Interop - Dyn Inc on DNSSEC for InteropNET
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Interop - Dyn Inc on DNSSEC for InteropNET

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  • 1. Securing InteropNET with DNSSEC Cory von Wallenstein VP, Engineering – Dyn Inc.
  • 2. Internet Infrastructure as a Service DynECT Managed DNS & Email Delivery
    • DNS is names to numbers
      • ->
    • 5+ Million active users/clients
    • 1000+ Enterprise clients
    • 250,000+ Zones managed
    • 100,000+ Domains registered
    • 17 World-wide datacenters
    • Billions of queries per day
    • Billions of messages annually
  • 3. User My Bank Insecure HTTP… end user beware! http –
  • 4. User My Bank Add HTTPS… verify domain owner. https – Is the domain correct?
  • 5. User My Bank But what verifies the IP in DNS? https – Is the domain correct? But what about the IP address that resolved to… What verifies that? A
  • 6. Quick DNS Terminology Recap
    • Authoritative DNS
      • The “authority” for DNS records
      • You as a web site owner or operator designate your authoritative DNS servers at your registrar.
      • Trusted information. Keys to the kingdom.
    • Recursive DNS
      • Query authoritative servers on behalf of clients (performing recursion as necessary) and caching answers for faster future lookups by other clients.
  • 7. DNS Recursion – Query the recursive server
  • 8. DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries root...
  • 9. DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries com
  • 10. DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries
  • 11. DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries
  • 12. DNS Recursion – Recursive server responds to original request
  • 13. But I see the lock in the browser window! I see “https” in the URL! Aren’t I safe?
    • Partially!
      • The domain is verified
      • The IP address is not
      • Implicit trust in your recursive DNS servers.
    • Attack vectors
      • Single computer
        • Edit /etc/hosts
      • One or more computers
        • Man in the middle attack
      • Many, many computers
        • Recursive DNS cache poisoning
  • 14. DNS Cache Poisoning
  • 15. You would be securely connected... but to the wrong computer!
  • 16. Need a way to verify the information in DNS. Enter DNSSEC.
    • Recursive resolvers and end users alike can verify the information in DNS.
    • Chain of trust.
      • I trust the root nameservers.
      • The root servers trust .com, and give me the information I need to verify .com hasn’ t been tampered with.
      • The .com servers trust, and give me the information I need to verify hasn’t been tampered with…
  • 17. DNSSEC Secured
  • 18.  
  • 19. Cisco providing DHCP service through their CNR
  • 20. CNR pushes updates to Dynect show floor hidden master
  • 21. It's good to have redundancy plus redundancy is good to have
  • 22. Sign the update and propagate it to Dynect
  • 23. Need to handle DNS requests too!
  • 24. Handle it by show floor anycast recursive servers.... and here is the complete DNS picture
  • 25. How do you sign a zone?
    • The BIND way (for each and every zone...)
      • Generate the keys using dnssec-keygen twice, once for the ZSK and once for the KSK
      • Store the private keys someplace safe (since anyone with the private keys can sign as you)
      • Include the correct keys in the zone file
      • Actually sign the zone using dnssec-signzone
    • The DynECT way...
  • 26. Click “Add DNSSEC”, publish to registrar!
  • 27.
    • Great visualization and debugging tool
    • Verify chain of trust
    • There’s a computer on this network called:
  • 28. Get started with DNSSEC.
    • Visit our booth - 236
    • Reach out
      • [email_address]
      • @cvonwallenstein
      • @DynInc