THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew Wilson

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Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse. …

Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse.
The last two years have been dominated by rows over the
selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the
conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more
authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention
has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28
October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic
bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the
authorities have denied them a possible victory. There
was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial
constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to
rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of
“political technology” and a change in the voting system
that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011.
Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election
was more competitive than expected – but only because the
authorities were confident they would win.

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  • 1. MEMOPOLICY THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew Wilson Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse. Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an The last two years have been dominated by rows over theSUMMARYSUMMARY impasse after two years dominated by rows over selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the the selective prosecution of regime opponents, conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in particular the conviction of former Prime in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in October 2011, authoritarian and corrupt style of rule in Ukraine. Attention and authoritarianism and corruption in Ukraine. has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28 However, the real danger following the elections on 28 October is not electoral fraud but the way that October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic the authorities are now entrenching themselves in bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the power by every possible means. Members of the authorities have denied them a possible victory. There literal and metaphorical “family” around President was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial Yanukovych are using their power to enrich constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to themselves on an unprecedented scale. The EU rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of cannot afford to simply wait until the next contest “political technology” and a change in the voting system in 2015. that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011. Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election The EU must think creatively to find a way to was more competitive than expected – but only because the move beyond this impasse. It should better define authorities were confident they would win. conditionality in the three key areas of selective prosecutions, the conduct of elections and “reform”. It should apply the Association Agreement and The recent focus on the elections has broadened the European Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement view from the Tymoshenko case to look at how things have with Ukraine that have been on hold since last deteriorated across the board. But there is also a danger December, if necessary selectively or provisionally, that the EU will move the goalposts and make the conduct but take a tougher line in other areas, for example by of the elections the only criterion for deciding whether or imposing a visa ban on leading figures in the regime not it should restart relations with Ukraine, or judge the and auditing suspect “family” companies in the EU. authorities more on past than on present behaviour and At the same time, the EU should liberalise visas, use a critique of the elections to move towards a de facto encourage educational exchanges and support the 1 The Ukrainian parliament has 450 MPs. After the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, it was emergence of new independent actors in Ukraine thought better that all of them should be elected by proportional representation. But in who are worried by the rise of the “family”. 2011 the government forced through a return to the earlier system, under which half of MPs would be elected by PR, and the other half in territorial constituencies, where so- called administrative resources (that is, state-directed fraud) had more weight.
  • 2. isolation policy. In November the Foreign Affairs Council the other of acting as a Trojan horse and secretly planningTHE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS will decide whether to move forward with the Association to ally with the Party of Regions after the elections. Divisions Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade within the main parties are manifold, and where they do not Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine that have been on hold exist they are created by the authorities’ malign influence. since last December. The annual EU-Ukraine summit is still The opposition shouldn’t even be the opposition in the scheduled for some time before the end of this year, though outgoing parliament, as it won the last elections in 2007. neither side is particularly enthusiastic. Some in the EU are But disunity in its ranks has repeatedly led to defections minded to sign the agreements, in part because the process and failure to block or effectively resist key measures like of ratification by member states is likely to get bogged down the election law itself in November 2011 or the new Law on anyway. Others want to use the agreements to enforce red Languages in July 2012. lines on political prosecutions or democratic deterioration. The position of the opposition is being further weakened However, neither approach will help transform Ukraine by the revival of so-called “political technology” (the local into the kind of society the EU would like to see. Signing the black arts of covert manipulation). Many of the “opposition” agreements prematurely would undermine conditionality; parties running in the election were in reality covert projects leaving them on ice leaves the EU without leverage. The of the authorities. Forward Ukraine! and its leader Nataliya EU therefore needs to think of creative ways of regaining Korolevska act like radical opposition forces, but are in influence while maintaining red lines on values – not least reality what is known locally as “clones” – that is, copies because the political situation in Ukraine could easily of other parties financed by leading oligarchs that try to deteriorate further. A tightening of the screws on independent take the place of the old opposition – hence the choice of media and on the still strong independent NGO sector is a young, glamorous female leader to compete with Yuliya possible after the elections. The row over the Tymoshenko Tymoshenko. The authorities prevented some opposition case was bad enough. But unless the EU regains traction, parties such as UDAR from campaigning in eastern Ukraine, there will be worse to come. The authorities are entrenching where the Party of Regions is relatively sanguine about themselves in power by every possible means, and members losing votes to other parties such as the Communists, as it of the literal and metaphorical “family” around President knows the Communists will be a reliable part of any future Yanukovych are using that power to enrich themselves on an super-majority. unprecedented scale. The EU cannot afford to wait until the next contest in 2015. Even the genuine opposition parties are now all financially dependent on oligarchic sponsors, often even from the authorities’ own ranks. Ukraine’s richest man, Rinat The return of “political technology” Akhmetov, supposedly spent $80 million on Forward Ukraine! – though he allegedly cut funding because the There were some encouraging signs of democratic vitality in project was threatening to take votes off the Party of the October elections. The mass media opened up a little, if Regions. The Communists are sponsored to the tune of $25 only temporarily. The authorities were unable to prevail in million by Ihor Koletnik, the head of the Customs Service.2 several key hotly contested constituency races. The United This financing illustrates how threatened some Ukrainian Opposition coalition built around Tymoshenko’s Fatherland oligarchs feel by the rise of Yanukovch’s “family”. At the same party came second, even though she was not allowed to stand. time, however, such funding reduces the real independence But while the EU has tended to focus on election fraud and of the “opposition”. the selective prosecution of political opponents, democracy in Ukraine is now being undermined in many other ways. The opposition parties have also been seeded with so-called The judicial “reform” pushed through in 2010 now gives the tushki – individuals who are known to be easily bribeable state the power to put anyone it wants in prison. The legal and are pre-programmed to defect after the election3. The system has become totally politicised; conviction rates are problem of bribery and the defection of MPs has been over 99 percent. The judiciary is used to silence enemies around for a long time. In 2004, changes to the constitution www.ecfr.eu and to legitimise the increasing problem of raidertsvo, or the were agreed that required MPs to stay in the parties they theft by oligarchs of each others’ businesses. Even the release were elected to serve and to ensure that the government of Tymoshenko would not solve this more fundamental “majority” was made up of parties rather than individuals. problem. But in a blatantly partial ruling in 2010 the constitutional court reversed that decision. At least 80 percent of November 2012 Where the opposition did well, it was despite its own “independent” MPs will be persuaded to join the authorities’ weaknesses. Many of its leading figures played safe and stood camp by the same means. Thus even though the Party of on party lists rather than take on the ruling Party of Regions Regions did not win the headline vote, together with the fake directly in the constituencies. The three main opposition opposition, “independents” and tushki, it still has a majority parties – Fatherland, UDAR (known as “Punch” because it is and is within reach of the 300 out of 450 seats in the new ECFR/65 led by the boxer Vitaliy Klichko) and the far-right Freedom parliament it needs to change the constitution. The three Party – could only reach a partial agreement on withdrawing 2 Author interview with leading local political technologist Taras Berezovets, 20 in each others’ favour in the constituencies. Each suspects September 2012. 2 3 Tushka means the corpse of a small animal – something like “roadkill”.
  • 3. main opposition parties will have to show an uncharacteristic Fragile pluralismlevel of solidarity to prevent this happening. The authorities are not far short of a two-thirds majority in the new parliament that would allow them to changeThe rise of the “family” the constitution. For example, they could decide to allow Yanukovych to be “re-elected” by parliament in 2015 ratherCorruption has also increased substantially since the 2010 than directly by the people. Alternatively, as the authoritieselections. Yanukovych has increasingly vested power and now control almost all political branches of state, they couldwealth in a literal and metaphorical “family”. The president’s target remaining independent centres of power before anyoldest son Oleksandr Yanukovych and his associates have taken such challenges arise. Since 2010, the authorities haveover the central bank and tax, finance and law enforcement been gradually tightening control over independent media,agencies, and used that power to take over rival businesses.4 not by restoring direct censorship, but by challengingThis began with businesses owned by supporters of the losing and redistributing oligarchic control. As Serhiy Kudelyaside in 2010 and Ukraine’s vulnerable SME sector. Now the puts it, “control over the leading television channels by“family” has shifted to targeting major oligarchs. “Grabbing oligarchic moguls close to Yanukovych has produced aproperty started with the supporters of the orange elite, but more decentralized system of self-censorship”.7 The newnow it is danger of spreading to the relatively loyal guys,” preference is for so-called usnyky, or verbal instructionssays leading Ukrainian analyst Mykhailo Honchar.5 Over from the presidential administration to TV owners inthe last year, the “family” has begun moving into the coal person. Thus the media remains pluralistic but is highlybusiness, electricity, telecommunications and agriculture. corrupt. According to one UDAR adviser, “all media is nowLand privatisation is scheduled finally to move forward after paid for, and we have to play that game”.8the elections, but amendments to the law recently created anew state land bank that would have first right of purchase The authorities may drop their relatively hands-off approachif peasant farmers chose to sell their land, leading to fears to the media once the vote is over, just as they did once thethat “family” businesses will quickly accumulate the largest Euro 2012 final in Kyiv was out of the way, in part so thatparcels of Ukraine’s rich farm land. the “family” can muscle in on the local media market. The campaign that began in the summer against Ukraine’s lastUkraine’s co-hosting of the Euro 2012 football championship remaining TV channels like TVi and independent outletsfinals was marred by controversies over the privileged role like the paper and popular web site Left Bank, as well asof shadowy contractor companies linked to the “family” like sites modelled on Alexey Navalny’s campaigns in Russia likeAltcom. Rake-offs and over-payments cost the Ukrainian parklikeidiot.com.ua and nashigroshi.org (“Our Money”),taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars. In August 2012, which looks at corruption in public contracts, may well beYanukovych signed a law cancelling the obligation of state resumed.companies to hold tenders for the purchase of goods andservices when they use their own funds. Yuliya Mostova, Meanwhile Ukraine’s relatively free NGO sector looksthe editor of Ukraine’s main independent paper Mirror like an increasing anomaly. The number of registeredof the Week, argues that Yanukovych’s goal is simple. “He NGOs has actually grown in recent years. Ukraine has notwants to be the richest man in Eastern Europe”, she says. yet followed Russia by forcing out “foreign” NGOs and“Yanukovych is the first president of Ukraine who needs a substituting them with Kremlin-friendly “government-controlling share not only of all power in the country but of organised NGOs” or GONGOs (Russia’s own measuresall its business too.”6 were ironically a reaction to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004). But the Ukrainian authorities are now setting upThe power of the “family” is likely to grow further after the “clone” NGOs such as For Fair Elections, which predictablyelections as Serhiy Arbuzov, the current head of the central gave the October elections a clean bill of health.9 Ironicallybank and “curator” of the many “family” businesses, moves to and sadly for the country that staged famous mass protestsbecome first deputy prime minister or even prime minister. against the last rigged elections in 2004, the organisation ofBecause the interests of the “family” are currently all within crowds and demonstrations is now a professional businessUkraine, its members are immune to the argument that – demonstrators, often students, are paid to turn up.10Ukraine needs the agreements with the EU. However, other Precisely because many NGOs played a key role in electionoligarchs who trade or invest abroad are deeply worried monitoring, a “final front” against themabout the threat to their business interests. could be opened after the elections. 7 Serhiy Kudelya, “Politics and Democracy in Ukraine”, in Taras Kuzio and Daniel Hamilton (eds.), Open Ukraine: Changing Course Towards a European Future (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), pp. 1-20 and pp. 10-11. 8 Author interview, 19 September 2012. 9 “The observers from For Fair Elections saw no serious violations and talk about the4 See the analysis of his expanding empire by Sevgil Musaeva, “How the Business of the ‘new developments’ in the upcoming elections in Ukraine”, Komsomolskaya Pravda inPresident’s Elder Son Works”, Forbes Ukraine, 3 September 2012, at http://forbes.ua/ Ukraine, 25 October 2012, available at http://kp.ua/daily/251012/362845/magazine/forbes/1336398-kak-rabotaet-biznes-starshego-syna-prezidenta 10 Yegor Vasylyev, “The Funny Business of Ukrainian Political Rallies”, Transitions5 Author interview, 8 November 2011. Online , 9 February 2012, available at www.tol.org/client/article/22988-the-funny-6 Author interview with Yuliya Mostova, 8 November 2011; Yuliia Mostova, “Semostiinyi business-of-ukrainian-political-rallies.html; Richard Boudreaux, “Bucks Populi: MakingYanukovych”, Dzerkalo tyzhnia , 1 June 2012, available at http://dt.ua/POLITICS/ Democracy a Going Concern in Kiev”, The Wall Street Journal , 5 February 2010.semostiyniy_yanukovich-103152.html. 3
  • 4. On the other hand, the opposition has a strong defensive areas, particularly on the Tymoshenko case: some EU leadersTHE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS position in the new parliament and there are signs of have asked for her release; others have complained at new dissatisfaction and division within the ruling elite. The EU charges being laid against her; and others have criticised should support political and economic pluralism wherever the conditions in which she is held. The EU therefore needs it can. to agree a standard that is both substantive and actionable: asking the Ukrainian authorities to comply fully with any ruling of the European Court on Human Rights is one The customs union bluff possibility. On elections, the final OSCE-ODIHR report should be as rounded as possible, looking at “political Even before the AA and the DCFTA were frozen in December technology” as well as simple fraud, but also noting areas in 2011, the EU was not good at explaining the benefit of them to which the authorities’ will or schemes did not prevail. The Ukrainians. Since the agreements were frozen, the Ukrainian EU should press for “reform” in areas that enable progress media has been increasingly stressing their downside – on other fronts, such as dropping the provisions in the anti- which is not insignificant, given the cost of implementing discrimination legislation that are incompatible with visa such a large proportion of the acquis communautaire,11 This liberalisation. argument has particular traction with hard-pressed SMEs, which are suffering as the Ukrainian economy seems to be The second step should be provisional application of the going into another recession. Ukraine’s SME sector was agreements with the EU. If necessary, the AA could be already too small for an economy of its size, but has actually split to allow the DCFTA and sectoral parts to be enacted shrunk in recent years to less than 20 percent of GDP. on their own without the “political” and justice sections. Banks have virtually stopped lending to SMEs, particularly Alternatively, the agreements could remain in deep freeze, because they have been renationalised since 2008 – the but the EU could continue with sectoral integration on the share of banking assets owned by Western banks has fallen basis of parallel sectoral agreements. Defining a dividing from a peak of 42 percent in early 2009 to 25 percent in the line between what is EU competence (most of the DCFTA) first half of 2012.12 The new owners favour lending to big and what is member-state competence will be difficult but oligarchs – which often means themselves. not impossible. The Ukrainian authorities intend to use the elections to There was always a strong case both for the agreements, restore their legitimacy in the West. If it is not forthcoming, which will help transform Ukrainian society in the long they will blackmail the West by threatening to join the run, and for red lines. But it makes little sense to block the Russia-led customs union. But this is a bluff. In fact, only a agreements to punish Ukraine. Rather, the EU should take a handful of oligarchs, mainly the so-called gas lobby, would tougher line in other areas in order to allow the agreements see gains in such a union. Ironically, it is the hard-pressed to be revived. The advocates of a tougher approach will SME sector, rather than the oligarchs, that may be tempted hopefully feel happier about the agreements going forward by the idea of a customs union with Russia. Even more if they can see that action is being taken elsewhere. The ironically, the “family” would not gain at all if Ukraine were resolution on Ukraine passed by the US Senate in September more open to Russian capital. is the beginning of a trend towards the construction of a Ukrainian equivalent of the “Magnitsky List”. 13 The European Commission is investigating Gazprom. The EU Policy recommendations should start with a visa ban on Renat Kuzmin, the deputy prosecutor responsible for the trials of Tymoshenko and The current impasse means that doing nothing will simply former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko. allow these worrisome trends to get worse. The mooted solution of signing the agreements if the elections are deemed The EU should also audit the activities of suspect “family” “not too bad” is just as dangerous. It would completely companies in Austria, Cyprus and Luxembourg (and in undermine conditionality, which was originally applied over Liechtenstein and Switzerland), which break existing EU law. www.ecfr.eu selective prosecutions, and deepen the regime’s current This need not be formal “sanctions”; it can be undertaken sense of impunity. Creative thinking is therefore needed by national financial security agencies. The US is currently in order to get round the impasse and move relations onto taking a tougher line, but most of the Ukrainian elite’s another page. The Tymoshenko case is only one of many financial malfeasance is within the EU and dependencies problems. Her release should be an ultimate goal but not like the British Virgin Islands. For example, the Activ Solar November 2012 the only immediate goal. company, which is based in Vienna, allegedly acts as a front for government circles that are siphoning off budget money The first step is to better define conditionality in the three and circulating it back home tax free.14 In this sense, the lack key areas of selective prosecutions, the conduct of elections of Western interest would be fatal for Ukraine. and “reform”. There are too many EU voices in all three ECFR/65 11 See Rafał Sadowski, “The Prospects for the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement”, Centre 13 The text can be found at http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/index. for Eastern Studies, 18 October 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=26d65aab-4ed1-4173-8f61-c05809c5b0ac. commentary/2012-10-18/prospects-euukraine-free-trade-agreement 14 See the article by Serhiy Leshchenko “Tax Haven of Yanukovych and Kluyev”, 22 12 Yevhen Hrebenyuk, “Foreign Banks Flee Ukraine”, Ukrainian Week , 23 October January 2012, translated at http://eastbook.eu/en/2012/01/material-en/news-en/ 4 2012, http://ukrainianweek.com/Economics/63007. serhyi-leshchenko-tax-haven-of-yanukovych-and-kluyev/
  • 5. The third step should be to press ahead with parallelmeasures. The authorities’ propaganda relies heavily on theargument that the EU cares only about Tymoshenko andnot about ordinary Ukrainians. Visa liberalisation shouldtherefore be a part of any scenario. Ratification by theEuropean Parliament of the new amended Visa FacilitationAgreement signed in July has also been blocked because ofthe Tymoshenko affair, but should now move forward. Nowthat Ukraine has introduced biometric passports it shouldbe within sight of the second, post-legislative stage of itsVisa Liberalisation Action Plan. Wider travel will liberaliseUkraine in the long run. So would easier internal travel, ifbudget airlines could be attracted to Ukraine as a result ofan Open Skies Agreement.Changes to the Erasmus education exchange programmewill also benefit Ukraine, but the EU needs to be wary ofencouraging a “brain drain” from Ukraine and should insteadencourage a two-way process with schemes to encouragevisiting students and experts from the West.The EU should also be much more proactive about advertisingthe economic and social benefits of the agreements. It shoulddevelop a positive communication strategy, involving localNGOs, to sell the agreements to local stakeholders.The EU should also support the emergence of newindependent actors in Ukraine. Western loans andinvestments, for example, help protect business againstraidertsvo. The EU should help revive lending schemesfor SMEs, which are not working as they might – from theEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development andthe World Bank.Finally, the EU should open other channels to circumventthe current dialogue of the deaf. The European Parliament’sKwasniewski/Cox mission to monitor selective prosecutions,which is currently suspended for the duration of theelections, can be replicated and expanded. The EU shouldgive a voice to business circles that are worried by the riseof the “family”.ConclusionUkraine’s leaders behave like they have immunity andimpunity, as if Ukraine were a vital raw material supplieror possessed of other geopolitical importance. In reality,they only have power in isolation. The EU should not fearcontinuing to apply tough standards to Ukraine. But the EUneeds leverage and should also work harder to show it is onthe side of Ukraine’s beleaguered democratic, liberal andeconomically constructive forces. Once Ukraine developsproper relations with Europe appropriate to its size, locationand economic potential, the EU’s leverage will be muchhigher. It’s time to show Ukraine some tough love. 5
  • 6. About the author AcknowledgementsTHE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew Wilson is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European The author would like to acknowledge the help of Jana Council on Foreign Relations and a reader in Ukrainian Kobzova for her useful advice and Hans Kundnani for Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies his excellent and speedy editing, as well as the following (SSEES) at University College London. He has previously interviewees in Ukraine: Olexiy Haran, Rostyslav Pavlenko, held academic positions at the London School of Economics Taras Berezovets, Yuliya Mostova, Alyona Getmanchuk, and Cambridge. His most recent books are Belarus: The Mykhailo Honchar, Oleksandr Lytvynenko and members of Last European Dictatorship (2011) and The Ukrainians: the EU delegation in Kiev. Unexpected Nations (third edition, 2009). His publications for ECFR include Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict (2011) and Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood (with Nicu Popescu). www.ecfr.eu November 2012 ECFR/65 6
  • 7. Among members of the EuropeanCouncil on Foreign Relations are John Bruton (Ireland) Hanzade Dogan Boyner ˘ Heidi Hautala (Finland) Former European Commission (Turkey) Minister for International Developmentformer prime ministers, presidents, Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Chair, Dog Gazetecilik and Dog ˘an ˘anEuropean commissioners, current Minister (Taoiseach) On-line Sasha Havlicek (Unitedand former parliamentarians and Kingdom)ministers, public intellectuals, Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) Executive Director, Institute for Strategicbusiness leaders, activists and Writer and academic Member of the European Parliament Dialogue (ISD)cultural figures from the EU member Erhard Busek (Austria) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) Connie Hedegaard (Denmark)states and candidate countries. Chairman of the Institute for the Former Foreign Minister Danube and Central Europe Commissionr for Climate Change Hans Eichel (Germany)Asger Aamund (Denmark) Former Finance Minister Steven Heinz (Austria)President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Co-Founder & Co-Chairman,and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Member of the European Parliament; Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Lansdowne Partners Ltd Former Executive Chairman, UnitedUrban Ahlin (Sweden) former President of the European Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Annette Heuser (Germany)Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Parliament; former Prime Minister former OSCE High Commissioner on Executive Director, BertelsmannAffairs Committee and foreign Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) National Minorities; former Chairman Foundation Washington DCpolicy spokesperson for the Social Minister for International Development Stockholm International PeaceDemocratic Party Cooperation Research Institute, SIPRI Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Co-founder of Spanish newspaperMartti Ahtisaari (Finland) Maria Livanos Cattaui Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) El País; President, FRIDEChairman of the Board, Crisis Chairman, Baltic Development Forum;Management Initiative; former (Switzerland) former Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (ThePresident Former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce Steven Everts (The Netherlands) Netherlands)Giuliano Amato (Italy) Adviser to the Vice President of the Former NATO Secretary GeneralFormer Prime Minister and vice Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) European Commission and EU HighPresident of the European Convention; Director of Melak Investments/ Danuta Hübner (Poland) Representative for Foreign and Security Member of the European Parliament;Chairman, Centre for American Journalist PolicyStudies; Chairman, Enciclopedia former European CommissionerTreccani Carmen Chacón (Spain) Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) Former Minister of Defence Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) Member of the European Parliament Member of the European ParliamentGustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Charles Clarke (UnitedMember of Parliament Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Kingdom) President, Chamber of Deputies; Former Ambassador and formerViveca Ax:son Jonhson Visiting Professor of Politics, University former Foreign Minister Executive Director, Crisis Management(Sweden) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary Joschka Fischer (Germany) InitiativeChairman of Nordstjernan AB Nicola Clase (Sweden) Former Foreign Minister and vice- Toomas Ilves (Estonia)Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Chancellor PresidentFormer Prime Minister former State Secretary Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Chairman, Munich SecurityMember of Parliament; former Foreign Member of the European Parliament Lykke Friis (Denmark) Conference; Global Head ofMinister Government Affairs Allianz SE Robert Cooper (United Member of Parliament; former MinisterLeszek Balcerowicz (Poland) Kingdom) for Climate, Energy and Gender Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US)Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Counsellor of the European External Equality International Advocacy Director, OpenSchool of Economics; former Deputy Action Service Society FoundationPrime Minister Jaime Gama (Portugal) Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Former Speaker of the Parliament; Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)Lluís Bassets (Spain) Chairman of the Supervisory Board of former Foreign Minister Professor, London School of EconomicsDeputy Director, El País the ThyssenKrupp Timothy Garton Ash Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey)Marek Belka (Poland) Maria Cuffaro (Italy) (United Kingdom) Senior Advisor to the Prime MinisterGovernor, National Bank of Poland; Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI Professor of European Studies, of Turkey on foreign policy and publicformer Prime Minister Oxford University diplomacy Daniel Daianu (Romania)Roland Berger (Germany) Professor of Economics, National Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) Sylvie Kauffmann (France)Founder and Honorary Chairman, School of Political and Administrative Chairman of the Portuguese Institute Editorial Director, Le MondeRoland Berger Strategy Consultants Studies (SNSPA); former Finance of International Relations (IPRI)GmbH Minister Olli Kivinen (Finland) Teresa Patricio Gouveia Writer and columnistErik Berglöf (Sweden) Massimo D’Alema (Italy) (Portugal)Chief Economist, European Bank for President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Ben Knapen (The Netherlands)Reconstruction and Development President, Foundation for European Gulbenkian Foundation; former Minister for European Affairs and Progressive Studies; former Prime Foreign Minister International CooperationJan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Minister and Foreign MinisterChairman, Prime Minister’s Economic Heather Grabbe (United Gerald Knaus (Austria)Council; former Prime Minister Marta Dassù (Italy) Chairman of the European Stability Under Secretary of State for Foreign Kingdom) Initiative and Carr Center FellowCarl Bildt (Sweden) Affairs Executive Director, Open SocietyForeign Minister Institute – Brussels Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group;Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister Charles Grant (United Kingdom) former State SecretaryPresident, Polish Confederation of Director, Centre for European ReformPrivate Employers – Lewiatan Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Bassma Kodmani (France) Poet and Cultural Critic Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Executive Director of the Arab ReformSvetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the InitiativeFounder, Communitas Foundation and Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) United Nations and the League ofPresident of Venture Equity Bulgaria Member of the European Parliament; Arab States on Syria Rem Koolhaas (TheLtd. former Prime Minister Netherlands) Elisabeth Guigou (France)Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) Member of Parliament and President Graduate School of Design, HarvardCFO & Deputy CEO, Vaffenfall AB Director, Confederation of Italian of the Foreign Affairs Committee University Industry (Confindustria) - BrusselsEmma Bonino (Italy) office; former Member of the European David Koranyi (Hungary)Vice President of the Senate; former EU Parliament Fernando Andresen Guimarães Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu EurasiaCommissioner (Portugal) Center of the Atlantic Council of the Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) Head of the US and Canada Division,Stine Bosse (Denmark) Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German United StatesChairman and Non-Executive Board European External Action Service Marshall Fund of the United States Bernard Kouchner (France)Member (Bratislava) Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kemal Dervis (Turkey) (Germany) Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria)Han ten Broeke Vice-President and Director of Global Former Defence Minister Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal(The Netherlands) Economy and Development István Gyarmati (Hungary) StrategiesMember of Parliament and President and CEO, Internationalspokesperson for foreign affairs Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Aleksander Kwasniewski ´ President, DEMOS Hungary Centre for Democratic Transitionand defence (Poland) Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Former President Former Chairman, Defence Commission; former Defence Minister Mart Laar (Estonia) Minister of Defence; former Prime 7
  • 8. Minister Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Marietje Schaake Stelios Zavvos (Greece)THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Former Foreign Minister (The Netherlands) CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd Miroslav Lajc (Slovakia) ˇák Member of the European Parliament Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia) Minister CEO, European Council on Foreign Klaus Scharioth (Germany) EU Representative to Kosovo; Former Relations; former Europe Director, Dean of the Mercator Fellowship foreign Minister Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Amnesty International on International Affairs; former (Germany) Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Member of the European Parliament Mabel van Oranje (The Germany to the US Netherlands) Pascal Lamy (France) Senior Adviser, The Elders Pierre Schori (Sweden) Honorary President, Notre Europe and Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Director-General of WTO; former EU Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) former Director General, FRIDE; former Commissioner Member of the Board, Fomento de SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire Construcciones y Contratas; former EU Bruno Le Maire (France) Commissioner Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) Member of Parliament; Former Minister Member of Parliament; former for Food, Agriculture & Fishing Monica Oriol (Spain) Chancellor Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) CEO, Seguriber Karel Schwarzenberg Director, European Council on Foreign Cem Özdemir (Germany) Relations Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green (Czech Republic) Party) Foreign Minister Jean-David Levitte (France) Ana Palacio (Spain) Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) Former Sherpa to the President of the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Executive Vice President, Head of Public French Republic; former Ambassador to President and General Counsel of the Affairs, UniCredit Spa the United States World Bank Group Narcís Serra (Spain) Sonia Licht (Serbia) Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice President, Belgrade Fund for Political Chairman, People in Need Foundation President of the Spanish Government Excellence Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Radosław Sikorski (Poland) Juan Fernando López Aguilar Foreign Minister Chancellor of Oxford University and co- (Spain) chair of the International Crisis Group; former EU Commissioner Aleksander Smolar (Poland) Member of the European Parliament; Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory former Minister of Justice Foundation Diana Pinto (France) Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Historian and author Javier Solana (Spain) CEO, Menemsha Ltd Former EU High Representative for the Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Monica Macovei (Romania) Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Common Foreign and Security Policy & Member ot the European Parliament Paris-Dauphine Secretary-General of the Council of the EU; former Secretary General of NATO Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) CEO of Marcegaglia S.p.A; former Member of Parliament; Chairman of the George Soros (Hungary/USA) President, Confindustria Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Founder and Chairman, Open Society Foundations Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia) Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Teresa de Sousa (Portugal) Senior Adviser, World Bank Member of Parliament; former Foreign Minister Journalist Inigo Mendez de Vigo (Spain) Charles Powell Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Secretary of State for the European Playwright and Academic (Spain/United Kingdom) Union Director, Real Instituto Elcano Rory Stewart (United Kingdom) Member of Parliament David Miliband (United Andrew Puddephatt Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Alexander Stubb (Finland) Director, Global Partners & Associated Minister for Foreign Trade and Member of Parliament; Former European Affairs; former Foreign Secretary of State for Foreign and Ltd. Minister Commonwealth Affairs Vesna Pusic (Croatia) ´ Alain Minc (France) Foreign Minister Michael Stürmer (Germany) Chief Correspondent, Die Welt President of AM Conseil; former Robert Reibestein chairman, Le Monde Ion Sturza (Romania) (The Netherlands) Director, McKinsey & Company President, GreenLight Invest; former Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) Prime Minister of the Republic of Foreign Minister; former Defence Minister; former Member of the George Robertson Moldova European Parliament (United Kingdom) ´ Paweł Swieboda (Poland) Former Secretary General of NATO President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for Dominique Moïsi (France) European Strategy Senior Adviser, IFRI Albert Rohan (Austria) Former Secretary General for Foreign Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) Pierre Moscovici (France) Affairs Director, Finnish Institute for Finance Minister; former Minister for International Relations European Affairs Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Luisa Todini (Italy) Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group Council of Europe Commissioner for on Difficult Matters, Commissioner of Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A www.ecfr.eu Human Rights Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Hildegard Müller (Germany) Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Norbert Röttgen (Germany) Professor, University of Athens and Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Minister for the Environment, der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft President, ELIAMEP Conservation and Nuclear Safety Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Olivier Roy (France) Foreign Minister President, Eurointelligence ASBL Professor, European University Institute, Florence Daniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria) Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Romania) November 2012 Former Deputy PM and Minister of Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Education School of Governance CEO, Proventus Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia) Kalypso Nicolaïdis Pasquale Salzano (Italy) Former President Vice President, International Institutional (Greece/France) Affairs, ENI Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Professor of International Relations, Lawyer; former EU Commissioner University of Oxford Stefano Sannino (Italy) Director General for Enlargement, Andre Wilkens (Germany) Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) European Commission ECFR/65 Director-General, Institute of Director Mercator Centre Berlin and Director Strategy, Mercator Haus International and European Affairs Javier Santiso (Spain) Director, Office of the CEO of Telefonica Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Former Ambassador to Brazil Editorialist Europe 8
  • 9. Also available Supporting Moldova’s Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: European Foreign Policyfrom ECFR Democratic Transition a Bolder EU Approach Scorecard 2012, February 2012 Nicu Popescu, October 2009 Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski (ECFR/48)New World Order: The Balance (ECFR/17) and Nick Witney, May 2011of Soft Power and the Rise of (ECFR/32) The long shadow ofHerbivorous Powers Can the EU rebuild failing Ordoliberalism: Germany’sIvan Krastev and Mark Leonard, states? A review of Europe’s A Chance to Reform: How the Approach to the Euro crisisOctober 2007 (ECFR/01) Civilian Capacities EU can support Democratic Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Evolution in Morocco Guérot, February 2012 (ECFR/49)A Power Audit of EU-Russia October 2009 (ECFR/18) Susi Dennison, Nicu PopescuRelations and José Ignacio Torreblanca, The end of the Putin consensusMark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Towards a Post-American May 2011 (ECFR/33) Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson,November 2007 (ECFR/02) Europe: A Power Audit of March 2012 (ECFR/50) EU-US Relations China’s Janus-faced ResponsePoland’s second return to Europe? Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, to the Arab Revolutions Syria: Towards a PoliticalPaweł Swieboda, December 2007 October 2009 (ECFR/19) Jonas Parello-Plesner and Solution(ECFR/03) Raffaello Pantucci, June 2011 Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012 Dealing with Yanukovych’s (ECFR/34) (ECFR/51)Afghanistan: Europe’s Ukraineforgotten war Andrew Wilson, March 2010 What does Turkey think? How the EU can supportDaniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/20) Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June reform in Burma(ECFR/04) 2011 (ECFR/35) Jonas Parello-Plesner, March Beyond Wait-and-See: 2012 (ECFR/52)Meeting Medvedev: The Politics The Way Forward for What does Germany thinkof the Putin Succession EU Balkan Policy about Europe? China at the crossroadsAndrew Wilson, February 2008 Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus Edited by Ulrike Guérot and François Godement, April 2012(ECFR/05) and Daniel Korski, May 2010 Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 (ECFR/53) (ECFR/21) (ECFR/36)Re-energising Europe’s Security Europe and Jordan: Reformand Defence Policy A Global China Policy The Scramble for Europe before it’s too lateNick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) François Godement, June 2010 François Godement and Jonas Julien Barnes-Dacey, April 2012 (ECFR/22) Parello-Plesner with Alice (ECFR/54)Can the EU win the Peace in Richard, July 2011 (ECFR/37)Georgia? Towards an EU Human Rights China and Germany: Why theNicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Strategy for a Post-Western Palestinian Statehood at the emerging special relationshipAndrew Wilson, August 2008 World UN: Why Europeans Should matters for Europe(ECFR/07) Susi Dennison and Anthony Vote “Yes” Hans Kundnani and Jonas Dworkin, September 2010 Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, Parello-Plesner, May 2012A Global Force for Human (ECFR/23) September 2011 (ECFR/38) (ECFR/55)Rights? An Audit of EuropeanPower at the UN The EU and Human Rights The EU and Human Rights at After Merkozy: How FranceRichard Gowan and Franziska at the UN: 2010 Review the UN: 2011 Review and Germany can makeBrantner, September 2008 Richard Gowan and Franziska Richard Gowan and Franziska Europe work(ECFR/08) Brantner, September 2010 Brantner, September 2011 Ulrike Guérot and Thomas Klau, (ECFR/24) (ECFR/39) May 2012 (ECFR/56)Beyond Dependence: How todeal with Russian Gas The Spectre of a Multipolar How to Stop the The EU and Azerbaijan:Pierre Noel, November 2008 Europe Demilitarisation of Europe Beyond Oil(ECFR/09) Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard Nick Witney, November 2011 Jana Kobzova, May 2012 with Dimitar Bechev, Jana (ECFR/40) (ECFR/57)Re-wiring the US-EU relationship Kobzova & Andrew Wilson,Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and October 2010 (ECFR/25) Europe and the Arab A Europe of Incentives: How toMark Leonard, December 2008 Revolutions: A New Vision for regain the trust of citizens and(ECFR/10) Beyond Maastricht: a New Democracy and Human Rights markets Deal for the Eurozone Susi Dennison and Anthony Mark Leonard and Jan Zielonka,Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge Thomas Klau and François Dworkin, November 2011 June 2012 (ECFR/58)Daniel Korski, March 2009 Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/41)(ECFR/11) (ECFR/26) The Case for Co-operation in Spain after the Elections: the Crisis ManagementA Power Audit of EU-China The EU and Belarus after “Germany of the South”? Richard Gowan, June 2012Relations the Election José Ignacio Torreblanca and (ECFR/59)John Fox and Francois Godement, Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Mark Leonard, November 2011April 2009 (ECFR/12) and Andrew Wilson, January (ECFR/42) The Periphery of the Periphery: 2011 (ECFR/27) The Western Balkans and theBeyond the “War on Terror”: Four Scenarios for the Euro CrisisTowards a New Transatlantic After the Revolution: Europe Reinvention of Europe Dimitar Bechev, August 2012Framework for Counterterrorism and the Transition in Tunisia Mark Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/60)Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, (ECFR/43)(ECFR/13) Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, Lebanon: Containing Spillover March 2011 (ECFR/28) Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia from SyriaThe Limits of Enlargement-lite: Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Julien Barnes-Dacey, SeptemberEuropean and Russian Power in European Foreign Policy Nicu Popescu, November 2011 2012 (ECFR/61)the Troubled Neighbourhood Scorecard 2010 (ECFR/44)Nicu Popescu and Andrew March 2011 (ECFR/29) A Power Audit of EU-NorthWilson, June 2009 (ECFR/14) Rescuing the euro: what is Africa Relations The New German Question: China’s price? Nick Witney and AnthonyThe EU and human rights at the How Europe can get the François Godement, November Dworkin, September 2012UN: 2009 annual review Germany it needs 2011 (ECFR/45) (ECFR/62)Richard Gowan and Franziska Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard,Brantner, September 2009 April 2011 (ECFR/30) A “Reset” with Algeria: The Transnistria: A bottom-up(ECFR/15) Russia to the EU’s South Solution Turning Presence into Power: Hakim Darbouche and Susi Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra,What does Russia think? Lessons from the Eastern Dennison, December 2011 September 2012 (ECFR/63)edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Neighbourhood (ECFR/46)Leonard and Andrew Wilson, Nicu Popescu and Andrew Why the Euro Crisis threatensSeptember 2009 (ECFR/16) Wilson, May 2011 (ECFR/31) Ukraine after the Tymoshenko the European Single Market verdict Andrew Wilson, Sebastian Dullien, October 2012 December 2011 (ECFR/47) (ECFR/64) 9
  • 10. ABOUT ECFRThe European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is thefirst pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, itsobjective is to conduct research and promote informed debateacross Europe on the development of coherent, effective andvalues-based European foreign policy.ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elementsthat define its activities:• pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a A distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje.•  physical presence in the main EU member states. A ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. In the future ECFR plans to open an office in Brussels. Our offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications.•  distinctive research and policy development process. A ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets.ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, theSpanish foundation FRIDE (La Fundación para las RelacionesInternacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the BulgarianCommunitas Foundation, the Italian UniCredit group, theStiftung Mercator and Steven Heinz. ECFR works in partnershipwith other organisations but does not make grants toindividuals or institutions.www.ecfr.eu The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This paper, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors. Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, reproduce, Design by David Carroll & Co davidcarrollandco.com republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the European Council on Foreign Relations © ECFR November 2012. ISBN: 978-1-906538-65-1 Published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 35 Old Queen Street, London, SW1H 9JA, United Kingdom london@ecfr.eu