Nyaya philosophy

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Nyaya system of Indian Philosophy

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  • Origins The beginning of Nyaya can be traced back to the writings of Aksapada Gautama (ca. sixth century B.C.E.) who wrote the Nyaya Sutras.  Gautama founded the Nyaya school, which was closely affiliated to the  Vaisheshika  ( atomism ) school of Hindu philosophy. While Nyaya centered around logic and  epistemology , Vaisesika was primarily a  metaphysical  system of thought that classifies all beings into seven categories, and postulated that all objects in the physical universe are reducible to a finite number of  atoms . The exact periods of the origin of Vaisesika have not been established; it is thought to be more ancient than Nyāya, and may have preceded, but was at least contemporary with, Buddhism and  Jainism . The founder of Vaisesika is considered to be Kanāda, author of the  Vaishesika Sutra , written sometime after 300 B.C.E.. Gautama has sometimes been equated with the Greek philosopher Aristotle. However, Gautama’s system of logic differs from Aristotelian logic as it is much more than logic in its own right. Followers of  Nyaya ( Nyayanikas ) believe that through the process of obtaining valid knowledge of things one could secure release from material bondage. Gautama and his followers therefore took great pains in identifying valid sources of knowledge and distinguishing them from invalid sources. Nyaya's most important contribution to Hindu thought is its elucidation of the  pramanas  (tools of epistemology). Its followers believe that obtaining valid knowledge is the only way to obtain release from suffering. They therefore took great pains to identify valid sources of knowledge and to distinguish these from mere false opinions. They argued that there are exactly four sources of knowledge: perception, inference, comparison and testimony. However, knowledge obtained through each of these sources can still be either valid or invalid. As a result, Nyaya scholars again went to great pains to identify, in each case, what it took to make knowledge valid—in the process creating a number of explanatory schemes. In this sense, Nyaya is probably the closest Indian equivalent to contemporary analytic philosophy. 05/26/10
  • The  nyaya  system of philosophy was established by the sage Gautama. As he was also known as Aksapada, this system is also sometimes referred to as the  aksapada  system.  Nyaya  philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of correct knowledge and the means of receiving this knowledge.  Nyaya  is predominantly based on reasoning and logic and therefore is also known as  Nyaya Vidya  or  Tarka Sastra  -- "the science of logic and reasoning", Because this system analyzes the nature and source of knowledge and its validity and nonvalidity, it is also referred to as  anviksiki , which means "the science of critical study." Using systematic reasoning, this school of philosophy attempts to discriminate valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. This philosophy asserts that obtaining valid knowledge of the external world and its relationship with the mind and self is the only way to attain liberation. If one masters the logical techniques of reasoning and assiduously applies these in his daily life, he will rid himself of all suffering. Thus, the methods and conditions of determining true knowledge are not the final goal of  nyaya  philosophy; logical criticism is viewed only as an instrument that enables one to discriminate valid from invalid knowledge. The ultimate goal of  nyaya  philosophy, like that of the other systems of Indian philosophy, is liberation -- the absolute cessation of pain and suffering.  Nyaya  is a philosophy of life, even though it is mainly concerned with the study of logic and epistemology 05/26/10
  • The subjects discussed under  pramana , the source of knowledge, are the most important and the most thoroughly and profoundly expounded of all the divisions. For this reason, pramana will be explained in detail after the other fifteen divisions of studying reality have been described.  05/26/10
  • All six schools of Vedic philosophy aim to describe the nature of the external world and its relationship to the individual, to go beyond the world of appearances to ultimate Reality, and to describe the goal of life and the means for attaining this goal. In this attempt, the six philosophies divide their course of study into two major categories: the study of unmanifested reality, and the study of manifest reality. In nyaya  philosophy, both aspects of reality are divided into sixteen major divisions, called  padarthas  (see chart below). These sixteen philosophical divisions are:  pramana , the sources of knowledge;  prameya , the object of knowledge;  samsaya , doubt or the state of uncertainty;  prayojana , the aim;  drstanta , example;  siddhanta , doctrine;  ayayava , the constituents of inference;  tarka , hypothetical argument;  nirnaya , conclusion;  badha , discussion;  jalpa , wrangling;  vitanda , irrational argument;  hetvabhasa , specious reasoning;  chala , unfair reply;  jati , generality based on a false analogy; and  nigrahsthana , the grounds for defeat. For example,  Nyaya  divides perceivable and imperceivable reality into sixteen divisions ( padarthas ) that are: 1)  pramana , the sources of knowledge 2)  prameya , the object of knowledge 3)  samsaya , doubt or the state of uncertainty 4)  prayojana , the aim 5)  drstanta , example 6)  siddhanta , doctrine 7)  ayayava , the constituents of inference 8)  tarka , hypothetical argument 9)  nirnaya , conclusion 10)  badha , discussion 11)  jalpa , wrangling 12)  vitanda , irrational argument 13)  hetvabhasa , specious reasoning 14)  chala , unfair reply 15)  jati , generality based on a false analogy 16)  nigrahsthana , the grounds for defeat 05/26/10
  • The most important contribution made by the Nyaya school to modern Hindu thought is its methodology. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently, has been adopted by the majority of the other Indian schools, orthodox or not. This is comparable to how Western science and philosophy can be said to be largely based on  Aristotelian logic . However, Nyaya differs from  Aristotelian logic  in that it is more than logic in its own right. Its followers believed that obtaining valid knowledge was the only way to obtain release from suffering. They therefore took great pains to identify valid sources of knowledge and to distinguish these from mere false opinions. Nyaya is thus a form of  epistemology  in addition to logic. According to the Nyaya school, there are exactly four sources of knowledge (pramanas): perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Knowledge obtained through each of these can, of course, still be either valid or invalid. As a result, Nyaya scholars again went to great pains to identify, in each case, what it took to make knowledge valid, in the process creating a number of explanatory schemes. In this sense, Nyaya is probably the closest Indian equivalent to contemporary  analytic philosophy . 05/26/10
  • PRAMEYA – 12 OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE Not all these objects are found in the physical world which is composed of the four gross elements – air, fire, water, earth. Soul and mind are involved in the physical world but are not physical elements. Time and space are nonmaterial but belong to the physical world. Akasa (space or ether) is also a physical substance but not a productive cause. SOUL: The soul is a unique substance of which all desires, aversions, pleasures, pains and cognitions are qualities. Indestructible. Eternal. Its attribute is consciousness. Infinite. All-pervading. There are many souls – as one person’s experience is completely distinct from any other’s. Body is not soul because immaterial consciousness cannot be an attribute of a material body. Neither can the functioning of the senses explain the processes of imagination, memory and ideation. Soul experiences the external world through the mind and senses. All cognitions and conscious states arise in the soul when the soul is related to the mind, the mind to the senses and the senses to external objects. The soul is not known by sensory perception but rather by inference (anumana) and testimony (sabda). Memory must depend on a permanent entity – the soul. One’s own soul can be known through mental perception but another’s soul in another body can only be inferred. The Object of Knowledge.   Prameya  may be translated as "that which is knowable," or "the object of true knowledge." That which is the object of cognition is  prameya , and whatever is comprehended or cognized by  buddhi  is categorized into the twelve objects of cognition known as the  prameyas . These twelve divisions are:  atman , the self;  sarira , the body -- the abode of the experience of pain and pleasure that is the seat of all organic activities;  indriyas , the five senses -- smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing -- which contact external objects and transmit the experience to the mind;  artha , the objects of the senses;  buddhi , cognition;  manas , the mind -- the internal sense that is concerned with the perception of pleasure, pain, and all other internal experiences and that, according to  nyaya , limits cognition to time and space. The mind is compared to an atom (not the atom of modern physics; see vaisesika philosophy) because it is minute, everlasting, individual, and all-pervading;  pravrtti , activity -- vocal, mental, and physical;  dosa , mental defects that include attachment ( raga ), hatred ( dvesa ), and infatuation or delusion ( moha );  pretyabhava , rebirth or life after death;  phala , the fruits or results of actions experienced as pain or pleasure;  dukha , suffering -- the bitter or undesired experiences of mind; and  apavarga , liberation or complete cessation of all suffering without any possibility of its reappearance. According to  nyaya  philosophy the goal of life is to understand these twelve aspects of reality, the  prameyas , as they actually are. Bondage is born of the misunderstanding of these twelve knowable objects, and one obtains freedom from bondage when he attains the correct know ledge of these twelve aspects of reality. Most of the time, however, this knowledge remains incomplete, and the means for attaining an integral comprehension of reality is not learned, so defective or invalid knowledge is maintained. In order to cast off this invalid knowledge, nyaya  provides a profound method for determining valid knowledge. This is studies under the category of  pramana , which will be discussed following brief descriptions of the other fourteen components in the  nyaya  process for attaining valid knowledge. 05/26/10
  • Doubt .  Samsaya  means "doubt." It is the state in which the mind wavers between conflicting views regarding a single object. In a state of doubt, there are at least two alternative views, neither of which can be determined to lead to a state of certainty.  Samsaya  is not certain knowledge; neither is it a mere reflection of knowledge; nor is it invalid knowledge. It is a positive state of cognition, but the cognition is split in two and does not provide any definite conclusions. For example, in the dark of the night a person may be looking at a plant, but because he cannot see clearly he does not recognize the plant for what it is and falsely perceives it as a man. However, if it would be logically impossible for a man to be present at that place, then the mind does not accept that the figure is a man. The mind becomes confused at that moment, questions whether it is a man or a plant, and cannot come to a decision about what it actually is. Thus, doubt is a product of a confused state of mind that is not able to perceive with clarity. 05/26/10
  • Aim – Prayojana – No action can be performed without an objective, a target or an aim. It does not matter if the aim is only presumed or is fully understood. One acts either to achieve desirable objects or to get rid of undesirable ones; these desirable or undesirable objects are known as prayojana. 05/26/10
  • Example .  Drstanta  is the use of an example to illustrate a common fact and establish an argument. This is a very important aspect of reasoning, for frequently a useful example can be accepted by both parties involved in a discussion without any disputation or difference of opinion. For instance, when one argues that there must be fire because there is smoke, he may use the example of smoke in the kitchen to confirm the permanent relationship between fire and smoke. The relationship between fire and smoke in the kitchen is a common occurrence and may be readily accepted by both parties. Therefore, the example of the kitchen for confirming the existence of fire inferred from the presence of smoke is potentially very helpful. 05/26/10
  • 6. Doctrine .  Siddhanta  means "doctrine." It is an axiomatic postulate that is accepted as the undisputed truth and that serves as the foundation for the entire theory of a particular system of philosophy. This accepted truth might be derived either from direct experience or from reasoning and logic. For example, it is the doctrine of  nyaya  philosophy that there is a God ( nimitta karana ) who is the operative cause of the universe and who organizes and regulates the atoms. 05/26/10
  • 7. Constituents of inference . The term  avayaya  literally means "constituents" or "parts," and in this context it refers to the constituents of inference. This is an important topic in  nyaya  philosophy because  nyaya  strongly emphasizes describing the minute complexities of the pramanas , the sources or methods of receiving correct knowledge. Among these methods, inference is the most important source of correct knowledge, and  nyaya  therefore provides a technical method to test the validity of inference. If an inference contains five necessary constituents, then it can give correct know ledge. These five requisite components of inference are  pratijna  (statements);  hetu  (reason); udaharana  (example);  upanaya  (universal proposition); and  nigamana  (conclusion). These are discussed later in this chapter in the section on inference. 05/26/10
  • 8. Hypothetical argument .  Tarka  may be translated as "hypothetical argument." All the systems of Indian philosophy agree that it is simply the mind's jabbering that creates confusion and misunderstanding within and without. Because the mind is clouded by its own modifications, it is very important to wash out these confusions before attempting to understand something solely through the mind. For this purpose, nyaya  philosophy discusses the possible problems of the mind and clarifies its confusions, using such processes as  tarka. Tarka  is the process of questioning and cross-questioning that leads to a particular conclusion. It is a form of supposition that can be used as an aid to the attainment of valid knowledge.  Tarka  can become a great instrument for analyzing a common statement and for discriminating valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. 05/26/10
  • 9. Conclusion .  NirРѓnaya , conclusion, is certain knowledge that is attained by using legitimate means. If the mind has doubts concerning the correctness or validity of a conclusion it has drawn, then employing the process of tarka (hypothetical argument) can help to resolve those doubts. But it is not always necessary for a conclusion to pass through a doubtful state. It may be indubitably perceived, either through direct perception, inference, testimony, or intuition.  Nirnaya  is this ascertainment of assured truth about something that is attained by means of recognized and legitimate sources of knowledge. 05/26/10
  • 10. Discussion .  Badha , discussion, is a kind of debate between two parties -- the exponent and the opponent -- on a particular subject. Each party tries to establish its own position and to refute that of the other, arguing against any theory propounded by the other. Both, however, are trying to arrive at the truth by applying the methods of reasoning and logic. This is an effective and efficient way to reach valid knowledge if both parties are honest and free from prejudices. 05/26/10
  • 11. Wrangling .  Jalpa , or wrangling, is the process by which the exponent and opponent both try to attain victory over the other without making an honest attempt to come to the truth; there is an involvement of ego instead of a search for knowledge.  Jalpa  contains all the characteristics of a valid debate except that of aiming to discover truth. It is that type of discussion in which each party has a prejudice for his own view and thus tries to gather all possible arguments in his own favor. Lawyers sometimes apply this method to win their cases in court. 05/26/10
  • 12. Irrational reasoning .  Vitanda  is irrational reasoning. Specifically, it is argumentation that is aimed exclusively at refuting or destroying an antagonist's position and that is not at all concerned with establishing or defending one's own position. It is mere destructive criticism of the views of one's opponent. Whereas in wrangling both the exponent and opponent try to establish their own position, in irrational reasoning either or both tries to refute the other's position instead of establishing his own. This usually occurs when one or both parties realize that his own case is weak and that he cannot defend his point of view. Consequently, he irrationally attacks the other's case with destructive intent. 05/26/10
  • 13. Specious reasoning – Hetvabhasa – is irrational argument which is reasoning that appears to be valid but is really unfounded. This specious reasoning is a fallacy of inference, and it is therefore discussed later in this chapter in the section on inference. 05/26/10
  • 14. Unfair reply .  Chala  means "unfair reply." Here it is used to designate a statement that is meant to cheat or to fool someone. In unfair reply one takes a word or phrase that has been used in a particular sense, pretends to understand it in a sense other than that which was intended, and then denies the truth of this deliberate misinterpretation of the original speaker's words. For example, suppose someone's name is Bizarre, and in referring to this person, someone says, "He is Bizarre." If the listener knowingly misconstrues this statement and replies, "He is not bizarre; he is just a common ordinary man," then that person is using  chala . 05/26/10
  • 15. Generality based on a false analogy .  Jati  means generality, but as used here,it is a technical term used to describe a debate in which an unfair reply or conclusion is based on a false analogy. Suppose, for example, that someone is arguing that sound is noneternal because it is an effect of a certain cause, just as a pot is produced from clay. But another argues that sound must be eternal because it is nonmaterial, like the sky. This counter argument of trying to prove the eternity of sound by comparing it with the nonmaterial sky is fallacious, because there is not necessarily a universal relationship between the nonmaterial and the eternal. (In the  nyaya  system itself, sound is considered to he a noneternal quality because it is produced and can be destroyed. Some other systems, however, do not agree with this view.) 05/26/10
  • 16. Grounds for defeat .  Nigrahasthana  may be translated as "the grounds on which a person is defeated in his argument." When a proponent misunderstands his own or his opponent's premises and their implications, then he becomes helpless and must eventually admit his defeat in the debate. The point at which he accepts his defeat is called  nigrahasthana .  05/26/10
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  • 6. Alaukika (extraordinary perception) is of three types: Perception of classes (samanya laksana) Eg. All people are mortal. But one cannot come to this knowledge through the laukika since the senses cannot at once perceive the mortality of all people. But one can come to this conclusion by acknowledging the personhood of each individual and personhood is common to all humans and this can be directly sensed and becomes the medium through which all people, or the class of people, can be perceived to be mortal. Perception based on association (jnana laksana) Eg. One says that something looks delicious, or a block of ice looks cold or that a stone looks hard. This implies that the taste of food, coldness of ice and hardness of stone is perceived by the eye. But how can the eye perceive the qualities of touch and taste? It is because the past experience of touch and taste become closely associated with the visual appearance of the causative agents. Intuitive perception (yogaja) – Knowledge born of yogic practices. It is intuitive and never depends on sense-object contact and is never false; it is perceived after the mind is cleansed through yogic practices. Those who have attained spiritual perfection and perceive intuitive knowledge of all objects constantly and spontaneously are called yukta yogins. Those still on the path and who are practicing concentration and such conditions are called yunjan yogins. 05/26/10
  • The Nyaya school classified inference into several types: inference for oneself ( Svarthanumana ), inference for others ( Parathanumana ),  Purvavat  (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause),  Sheshavat  (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect), and  Samanyatodrishta  (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed analysis of error is also given, explaining when anumana could be false. The Nyaya theory of error is similar to that of Kumarila's  Viparita-khyati  (see  Mimamsa ). The Nyayayikas also believe that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions ( paratah pramana  during both validity and invalidity). I NFERENCE It is the detailed process of knowing something not by means of contact between the senses and the objects of the world and not by observation but rather through the medium of a sign or linga that is invariably related to it. Anumana – the cognition or knowledge that follows from some other knowledge. Eg. You see smoke on the hill and arrive at/infer knowledge of fire on the hill because of previous knowledge of the universal relationship between smoke and fire, as in a kitchen. The knowledge of smoke on the hill is called linga, or sign. Next arises the awareness of the universal relationship between smoke and fire based on past observations – this is known as vyapti. As a result, knowledge of the unperceived (directly) fire on the hill arises – this is known as nirnaya or conclusion. The hill, the subject under consideration, is the minor term in this inferential argument – paksa. The fire, what one wants to prove in relation to the hill, is the major term – sadhya. The presence of smoke on the hill is the linga, the sign that indicates the fire. It is also called hetu or meaning “the reason or grounds for inference”. INFERENCE It is a syllogism consisting of at least three categorical premises – paksa, sadhya, linga – ordered thus: There is fire on the hill. There is visible smoke on the hill. Where there’s smoke, there’s fire. Where there’s smoke, there’s fire, as in the kitchen. It is important to state the inference in a systematic, comprehensive chain of arguments and then one must state it in the form of five premises: pratijna (fact), hetu (reason), udaharana (example), upanaya (application) and nigamana (conclusion). John is mortal. Because he is a man. All men are mortal, for example, Napoleon, Lincoln, Socrates and so on. John is a man. Therefore John is mortal. The Nyaya method of inference uses inductive reasoning – it draws a particular conclusion on the grounds of a general and universally known truth 05/26/10
  • The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown: * There is fire on the hill (called  Pratijna , required to be proved) * Because there is smoke there (called  Hetu , reason) * Wherever there is fire, there is smoke (called  Udaharana , ie, example) * There is smoke on the hill (called  Upanaya , reaffirmation) * Therefore there is fire on the hill (called  Nigamana , conclusion) 05/26/10
  • The Nyayayikas also believe that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions ( paratah pramana  during both validity and invalidity). The fallacies in Anumana ( hetvābhasa ) may occur due to the following: Asiddha : It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. [Paksadharmata] Ashrayasiddha : If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus. Svarupasiddha : Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible. Vyapyatvasiddha : Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke'. The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel. Savyabhichara : This is the fallacy of irregular hetu. Sadharana : The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The hill has fire because it is knowable'. Asadharana : The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not present in the Sapaksa and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is audible'. Anupasamhari : Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. 'All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable'. Satpratipaksa : Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible', and 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counter-balanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force. Badhita : When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'. Viruddha : Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. 'Sound is eternal because it is produced'. 05/26/10
  • Anyathakyativada of Nyaya The Nyaya theory of error is similar to that of Kumarila's Viparita-khyati (see  Mimamsa ). The Naiyayikas also believe like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions ( paratah pramana  during both validity and invalidity).t 05/26/10
  • Comparison, called  Upamana , is the knowledge of the relationship between a word and the object denoted by the word. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity, given some pre-description of the new object beforehand COMPARISON – UPAMANA This kind of knowledge comes when one perceives the similarity between the description of an unfamiliar object and its actual appearance to one’s senses. Eg. A friend describes crab apples as looking like a regular red apple but it is smaller and has a longer stem. You go into the forest and find a tree bearing this fruit you have never seen but you remember the description and conclude that this is a crabapple tree. The Carvaka system of philosophy does not recognize this mode as a source of knowledge; it maintains that perception is the sole source of knowledge. Buddhism recognizes it as a valid source of knowledge but regards it as a mere compound of perception and testimony. The Vaisesika and Samkhya systems explain upamana as simply a form of inference. The Jaina systems maintains that it is merely a kind of recognition. The Mimamsa and Vedanta systems consider upamana an independent source of knowledge but they explain it in a different way. 05/26/10
  • TESTIMONY – SABDA – “WORDS” It is the knowledge derived from words or sentences. But not all verbal knowledge is sabda. Sabda is defined as the statement of an apta or a person who speaks and acts the way he thinks; a person whose mind, action and speech are in perfect harmony and is therefore accepted as an authority. 05/26/10
  • SABDA – TESTIMONY – “WORDS” II. Based on the nature of the source of the knowledge All testimony is categorized as either: Scriptural – refers only to the sacred writings related to the Veda and the Veda itself. These words are perfect and infallible. Secular – refers to the testimony of fallible human beings and may be either true or false. 05/26/10
  • Nyaya asks: What is a word, what is a sentence and what the nature of their construction? It says the essential nature of any word lies in its meaning and there must be specific rules governing the arrangement of words as without such rules, words can be reordered to convey a meaning different from what was intended. Nyaya states: All words are significant symbols and have the capacity to designate their respective objects. This capacity is called sakti (potency) and this potency is said to be the will of God. There are four conditions essential to proper functioning of words and sentences: Akamsa – expectancy – the word “bring” makes one expect another – jar? Book? Yogyata – fitness – refers to appropriateness. “Moisten with fire” has no “fitness”. Sannidhi – proximity – words must be used within appropriate limits of time and space in terms of continuity. If you speak a word today, another tomorrow, effective communication fails. Tatparya – intention – the meaning one intends to convey; dependent on context. Confusion comes even in scriptures because one does not understand the original intention. 05/26/10
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  • The Nyaya theory of causation A  cause  is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an  effect  and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is  not  present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect. The following conditions should be met: The cause must be antencedent [Purvavrtti] Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti] Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha] 05/26/10
  • Nyaya  maintains that material suffering is caused by a misunderstanding of these twelve aspects of reality. Once these twelve are percieved correctly, one attains freedom from suffering. 05/26/10
  • Furthermore,  Nyaya  inquires why some people are happy and others are unhappy. To claim that each individual suffers or attains happiness randomly is not logical. Gautama postulates that this must be due to the law of cause and effect ( karma ). Such a law is not of itself and by itself – it lacks intelligence and therefore must be guided by a higher principle, an intelligent agent who directs  karma  through the proper channels to produce proper consequences. 05/26/10
  • Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha] Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter's cloth. Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the potter. The co-effects of a cause are not causally related. Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents. e.g. space. Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter. Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause: Samavayi , material cause. E.g. Thread of a cloth. Asamavayi , colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth. Nimitta', efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth. 05/26/10
  • The Nature of the Physical World  As mentioned previously, the  nyaya  system groups all the objects of the world into twelve major categories: soul, body, senses, objects of the senses, cognition ( buddhi ), mind ( manas ), activity, mental modifications, rebirth, feelings, suffering, and absolute freedom from all sufferings. Not all these objects of knowledge are found in the physical world because the physical world is composed only of the four gross elements -- earth, water, fire, and air. Although the soul and the mind are involved in the physical world, they are not physical elements. Likewise, time and space are completely nonmaterial, but they nonetheless belong to the physical world.  Akasa  (space or ether) is considered to be a physical substance, but it is not considered to be a productive cause of anything In fact, the ultimate constituents of earth, air, fire, and water are eternal and unchanging atoms. Ether and time and space are also eternal and infinite substances, each being one single whole. All in all, the  nyaya  theory of the physical world is very similar to that of the  vaisesika  school, and a more detailed discussion of this world view will be provided in the next chapter.  05/26/10
  • The Concept of the Individual Soul  There are many apparently different concepts of the soul among the various schools of Indian philosophy. The  carvaka  system states that the soul consists of the living physical body and its attributes. According to Buddhist philosophy, there is no soul. Buddhism teaches that the stream of ever-changing thoughts and feelings is the ultimate reality. This may be termed soul, but it is not considered to be a permanent entity, as is maintained by other philosophies. According to the concept of soul held by the  nyaya  and  vaisesika  systems, the soul is a unique substance, of which all desires, aversions, pleasures, pains, and cognition are qualities. There are different souls in different bodies. The soul is indestructible and eternal, and its attribute is consciousness. Because it is not limited by time and space, the soul is also seen as infinite or all-pervading. There are many souls, because one person's experiences do not overlap those of another person; one's, experience is completely distinct from any other's. Nyaya  gives numerous arguments to prove the existence of the soul. It first argues that the body is not the soul because immaterial consciousness cannot be said to be an attribute of the material body, which in itself is unconscious and unintelligent. Neither can the functioning of the senses explain the process of imagination, memory, and ideation -- none of these functions depends on any external sense. The mind can also not be the soul because the mind is considered to be an imperceptible substance. Nor can the soul, as the Buddhists maintain, be identified as the ever- changing series of cognition. The soul cannot be said to be an eternal and self-effulgent consciousness because consciousness cannot subsist without a certain locus. At the same time, the soul is not mere consciousness or knowledge but is the knower of knowledge and the enjoyed of objects. In sum, the soul is not consciousness but is a substance having consciousness as its attribute. The soul experiences the external world through the mind and senses. All the cognition and conscious states arise in the soul when the soul is related to the mind, the mind to the senses, and the senses to external objects. It is because of this sequential contact or relationship that the whole process actuates; otherwise there would be no consciousness in the soul. In its disembodied or disintegrated state, the soul has no knowledge or consciousness. How then can one know whether there is such a thing as an individual soul? The  nyaya  system answers that the soul is not known by sensory perception but rather by inference or testimony. The existence of the soul is inferred from the functions of desire, aversion, and volition, from the sensations of pain and pleasure, and from memories of these. These memories cannot be explained unless one admits a permanent soul that has experienced pain and pleasure in relation to certain objects in the past. The process of knowledge based on memory requires to}e existence of a permanent self that desires to know something and then desires to attain certain knowledge about it. Desire, volition, pain, and pleasure cannot be explained by the body, senses, or mind. Just as the experiences of one person cannot be remembered by another person, the present states of the body or the senses or the mind cannot remember their past states. The phenomenon of memory must depend upon a permanent entity -- the soul. One's own soul can be known through mental perception, but someone else's soul in another body can only be inferred.  05/26/10
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  • The Concept of God  According to  nyaya , God is considered to be the operative cause of creation, maintenance, and destruction of the universe. God does not create the world out of nothing or out of himself but rather out of the eternal atoms of space, time, mind, and soul. The creation of the universe refers to the ordering of these eternal entities, which are in coexistence with God, into a mortal world. Thus God, as the first operative cause of the universal forces, is the creator of the world. And God is also the preserver, as he causes the atoms to hold together and continue their existence in a particular order that maintains the physical universe. God is also called the destroyer of the universe, because he lets loose the forces of destruction when the energies of the mortal world require it. God is one, infinite, and eternal, and the universe of space and time, of mind and soul, does not limit him. God is said to possess six perfections: infinite glory, absolute sovereignty, unqualified virtue, supreme beauty, perfect knowledge, and complete detachment. Nyaya  provides a few arguments to establish the theory of God. The first is the causal argument. According to this line of reasoning, the entire universe is formed by the combination of atoms. Mountains, fields, rivers, and so on must have a cause, for they are made up of parts, possess limited dimensions, and are not intelligent. This being so, they cannot be the cause of themselves; they require the guidance of an intelligent cause. That intelligent cause must have direct knowledge of all matter and of the atoms that underlie all matter. He must be omnipresent and omniscient. This intelligent entity cannot be the individual soul because the knowledge of the soul is limited -- a soul, for instance, does not have the knowledge of other souls. Therefore, there must he an ultimate intelligent entity, which is termed God. The second argument is based on  adrsta , which means "the unseen" or "the unknown," and may be translated as providence or fate. The philosophers of the  nyaya  system inquire as to why some people are happy and others are not, why some are wise and others ignorant. One cannot say that there is no cause, because every event has a cause. The causes of pain and pleasure must therefore be one's own actions in this life or in previous lives. People enjoy or suffer according to the merits or demerits produced by their past good or bad actions. This law of  karma , which governs the life of every individual soul, requires that every human being must reap the fruits of his own actions. There is often a long interval of time between an action and its effect, however, and many pleasures and sorrows cannot be traced to any action performed in this life. Likewise, many actions performed in this life do not produce fruits immediately. The subtle impressions of all one's actions persist long after the actions themselves and are collected in the soul in the form of credits or merits ( punya ) and deficiencies or demerits ( papa ). The sum total of all merits and demerits that are accrued from good or bad actions is called  adrsta , fate, and this produces present pain and pleasure.  Adrsta  is not an intelligent principle, however, and it cannot inspire its own fructification. It must therefore be guided or directed by so 05/26/10
  • Early Naiyanikas wrote very little about  God  ( Ishvara ). However, the ascendancy of Buddhist doctrine in India provoked the Hindu Naiyanikas to enter into philosophical disputes with Buddhists. The Naiyanikas tried to prove the existence of God through logic, and they gave the following nine proofs for the existence of God, which are enumerated in Udayana's  Nyaya Kusumanjali : 05/26/10
  • Nyaya arguments for monotheism Not only have the Naiyanikas given proofs for the existence of God, but they have also given an argument that such a God can only be one. In the  Nyaya Kusumanjali , this is discussed against the proposition of the  Mimamsa  school that there were many demigods ( Devas ) and sages (rishis) in the beginning, who wrote the  Vedas  and created the world. Nyaya says that: [if they assume such] omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size, etc., and capable of creating everything, then we reply that the  law of parsimony  bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown; there is no other way open. In other words, Nyaya says that the polytheist would have to give elaborate proofs for the existence and origin of his several celestial spirits, none of which would be logical. So it is much more logical to assume only One, eternal and omniscient God. 05/26/10
  • The Concept of Liberation  Like all the other systems of Indian philosophy, the  nyaya  system maintains that the ultimate goal of human life is to attain liberation. By liberation is meant absolute freedom from all pain and misery. This implies a state in which the soul is completely released from all bondage and from its connection with the body. It is impossible for the soul to attain the state of complete freedom from pain and misery unless the soul is totally disconnected from the body and senses. In liberation, the soul is unconditionally and absolutely freed from all shackles forever. To attain the state of liberation, one has to acquire true knowledge of the soul and of all the objects of experience. This knowledge is called tattva-jnana , which means "to know reality as completely distinct from unreality."  Nyaya  philosophy prescribes a three-stage path for reaching the goal of liberating knowledge. The first step is  sravana , the study of the scriptures. One has to study the spiritual scriptures and listen to authoritative persons and saints. Following this, one must use his own reasoning powers to ponder over what he has learned. This process of rumination is called  manana . Finally, one must contemplate on the soul, confirm his knowledge, and practice that truth in his life. This is called  nididhyasana . Through the practice of  sravana, manana , and  nididhyasana , a person realizes the true nature of the soul as being totally distinct from the body, mind, senses, and all other objects of the world. The truth realized within dispels the darkness of self-identification and misunderstanding ( mithya-jnana ) concerning "I-ness" and "Thy-ness." When this happens, a person ceases to be moved by his passions and impulses and begins to perform his duties selflessly without having any desire to reap the fruits of these actions. The fire of true knowledge roasts one's past  karma  like seeds, thereby making them unable to germinate. Thus, true knowledge leads a person to the state where there is no cycle of birth and death. This state is called liberation.  05/26/10
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  • Nyaya philosophy

    1. 1. NYAYA PHILOSOPHY Aksapada Gautama (600 BC)
    2. 2. INTRODUCTION <ul><li>Founded by the sage Gotama, also known as Aksapada. </li></ul><ul><li>Primarily concerned with the conditions of correct knowledge and the means of receiving this knowledge (Epestemology). </li></ul><ul><li>The science of logic or reasoning – the science of critical study (Anviksiki). </li></ul><ul><li>Discovers the validity or invalidity of knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>Through the process of obtaining valid knowledge of things one could secure release from material bondage. </li></ul><ul><li>Obtaining valid knowledge is the only way to obtain release from suffering. </li></ul>
    3. 3. NYAYA EPISTEMOLOGY
    4. 4. SIXTEEN DIVISIONS ( PADARTHAS ) OF EXTERNAL REALITY <ul><li>Nyaya  divides perceivable and imperceivable reality into sixteen divisions ( padarthas ) that are </li></ul><ul><li>Pramana , the sources of knowledge </li></ul><ul><li>Prameya , the object of knowledge </li></ul><ul><li>Samsaya , doubt or the state of uncertainty </li></ul><ul><li>Prayojana , the aim </li></ul><ul><li>Drstanta , example </li></ul><ul><li>Siddhanta , doctrine </li></ul><ul><li>Ayayava , the constituents of inference </li></ul><ul><li>Tarka , hypothetical argument  </li></ul><ul><li>Nirnaya , conclusion </li></ul><ul><li>Badha , discussion </li></ul><ul><li>Jalpa , wrangling </li></ul><ul><li>Vitanda , irrational argument </li></ul><ul><li>Hetvabhasa ,specious reasoning </li></ul><ul><li>Chala , unfair reply </li></ul><ul><li>Jati , generality based on a false analogy </li></ul><ul><li>Nigrahsthana , the grounds for defeat </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    5. 5. 1.PRAMAN: SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE <ul><li>Prama = valid knowledge </li></ul><ul><li>Pramana is that through which valid knowledge is received. </li></ul><ul><li>Knowledge itself is of two types: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Anubhava (experiential) and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Smriti (memory). </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Both categories can be divided into valid and invalid knowledge. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Valid experiential knowledge is called prama and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Invalid experiential knowledge is aprama. </li></ul></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    6. 6. 2. PRAMEYA: THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE <ul><li>2.01 Atma  - the individual conscious unit </li></ul><ul><li>2.02 Sarira  - the material body </li></ul><ul><li>2.03 Indriyas  - the sense organs </li></ul><ul><li>2.04 Artha  - the objects of the senses </li></ul><ul><li>2.05 Buddhi  - cognition </li></ul><ul><li>2.06 Manas  - the mind </li></ul><ul><li>2.07 Pravrti  - activity </li></ul><ul><li>2.08 Dosa  - mental defects </li></ul><ul><li>2.09 Pretyabhava  - life and death </li></ul><ul><li>2.10 Phala  - the results of pleasure and pain </li></ul><ul><li>2.11 Duhkha  - suffering </li></ul><ul><li>2.12 Apavarga  - permanent relief from all suffering </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    7. 7. 3. SAMSAY - DOUBT <ul><li>A state in which the mind wavers between conflicting views regarding a single object. </li></ul><ul><li>Is that a plant or a human being in the darkness? Is that a rope or a serpent? </li></ul><ul><li>Samsaya is not certain knowledge, nor is it a mere reflection of knowledge, nor is it invalid knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>It is a positive state of cognition but the cognition is split in two and does not provide any definite conclusion. </li></ul><ul><li>Doubt is the product of a confused state of mind. </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    8. 8. 4.PRAYOJANA - AIM <ul><li>No action can be performed without an objective, a target or an aim. </li></ul><ul><li>It does not matter if the aim is only presumed or is fully understood. </li></ul><ul><li>One acts either to achieve desirable objects or to get rid of undesirable ones; these desirable or undesirable objects are known as prayojana. </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    9. 9. 5. DRSTANTA: EXAMPLE <ul><li>This refers to using an example or an illustration to highlight a common fact and establish an argument. </li></ul><ul><li>Useful examples can be accepted by both parties in a dispute. </li></ul><ul><li>For instance, one can say that there must be fire because one sees smoke and one can refer to the fire and smoke in a kitchen to establish common ground. </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    10. 10. 6. SIDDHANTA: DOCTRINE <ul><li>An axiomatic postulate accepted as undisputed truth and serves as the foundation for the entire theory of a particular system of philosophy. </li></ul><ul><li>For instance, it is a Nyaya siddhanta that there is a Nimitta Karana (efficient cause) of the universe </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    11. 11. 7. AVAYAVA: CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE <ul><li>Parts or components. </li></ul><ul><li>Nyaya uses inference to establish reasons and come to conclusions in arguments. </li></ul><ul><li>If an inference has five necessary parts, it is assumed that it can give correct knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>These components are: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>pratijna (statements), </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>hetu (reason), </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>udaharana (example), </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>upanaya (universal proposition) and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>nigamana (conclusion). </li></ul></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    12. 12. 8.TARKA HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT <ul><li>The mind's jabbering that creates confusion and misunderstanding within and without </li></ul><ul><li>Because the mind is clouded by its own modifications, it is very important to wash out these confusions before attempting to understand something solely through the mind </li></ul><ul><li>Tark is the process of clarifying the confusion </li></ul><ul><li>It is the process of questioning and cross-questioning with the mind that leads to a particular conclusion. </li></ul><ul><li>Tarka can be useful in differentiating between invalid and valid knowledge </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    13. 13. 9.NIRNAYA: CONCLUSION <ul><li>Is certain knowledge that is attained by using legitimate means. </li></ul><ul><li>It is the ascertaining of the truth about something, perhaps using Tarka or other ways of perception like direct perception, inference, testimony or intuition </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    14. 14. 10. BADHA: DISCUSSION <ul><li>A debate between two parties – exponent and opponent – on a subject. </li></ul><ul><li>But both are agreed on using the methods of reasoning and logic and valid knowledge can be reached if both parties are honest and free from prejudices </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    15. 15. 11. JALPA: WRANGLING <ul><li>When the two parties try to defeat each other through dishonest means. </li></ul><ul><li>There is an involvement of ego instead of a true search for knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>Jalpa  contains all the characteristics of a valid debate except that of aiming to discover truth. </li></ul><ul><li>It is that type of discussion in which each party has a prejudice for his own view and thus tries to gather all possible arguments in his own favor </li></ul><ul><li>Lawyers sometimes apply this method to win their cases in court </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    16. 16. 12. VITANDA: IRRATIONAL REASONING <ul><li>An argumentation aimed at refuting or destroying an antagonist’s position without seeking to establish one’s own position – it is mere destructive criticism. </li></ul><ul><li>In irrational reasoning either or both tries to refute the other's position instead of establishing his own. </li></ul><ul><li>This usually happens when one of the parties realizes that his position is weak and that he cannot defend his point of view </li></ul><ul><li>Consequently, he irrationally attacks the other's case with destructive intent </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    17. 17. 13. HETVABHASA : SPECIOUS REASONING <ul><li>An irrational argument which is reasoning that appears to be valid but is really unfounded </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    18. 18. 14.CHALA: UNFAIR REPLY <ul><li>A statement meant to cheat or to fool someone in an argument. </li></ul><ul><li>A person pretends to understand a word or phrase used in a particular sense as other than what was intended and then denies the truth of this deliberate misinterpretation of the speaker’s words. </li></ul><ul><li>For example, suppose someone's name is Bizarre, and in referring to this person, someone says, &quot;He is Bizarre.&quot; If the listener knowingly misconstrues this statement and replies, &quot;He is not bizarre; he is just a common ordinary man,&quot; then that person is using  chala . </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    19. 19. 15 JATI : GENERALITY BASED ON FALSE ANALOGY – <ul><li>A debate in which an unfair reply or conclusion is based on a false analogy. </li></ul><ul><li>Example of sound – is it non-eternal or eternal? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A. Sound is noneternal because it is an effect of a certain cause, just as a pot is produced from clay. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>One can argue that it is eternal by comparing it with the sky. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>But it is a false analogy because there is no universal relationship between the non-material and the eternal </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>In the  nyaya  system itself, sound is considered to he a noneternal quality because it is produced and can be destroyed. </li></ul></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    20. 20. 16. NIGRAHASTHANA: GROUNDS FOR DEFEAT <ul><li>The grounds on which a person is defeated in his argument. </li></ul><ul><li>Happens when a person misunderstands his own or his opponent’s premises and becomes helpless and eventually accepts defeat in the debate </li></ul><ul><li>The point at which he accepts his defeat is called  nigrahasthana </li></ul>16 Padarth of Nyaya Philosophy
    21. 21. 1. PRAMAN: SOURCES OF OBTAINING KNOWLEDGE <ul><li>Praman (Valid) </li></ul><ul><li>Pratyaksa  (direct perception):. </li></ul><ul><li>Anumana  (inference): . </li></ul><ul><li>Upamana  (comparison): . </li></ul><ul><li>Sabda  (testimony):  </li></ul><ul><li>Aprama (Invalid) </li></ul><ul><li>Doubt (samsaya), faulty cognition (bhrama or viparyaya) and </li></ul><ul><li>Hypothetical argument (tarka). </li></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    22. 22. 1. PRAMAN: 1.1 PRATYAKSA  <ul><li>This source occupies the foremost position in  Nyaya  and is divided into </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.1 Laukika  or ordinary perception as attained through the senses of six types, viz., visual-by eyes, olfactory-by nose, auditory-by ears, tactile-by skin, gustatory-by tongue and mental-by mind. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.2 Alaukika or extra-ordianry. involves  </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.2.1 Samanyalakshana  (perceiving generality from a particular object),  </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.2.2 Jñanalakshana  (when one sense organ can also perceive qualities not attributable to it, such as when seeing a chili, one knows that it would be bitter or hot), and  </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.2.3 Yogaja  (when certain human beings, from the power of  Yoga , can perceive past, present and future and may have supernatural abilities). </li></ul></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    23. 23. 1.PRAMAN: 1.1PRATYAKSA: 1.1.1 LAUKIK  <ul><ul><li>1.1.1.1 External (bahya) – any or all of the faculties of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell are involved in bringing the object to the mind. The five senses are gross senses… </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.1.2 Internal (manasa) - … and the mind is the subtle sixth sense – the faculty which perceives qualities of soul like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and cognition. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.1 Laukika (ordinary perception) is either </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.1.1 Indeterminate (nirvikalpa) or </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.1.2 Determinate (savikalpa) – </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>for instance the first glance at a table shows us just its mere existence, the general appearance – a second look shows us the details. Determination is always preceded by indeterminate perception. </li></ul></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    24. 24. 1.PRAMAN: 1.1PRATYAKSA: 1.1.2 ALAUKIK <ul><li>1.1.2.1 Perception of classes (samanya laksana): All people are mortal. </li></ul><ul><li>1.1.2.2 Perception based on association (jnana laksana): a block of ice looks cold </li></ul><ul><li>1.1.2.3 Intuitive perception (yogaja): </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.2.3.1 Yukta yogins. : Spontaneous intuition </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.1.2.3.2 Yunjan yogins: Still on path </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    25. 25. 1.PRAMAN: 1.2 ANUMANA (INFERENCE): <ul><li>It is the detailed process of knowing something not by means of contact between the senses and the objects of the world and not by observation but rather through the medium of a sign or linga that is invariably related to it. </li></ul><ul><li>Anumana – the cognition or knowledge that follows from some other knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>Two types of inference – </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1.2.1 Svarthanumana , or inference for oneself   </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.2.2 Parathanumana , inference for others. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.2.3 Purvavat  (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.2.4 Sheshavat  (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.2.5 Samanyatodrishta  (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    26. 26. 1.PRAMAN: 1.2 ANUMANA: METHOD <ul><li>The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown </li></ul><ul><ul><li>There is fire on the hill (called  Pratijna , required to be proved) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Because there is smoke there (called  Hetu , reason) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Wherever there is fire, there is smoke (called  Udaharana , ie, example) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>There is smoke on the hill (called  Upanaya , reaffirmation) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Therefore there is fire on the hill (called  Nigamana , conclusion) </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    27. 27. 1.PRAMAN: 1.2 ANUMANA: METHOD CONT…. <ul><li>In Nyaya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as  paksha  (minor term), the fire is called as  sadhya  (major term), the smoke is called as  hetu , and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is called as  vyapti  (middle term). </li></ul><ul><li>Hetu further has five characteristics: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>It must be present in the Paksha. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>It must be present in all positive instances. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>It must be absent in all negative instances. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>It must not incompatible with the minor term or Paksha. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be absent. </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    28. 28. 1.PRAMAN: 1.2 ANUMANA: FALLACIES IN ANUMAN ( HETVABHAS ) <ul><li>Asiddha : It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. [Paksadharmata] </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Ashrayasiddha : If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Svarupasiddha : Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Vyapyatvasiddha : Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke'. The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Savyabhichara : This is the fallacy of irregular hetu. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Sadharana : The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The hill has fire because it is knowable'. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Asadharana : The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not present in the Sapaksa and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is audible'. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Anupasamhari : Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. 'All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable'. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Satpratipaksa : Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible', and 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counter-balanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force. </li></ul><ul><li>Badhita : When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'. </li></ul><ul><li>Viruddha : Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. 'Sound is eternal because it is produced'. </li></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    29. 29. 1.PRAMAN: 1.2 ANUMANA: HETVABHAS <ul><li>Five kinds of fallacious &quot;middle&quot; (hetu) are distinguished: </li></ul><ul><li>the inconclusive ( savyabhicara ), which leads to more conclusions than one; </li></ul><ul><li>the contradictory ( viruddha ), which opposes that which is to be established; </li></ul><ul><li>the controversial ( prakaranasama ), which provokes the very question that it is meant to settle; </li></ul><ul><li>the counterquestioned ( sadhyasama ), which itself is unproved; and </li></ul><ul><li>the mistimed ( kalatita ), which is adduced &quot;when the time in which it might hold good does not apply&quot;. </li></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    30. 30. ANYATHAKYATIVADA OF NYAYA <ul><li>The Nyaya theory of error is similar to that of Kumarila's Viparita-khyati (see  Mimamsa ). </li></ul><ul><li>The Naiyayikas also believe like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. </li></ul><ul><li>The represented object is confused with the presented one. </li></ul><ul><li>The word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in error. </li></ul><ul><li>The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. </li></ul><ul><li>They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions ( paratah pramana  during both validity and invalidity). </li></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    31. 31. 1.PRAMAN: 1.3 UPAMANA  (COMPARISON): <ul><li>Upamana  refers to the relationship between a word and an object that is referred to by the word, produced by the understanding of a knowledge of similarity. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Eg. A friend describes crab apples as looking like a regular red apple but it is smaller and has a longer stem. You go into the forest and find a tree bearing this fruit you have never seen but you remember the description and conclude that this is a crabapple tree </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    32. 32. 1.PRAMAN: 1.4 SABDA  (TESTIMONY): <ul><li>  Sabda  is the knowledge derived from words or sentences. But not all verbal knowledge is sabda. </li></ul><ul><li>Sabda is defined as the statement of an apta or a person who speaks and acts the way he thinks; a person whose mind, action and speech are in perfect harmony and is therefore accepted as an authority </li></ul><ul><li>Types –  </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1.4.1 Vaidika , or the words of the  Vedas , and  </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.4.2 Laukika , or the words of humans who are trustworthy. </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    33. 33. 1.PRAMAN: 1.4 SABDA: CLASSIFCATION <ul><li>1.4.1 Based on the nature of the object of knowledge: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1.4.1.1 The trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, saints, sages and scriptures on matters related to the perceptible objects of the world. Eg. Testimony in court, doctor’s diagnosis, ritual prescriptions. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.4.1.2 The trustworthy assertions of persons, saints, sages and scriptures on matters concerning the super-sensible realities . Eg. Physicist on atoms, nutritionist on vitamins, seer’s instructions on virtue, scriptural statements on God and immortality. </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    34. 34. 1.PRAMAN: 1.4 SABDA: CLASSIFCATION <ul><li>1.4.2 Based on the nature of the source of the knowledge </li></ul><ul><li>All testimony is categorized as either: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1.4.2.1 Scriptural – refers only to the sacred writings related to the Veda and the Veda itself. These words are perfect and infallible. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1.4.2.2 Secular – refers to the testimony of fallible human beings and may be either true or false. </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    35. 35. 1.PRAMAN: 1.4 SABDA: NATURE <ul><li>Nyaya asks: What is a word, what is a sentence and what the nature of their construction? It says the essential nature of any word lies in its meaning and there must be specific rules governing the arrangement of words as without such rules, words can be reordered to convey a meaning different from what was intended. </li></ul><ul><li>Nyaya states: All words are significant symbols and have the capacity to designate their respective objects. This capacity is called sakti (potency) and this potency is said to be the will of God. There are four conditions essential to proper functioning of words and sentences: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Akamsa – expectancy – the word “bring” makes one expect another – jar? Book? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Yogyata – fitness – refers to appropriateness. “Moisten with fire” has no “fitness”. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Sannidhi – proximity – words must be used within appropriate limits of time and space in terms of continuity. If you speak a word today, another tomorrow, effective communication fails. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Tatparya – intention – the meaning one intends to convey; dependent on context. Confusion comes even in scriptures because one does not understand the original intention. </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Epistemology
    36. 36. THE NYAYA THEORY OF CAUSATION
    37. 37. THE NYAYA THEORY OF CAUSATION <ul><li>A  cause  is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an  effect  and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. </li></ul><ul><li>The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is  not  present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The following conditions should be met: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The cause must be antencedent [Purvavrtti] </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti] </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha] </li></ul></ul>Causation in Nyaya Philosophy
    38. 38. NYAYA RECOGNIZES THREE KINDS OF CAUSE: <ul><li>Samavayi , material cause. E.g. Thread of a cloth. </li></ul><ul><li>Asamavayi , colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth. </li></ul><ul><li>Nimitta', efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth. </li></ul>Causation in Nyaya Philosophy
    39. 39. CAUSE OF SUFFERING <ul><li>A misunderstanding of these twelve aspects of reality. </li></ul><ul><li>Once these twelve are percieved correctly, one attains freedom from suffering. </li></ul>Causation in Nyaya Philosophy
    40. 40. LAW OF KARMA <ul><li>Nyaya  inquires why some people are happy and others are unhappy </li></ul><ul><li>To claim that each individual suffers or attains happiness randomly is not logical </li></ul><ul><li>Gautama postulates that this must be due to the law of cause and effect ( karma ). </li></ul><ul><li>Such a law is not of itself and by itself – it lacks intelligence and therefore must be guided by a higher principle, an intelligent agent who directs  karma  through the proper channels to produce proper consequences. </li></ul>Causation in Nyaya Philosophy
    41. 41. FIVE KINDS OF ACCIDENTAL ANTECEDENTS [ANYATHASIDDHA] <ul><li>Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter's cloth. </li></ul><ul><li>Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the potter. </li></ul><ul><li>The co-effects of a cause are not causally related. </li></ul><ul><li>Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents. e.g. space. </li></ul><ul><li>Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter. </li></ul>Causation in Nyaya Philosophy
    42. 42. NYAYA METAPHYSICS
    43. 43. ATMAN <ul><li>The  atma  is eternal in nature because it is not limited by space or time. </li></ul><ul><li>It also accepts that there are an infinite number of  atmas . </li></ul><ul><li>One’s own  atma  can be known through mental perception, whereas someone elses  atma  can only be inferred. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics
    44. 44. BRAHMAN <ul><li>Brahman is the efficient cause of creation, maintenance and dissolution </li></ul><ul><li>Brahman creates all substances from eternal atoms of space, time, mind and consciousness. </li></ul><ul><li>Brahman causes these atoms to hold together and continue their existence in a particular order to maintain the physical universe. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics
    45. 45. ARGUMENT FOR EXISTENCE OF GOD <ul><li>Kāryāt  (lit. &quot;from effect&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Āyojanāt  (lit., &quot;from combination&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Dhŗité  (lit., &quot;from support&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Dhŗité  (lit., &quot;from support&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Pratyatah  (lit, &quot;from faith&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Shrutéh  (lit., &quot;from scriptures&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Vākyāt  (lit., &quot;from precepts&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Samkhyāvişheshāt  (lit., &quot;from the specialty of numbers&quot;) </li></ul><ul><li>Adŗişhţāt  (lit., &quot;from the unforeseen&quot;) </li></ul>
    46. 46. 1. KĀRYĀT  (LIT. &quot;FROM EFFECT&quot;): <ul><li>An effect is produced by a cause, and similarly, the universe must also have a cause. </li></ul><ul><li>Causes (according to Naiyanikas) are of three kinds: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Samavayi (in case of the universe, the  atoms ), </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Asamavayi (the association of atoms) and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Nimitta (which is Ishvara). </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The active cause of the world must have an absolute knowledge of all the material of creation, and hence it must be God. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hence from the creation, the existence of the Creator is allegedly proved. </li></ul></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    47. 47. 2. ĀYOJANĀT  (LIT., &quot;FROM COMBINATION&quot;) <ul><li>Atoms are inactive and properties are unphysical. </li></ul><ul><li>Thus it must be God who creates the world with his will by causing the atoms to join. </li></ul><ul><li>Self-combination of inanimate and lifeless things is not possible, otherwise atoms would only combine at random, creating chaos. </li></ul><ul><li>Thus there must be the hand of a wise organizer behind the systematic grouping of the ultimate atoms into dyads and molecules. </li></ul><ul><li>That final organizer is God. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    48. 48. 3. DHŖITÉ  (LIT., &quot;FROM SUPPORT&quot;) <ul><li>Just as a material thing falls off without a support, similarly, God is the supporter and bearer of this world, without which the world would not have remained integrated. </li></ul><ul><li>This universe is hence superintended within God, which proves his existence </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    49. 49. 4. DHŖITÉ  (LIT., &quot;FROM SUPPORT&quot;) <ul><li>Every word has the capability to represent a certain object. </li></ul><ul><li>It is the will of God that a thing should be represented by a certain word. </li></ul><ul><li>Similarly, no knowledge can come to us of the different things here, unless there is a source of this knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>The origin of all knowledge should be omniscient, and, consequently, omnipotent. </li></ul><ul><li>Such a being is not to be seen in this universe, and so it must be outside it. This being is God. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    50. 50. 5. PRATYATAH  (LIT, &quot;FROM FAITH&quot;) <ul><li>Hindu holy scriptures, the Vedas, are regarded as the source of eternal knowledge. </li></ul><ul><li>Their knowledge is free from fallacies and is widely believed as a source of proof. </li></ul><ul><li>Their authors cannot be human beings because human knowledge is limited. </li></ul><ul><li>They cannot obtain knowledge of past, present and future and in-depth knowledge of mind. </li></ul><ul><li>Hence only God can be the creator of the Vedas. </li></ul><ul><li>Hence his existence is proved from his being the author of the Vedas, which he revealed to various sages over a period of time. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    51. 51. 6. SHRUTÉH  (LIT., &quot;FROM SCRIPTURES&quot;) <ul><li>The Shrutis extol God and talk about his existence. &quot;He is the lord of all subjects, omniscient and knower of one's internal feelings; </li></ul><ul><li>He is the creator, cause and destroyer of the world,&quot; say the Shrutis. </li></ul><ul><li>The Shrutis are regarded as a source of proofs by Naiyanikas. </li></ul><ul><li>Hence the existence of God is proved. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    52. 52. 7. VĀKYĀT  (LIT., &quot;FROM PRECEPTS&quot;): <ul><li>Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of &quot;sentences,&quot; in other words, the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves. That person must have been God. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    53. 53. 8. SAMKHYĀVIŞHESHĀT  (LIT., &quot;FROM THE SPECIALTY OF NUMBERS&quot;): <ul><li>The size of a dyad or a molecule depends on the number of the atoms that go to constitute it. </li></ul><ul><li>This requisite number of the atoms that go to form a particular compound could not have been originally the object of the perception of any human being; so its contemplator must be God. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics: Argument for Brahman
    54. 54. 9. ADŖIŞHŢĀT  (LIT., &quot;FROM THE UNFORESEEN&quot;): <ul><li>It is seen that some people in this world are happy, some are in misery. Some are rich and some poor. </li></ul><ul><li>The Naiyanikas explain this by the concept of Karma and reincarnation. </li></ul><ul><li>The fruit of an individual's actions does not always lie within the reach of the individual who is the agent. </li></ul><ul><li>There ought to be, therefore, a dispenser of the fruits of actions, and this supreme dispenser is God. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics
    55. 55. MONOTHEISM IN NYAYA <ul><li>[if they assume such] omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size, etc., and capable of creating everything, then we reply that the  law of parsimony  bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. </li></ul><ul><li>There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown; there is no other way open. </li></ul><ul><li>In other words, Nyaya says that the polytheist would have to give elaborate proofs for the existence and origin of his several celestial spirits, none of which would be logical. </li></ul><ul><li>So it is much more logical to assume only One, eternal and omniscient God. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics
    56. 56. LIBERATION <ul><li>To attain this one needs to acquire true knowledge of the soul and all the objects of experience. This knowledge is called tattvajnana which means “to know reality as completely distinct from unreality”. </li></ul><ul><li>There is a 3-stage path. </li></ul><ul><li>Sravana – study of the scriptures, understand their authority. </li></ul><ul><li>Manana – rumination – the aspirant must use his own reasoning power to ponder what he has learnt. </li></ul><ul><li>Nididhyasana – contemplate on the soul, confirm your knowledge and practice that truth in life. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics
    57. 57. SIGNIFICANCE <ul><li>Nyaya's most important contribution to Hindu thought is its elucidation of the  pramanas  (tools of epistemology). </li></ul><ul><li>It developed a system of logic adopted by other Indian schools of philosophy. </li></ul><ul><li>Nyaya differs from Aristotelian logic in that it is more than logic in its own right. </li></ul><ul><li>Obtaining valid knowledge was the only way to obtain release from suffering. </li></ul><ul><li>To identify valid sources of knowledge and to distinguish these from mere false opinions. </li></ul>Nyaya Metaphysics
    58. 58. THE END

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