ISCRAM 2013: Lessons Learnt from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Focusing on Emergency Management and Information Systems

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Author: Hirokazu Tatano …

Author: Hirokazu Tatano
Disaster Prevention Research Institute (DPRI), Kyoto University

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  • 1. Lessons Learnt from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Focusing on Emergency Management and Information Systems Hirokazu Tatano Disaster Prevention Research Institute (DPRI), Kyoto University
  • 2. Contents • Overviews of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, March 11th, 2011. • Earthquake Early Warning System • Evacuation • Relief and Recovery
  • 3. Outline of the Earthquake • 14:46 2011 March 11 • M9.0 • Rupture area • 450km x 200km • Causes strong ground motions and enormous Tsunamis in a large area
  • 4. Tsunami height and maximum run- up JSCE
  • 5. beforeafter
  • 6. Town office was also damaged. Not only wooden but also steal buildings suffered damage.
  • 7. Triple Disaster • Earthquake – M9.0 – Large affected areas • Tsunami • Killed or missing persons about 20,000 • Nuclear Accident
  • 8. Features of the event • Large Spatial Scale – Preparation is not enough – Huge causality, economic losses – Difficulty in coordinating response, relief and recovery • Complex – Earthquake, Tsunami, Nuclear, NaTech, etc. • Cascading Impacts – Production Capacity Decrease, Supply Chain Disruption, Shortage of Goods and Services
  • 9. Our models are based on the assumption that each segment moves separately.
  • 10. Development of sea walls and their damages 農林水産省・国土交通省 IwateMiyagiFukushima SeawallheightdeterminedbyTsunamiSeawallheightdeterminedbyStormsurge
  • 11. How sea wall collapsed?
  • 12. Four Nuclear power plants are affected
  • 13. Nuclear Power Plant Fukushima No.1 TEPCO assumed to have a maximum Tsunami height at 5.7m. TEPCO made a internal research draft which reported Maximum Tsunami height can reach at 15.7m in 2008 but they reported Nuclear Power Authority on March 7th 2011. Unfortunately, TEPCO loose the chance for installing additional Tsunami Countermeasures and the Tsunami on March 11th run-up height reached to 15m and Tsunami washed away functionality of the emergency diesel power generator.
  • 14. Tokai Dai Ni Nuclear Power plant In 2009.9, they modified the design tsunami height (4.86m→5.7m) based on revised Tsunami hazard assessment by the Ibaragi Pref. (2008.9) and had start constructing of Tsunami protection wall for emergency diesel building (6.1m). At march 11th, two of the emergency diesel power generator was saved and kept functionality.
  • 15. Why we have “expected surprise”? • Design external force is used for facility design. • If the actual external force exceeds the design force, it is not a responsibility of the authority. No authority don’t want to take risk by considering force exceeding the design force. → This leads to “cliff-edge fragility” problem (Kameda 2011) .
  • 16. From Cliff-edge to Smooth Fragility (Kameda, 2011)Prob.malfunctioning Hazard level Cliff- edge Allowing uncertainty of functionality of countermeasures for excess external forces, we should increase the coping capacity of the facility against natural hazards.
  • 17. Two options for “uncertain events” • The first option is to take an action: To recognize and develop countermeasures in risk management, i.e., risk transfer, risk acceptance, prevention/avoidance, mitigation/reduction, risk transfer and retention/preparation. • The second option is to change our mind set: To neglect the possibility of the event. It will not happen to me!
  • 18. • In 1990, when seismic nuclear power plant design code has been established, the nuclear safety committee announced “Station black out would not cause serious accident because offsite power supply will be recovered within a few hours and/or emergency power generator will work soon after the event. ” • After the March 11th, the head of the nuclear safety committee said “I think that we have implicit consensus that it is not necessary for us to discuss about the serious consequences of nuclear power plants.” • He also apologized by saying “we seriously feel sorry for us not to explore solutions seriously for severe accidents of nuclear power plants.”
  • 19. Exceeding external forces • Safety is a fundamental needs of citizen. • Design and evaluation standard gradually were getting considering “exceeding external forces.” – Robust river dykes – Seismic design: economic efficiency investigation
  • 20. P-wave S-wave Earthquake P-arrival Earthquake Early Warning System (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 21. P-wave S-wave Earthquake P-arrival Source Estimate Earthquake Early Warning System (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 22. Earthquake P-arrival Source Estimate S-wave P-wave Earthquake Early Warning System (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 23. 21 warnings have been issued in 3 years 8 warnings for M6 to M7 earthquakes M Predicted Observed Elapsed time* Intensity Intensity for public warning May 8, 2008 7.2 6 + 6 - 4.5 sec July 8, 2008 6.1 5 - 5 - 13.9 July 24, 2008 6.8 5 - 6 - 20.8 Sep. 11, 2008 7.1 5 + 5 - 9.7 Aug. 11, 2009 6.5 5 + 6 - 3.8 Oct. 30, 2009 6.8 5 - 4 26.8 Feb. 27, 2010 7.2 6 - 5 - 4.1 Mar. 14, 2010 6.7 5 - 5 - 3.6 * Time measured from detection of first P wave Earthquake Early Warning System (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 24. Distribution of Information TV (98%) 124 stations Radio (75%) 41 AM stations 35 FM stations Early Warning for Mainshock on March 11 Earthquake Early Warning System (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 25. Cellular phones Phone companies (Docomo, AU, Softbank) broadcast Earthquake Early Warnings provided by JMA 52,300,000 cellular phones can receive the Earthquake Early Warnings (47% of total) http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/english/ Earthquake Early Warning An earthquake occurred off the southeast coast of Mie. Prepare for strong shaking (JMA) Earthquake Early Warning System (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 26. Summary of Early WarningEarthquake Early Warning System Warning issued 8 sec after P-wave detection. 31 sec after origin time. Warnings gave at least 5 to 30 sec warning in Tohoku region (J.Mori, 2013)
  • 27. Earthquake Early Warning System : Japan Railways (JR) At event, 27 bullet trains were on the rail. 19 trains were running. On the sake of the EWS, all the trains safely stopped. Nobody was killed.
  • 28. Tsunami Early Warning System Before Tsunami happens, to achieve quick dissemination of early warning, many tsunami simulations are conducted in advance and their results are stored in a database. When an earthquake happens, its source position and magnitude is estimated in a few minutes and search similar event in the DB and issue Tsunami early warning within 3minutes.
  • 29. Tsunami EW Information is modified in real-time based on observations
  • 30. Ozaki, 2011 Tsunami warning issued at 14:46 M7.9 (3 minutes after earthquake origin time) 7 updates at 15:14, 15:30, 16:08, 18:47… Tsunami Warnings
  • 31. Preparedness • Disaster Risk Reduction Planning: – Regional Disaster Prevention Plan, Contingency plans for disaster response, BCP, etc. • Risk information provision: – Hazard map, etc. • Capacity development: – Disaster education, Risk communication, WS, Drills, etc.
  • 32. Regional Disaster Prevention Plan  Requested by Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act (1961) triggered by Isewan typhoon disaster  Every level of public sectors shall have a plan by disaster prevention basic act (legal duty).  A plan shall include long-term establishment plan on (1) forecasting system, (2) facilities for flood fighting, (3) warning criteria, (4) rescue system, and (5) communications in emergency.
  • 33. Hazard Map
  • 34. Distribution of the killed people
  • 35. Capacity building: Disaster Edication “Kamaishi Miracle” •Prof. Katada, Gumma University and his group have spend eight years for disaster education for elementary and junior high school. •All the pupils under the control of schools are saved in entire Kamaishi City. What he taught: (1) Not believe hazard scenario (map) (2) Spend best effort for survive (3) Behave as a “leading evacuator”
  • 36. Immediate response • Evacuation: Very few children were killed under the control of nursery. – Nursery should make practice of evacuation drill once in a month. • No contingency scenario for station black out. No new things can be done during disaster. Pupils of Kamaishi said, “We can save our lives because of the drill and practice of evacuation before the event. We think it was a result of the practice, not miracle.”
  • 37. Relief • Disaster relief act: – Request base – Voluntary Base • Multiple Prefectures were affected: Problems are found in Leadership, Role Share and Governance.
  • 38. Local governments also affected No headquarters No workers No electricity No Data Data backup (inc. cloud comp.) Emergency Power generators Mutual assistant agreement Local Gov.’s BCP
  • 39. Humanitarian Logistics Suppler Primary yard Prefecture Secondary yard City Gov. Shelter Government(National/Local) Information Management Iwate:Convention center (1) Miyagi:(25) Fukushima:(9) 2500
  • 40. Problems in Humanitarian Logistics Suppler Primary yard Prefecture Secondary yard City Gov. Shelter Government(National/Local) Information Management Iwate:Convention center (1) Miyagi:Private (25) Fukushima:Private (9) 2500 No Professionals Limited Information of available resources and routes Gasoline Shortage Low Capacity of Public buildings Unnecessary goods Shortage of necessary goods Shortage of manpower
  • 41. 0 1000000 2000000 3000000 4000000 5000000 6000000 7000000 8000000 9000000 3/ 12 3/ 18 3/ 25 4/ 1 Recovery of Water Supply Water Supply Electric Power Supply Gas Supply Although malfunction of lifeline occurred widely, their recovery speed is relatively fast.
  • 42. • “Kushinoha Sakusen( くしの歯作戦)” Operation for reopening highways • Inland -> Seashore • Existence of Redundant Networks: Tohoku Express Way • March 18th: 97% of recovery
  • 43. Lifeline Recovery and Production Capacity Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 46 Disaster ProductionCapacity Time Facility Damage Facility Damage+Recovery +Lifeline Impacts Facility Damage+Recovery Facility Damage+Lifeline Impacts LifelineResilience Factor 1 0 Recovery of Electricity Recovery of Water Recovery of Gas Business Interruption Losses (Facility Damage+Recovery+Lifelin Impacts)
  • 44. Est. Result (Transport. Manf. in Fukushima) Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 47 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 3/11 4/10 5/10 6/9 7/9 8/8 9/7 10/7 11/6 12/6 ProductionCapacity Facility Damage & Recovery & Lifeline Impacts Facility Damage & Lifeline Impacts Facility Damage & Recovery
  • 45. Estimated Capacity Losses Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 48 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Mining Construction Food Apparel&Textile Wood&WoodenProducts Paper-Pulp Chemicals Refinery&Coal GlassStoneClay Steel Non-Ferrous MetalProducts GeneralMachinery ElectricMachinery Information&Comm.Device ElectronicParts TransportEq PrecisionMachinery OtherManufacturing Communication Transportation Retail&Wholesale Financial&Insurance RealEstate MedicalService OtherServices Fukushima Iwate Miyagi Ibaragi Tochigi Ground Motion, Tsunami, and Nuclear(20 km radius) Around 30% of capacity is lost
  • 46. Index of Industrial Production (IIP) Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 49 Steel Pulp Transportation Machinery Electronics
  • 47. 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Estimated Index of Industrial Production (Mar/Feb) Facility Damage Facility Damage and Lifeline Impacts Facility Damage and Recovery Facility Damage, Recovery, and Lifeline Impacts Estimated Results 1 (March, 2011) Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 50 Miyagi Fukushima Ibaragi Tochigi Iwate
  • 48. Estimated Results 2 (April, 2011) Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 51 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Estimated Index of Industrial Production (Apr/Feb) Facility Damage Facility Damage and Lifeline Impacts Facility Damage and Recovery Facility Damage, Recovery, and Lifeline Impacts Miyagi Fukushima Ibaragi Tochigi Iwate
  • 49. 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Estimated Index of Industrial Production (May/Feb) Facility Damage Facility Damage and Lifeline Impacts Facility Damage and Recovery Facility Damage, Recovery, and Lifeline Impacts Estimated Results 3 (May, 2011) Disaster Prevention Reasearch Institute Kyoto University 52 Miyagi Fukushima IbaragiTochigi Iwate
  • 50. Recovery Plan of Sendai City(仙台市) Multiple protection lines: Sea walls, river dykes, raising elevation of highways Land use regulation: Areas where expected Tsunami depth exceeds 2m are designated as “Sakigai Kiken Kuiki” (Disaster Prone Zones). In the area, construction of buildings for the purpose for living is prohibited. Evacuation Shelters and Routes: Mounded parks closer to sea shore, high-rise building as a shelter Highway Highway Park(mold) Protection against maximum Tsunami Protection against Tsunami once in one hundred and several ten years Land use regulation: Restriction of construction of houses.
  • 51. 京都大学防災研究所 総合防災研究部門 多々納裕一 Life in Community Land Use Built Environment Infrastructure Social Schemes Culture and Convention Natural Environment Ex:Activity overlaps between young and old people as a disaster risk potential Safety Low High Niche OverlapLow High City B Vulnerable against Disaster City A Strong enough against the disaster Trade through road networks Ex.Spatial-Temporal Impacts of the disaster on urban infrastructures Ex. Effectiveness of hazard map type of information for disaster mitigation Needs for Integrated Disaster Risk Management
  • 52. Challenge • Establishing Better Risk Governance – Who takes responsibility for the safety against natural hazards? – Can we achieve it by enhancing public private partnership? • Establish networks and platforms from normal periods: – Local government’s BCP/ District BCM – Mutual assistance agreement among stakeholders, including distant local governments
  • 53. Thank you for your attention. tatano@imdr.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp http://idrim.org/ IDRiM 2013 @ Northumbria U., UK, Sept. 4-6, 2013
  • 54. Expected Earthquake Sources 50 to 150 km segments M7.5 to 8.2 (Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion) North Sanriku-oki ~M8 0.2 to 10% South Sanriku-oki ~M7.7 80 to 90% Off Fukushima ~M7.4 7% Off Ibaraki ~M6.7 – M7.2 90% 30 year Probabilities Sanriku to Boso M8.2 (plate boundary) 20% Sanriku to Boso M8.2 (Intraplate) 4-7% Off Miyagi ~M7.5 > 90% 400 years history 13 M7 5 M8
  • 55. Expected Earthquake Sources 50 to 150 km segments M7.5 to 8.2 (Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion) 30 year Probabilities 2011 Tohoku Earthquake 400 km long fault, M 9.0 Aftershocks from USGS