Golden Growth: Restoring the Lustre of the European Economic Model
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  • It seems the Baltic states are more similar to the EU cohesion.
  • Less adjustment is projected for Estonia.

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  • 1. Golden GrowthRestoring the Lustre of theEuropean Economic Model
  • 2. The European Economic Model Trade Finance Enterprise Innovation Labor Government 2
  • 3. The achievements Trade Convergence Machine Finance Enterprise Brand Europe Innovation Labor Lifestyle Superpower Government 3
  • 4. Europe—“Convergence Machine” 4
  • 5. The convergence machineFigure 1: In Europe, a rapid convergence in living standards—not much elsewhere(annual growth of consumption per capita between 1970 and 2009, by level of consumption in 1970) Europe East Asia Latin America 8 Corr. = -0.80*** 6 n = 26 Corr. = -0.21 4 n = 15 Corr. = -0.25 n = 22 2 0 -2 0 3 6 9 12 15 0 3 6 9 12 15 0 3 6 9 12 15 Initial level of consumption per capita, 1970 PPP, thousands of 2005 international dollarsNote: n = number of countries. *** statistical significance at the 1 percent.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011); see Chapter 1. 5
  • 6. Trade (goods)Figure 2: Almost half of the global goods trade involves Europe(merchandise trade in 2008, US$ billion)Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WTO (2009); see Chapter 2. 6
  • 7. Trade (services)Figure 2.19: India and the United States have more sophisticated services exports than the European Union(Service EXPY, 1990–2007 (left), and shares in service EXPY, 2007 (right))Source: Lundstrom Gable and Mishra (2011); see Chapter 2. 7
  • 8. New members’ trade has becomemore diversifiedFigure 2.3: The European Union’s new members are more important partners for the EU15, the EU15 less for the new(shares of regional trade for EU15 and EU10, 1996–2008)Note: The EU10 includes new member states joined the EU in 2004.Source World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade; see Chapter 2. 8
  • 9. Shares of the Baltic states’ trade with theEU15 have declinedFigure 2.3: The European Union’s new members are more important partners for the EU15, the EU15 less for the new(shares of trade with EU15 for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 1995–2010) Estonia Latvia Lithuania 70 60 50 40 30 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 All products: Exports ImportsSource World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade; see Chapter 2. 9
  • 10. Factory Europe has become brainierFigure 2.9: Advanced and emerging Europe are trading more sophisticated intermediate goods(EXPY for intermediate goods, thousands of US$, 1996–2008) Exports Imports 17.0 16.5 16.0 15.5 15.0 14.5 14.0 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Trade in intermediate goods of: EU10 with EU15 World World with EU15Note: Trade in intermediates is defined by the BEC nomenclature.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade, and WDI; see Chapter 2. 10
  • 11. Intermediates trade of the Balticstates is more sophisticatedFigure 2.9: Advanced and emerging Europe are trading more sophisticated intermediate goods(EXPY for intermediate goods trade with the rest of the world, thousands of US$, 1996–2008) Estonia Latvia Lithuania 16 15 14 13 12 11 1996 2000 2004 2008 1996 2000 2004 2008 1996 2000 2004 2008 Trade in intermediate goods: Exports ImportsNote: Trade in intermediates is defined by the BEC nomenclature. EXPY for trade with the EU15 follows the similar pattern.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UN Comtrade, and WDI; see Chapter 2. 11
  • 12. Financial integrationFigure 3.2: Capital flows in emerging Europe are particularly large(percentage of GDP; period average of group median values)Note: ―EU coh.‖ refers to the EU cohesion countries, ―EU cand.‖ refers to EU candidate countries, ―E. prtn.‖ refers to EU eastern partnership countries, ―LAC‖ refers to the Latin America and the Caribbean region. CA stands for current account and FX is foreign exchange.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO; see Chapter 3. 12
  • 13. Financial flows have helped inemerging EuropeFigure 4: In Europe, foreign capital has boosted growth in emerging economies(current account deficits and annual per capita growth, 1997–2008, by groups of countries, percent)Note: Average growth rates calculated using 3 four-year periods in 1997-2008.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF WEO; see Chapter 3. 13
  • 14. More equity flows to the east, moredebt in the southFigure 3.14: Greater debt exposure in Southern Europe, more equity exposure in the east(aggregate external net equity and net debt exposures, percentage of GDP, 2002–09) -10 EU candidates -20 EU cohesion Asia (2009) -30 Lithuania EU12 LAC (2009) -40 Latvia -50 Eastern partnership Estonia -60 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 Net debt position, 2002-09Note: Arrows begin in 2002 and end in 2009. The arrows for each region are median values. The dot is the median value for the referenced group. Ireland is excluded from net debt position as its data are distorted because international mutual funds hosted by Ireland are recorded as positive net debt, even though these resources are not related to the domestic economy.Source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); see Chapter 3. 14
  • 15. Needed: real integrationBox figure 1: More monetary and financial than real integration in Europe during the last decade(arrows begin in 1997 and end in 2008; the origin indicates complete nominal and real integration) 6 Eastern partnership 5 4 EU candidates 3 2 Latvia Lithuania EU12 1 EU15 Estonia 0 0 1 2 3 4 Real integration (0 = full integration)Note: The figure shows the extent of economic integration. The vertical axis combines in one index of dissimilarity three indicators of nominal integration—volatility of exchange rates, convergence in inflation rates, and convergence in interest rates. The horizontal axis does the same with three indicators of real integration—extent of synchronization in business cycles measured by indexes of industrial production, trade integration, and per capita income.Source: Sugawara and Zalduendo (2010). 15
  • 16. European ConvergenceSee Spotlight One.
  • 17. “Europe”—Global Brand 17
  • 18. The making of “Brand Europe”Table 1: Relentless growth in the United States, revival in Asia, and a postwar miracle in Europe(average annual compound growth rates, GDP per capita, 1820–2008, US$ 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP estimates)Note: Regional aggregates are population weighted; see Spotlight One for details.Source: Maddison (1996); and Conference Board (2011). 18
  • 19. The making of “Brand Europe”Figure 5: European enterprises have delivered jobs, productivity, and exports(performance of European subregions and benchmark countries, 1995–2009) EFTA 1.3 1.4 50.2 EU15 1.3 1.0 49.4 EU12 0.4 3.0 57.5 Estonia 0.3 5.7 71.2 Latvia 0.1 4.2 43.4 Lithuania -0.3 4.3 54.8 EU candidates 0.6 3.6 31.2 Eastern partnership -0.1 6.6 38.7 United States 1.2 1.6 11.2 Japan -0.1 1.2 13.4 China 1.0 7.8 26.7 East Asia 1.7 2.0 64.0 Latin America 2.4 0.4 23.2 -1 0 1 2 3 0 2 4 6 8 0 20 40 60 80 Employment growth, percent Productivity growth, percent Exports, percentage of GDP, 2009Note: Growth rates in employment and productivity are compound annual growth rates. Average values by group are shown. China and Japan, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are also included in the calculation of East Asia and EU12 regional averages, respectively.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on WDI and ILO (2010); see Chapter 4. 19
  • 20. Two productivity gapsNorth vs. South, and EU vs. USFigure 5.1: Mind the gap: convergence followed by slowdown in Europe’s productivity relative to the United States(GDP per hours worked in Geary/Khamis $, United States =100) 100 80 EU Continental EU North 60 EU South Estonia 40 Lithuania EU12 20 Latvia 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Note: EU15 North = Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; EU15 Continental = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; EU15 South = Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Conference Board (2011); see Chapter 5. 20
  • 21. Productivity levels differ in Europe—as expectedFigure 6a: Much of Europe is becoming more productive, but the south has fallen behind(labor productivity levels in 2002, thousands of 2005 US$)Note: For Belgium, Greece, and Norway, productivity levels refer to 2003. The three lines show average values for countries covered by each line.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see Chapter 4. 21
  • 22. Productivity growth—not exactlywhat was expectedFigure 6b: Much of Europe is becoming more productive, but the south has fallen behind(labor productivity growth, 2002–08, annual percentage increase)Note: The period considered varies: Belgium and Norway (2003–08), Greece (2003–07), and the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Romania, and the United Kingdom (2002–07). The three lines show average values for countries covered by each line. Expected growth for EU15 South is obtained by computing gaps in productivity levels between EU15 South and each of the other two groups and then applying these shares to the difference in growth between the first (that is., EFTA, EU15 North, and EU15 Continental) and the third (EU12) groups.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see Chapter 4. 22
  • 23. Entrepreneurial structures must besuitable for a big marketFigure 7: Smaller firms contribute half of value added in the EU15 South, but just a third elsewhere(contributions to value added by size of enterprises, 2009)Note: The numbers in parentheses are the total value added expressed in billions of constant 2005 U.S. dollars. The EU15 comprises Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Continental); and Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South). The EU12 comprises Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (North); the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Continental); and Bulgaria and Romania (South).Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat; see Chapter 4. 23
  • 24. FDI has turned eastward, away fromthe southFigure 8: Western European investors have been looking east, not south(foreign direct investment inflows in Europe, percent, 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2008, percent)Note: The numbers in parentheses are the amount of inflows expressed in billions of U.S. dollars.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on UNCTAD (2010); see Chapter 4. 24
  • 25. Doing business is now most difficultin the EU15 SouthFigure 9: Southern and Eastern Europe must make it easier to do business(principal components index of the ease of doing business in 2011, scaled from 0 [poor] to 100 [excellent]) 90.790 87.2 82.8 79.5 76.0 74.4 74.5 74.9 75.2 73.6 69.4 68.0 64.4 66.56030 0 USA JPN EFTA EU15 North Conti- South EU12 North Conti- EST LVA LTU South nental nentalNote: Averages are computed using principal component analysis. EFTA here comprises Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU15 comprises Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Continental); and Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South). The EU12 comprises Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (North); the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (Continental); and Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania (South).Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Doing Business; see Chapter 4. 25
  • 26. Another productivity gap has beengrowing—between the EU15 and the USFigure 10: Productivity growth in Europe’s larger economies has slowed down since the mid-1990s(EU15 labor productivity, indexed to the United States and Japan)Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on the OECD Productivity Database; see Chapter 5. 26
  • 27. Europe specializes in old sectors, theUS in newFigure 11: The United States specializes in younger, more R&D-intensive products(relative technological advantage and R&D efforts by young and old innovation leaders in the United States, Europe and the rest of the world)Note: R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D spending to total sales, for firms established after 1975 (young leading innovators or ―Yollies‖) or before 1975 (―Ollies‖). The relative technological advantage is calculated as the share of each region or country (say Europe) in the R&D of a particular sector (say the Internet) relative to the share of Europe in world R&D; values greater than 1 indicate the region is technology specialized in the sector.Source: Bruegel and World Bank staff calculations, based on the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies R&D Scoreboard; see Chapter 5. 27
  • 28. Some economies are doing well, butthey are smallFigure 5.3: Europe’s leaders invest as much in innovation as the United States and Japan(business and public R&D expenditure, percentage of GDP)Note: Data refer to different years by country.Source: European Commission (2011) and UNESCO; see Chapter 5. 28
  • 29. And the US lead in top tertiaryeducation is growingFigure 5.16: Europe is falling behind the United States in top university rankings(world’s top 100 universities)Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on data from Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Thomson Reuters/Times; see Chapter 5. 29
  • 30. Greening productionSee Spotlight Two.
  • 31. Europe—Lifestyle Superpower 31
  • 32. The lifestyle superpowerFigure 12: Outspending the rest of the world(general government spending on defense [United States] and social protection [Europe], 2004–09, share of total world spending)Note: For social protection spending, due to the data availability, averages over 2004–09 by country are used. n is the number of countries included in the calculations. Data cover general government but, if unavailable, refer to central government only.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011), IMF GFS, WDI, World Bank ECA Social Protection Database, and Weigand and Grosh (2008). 32
  • 33. Fewer workers in EuropeFigure 14: Europe’s labor force will shrink, while North America’s will grow by a quarter(projected cumulative change in working-age population, 2010–50, percent) 30 North America 20 10 0 -10 Western Europe Emerging Europe -20 North-East Asia -30 Lithuania -40 Estonia Latvia -50 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050Note: North America is the US and Canada; North-East Asia includes China, Hong Kong SAR, China, Japan, Macao SAR, China, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, China. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are also included in Emerging Europe.Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base; see Chapter 6. 33
  • 34. European workers are less mobileFigure 15: Europeans are less mobile, even within their own countries(labor mobility, share of working age population that has moved, 2000-05)Source: Bonin and others (2008); and OECD (2005 and 2007); see Chapter 6. 34
  • 35. Europeans are living longer, andretiring earlierFigure 13: Europe’s pension systems have to support people for many more years(changes in life expectancy at 60 and effective retirement age, 1965–2007)Source: OECD (2011) and updated data from OECD (2006). 35
  • 36. European governments spend about10 percent of GDP moreFigure 16: Governments in Europe are big(the world resized by government spending in dollars, 2009)Source: World Bank staff using IMF WEO. 36
  • 37. Social protection spending is the(only) reasonFigure 17: Social protection explains the difference in government size between Europe and its peers(government spending, percentage of GDP, 2007–08)Note: ―Social protection‖ includes benefits related to sickness and disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, and housing. Western Europe comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Center); Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South).Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF GFS and IMF WEO; see Chapter 7. 37
  • 38. The Baltic states are smaller thanother eastern countries and the westFigure 17: Social protection explains the difference in government size between Europe and its peers(government spending, percentage of GDP, 2007–08) 50 40 17.5 21.1 18.5 8.7 16.2 19.9 10.6 11.5 30 5.2 6.7 4.6 6.1 4.9 6.3 5.2 5.6 7.0 4.0 20 3.6 6.8 4.8 4.5 5.5 6.2 10 21.8 18.6 15.9 16.7 18.3 15.5 13.5 13.6 0 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland Sweden Italy Germany Social protection Education Health Non-social spendingNote: ―Social protection‖ includes benefits related to sickness and disability, old age, survivors, family and children, unemployment, and housing.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on IMF GFS and IMF WEO; see Chapter 7. 38
  • 39. Others also subsidize the elderly, butnot for nearly as longFigure 18: Small differences in annual pensions per beneficiary, big in overall public pension spending(public pension spending in 2007)Note: Median values by group are shown. Western Europe comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (North); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Center); Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (South). Anglo-Saxon comprises Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on Eurostat and the OECD Pensions Statistics; see Chapter 7. 39
  • 40. Big adjustments ahead, because of currentimbalances and future health costsFigure 19: Western Europe has to reduce fiscal deficits by 6 percent of GDP, emerging Europe by less(illustrative fiscal adjustment needs, 2010–30, percentage of GDP) Required adjustment Cyclically-adjusted primary balance, 2010-20 Changes in pensions and healthcare, 2010-30 12 10 4.1 8 2.1 6 5.9 3.1 3.1 4 3.6 2.0 7.0 0.9 6.9 6.4 2 3.6 2.5 2.8 3.2 2.8 3.4 3.0 0.7 0.7 0 -0.3 -0.1 Overall North Center South Overall EU12 Estonia Latvia Lithuania EU Eastern candi- partner- dates ship Western Europe Emerging EuropeNote: The fiscal impacts of aging on pensions and health care systems are missing for EU candidate and eastern partnership countries. For this exercise, the sum of adjustment in health care spending is assumed to be the same as for the new member states. The adjustment in pension related spending is assumed to be the same as that for southern Europe. For the country composition in each group, see note for figure 17.Sources: Calculations by staff of the Institute for Structural Research in Poland and the World Bank, based on IMF WEO; see Chapter 7. 40
  • 41. Imperatives 41
  • 42. Keeping what has been achieved• Restarting the Convergence Machine: Services • Facilitate the trade in business services • Strengthen regulatory coordination for finance• Rebuilding Brand Europe: Productivity • Restart the convergence machine • Improve enterprise where productivity growth has slowed • Download ―killer apps‖ of innovation from the United States• Remaining the Lifestyle Superpower: Demography • Restart the Convergence Machine • Rebuild Brand Europe • Make labor markets more competitive • Make government more efficient, or make it smaller 42
  • 43. Imperatives, strengths and weaknesses Government Demographic Trends Labor Innovation Productivity Growth Enterprise Finance Modern Services Trade 43
  • 44. It’s been done before (in Europe)Table 8.1: Benchmark countries for selected policies Selected countries Policy area Europe World 1 Restructuring private debt Sweden Korea, Rep. 2 Managing financial foreign direct investment (EU) Poland (Non-EU) Croatia 3 Crisis-proofing financial integration Czech Republic Canada 4 Increasing value-added Slovak Republic Singapore 5 Job creation Ireland New Zealand 6 Export generation Germany Korea, Rep. 7 R&D policy Switzerland United States 8 Tertiary education United Kingdom United States 9 Management quality Sweden United States 10 Internal mobility Ireland United States 11 Labor legislation Denmark United States 12 Immigration policies Sweden; United Kingdom Canada; United States 13 Social security Iceland Japan 14 Social service delivery Finland Singapore 15 Reducing public debt Turkey New Zealand 16 Green growth policies Germany California (US)Source: Iwulska (2011), available at www.worldbank.org/goldengrowth. 44
  • 45. Available atwww.worldbank.org/goldengrowth 45