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SatanCloud
A Journey into the Privacy and Security
Risks of a Cloud Computing
Marco Balduzzi, MSc./Ph.D. • Senior Threat Researcher




                       Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.
Who am I?
• From Bergamo (Italy)
   – MSc. in Computer Engineering
• Télécom ParisTech (France)
   – Ph.D. in Applied System Security
• 10+ years experience in IT Security
• Engineer and consultant for different
  international firms
   – Senior Threat Researcher @ TrendMicro
• Co-founder of BGLug, Applied UniLab, (ex)
  SPINE Group, free software developer,
  hacking groups


                 http://www.iseclab.org/people/embyte

                     Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 2 of 37
Roadmap
• Introduction
   – Cloud Computing
   – IaaS and Amazon EC2
• Security Problem definition
• SatanCloud
   – Automated analysis & testing
• Experiments
   – Findings
• Lessons learned
• Conclusions




                    Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 3 of 37
What is Cloud Computing?
• The delivery of
  computing as a
  service rather than a
  product, whereby
  shared resources,
  software, and information
  are provided to
  computers and other
  devices as a utility over
  a network (Internet).
 [wikipedia]




                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 4 of 37
Cloud, an old new concept
• Parallel, distributed and grid computing have been around
  for a while
  – Scientists, governments, international organizations, military
  – Urban planning, weather forecasts, economic modeling, etc…
• Now, cloud computing is a commodity
  – Who does not use the cloud nowadays?
• Ready-to-go services




                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 5 of 37
3 Models of Cloud Services
• Software as a Service (SaaS): software
  – e.g. CRM, email, games, virtual desktops
     • Google Apps, Salesforce CRM, Dropbox

• Platform as a Service (PaaS): computing or solution
  platform
  – e.g. programming language execution environments, databases,
    web servers
     • Microsoft’s Azure, Google’s AppEngine.

• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): computers
  (physical/virtual), storage, firewalls or networks
     • Amazon EC2, Rackspace Cloud, Joyent Smart Machines



                   Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 6 of 37
Infrastructure as a Service
• Remote access to virtualized server images on an
  hourly/monthly basis
• Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
• Competitors (Jason Read @ CloudHarmony.com)
  –   Storm on Demand: $100/mo
  –   Voxel VoxCLOUD: $144/mo
  –   Linode VPS: $160/mo
  –   ThePlanet Cloud Servers: $169/mo
  –   Zerigo: $173/mo
  –   Rackspace Cloud: $175/mo
  –   NewServers Bare Metal Cloud: $180/mo
  –   SoftLayer CloudLayer Computing: $199/mo
  –   Terremark vCloud Express: $202/mo
  –   ReliaCloud: $230/mo
  –   GoGrid: $232/mo
  –   Joyent Smart Machines: $500/mo


                       Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 7 of 37
Amazon EC2 [1/3]
• Infrastructure-as-a-Service platform
• Users can rent Amazon Machine Images (called AMIs)
  on an hourly basis
  – Provided an online catalog
  – Web interface and APIs
• Users can publish AMIs to the Cloud
  – 1. Amazon itself
  – 2. individuals
  – 3. third-party companies (can charge extra costs via Amazon
    DevPay)




                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 8 of 37
Amazon EC2 [2/3]
• AMI can be built from…
  – … a live system
  – … a virtual machine image (ISO)
  – … or another AMI (by copying the file system contents to S3)
• To start an Image, the user configures:
  – Credentials
  – Resources: processing, memory, IO performance
  – Region: US East, US West, Europe, Singapore, Tokyo
  – Inbound firewall
• Three pricing models
  – Fixed pricing
  – Subscription
  – Spot instances (price changes according to load)

                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 9 of 37
Amazon EC2 [3/3]
• When an AMI is initiated
  – Hostname is announced
     • e.g. ec2-IP-region.computer.amazonaws.com
  – Accessible via SSH (port 22) or Remote Desktop (port 3389)


• Amazon does not care about securing the image
  – The maintenance is completely under the responsibility of
    the end user
• User has root privileges, needs to administer system




                   Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 10 of 37
Usage example [1/3]
• Amazon Web Services (AWS) Management Console




              Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 11 of 37
Usage example [2/3]
• Launch an instance




                Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 12 of 37
Usage example [3/3]




          Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 13 of 37
Problem definition
• A popular approach is to create, publish and share server
  images with other users
• Trust model cloud provider & user is well-defined
  – i.e., Amazon is not going to hurt you 
• What about image provider & user?
  – Users can create and share images too… blurry


• Are there any threats associated with renting images
  from the public catalogs of cloud service providers?
• To which extend?


                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 14 of 37
The Threats Landscape
• Securing the Image against external attacks
• Securing the Image against malicious image providers
• Sanitizing the Image to protect the privacy of the image
  provider




                Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 15 of 37
Large-scale experiment
• Automated system for security analysis and
  measurement
• All public server images provided by Amazon in its four
  data centers
  – US East, US West, Europe and Asia
• Over a period of 7 months


• Successfully scanned 5,303 AMIs
  – Linux and Windows



                Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 16 of 37
SatanCloud




         Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 17 of 37
Remote Scanner
• It collects information over network


• List the open ports and services (NMap is used)
• The installed web server
• Web modules (name, version)
• Web application (index page)


•         Utility? Wait the end of the talk…


                Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 18 of 37
Local Scanner, two tasks
• 1. Analyze the AMI for known vulnerabilities using the
  Nessus tool (locally – i.e., precise)


• 2. Upload to AMI and remote execute a test suite
• Self-extracting archive that contains 24 tests grouped in 4
  categories:
  – General – system information, log files and data collection
  – Network – shared directories, open sockets, running servers
  – Privacy – history files, file-system analysis, forgotten data
  – Security – vulnerable applications, rootkit & malware
    detection, hidden processes


                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 19 of 37
Overview of Tests We Performed




          Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 20 of 37
Findings




           Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 21 of 37
Software vulnerabilities [1/2]
• Nessus performed a precise, local scan on the actual
  software installed
  – Windows, Linux
• We limited the analysis to the critical vulnerabilities only




                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 22 of 37
Software vulnerabilities [2/2]
• 98% Windows, 58% Linux AMIs come with critical
  vulnerabilities

    AMIs…                                                            Windows                              Linux
    with vulnerabilities <= 2 years                                  145                                  1,197
    with vulnerabilities <= 3 years                                  38                                   364
    Avg. # vulnerabilities / AMI                                     46                                   11


• 87 Debian AMIs come with the now notorious SSH/
  OpenSSL vulnerability discovered in May 2008 (i.e., CVE-
  2008-0166)



                    Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 23 of 37
Security Risks - Malware
• We used ClamAV to scan systems (850,000 signatures)
• We discovered two infected AMIs, both Windows-based
• Trojan-Spy 50112: key logger, process monitor, and data
  leakage from saved files
• Trojan.Agent 173287: browser spyware (IE BHO)
  – Cannot manually confirm the presence
  – The machine got infected during our test experiment?
  – 1h of unpatched execution with no firewall




                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 24 of 37
Security Risks - Unsolicited connections
   Plenty of outgoing connections
   Hard to evaluate each of them
   Two Linux AMIs configured to send
    the logs to a remote host
   syslog-NG




                  Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 25 of 37
Leftover Credentials
• When user rents AMI, public key needs to be provided
  – Amazon adds this to authorized_keys for ssh access
• Security Risk: Users could leave key behind and make image
  public (turn to backdoor)
  – Same problem if a user sets password and publishes image

                                             US East                 US West                 Europe              Asia    Total
  AMIs with leftover credentials             34.75%                  8.35%                   9.80%               6.32%   21.80%
  With password                              67                      10                      22                  2       101
  With SSH keys                              794                     53                      86                  32      965
  With both                                  71                      6                       9                   4       90
  Superuser privileges                       783                     57                      105                 26      971
  User privileges                            149                     12                      12                  12      185


• Privacy Risk: Passwords can be cracked and used by 3rd
  parties
                           Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 26 of 37
Privacy risks
• If the image contains sensitive information, these would be
  available to anybody who is renting the AMI
• Not only customers have a potential risk, but providers
  too


• Accessing credentials, e.g.
  – To login into other servers
  – To start instances “for free”
• Information such as browser history can be used for
  deanonymization, or social engineering


                  Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 27 of 37
“Forgotten” keys
• We searched the images for forgotten keys
  – id_dsa and id_rsa for SSH keys
  – pk-[0-9A-Z]*.pem and cert-[0-9A-Z]*.pem for AWS
    API keys
• 56 private SSH keys used to login to other machine
  – 54 of which where not protected with a passphrase
  – IP of other machines available in the logs :)
• We discovered 67 unprotected AWS API keys
  – Can immediately be used to start images on the cloud at the
    expense of the key’s owner



                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 28 of 37
Shell history
• Shell histories: credentials (usernames and passwords)
   – Automatically inspected .history, .bash_history, .sh_history
   – 869 files stored interesting information, 158,354 lines of
     command history

 Finding                                # Credentials                             # Local                    # Remote
 Amazon RDS                             4                                         0                          4
 Dynamic DNS                            1                                         0                          1
 Database Monitoring                    7                                         6                          1
                                                                                                                  $ mysql –u user –p password –h host …

 MySQL                                  58                                        45                         13
 Web Applications                       3                                         2                          1
 VNC                                    1                                         1                          0
 Total                                  74                                        54                         20


• So if I delete my data then I am fine … ?

                       Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 29 of 37
Recovery of deleted files [1/3]
• AMIs can be bundled using different methods




• Block-based bundling methods are vulnerable to file
  undelete attacks
  – Even if provider deletes files, attacker might still access them
• We randomly selected 1,100 Linux AMIs in 4 regions
• We used extundelete to automatically inspect the AMI’s
  filesystem


                  Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 30 of 37
Recovery of deleted files [2/3]
• Were undelete 28GB of data
• We recover files for 98% of the AMIs (6 to 40,000 file per
  AMI).




• Even an official Amazon image (private SSH key!)

                Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 31 of 37
Recovery of deleted files [3/3]




           Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 32 of 37
Matching AMIs to Running Instances
• Suppose attacker hides an ssh key, how
  does he locate the server?
• Given a running instance on the
  Amazon EC2 cloud, how to find the
  corresponding AMI ?
• Perfect solution: SSH host key
  – Should be regenerated upon
  – But that is not always the case...
• Approximate solutions
  – Service Banners
  – Web

                  Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 33 of 37
Experiment
• We scanned the Amazon IP range (ARIN, RIPE, LAPNIC)
• 653,401 IPs
• Collected info for 233K running instances


Technique   Instances                    Perfect                               Set of 10               Set of 50
                                         Match                                 Candidates              Candidates
SSH         130,580                      1.65%                                 6.79%                   9.01%
Services    203,563                      3.45%                                 14.91%                  31.20%
Web         125,554                      4.42%                                 25.21%                  43.74%




                 Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 34 of 37
Feedbacks and collaboration
• During our experiments we were in contact with the
  AmazonWS Security Team
• 1 - Passwords and public keys
  – Contacted all the clients, released a public bulletin, changed the
    status of vulnerable AMIs to private
• 2 - Leftover data
  – Released (within 5 days) a tutorial to help customers share
    public images in a secure manner
• 3 - Recovering deleted data
  – Verified our finding (immediately)
  – AMIs examination (work in progress)


                  Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 35 of 37
Lessons Learned
• Prepare your own image
• Otherwise:
  – Immediately update the software (with the firewall up)
  – Regenerate the SSH host key
  – Delete any user, password, and SSH key
  – Check the configuration files of the services you plan to run
  – Check for suspicious connections
  – … did I tell you to prepare your own image?
• If you plan to release a public image
  – Use a file-based bundle mechanism (or shred any sensitive files)
  – Delete logs and history files


                   Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 36 of 37
References
• Amazon
  – How to share and use public AMIs in a secure manner
  – Reminder about safely sharing and using public AMIs


• M. Balduzzi, J. Zaddach, D. Balzarotti, E. Kirda, S. Loureiro
  – A Security Analysis of Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud
    Service. In Proceedings of the the 11th edition of the Computer
    Security track at the 27th ACM Symposium on Applied Computing


                                               Thanks!



                  Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 37 of 37

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SatanCloud: Privacy and Security Risks of Cloud Computing

  • 1. SatanCloud A Journey into the Privacy and Security Risks of a Cloud Computing Marco Balduzzi, MSc./Ph.D. • Senior Threat Researcher Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.
  • 2. Who am I? • From Bergamo (Italy) – MSc. in Computer Engineering • Télécom ParisTech (France) – Ph.D. in Applied System Security • 10+ years experience in IT Security • Engineer and consultant for different international firms – Senior Threat Researcher @ TrendMicro • Co-founder of BGLug, Applied UniLab, (ex) SPINE Group, free software developer, hacking groups http://www.iseclab.org/people/embyte Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 2 of 37
  • 3. Roadmap • Introduction – Cloud Computing – IaaS and Amazon EC2 • Security Problem definition • SatanCloud – Automated analysis & testing • Experiments – Findings • Lessons learned • Conclusions Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 3 of 37
  • 4. What is Cloud Computing? • The delivery of computing as a service rather than a product, whereby shared resources, software, and information are provided to computers and other devices as a utility over a network (Internet). [wikipedia] Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 4 of 37
  • 5. Cloud, an old new concept • Parallel, distributed and grid computing have been around for a while – Scientists, governments, international organizations, military – Urban planning, weather forecasts, economic modeling, etc… • Now, cloud computing is a commodity – Who does not use the cloud nowadays? • Ready-to-go services Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 5 of 37
  • 6. 3 Models of Cloud Services • Software as a Service (SaaS): software – e.g. CRM, email, games, virtual desktops • Google Apps, Salesforce CRM, Dropbox • Platform as a Service (PaaS): computing or solution platform – e.g. programming language execution environments, databases, web servers • Microsoft’s Azure, Google’s AppEngine. • Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): computers (physical/virtual), storage, firewalls or networks • Amazon EC2, Rackspace Cloud, Joyent Smart Machines Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 6 of 37
  • 7. Infrastructure as a Service • Remote access to virtualized server images on an hourly/monthly basis • Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) • Competitors (Jason Read @ CloudHarmony.com) – Storm on Demand: $100/mo – Voxel VoxCLOUD: $144/mo – Linode VPS: $160/mo – ThePlanet Cloud Servers: $169/mo – Zerigo: $173/mo – Rackspace Cloud: $175/mo – NewServers Bare Metal Cloud: $180/mo – SoftLayer CloudLayer Computing: $199/mo – Terremark vCloud Express: $202/mo – ReliaCloud: $230/mo – GoGrid: $232/mo – Joyent Smart Machines: $500/mo Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 7 of 37
  • 8. Amazon EC2 [1/3] • Infrastructure-as-a-Service platform • Users can rent Amazon Machine Images (called AMIs) on an hourly basis – Provided an online catalog – Web interface and APIs • Users can publish AMIs to the Cloud – 1. Amazon itself – 2. individuals – 3. third-party companies (can charge extra costs via Amazon DevPay) Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 8 of 37
  • 9. Amazon EC2 [2/3] • AMI can be built from… – … a live system – … a virtual machine image (ISO) – … or another AMI (by copying the file system contents to S3) • To start an Image, the user configures: – Credentials – Resources: processing, memory, IO performance – Region: US East, US West, Europe, Singapore, Tokyo – Inbound firewall • Three pricing models – Fixed pricing – Subscription – Spot instances (price changes according to load) Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 9 of 37
  • 10. Amazon EC2 [3/3] • When an AMI is initiated – Hostname is announced • e.g. ec2-IP-region.computer.amazonaws.com – Accessible via SSH (port 22) or Remote Desktop (port 3389) • Amazon does not care about securing the image – The maintenance is completely under the responsibility of the end user • User has root privileges, needs to administer system Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 10 of 37
  • 11. Usage example [1/3] • Amazon Web Services (AWS) Management Console Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 11 of 37
  • 12. Usage example [2/3] • Launch an instance Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 12 of 37
  • 13. Usage example [3/3] Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 13 of 37
  • 14. Problem definition • A popular approach is to create, publish and share server images with other users • Trust model cloud provider & user is well-defined – i.e., Amazon is not going to hurt you  • What about image provider & user? – Users can create and share images too… blurry • Are there any threats associated with renting images from the public catalogs of cloud service providers? • To which extend? Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 14 of 37
  • 15. The Threats Landscape • Securing the Image against external attacks • Securing the Image against malicious image providers • Sanitizing the Image to protect the privacy of the image provider Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 15 of 37
  • 16. Large-scale experiment • Automated system for security analysis and measurement • All public server images provided by Amazon in its four data centers – US East, US West, Europe and Asia • Over a period of 7 months • Successfully scanned 5,303 AMIs – Linux and Windows Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 16 of 37
  • 17. SatanCloud Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 17 of 37
  • 18. Remote Scanner • It collects information over network • List the open ports and services (NMap is used) • The installed web server • Web modules (name, version) • Web application (index page) • Utility? Wait the end of the talk… Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 18 of 37
  • 19. Local Scanner, two tasks • 1. Analyze the AMI for known vulnerabilities using the Nessus tool (locally – i.e., precise) • 2. Upload to AMI and remote execute a test suite • Self-extracting archive that contains 24 tests grouped in 4 categories: – General – system information, log files and data collection – Network – shared directories, open sockets, running servers – Privacy – history files, file-system analysis, forgotten data – Security – vulnerable applications, rootkit & malware detection, hidden processes Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 19 of 37
  • 20. Overview of Tests We Performed Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 20 of 37
  • 21. Findings Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 21 of 37
  • 22. Software vulnerabilities [1/2] • Nessus performed a precise, local scan on the actual software installed – Windows, Linux • We limited the analysis to the critical vulnerabilities only Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 22 of 37
  • 23. Software vulnerabilities [2/2] • 98% Windows, 58% Linux AMIs come with critical vulnerabilities AMIs… Windows Linux with vulnerabilities <= 2 years 145 1,197 with vulnerabilities <= 3 years 38 364 Avg. # vulnerabilities / AMI 46 11 • 87 Debian AMIs come with the now notorious SSH/ OpenSSL vulnerability discovered in May 2008 (i.e., CVE- 2008-0166) Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 23 of 37
  • 24. Security Risks - Malware • We used ClamAV to scan systems (850,000 signatures) • We discovered two infected AMIs, both Windows-based • Trojan-Spy 50112: key logger, process monitor, and data leakage from saved files • Trojan.Agent 173287: browser spyware (IE BHO) – Cannot manually confirm the presence – The machine got infected during our test experiment? – 1h of unpatched execution with no firewall Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 24 of 37
  • 25. Security Risks - Unsolicited connections  Plenty of outgoing connections  Hard to evaluate each of them  Two Linux AMIs configured to send the logs to a remote host  syslog-NG Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 25 of 37
  • 26. Leftover Credentials • When user rents AMI, public key needs to be provided – Amazon adds this to authorized_keys for ssh access • Security Risk: Users could leave key behind and make image public (turn to backdoor) – Same problem if a user sets password and publishes image US East US West Europe Asia Total AMIs with leftover credentials 34.75% 8.35% 9.80% 6.32% 21.80% With password 67 10 22 2 101 With SSH keys 794 53 86 32 965 With both 71 6 9 4 90 Superuser privileges 783 57 105 26 971 User privileges 149 12 12 12 185 • Privacy Risk: Passwords can be cracked and used by 3rd parties Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 26 of 37
  • 27. Privacy risks • If the image contains sensitive information, these would be available to anybody who is renting the AMI • Not only customers have a potential risk, but providers too • Accessing credentials, e.g. – To login into other servers – To start instances “for free” • Information such as browser history can be used for deanonymization, or social engineering Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 27 of 37
  • 28. “Forgotten” keys • We searched the images for forgotten keys – id_dsa and id_rsa for SSH keys – pk-[0-9A-Z]*.pem and cert-[0-9A-Z]*.pem for AWS API keys • 56 private SSH keys used to login to other machine – 54 of which where not protected with a passphrase – IP of other machines available in the logs :) • We discovered 67 unprotected AWS API keys – Can immediately be used to start images on the cloud at the expense of the key’s owner Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 28 of 37
  • 29. Shell history • Shell histories: credentials (usernames and passwords) – Automatically inspected .history, .bash_history, .sh_history – 869 files stored interesting information, 158,354 lines of command history Finding # Credentials # Local # Remote Amazon RDS 4 0 4 Dynamic DNS 1 0 1 Database Monitoring 7 6 1 $ mysql –u user –p password –h host … MySQL 58 45 13 Web Applications 3 2 1 VNC 1 1 0 Total 74 54 20 • So if I delete my data then I am fine … ? Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 29 of 37
  • 30. Recovery of deleted files [1/3] • AMIs can be bundled using different methods • Block-based bundling methods are vulnerable to file undelete attacks – Even if provider deletes files, attacker might still access them • We randomly selected 1,100 Linux AMIs in 4 regions • We used extundelete to automatically inspect the AMI’s filesystem Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 30 of 37
  • 31. Recovery of deleted files [2/3] • Were undelete 28GB of data • We recover files for 98% of the AMIs (6 to 40,000 file per AMI). • Even an official Amazon image (private SSH key!) Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 31 of 37
  • 32. Recovery of deleted files [3/3] Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 32 of 37
  • 33. Matching AMIs to Running Instances • Suppose attacker hides an ssh key, how does he locate the server? • Given a running instance on the Amazon EC2 cloud, how to find the corresponding AMI ? • Perfect solution: SSH host key – Should be regenerated upon – But that is not always the case... • Approximate solutions – Service Banners – Web Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 33 of 37
  • 34. Experiment • We scanned the Amazon IP range (ARIN, RIPE, LAPNIC) • 653,401 IPs • Collected info for 233K running instances Technique Instances Perfect Set of 10 Set of 50 Match Candidates Candidates SSH 130,580 1.65% 6.79% 9.01% Services 203,563 3.45% 14.91% 31.20% Web 125,554 4.42% 25.21% 43.74% Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 34 of 37
  • 35. Feedbacks and collaboration • During our experiments we were in contact with the AmazonWS Security Team • 1 - Passwords and public keys – Contacted all the clients, released a public bulletin, changed the status of vulnerable AMIs to private • 2 - Leftover data – Released (within 5 days) a tutorial to help customers share public images in a secure manner • 3 - Recovering deleted data – Verified our finding (immediately) – AMIs examination (work in progress) Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 35 of 37
  • 36. Lessons Learned • Prepare your own image • Otherwise: – Immediately update the software (with the firewall up) – Regenerate the SSH host key – Delete any user, password, and SSH key – Check the configuration files of the services you plan to run – Check for suspicious connections – … did I tell you to prepare your own image? • If you plan to release a public image – Use a file-based bundle mechanism (or shred any sensitive files) – Delete logs and history files Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 36 of 37
  • 37. References • Amazon – How to share and use public AMIs in a secure manner – Reminder about safely sharing and using public AMIs • M. Balduzzi, J. Zaddach, D. Balzarotti, E. Kirda, S. Loureiro – A Security Analysis of Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud Service. In Proceedings of the the 11th edition of the Computer Security track at the 27th ACM Symposium on Applied Computing Thanks! Hack In The Box 2012 Amsterdam, 25 May - Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc. - 37 of 37