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    Common Foreign and Security Policy of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy of EU Document Transcript

    • Framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); Analyzing Through Theoretical Approaches ECE DINCASLAN
    • The Common Foreign and Security Policy came from in the formation of EuropeanPolitical Cooperation in 1970. European Political Cooperation was an informal discourseamong members on foreign policy as the aiming of creation on common approach to foreignpolicy issues and enhancing the EUs own interests. This encourage international cooperation,democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. Before the Maastricht Treaty cameinto effect on 1 November 1993, the EU had no official role in foreign affairs and could notspeak a single voice. With the Maastricht Treaty, member states assigned to develop a foreignpolicy and allowed to speak with one voice in this area. The Amsterdam Treaty created theoffice of the High Representative which held by Javier Solana for the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy to represent and coordinate the EUs foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon wasactivated in December 2009 and brought an end to the pillar system. There are several objectives which the European Union defines and implements a commonforeign and security policy that covers all areas of foreign and security policy according to theTreaty on European Union. First of all, the objectives started with preserving the commonvalues, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union. After that, itcontinued as strengthening the security of the Union in all ways. Next, it was also to preservepeace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UnitedNations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of theParis Charter, including those on external borders. Finally, promoting internationalcooperation, developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and respect forhuman rights and fundamental freedoms were other aim for CFSP. The Common Foreign and Security Policy have some elements which were types of policy,the High Representative and bodies. For types of policy, The European Council identified theprinciples and general statute for the CFSP. According to these principles, the Council ofMinisters adopts joint actions or common positions. Joint actions address specific situationswhere operation action by the EU is considered essential and set up a rule for the objectives.However, common position describe the approach that the EU takes on a certain matter anddescribe in the abstract the general principles to which the national policies of Member statesmust implement. For the High Representative, the Common Foreign and Security Policyneeds unanimity among the now 27 member states on the favorable policy to follow on anyspecific policy. There was unusual fact ın Iraq issue which showed us disagreements in CFSP.The tasks of the European Union Special Representatives were also coordinated by the HighRepresentative. The High Representative serves as the head of the European Defense Agency
    • and exercises the same functions over the Common Security and Defense Policy as the CFSP.On 1 December 2009, Catherine Ashton took over Javier Solanas post as the HighRepresentative, who has held the post since 1999.1 In addition, there are several bodies tocoordinate within the context of the CFSP. Within the Council, there is the Foreign AffairsCouncil formation, essentially a meeting of foreign ministers and the Political and SecurityCommittee which follows the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP andpromote by delivering ideas to the Council of Ministers. The European Defence Agency promotes increase in defence capabilities, military researchand the establishment of a European internal market for military technology. Two bodiesobtained over from the Western European Union which the European Union Institute forSecurity Studies and the European Union Satellite Centre which deal with security anddefence policy. How does the CFSP work? The High Representative for Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the EuropeanUnions foreign policy and provide consensus between member states. Although the HighRepresentatives specific powers are mostly undefined and likely to be shaped by CatherineAshton, member states are still made actual decisions on CFSP in the European Council. As aresult, it was agreement that involved the EU in peacekeeping in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Congo in 2003, as well as observer missions in Gaza and Indonesia. In2007, EU foreign ministers agreed on implementing sanctions against Iran. In 2008, sanctionswere imposed against Zimbabwe following a violent and undemocratic presidential election,and the EU launched its first maritime operation to prevent hijacking of Somalia. In addition,The European Council also issues common strategies on issues about which members statesagree, many as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU has diplomatic duties inseveral important countries under the authority of the High Representative. These involvestrategies on promoting democracy and peace in Russia, the eastern Mediterranean and theUkraine.1 Smith, Michael E. (2004), Europe‟s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    • Although the using of QMV increased under the Lisbon Treaty in CFSP, right to veto wasmaintained by member states in all EU foreign policy decisions and strategies. For example,Poland blocked a new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia because ofongoing Russian ban on Polish meat imports in 2005-07. Also Spain, Greece and Slovakiaopposed UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaaris plan for Kosovo independence from Serbia washowever an EU mission was sent to Kosovo when it declared its independence in 2008.Member states still have the freedom to resume their own foreign policy aims. For example,Britain and some other members agreed on US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 despite theopposition of other member states. There are some arguments which are in favor and against for CFSP. Initially the CFSP is aninfluential way of developing security around the EU by emphasizing shared aims and values.Countries gain a louder voice with cooperating on foreign policy on the world stage. Also,members have right to save money as pooling diplomatic and defence resources because theycan share know how and hardware. What about against? The EU should not go it alone, but itshould instead retain traditional links with the USA through NATO and the UN. In addition,setting foreign policy is one of the most important tasks of a national government so unelectedEuropean officials should not be given this power. The CFSP can only ever have limitedeffectiveness because member states find it very difficult to agree on foreign and securitypolicy. CFSP allows some countries to do less about their security because they can ride onthe back of more powerful countries, like the UK or France. The reasons for the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy To begin with, the European integration has improved an increasing common understandingamong member states and focus on their common interests. Both economic and trade interestsand the need to encourage the values that constitute the cornerstone of democratic Europewere considered on a basis. Also, the consequence of the development of the Europeancommunitys external action emerged the need to coordinate the member states foreign policyand the improving interdependence between international affairs and economic and tradeissues. After, the following events of enlargement of the EU have extended of its externalrelations which are Commonwealth, Latin America and Mediterranean. In addition, the EUgains new way and responsibilities on the international scene with the end of cold war and ofthe bi-polar international system. Therefore, the Balkan crisis created needing to improve theCFSP in order to the EU not to be limited to a simple “free-trade area”. European public
    • opinion could not compromised by itself to the concept of “an economic giant but a politicaldwarf”. It is now hoped that the launching of the euro will also promote the followingimprovement of the CFSP. The main stages of the construction of the CFSP The Davignon report is the founding document of the European Political Cooperation, theCFSPs predecessor. Its content was strengthened by the Copenhagen report in November1973 (trimestral meetings of the Foreign Ministers and monthly meetings of the PoliticalCommittee, creation of the COREU network and of the working groups), the Paris Summitconclusions in December 1974 (introduction of the role of the Presidency in the developmentof relations with third countries) and the London report in October 1981 (introduction of the“troika” formula). Also, title of the Single European Act institutionalized in 1986 fifteen yearsof “customary practice” and stipulates the creation of the Secretariat.2 After the Treaty on theEuropean Union adopted in Maastricht in December 1991, a single institutional frameworkwas created which the Common Foreign and Security Policy constitutes the second pillar. Themember state attitudes focus on strengthening the European identity on the internationalscene, clearly through the implementation of the CFSP. Also, the member states committed themselves to guarantying that their national foreignpolicies apply with the EUs common positions and to coordinating their behavior ininternational organizations and at international conferences. The next step was the adoption ofthe treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which altered the TEU and resumes in force while waitingfor the confirmation by member states of the Nice Treaty which was adopted in December2000. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam includes several new steps which firstly thecreation of the post of the CFSP High Representative, as well as of the Policy Unit in theSecretariat. Than, Institutionalization of the “constructive abstention” mechanism in order tofacilitate the CFSP decision-making process. The final step was creation of a new instrumentcalled the “common strategy”. After the Cologne European Council in 1999, the Common Security and Defence Policy hadbecome an important part of the CFSP. The European Union had limited military capability,member states are responsible for their own territorial defence and a majority of EU members2 http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=40&article=59
    • are also members of NATO which is responsible for the defence of Europe. The Kosovo warin 1999, the European Council agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomousaction, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readinessto do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO." 3 However, some enterprises were made to increase the EUs military capability, clearly theHelsinki Headline Goal process. Following discussion, the most concrete result was the EUBattlegroups initiative and planned to be able to mobilize about 1500 men quickly. EU forceshave been appointed on peacekeeping missions from Africa to the Balkans and the MiddleEast. A number of bodies support EU military operations, including the European DefenceAgency, main centre and the military staff. Also, the European Union big member states havevariety ideas about NATO. Germany declared that NATO is still significant organization inEurope security and it is the corner stone of Europe security and a new developing Europedefense system must act together with NATO. However, France has been always against USAfrom a historical point of view will not be wrong. Also, they argued that European defensepolicy will be coordinated with NATO but as an independent. In addition, although Englandacts show more closely to France behavior, they sometimes emphasized that Union must actin coordination with USA in security policy. Petersberg tasks/crisis management tasks The „Petersberg tasks‟ create a central part of the CFSP. These are crisis management tasksnamed after the place where the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union. ThePetersberg tasks are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combatforces in crisis management, involving peacemaking. The European Council has stated thatthe EU must „have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to internationalcrises without prejudice to actions by NATO‟.4 The Helsinki European Council established the general aims for military capability inDecember 1999. The objectives, which were to be distinguished by 2003, were that the EUshould be able to appoint, within 60 days and for at least one year, up to 60 000 personscapable of performing the full range of Petersberg tasks. Although ıt did not involve the3 Grant, Charles (2001), A Stronger European Foreign and Defence Policy, in: Bannerman, Edward et.al. (eds.),Europe After September 11th, London: CER, 31-484 http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/95/
    • creation of a European army, decisions on recruitment and deployment of national troops aretaken at Member State level. In addition to that, although there were certain shortcomings todeployment capability and speed a Council meeting of EU Ministers for Foreign Affairsdeclared that the Helsinki objectives had been achieved in December 2003. The newobjectives adopted by the June 2004 European Council, „Headline Goal 2010‟, is therefore onquality and specific capacity requirements rather than quantity. There are some distinctive features of Common Foreign and Security Policy. To begin with,unlike EPC, CFSP for the first time brings a distinct political and military-defense processorto the European project. Also, CFSP is officially one of the three pillars of the EuropeanUnion while the other two being the European Community and Justice and Home Affairs. Inaddition, unlike the EC, the CFSP will conduct chiefly through intergovernmentalcooperation. Moreover, while the CFSP is part of the EU, it will manage like EPC in amanner mostly independent of the institutions of the Community. Afterward, CFSP officiallycovers all issues related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of acommon defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. THE CASES OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS AND THE IRAQ CRISIS The EU has failed to developed coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor dueto different ideas among the EU Member States during the Yugoslav crisis and the Iraq crisis.In both cases, not only different national interests among the EU Member States but also theirchoice for national interests over mutual European interests prevented them from agreeing ona coherent position. As a result, this fact led to a loss of effectiveness and internationalcredibility on the part of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. After the failure in theYugoslav crisis, the CFSP was launched. In addition, during another Former Yugoslav crisis,Kosovo crisis in late 1990s, the EU Member States once again failed to stop the conflict ontheir own and they recognized the fact that civilian, persuasive diplomacy not supported bycredible military forces for crisis management and conflict prevention could not alone besuccessful in preventing and managing conflicts. The EU Member States should actcollectively as a coherent actor within the framework of the CFSP in order to be an effectiveforeign and security policy actor.
    • Evaluating CFSP in the sense of Neo-Institutionalism, Constructivism, and Neo- Realism Nation States has no longer face common policy that would diverge significantly from theirnational policy. Hence, common policy is better for national autonomy and common actionsare seen to be very good for sacrificing sovereignty and national identity is worth, or if theirnational interest converge to the point that little loss of sovereignty is needed. Disagreements about Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of EU can be analyzedboth descriptive and prescriptive statements. These are not really disagreement but basicallyreflections of inefficacy, in order to agree on terms and state them clearly. CFSP it is aprogress and also underlies the creation of institutional, legal, or political mechanisms topromote and implement common actions. If the meaning of CFSP tried to be understood or questioned, there is no wrong or rightdefinition to everyone. These questions need to be evaluated: How integrated the CFSP? ,How global it is? , How military capable it is? , How openly articulated or well defined it is? ,How it can deal with immediate crisis? The possible answers will oppose tointergovernmental view, then regional, to civilian… Besides, it reveals that, CFSP shouldexplained in a better sense and it conflict to pursue long term goals. CFSP will have variety of trueness and precisions, also drawbacks. Integration of CFSPmay, for instance be in the interest of the European Union as an organization. What‟s more,small member states with little independence to loose but it could not be in the interest ofother states or outside the actors. This policy includes different ways of coordination andintegration. They would affect various actors in the political time. Thus affect the outcome ofnegotiations, whether CFSP conducted in their interest and conflicting views will notdefinitely be wrong. In the 2nd pillar CFSP remains almost intergovernmental. Thedisagreement between the member states that backed foreign policy integration with Europeancommunity, despite this, it reflected unwillingness of a majority of member states, not onlyBritain but also including French, to pool their national sovereignty and right of foreign policyinitiative to the commission. The gains and profits of common foreign and security policy are not always accurately norobviously well suited. All members of the group, national interests or government preferenceshave oriented to the point where the potential costs, minuses and risks of obligatory actionsare low. When constructivism has been evaluated as an explanation for further change and
    • transformation, it has stand on the behalf of liberal International Relations theory. It reachesmany of the same conclusions and in the same way. Liberal institutionalism explained though the states which are primary actors that shapesself-help a strategy for survival; in the sense of common interests exist, but are hard toidentify, absolute gains often enough and Collective action facilitated by institutions whichare; Institutions facilitate communication, Institutions provide agreed common rules,Institutions facilitates monitoring and, Institutions provide mechanisms for sanctions. Thus,the CFSP helps identify common interests. Because it can be understood within a denseinstitutional structure and constant communication. For example, the CFSP generates trustbetween the members (diffuse reciprocity), and also, CFSP facilitates a realization of commoninterests, but national one. Constructivists supported that states not necessarily most important actors and spill-overoccurred in integration for one area will incrementally lead to integration in other areas (butnot to high politics which supported by who cares most about national and internationalsecurity concerned issues. What‟s more loyalty evaluated that; the actors involved will besocialized into collective understanding. Besides, the common interests will be upgraded overtime in the constructivist view. CFSP has continued to develop over time despite the odds.What‟s more, foreign ministers and ambassadors meet more often in Brussels than they meetwith their national counterparts and it can be proved by converging policies on many foreignpolicy issues where there were initially disagreements, For instance, in the areas of securitystrategy and the Diplomatic Republic of Europe. Constructivism sets forth a new debate perceiving the European Union as a power as far asthe external impact of the CFSP is concerned. Constructivist theory also, rejects the basicassumption of neo-realist theory that the state of anarchy which lacks of a higher authority orgovernment is a structural condition inherent in the system of states. Within the rationalistsense, the European Union cannot be considered as a security actor given the lack of itsmilitary capability and military autonomy. At the most extreme, the European Union can beconceptualized as a „soft security‟ actor, but such a conception is not sufficient for rationaliststo describe the European Union as a security actor in the international sphere (Rieker, 8). However, exogenous interest, neo liberal institutionalism depends on implicity on an identitytransformation in order to account for union‟ cooperation maintenance. Moreover, clusters
    • theories which argue that international institutions play an important role in coordinatinginternational cooperation. Likewise, the preference between neo liberal institutionalism andconstructivism is not pragmatic and it is a kind of choice around explaining short term,behavioral cooperation at the time, also it‟s dependent on the communal cooperation in thefuture. Yet, constructivists emphasize the normative power of the European Union with thereasoning that the European Union has not only impacted the perception and agendas of thenational security actors and policies through the super state Brussels and Europeanization, butalso devised its security policy through which it addresses various internal and external threatswithin the enhanced and multifaceted security agenda (Rieker, 1-18). CFSP is shared bysupranational institutions and member states, so it‟s on the hands of bargaining powers ofmember states. Furthermore, MSs preferences and identities diverge this concept. So, InNormative institutionalism or so-called New Institutionalism MSs committed to ensuring theUnion‟s political viability. Within the constructivist analyses, the ideational and normativeexistence of the European Union, and the policies and actions of the Union have beenconsidered as tools that bring forth actor capability on behalf of the Union. Even CFSP is seenas a dimension of federalism and it possess a drawing capacity on civilian and military assets.As a matter of fact, Richard Young argues that the international presence of the EuropeanUnion has not only stemmed from the commitment of the European Union to normativevalues, but the European Union has enshrined and implemented particular values and normsin its external policy through promoting human rights, encouraging development in the ThirdWorld with the principle of conditionality and exporting human rights and democracy throughmembership perspective for the former Eastern European countries and humanitarianassistance. Thus, he underlines that the sole focus shall not be the ideational/normativepresence of the European Union, but the social learning process in external relations indiscussing the international presence of the European Union (Richard Youngs, 415-35). Given the variation in reacting to the external pressures by facing with internationalconflicts, terrorist attacks or others related things the EU member states have differentinterests in proceeding on the path to integrating their national foreign policies, which cannotbe properly explained by realism (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, M. E. Smith 2004: 20-21). Thesedifferences and interests are cumulatively translated into the institutional built-up of theCFSP. Clearly, although EU member states react to different international events in the waythey find appropriate and conform to their national interests respectively, this does notautomatically mean that the outcome is the smallest common denominator. What is true,
    • however, is that whatever the institutional outcome, this occurs as LiberalIntergovernmentalism suggests according to the logic of asymmetric interdependence. This„simple logic of “asymmetrical interdependence” those who benefit the most from a policymust sacrifice the most on the margin is the most profound factor shaping the negotiations‟(Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002: 3, Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). In short, constructivism brought up new concepts and a framework to security studies bydistancing themselves from the „materialist ontology‟ and „rationalist explanations‟. CFSP isconcerned through the constructivist way. Hence, it premises have been critical of therationalist approaches that have overlooked in the political, social and economic processesframing the foreign and security policy and the impact of the it on member states‟ identities,interests and behaviors. From that like a perspective, the constructivist approach increases ourtheoretical ability to grasp the incremental development of the CFSP and in deepening theanalysis of security and defense cooperation in Europe. „Open method of coordination‟(OMC) which means of, governance in the European Union, based on the voluntarycooperation of its member states, and increasing sensitivity in many areas of EU internalpolicy making to the implications of globalization, can be really seen as foreign and securitypolicy any longer as such a special area facing challenges and exogenous shocks. Theconstructivist approach has also increased the understanding about not only the transformativerepercussions of the security policy on actors‟ identity, preferences, incentives and intereststhrough socialization, communication social learning, as an ongoing process rather than astatic one, but also the widened security agenda. If Neo Realist theories of IR try to evaluate CFSP, it needs to know firstly what Neo Realistsupported. The international system, at a particular way in time, may be characterized asunipolar, bipolar or multipolar, developed by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz supported that,„balancing is not the aim of the state, balancing is a product of the aim to survive‟. Thus,states are considered as primary actors in an anarchic system and self-help a strategy forsurvival. After that, the security for dilemma reveals that relative gains important and resultedin a cooperation in high politics is unlikely, to form an alliances are temporary, and also,balance of power will form in the international system. National interests will prevail that;states will never trust each other enough to make the CFSP work. The EU members feel noobligations which underlies that, CFSP is “unimportant”. It will be supported, around the
    • 5evidences of Iraq, UNSC, not existence of any European army. Following a Neo-realistthought, for example, the member states might wish to use the EU as their instrument tobalance the American power. This means that in a Rationalist view an EU foreign securitypolicy is likely to emerge only as long as it is in the member states interest to do so. However,with references to the divisions over the Iraq war, as it mentioned the above, they would tendto argue that the prospects for this to happen are weak. Moreover Neo- Realism rooted inmistrusting relationship between nation states, which is a driving force of survival is theprimary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures to develop defensive or offensivemilitary capabilities. Because states can never be certain of other states future intentions, tobe on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten theirsurvival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma. (CultureRelations: The Role of the State). Neo-realists also assume that states are rational, unitaryactors in their external behavior because when it comes to international relations and foreignpolicy, all factions and organizations agree on the common goal of making the states as secureas possible (Denny, Roy, 1998, Chinas Foreign Policy). But according to Constructivists, it is not need to use a broader definition of security toargue that the EU is a security actor. It will be examined these components a bit more indetail. Some Constructivists thought that the European Union also has a significant militarycapacity. Instead of comparing member states‟ capacities to those of the US, they will look atthe EU as a different military power. They would, for example, argue that comparisons withthe US are of little value, and that what is interesting is rather to evaluate what the EU aims atand what it is capable of doing (Ulriksen, 2004). An EU security strategy was adopted identifying the main threats, the main strategicobjectives and also the policy implications for Europe. The basis for the EU‟s commonforeign and security policy (CFSP) remains „soft‟ power: the use of diplomacy - backedwhere necessary by trade, aid and peacekeepers - to resolve conflicts and bring aboutinternational understanding. It recognizes that the EU has made progress towards a coherentforeign policy and effective crisis management, but it also stresses the need to make acontribution that matches the EU‟s potential. It argues that the EU needs to be more active,more capable, and more coherent and be better at working with partners. It focuses on the5 EUObserver.com, 1 December 2010
    • need for bringing together the various instruments and capabilities in order to meet theidentified threats. The approach presented in the strategy is one that fits the Constructivistinterest in comprehensive security. Constructivist analysis of EU security policy will argue that the EU already has developed asecurity policy. And they would argue that this has happened despite the fact that majormember states continue to have different positions in relation to some hot topics ininternational politics. If compared Neo-realists and Constructivists views they both will arguethat the EU does not have any security policy. There are several units in this argument. First,EU does not have much autonomy and EU is governed by the member states. Then, attemptsat building military capacities and to make more powerful security cooperation in the EUhave became unsuccessful and faced with failure. And finally, it is very difficult to perceive acommon threat that will promote the EU cooperation in the future. Predict what will happen in the future. In fact, one is often surprised by the policydevelopments. This means that it is important to avoid having too narrowed a theoreticalframework, which may prevent us from seeing developments that in the longer run mighttransform European security. To sum up, CFSP; a type of post- modern or extra- national foreign policy, lacking the keycontrol institutions and instruments characteristic of foreign policy based on statist ormodernist assumptions. What‟s more, the boundary of CFSP is unclear and carries strongunanswered questions of member states‟ strong incentives whether it is a „governance withoutgovernance‟. Although a formal involvement of commission in the process, the CFSPremained essentially constructivist in inspiration and dependent on divergent interests ofmember states. It remains as a major force of the EU in the international arena, by takingfurther possibility of QMV and also pulls budgetary stabilization. Besides, searching forlegitimacy, MSs preferences and desire for environmental stabilization are successively lairedor overlaid by reflecting the ideas institutions and policy. A number of interlinked ideas in theCFSP is framing and reframing of the policy space. As a result, the outcome is a formal post-modern foreign policy detached from modernist thoughts and think tanks of territoriality, ofcentral governmental control and of the deployment of hard policy tools. It is important toclarify CFSP which includes policy areas dominated by the Member States that the paperdefines EU foreign policy as the set of policies adopted by the Unions Member States to
    • address issues and manage relationships beyond their collective external border. Hence itrequires unanimous support and subjected to veto by a single Member State. And because theEU has adopted relatively few Common Strategies that opposed to the more frequentCommon Positions and Joint Actions, the vast majority of policies especially about securityand related issues are adopted by unanimous agreement of the Member States. Reciprocalrelationship between CFSP and national foreign policies and the transforming capacity of theCFSP offers conclusion about vis-à-vis national foreign policies, and including their„Europeanization‟ process.6 The expansion of common foreign and security policy has been started since early1970s. However, this is totally different from other European Union policies which containsensitive issues for member states. All policies of European Union requires common attitudesand also obligation between member states that emerge major challenge. Because of thatproblem , the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) attempted to reorganize theseinstitutional forms into a compatible policy process. On the other hand , Common Foreignand Security policy has not been yet a supranational issue for member state altough between1970s and 1980s under the European political co-operation ( EPC ) has seen importantprocess toward multi-level governance of EU foreign policy however the issues are limitedbecause states do not want to transfer their sovereignty to multi- level governance asintergovernmentalism assert that . The objectives of intergovernmentalism protect andpromote security and European integration should be driven by interest and actions of nation– state. Hoffmen who is significant representative of intergovernmentalism criticise neo-functionalism and according to him „spill over is not a proven fact „„In spite of a continuous support for the neofunctionalist tenet, recurrent crisis within the EC‟ssummits, deadlocked meetings within the Council of Ministers and the discordant relationbetween the UK and the rest of the Community had strongly shaken the neofunctionalistarguments. (Laffan, Mazey 2006, 40) Stanley Hoffmann through his intergovernmentalist6 Ben Tonra, Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach, Vol.41
    • critique of the neofunctionalist approach emphasized the importance of the nationalgovernments and their roles in shaping the EC‟s structure. He underlined that nationalgovernments would always endorse their interests within a broader system. In order to showthe limits of the functional method, Hoffman argued that, in fact, it was the logic ofdiversity which prevailed and limited the spillover effects of the neofunctionalist theory.Hoffmann clearly highlighted the dichotomy between low politics, which comprises areassuch the economic and welfare policies and the vital national interests or high politics such asforeign policy, security and defense, where national governments are less willing totransfer their authority to a supranational body. National governments would try to minimizeuncertainty and retain tight control over decision processes when vital interests areinvolved.‟(Smith, 2003) 7„in order to support the intergovernamentalist perspective it should be mentioned that staterepresentatives are the only legally recognized signatories of the treaties of the EU. “Treatymaking is the realm of negotiation among national leaders, the national veto, and side-payments to bring recalcitrant national governments on board.” (Marks 1996, 352) To back upthe intergovernmentalist tenet it is interesting to notice how ardently the MS wished topreserve their own cultural, political and constitutional features, a point clearly made in Art.(1), Treaty of the European Union: “The Union shall respect the national identities of MS,whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy”. (Chryssochoou,Tsinisizelis 1999, 14) This “respect for the national identity” is very well preserved especiallyin key moments when intergovernmental decisions are taken under unanimity, during thetreaty-amending negotiations or when dealing with decisions in the European Council. By andlarge, these kinds of decision are relevant for the second and third pillar of the EU, theCommon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and for fostering cooperation within the Justiceand Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. (Wiener, Diez, 2004: 83) With regards to CFSP, theintergovernmentalist bargaining is more than obvious if we take into account that “there is ausual great sensitivity among most governments about foreign policy as a special domain inwhich national concerns dominate international or European interests” (Smith, 2000:614). In comparison to the EU‟s first pillar (European Communities pillar) where Brussels hasthe capacity to impose explicit demands on its members in the form of treaty articles,7 The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a postmodern policy framework?- William Smith 2003
    • secondary legislation, court cases in different socio-economic areas of the integration project,CFSP doesnot have the competence to impose change on MS foreign policies.‟8 What ‟ s more, according to intergovernmentalism , Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy will be last institutional form of European integration. The reason of this argument isthe key points of foreign and security ; information-sharing, norms, and organisations. Indeed, in intergovernmentlist perpective , common foreign and security policy is more thanintegration which is also supported by Smith and he claim that "it is also clear that the specificinstitutional reforms of EU foreign policy resulting from these events largely reflectedendogenous, path-dependent process" Intergovernmental paradigm has been predominant since 1980s when the limits of neo– functionalist became clear that emphisizes national interest, lowest – common –denominator deals , bargaining and unwillingness of state. The different view of neo –functionalist and intergovernmentalism seperated especially in the perspective which iscommon foreign and security policy. According to neo – functionalist, the process will be stepby step (some kind of political spill over ) Neo functionalist expecte that custom unionemerge single market and single market led the pressure to monetary union which iscompleted and monetary union evokes all member states to democratization process whichmeans common interest and common foreign and security policy became a major issue forwhole european to support common interest which is shared by each member state. Thus , EUelites support this spillover in order to get more economic advantages which are one of thekey element of neo- functionalism. However, this is not acceptable each situation. Forinstance, in 1960s France did not support streghtened European Commision rule or increasinguse of majority voting with claiming it is opposite according to their national interest. On theother hand , in 1970s the idea of single market was promoted by states but oil crisis boomedand in middle east wars started again, states started to criticise this integration for theirnational interest that is to say development of common foreign and security policy sacrifizingtheir national soverneigty or decision making process of all member states on security andforeign policy could be achieved in really long term. However, in neo – functionalistperpective , full integration shoul be for interfering all problems. For instance, whileeconomic crisis occurs , the attitude of member states can change altough normally they agree8 The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European IntegrationProcess, Teodor Lucian Moga , 2009
    • on economic integration . Thus , non – developed common view on foreign and securityissues , states can renounce when a position emerged which is opposite to their interest. The starting point of explaining member states , economic interdependence isfundamental concept for neo – functionalist and liberal intergovermentalism. On the otherhand , the differences between intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism isgiven importance of economic issues . Moreover, liberal intergovernmentalism predicts thatconstitutional powers will remain with the member states, while neo-functionalism wouldexpect an ever increasing role for supranational institutions. The intergovernmentalism andliberal intergovernmentalism have still been a effective on common foreign and securitypolicy. However , the perspectine of these approaches criticizes in some way.‟ The Europeandivisions over the Iraq war only serve to highlight this point. Europe re-mains divided, whilethe U.S. rules. Moreover and whatever the version of realism one adheres to, balancing is tobe expected as the standard behaviour of nation-states. Balancing in a one-super-power world,however, requires pooling resources and building alliances. From this perspective, one wouldexpect the EU to get its act together in foreign and security affairs in order to build a counter-weight to U.S. power. Second, it is wrong that European states are not prepared to give upsovereignty in the realm of security and defense. Most EU member states are also members ofthe NATO alliance. While NATO is an intergovernmental organization built on the consensusrule when it comes to decision-making, it features a completely integrated military structure.Once decisions have been made with regard to war and peace, German and other troops ofNATO members are prepared to die under the command of U.S., British, or French generals.In the post-Cold War environment, this is no longer hypothetical, but routinely the case inBosnia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Moreover and perhaps more important, there is noagreement among EU member states that giving up sovereignty in the realm of foreign anddefense affairs constitutes a bad idea. Rather, roughly two thirds of the current EU memberstates – let alone their populations – would be more than willing to supranationalize and tocommunitarize external security and national defense. Thus, intergovernmentalism onlyseems to apply to some countries such as the United Kingdom. To put it differently: If wewant to account for the puzzle of European foreign and security policy, we must explain thevariation among EU member states with regard to their preparedness to communitarizedefense affairs. „99 Neo-functionalism , European Identity , and the Puzzles of European Integration , Thomas RISSE ,2004
    • In addition , the preferences of member states about common foreing and securityissues change according to their structure -constitutional preferences- , for instance , ‟Germany has been more than willing to give up national sovereignty in favor of strengthenedEuropean integration , in contrast , The United Kingdom , inspite of all recent efforts atregional devolution. With the one exception of Margret Thatcher‟s endorsement of qualifiedmajor-ity voting during the negotiations leading up to the Single European Act, Britishleaders have con-sistently rejected strengthening supranational institutions of the EU. TheBritish dominant discourse – whether among the political elites or in the mass media – 10strongly emphasizes intergovernmen-talism (Marcussen et al. 1999) „ These examplesconclude that , federal and unitary states have different view on transfering sovereigntybecause federal member states consistently favor federal solutions for the institutional make-up of the EU, while unitary member states usually prefer strengthening the intergovernmentalpillar. Markus Jachtenfuchs explained in detail, there is a clear correlation between a memberstate‟s constitutional tradition and its preferences for institutional solutions at the EU level .Federally organized member states which are used to share sovereignty among the variouslevels of territorial governance are more than willing to give up sovereignty when it comes tothe EU.The responce of member state who had federal system is normal and generally supportfederal institutionalism in EU . The Federal Republic of Germany is perhaps the mostsignificant example in this context. Its cooperative federalism is based on the principle ofshared sovereignty between the federal level and the Laender (Börzel, 2002) New institutionalism reflect features of issue in European Union and important tounderstand basic parts of it that are; historical institutionalism, rational choiceinstitutionalism and socioligical institutionalism. If the berief analysis of these newinstitutionalisms examine, one could say about Historical Institutionalism, it pay lessattention to question that was how institutions affect the behavior, it focus on the step ofsituation which means reflection of causal chain through which institution affect behavior. Atthe same time rational choice institutonalism , refers that institutions and individuals aresignificant concept in order to understand system. Because decision – making and outcomes iscrucial to obtain more benefit from relations which related with human motivation of action,decision, preferences and choices. On the other hand, sociological institutionalism underlinesthe impotance of „cognitive script, categories and models that are indispensible for action‟ (Hall & Taylor, 1996 ) As we think this theoratical approaches in common foreign and security10 The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European IntegrationProcess, Teodor Lucian Moga , 2009
    • policy, it is not possible to divide theese three approaches in order to understand the system ofCFSP. Because it contains logical steps in there, on the other hand Hall and Taylor explain therelation between instiution and individual „ highly – interactive and mutually – constitutivecharacter‟. This issue cause a clash among states but also create „historical efficiency „Because each step help people and they are learning from experience, the best example is Post– Maastricht period as an evidence, new institutional structure is shaped by necessity, on theother hand , it creates historical inefficiency because it could not answer which way should beused for learning from experience. Moreover, it is necessary to mention that newinstitutionalism is suitable in order to analysis CFSP which includes intergovernmentalism(unanimity in decision – making ) transgovernmentalism ( formed through direct contactsbetween foreign minister of member states ) and supranationalism. Following these features,CFSP does not have own budget, office holder, bureucracy and also legal enforcement. There are lots of debates on European Union when one start to explain . the commonexplanation for the EU‟s alleged incompetence is primarily its lack of military capabilities andsecondarily its insufficient institutional capacity. Some scholars argues that European Unionis good at especially „ soft power „ , however, they also claimed that European Union containpossibility to achieve more than it which mentions security policy. „ This account implicitlyrests upon a widespread „actor-environment‟ understanding of the international system: Theactors of global politics are primarily states, which are characterised by distinct properties,such as the monopoly of legitimate force and the disposability of military power. Theenvironment of global politics is the anarchic international system. The corollary is thatsecurity problems are primarily associated with the interaction of clearly separatedcommunities being organised in states. This „methodological nationalism‟ (Beck 1997: 44-45)reversely suggests that inter-state war and military interventions represent the essential threatsto peace and security.‟ The quotation indicates us , European Union has not been an actor yetin international system because of the lack of military capabilities and insufficientinstitutional capacity , because each state has different wealth on military. Thus , effect ofenlargement became an significant debate for each therotical approach . The open disarrayover Iraq prompted many to write off the CFSP as an impossible dream. If 15 member statescould not agree, how could 25 possibly agree? What would be the common interests in aUnion stretching from Finland to Cyprus and from Portugal to Estonia? Some analystsproposed that the EU should only concentrate on its immediate neighbourhood and forget
    • about a global role. Others suggested that reinforced cooperation was the only way forward. 11( Frazer CAMERON, ANTOINETTE PRIMATAROVA: 1999 ) Because of theenlargement, member states ( especially 15 member states ) display considerableheterogeneity in foreign and security policy who do not support long – term decision oncommon foreign and security policy especially after Iraqi war. Therefore, European Unioncould not speak one voice to became a significant power in international system .‟ Therefore,most of the large member states claimed the process and development of foreign and securitypolicy in intergovernmental basis, on the other hand, the US has traditionally been asupporter of a more integrated Europe and pressured the EU to speak with one voice. But asthe EU has become a more active and vocal global player, the government in Washington hasseemed to have doubts about the benefits of a common EU voice, particularly when the voicemay be opposing the US! „. ( Frazer CAMERON, Antoinette PRIMATAROVA, 1999: 7-8 ) ‘The accession countries have had several years of shadowing the CFSP and until theIraq crisis, there were no major difficulties. The International Criminal Court (ICC),however, posed a problem as several accession states were subjected to pressure by the US tosign bilateral agreements that exclude US service personnel from ICC jurisdiction. But thisproblem was partly caused by the lack of a common position within the EU. During the period of shadowing the CFSP, the accession states normally gaveunqualified and disinterested support to the Union. Their priorities were the accessionnegotiations and the adoption of the acquis. Furthermore, what they were invited to do by theUnion was hardly onerous: align themselves with EU declarations and démarches; join EUcollaborative actions and common positions. In practice, the CFSP meant for the candidatecountries mainly rhetoric rather than action. Some candidates had trouble with the bureaucratic changes required. Regarding thepositions of ‘political director’ and ‘European correspondent’ needed for participation indifferent CFSP meetings and working groups, many candidate countries were slow to makethe necessary changes and appointments in their Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs). Inestablishing new positions to deal with the CFSP structures, the candidates wereexperiencing similar problems to the turf battles of previous years in the MFAs of memberstates.’11 ENLARGEMENT, CFSP AND THE CONVENTION THE ROLE OF THE ACCESSION STATES, Frazer CAMERON,ANTOINETTE PRIMATAROVA: 1999 )
    • REFERENCESAdrian Hyde-Price, “Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique”, Journal of EuropeanPublic Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2Amelia HADFIELD, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent,UK, 2006, Foreign Policy and Dyadic Identities: The Role of the CFSPAna E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, March 2000, The Deadlock that never Happened: theImpact of Enlargement on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Council Working GroupsBretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London and New York,Routledge, 1999Christopher Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, London, LynneRienner, 1997David LONG, 1995, The Norman Peterson School of International Affairs, CarletonUniversity,‟The CFSP and beyond:The EU‟s Territorial and Functional conception of securityDenny, Roy, (1998), Chinas Foreign PolicyErshova ANASTASIA, 2010, Central European University, „Institutional Arrengement ofCFSP; means fort he „soft‟ power? „Esther Barbe´, Oriol Costa, Anna Herranz and Michal NatorskiWhich rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and securitypoliciesFraser CAMERON AND Antoinette PRIMATAROVA,2003, EPIN Working Paper No:5 ,ENLARGEMENT, CFSP AND THE CONVENTION THE ROLE OF THE ACCESSIONSTATESGrant, Charles (2001), A Stronger European Foreign and Defence Policy, in: Bannerman,Edward et.al. (eds.), Europe After September 11th, London: CERHelen Sjursen, “The EU as a Normative Power: How Can This Be?”, Journal of EuropeanPublic Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999Jennifer Sterling – Folker, 2000, University of Connecticut, Competing Paradigms and Birdsof a Feather? Constructivist and Neo-liberal Institutionalism ComparedJulia Schmidt, COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND EUROPEANSECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER THE LISBON TREATY: OLD PROBLEMSSOLVED?Kenneth Waltz. The Emerging Structure of International Politics
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    • LINKShttp://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=40&article=59http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/95/http://www.digilib.ui.ac.id/opac/themes/libri2/detail.jsp?id=89691