• Save
TVS Suzuki JV Split - Analysis on Corp Governance
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

Like this? Share it with your network

Share

TVS Suzuki JV Split - Analysis on Corp Governance

on

  • 2,113 views

Our PGPX Group Analysis of the TVS-Suzuki JV Split and issues related to corporate governance.

Our PGPX Group Analysis of the TVS-Suzuki JV Split and issues related to corporate governance.

Statistics

Views

Total Views
2,113
Views on SlideShare
2,106
Embed Views
7

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0

3 Embeds 7

http://www.slashdocs.com 5
http://www.linkedin.com 1
https://www.linkedin.com 1

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Adobe PDF

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

TVS Suzuki JV Split - Analysis on Corp Governance Presentation Transcript

  • 1. TVS-SUZUKI: GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN CORPORATEPARTNERSHIPS AND SEPARATION Group K Vishal Jain Amitesh Tyagi Aniruddha Ray Gaurav Goel Dindi Keshava Rao Niten Lalpuria Pervinder Chawla
  • 2. Dominant Ownership - Types• Category I : 100% Subsidiaries• Category II : Companies (Joint Venture) – Group II A : Exclusive Joint Venture – Group II B : Venture with Partners and Retail Investors• Category III : Companies (Ventures without Identified Partners
  • 3. Group II B : Venture with Partners andRetail Investors• FDI Company residual equity is held in varying proportion, partly by JV partner and partly by retail investors• Popular in pre-liberalisation regime• Board of Directors usually comprised an equal number of nominees and also few outside directors• The directors, unwittingly or otherwise, might fail to represent and protect the interest of all shareholders
  • 4. Retail Investors• Dispersed lot, either due to indifference or ignorance, hardly participate in members meetings• Might become vulnerable to possible discipline and excesses of dominant shareholders• Huge Corporate Governance problem, when decisions taken are not in interest in such minority shareholders
  • 5. Press Note 18 : Issues• Measure of protecting Indian Industry• Issued in 1998 Scrapped in 2005• Compels all foreign companies and businesses to justify to the Indian Government acting through a committee of bureaucrats known as the FIPB that their newly intended foreign investment, whether by way of equity or other financial or technical collaboration, in even an allied field would not in any way jeopardize the interest of a previously existing Indian collaborator• Need to procure NOC from existing JV partner
  • 6. Press Note18 : Issue• Failed to take a holistic approach towards the potentially affected parties• Assumes identified domestic JV partner alone as the aggrieved party• The regular absentee shareholders are likely to be impacted by such decision• Led to number of corporate governance and shareholder protection problems
  • 7. Responsibility of Company Directors• Fiduciary responsibilities apply to all the shareholders in a company• Act as moderators and protectors at the first interface level with the controlling owners and executive management• Responsible for the reasonable and appropriate exercise of these powers in the overall interest of the company, more specifically its absentee shareholders
  • 8. TVS – Suzuki Case : Issues• Venu Srinivasan representing the partner, Sundaram Clayton Ltd, and acting as JV Executive – its MD• For best interest of overall company, Separate MD for the JV reporting to his or her venture
  • 9. TVS – Suzuki Case - Issues• Distress Sale by Suzuki – 26% holding to TVS• Price - Rs 15 per share (Market price Rs 70)There should have been a premium forcontrolling stakes – But sold on Discount ???No explanation was given to JapaneseShareholder of SuzukiLegal but not Appropriate from AbsenteeShareholder
  • 10. Options Available – Option 1Surrender Suzuki shares to the company forextinguishing – Use company fund to buyback the share and cancel – The share capital would have come down – TVS holding would have gone up from 32 % to 43.85%
  • 11. Option 2Sale offer by Suzuki of its shares to residualshareholders• All shareholders have right not obligation to buy• Share Holding of TVS goes up to 43.85%Why TVS did not opt these option?Garner some additional market price basedpaper gain (~ Rs 400 to Rs 450 million)
  • 12. Role of Independent Directors• 5 out of 9 Independent Directors (Officially)• Failed on Counseling Dimension: How they counsel the two partners to avoid the deteriorating partnership• Failed on Controlling Dimension: Did not ensured the appropriate wealth is passed to Absentee Shareholders• Failed on Communication Role : Did not communicate about the disengagement• Failed on Fiduciary Duty: Failed to protect the interest of non-management shareholders
  • 13. QUESTIONS?