Banking Fraud Evolution - New techniques in real fraud cases

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New techniques in banking fraud are applied not only to malicious binaries, but also to how different cybercriminal groups use these binaries. Criminals always attempt to make the most of their malicious software. An example of this is the broad possibilities offered by HTML code injection. The latest injections discovered in both ZeuS and SpyEye show, once again, their continuous struggle to adapt to the changes and measures put in place to counter them. In the case of ZeuS, one of the latest strategies involves rendering useless the two-factor authentication used in numerous on-line banking operations.Similarly, in a campaign for distributing SpyEye, the group responsible for the malware injected code designed to automatically make fraudulent transfers after dynamically obtaining the destination accounts (mules) from a server. Therefore, the impact of campaigns to spread malware depends not only on the dangerousness of the malicious software itself, but also on how this software is used and the creativity of its criminal owners.

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Banking Fraud Evolution - New techniques in real fraud cases

  1. 1. [ Banking Fraud Evolution ] New techniques in real fraud cases Jose Miguel Esparza
  2. 2. [ Agenda ] • Banking trojans • Tatanga: a new actor emerges • Anatomy of an e-banking fraud incident • The eternal game of cat and mouse • Real e-banking fraud incidents • Conclusions
  3. 3. [ Banking trojans ] • … • ZeuS • Sinowal (Torpig) • Gozi • SpyEye • Carberp • Feodo • …
  4. 4. [ Banking trojans ] Source: abuse.ch
  5. 5. [ Banking trojans ] • Binaries functionalities – Bot – Configuration update – Binary update – HTML injection – Redirection
  6. 6. [ Banking trojans ] • Binaries functionalities – Screenshots – Capture virtual keyboards – Credentials theft – Certificates theft – System corruption (KillOS)
  7. 7. [ Banking trojans ] • Binaries functionalities – Screenshots – Capture virtual keyboards – Credentials theft – Certificates theft – System corruption (KillOS) Information theft
  8. 8. [ Tatanga ] • Discovered by S21sec in February 2011 • Very low detection • MarioForever (2008) evolution? • C++ • No packers • Modular design • Anti-VM, anti-debugging • 64bits support
  9. 9. [ Tatanga ] • Proxys to distribute binaries • Weak encrypted communication with C&C • HTML injection • Man in the Browser • Records video!!
  10. 10. [ Tatanga ] • Proxys to distribute binaries • Weak encrypted communication with C&C • HTML injection • Man in the Browser • Records video!!
  11. 11. [ Tatanga ] • Modules: XOR + BZIP2 – HTTPTrafficLogger – Comm – ModDynamicInjection – ModEmailGrabber – ModAVTrafficBlocker – ModCrashGuard
  12. 12. [ Tatanga ] • Modules: XOR + BZIP2 – ModMalwareRemover
  13. 13. [ Tatanga ] • Modules: XOR + BZIP2 – SSL Decrypt – FilePatcher – IMSender – HTTPSender – Coredb – SmartHTTPDoser
  14. 14. [ Tatanga ] • Control panel – Statistics: country, browser, OS, AV, injections, honeypots – Injections and drops management – Storing dumps of banking webpages – Classified versions of droppers and modules – Dependencies between modules – DDoS – FTP iframer – …
  15. 15. [ Tatanga ]
  16. 16. [ Tatanga ]
  17. 17. [ Tatanga ]
  18. 18. [ Tatanga ]
  19. 19. [ Tatanga ]
  20. 20. [ Tatanga ]
  21. 21. [ Tatanga ]
  22. 22. [ Tatanga ]
  23. 23. [ Tatanga ]
  24. 24. [ Anatomy of an e-fraud incident ] • Infection • Configuration file update/download • Interaction with the user Social engineering!! HTML injection, Mit(B|M|Mo), Pharming, Phishing… • Banking credentials theft
  25. 25. [ Anatomy of an e-fraud incident ] • Account spying – Manual / Automatic – Getting balance to choose the victim • Fraudulent transaction – Manual Mules – Automatic Man in the Browser (MitB) • Money laundering
  26. 26. [ The game of cat and mouse ] Virtual keyboard Code card OTP Token SMS : mTAN PasswordID + 2FA
  27. 27. [ The game of cat and mouse ] Virtual keyboard screen/video capturing…
  28. 28. [ The game of cat and mouse ] Code card pharming, phishing, injection…
  29. 29. [ The game of cat and mouse ] Token mTAN …MITM, code injection
  30. 30. [ The game of cat and mouse ] Virtual keyboard Code card OTP Token SMS : mTAN PasswordID + SCREEN-CAPTURING PHISHING MITM CODE INJECTION FORM GRABBING KEYLOGGING PHARMING
  31. 31. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ] • SpyEye MitB, October 2010 • Automatic fraudulent transfer – Session of the legit user – Balance request – Account selection based on balance – Getting mules from the server – Social engineering password request – Automatic transaction – Modification of balance and operations
  32. 32. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ] • Tatanga MitB, February 2011 • Automatic fraudulent transfer using OTP – Session of the legit user – Balance request – Account selection based on balance – Getting mules from the server – Social engineering password request – Social engineering OTP request – Automatic transaction – Modification of balance and operations
  33. 33. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ] • Tatanga MitB, February 2011
  34. 34. [ Real e-banking fraud incidents ] • ZeuS Man in the Mobile (MitMo) – September 2010, Spain – February 2011, Poland
  35. 35. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
  36. 36. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Each day we try to improve your security. Lately we have noticed many mobile SIM cloning attacks that result in fraudulent transfers. Due to the increase of these incidents, we have implemented a new mobile identification method, using a digital certificate. The certificate works in smartphones and is an additional method of protection. This application ensures that only you can access your online account. Please click here to start the installation
  37. 37. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Source: http://niebezpiecznik.pl/post/zeus-straszy-polskie-banki/
  38. 38. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Please choose your mobile manufacturer and model and add your mobile number. The digital certificate installation link will be sent via SMS. Please download and install the application
  39. 39. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Source: http://niebezpiecznik.pl/post/zeus-straszy-polskie-banki/
  40. 40. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] The certificate installation program link will be sent by SMS. Once received, please download and install the aplication.
  41. 41. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Spoofed SMS Sender ID ID Token (remember this for later!)
  42. 42. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Serial Number: BF43000100230353FF7915 9EF3B3 Revocation Date: Sep 28 08:26:26 2010 GMT Serial Number: 61F1000100235BC2794380 405E52 Revocation Date: Sep 28 08:26:26 2010 GMT
  43. 43. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] http://dtarasov.ru/smsmonitor_lite.html
  44. 44. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Spoofed SMS Sender ID ID Token (remember this for later! It is important) …sent to a UK mobile phone.
  45. 45. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ON / OFF SET ADMIN ADD REM SET …sent from the “bad guy” mobile phone. SENDER ALL
  46. 46. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
  47. 47. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ]
  48. 48. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] if ($urlPathExt == ’sis') { $oGate->addHeader('Content-Type: application/vnd.symbian.install'); if ($data['mobile_os_type'] == OS_SYMBIAN_78) $oGate->outputFile('./symbian/cert_78.sis.txt'); else if ($data['mobile_os_type'] ==OS_SYMBIAN_9) $oGate->outputFile('./symbian/cert_9.sis.txt');} if ($urlPathExt == 'cab') { $oGate->addHeader('Content-Type: application/cab'); if ($data['mobile_os_type']==OS_WINDOWS_MOBILE_2K) $oGateoutputFile('./wm/cert_uncompress.cab.txt');else if ($data['mobile_os_type']=OS_WINDOWS_MOBILE_GR5) $oGate->outputFile('./wm/cert_compress.cab.txt'); if ($urlPathExt == ’cod') {$oGate->addHeader('Content-Type: application/vnd.rim.cod');if ($data['mobile_os_type'] == OS_BLACKBERRY_41) $oGate->outputFile('./blackberry/cert_41.cod.txt'); else if ($data['mobile_os_type'] == OS_BLACKBERRY_GR44)
  49. 49. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] Remember the token ? mysql_unbuffered_query(“ UPDATE sms_list SET mobile_os_version=$mobile_os_version, is_downloaded='YES', ts_downloaded=$ts_downloaded WHERE token='$token'");
  50. 50. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected
  51. 51. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected
  52. 52. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD
  53. 53. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD Mitmo Infected
  54. 54. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD Mitmo Infected COMMANDS
  55. 55. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD Mitmo Infected COMMANDS
  56. 56. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD Mitmo Infected COMMANDS
  57. 57. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] OTP: 0023424 COMMANDS ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD Mitmo Infected
  58. 58. [ ZeuS Man in the Mobile ] ZeuS infected ID + PASSWORD Mitmo Infected GAME OVER OTP: 0023424 COMMANDS
  59. 59. [ DEMO TIME!! ]
  60. 60. [ Conclusions ] • Successful attacks: not binary dependent • Social engineering – HTML injections + extras • Innovation • Underground market – User dependent • Monitoring injections • Sharing information
  61. 61. [ Questions? ]
  62. 62. [ Thank You!! ] Jose Miguel Esparza jesparza s21sec.com @eternaltodo

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