The Future of ACP-EU Relations:Scenarios for Post Cotonou 2020

The Future of ACP-EU
Relations:
Scenarios for Post
Cotonou 2020
Geert Laporte
Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
29 September 2016

I. Context of the Post-Cotonou debate
II. Current practice of ACP-EU cooperation
III. Scenarios for Post-Cotonou
IV. State of debate on Post-Cotonou in the ACP
and in the EU
V. Options for Austria’s position regarding
Europe’s future relations with the ACP-group
Structure of presentation
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• “Think and do tank” born out of ACP-EU cooperation
(1986)
• Non-partisan and independent role
• Knowledge broker and dialogue facilitator
• In depth political economy of ACP-EU relations and
scenario building
Role ECDPM in ACP-EU
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• Evidence-based analysis to understand how things work out
in practice and why
• Look beyond policy discourse, legal frameworks and formal
institutions
• Focus on political and economic interests and incentives
that drive the key players
• Focus on “what is feasible” in the given context rather than
on “what should be done” (avoiding normative approaches)
• Drop taboos and political correctness: assess what has
(not) worked and why
• Results provide a picture of the present state of
cooperation with a view to inspire the identification of
realistic & result-oriented scenarios for the future
ECDPM Political Economy Analysis
(PEA)
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I. Context of the
Post-Cotonou debate
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• Highly political and polarised debate in “inner circles” of
EU and ACP policy makers (Informal Councils under
Netherlands and Slovak Presidencies)
• Divided Europe
• Heterogeneous ACP Group
• Poor knowledge and interest beyond formal ACP-EU
institutions
• Time is short to strike a deal involving 79 ACP and 27
(28?) EU countries!
Context of Post-Cotonou debate
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II. Current Practice of
ACP-EU Cooperation
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The Cotonou partnership has
lost appeal on both sides
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• Trade (EPAs) has
moved to RECs
• Security, migration
etc. has moved to
AU and RECs
• Weak international
identity ACP Group
• Limited intra-ACP
cooperation beyond
projects
• Mainly aid
instrument
Erosion of the three pillar
structure and political constraints
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1. Should we continue to treat EU development
differently for the ACP?
2. Does Cotonou deliver value for money?
3. Does it respond to the growing heterogeneity
of EU and ACP?
4. Does ACP Group have an added value
compared to other regional frameworks
between Europe and Africa?
5. Can ACP- EU effectively deal with UN Agenda
2030?
Existential questions
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III. Scenarios
and analytical tool
for policy makers
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1. What is the scenario about?
2. On what assumptions is the scenario based?
3. What key interests do ACP and EU pursue with
this scenario?
4. How realistic are the assumptions and interests?
5. What are the thorny questions and political
choices linked to this scenario?
6. Balance sheet with advantages, disadvantages
and risks
6 STEPS to assess feasibility of
each scenario
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• Continuity with the past
• No major changes to
current architecture (tri-
continental structure,
joint institutions, legal
framework,..)
• Corresponds to large
extent with scenario 1 of
the EU
SCENARIO 1: Keep CPA with
revisions
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• Best framework for mutually beneficial relations
between A,C,P and EU post 2020
• ACP sufficiently coherent to transform into
effective global player that can deliver on
universal 2030 Agenda
• It is possible to fix longstanding implementation
problems (political dialogue, intra-ACP, co-
management, limited joint action in global fora,…)
• Play safe because current climate in EU (Brexit,
migration crisis, etc.) is not conducive to big
reforms
Assumptions (scenario 1)
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Perceived interests of ACP
and EU (scenario 1)
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Perceived interests of the
ACP Group
Perceived interests of
EU policy makers supporting
this scenario
• Keep substantial and
predictable aid (EDF)
through existing architecture
(ACP Secretariat, Committee
of Ambassadors, NAOs, joint
institutions, UN agencies
benefitting from EDF, etc.)
• Safeguard acquis of
Cotonou: legal status, articles
for political dialogue,
provisions regarding EPAs,
etc)
• Limited transaction costs
by keeping 1 single
interlocutor

Political value
• CPA eroded to mainly aid instrument
• Legal status was not a guarantee for effective political action
• ACP limited track record in international fora
• Competing alternative frameworks
Ability to deliver on Agenda 2030
• Limited ACP-EU collective action on global public goods &
negotiation of common interests (heterogeneity members)
• Aid driven N-S partnership
• Global challenges are addressed elsewhere (AU)
Coherence external action
• CPA does not fit well with new EU priorities for more coherent
foreign policy (Global Strategy, regionalisation, overlapping policy
frameworks- JAES,…)
How realistic are assumptions &
interests (scenario 1)?
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• How solid is the assumption that the ACP Group can
reinvent itself as a global player and an effective (self-
financed) institution?
• Does it make sense to have a major new treaty that
will primarily deal with development cooperation?
• How will this scenario accommodate increasing
regionalisation and thematic dynamics?
• What concrete value added will an ACP-EU framework
have in dealing with Agenda 2030?
Critical questions
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Keep CPA with revisions: Overall
balance sheet
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Advantages Disadvantages and risks
• Keep a framework for managing
development cooperation with 79
ACP
• Guarantee to the ACP that
cooperation will continue, most
probably in the form of a legally
binding treaty
• Desirable option for risk averse
policy makers, especially in view of
the turbulent times the EU is
currently going through
• Artificial split between ACP and
non-ACP in EU external
action/development policy
• Difficult negotiations about
politically sensitive issues (ICC,
LGBT, migration)
• Major ratification challenges
• Costly and quite ineffective joint
institutions that often overlap
with EPA institutions
• Largely ignore whether the ACP as
a Group can transform itself as an
effective global player and
political interlocutor
• Risk of being bound beyond 2020
to an increasingly ‘empty’ ACP-EU
framework (aid)

• Safeguarding acquis
(through ACP-EU
umbrella agreement)
while deepening
regional partnerships
(e.g separate
agreements with
regional bodies)
• Preferred scenario
DEVCO/EEAS (Scenario
3 Informal Council
September 2016)
SCENARIO 2: ACP umbrella
linked to regional agreements
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• Current weaknesses of ACP-EU framework can be
addressed through umbrella and regional
agreements
• Umbrella keeps legally binding provisions for all 3
regions (pol dialogue, addressing sensitive issues
migration, ICC, LGTBI, etc)
• Regional strategies (JAES including North Africa &
JCEUS) can be consolidated
• Functional division of labour between ACP and the
continental (AU) and regional bodies
Assumptions (Scenario 2)
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Perceived interests of ACP and
EU (scenario 2)
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ACP Group
Perceived interests of EU policy
makers supporting this scenario
• Continuity of an all-ACP-EU legally
binding agreement
• Keeping the ACP and the joint
institutions largely intact
• Functional task division between
the all-ACP level and the regions
(subsidiarity/complementarity)
• Increasing the policy space for
the RECs to further develop their
own external policy towards Europe
while benefitting from wider tri-
continental Group and South-South
cooperation
• Keep acquis of the CPA: legal
status, channels for bilateral
political dialogue (Articles 8 and
96) migration (art 13) or EPAs
• Deepening and widening the
political partnership with Africa
as a whole, including North Africa
• Tackle core EU interests (e.g.
security, migration, etc.) through
regional strategies (e.g. EU-
Sahel, EU-Horn of Africa)
• Keep EDF that allows to flexibly
fund EU priorities (without lengthy
internal negotiations-(e.g. Africa
Peace Facility.

Political value
• Unclear added value of overarching all ACP structure
• The political partnership between the EU and the AU will
continue to get priority over EU-ACP (e.g. joint summits EU-
Africa)
• Despite a mixed track record, regional integration and co-
operation will remain a political priority for the EU.
• The EU Global Strategy (2016) does not refer to the ACP-EU
partnership. References to the Caribbean and the Pacific are
scarce and framed in a wider geographic context (e.g.
Caribbean and Latin America or the wider Asia-Pacific
region). Even for Africa, the focus is on specific geographic
sub-groups of African states that are central to the EU’s
strategic interests.
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• Limited track record and unclear role of the all-ACP Group as
an umbrella to undertake collective action on global public
goods due to their growing heterogeneity
• The EU and the ACP regions increasingly look for other
institutional channels (than the ACP-EU framework) to deal
with global challenges: Valetta process (2015) with African
leaders on migration; peace and security with AU; food
security with UN related bodies as well as continental and
regional structures; climate change through thematic
groupings (e.g. SIDS) etc…
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• Strengthening the regional dimension is coherent with
regionalisation dynamics both in the EU and the A, the C and
the P
• Possibility of ensuring a more differentiated approach tailored
to the needs of each region and the EU’s priorities at stake
• There are doubts about the capacity from the side of the EU
and the ACP to rationalise the ‘patchwork’ of regional
cooperation frameworks
• Maintaining an all-ACP umbrella structure may reduce
coherence and lead to higher institutional costs (e.g. complex
structures and lengthy debates on who does what)
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1. How far do the various parties want to go in
putting ‘regionalisation first’ in a future agreement?
2. What do the various parties want to put under an
ACP-EU umbrella agreement?
3. Where does the ACP Group enjoy recognised value
added by its members?
4. How to effectively and efficiently manage such a
complex set of structures at two levels (All ACP
and regions)
Critical questions
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Umbrella scenario: Overall
balance sheet
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• Potential to combine “the best
of two worlds” with a clear
distinction between principles
(in umbrella agreement) and
specific regional arrangements
with the A, the C and the P
• Continuity of (most of) current
ACP-EU institutions
• A more differentiated
approach according to the
needs of each region and the
EU’s priorities
• Complicated and simultaneous
negotiating processes at ACP-
EU and regional-EU levels
• Unclear complementarity
between possible umbrella
agreement and specific EU-RECs
agreements
• Unclear added value of ACP-
EU umbrella structure to deliver
on global public goods

• De facto external action
of EU with A,C,P
increasingly takes place
with regional groupings
• Post Cotonou 2020
provides opportunity to
organise relations
directly around regional
dynamics without all-
ACP structure
• Corresponds with
scenario 2 of Comms/
EEAS
SCENARIO 3: Regionalisation
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• RECs are no longer building blocks of ACP
• No added value of ACP-EU umbrella- CPA acquis can be
incorporated in regional partnerships
• Regionalisation as the driving force behind EU’s foreign
policy
• More homogenous and effective regional interlocutors to
deliver global public goods
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Perceived interests of ACP and EU for
scenario 3 (regionalisation)
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ACP Group
• Deepening of the political
partnership of Africa (mainly
through the AU), the Caribbean and
the Pacific with the EU
• Increasing the policy space for the
various regions and sub-regional
groupings in the ACP in their relations
with the EU
• The interest of the Caribbean and the
Pacific in this scenario largely
depends on the ‘offer’ the EU can
make in terms of an alternative
deal to the CPA (Caribbean and
Pacific reluctant to be part of
respectively EU-LA and wider
geopolitical Asian partnership
• Deepening political partnership
with Africa (as a whole) and to a
lesser extent with the C and P
• In a highly competitive world
consolidating the EU’s position as
a key international partner for RECs
in Africa, the C and P
• Using ODA and other external action
tools to tackle core EU interests
(e.g. security, migration, trade)
through targeted RECs
• Having credible regional partners
to jointly deliver on the 2030 Agenda
• Ensuring coherence with the
geographic focus of the EU Global
Strategy (2016)

Political value
• Despite mixed track record and some set-backs RI
will remain top priority for the EU
• Trend in EU to go regional to conclude political
deals (e.g. Global Strategy)
• Political partnership EU-AU more important to deal
with joint challenges (P&S, migration,..)
• Concerns on whether EU and the regions can
manage simultaneous negotiation processes with
several RECs
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• EU and ACP regions increasingly look for other
institutional fora to deal with global challenges
• RECs may have more legitimacy but the are
confronted with similar problems of legitimacy,
autonomy, self financing and therefore do no
provide guarantees that results will be
spectacularly better…
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• Coherent with regionalisation dynamics
• Potential for differentiation tailored to the needs of
each region and the EU’s strategic priorities
• Doubts about capacity and preparedness EU and
ACP to rationalise patchwork of regional
cooperation frameworks
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1. Is the EU looking for strategic partners at regional
level or implementing bodies for development
cooperation?
2. Is a regionalisation scenario possible without the
marginalisation of the C and P regions?
3. What will be status of the regional agreements that
replace the ACP-EU framework? Is it politically
desirable/feasible to negotiate a comprehensive and
legally binding agreement (like the CPA) with
specific regions?
4. What relation will be maintained with the ACP
Group?
Critical questions
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Regionalisation: Overall balance
sheet
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• Regional approach coherent with
evolution of international
relations and major changes in
the external action of both the EU
and ACP
• Opportunity to differentiate and
customise EU external action
with A, C, P according to interests
• Coherence with the logic of the
universal 2030 Agenda and
global goals
• Negotiations on a follow-up
treaty to the CPA – which are
likely to be difficult – could be
avoided
• Complexity of implementing such
a differentiated regional approach
in practice
• Fear that the acquis of the CPA as
such would be lost, especially
without a legally binding treaty
• Risk that the C and the P are
marginalised in EU external
action
• Need for major adjustments in
the institutional set-up and
(financial) instruments

• Engage on the basis of
shared interests both
regional and functional
SCENARIO 4: Mixed regional
and thematic multi-actor
partnerships
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• Modern international cooperation = functional, based on
shared values and interests not on historic or N-S logics
• Today’s multipolar world require a menu of strategic
partnerships where political deals can be concluded on
global public goods
• An open-ended and interest-driven approach to
partnership is coherent with the evolving nature of the
external action as conducted by both the EU and the
regions of the A, C and P
• The EU and the A,C, P regions have the political and
institutional interest and capacity to conceive and
implement a transition towards a portfolio approach
• Brexit may further erode the legitimacy of the ACP-EU as
a postcolonial construction
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Perceived interests of ACP
and EU (scenario 4)
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Perceived interests of the ACP
Group
• In line with ACP Group ambition to become
a global player with diversified strategic
partners (including EU)
• AU diversified its strategic partnerships
with and beyond the EU (e.g. China, India,
Latin America, Turkey, etc.)
• RECs may be open to deepen partnership
relations with the EU, particularly to
address shared priorities.
• Caribbean and the Pacific increasingly
‘going regional’ by linking up with countries
in their direct neighbourhood (South
America, Asia) or seek to defend their
interests through specific thematic (global)
groupings (SIDS)
• Beyond 2020, the application of the
differentiation principle means that
traditional aid benefits will further diminish
• Deepening political partnership with
Africa (as a whole) and with sub-regions
and groups of countries
• Address core EU interests (e.g.
migration, security, Agenda 2030)
through regional structures and thematic
groupings
• Ensuring coherence with the EU Global
Strategy by focusing on strategic
regions and countries in the proximity of
Europe, such as North Africa, the Sahel
and the Horn of Africa
• Reducing transaction costs by dealing
directly with the regional bodies and
issue-driven thematic groupings

Political value
• New approach to international relations
• More differentiation
• In line with EU Global Strategy and consensus
• Uncertain political value for the ACP Group because
of likely competition with RECs
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Ability to deliver on Global public
Goods (Agenda 2030)
• Global challenges increasingly structured around
regional but also functional lines
• Collective action EU and RECs and functional
groupings still in infancy stage
• Most groupings confronted with problems of
legitimacy, capacity, funding etc. affecting their
capacity to deliver on GPG
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• Consistent with EU Global Strategy’s ambition to
reform EU external action towards greater
alignment with EU strategic interests
• Allows to treat Africa as 1 continent and revitalise
EU-Africa partnership
• Incorporate EDF in the EU budget and reduce the
number of financial instruments
interests of scenario 4?
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1. Are the benefits and practical implications of this
scenario sufficiently clear?
2. What are the risks of such a ‘portfolio’ approach to
future cooperation and how can they be mitigated
3. Is the scenario possible without the marginalisation of
the Caribbean and Pacific regions and how?
4. Can the EU manage such a far-reaching reform of its
partnerships and instruments?
Critical questions
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Mixed regional& thematic multi-actor
partnerships: Overall balance sheet
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• Coherent with evolution of
international relations and major
changes in the external action of
both the EU and ACP
regions/countries
• Opportunity to differentiate and
customise EU and A, C, P external
action
• Coherence with the logic of the
universal 2030 Agenda
• Negotiations on a follow-up treaty
to the CPA – which are likely to be
difficult – could be avoided
• Complexity of implementing such a
differentiated approach in practice
• Fear for loss of acquis (e.g. legally
binding treaty)
• Need for major adjustments in the
institutional set-up and EU
(financial) instruments
• Interest-driven cooperation may
lead to short-sighted EU policies
incompatible with development
objectives
• Requires political leadership,
institutional creativity, risk
taking which may not be available
in EU or in the A, C and P regions

IV. State of the debate on
Post Cotonou in the ACP
and the EU
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• Very ambitious agenda as a global player, partnerships
beyond EU, financial sustainability …but not always
realistic
• Critical reflections Chair ACP Ambassadors: “Are we as
ACP member states serious about our own
institution. If not why should the EU take the ACP
seriously?...We must put something on the table to
the EU and have them to react to our ideas”
• Retreat Ambassadors 5-6 November 2016 (contours of
future partnership with EU and operationalisation EPG
report)
• Action Plan for implementation on priorities on which
there is convergence across the various regions (for
Ministerial Council of November 2016 and after approval
to be shared with the EU)
• Crucial role RECs in A,C, P but very distant so far
State of the debate in the ACP
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TWO CAMPS:
➢ GROUP 1: Revision/ modernisation (legal framework,
integrate SDGs, modernisation institutions, into some
type of Cotonou II: F, ES, PT, IT, LUX
➢ GROUP 2: fundamental change; most other countries
led by D, NL, DK, UK, POL, FIN, CZ, LET, SW,… “like
minded”
➢ Impact Brexit on Post Cotonou debate?
➢ Joint Staff Working document: not an independent
evaluation, not evidence based rather reflection paper
➢ November: Communication Commission
➢ Towards umbrella option as a compromise?
State of the debate in the EU
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• ……
• …….
• ……
• …..
• …..
V. Options for Austria’s position
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Thank you
Geert Laporte
gl@ecdpm.org
www.ecdpm.org
Page 50

The Future of ACP-EU Relations:Scenarios for Post Cotonou 2020

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