A regulatory regime that benefits citizens rohan samarajiva


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  • Questions asked from all respondenetsNot used a computer before
  • Use the interent % changes if we just ask the no, yes, cant remember, what is interent question. The other question which we are merging here the yes is divided to everyday, once a week bla bla. The percentages slightly change. In the direct question interent usage is india is 1.4 and thailand 20.2, when adding the frequency of yeses- india becomes 2% thailand 21%
  • A regulatory regime that benefits citizens rohan samarajiva

    1. 1. A regulatory regime that benefits citizens Rohan Samarajiva rohan@lirneasia.net eAsia, Dhaka, 3 December 2011This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre, Canada and UKaid from the Department for International Development, UK.
    2. 2. Agenda• The success of voice & the challenge of Digital Bangladesh• What can regulation contribute? – Not a comprehensive discussion• How to do good regulation – Bracketing the need for new law and policy
    3. 3. Voice: A success in difficult circumstances• ~100% of national territory covered by signals• High uptake – 99% at BOP say they have used a phone in last 3 months – More phones than radios (and even TVs) in BOP households• Prices among lowest in the world – Result of Budget Telecom Network (BTN) business model• Voice has become a commodity; profits a problem  mobilizing capital more difficult
    4. 4. 99% of BOP have used a phone in previous 3 months Used a phone in the last 3 months (% of BOP) Bangladesh Pakistan India Sri Lanka Java Thailand2008 95% 96% 86% 88% - 77 %2011 99% 96% 89% 90% 90% 91% SEC D& E, corresponding to those living on less than USD 2/day Representative sample of 2,050, +/- 2% at 95% confidence interval 4 Among BOP (OUTER SAMPLE)
    5. 5. 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% Electricity Phone ( Fixed + mobile) Television Radio Computer Bangladesh Electricity Phone ( Fixed + mobile) Television Radio Pakistan Computer Electricity Phone ( Fixed + mobile) Television India Radio Computer Electricity Phone ( Fixed + mobile) Television Radio Sri Lanka Computer Electricity TV, radio, computer Phone ( Fixed + mobile) Television Java Radio Household access (%BOP outer sample) Computer Electricity Phone ( Fixed + mobile) Television Radio Thailand Computer Household access to electricity, phone, 5Among BOP (OUTER SAMPLE)
    6. 6. USD per month 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Bangladesh Sri Lanka China Pakistan India Uzbekistan Ave: USD 11.47 Kenya Egypt Vietnam Sudan Iran Ethiopia Cambodia Thailand Ghana Uganda Tanzania Haiti Indonesia Algeria (USD) Philippines Tunisia Monthly TCO Bolivia Budget Telecom Network (BTN) model Guatemala Ave with Internet premium: USD 15.05 Mozambique Voice + SMS TCO: Brazil = Bangladesh x 23 Nigeria (USD) Senegal AVERAGE Syria Different business model in sub USD 10 countries? Honduras Voice, SMS & Internet TCO: Morocco = Sri Lanka x 57 Côte dIvoire Internet premium Kazakhstan Ecuador Dominican Republic Guinea South Africa Madagascar Angola Zimbabwe Burkina Faso DRC Colombia Zambia Malawi Nokia total cost of ownership study 2011 Chile Cameroon Morocco Turkey NokiaSource: Chad Argentina Peru Brazil
    7. 7. The challenge for Digital Bangladesh: Lowest Internet users & fixed broadband subs/100 in region (mobile broadband not reported)1816 Based on ITU data for 2010; ITU data supplied by MOPT/BTRC14 and their equivalents; responsibility12 for errors lie with data suppliers10 Internet users/100 8 Fixed broadband/100 6 4 2 0 BD IN NP PK LK
    8. 8. Computer use @ BOP low overall Usage of computers (% of BOP teleusers)100% 12% 16%90%80%70%60% 74% 76% Dont know what a computer is 83%50% 96% 83% No used a computer in last 12 Not 81% months40% Cant remember when, but I have used30% one before20% Yes a computer in last 12 months Used10% 17% 21% 22% 0% 5% 4% 2% Bangladesh Pakistan India Sri Lanka Java Thailand Among BOP teleusers
    9. 9. Internet use similarly low@BOP; awareness problems in BD & IN Internet use (% of BOP teleusers)100%90% 17% 24%80% I havent heard of the internet70% No Cant remember when, but i have used it before60% 78% 89% Less than once a month50% 98% 82% At least once a month40% 74% At least two to three times a month30% At least once a week20% At least two times a week10% At least once a day 0% Bangladesh Pakistan India Sri Lanka Thailand Bangladesh Pakistan India Sri Lanka ThailandUse the Internet (% of 2% 2% 1% 9% 21% BOP teleusers) Among BOP teleusers
    10. 10. A challenge that can only be met . .• By creating conditions for extending the Budget Telecom Network model to broadband – Low prices essential – Costs must be kept down if low prices are to be sustained• By enabling the build out of wireless access networks capable of handling data cost-effectively – Backed up by non-discriminatory, cost-oriented access to fiber backhaul, including redundant capacity• By offering applications that are of value to consumers, giving them reason to use broadband
    11. 11. Regulatory contributions to Digital Bangladesh• Understand that what amount to overlay networks will have to be built; Also understand that creating platforms for applications will require investment – Major investments, with relatively long gestation periods, required • Regulatory risk must be reduced, especially re licenses, renewals & spectrum• Develop, in consultation with stakeholders, a roadmap on when and what spectrum will be made available – And adhere to it• Leverage the BTN model to achieve policy objectives, rather than work at cross purposes to it
    12. 12. Reduce regulatory risk for Digital Bangladesh networks• Market entry – Build on recently concluded license-renewal debate to establish coherent market entry-exit policies – Model: Pakistan licensing policies of 2003 • Emphasized transparency and predictability • Resulted in all operators being brought to a level playing field • Renewal handled in exemplary manner – But market-entry policies are incomplete without market- exit rules
    13. 13. Reduce regulatory risk . . . (market exit)• Who can best decide number of suppliers? – Not Minister; not regulator; but the market • Transparently assign as many licenses as resources (spectrum) permit in blocks adequate for data and voice; no point in fragmenting  increasing costs – Allow secondary trading so operators can find the optimum distribution of spectrum • Create orderly exit mechanisms (ideally, known at time of entry), so that market can settle at optimum level – Includes rules on spectrum, secondary trading is a solution – Also safeguards for consumers
    14. 14. Reduce regulatory risk . . . (scarce resources)• Spectrum is the most critical input in providing wireless broadband access – Spectrum refarming is central • All users of spectrum must understand that assignments are not for ever; that countries that are technology-takers must realign their spectrum assignments periodically • Difficult process; I did it in 2002-04 (900 and 1800 bands) – Requires extensive consultation with all affected stakeholders – Lots of listening and talk – Need to use proceeds of auctions to compensate “losers” – Operators must be able to plan and to mobilize resources • Not just a question of auctions versus administrative allocation – Auctions are best, but unless embedded within a credible roadmap, they will distort bidder’s incentives
    15. 15. Reduce regulatory risk . . . (road map)• Best way to improve spectrum regulation is to set out principles and a schedule for refarming actions (known as roadmap) – Build on 2009 consultation, but make principles explicit and include time (when specific blocks will be refarmed/made available) – To the extent possible, reduce technology bias in spectrum assignments: e.g., why should 900 band be limited to specific technology? – Change and certainty • All should recognize that nothing is permanent in spectrum assignments • But change should be predictable and the path decided through extensive consultation based on principles
    16. 16. Reduce regulatory risk . . . (other scarce resources)• Costs (time and money) of obtaining rights of way are escalating – Multiple levels of government involved • Not necessary to rewrite laws/Constitution • Simply enact amendments that provide for compulsory arbitration and time limits• Numbers are a finite resources that is running out because all (regulators and operators) are treating it as infinite – Consider pricing and incentives to reuse – Start work on numbers/addresses for a converged world
    17. 17. Focus on high priority tasks and pull back from others• As retail prices come down, greater attention must be paid to vertical price squeeze• Building on inchoate decision to separate BTCL’s backhaul operations create PPP to manage publicly funded backhaul (including international)• Pull back from tariff regulation – A form of banded forbearance exists in Bangladesh • Why not make it formal, allowing reallocation of regulatory resources and reducing regulatory risk
    18. 18. How to regulate well• Focus on legitimacy = acceptance in the eyes of others• Sources of legitimacy – Expertise – Transparency • Fair procedure, including consultation • Willingness to explain reasons for actions – Openness to review and appeal
    19. 19. Expertise  legitimacy• Requires good hiring procedures – Focus on those willing to learn; continual need for new knowledge• Ability to hold and motivate good people• Consistent focus on training• Now, both Ministry and BTRC require expertise• Without expertise, little basis for ex-ante, sector- specific regulation – But state of markets and technology are such that individual expertise alone is not enough
    20. 20. Procedural legitimacy• When things are done the right way, more likely that outcomes will be seen as right• In addition, serves to appeal-proof decisions• Also permits regulatory authorities and staff to draw from a range of information sources and to assess the veracity and value of information
    21. 21. Explain, explain• Regulators should behave like idealized bureaucrats, not as quasi-judges – Reasons for decisions must be given to • Stakeholders • General public via the media
    22. 22. Appeal and review• Appeal and review should not be seen solely as causes of delay• To the extent appeals and reviews can be done expeditiously, they relieve the pressure on the regulatory agency
    23. 23. For more . . .• Samarajiva, R. (2010). Leveraging the budget telecom network business model to bring broadband to the people, Information Technology and International Development, 6, special edition: 93-97. http://itidjournal.org/itid/article/view/630/270• Samarajiva, R. & T. Iqbal (2009). Banded forbearance: A new approach to price regulation in partially liberalized telecom markets, International Journal of Regulation and Governance, 9(1): 19-40.• Samarajiva, R. (2006). Preconditions for effective deployment of wireless technologies for development in the Asia-Pacific, Information Technology and International Development, 3(2): 57-71. http://itidjournal.org/itid/article/view/224/94• Samarajiva, R. (2004). Getting from dysfunctional government to e(ffective) government: Mapping a path in Sri Lanka, International Journal of Regulation & Governance, 4(2): 171-85. – A discussion of designing a Digital Bangladesh like initiative with regulatory reforms and details on spectrum refarming• Samarajiva, R. (2002) Why regulate?, chapter 2 of Effective regulation: Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2002. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union.• Samarajiva, R. (2001). Regulating in an imperfect world: Building independence through legitimacy. Info, 3(5), 363-68.