• Share
  • Email
  • Embed
  • Like
  • Save
  • Private Content
Hogan m opaque web practices among lc_cs
 

Hogan m opaque web practices among lc_cs

on

  • 635 views

test

test

Statistics

Views

Total Views
635
Views on SlideShare
635
Embed Views
0

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0

0 Embeds 0

No embeds

Accessibility

Categories

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Adobe PDF

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

    Hogan m opaque web practices among lc_cs Hogan m opaque web practices among lc_cs Document Transcript

    • Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Air Transport Management journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jairtramanOpaque Web practices among low-cost carriersAnn M. Torres a, *, Chris Barry b, Mairead Hogan b ´a J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics, National University of Ireland Galwayb Business Information Systems, J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics, National University of Ireland Galway, Ireland a b s t r a c tKeywords: The low-cost airlines’ adoption of Web technologies to facilitate direct sales has accelerated their marketLow-cost carriers penetration. However, some low-cost carriers are increasingly using Websites to create distance betweenUsability themselves and their consumers in specific areas of their operations, while simultaneously developingInformation systems excellence in sales transaction completion via self-service. The ‘opaque’ practices many low-cost carriersOn-line trust employ appear to be intentional design features and are contrary to the ethos of designing a ‘goodMarketingConsumer protection system’ to facilitate the full spectrum of customer service. As a result, the low-cost sector has come underRegulation increased scrutiny for engaging in unfair practices and violating consumer protection law. Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction a post-deregulation industry brought about the second wave of change; many airlines folded, consolidated, merged, or were Increasingly, some low-cost carriers (LCCs) are using their acquired through leveraged buyouts (Rubin and Joy, 2005; WagnerWebsites to create distance between themselves and their customer et al., 2005). Consumers are currently experiencing the third wavebase in specific areas of their operations (such as accessible contact of change, which some believe to be the most transformative, as itdetails and visible complaint procedures), while simultaneously involves changes to long-term aspects of the airline industry:developing excellence in sales transaction completion via self- competitive structure, ticket purchasing, route patterns and theservice. This paper examines the low-cost, Web-based self-service emergence of low-cost airports (de Neufville, 2008). This collectionairline industry in the Republic of Ireland and explores whether the of changes to long-standing aviation practices has resulted inindustry is deploying design practices that violate usability princi- a sharper focus on operation costs, an area in which LCCs haveples and hinder customer service. The emergence of the LCC model made substantial gains.and the nature of the industry are explored before a study is Southwest Airlines is recognised as successfully implementingpresented that scrutinises their Web practices. the original low-cost model (Alamdari and Fagan, 2005), which has since been widely emulated. Defining an LCC is somewhat ambig-2. The low-cost carrier phenomenon uous as there are many variations within the sector. Some LCCs rigidly follow Southwest’s low-cost principles, while others pursue The airline industry has evolved through three ‘‘waves of differentiation strategies in addition to undercutting competitors’dramatic change and restructuring that heavily affected consumers fares. To trace the spread of the low-cost phenomenon, Francis et al.and their travel decision making’’ (Rubin and Joy, 2005). The first (2006) developed a typology of five broad types: Southwest copy-wave of change was brought about by the progressive economic cats (e.g. Ryanair and easyJet), subsidiaries (e.g. Germanwings,deregulation of the global airline industry from the late 1970s Centralwings and bmibaby), costcutters (e.g. Aer Lingus and Iberia),through to 2000s (de Neufville, 2006). Deregulation prompted diversified charter carriers (e.g. Monarch and Thomsonfly), andintense fare competition and, accompanied by industry expansion, state subsidised carriers competing on price (e.g. Emirates). Despiteit spurred airlines to seek improvements in efficiency through the these variations in strategy, LCCs ‘‘share a commitment to whatdevelopment of the hub-and-spoke route system and creating the Lawton (2003) terms the cult of cost reduction’’ by reducing unitnotion of the ‘full service network carrier’ (FSNC). In the latter half costs, while simultaneously increasing output and productivityof the 1980s, the heightened competitive conditions of (Graham and Vowles, 2006). Among the analyses of low-cost airlines, a common theme emerges: ‘‘the focus on a particular route length (short-haul), * Corresponding author. itinerary (non-stop flights) and customer type (price-sensitive)’’ E-mail address: ann.torres@nuigalway.ie (A.M. Torres). (Shumsky, 2006). According to de Neufville (2006), ‘‘successful0969-6997/$ – see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2009.02.003
    • 300 A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307low-cost airlines share two key strategies; they avoid airports with component in offering consumers more efficient flight options.congested airspace, runways, and taxiways and also avoid expen- Thus, the industry’s increasingly competitive environment hassive capital [airport] projects’’ that had been favoured by legacy favoured those ‘‘. customers who are now becoming morecarriers and FSNCs. Avoiding congestion permits LCCs to minimise conscious of their needs. Furthermore, the Internet as an infor-unproductive time in the air and on the ground, thereby cutting mation and distribution channel with minor information andturnaround time to a minimum (de Neufville, 2006). As a result of transaction costs intensifies these changes in customers’ prefer-avoiding congestion, LCCs may achieve aircraft productivity that is ences and their behavior’’ (Teichert et al., 2008). Yet despite thesemore than 50% greater than that of the FSNCs (Warnock-Smith and advances, it appears a number of LCCs use their informationPotter, 2005). To further reduce costs, LCCs also avoid expensive systems in a conflicting manner when managing customer inter-ground facility rents in favour of less expensive facilities where they actions, particularly when selling ancillary services and managinguse their space more intensely. Thus, even when LCCs pay complaints. The Websites for many LCCs smoothly engage andcomparable per square foot rents as FSNCs, LCCs pay far less per facilitate customers through the self-service process to commitpassenger served because they require less space. Additional users to purchase tickets. However, once users move beyond theoperational reductions are attributed to LCCs’ lower pay scales, and ‘committal’ point (i.e. after they have chosen where and when theytheir preference for non-unionised labour forces (Rubin and Joy, wish to travel and received an initial quote), the Websites appear2005). Consequently, the LCCs’ healthy financial performance over more opaque.legacy and FSNCs is attributed to improved cost savings rather thandifferences in revenue management practices. 3. Website practices Many believe the low-cost model is the most important changein airline strategy since the emergence of the hub-and-spoke route Information systems have been developed using a wide tableausystem in the 1980s. The LCCs’ impact on the airline industry is of methodologies and techniques, with the most widely usedsignificant, as they ‘‘have not just changed airline ticket pricing, but techniques being structured and object-oriented methods (Barryalso consumer price expectations’’ (Graham and Vowles, 2006). As and Lang, 2001). Their origins are in scientific research and they areone analyst of the industry notes, consumers ‘‘have widely changed of a positivist tradition. Human–computer interaction (HCI) hastheir buying criteria, preferring price and convenience over exten- long held that its basic goal is to improve the interaction betweensive connectivity and seamless travel’’ (Franke, 2007). Thus, cost users and computer systems by making them more usable andreduction is believed to have become ‘‘a continued and permanent amenable to the users’ needs (Dix et al., 2004). Within theserequirement if airlines are to be profitable’’ (Doganis, 2001). methods there is a near-universal supposition that a key goal of European LCCs became a phenomenon in the mid-1990s and information systems development (ISD) is to improve usability andsince then the European low-cost sector has attracted numerous deliver a satisfying user experience, and that IS professionalsentrants. As of late 2007, it is estimated there are 60 European LCCs should adopt a benign and moral posture. The authors would arguein operation; but 50 entrants no longer operate (Low Cost Airlines this supposition has become unsafe. To borrow the language ofEurope, 2007; Kerensky, 2007). Between 2000 and 2004, Ryanair Argyris (1980), the ‘espoused theory’ of how IS should be developedand easyJet’s passenger traffic grew at an average of over 40% per is, for some, quite different to the ‘theory-in-use.’ The Websites ofannum (Doganis, 2006), and now European LCCs are growing LCCs and their apparent contradiction of ‘best’ IS design practice,20–40% annually (Alamdari and Fagan, 2005). Between 1999 and mean adopting a considerate and user-centred approach no longer2006, European LCCs gained more than a quarter of the European seems to be a central tenet. Such, ‘poor’ Website practices are likelymarket (de Neufville, 2006), and it is a sector that is expected to to erode on-line trust between LCCs and their customers.expand further, particularly as the new EU–US Air Transport The importance of on-line trust should not be underestimated;Agreement took effect in March 2008 (Association of European it ‘‘is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that cannot simply beAirlines, 2006). Thus, ‘‘for the first time, European airlines can fly ‘produced’ by applying adequate instruments’’ (Grabner-Kraeuter,without restrictions from any point in the EU to any point in the US’’ 2002). Given that many consumers are sceptical about the mech-(European Commission, 2008). The most important European LCCs anisms of e-commerce, trust has become essential in the diffusionare Ryanair, which has 31% share of the European low-cost sector, and acceptance of e-commerce. Many firms that operate in fiercelyeasyJet (26%), TUIfly (9%), Air Berlin (7%), and Aer Lingus (6%) competitive ‘electronic markets’, have come to recognise that(Association of European Airlines, 2006, 2007). consumers often rely on trust as a heuristic or short-cut to facilitate LCCs’ commitment to cost reduction means they examine every their decision making and reduce uncertainty. As trust is expectedfunction and service so as either to eliminate those considered to ‘‘remain as a decisive factor in the success or failure of e-busi-superfluous frills or to charge for them separately as ancillary nesses, . it is an imperative for Internet companies to act in a wayservices to the basic fare. To bolster profit, LCCs have become adept at that engenders consumers’ trust’’ (Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002). `generating ancillary revenues, which are ‘‘the a la carte services and Since the Internet’s inception, there has been a decisive shiftfeatures that passengers may purchase before or during their travel from supplier power to consumer power, namely: expert, sanction,experience. Legacy [and FSNC] bundle these services into the price of and legitimate power. For example, firms’ expert power hasan airline ticket’’ (Sorenson, 2006). Ancillary revenue is an increas- decreased with enhanced market transparency. Sanction power ofingly important financial component for LCCs. During the 2006– consumer exit and consumer voice, has also been facilitated2007 financial year, Ryanair increased its ancillary revenues by 40% through market transparency as well as consumer networking. Into V362 million, or 16% of their revenue (Association of European particular, ‘‘voice has become more effective because consumerAirlines, 2007). Ancillary revenues for easyJet increased by 32% in [compliments and] complaints, whether justified or not, spreadthe first half of the 2007 financial year, reaching £77 million or 11% of rapidly on the Internet and sometimes also reach traditionaltheir revenue (Association of European Airlines, 2007). media’’ (Rezabakhsh et al., 2006). While consumers’ legitimate With respect to the operational management of low-cost power has strengthened due to their active ‘‘influence in the valueairlines, securing resources and developing competences in chain, [which] makes it possible for consumers to directly influencemanaging e-business tools have become crucial (Nucciarelli and the price and the specification of goods’’ (Rezabakhsh et al., 2006).Gastaldi, 2008). The LCCs’ adoption of technology, in areas such as In realisation of this enhanced consumer sovereignty of theelectronic ticketing and dynamic pricing, has become an important Internet age, some firms have come to accept the empowered
    • A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307 301consumer as a permanent market condition. These firms view 4. Analysisconsumer voice as useful feedback to improve products andservices. ‘‘Therefore the Internet is not taken as a threat, but as We establish whether users believe airlines are using informa-a source of marketing intelligence and early warning’’ (Rezabakhsh tion systems design practices that facilitate customer interactionet al., 2006). Indeed, complaints can be viewed as opportunities for when it suits them, but not when it comes to non-revenue-service recovery that can turn angry, disgruntled customers into generating services, like complaints. It was also planned to exploreloyal, vocal advocates for the firm. Moreover, good service recovery their views on ancillary charges, regulation, and how favourablytypically translates into higher sales than if all had gone well in the disposed users feel towards LCCs. Based on an examination of thefirst place (Smith et al., 1999; Keaveney, 1995). Poor service literature and operations of the industry, it was decided to gatherrecovery is an indication that a firm lacks commitment and dili- broad and specific data about how users perceive the usefulnessgence, which along with trust and earned reputation are indis- and functionality of LCC Websites. Three research techniques werepensable to establishing enduring relationships in service and dot- used: usability testing, verbal protocols, and focus groups. Usabilitycom businesses (Murphy et al., 2007). Because many firms handle testing was used largely to examine ease of use, verbal protocols tocustomer complaints poorly, those firms that do succeed in offering examine attitudes towards the Website and focus groups to exploreexcellent service recovery may secure an unrivalled source of in more detail issues and concerns arising from usability tests and ´competitive advantage (Anton et al., 2007). verbal protocols. Certain opaque Web features appear not to be accidental in Usability testing is generally carried out to determine a pro-design and are beginning to come under regulatory scrutiny. duct’s ease of use. It is carried out in a controlled environment, suchHidden costs and the exclusion of charges that are unavoidable is as a laboratory, where users carry out prescribed tasks and theirbecoming an increasingly contentious issue that has attracted the performance is measured. The users chosen should be typical of theattention of national and EU bodies. The European Consumer final users of the system being tested (Sharp et al., 2007). User testsCentre Network (ECC-Net) also recommends airlines to make and user satisfaction questionnaires are the main methods of dataavailable their contact details for complaints, via telephone, e-mail collection. Performance is measured by collecting data such as theand post; that complaints are dealt with within a reasonable time; number of users able to complete a task. Users’ attitudes towardsand that booking confirmation includes a clear and comprehensive the product are determined by employing questionnaires in whichbreakdown of all the supplementary charges, indicating what they the product is rated on a variety of measurement scales.are for and to whom they are payable (European Consumer Centre In this study, a simple and focused usability test was conducted.Network, 2007). Complaints received by ECC-Net regarding airline Ninety-six student users completed a pre-test questionnaire, ofcarriers nearly doubled from 2005 to 2006. Amongst these which ninety-one completed three tasks (i.e. Find a Flight, Bookcomplaints, significant numbers were made regarding price a Flight and Make a Complaint) on two of four LCC Websitesdisplays, managing on-line bookings, as well as taxes, fees and operating out of the Republic of Ireland, namely: Aer Lingus, Aercharges (European Consumer Centre Network, 2006).1 Arann, bmibaby and Ryanair.2 The student users involved in this In 2007, the European Commission co-ordinated the airline part of the study ranged in age from late teens to mid fifties. Thereticket selling investigation under the auspices of Consumer were both full-time and part-time students in the sample, and all ofProtection Co-operation Regulation, which had came into force at the part-time, mainly older, students were working in a varietythe end of 2006. European Consumer Affairs Commissioner, of full-time jobs. The students were predominately frequent trav-Maglena Kuneva, believes there is a substantial problem with ellers who had used the Websites of LCCs on multiple occasions.respect to airlines violating European consumer laws. Commis- This convenience sample is consistent with the profile of on-linesioner Kuneva cites the EU-wide investigation conducted by 15 shoppers identified by Swinyard and Smith (2003) who foundnational regulatory bodies (NRBs), which found ‘unfair and on-line shoppers to be mainly younger, wealthier, better educatedmisleading’ practices in more than 50% of the Websites for LCCs and and having higher computer literacy than those who do not shopother carriers (Smyth, 2007). The investigation identified the most on-line.3common violations related to price indications, availability of A key measure was the number of users who completed each ofspecial offers, and contract terms. With respect to clear pricing, the the tasks. The order in which users approached the tasks wasCommissioner is directing airlines to give a clear indication of the counterbalanced for each of the two airlines to avoid bias. To ensureprice, including taxes and booking/credit card fees in the headline the test was as realistic as possible, users were told to take as longprice first advertised on a Website, rather than at a late stage in the as they liked to complete the tasks. They were also instructed tobooking process. Accessibility of special offers was of particular abandon the task at any stage if this is what they would do whenconcern, as in many cases these offers were not available or carrying out that task in reality. After completing each task, theyextremely limited. Commissioner Kuneva is requiring airlines to filled in a brief questionnaire to determine how easy the task was toindicate clearly any limitations associated with special offers. Other complete. At the end of the test, users completed an additionalunfair practices were found to include mandatory insurance questionnaire describing how easy they found the airline’s Websiteattached to an offer, or where consumers were required to explic- to use overall.itly opt-out of insurance or other optional services (e.g. priority Verbal protocols involve an end user thinking out loud whileboarding, baggage, seat selection). Additionally, the Commissioner carrying out tasks on a system (Nielsen et al., 2002). This ver-is obliging airlines to outline contract terms and conditions in balisation helps the evaluator to understand the user’s attitudesa clear, fair and accessible manner. towards the system and to identify aspects of the design that are 1 2 The European Consumer Centre Network (2006) recognises:‘‘. airlines try to As easyJet operates out of Belfast, Northern Ireland, it was not included as partcompete on the market by advertising very low prices, even reaching the level of of this study. Aer Lingus, previously an FSNC, has reinvented itself as a ‘superior’ LCC1 cent. However, when consumers reach the end of the booking process, the price on its European routes, while largely retaining its FSNC orientation for its trans-may vastly increase, through the addition of all sorts of supplementary charges, atlantic routes (Graham and Shaw, 2008; Association of European Airlines, 2007;such as airport charges, government taxes, baggage fees, credit card charges, fuel Dennis, 2007). 3surcharges, etc. Clearly this blurs the picture for consumers and is misleading for These characteristics were further confirmed by Levin et al. (2005) for thosethem.’’ who purchase airline tickets on-line.
    • 302 A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307Table 1 5. FindingsNumber of flights purchased in the past 12 months.Flights purchased in last 12 months Participants 5.1. Participant profiles0 8 (9%)1–2 51 (57%) Usability testing was carried out with ninety-six under-graduate3–4 21 (24%) and post-graduate students from a variety of disciplines, both5þ 9 (10%) technical and non-technical. There were 51 male and 45 femaleTotal 89 (100%)* participants, ranging in age from 18 to 55 years, with a mean age of * N.B. 7 of the 96 participants did not answer this question, yielding 89 usable 23.5 years. Participants completed a pre-test questionnaire toresponses. gather demographic information and to determine attitudes towards purchasing products and services on the Internet. It was established that 95% of participants had purchased some other typeproblematic for the user (Holzinger, 2005). During the interaction, of product or service on the Internet and a similar proportion hadthe user is encouraged to talk aloud by the evaluator asking previously booked LCC flights on the Website of an LCC. Of thoseappropriate open questions such as: ‘‘Why has the system done participants that had previously booked LCC flights, Table 1 outlinesthat?’’; ‘‘What were you expecting to happen?’’; or ‘‘What has the the number of flights purchased in the past twelve months. Thesystem done now?’’ The sessions are generally taped and a sepa- average number of flights purchased in 2008 was 1.79 flights.rate note taker may also take detailed notes of the comments andactions of the user (Monk et al., 1993). In this study, seven typical 5.2. Participant expectationsusers of LCC Websites participated in a series of verbal protocolevaluations. The participants ranged in age from early twenties to The participants were asked to specify, on a 5 point scale, howearly forties and consisted of students and working people. They important each of the following factors was to them whenall have access to the Internet and use it to purchase goods and purchasing a product or service other than a flight and whenservices. The participants in the verbal protocols were not purchasing a flight: cost, ease of purchase, ease of navigation, ease ofinvolved in the usability testing as it was felt completing the tasks making a complaint and transparency of additional costs. In all cases,twice could introduce bias into the results. Each participant there was little difference in the mean level of importance (with 1carried out three tasks (the same as those carried out in the indicating very unimportant and 5 indicating very important) forusability tests) on each of two airlines’ Websites. While conduct- each factor when purchasing a product or service and purchasinging the tasks, participants were prompted to talk aloud and a flight (Table 2). When t-tests were carried out, the only factor fordescribe the interaction. which there was a significant difference was cost, suggesting that The tasks chosen for the usability tests and the verbal protocols cost is slightly more important to consumers when purchasing flightswere chosen on the basis that they were typical tasks that could be than when they are purchasing other types of products or services viacarried out by a typical user. Prior research (Barry and Torres, 2007) the Internet. As can be seen by the mean values, four factors (cost,indicated that, in many cases, the design of the airline Websites was ease of purchase, ease of navigation, and transparency of additionalsuch that finding and booking a flight were more user-friendly than costs) are extremely important to participants. Furthermore, they aremaking a complaint. The tasks completed by the users were largely of equal importance to them. The one factor that differsspecifically chosen to determine whether there was a difference in substantially is the ‘ease of making a complaint’, which while stillthe ease with which users could complete the tasks. important, is less so. This finding most likely represents the position Focus group discussions are highly suitable to complement of on-line consumers generally, who are more conscious of cost andother research methods where greater understanding is required ease of securing purchase (all pre-sale activities) rather than com-(Bloor et al., 2001). In this study, focus groups were considered plaining (a post-sale activity) about issues that have not arisen.suitable as a means to explore further insights drawn from The results indicate user expectations of purchasing flights (i.e.usability tests and verbal protocols. Focus group participants were at the outset of the tests) are similar to purchasing other types ofdrawn from members of the usability test sessions. Five focus products or services via the Internet. This finding about expecta-group discussions, of an hour duration were held, with each group tions is important, as it suggests consumers do not at the outset, andconsisting of four or five participants. The groups were inten- perhaps in some abstract sense, expect Websites of LCCs to be lesstionally kept small to ensure each participant, guided by a facili- easy to navigate, less transparent in terms of charges or less easy totator, could talk freely and spontaneously about the issues make a complaint. However, as will be shown later, the experiencepresented for discussion (Macnaghten and Myers, 2004). More- of participants deviates considerably from these expectations.over, the facilitators took great care in ensuring the questionsposed were presented in a neutral manner to avoid leading 5.3. Overall ability to complete tasksparticipants in their responses. Discussions were taped and a notetaker was present to document pertinent comments. The main The percentage of participants being able to actually completeissues for discussion in the groups were: the participants’ expe- the tasks varied, with 98% of participants completing the task ofrience of the booking process, their views on ancillary charges, finding a flight, 96% completing the task of booking the flight andtheir experience in attempting to complain, the role they believe only 44% managing to complete the task of making a complaintregulation should play in this industry, as well as their general (about a damaged and uncomfortable seat they had to endure onperceptions of each carrier. a recent flight) (Table 3). The contrast here is stark – taskTable 2Importance of factors to Internet consumers. Cost Ease of purchase Ease of navigation Ease of complaint Transparency of additional costsWhen purchasing a product or service other than a flight 4.65 4.40 4.31 3.49 4.55When purchasing a flight 4.80 4.45 4.26 3.48 4.60
    • A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307 303Table 3Attempted and completed tasks.Airline Find a Flight Book a Flight Make a Complaint Attempted/completed task % Completed Attempted/completed task % Completed Attempted/completed task % CompletedAer Arann 41/40 98% 42/43 98% 45/31 69%Aer Lingus 49/48 98% 50/47 94% 47/12 26%bmibaby 34/34 100% 34/32 94% 36/14 39%Ryanair 44/43 98% 43/43 100% 44/18 41%Overall 168/165 98% 170/164 96% 172/75 44%completion was only an issue for participants attempting to make 5.5. Overall ease of use on LCC Websitesa complaint. That more participants failed to make a complaintthan those that were able to do so is alarming. This finding clearly Usability test participants were asked to rate the overall ease ofdemonstrates that these Websites are able to engage and support use of each airline’s Website on a scale of 1–5 (see Table 5). A one-users easily in revenue-focussed activities, but fail in most cases to way ANOVA was carried out to determine whether there weredo so in service-related matters. significant differences between the airlines for overall ease of use. Views from the focus groups offer a revealing picture of the No significant linear trends were apparent. This finding suggestsreasons why so many were unable to complain. Participants were participants perceived no difference in the overall ease of use of thecynical about the reasons why the task was at times impossible to different airlines’ Websites. This is somewhat surprising given thecomplete within a reasonable time frame. They cited: contact marked difference in the participants’ ability to complete the taskdetails were hidden on purpose; navigation was constructed to Make a Complaint and in their perception of the ease with whichdeliberately throw users off; the Websites were designed to they completed the task. This finding is perhaps connected to theincrease the time it takes to get the information. They believed that fact that participants ranked ‘making a complaint easily’ as lesssuch design was deliberate, not accidental or unintended. As one important in the pre-test questionnaire than other factors such asfocus group participant put it: ‘‘they don’t want you to complain, as ease of purchasing. If they attribute less importance to this task,they might have to do something about it.’’ they may well not weight the difficulty in completing the task as highly as the other tasks when determining the overall ease of use5.4. Ease of task completion of the Website. Those who attempted each of the tasks were asked to rank thedifficulty of the task on a 4 point scale, with 1 ¼ very difficult and 5.6. Experiences complaining4 ¼ very easy. Those that completed the Find a Flight task hada mean rating of 3.41, while those who completed the Book a Flight The analysis shows it is significantly harder to secure complainttask had a mean rating of 3.35 (Table 4). Both tasks were deemed information than it is to find or book a flight. However, a consid-technically easy to complete by participants. In contrast, the mean erably higher percentage of participants were able to complete therating assigned by those who completed the Make a Complaint task task Make a Complaint on Aer Arann than for the other airlineswas 2.67. What emerged from both the verbal protocols and focus (Table 3). These findings are further supported by verbal protocolsgroups was a much more expressive confirmation of this finding. and focus groups where it was clear Aer Arann provided the most t-tests were carried out to determine whether there was complete contact information, including both a phone number anda significant difference in terms of ease of completion between the an e-mail address under ‘Customer Relations’. Nevertheless,different tasks. There was no significant difference between the participants were not wholly content with the Website. A secondFind a Flight and the Book a Flight tasks, whereas there was e-mail address was found under ‘Feedback’ where users were askedsignificant difference between the Make a Complaint task and each to ‘‘Get in touch and tell us what you think of our service.’’ Usersof the other two tasks (i.e. p  0.01 in both cases). The similarity in were confused as to which mechanism should be used to complain.values, and the lack of a significant difference for the two tasks, Find Furthermore, finding this information was not easy; a ‘Contact’ linka Flight and Book a Flight, suggests that both of these tasks are easy could be found by scrolling to the bottom of the homepage thatto complete. This finding is supported by the high completion rate leads to a series of contact departments, at the end of which arefor both of these tasks. In practice, these tasks would most likely be customer relations’ details, which presumably one contacts if oneconnected in the mind of the user, as it is necessary to find a flight has a complaint. Nonetheless, 69% of usability test participantsbefore booking one. In contrast, the low mean value for the Make were able to complete the task.a Complaint task and its significant difference to the other two tasks Only 26% of test participants were able to complete the task ofsuggest it is considerably more difficult to complete than the making a complaint on the Aer Lingus Website. More problemsothers. This finding is supported by the low completion rates for the were encountered with Aer Lingus than any other airline because ofMake a Complaint task. the ambiguous information found by following their ‘About Us’ linkTable 4Ease of task completion. Table 5 Overall ease of use of LCCs’ Websites.Airline Find a Flight Book a Flight Make a Complaint Airline Mean NAer Arann 3.45 (40) 3.43 (42) 2.71 (31)Aer Lingus 3.38 (48) 3.30 (46) 2.42 (12) Aer Arann 3.91 44bmibaby 3.24 (34) 3.31 (32) 2.71 (14) Aer Lingus 3.80 49Ryanair 3.53 (43) 3.35 (43) 2.72 (18) bmibaby 3.86 37 Ryanair 3.90 41Overall 3.41 (165) 3.35 (163) 2.67 (75) Total 3.87 171Note: number of observations in parenthesis.
    • 304 A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307on the homepage. It reveals ‘Aer Lingus Contact Information’ with don’t think you’d get a reply.’’ Similarly, the focus group discussionslinks for Ireland and UK to ‘Reservations’, ‘Website Helpdesk’ and revealed deep distrust about the procedure for complaining to‘Groups’. A ‘Customer Relations’ link could only be reached by LCCs. Their collective view was that the airlines do not want you toscrolling down deeply on the same Webpage. No direct link to this complain and deliberately make it difficult for users to do so. It wasinformation was found. Therefore, if consumers have a pre-flight observed by several participants that the provision of a fax numberquery, they contact their local Reservations Office. However, if was a crude attempt to create distance between the airline and theconsumers want to compliment or complain about an Aer Lingus customer. One participant summed up a common observation –flight (i.e. post-flight assistance), they are asked to write to the ‘‘how many have a fax machine at home?’’nearest Aer Lingus office and to include a copy of their ticket or The temporal dimension of complaining was discussed by mostboarding card. A fax number is also provided. No telephone focus groups. One comment was: ‘‘I would never complain innumbers or e-mail addresses are provided for post-flight assis- reality; it takes too much time,’’ while another observed ‘‘if it wastance. Only one in four participants managed to reach this point. an e-mail I’d complain, but I wouldn’t write a letter.’’ The view wasOne participant from the verbal protocol, who attempted to commonly expressed that LCCs were fully aware that removingcomplain to Aer Lingus, said: ‘‘this [process] makes you think I’ll spontaneous communication channels would minimise contactjust go away and won’t bother as it’s too much hassle [to complain]’’ around complaints and dissuade users from putting pen to paper.and that ‘‘when you complain [the airlines are] going to have to do In focus groups, when discussing whether these practices weresomething about it. Airlines just want to take your money.’’ acceptable it was noted: ‘‘unless it is cheap, it is not acceptable.’’ Only 39% of test participants were able to complete the task of This idea drew a clear relationship among participants betweenmaking a complaint on the bmibaby Website. With bmibaby low-cost and low service. Several mentioned the industry hasa ‘Contact Us’ link on top of the homepage leads to a number of deconstructed flying, extracting the flight from other serviceoptions including ‘Customer Relations.’ Consumers are asked to elements and levying charges for each of these. As one participantcontact customer relations via a postal address if their flight orig- put it, concurring with Rubin and Joy (2005), a flight ‘‘is justinates in the UK, but no information is given if the flight is from a commodity now.’’ Interestingly, many focus group participantsIreland, despite offering flights to and from Belfast, Dublin and did not believe deflecting communications was a good idea inCork. Some participants felt this lack of contact information was an ‘business terms’ and believed that it would harm the reputation ofoversight, rather than a deliberate omission, while others felt the LCCs in the long-run.firm did not take their Irish operation seriously. It was noted byseveral verbal protocol participants that bmibaby’s customer rela- 5.7. Experiences finding and booking flightstions page does not state it has anything to do with complaints. Theinformation is also strangely presented; one participant com- The Websites of LCCs achieved a high ease of use result from themented: ‘‘It just starts in the middle of a sentence and suggests it is usability tests. Few participants had any problem in completing thefor flights originating from Birmingham.’’ and refers users to a PO tasks of Find a Flight and Book a Flight. Since airlines raise much ofBox. Another participant remarked: ‘‘I would have thought that just their revenues from this activity it is perhaps unsurprising theysending an e-mail [to bmibaby to complain] wouldn’t be that would design their Websites so these tasks are as easy as possibledifficult.’’ for users. It is good business sense to engage customers through the Forty-one percent of test participants were able to complete the self-service process so they commit to purchase flights. However,task of making a complaint on the Ryanair Website. Trying to the ease of use masks demanding experiences during the process,contact Ryanair to complain was perceived as being more awkward which surfaced in focus groups and verbal protocols wherethan for the other airlines. On the homepage an ‘About Us’ link participants expressed a range of emotions from irritation andreveals the history of the airline. A strange technique is used frustration to cynicism and resignation.whereby if a consumer clicks on the ‘About Us’ link on the main In finding a flight, there are many design features that acceleratehorizontal navigational bar at the top of the page, the bar itself the process, from giving users the closest dates around the selectedchanges to include other options including ‘Customer Feedback’ date (by default and when that date is unavailable) to retaining userand ‘About Us’. Customer Feedback led to a page of testimonials and dates and details. For example, Aer Lingus even allows the‘Contact Us’ to pre-flight Reservation Contact Numbers. A link titled consumer to select departure and return flights for specific dates,‘Contact Customer Service’ on a lower left panel can be found by where a screen is presented for which the priced flight is, in fact,scrolling down the page, which led to a page of contact information the cheapest of a selection of other flights. Additionally, all of thewhere consumers are provided with a postal address and fax airlines afford advanced design features such as animated routenumber. The decision not to provide consumer contact information maps that superbly assist users in visualising what would other-via either an ‘About Us’ or ‘Contact Us’ link is either exceptionally wise be flat, tabular information. However, once users movepoor design or deliberately enacted. During one interaction with beyond the committal point (i.e. they have chosen when and whereRyanair, a verbal protocol participant found two ‘Contact Us’ links they wish to travel and received an initial quote), each LCC hason the same page leading to two different pages before dis- design features that adversely affect usability and trust.continuing the search. He commented that he would ‘‘go to All airlines quote an initial price that suggests it is either ‘Final’a message board to find Ryanair’s contact details’’, expecting it to be or ‘Total’ whereas, in fact, it is neither. In focus groups, participantsa more direct route. Another participant felt it was well known that were unanimously of the opinion that this tactic was a stratagem‘‘Ryanair makes it very difficult to make a complaint’’ and that even for users to become psychologically committed to booking a flight.when he established the LCC had changed the Website to make it One participant voiced her annoyance in saying: ‘‘don’t tell me it’seasier to find contact details he mused, cynically, that they must the total price and then keep on adding things to it.’’ Once you havehave been ‘‘legally bound to do so.’’ ‘‘bought into the idea of buying the flight’’ (i.e. the ‘committal’ point Several verbal protocol participants offered no confidence that identified above), a number of additional avoidable and unavoid-using a supplied fax number or postal address would yield any able charges and ‘services’ are drip-fed to the user. On the additionresponse. One said ‘‘I’d be afraid that it would just be going into of charges, a participant remarked: ‘‘I knew there would be charges,a black hole’’ and that ‘‘no one would pick up these faxes.’’ Another but I didn’t think they would be so high’’ and another noted it wasthought ‘‘you’d have to be really mad to send a letter’’ and that ‘‘I fairly standard practice ‘‘but it’s still annoying because you never
    • A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307 305really know until you get to the very end how much you are going alert box that does not fully breakdown charges. Such fees are oftento pay.’’ When asked whether this purchasing process was significantly different for each leg and little effort is made to explainreasonable, a participant responded: ‘‘I’ve come to accept it is part the differential. A somewhat similar technique is used by Aerof the [airlines’] tactics.’’ Arann, which uses pop-up alert boxes to display different fare types Participants did not believe the headline prices quoted for denoted as ‘Q’, ‘R’, ‘T’, ‘W’ and so on. These fare type designationsflights and fully expected it to be different when they actually pay are unexplained and wholly confusing. Such lack of clarity in designfor it. During a verbal protocol, when asked whether he thought camouflages the nature of the real price of a flight for users. Manythis was the price he was going to pay, a participant replied simply participants felt there was ostensible transparency where headline‘‘probably not.’’ Another participant commented: ‘‘customers real- prices including taxes and charges are quoted since there are soise that flights are not as cheap as advertised.’’ After a quoted price many other revenue-generating choices that need to be negotiatedmoved from V12.80 to V67.00 a participant quipped: ‘‘I feel I am before a ‘final’ price is achieved. Furthermore, special offers that arepaying a changed price.’’ widely promoted can be difficult and sometimes impossible to find, One verbal protocol illustrates the opaque nature of Ryanair’s often involving trial and error with dates and airports. A strongbooking procedure, in particular. Once the participant had clicked view emerged that the LCCs could easily layout all charges up fronton ‘Confirm Flights’ (that specifies the ‘Total Cost of Flight’), seven instead of incrementally releasing the charges as users movedifferent choices have to be negotiated before finally securing the towards a final card payment. The consensus on why this is notflight. Five of these involve charges for baggage (opt-in), priority done is that LCCs do not want consumers to know the final price atboarding (opt-out), airport check-in (opt-out), travel insurance the outset to dissuade users from reversing out of the process and(opt-out) and credit card charges (unavoidable). The remaining are also to avoid valid price comparison.personal information retention (opt-in) and newsletter (opt-in).Other airlines have similar, if fewer, obstacles to overcome. One 5.8. Overall disposition towards the LCCsparticipant perceptively noted Ryanair designed its pre-selectedtravel-insurance charge ‘‘to get people to buy by mistake.’’ On why Focus group participants were asked how favourably disposedhe is asked a second time by Ryanair’s system if he wants travel they were to the different LCC operators. Greatly mixed responsesinsurance, a participant answers: ‘‘to make money, it’s not illegal; were received about Aer Lingus. There was a real sense of residualif they can get away with it, why not?’’ A similar view (‘‘you’d have high regard for Aer Lingus and some still referred to it as thechosen it without knowing’’) was expressed regarding bmibaby’s ‘national carrier’. However, participants felt the airline and people’stravel insurance. Several focus groups felt LCCs designed their perception of it was changing rapidly for the worse. Many were ofWebsites in such a way that novice or older users would get the opinion that Aer Lingus is losing significant opportunities by‘caught’ with additional charges while still perceiving LCC systems abandoning its traditional reputation for higher service and that itto be benign and not devious. Indeed, behavioural economists was following Ryanair in a ‘race to the bottom’. This sentiment washave found opt-out options to be highly profitable for firms that illustrated in Aer Lingus treatment of their staff and of customers.use them (Lunn, 2008). For example, if consumers are left to select Conversely, a few believed Aer Lingus was over-unionised. Manythe travel-insurance option, less than 10% will buy travel insur- participants were unfavourably disposed towards the airline for theance. However, if consumers have to opt-out of a pre-selected imposition of extra charges and it was often perceived as being farinsurance charge, then 40% of consumers will buy travel insurance from low-cost.(Lunn, 2008). Several participants were favourably disposed towards Ryanair The inconsistency of the application of charges between LCCs as an indigenous Irish firm associated with leading low-cost flightand constantly changing airline policies leaves participants and compelling other airlines to follow suit. However, negativecontinuously wary and cautious. For example on credit cards, Aer sentiment was also widespread for a variety of reasons thatArann charges per booking, Aer Lingus and bmibaby charge per included: hidden and ‘sneaky’ charges; poor flexibility; highpassenger, while Ryanair charges for each passenger for each flight baggage and excess-baggage charges; poor treatment of customerssegment. In the latter case, a family of six pays twelve credit card by staff; and lack of customer service. There was a real sense thatcharges for a single booking. Participants speculated that Ryanair’s booking process was ‘booby-trapped’ and contact infor-consumers would never tolerate credit card charges being added on mation almost ‘non-existent’. Several participants claimed theyto a garage bill or when buying groceries and broadly concluded it would either never book with them or only do so as a last resort.simply represents revenue generation and is not related to the Some felt their homepage design was aggressive and ‘in your face’,administrative cost of processing cards as some LCCs claim.4 but that it reflected Ryanair’s outward image of belligerence and It is clear that some airlines are more transparent than others; brashness. Mixed feelings were voiced about Ryanair’s statedbmibaby is the only airline that includes all taxes and charges, but baggage policy of discouraging checked-in luggage by making itthe latter appear very high and are not explained to the user during expensive to travellers. Some felt they should not be penalised inthe booking process, while Aer Arann is the only airline that does their flight cost by cross-subsidising fellow passengers, whilenot charge separately for baggage. The taxes and charges that each others thought it was reasonable that a passenger should be givenairline applies subsequent to the first quoted price, except for a baggage allowance as part of the quoted price. A view was alsobmibaby, are all substantial and generally unavoidable. Aer Lingus expressed that Ryanair does not suit older people who would needand Aer Arann do not breakdown the cost during the quote or ‘‘to know they’d be better looked after [i.e. cared for].’’ Hence, olderbooking process. On Aer Lingus application of an unexplained people and those with disabilities should choose to fly with another‘handling fee’ it was commented: ‘‘so what’s a handling fee if it’s not carrier where ‘‘there’d be someone [to look after them] at thea charge?’’ While Ryanair does provide a ‘details’ link, it is a pop-up airport.’’ Many participants did not like the way Ryanair presented itself, but felt resigned to choose them on the basis of price, as well as because Ryanair operates in destinations not well serviced by 4 other carriers. It is possible for consumers to avoid credit card and laser charges by usinga Visa Electron card to book their flights. Although the Visa Electron is available in A more benign attitude was expressed towards bmibaby,the UK, banks operating within the Republic of Ireland do not currently offer this perhaps because their presence in Ireland is not as extensive as thefacility. other LCCs. Participants felt their Website was well-designed, but
    • 306 A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307that significant supplementary charges were levied throughout the these extra charges are at a late point. It’s clearly very unfair’’booking process. Taxes and charges were perceived as being high (Mason, 2008). David Henderson of the Association of Europeanand that bmibaby made little attempt to explain them. One notable Airlines (AEA) agrees, as he believes ‘‘consumers are getting a littlecomplaint was in relation to the seat selection page. Several bit fed up with the fact that what they pay doesn’t always bearparticipants commented they had used an interactive page dis- a great deal of resemblance to what they’re offered’’ (Mason, 2008).playing the cabin layout and available seating, but did not notice MEP Arunas Degutis, who led the legislation through the parlia-until the next page that seat selection would cost between V9.60 ment, believed the new directive should come into force in earlyand V16.00. 2009. There was a great deal of positive sentiment towards Aer Arann.Some considered Aer Arann to be more concerned with sorting out 6. Conclusionsproblems because they were smaller and more intimate. Partici-pants felt their Website was largely well-designed with a clear The findings reveal LCC self-service Websites work well inpresentation of flight information and charges. Not charging for moving customers through the booking process as far as thebaggage was an unexpected surprise for many users. On a negative committal point. In this regard they were deemed easy to use. Itnote, a view was expressed that the airline was overly-subsidised would appear low-cost airlines have the capacity to exploitby the Irish Government on some routes. sophisticated Web technologies to develop functionality with a high level of usability. In contrast, non-sales related activities,5.9. Role of regulation such as a complaint facility are strangely inaccessible to most users in this study and, for those who did find the information, it was All focus groups agreed that regulation should be increased to difficult to do so. Furthermore, participants considered contactprovide greater transparency in prices and charges. One partici- information as woefully inadequate, and concluded most LCCspant observed: ‘‘there should be similar rules for all airlines’’ in simply did not want to be contacted for customer service that didthe presentation of prices and charges so meaningful compari- not involve a revenue stream. Indeed, of the four LCCs evaluated,sons between airlines could be made. At present, participants felt only Aer Arann has complied with the European Commission’sthis kind of price comparison was extremely difficult and only recommendations on the supply of contact information. Suchpossible after a great deal of effort on the part of the consumer. difficulties and omissions within non-sales activities are contrary toSeveral participants felt optional services or charges should all be the ethos of designing a ‘good system’ to facilitate the full spectrumopt-in and, therefore, opt-out implementations should be of customer service.prohibited. Other features programmed into LCCs’ sales systems, after the Participants had little awareness that the European Commission committal point, are the antithesis of good design principles. Forhad identified unfair and misleading practices on the Websites of example, it becomes highly problematic in navigating towardsmany LCCs, but were pleased some effort was being made at a ‘real’ final price, necessitating the users to side-step a series ofa European level to monitor the industry. Some were cynical about options. The eccentricities of LCC pricing may mean an advertisedsuch efforts, remarking: ‘‘there will always be regulation, but [LCCs] flight for V5 may cost more than V100, once extra charges arewill always find a way around it’’. Focus groups had divergent views calculated and the booking process is complete, resulting inon regulation. A number of participants did not want too much consumers feeling deceived and ‘ripped off’. Such design failuresregulation in case the industry becomes ‘‘tied up in red tape’’ and are not explained by Ogburn’s cultural lag theory that proposesconsequently less competitive. ethical guidelines for the utilisation of new technologies are Shortly after this study was conducted, evidence of increased developed more slowly than the rapid emergence of modernregulation was already to be found. In July 2008, Members of the technological advances. In this case, LCCs have proven their abilityEuropean Parliament (MEP) voted in favour of a directive to end to design well, but if study participants’ suspicions are correct, theirambiguous practices regarding airport taxes and additional managers either intentionally instruct developers to design certaincharges. The EU’s 2007 investigation on airline ticket selling features poorly or neglect to instruct developers in these areas atinvestigation led the MEPs to safeguard the consumers’ rights all. Thus, some IS/IT managers would appear to be in violation ofwithin the industry as, ‘‘air passengers have as much right as any their own Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professionalother consumers to clear and comprehensive information about the Practice (Association for Computing Machinery, 2008), which statesprice they actually have to pay’’ (Neate, 2008). ‘‘Under the EU software engineers and software engineering managers should actregulation, all carriers will in future have to provide the general in the public interest and ‘‘subscribe to and promote an ethicalpublic with comprehensive information, ‘including on the Internet,’ approach to the management of software development andon their air fares’’ (European Parliament, 2008). Thus, airlines will maintenance.’’no longer be able to advertise V1 or V2 tickets for journeys that Since this study was originally carried out, some of the LCCscost far more given the inclusion of all known taxes, surcharges and have changed their Websites, perhaps as a result of recommenda-fees, such as those related to security or fuel. Moreover, ‘‘options tions from the ECC-Net. However, while it is now easier to findsuch as travel insurance would only be able to be sold on an ‘opt-in’ contact details for Aer Lingus and Ryanair, it is still no easier tobasis, where buyers have to choose to buy the product rather than actually contact them. Aer Lingus has placed a contact link on thehaving to opt-out’’ (European Parliament, 2008). front page, but the relevant details are deep within the page. It still MEP Timothy Kirkhope notes ‘‘there has been some resistance only provides a postal address and a fax number and also requireswithin the airline industry to transparent pricing’’, as ‘‘some airlines that a copy of the customer’s ticket or boarding pass be included.would have liked to have had some advantages over their rivals by Ryanair has included a contact link on the menu bar on the leftnot having to specifically itemise the amounts of money people are hand side of the front page. The customer goes directly to thegoing to have to find when they buy a ticket’’ (Mason, 2008). Kir- appropriate information but again, all that is provided is a faxkhope suggests, ‘‘airlines being less than candid about their fares number and a postal address. Ryanair also requires the customer tocosts passengers a lot of money’’ (Mason, 2008). He continues by include their confirmation number. Neither Aer Arann nor bmibabysuggesting, ‘‘when people do the actual booking, they are already has changed their contact details, with bmibaby still not providingalmost half-obliged to continue with it – and then find out what contact details for flights originating in Ireland. The fact that
    • A.M. Torres et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 15 (2009) 299–307 307Aer Lingus and Ryanair followed recommendations to improve Graham, B., Vowles, T.M., 2006. Carriers within carriers: a strategic response to low- cost airline competition. Transport Reviews 26, 105–126.access to contact details, but made it no easier to actually contact Holzinger, A., 2005. Usability engineering methods for software developers.the airline, confirms the suspicions of many verbal protocol and Communications of the ACM 48, 71–74.focus group participants – that some airlines would find ways Keaveney, S., 1995. Customer switching behavior in service industries: an explor-around regulation. atory study. Journal of Marketing 59, 71–82. Kerensky, L., August 10, 2007. World’s Best Low-Cost Carriers, Forbes. http://www. forbes.com/2007/08/09/travel-carriers-affordable-forbeslife-cx_lk_0809biztravel. html (accessed 25.11.07.).References Lawton, T., 2003. Managing proactively in turbulent times: insights from the low- fare airline business. Irish Journal of Management 24, 173–193.Association for Computing Machinery, 2008. Association for Computing Machinery Levin, A.M., Levin, I.P., Weller, J.A., 2005. A multi-attribute analysis of preferences (ACM) Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct. http://www.acm.org/about/ for on-line and off-line shopping: differences across products, consumers and code-of-ethics (accessed 03.03.08.). shopping stages. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research 6, 281–290.Association of European Airlines, 2007. Association of European Airlines (AEA) Low Cost Airlines Europe, 2007. http://www.etn.nl/lcosteur.htm (accessed Yearbook 2007. Association of European Airlines, Bruxelles. 25.11.07.).Association of European Airlines, 2006. Association of European Airlines (AEA) Lunn, P., 2008. Basic Instincts: Human Nature and the New Economics. Marshall Yearbook 2006. Association of European Airlines, Bruxelles. Cavendish, London.Alamdari, F., Fagan, S., 2005. Impact of the adherence to the original low-cost model Macnaghten, P., Myers, G., 2004. Focus groups. In: Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrim, J.F., on the profitability of low-cost airlines. Transport Reviews 25, 377–392. Silverman, D. (Eds.), Qualitative Research Practice. Sage Publications, London. ´Anton, C., Camarero, C., Carrero, M., 2007. Analysing firms’ failures as determinants Mason, C., 9 July 2008. Will ban restore EU’s airfare clarity? BBC News. http://news. of consumer switching intentions: the effect of moderating factors. European bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7498846.stm (accessed 11.07.08.). Journal of Marketing 41, 135–158. Monk, A., Wright, P., Haber, J., Davenport, L., 1993. Improving Your Human–Argyris, C., 1980. Inner Contradictions of Rigorous Research. Academic Press, Computer Interface: a Practical Technique. Prentice Hall, New York. Burlington, MA, USA. Murphy, P.E., Laczniak, G.R., Wood, G., 2007. An ethical basis for relationshipBarry, C., Lang, M., 2001. A survey of multimedia and web development techniques marketing: a virtue ethics perspective. European Journal of Marketing 41, and methodology usage. IEEE MultiMedia 8, 52–60. 37–57.Barry, C., Torres, A., 2007. ‘Calling passengers’ – an ethical problem in the design of Neate, R., 10 July 2008. EU hidden fees laws to end £1 flights. Telegraph. http://www. self-service websites amongst low-cost airlines in Ireland. In: Barry, C., Lang, M., telegraph.co.uk/travel/2275831/EU-hidden-fees-laws-to-end-andpound1-flights. Conboy, K., Wojtkowski, G., Wojtkowski, W. (Eds.), Information Systems Devel- html (accessed 11.07.08.). opment: Challenges in Practice, Theory and Education. Springer, New York. Nielsen, J., Clemmensen, T., Yssing, C., 2002. Getting access to what goes on inBloor, M., Frankland, J., Thomas, M., Robson, K., 2001. Focus Groups in Social people’s heads? – reflections on the think-aloud technique. In: Proceedings of Research. Sage, London. NordiCHI, Aarhus.Dennis, N., 2007. End of the free lunch? The responses of traditional European Nucciarelli, A., Gastaldi, M., 2008. Information technology and collaboration tools airlines to the low-cost carrier threat. Journal of Air Transport Management 13, within the e-supply chain management of the aviation industry. Technology 311–321. Analysis & Strategic Management 20, 169–184.de Neufville, R., 2006. Planning airport access in an era of low-cost airlines. Journal Rezabakhsh, B., BornemannHansen, U., Schrader, U., 2006. Consumer power: of American Planning Association 72, 347–356. a comparison of the old economy and the Internet economy. Journal ofde Neufville, R., 2008. Low-cost airports for low-cost airlines: flexible design to Consumer Policy 29, 3–36. manage the risks. Transportation Planning and Technology 31, 35–68. Rubin, R.M., Joy, J.N., 2005. Where are the airlines headed? Implications of airlineDix, A., Finlay, J., Abowd, G., Beale, R., 2004. Human–Computer Interaction, third ed. industry structure and change for consumers. The Journal of Consumer Affairs Pearson/Prentice-Hall, New York, USA. 39, 215–228.Doganis, R., 2001. The Airline Business in the 21st Century. Routledge, London, UK. Shumsky, R., 2006. The southwest effect, airline alliances and revenue manage-Doganis, R., 2006. The Airline Business. Routledge, London. ment. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 5, 83–89.European Commission, 28 March 2008. EU–US Open Skies: a New Era in Transatlantic Sharp, H., Rogers, Y., Preece, J., 2007. Interaction Design: Beyond Human–Computer Aviation Starts on 30 March. Europa Press Releases. http://europa.eu.libgate.library. Interaction, second ed. John Wiley and Sons, New York. nuigalway.ie/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referen-ce¼IP/08/474&format¼HTML Smith, A., Bolton, R., Wagner, J., 1999. A model of customer satisfaction with service &aged¼0&language¼EN&guiLanguage¼en (accessed 05.04.08.). encounters involving failure and recovery. Journal of Marketing Research 36,European Consumer Centre Network, 2006. Report on Air Passenger Rights: 356–372. Consumer Complaints 2005. European Consumer Centre Network, Brussels. Smyth, J., 13 November 2007. Ryanair could face action on ticket sales. Irish Times.European Consumer Centre Network, 2007. Report on Air Passenger Rights: http://www.irishtimes.com.newspaper/finance/2007/1113/1194550199112.html Consumer Complaints 2006. European Consumer Centre Network, Brussels. (accessed 25.11.07.).European Parliament, Wednesday, 9 July 2008. MEPs All-Inclusive Air Fares Just Sorenson, J., October 10, 2006. Europe’s Top 4 Low-Cost Carriers Generated 470 Around the Corner as MEP Back Legislation on Transparency. European Parlia- Million Euros (US$593 Million) From Non-Ticket Sources in 2005. http://www. ment Press Releases. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_ ideaworkscompany.com/news/industry.htm (accessed 10.08.08.). page/062-33694-189-07-28-910-20080708IPR33693-07-07-2008-2008-true/ Swinyard, W.R., Smith, S.M., 2003. Why people (don’t) shop on-line: a lifestyle default_en.htm (accessed 10.08.08.). study of the Internet consumer. Psychology & Marketing, 567–597.Francis, G., Humprheys, I., Ison, S., Aicken, M., 2006. Where next for low cost Teichert, T., Shehu, E., von Wartburb, I., 2008. Customer segmentation revisited: the airlines? A spatial and temporal comparative study. Journal of Transport case of the airline industry. Transportation Research Part A: Policy & Practice 42, Geography 14, 83–94. 227–242.Franke, M., 2007. Innovation: the winning formula to regain profitability in avia- Wagner, C.M., Huber, B., Sweeney, E., Smyth, A., 2005. B2B e-marketplaces in the tion? Journal of Air Transport Management 13, 23–30. airline industry: process drivers and performance indicators. InternationalGrabner-Kraeuter, S., 2002. The role of consumers’ trust in on-line-shopping. Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications 8, 283–297. Journal of Business Ethics 39, 43–50. Warnock-Smith, D., Potter, A., 2005. An exploratory study into airport choice factorsGraham, B., Shaw, J., 2008. Low-cost airlines in Europe: reconciling liberalization for European low-cost airlines. Journal of Air Transport Management 11, and sustainability. Geoforum 39, 1439–1451. 388–392.