverage  •  It  helps  improve  risk  discipline  for  the  project   •  More  external  eyes  on  contracts,  interfaces  and  detailed  project  structure   •  Specific  focus  by  banks  and  their  advisors  on  potenGal  downside  scenarios   •  Project  can  “work”  on  a  stand-­‐alone  basis  (which  makes  it  easier  to  sell)  •  It  can  help  investors  –  and  contractors!  –  obtain  more  favorable  contractual  terms   •  Using  banks  as  a  “bad  cop”  can  be  useful  in  contractual  negoGaGons  (true  for  both  investors  and  contractors!)   •  3-­‐way  negoGaGons  can  allow  you  to  get  away  from  zero-­‐sum  negoGaGons  •  It’s  really  non-­‐recourse   •  Banks  take  construcGon  risk  on  the  basis  of  the  contracts  and  commiged  conGngency  mechanisms   •  While  sponsor  involvement  is  valued,  banks  evaluate  deals  with  no  expectaGon  of  addiGonal  cash  in  •  It’s  no  longer  so  expensive   •  Recent  deals  have  seen  overall  cost  of  >15-­‐year  debt  at  6%   Confidential
  35. 35. 3.  What’s  the  best  route?   You  cannot  improvise  a  project  finance  deal  •  It  needs  to  be  an  early  decision  by  investors   •  A  lot  of  the  value  from  project  finance  discipline  comes  at  an  early  stage,  when  choosing  the  contractual   structure  and  negoGaGng  the  relevant  contracts   •  The  good  news  is  that  a  lot  of  that  work  can  be  done  without  involving  large  banking  groups,  by  using  a  small   number  of  specialised  advisors  •  It  requires  experienced  advisors   •  Bring  in  at  your  side  enGGes  which  have  credibility  as  lenders’  advisors  and  ask  them  to  look  at  the  project  from   the  perspecGve  of  lenders   •  Technical  advisors  (Mog,  Sgurr)  are  indispensable   •  We  believe  we  can  also  bring  value  in  pre-­‐packaging  a  deal  that  banks  will  accept  •  Investors  and  contractors  need  to  be  commiked  to  it   •  CounterparGes  will  accept  to  incorporate  banks’  requirements  in  their  commercial  offers  only  if  they  really   believe  that  the  project  will  not  happen  without  external  financing   •  Do  take  into  account  the  feedback  from  specialised  advisors,  otherwise  it  won’t  work   Confidential
  36. 36. Where  to  reach  us   Paris     Utrecht   8  rue  d’Uzès,  75002  Paris     Maliebaan  92,  3581  CX  Utrecht     tel:  +  331  4221  3663     tel:  +  31  30  820  0334   email:  fr@green-­‐giraffe.eu     email:  nl@green-­‐giraffe.eu         London   hgp://www.green-­‐giraffe.eu   133  Houndsditch,  London  EC3A  7BX   tel:  +4475  5400  0828   email:  uk@green-­‐giraffe.eu         27  
  37. 37. Debt Finance and the role of development banksAmit DewanManaging Director, Project Finance+44 (0) 20 78261672Amit.Dewan@unicredit.eu
  38. 38. European Project Finance League Table Analysis: 2012 - YTD 5,000,000 11 4,500,000 2 4,000,000 16 3,500,000 Deal Value (EUR) 2 3,000,000 1 13 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 2 16 1,000,000 500,000 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 ia y d d n m e ay l ce y an s lic ga al an ai an m in ar an nd iu an rw It Sp b st do ra lg rtu nl el lg rm pu la ki Fr No Uk Ir Bu Fi ng Be er Po be Re Ge th Ki Uz Ne ak d ite ov Un Sl Source: Dealogic ProjectWare, 20th ofJune 2012

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