1. Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 94:333–352 Ó Springer 2009
DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0266-y
Business and the Polis: What Does it Mean
to See Corporations as Political Actors? ´
Pierre-Yves Neron
ABSTRACT. This article addresses the recent call in corporations as political entities, actors, institutions, or
business ethics literature for a better understanding of units could probably highlight some normative issues
corporations as political actors or entities. It first gives an related to business institutions and practices and
overview of recent attempts to examine classical issues in contribute to a better understanding of these issues. It
business ethics through a political lens. It examines dif- could also sometimes lead to the formulation and
ferent ways in which theorists with an interest in the
defense of radical propositions. It may also simply lead
normative analysis of business practices and institutions
could find it desirable and fruitful to use a political lens.
to the reaffirmation of classical theoretical statements
This article presents a distinction among four views of the in business ethics. In brief, treating corporations as
relations between corporations and politics: corporations political things could be theoretically useful and have
as distributive agents, corporations as political commu- potentially quite radical implications, but in some
nities, corporate practices and policies as citizenship issues, cases it might be also quite banal or not very fruitful
and corporations as active participants in the political from a theoretical perspective (we should not put this
process. This article finishes with an examination of three option out too quickly). This is why I try to propose
challenges that need to be overcome by the theory of the in this article some theoretical avenues to investigate
firm as a political actor. and clarify the very idea of ‘‘corporations as political
actors.’’ I first try to clarify what is at stake in this call
KEY WORDS: business and government relations, busi- for a theory of the firm as a political actor. Then
ness and politics, corporations and citizenship, organiza-
I examine four political views of corporations and
tions, political philosophy
business institutions and the various theoretical
insights possibly offered by these different views.
I conclude taking into consideration three challenges
Introduction that need to be overcome by theorists interested in
building a theory of the firm as a political actor.
An interesting feature of the recent literature on
corporate roles and responsibilities is that there has
been a call for a better understanding of corporations The call for a theory of the firm as a political
and the business world in general, as ‘‘political actor
actors’’. When saying that there has been a call for
such a conception of corporations as political actors, The study of ‘‘business and society’’ is characterized
I refer very broadly to a set of recent articles and by a certain ‘‘conceptual anarchy.’’ Academics,
books that stress the importance of looking more NGOs, business people, corporations, and govern-
politically at firms and business institutions and ments use many different ‘‘vocabularies’’ or ‘‘nor-
practices. The question I want to ask in this article is: mative frameworks’’ for discussing and evaluating
what does it mean more precisely to look at cor- the responsibilities of corporations (Schwartz and
porations this way, and what are the implications? Carrol, 2008). Philosophers like to refer to more
The short answer is that it could mean a lot of things. abstract tools and concepts from moral theory for
Moreover, depending on the interpretation that one applying them to business systems and interactions.
makes of the ‘‘politicization’’ of corporations, it Whereas some like to use the language of sustain-
could have very different implications. Treating ability to talk about environmental practices in

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Pierre-Yves Neron
economic development, others refer to the now corporate citizenship tends to replace the language of
omnipresent language of corporate social responsibility CSR or at least, tend to be used as a synonym. They
which acts as a rejection of ‘‘orthodox’’ business also seem to recognize that some of their own views
models, and is closely linked to the language of about corporate citizenship are compatible with
stakeholder management which tries to expand, the classical definitions of CSR (2002, p. 162). According
obligations of businesses and managers to include the to this view, treating corporations as ‘‘citizens’’ means
interests and opinions of a wide range of groups that corporations should acknowledge a broader so-
affected, the stakeholders, by firm’s activities and cial role and corporate obligations should be extended
policies. Economists enter theses debates by framing to include multiple stakeholders beyond the tradi-
the issues in terms of good corporate governance, which tional base of shareholders, such as workers, local
comes mostly from law and economics and is con- communities, and the environment, and the out-
cerned with structures of incentives and controls for comes of policies and programs directed toward those
managing fiduciary responsibilities and reducing societal relationships. The language of corporate cit-
agency problems.1 izenship, then, should be associated with the defense,
As noted in the ‘‘Introduction’’, recent studies in or maybe a better defense, of the set of corporate
the field suggest a desire to add to these various obligations usually associated with the concept of
normative frameworks a new language with strong CSR (Birch, 2001; Dawkins, 2002; Logsdon, 2004;
political connotations. Taking new realities into Logsdon and Wood, 2002; Post and Berman, 2001).2
account, some theorists now urge that we seek a Corporate citizenship theorists (and critics) from
better and richer understanding of the political the ‘‘second wave’’ have been more critical of this
aspects of businesses activities. Moreover, this ‘‘call’’ tendency to use the vocabulary of citizenship as a
comes from very different perspectives and disci- (new) comprehensive framework to think, in a very
plines. It is revealing, for instance, that this move general way, about the roles of corporations in our
toward a political understanding of economic orga- society. They refuse to see corporate citizenship as an
nizations is explicitly suggested in the title of a recent all-encompassing framework or as a concept that
collaborative article, regrouping many young could do a better job in capturing what is actually
scholars from different disciplines, called ‘‘Corpora- denoted by the concept of CSR (Crane et al., 2008a, b;
tions as political actors,’’ in which the authors reflect Matten and Crane, 2005; Matten et al., 2003; Moon
on the globalization process in which ‘‘corporations ´
et al., 2005; Neron and Norman, 2008a). Instead of
have become political actors’’ in ‘‘postnational seeing corporate citizenship as an extension or a
constellations’’ (Rasche et al., 2008). A recent call reformulation of CSR, they suggest to take seriously
for articles for an upcoming special issue of the the political connotations of the idea of citizenship.
Business Ethics Quarterly also invites scholars to con- Moon et al. argue, for instance, that corporate citi-
tribute to a better understanding of the ‘‘political zenship should be used as a ‘‘metaphor’’ to illuminate
mandate of the corporation’’. the roles corporations already play in the political
Recent developments in the theory of corporate process of contemporary societies (2005). Crane and
citizenship also open the door for a more explicit Matten call for a ‘‘political view of the firm’’ in which
political understanding of corporations. Corporate corporations are not seen as purely economic insti-
citizenship theorists from the ‘‘first wave’’ have seen tutions but as actors firmly located within the polit-
the use of the language of citizenship as a way to ical arena (2008). Crane et al. (2008a) contend that
achieve a better understanding and to articulate a debates on corporate citizenship have led to a more
better justification of the idea of corporate social general debate that has just begun on the political
responsibility (CSR), broadly understood as the idea nature of the corporation. According to these au-
that firms are required to benefit the societies in thors, the main benefit of applying the citizenship
which they operate in ways that go beyond the thinking to issues in business ethics is that it exposes
production, in compliance with laws and regula- the political nature of debates about CSR and stake-
tions, of goods and services as a part of the firm’s holder theory. It offers ‘‘a new perspective on the
normal profit-seeking activities. Wood and Logs- corporation’’ because ‘‘it unveils the political nature of
don, for example, notice that the language of its involvement in society’’ and ‘‘helps to illuminate

3. Business and the Polis 335
certain dimensions that might otherwise go unex- economic sphere, with its own sources of legitimacy,
amined’’. (Crane and Matten 2008, p. 29). and the political sphere, with its own, different,
´
In a similar vein, Neron and Norman suggest that sources of legitimacy. However, according to these
the use of the language of citizenship may concern authors, this apolitical conception of the firm is both
only some particular sets of corporate obligations in normatively and empirically untenable, and, hence,
some specific relations, namely with governments and the need for a ‘‘politicization of the corporation’’
regulatory agencies (2008a).3 The idea here is that (Matten, 2009; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). We
the best way to make sense of the metaphor of cit- should, as Hanlon suggests, overcome the ‘‘denial of
izenship is to take seriously the kind of the specific politics’’ in the fields of business ethics and CSR
political relations and activities that citizenship is studies (Hanlon, 2008).
usually associated with. In brief, the theory of cor- One particularly provocative invitation to take
porate citizenship should, first, draw our attention to seriously the political nature of the firm is to be
the different ways corporations interfere in the found in the Crane et al.’s approach in which groups
political process and the shaping and reshaping of related to the firm are not seen as ‘‘stakeholders’’ but
their regulatory environment and, second, aim to as ‘‘citizens’’ (2004). The authors propose, in what
provide theoretical avenues that would allow us to could be considered as a radicalization of the stake-
determine which political activities and relations holder paradigm, to use the lens of citizenship theory
with government regulators are appropriate or to look at the ways different groups interact in the
inappropriate, permissible or impermissible, obliga- shaping and reshaping of ‘‘ethical institutional
tory or forbidden for corporations. arrangements for business,’’ leading to a reconcep-
Even a more radical critic of corporate citizenship, tualization of stakeholder relations with the firm in a
for example, van Oosterhout agrees with the idea fundamentally political language (2004, p. 108).
that there is a need for a better understanding of the These are all examples of the recent call for a
political aspects of the life and activities of business political conception of the firm and its activities.
organizations. While radically rejecting the intro- However, it is worthy here to take a few steps back
duction of the vocabulary of corporate citizenship, and recall that this ‘‘politicization’’ of corporations
van Oosterhout suggests, nonetheless, that there is was at the heart of some of the most radical critiques
much to be gained by developing concepts and of the social responsibility of business, most notably
theoretical tools that can help us to truly transcend in Friedman’s charge against the idea (Friedman,
what he calls the ‘‘confines of economic and political 2002). In the Friedmanian view, it is precisely
organizations’’ (2008, p. 39). Underlying van skepticism toward the idea of ‘‘firms as political
Oosterhout’s proposition is the idea that we should actors,’’ which leads to a reaffirmation of the neo-
not take for granted that there is a radical division classical view that firms’ main responsibility is to
between the sphere of politics and the sphere of maximize shareholders profits. The reference to
economic organizations. Or more specifically, that corporations as having ‘‘social responsibilities’’ is no
we should not take for granted that organizations more than an ideological and subversive way to
with economic purposes are apolitical entities. politicize economic institutions. In order to put it
Scherer and Palazzo follow the same path and crudely, this is, from a Friedmanian point of view, a
refer to what they consider a new conception of very bad idea. Recent literature though, suggests
corporate responsibility in which the firm is seen as a that theorists do not hesitate to use this language of
‘‘politicized’’ actor ‘‘democratically embedded’’ politics to think normatively about business.
(2007, pp. 1105–1112). In another article written
with Baumann, they argue for what they call a
‘‘political responsibility of the business firm’’ (Scherer Corporations and politics: four directions
et al., 2006, p. 515). They suggest that our theo-
retical understandings of corporate roles and respon- What should we think about the call for a better
sibilities have been obfuscated by a historically understanding of the political aspects of business life?
developed de-politicization of the corporation in How should we welcome this invitation to think
which there is a clear separation between the about the firm as a political actor? Why should we

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Pierre-Yves Neron
think, contrary to the Friedmanian skepticism, that it This ‘‘political’’ view of the nature of corpora-
is a theoretically fruitful idea? My contention is that tions is extremely important for critics of classical or
it is highly seductive but it is not clear how it could orthodox models of business. Take, for instance, the
be helpful and what it means exactly for the nor- so-called progressive corporate law movement. For
mative analysis of business practices and institutions. Mitchell, Green and Millon, our classical views on
The agenda for a ‘‘political theory of the firm’’ is corporate responsibilities are biased from the start
appealing but remains unclear. This is why, in this because they fail to realize the public nature of
section, I try to provide some insights first by corporations (Mitchell, 1995). This is why one of
answering these questions and then clarifying a little the crucial moves of the progressive corporate law
bit further what it means to use a ‘‘political lens’’ to theorists is to invite us to shift from a ‘‘contractarian’’
examine issues in business ethics. I propose four view of the firm to favour what Millon calls a
directions in which we might think politically about ‘‘communitarian’’ view:
corporations and examine some of the implications
of doing so. Communitarians tend to differ from contractarians in
emphasizing the broader social effects of corporate
activity. Contractarians focus on the corporation’s
Corporations as distributive agents internal relationships, applying a cost-benefit analysis to
a relatively narrow range of more or less readily mo-
The first possible desirable way to look at business netizable interest. Communitarians see corporations as
with a political lens is to focus on the impact of the more than just agglomerations of private contract; they
firm on the society as a whole. Corporations are are powerful institutions whose conduct has substantial
among the most powerful social entities in our world public implications. Thus, for example, assessing the
and are, sometimes, depicted as the key institutions costs of the reorganization of a corporation like Time is
not just a matter of adding up possible costs in worker
of our time. Their ‘‘pervasive presence’’ and impact
layoffs and potential gains to Time shareholders. It is
on human lives rival that of history’s most powerful
also necessary to take into account the general public’s
emperors, czars, and kings.4 They control vast hu- possible interest in the various publications’ continued
man, organizational, and financial resources, trans- editorial independence. (Millon, 1993, p. 1379)
national borders and affect every human life. They
shape flows of capital, natural resources, and labor; This ‘‘communitarian’’ view is probably very
they influence national governments and local close to what a lot of theorists have in mind when
communities; and they support (directly and indi- they refer to the need for a political view of the firm.
rectly) everything from education to the arts and Millon’s basic point here is that firms are not merely
sports. Moreover, in the process of globalization, private associations with purely economic goals but
business organizations are even taking on broader, social or public institutions that are related to, and
more complicated roles in society. have an impact on, many other important social
Here, firms could be viewed as being ‘‘political’’ in institutions that realize important social goals. In
the sense that they have an impact on society as whole brief, what progressive corporate law and stake-
and often serve larger purposes than profit maximi- holder theorists are trying to do here is to empirically
zation. They have significant distributive effects because turn Friedman on his head. From this point of view,
they are able to impose a heavy imprint upon society Friedman is simply wrong at the beginning about the
as a whole. This could be called the ‘‘stakeholder’’ nature of corporations. As a matter of fact, it is
view of the corporations as political actors. One of the simply not true that firms’ activities are limited to the
recurrent themes in stakeholder theory is the market. They are ‘‘political’’ from the beginning
importance of not overlooking the ‘‘public’’ nature of because they are social institutions created by polit-
the modern corporation, which should not be ical communities and serve larger purposes than
understood simply as a ‘‘private’’ association but as a profit-seeking.
social institution whose activities and policies have an Of course, stakeholders, CSR, and progressive
impact on a plurality of stakeholder groups and not corporate law theorists are right in pointing to the
only on shareholders’ welfare.5 ‘‘public’’ nature of firms as social institutions of capitalist

5. Business and the Polis 337
societies.6 Corporations are certainly powerful create ties, cooperate, regulate conflicts, and coordi-
political actors in this sense. After all, if politics is nate their efforts through different ‘‘political’’
about giving an answer to the immense question of mechanisms of collective decision making.9
‘‘who must do what for whom?’’, then there is no This view of corporations as small political com-
doubt today that businesses are successful political munities is implicit in Christopher McMahon’s
actors.7 Moreover, as they enter new arenas, such as suggestion that the task of justifying the existence of
health care, education, and even military operations, the firm in our economic systems is analogous to the
where tough choices and tradeoffs among multiple task of justifying the existence of the state (McMa-
goods are commonplace, conflicts between economic hon 1994, 1995, 2007). From this point of view, it is
objectives and other public worthy aims is likely to possible to make what Joshua Cohen calls ‘‘parallel
increase. It is why it is surely right to ask ourselves, as case arguments’’ according to which it is plausible to
these theorists do: what are the responsibilities of claim that workers stand in relation to economic
these ‘‘social institutions?’’ and what are their capac- enterprises in a similar way as citizens stand in rela-
ities in certain domains of social and environmental tion to the state.10 If political theorists have been
action? concerned with the exercise of legitimate authority
The main problem with this first view of the firm by the state, then they also must be concerned with
as a political actor is that it is hard to see how it could the way that economic organizations, especially large
bring a refreshing perspective on debates about corporations, are organized.11
firms’ roles and responsibilities. CSR and stake- In his study on what he calls the ‘‘political theory
holders theorists and critics of the modern business of organizations’’, McMahon appears to make two
firm are incessantly making this point. Moreover, claims about the political aspects of business orga-
the problem is not that it is a false view. The nizations. First, that given their size and organiza-
problem lies in its normative scope. Firms could tional resources, some important political decisions are
certainly be understood as ‘‘social institutions’’, in left to be made by corporations; and second, that
this stakeholder theory sense, because their policies firms are analogous in some way to political com-
and activities have significant distributive effects on munities. These claims draw our attention to two
many groups in our societies. The problem is that it different meanings of corporations as political actors
should be, in fact, a relatively noncontroversial that I want to highlight here. The first claim is about
starting point. Even neoclassical economists arguing the external effects of corporate activities and cor-
for the Friedmanian view could agree with this responds broadly to what I call the view of ‘‘cor-
starting point while insisting on the idea that the porations as distributive agents.’’ In this view, some
fact that corporations are ‘‘social institutions’’ is important ‘‘political’’ decisions are made by corpo-
precisely at the basis of the best strategy to justify rations in the sense that they have an impact on who
the profit orientation of firms in competitive gets what, when, and how in our societies. The
markets.8 second claim draws our attention to another political
aspect of firms because it is a claim about the internal
organization of corporations and leads us to the view
Corporations as political communities of corporations as political communities. It is a claim
about those who are ‘‘inside’’ the firm.
It appears to be possible to look politically at the As such, ‘‘political theorists’’ of the firm appear to
business world in a different way, viewing firms as have some reasons to draw our attention to issues of
being themselves ‘‘small’’ political communities. The authority in such relations. It is often claimed, in the
very basic idea here is the following: the modern economic literature on the theory of the firm, that
business firm is not only an organization for making the main distinction between firms and markets is
decisions in a market economy. Economics organi- the exercise of authority within the firm (Hsieh,
zations are, sometimes, huge communities ‘‘popu- 2008). Contrary to competitive market relations
lated’’ by hundreds and thousands of employees with structured by the price mechanism, intrafirm relations
a variety of interests, values, and different conceptions are administrated relations that are governed by the
of the good life. These ‘‘organizational citizens’’ rules that structure the bureaucratic hierarchy of the

6. 338 ´
Pierre-Yves Neron
organization (Heath, 2007, p. 359). McMahon power, collective action and decision making.
wants to take seriously the normative aspect of this One could argue, as Walzer did a long time ago, that
feature of intrafirm relations while asking the ques- the analogy works better with cities. Cites, similar
tion of the foundations of the authority exercised by to firms, ‘‘are created by entrepreneurial energy,
managers in such hierarchical bureaucratic structures enterprise, and risk taking; and they too, recruit and
(1994). hold their citizens, by offering them and attractive
Of course, the association suggested by McMahon place to live’’ (Walzer, 1984, p. 295). In drawing this
between the state and the firm as both being similar Walzerian analogy, one is led to see the differences
political units is probably too strong, and could be between firms and political communities similar to
contested. Phillips and Margolis, for example, criti- states and cities as matter of degree (Moriarty, 2005).
cize this analogy as being misleading (1999). As they For example, it is true that state membership is not
point out, states and firms (and associations in gen- the same as organizational membership. The vol-
eral) could also be viewed as having very different untariness is more important when we think about
features and purposes. They insist on three major the latter than when we think about the former,
differences between states and large corporations: because the possibility of exit is greater in corpora-
tions. However, at the same time, one should not
– Exit: freedom to exit from a state is quite differ- exaggerate the possibility of exit in corporations.
ent than freedom to exit from a corporation. Exit from a corporation could be easier in some
Freedom of exit is a fundamental normative degree than exit from a state, but it could also be
component of what organizational membership painful. It involves research costs in finding a new
means, just as its impossibility is constitutive of job as well as transition costs in making the move
state membership. from one job to another.12 As Moriarty puts it: ‘‘It is
– Aims and purposes: It is appropriate to expect obvious that leaving one’s country is difficult. It is
organizations to promote specific aims and goals, perhaps not appreciated how difficult leaving one’s
but not for a state. job can be. For many workers, leaving a job means
– Mutual assessment of contribution: the mutual eval- losing seniority, retirement funds, health benefits,
uation of members of economic organizations is job-specific skills, community ties, and friends. Most
different from the evaluation of members of a will need to find new jobs, and these can be hard to
state, which should be viewed as a community find.’’ (Moriarty, 2005, p. 460). If there are such
of equals. Firms tolerate a greater level of meri- important limits to the freedom of exit from cor-
tocracy and it should be the case. porations, then one should regard voice as a signifi-
Philips and Margolis’ message is clear. Even if we cant alternative. Where the costs of exit are very
agree with McMahon that we should care about the high, workers should be able to rely on voice, the
way large corporations are organized, the analogy capacity to express dissent, and contest some of
with the state is too strong. We should not under- corporate policies without exiting (Hsieh, 2005).
estimate some important features of the state, most ˆ
In recent articles, Nien-he Hsieh goes in the same
notably those related to its coercive power. The direction by drawing some attention to issues of dis-
problem of protecting citizens from abuse and tributive justice in the organized production of goods
exploitation by the state might differ in some ways and services, which he perceives as an underestimated
from the protection of worker interests in the topic in contemporary political philosophy. He
workplace. As Moriarty puts it, the point is that we reviews contemporary studies on the various demands
all know that there is a difference between Saddam that workers can legitimately make to managers and
Hussein and Montgomery Burns (Moriarty, 2005). examines claims about meaningful work and worker
Despite these criticisms, it seems appealing to refer participation in firms’ governance structures. While
to firms, not necessarily as quasi-states, but as some insisting on the requirement to go beyond parallel
sort of political communities. After all, similar to case arguments, Hsieh suggests that the need for
political communities organized through some efficient decision making in contemporary economic
variety of government, corporations are sites of organizations involves the possibility of substantial

7. Business and the Polis 339
arbitrary interference from managers in the lives of management and organizational strategies to over-
workers. This feature, according to him, should draw come agency problems do not only always rely on
our attention to the legitimacy of power and authority the good engineering of external incentives but also
in corporate structures (Hsieh, 2005, 2006, 2008). on building a strong organizational culture that
Here, it should be noted that my aim is not promotes trust.13
necessarily to articulate and to defend these claims. It To see firms as some sort of political communities
is rather to show how the idea of corporations as offers a promising way to overcome some of the
political communities points in some refreshing major weaknesses of agency theory, or at least to
directions. When Hsieh asks what justice requires in shed some light on under examined aspects of the
economic production and evaluates the moral rich and complex life of modern economic organi-
importance of ‘‘voice’’ beside ‘‘exit’’ and the notion zations. It is so because it might help us tell better
of ‘‘meaningful work,’’ he gives us a good idea of stories about these complex organizations. To sug-
what it could mean to take a political look at what is gest that firms are somehow small political com-
going on inside the firm. My primary concern, munities explains partly in which ways organizations
hence, is to illuminate the style of analysis and such as firms matter for their members. It allows us
normative reasoning suggested by the view of firms to describe groups similar to the group of employees
as political communities, and how the use of a as members of a community with an organizational
political lens can contribute to a better understand- culture, some common values, and specific common
ing of some forms of participation in economic goals. The fact is that these members are not only a
enterprises and some under-theorized intrafirm part of a useful division of labor but persons with
relations (such as the contestation of managerial values and a particular conception of the good life.
decisions and authority). Moreover what a community such as a firm provides
Take, for instance, the classical accounts of the is not only a job but also community ties and friends.
theory of the firm. One clear advantage of using a For many of us who spend most of our life in that
political lens in viewing intrafirm relations is that it kind of community, it is an important source of
might help to highlight some neglected aspects in meaning.14
the economic theory of the firm in which corpo- Here again, my aim is not to develop an alter-
rations are seen as a nexus of contracts. In this view, native to agency theory. It is to illustrate the style of
the firm is understood as a set of principal–agent analysis suggested by the ‘‘firms as political things’’
relations that necessarily create agency problems. perspective. My point is that in allowing us to focus
The main objective of the governance structures of on such themes as community ties, trust-building,
the firm is then to overcome these agency problems loyalty, belonging, culture, and leadership in terms
by providing the appropriate set of incentives. of what Gary Miller calls ‘‘political leadership,’’ it
However, in some versions of the theory, it is easy to might provide some insights to better understand
find a quite pejorative view of the ‘‘agents’’ who are how hundreds and thousands of agency problems are
supposed to act in the interest of the principal. While solved on a daily basis by huge organizations (Miller,
reading the literature on ‘‘agency theory,’’ one could 1993, Chap. 11).
have the feeling that ‘‘agents’’ similar to employees Of course, the use of the idea of firms as political
are simply depicted as lazy opportunists who will communities should not lead to an overestimation of
avoid working whenever the boss isn’t looking the degree of harmony and trust in firms. The life of
(Heath, 2009). economic organizations is also about conflicts. Dif-
The problem with this view is not only that it fails ferent groups inside the firm can have highly
to provide a proper account of agents’ moral moti- divergent interests and cooperation is not easy to
vations but also that it fails to provide an appropriate enforce. However, is also this is also what the idea of
understanding of the rich life of complex organiza- corporations as political communities is about. It
tions. It generally fails to explain why employees do should also be understood as a way to focus on these
not only respond to external incentives but also de- different conflicts, not only between shareholders
velop some moral allegiances to their business and managers, but also among many different
organizations. It fails to explain why successful stakeholders.15

8. 340 ´
Pierre-Yves Neron
One of the most radical theoretical ways to follow should not undermine the insights provided by an
this path and to see corporations as political com- ethics of roles.
munities is probably to be found in the Crane et al.’s Another possible problem with this view is that it
approach of ‘‘stakeholders as citizens’’. In a way that often presupposes that seeing the firm as political
could be reminiscent of some republican accounts of communities will lead to the justification of some
the workplace, the authors suggest that we push the specific normative conclusions, namely those usually
stakeholder theory a little bit further in theorizing the defended in stakeholder theories. For instance,
groups usually referred to as stakeholders as ‘‘citizens.’’16 Crane et al.’s (2004) account of firms’ key stake-
This shift from stakeholders to citizens undoubtedly holders as ‘‘citizens,’’ it clearly leads to a radical
suggests a focus on the political dimensions of eco- critique of the shareholder view of the firm and to
nomic organizations. Corporations, in this view, are the defense of what could be associated with a
seen as communities of ‘‘internal’’ citizens in constant democratization of the firm. However, it is inter-
relations with ‘‘external’’ citizens such as NGOs and esting to note that an economist such as Hansmann
consumers. (1996), while analyzing the different structures of
This is highly seductive. The language of citi- ownership in his impressive book The Ownership of
zenship is a powerful and inspiring one. However, Enterprise has also argued that ‘‘one theme that has
this attempt to politicize the relations between dif- emerged with particular force is the importance of
ferent firm groups using the vocabulary of citizen- viewing the firm as a political institution’’ (1996, p. 287
ship could also be problematic. One could doubt my emphasis). Of course, Hansmann’s theory is far
whether it really helps to clarify the nature of obli- from the theory of corporate citizenship or the idea
gations that arise within these specific relations. For of workplace republicanism and could eventually
example, Crane et al. contend that ‘‘thinking about lead to a radical critique of stakeholder theory. But it
corporations as dealing here with ‘citizens’ rather is extremely significant that he, too, refers to the
than simply ‘consumers’ or ‘employees’, etc. brings firm as a ‘‘political institution’’ without drawing
up several issues.’’ (2004, p. 110). Note the language. radical propositions for change in the structures and
According to this approach, we should not refer to patterns of ownership or defending the ‘‘stakeholder
key groups affected by the firm’s activities as ‘‘sim- firm.’’ The firm here is labeled as a political insti-
ply’’ employees or consumers but as citizens. It tution by Hansmann because his account stresses the
clearly suggests that our usual language is insuffi- importance of the costs of collective decision making
cient, and it posits the language of citizenship as a among different groups of ‘‘patrons’’ with different
‘‘richer’’ one. In some sense, it is obviously true. As I interests. In some sense, he essentially agrees with
noticed earlier, it is true that individuals who have a James March’s famous conception of the firm as a
job in a firm are not only employees who accom- political coalition. The composition, goals, and
plish some kind of work. They have rich back- ownership structures of the firm are not given; they
grounds, ideas, values, and a conception of the good are negotiated, and determined through a set of
life; they may also disagree with some of their firm’s political decision-making mechanisms inside the
policies or decisions. However, it is also true that the firm.18 This is why Hansmann is able to illuminate
language of citizenship is very general and highly the importance of the costs of collective decision
abstract, in the sense that it does not capture very making as one of the main explanatory factors in
well the variety of roles and functions of moral agents ownership patterns. Firms, in Hansmann’s frame-
in a complex institutional division of labor; and the work, are political communities that regroup dif-
rights and obligations that derivate from those roles ferent actors who are precisely seeking to reduce the
and functions. It is, in fact, very useful to refer to the costs of politics.
group that provides labor as ‘‘simple’’ employees or A thoughtful examination of these debates on
to the group that provides financial capital as ‘‘sim- ownership and the cost of collective decision making
ple’’ shareholders because it helps to clarify the is, of course, beyond the scope of this article.
nature of the relation in which they are involved.17 However, this overview highlights the various pos-
The introduction of a language with strong political sible uses of a political language to talk about eco-
connotations (e.g., the language of citizenship) nomic organizations. Moreover, it highlights also the

9. Business and the Polis 341
differences in scope and potential radicalism of the do so at the supermarket or at a shareholder’s meeting.
project. Why? Because corporations respond (Hertz, 2001,
p. 191).
Of course, it is not necessary to be as enthusiastic
Corporate activities and policies as citizenship issues as Hertz about the political effects of shopping and
shareholder activism to take this ‘‘mutation’’ in cit-
The first two views of corporations as political things izenship’s activities and behaviors seriously. Crane
insist on a distinction between the internal organi- and Matten take a more modest stance and suggest
zation of the firm and external relations with soci- that to apply citizenship thinking to the business
eties as a whole. A third way to look at the political world doesn’t consist simply in taking a citizenship
nature of business is to examine some corporate concept ‘‘from outhere’’ and apply it to corporations
policies, structures, and practices as ‘‘citizenship is- (2008, p. 32). It obscures the fact that corporations
sues’’ while also looking at broader societal issues. themselves are subtly and sophistically involved in
Here, by ‘‘citizenship issues,’’ I refer to corporations’ this reshaping of citizenship in general. They sug-
policies, structures, and practices that seem to be at gest, rightly, that we should see some reactions to
the basis of political reactions from citizens or groups corporate power through this citizenship, hence
of citizens. Hence, corporations are not seen meta- political, lens. When NGOs and local communities
phorically as ‘‘citizens,’’ but as a growing matter of complain about some corporate operations, cer-
concern for real citizens. Their operations are then tainly, it should not be viewed only as a market
seen as ‘‘citizenship’’ issues. disoperation or as public relations failures by cor-
It is important here to note that individual citi- porations themselves but also as ‘‘examples of a cit-
zenship refers not only to a legal status or to what izenry unhappy about the inequitable distribution of
this status means for the identity of those who enjoy power to ‘corporate citizens’ ‘‘(2008, p. 29).
it, but also to a set of attitudes or virtues.19 Citi- As the view of corporations as political commu-
zenship does not refer only to a politico-legal status nities draws our attention to some political aspects of
and to an aspect of personal identity, but also to a what is going on inside the firm, this view of corporate
practice. Citizens are expected to behave in certain policies and practices as ‘‘citizenship issues’’ suggests
ways (engaging responsibly in public discourses, that what is going on inside the firm also matters for
respecting the rights of others, seeing the big picture, larger political communities. Not only social and
etc.) and to engage in some types of activities (vot- environmental impact of firms, but also the political
ing, participating to a certain degree in public decision-making process, organization, and structures
debates, etc.).20 of firms are crucial for broader political communities.
This third suggested way of looking at the political Talks about CSR, sustainable development, corporate
nature of business insists on this practical dimension of citizenship, or triple bottom line, of course, reflect
citizenship and the set of behaviors and activities this. However, the apparently more neutral language
associated there with. It starts from the realization of ‘‘corporate governance reforms’’ also hides political
some of these citizenship practices (from individual dimensions, as illuminated by recent studies of cor-
citizens) are now redirected toward corporations and porate governance patterns. Gourevitch and Shinn
business actors instead of being primarily directed (2005), for instance, in their illuminating book,
toward governments.21 The importance of this redi- examine how patterns of corporate governance are
rection of political activities by individual citizens shaped by political structures and reflect public policy
and groups was stressed by Hertz in her ‘‘Better to choices. Maintaining some distance from the classical
shop than vote’’ article where she states, very nexus-of-contracts view of the firm while accepting
enthusiastically: its usefulness, they show how patterns of corporate
… instead of showing up at the voting booth to reg- governance are also influenced by various elements of
ister their demands and wants, people are turning to politics – interests, institutions, and political conflicts.
corporations. The most effective way to be political While doing so, they give us a better idea of how
today is not to cast your vote at the ballot box but to political movements, organizations, and parties, from

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Pierre-Yves Neron
both the right and the left, organized their discourses Putting debates about the desirability and effec-
to favor changes in corporate governance structures.22 tiveness of this mutation of citizenship aside, the
From that point of view, talks about the relations contestation of corporate practices appears, none-
between corporations and the politically charged theless, to be increasingly important in the realm of
notion of citizenship are understood, not as an individual citizenship. A striking feature of the post-
invitation to see corporations as citizens, but as a socialist critique of capitalism is that several groups
challenge to our understandings of citizenship now devote most of their resources to orient changes
practices and their preconditions. It is, thus, pretty in corporate practices and policies, instead of push-
similar to other propositions such as ‘‘cosmopolitan ing for more regulation by governments or, more
citizenship,’’ ‘‘ecological citizenship,’’ ‘‘transnational radically, for the nationalization of entire indus-
citizenship,’’ ‘‘postnational citizenship,’’ ‘‘diasp- tries.24 The efforts of many activists from the left and
oric citizenship’’ and so on. All these propositions, critics of modern capitalism have been devoted
that Melissa Williams labels as the citizenships of trying to convince individual firms, using ‘‘naming
globalization, aim to revisit our assumptions about and shaming’’ strategies and more collaborative ones,
citizens status, entitlements, and modes of partici- into accepting voluntary constraints on their prac-
pation in light of new societal developments (2007, tices and activities. As Wayne Norman states it, in-
p. 228). For example, ‘‘ecological citizenship’’ has stead of using the language of socialism, class warfare,
become a popular way to frame debates in envi- or struggles against private property, those critics of
ronmental politics, such as ‘‘cosmopolitan’’ and modern capitalism are most likely to formulate their
‘‘transnational’’ citizenship have been frequently criticisms and recommendations in the language of
used as tools to think about issues of global justice. ‘‘corporate social responsibility,’’ ‘‘sustainable devel-
This is why, it should be stressed, that this redirec- opment,’’ and ‘‘stakeholder capitalism’’ (Norman,
tion of citizenship activities from governments to- 2004).25
ward corporations is crucial for a theory of individual From this perspective then, what appears to be
citizenship: its practices, institutions, preconditions, significant with this third way of looking politically
and so on. It does not justify the use of the metaphor at business practices and institutions is that it sheds
of ‘‘corporate citizenship’’ as a tool to think about some fresh light on the idea of social responsibility of
corporations’ responsibilities, obligations, and vir- business and the various ways it is embedded in
tues. It is much more an argument for the idea that political spheres and movements (Colomonos,
political philosophers of citizenship should think 2005). The ‘‘market for virtues,’’ in which virtuous
more seriously about the role of corporations in companies are recompensed and bad ones punished
political life and discourses than it being an argument or ashamed, is a complex arena involving a plurality
for the use of the language of citizenship to think of actors that interact within complex networks of
about corporate responsibilities. exchanges, collaboration, deliberation, and con-
Here, of course, an important issue concerns the frontation (Vogel, 2005; Colonomos, 2005). These
normative evaluation of this mutation in the prac- complex interactions and the shaping and reshaping
tical component of citizenship.23 It is one thing to of this market for virtues could be described as what
say that there is such a redirection of citizenship I shall call a ‘‘politics of accountability’’ in which
practices, but it is another to evaluate it. It is not corporations negotiate and renegotiate their place
clear at all whether the most effective way to be into society with consumers, media, politicians,
political is to target corporations and whether it governments regulators, and other ‘‘civil regulators’’
should be. Clearly, Hertz (quoted above) is not only (Zadek, 2001) while ‘‘moral entrepreneurs’’ (Col-
trying to describe new citizenship activities but also onomos, 2005) such as NGOs seek to wield eco-
celebrating them. Authors such as Crane, Matten, nomic powers in two directions: by handing out
and Moon are not always clear about this. They seek economic rewards to the virtuous and to punish, by
to describe and illuminate what they perceive as new shaming them, those who fail to conform to a spe-
realities in the realm of citizenship, but at some cific normative order.26
point, they also seem to present these mutations in The protagonists of this politics of accountability
the practice of citizenship as being clearly desirable. are, of course, numerous. Shifts in languages and

11. Business and the Polis 343
strategies to render account or to force others to do should think of the new ‘‘incorporation of citizen-
so are frequent. Moreover, my aim is not to give a ship,’’ they tend to overestimate the novelty of the
detailed account of this politics of accountability. It dynamic they are trying to shed some light upon.
is to show how labeling corporate activities and
policies as ‘‘citizenship issues’’ allows us to concep-
tualize CSR and stakeholder approaches not neces- Corporations as participants in the political process
sarily as a clear set of identifiable moral obligations
for corporations not only ‘‘business-as-usual’’ strat- A fourth, and probably the most straightforward,
egies, but also as way that uses a political lens to think normatively
– Political discourses: discourses that aim to articulate about business practices and institutions is to regard
some ‘‘contestation claims’’ and accountability corporations as actors that can influence the con-
demands from a discontented citizenry about the struction of public policies, regulations, and laws.
impact of some corporate practices and opera- Business organizations simply have become –
tions and the designs of markets; and through their zealous lobbying, contributions to
– Political strategies: strategies and tactics that aim to political action committees (PAC), public declara-
advance some particular set of issues, agendas, or tions, participation in public debates, provision of
interests on the public sphere by targeting mar- information, participation in public consultation
ket actors instead of governments. processes, and so on – significant actors of the
‘‘advocacy politics’’ of democratic societies.27
It should also be noted that Crane et al. suggest Here, it is important to distinguish this fourth
going a little further in our conceptualization of the understanding of corporations as political actors from
relations between citizenship and markets actors the first one, of corporations as ‘‘distributive agents’’.
such as corporations (2008a, b). According to them, In this first understanding, businesses are political
we should not entirely focus on the role of corpo- actors because they are important social institutions
rations in the reshaping of the practical dimension of with considerable financial and organizational re-
citizenship, but also on their roles in the administra- sources that have a profound impact on who gets
tion of individual citizenship rights. This is an what, when, and how. In this ‘‘stakeholder’’ sense,
important theme in their most recent writings. corporations are political actors because they are, by
Corporations are now playing a radically new key nature, social institutions. However, here, corpora-
role in governing citizenship next to governments. tions become political actors in intentionally trying to
This is, of course, very important. If we think, as influence the construction of public policies, regu-
Crane and al. urge that we do, that corporations lations, and laws. This is significant because it rep-
now play a significant role in what they call the resents a way to take seriously the distinction
administration of citizenship, then it could have an between the systemic effects of business on politics
impact on both the conceptualization of corporate and the intentional influence of firms on the political
responsibilities and our theorizing about individual process (Bernhagen and Brauninger, 2005). As noted
¨
citizenship. However, here, it should be said that, in above, firms clearly classify as political actors in the
some sense, the idea that corporations play a signif- sense that the design of markets and business orga-
icant role in the administration of citizenship is nizations have significant distributive effects on
nothing new. Moreover, this is close to the first view many groups. However, as (sometimes, quite active)
of firms as distributive agents. This is because as participants in the political process, corporations do
market actors, corporations are a part of a complex not become political actors by simply doing their job
institutional matrix that provides important ‘‘citi- in competitive markets. They intentionally enter the
zenship goods’’ for individuals. They provide jobs, political arena to influence the shaping and reshaping
retirement plans, and financial security similarly as of their regulatory environment. This distinction is
media provide important citizenship goods in important from a normative point of view because it
providing information for open public debate. refers to different kinds of relations between firms
Therefore, when Crane and Matten suggest that we and other social institutions, and it also suggests that

12. 344 ´
Pierre-Yves Neron
we might want to apply different normative tools or realize that we must pay much more attention to the
languages to think about these relations. responsibilities of corporations within the political
At this point, it is worth noting that this fourth, and administrative processes that lead to the reform
quite obvious, way to think about the political of government regulation. One has also to recognize
nature of the firm has been surprisingly overlooked that firms are ‘‘political actors’’ in the sense that they
in normative debates about the desirable conduct of are key actors of the advocacy politics, who influ-
business and the design of markets. As Leonard ence the construction of public policies, regulations,
Weber points out, in a rare academic discussion on and laws. Therefore, if government regulations play
the ethics of corporate political activities, it seems such a fundamental role that the shape and content
that questions about the legitimacy of corporate of such regulations are now heavily influenced by
political activities such as zealous lobbying and firms themselves, then one of the main aspects of the
contributions to PAC are being pushed more by definition of a responsible business organization
NGOs, and activists (shareholders and non-share- should be the determination of its political role and
holders) than by academics with an interest in the the limits of this role.
normative analysis of businesses practices (Weber, This could lead us far given the historical and
1997, p. 72).28 In general, normative theories of ideological opposition of the business world to
corporate rights, obligations, virtues, and so on, have government regulations (Baumol, 1974). As Joseph
failed to take seriously David Vogel’s suggestion that Heath puts it, ‘‘one of the more troubling features of
‘‘the most critical dimension of corporate responsi- the way businesses conduct themselves in the public
bility may well be a company’s impact on public sphere is that they consistently lobby against regu-
policy’’ (2005, p. 171). lations that are designed to correct market failures’’
This should be regarded as regrettable. There are (2007, p. 371). Hence, my suggestion is that one
significant ethical concerns about the role of cor- very interesting implication of taking such a stance is
porations in advocacy politics (and also the role of that it points out some of the most morally prob-
money in politics in general), in contemporary lematic aspects of the conduct of corporations,
democracies.29 Given the asymmetry of power be- namely, the entrenchment of market failures by
tween citizens and ‘‘corporate citizens,’’ certain political oppositions to their correction by the state.
questions do arise: What should be the proper role of
corporations in the political realm? Do corporations
have the right to influence elections? How should Building the political theory of the firm:
top executives think about the way their corpora- some challenges
tions could influence governments? Should respon-
sible corporations restrain themselves in the political In the preceding section, I have made several sug-
realm or even that, as the former US Secretary of gestions on the various possible ways in which to use
Labor Robert Reich argues, they have a responsi- a political language to think about business practices
bility to ‘‘respect the political process by staying out and institutions. What should we think about this
of it’’ (Reich, 1998, p. 16)? Answers to these questions call for a more explicitly political conceptualization
should be considered as crucial parts of a definition of what of normative issues that arise in the conduct of
it is to be a responsible economic organization, at home and business? How should we welcome the use of
abroad. political language to think about these issues? What
In order to develop that line of argument, of does the future of a ‘‘political theory of the firm’’
course, one has to recognize the fundamental role look like? In order to suggest some possible answers
government regulations play in the promotion and to these questions, I would like to conclude by
implementation of responsible business practices highlighting some problems with this political the-
(most notably as the main institutional response to ory of the firm. While doing so, I do not want to
market failures) (Heath and Norman, 2004; Heath, imply that building such a theory is unworthy.
2006). Moreover, after focusing on how paramount I think that doing so is one of the main tasks of
state regulation has been over the past century in academics with an interest in the normative study of
making corporations more responsible, we also business practices and institutions. As a consequence,

13. Business and the Polis 345
I want to contribute to future debates about the firm while insisting on the variety of relations and
political nature of business by suggesting three interactions that fall under this political umbrella.
challenges that need to be overcome. In order to show that such a theory has different
One striking feature of this call is that it is highly compartments is important to put aside a tendency
seductive. It appears to correspond to some of our toward uniformity that is inherent to the over-
intuitions about some features of the business world. inclusion problem. Business ethicists appear to be
Moreover, after examination, it seems to be a fruitful often tempted by the formulation of a moral uniform
way to open new debates and illuminate certain code in which a theory of general morality (Kantian,
dimensions that might otherwise go unexamined in utilitarian, Aristotelician) is applied to business
‘‘classical’’ business ethics. Of course, seeing corpo- problems (Heath, 2007).30 It would be tempting for
rations as political actors could be a good way to take theorists of the political nature of corporations to do
very seriously the common (and often vague) sug- the same, i.e., to use a political language in such a way
gestion that business organizations are not purely to think about every business relation. It is probably a
economic ones. Investigation of the ‘‘political’’ in mistake done by Crane and Matten in using the
business life could then serve to clarify what we citizenship language to think about almost every
mean exactly when we say that business organiza- problem in the normative evaluation of business
tions are not purely economic ones. It could also practices and institutions, from corporate governance
illuminate some aspects of these organizations in matters to consumer’s choices through CSRs,
putting the spotlight on some internal relations industrial relations, and meaningful work. As noted
between groups inside the firm (shareholders, non- above, this is well exemplified by their call for a
shareholder groups, and the management). How- theory that understands workers as ‘‘citizens’’ instead
ever, it could also be said that this invitation to think of viewing them as ‘‘simple’’ employees. The prob-
more politically about business remains, at least lem with this claim is that it overlooks the impor-
partly, very vague, especially when authors as diverse tance of a complex institutional division of labor in
as Crane, Matten, Palazzo, McMahon, Hartman, which human agents play different kinds of roles.
Walzer, Dahl, Hsieh, and Hansmann, with very Human beings can wear different hats depending on
different intellectual projects and political orienta- the kind of institutional interactions in which they
tions, refer to corporations as political ‘‘entities,’’ are involved. The basic insight of what could be
‘‘actors,’’ or ‘‘institutions.’’ Furthermore, it is not called an ‘‘ethics of roles’’ is that the recognition of
self-evident that it always helps to think more clearly the importance of this complex institutional division
about some issues and problems to systematically of labor is crucial in the way we think about the
label these issues and problems as ‘‘political.’’ rights, responsibilities, obligations, and virtues of
These remarks make clear that it would be highly moral agents. This is why the systematic use of the
problematic to simply talk about every problem or very general language of citizenship risks blurring our
intellectual project in business ethics as ‘‘political’’ sensibility to considerations of division of moral labor
ones. Let us call it the over-inclusion problem. This is and good institutional design. In order to put it
important because this call for a better understanding simply, it is not morally insignificant to refer to those
of corporations from a political point of view seems persons who do a specific job within an organization
to be especially vulnerable to this problem. As a that we call a ‘‘corporation,’’ as ‘‘employees.’’ It sit-
consequence, the first challenge facing the political uates them in an institutional context, giving us
theory of the firm would be to overcome this over- important insights about their rights and responsi-
inclusion problem. One way to do so is by drawing bilities, and their legitimate demands.
the kind of distinctions drawn in this article, which It should be clear by now that a call for a political
appears to be a useful way to show the variety of view of business ethics issues should not blur crucial
intellectual projects behind this call. It is useful be- differences between different kinds of interactions or
cause it ‘‘compartmentalizes’’ this very general idea relations and their different natures. This is why my
of a ‘‘political theory of the firm.’’ It retains the basic characterization of these four views takes seriously
intuitions behind this call for a political view of the the difference, stressed by Heath, between intrafirm

14. 346 ´
Pierre-Yves Neron
relations and extrafirm relations (Heath 2006, 2007). practices that leverage that which motivates business
Some extrafirm relations, such as business and gov- in a way that results in social and environmental
ernment relations, are obviously political while some value creation.’’ (Rasche et al., 2008, p. 155). An-
others, such as competitive practices between firms other contributor argues that corporations have a
through market interactions, might not be especially political responsibility that ‘‘can be defined as: to
well understood as political ones, both empirically respect human rights, avoid being complicit in hu-
and normatively. Meanwhile, some intrafirm rela- man rights abuses, do what they can to promote
tions, such as relations between employees and human rights principles.’’ (Rasche et al., 2008,
managers, could be fruitfully understood as political p. 164).
relations of power, authority, community, and trust These two formulations of the political responsi-
building, but they remain eminently different from bility of corporations are quite similar to classical
others types of political activities. accounts of CSR. It is in fact not self-evident that it
Some other relations between economic actors helps to refer here to a political responsibility. Most
are not straightforwardly political and, thus, are not theorists of CSR believe that social responsibility of
especially well theorized as political relations or as business is not simply about philanthropic gestures
citizenship activities. For instance, Hertz’s enthusi- and should ‘‘encompasses innovative models of
asm about shopping as the most efficient political business and practices that leverage that which
activity in contemporary societies exudes overcon- motivates business in a way that results in social and
fidence. Despite recurrent talk about the fall of environmental value creation.’’ In order to label this
nation states and a ‘‘silent takeover’’ by corporations, as a political responsibility appears to be a way to add
the state remains the key political actor, and changes some normative weight to a well-known statement.
in government have deep and pervasive impacts. The same could be said about the second account of
Theorists of the political nature of corporations and corporate political responsibility. Moreover, if we
business institutions should resist such enthusiasm in are to label these responsibilities as political responsi-
their attempts to shed some light on the political bilities, then the focus on human rights alone is
nature of corporate practices. surprising. In fact, this definition of political
A second problem would be the formulation of a responsibility fails to capture three of the four core
political view of the firm that simply leads to a areas of the UN Global Compact with corporations:
reaffirmation of the set of ideas usually associated labor standards, environment, and anti-corruption.
with CSR and stakeholder theory. In this case, it Why should we think, for instance, that a negative
would be impossible to differentiate this political obligation not to abuse human rights is best described
approach from classical CSR and stakeholder ap- as a political responsibility? Aren’t the collaboration
proaches. Let us call this the differentiation problem. and cooperation with relevant governmental and
Some recent attempts to see corporations as political civil authorities to fight corruption in developing
actors appear to fail overcoming this problem, and, countries more straightforward political activities?
thus, fail in meeting expectations. Despite the invi- Isn’t the lobbying of governmental agencies for
tation to set up an agenda to build the new political stronger environmental regulations and standards a
conception of the firm and shed some light on un- better example of an obvious, clear-cut political
der-theorized interactions and practices, these at- responsibility? Is there any reason to describe every
tempts offer something close to classical CSR ‘‘innovative model of business’’ as being political?
accounts and stakeholders theories. For instance, one Obviously, this association between the political
of the contributors to the report on the First Swiss view of business practices and the CSR agenda is not
Master Class in CSR (untitled ‘‘Corporations as a problem in itself. It is, of course, a possible result of
Political Actors’’) refers to a debate on ‘‘whether or our inquiries. However, it would be mistaken to
not business possesses a political responsibility be- assume from the start that using a political lens to
yond its traditional role in society’’ (Rasche et al., look at normative issues in the conduct of business
2008, p. 154) and suggests that a political responsi- would go hand in hand with something similar to a
bility moves beyond philanthropic gestures and ‘‘strong CSR agenda.’’ We should not think that it
‘‘encompass innovative models of business and will necessarily be the case. On the contrary, we

15. Business and the Polis 347
might be open to the possibility that taking such a feature of this literature that makes clear that the call
stance could lead to surprising, unexpected results. for a better understanding of the political nature of
One possibility, to overcome this problem, is to businesses does not represent a way to draw some
admit that among the four views examined here, attention to a specific set of activities such as lob-
some could be clearly more relevant or theoretically bying and campaign contributions. It seems to refer
useful than others. For instance, one could say that to something more. According to Crane, Matten, and
the first view of firms as distributive agents is Moon, for example, the theory of the firm as a
probably the most vulnerable to this differentiation political actor calls for a radical rethinking of the
problem. The idea of firms as political actors in this classical division of labor between business and
sense is well recognized in the CSR literature. It is government. It also states that corporations become
the familiar idea that given their nature as ‘‘public’’ political actors only when they adopt new patterns of
institutions, corporations cannot abdicate their behaviors oriented toward the ‘‘common good’’
broader social responsibilities. One might also (Crane et al., 2008a, b).
plausibly argue that the view of corporations as It is then clear that authors such as Crane, Matten,
political communities is more promising because it and Moon seem to have in mind something else
clearly appears to draw our attention to some under- rather than a reaffirmation of a classical account of
theorized relations within the organizational struc- CSR, especially when they insist on the possibility of
tures of the firm. One might also say that, in order to rethinking (maybe radically) the division of moral
overcome this differentiation problem, the fourth labor between business and government. Given this,
view of corporations as active participants in the it is probably useful here to draw a distinction
political process appears to be especially promising. between three different understandings of the call for
It is, of course, the most straightforward way to a theory of the business firm as a political actor. As
think politically about corporations, which puts aside should be clear by now, some authors clearly refer to
difficulties related with problematic or unobvious this as another way to defend CSR. Let us call it the
uses of a political lens to think about business. Reaffirmation view. Some other scholars clearly refer
However, it is also a view that might draw our to such a theory as a paradigm change in the way we
attention to very specific, but fundamental, practices normatively think about businesses’ roles and
by corporate actors that are not especially well the- responsibilities in our societies. Let us call it the Shift
orized with the tools provided by CSR and stake- in paradigm view. Proponents of this view associate
holders theories. This is probably why Scherer and the idea of the business firm as political actor as an
Palazzo suggest that some corporate activities in opportunity to rethink the classical division of labor
complex networks of (global) governance point to between business and government and to redefine
the need for a better understanding of the political corporate social and environmental roles and
nature of business (2007, p. 1115). The main con- responsibilities in a more expensive way. Another
tribution of a ‘‘political theory of the firm’’ then way to understand this call for a ‘‘political’’ theory of
might not be to a reassessment of business practices the business firm is to see it as a useful way to draw
in general, but to a point in the direction of a new some attention to a specific set of corporate activities
theory of corporate responsibilities, which focuses such as lobbying, contributions to campaigns, and so
on the various ways in which firms, in their external on. Let us call it the Shift in subject view. According to
relations, interfere in the political process, in the this view, recent literature on the firm as political
direction of a robust normative theory of corporate actor suggests, more modestly, a change in the subject
lobbying. of our thinking about corporate roles and responsi-
Interestingly enough, recent literature on the to- bilities. It draws our attention to the importance of
pic does not go in this direction. It rather suggests corporate political activities and suggests the need for
that the fact that corporations use zealous lobbying more theoretical tools to think normatively about
and political strategies to foster their economic ends and design principles for business and government
does not change them into political actors (Crane relations.
et al., 2008a, b). It does not imply, as such, that they This classification of the different positions should
have a political responsibility. It is a very significant give us a better idea of the varieties of projects and

16. 348 ´
Pierre-Yves Neron
their scope. The Reaffirmation view is of course should be viewed as a significant response to man-
facing the differentiation problem and seems to agerial decisions. Second, corporations could also be
imply that call for a political theory of the firm might quite uncomfortable with my remarks on the
not be especially fruitful. The Shift in paradigm view importance of taking very seriously the fourth aspect
does not face this problem and clearly implies a more (Corporations as participants in the political process)
radical project. The proponents of this view suggest examined here in our normative discussions about
a new paradigm in which corporations are under- corporate responsibilities. A conception of corporate
stood as assuming new roles of governance and state- roles and responsibilities that draws our attention to
alike responsibilities (Crane et al., 2008a, b). They the ways firms interfere in the political process, and,
are, therefore, able to put aside the differentiation therefore, in the shaping and reshaping of their
problem, but are probably facing what I called the regulatory environment, may have radical implica-
over-inclusion problem: the risk, under a new para- tions, given the ideological opposition and skepti-
digm, to label every issue of business ethics as cism of the business class toward government
‘‘political’’ ones without making any real theoretical regulations. Corporations generally wish to put the
improvement. By suggesting that the fourth way to spotlight on their various direct charitable contri-
think politically about corporations (Corporations as butions to the community, but have little incentive
participants in the political process) might be the to highlight their lobbying efforts, campaign con-
most fruitful one, I am, therefore, proposing some- tributions, political connections, and so on (Neron ´
thing more in the lines of the Shift in subject view. It and Norman, 2008a, p. 17, b, pp. 62–65). In order
does not simply reaffirm classical CSR discourses, to put it crudely, they will tend to promote their
but does not necessarily assert the need for a para- own green innovations and practices inside their
digm change in business ethics. It simply stresses, organizations, such as the use of recto–verso for the
maybe more modestly and less enthusiastically, the production and distribution of corporate documen-
need for a better normative theory of (classical) tation, but will have fewer incentives to be trans-
corporate political activities. parent about how they lobbied to defeat stronger
Finally, the third, probably more abstract, chal- environmental regulations inspired by the protocol
lenge is to realize that the choice of using a political of Kyoto. In contrast, some NGOs and critics of
lens to examine issues of business ethics is itself partly capitalism might have reasons to favor this intro-
political. In the preceding section, I have proposed duction of a ‘‘political’’ (in the fourth sense) view of
four directions in which it could be theoretically the firm.
fruitful to think about the complex relations be- ´
As Neron and Norman argue, this kind of resis-
tween the business world and the polis. It is worth tance from some groups to the introduction of
noting that these various ways to think politically specific ways to talk about corporate responsibilities
about business practices and institutions are not could be partly explained by the fact that it is
really consensual. As Crane and Matten point out, sometimes hard to draw a clear line between the
there are some resistances in business circles to the analysis of the language of politics and an exercise in
very idea that firms be seen as embedded in some ´
the politics of language (Neron and Norman,
sort of political relationships that the call for a 2008b). This is because when evaluating a normative
political theory of the firm is trying to shed light framework or language to think about business
upon (2008, p. 30). This is because the very idea of practices and institutions, we have to answer two
using a language with strong political connotations related but different questions. First, we want to
is, from the start, a controversial one. It suggests know whether the language or normative frame-
unobvious ways to publicly talk about business ethics. work X is helpful for thinking in a clear, coherent
Let me just give two examples. First, CEOs and top way about corporate responsibilities (and their jus-
management executives may be especially reluctant tifications). Second, we also want to ask ourselves
to address issues about the legitimacy of management whether the language or normative framework X is
authority raised by the view of corporations as an efficient way of talking about responsible business
political communities. They might, for instance, be practices in public discourses. The first question is
uncomfortable with the suggestion that ‘‘voice’’ largely calling for a ‘‘neutral’’ analysis of the language of

17. Business and the Polis 349
politics which aims to construct better normative of the project. Clearly, it is a worthy one. They
theories about corporate duties and obligations; the should be viewed as an attempt to orient the whole
second question is an invitation to engage in the project, as an invitation to not overestimating its
politics of language, to propose guidance on how we scope, to put aside overconfident claims, and to be
should or shouldn’t use different normative frame- careful about its implications. The utilization of a
works to promote what we would consider to be political lens to look at some aspects of the business
more desirable outcomes in the social world.31 In world is clearly useful to think in an imaginative,
order to use the title of Williams Connelly’s empirically informed way about normative issues
important book, we engage in such a process to related to business practices and institutions. In this
modify the ‘‘terms of political discourse’’ (1983). sense, it might be useful to overcome what Hanlon
Given the above-mentioned sort of dynamic, it is calls the ‘‘denial of politics’’ in business ethics.
not very surprising that some business circles might However, it is also clearly the case that some rela-
be uneasy with a more explicitly political language to tions are not especially well theorized as ‘‘political’’
talk about their responsibilities, practices, and ones. Moreover, some, e.g., shopping, are at best
internal organization, while some of their critics problematically theorized as being political. We
could enthusiastically embrace this language. In that should always keep in mind that while there are
case, the ‘‘politics of language’’ of the corporate some grains of truth in the slogan ‘‘Everything is
world would consist in resisting the introduction of a political,’’ some things are more political than others.
more explicitly political language and promoting
other, maybe more pro-business, normative lan-
guages. From this point of view, the debate about Notes
the introduction of a political language to think
about business practices and institutions is itself 1
For some reflections, which I draw here, on this
political because it is a way to engage in the shaping plurality of languages or framework, see Neron and ´
and reshaping of the terms and structures of public Norman (2008a, pp. 4–6).
2
debates and discourses about business practices and See also Jeurissen (2004), Waddock (2004), and
institutions. Zadek (2001). See Matten and Crane (2002, 2005),
´
Moon et al. (2005), and Neron and Norman (2008a)
for an analysis and a critique of this association of corpo-
rate citizenship with CSR.
Conclusion 3
See Heath for the importance of applying very dif-
ferent ‘‘normative logics’’ to different relations inside
Recent literature in business ethics suggests that the firm and outside the firm (Heath, 2006, 2007).
there has been a call for a ‘‘political’’ understanding 4
See Lynn Sharp Paine (2002, pp. 91–96).
of corporations, and business practices and institu- 5
See Boatright (2002) for a good discussion of this
tions in general – a call for what could be designated claim.
6
as a ‘‘political theory of the firm’’ or a ‘‘theory of the I use the term ‘‘institutions’’ here to talk about for-
firm as a political actor.’’ This article aimed to mal organizations.
7
investigate what it means to take seriously this call. See Bernhagen and Brauninger (2005, p. 43).
¨
8
In order to do so, it proposed four different ways, Here, see Heath (2006, pp. 540–542). See also
and their potential implications, to think politically Stiglitz (1996).
9
about issues in business ethics. It also showed how This could be reminiscent of James G. March’s
famous study on the firm as a political coalition (March,
recent literature has failed to take seriously these
1962).
distinctions and, therefore, has failed to identify the 10
See Cohen (1989, p. 27) for an excellent account
proper scope of the project. of parallel case arguments and the need to go beyond,
This is the reason why this article also points to see Hsieh (2008, pp. 15–22).
some potential difficulties that theorists involved in 11
In the preface of his 1994 book Authority and
this project need to overcome. Of course, none of Democracy, McMahon wrote that ‘‘The authority of
these critical comments or the clarification attempts governments might also be called political authority,
made in this article should be viewed as a rejection although for reasons that will become clear as we