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Professor Marc Jeannerod

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Professor Marc Jeannerod Professor Marc Jeannerod Document Transcript

  • Professor Marc Jeannerod Institut des Sciences Cognitives 67, boulevard Pinel 69675 Bron cedex France Tel: 33-4-37911212 Fax: 33-4-37911210 E-mail: jeannerod@isc.cnrs.fr; Marc.Jeannerod@isc.cnrs.fr http://www.isc.cnrs.fr:80/jea/mjeannerod.htm 1965 : Md degree at Lyon University. 1965 : Visiting fellow at Department of Anatomy, UCLA, Los Angeles. 1971 : Full professor in Physiology, Lyon University 2005 : Emeritus professor, Lyon University 1975-1997 : Director, INSERM Unit 94 (Laboratoire de Neuropsychologie Expérimentale). 1997-2006 : Director, Institut des Sciences Cognitives, CNRS and Lyon University. 1989 : Member, Academia Europea 2002 : Member, Académie des Sciences. Recent publications 1. Books Hein, A., and M. Jeannerod (Eds.). Spatially oriented behavior. Springer-Verlag, New- York, 1983, 365 pp. Jeannerod, M. Le cerveau-machine. Physiologie de la volonté. Fayard, Paris, 1983, 225 pp. Traduction anglaise: The brain-machine. The development of neurophysiological thought. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985, 207 pp. Ingle, D., Jeannerod, M., and D. Lee (Eds.). Brain mechanisms and spatial vision. NATO ASI Series, M. Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985, 470 pp. Ron, S., Schmid, R., and M. Jeannerod (Eds). Sensorimotor plasticity. Theoretical, experimental and clinical aspects. Colloque INSERM, vol. 140. Editions INSERM, Paris, 1986, 507 pp. Jeannerod, M. (Ed.). Neurophysiological and neuro-psychological aspects of spatial neglect. Advances in Psychology, vol. 45. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1987, 346 pp. Jeannerod, M. The neural and behavioural organization of goal-directed movements. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, 281 pp.
  • Jeannerod, M. (Ed.). Motor representation and control. Attention and Performance, vol. XIII. Erlbaum, New Jersey, 1990, 875 pp. Séron, X, et M. Jeannerod (Eds). Neuropsychologie humaine. Mardaga, Liège, 1994, 610 p. Behrman, M. S. Kosslyn and M. Jeannerod (Eds). The neuropsychology of mental imagery. Pergamon, Oxford, 1995, 250 p. Jeannerod, M. The cognitive neuroscience of action. Blackwell, Oxford, 1997. Jacob, P. & Jeannerod, M. (2003) Ways of seeing. The scope and limits of visual cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 287 pp. Freund, H.J., Hallett, M., Jeannerod, M. & Leigarda, R. (Eds) (2005) Higher-order motor disorders. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Jeannerod, M. (2006) Motor Cognition. What actions tell the self. Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford. 2. Papers (2001-2006) Frak, V.G., Paulignan, Y. & Jeannerod, M. (2001) Orientation of the opposition axis in mentally simulated grasping. Experimental Brain Research, 136, 120-127. Jeannerod, M. (2001) Neural simulation of action : A unifying mechanism for motor cognition. Neuroimage, 14, S103-S109. Slachewsky, A., Pillon, B., Fourneret, P. Pradat-Diehl, Jeannerod, M. & Dubois, B. (2001) Preserved adjustment but impaired awareness in a sensory-motor conflict following prefrontal lesions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 332-340. Fourneret, P., Paillard, J., Lamarre, Y., Cole, J. & Jeannerod, M. (2002) Lack of conscious recognition of one’s own actions in a haptically deafferented patient. Neuroreport, 13, 541-547.
  • Gallagher, S. & Jeannerod, M. (2002) From action to interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 3-26. Van den Bos, E. & Jeannerod, M. (2002) Sense of body and sense of action both contribute to self-recognition. Cognition, 85, 177-187. Farné, A., Roy, A.C., Paulignan, Y., Rode, G., Rossetti, Y., Boisson, D. & Jeannerod, M. (2003) Right hemisphere visuomotor control of the ipsilateral hand : evidence from right brain damaged patients. Neuropsychologia, 41, 739-757. Jeannerod, M. (2003) The mechanisms of self-recognition in humans. Behavioral Brain Research, 142, 1-15. Jeannerod, M. (2003) Self-generated actions. In : Voluntary action. Brains, minds, and sociality . S. Maasen, W. Prinz & G. Roth (Eds). New York, Oxford University Press, pp 153-164. Jeannerod, M. (2003) Consciousness of action and self-consciousness. A cognitive neuroscience approach. In : Agency and self-awareness. Issues in philosophy and psychology, J. Roessler and N. Eilan (Eds). New York: Oxford University Press, p 128-149. Jeannerod, M. & Farné, A. (2003) The visuomotor functions of posterior parietal areas. In : Advances in Neurology, Vol. 93, The parietal lobes A.M. Siegel, R.A. Andersen, J.H. Freund & D.D Spencer (Eds) pp 205-217. New-York, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Slachevsky, A., Pillon, B., Fourneret, P., Renié, L., Levy, R., Jeannerod, M. & Dubois, B. (2003) The prefrontal cortex and conscious monitoring of action. An experimental study. Neuropsychologia, 41, 655-665.
  • Jeannerod, M. (2004) Visual and action cues both contribute to the self-other distinction. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 422-423. Jeannerod, M. (2004) How do we decipher others’ minds. In : Who needs emotions ? The brain meets the robot. J.M. Fellous & M.A. Arbib (Eds) Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 147-169. Jeannerod, M. & Pacherie, E. (2004) Agency, simulation and self-identification. Mind and Language, 19, 113-146. Jeannerod, M. (2004) Actions from within. International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 2, 376-402. Jacob, P. & Jeannerod, M. (2005) The motor theory of social cognition : a critique. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 21-25. Jeannerod, M. (2005) Is motor cortex only an executive area ? Its role in motor cognition. In Motor cortex in voluntary movements. A distributed system for distributed functions. A. Riehle and E. Vaadia (Eds). Boca Raton, CRC Press pp 241-256. Jeannerod, M. & Jacob, P. (2005) Visual cognition. A new look at the two visual systems model. Neuropsychologia, 43, 301-312.. Boulenger, V., Roy, A.C., Paulignan, Y., Deprez, V., Jeannerod, M. & Nazir, T. (2006) Cross-talk between language processes and overt motor behaviour in the first 200 msec of processing. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 1607-1615. Jeannerod, M. (2006) The origin of voluntary action. History of a physiological concept. C.R. Biologies, 329, 354-362. Jeannerod, M. (2006) Consciousness of action as an embodied consciousness. In Does
  • consciousness cause behaviour?, S. Pockett, W. Banks & S. Gallagher (Eds), MIT Press, Pp 25-38. Jeannerod, M. (2006) From volition to agency. The mechanism of action recognition and its failures. In Disorders of volition, N. Sebanz and W. Prinz (Eds), Cambridge, MIT Press, pp 175-192. 3. Current scientific interest My interest in the psychopathology of intention originated from a longstanding practice of research on the brain mechanisms of action. I had been working in the past on sensory-motor coordination, on hand movements, and more generally on the way actions are internally represented and encoded. In the 1990s, we had discovered some of the properties of action representations, by using a classical model, that of motor imagery. We had found that imagining an action activated mechanisms quite similar to those of real actions. The most striking aspect of this finding is that action imagination is related to an activation of those cortical and subcortical motor areas (including primary motor cortex), which participate in the command of executed action. Hence the hypothesis, which is still nowadays the subject of intensive scrutiny by cognitive neuroscientists, that representing an action consists in simulating the mechanisms, like programming and generating the motor commands, that would be used to actually execute that action. This hypothesis has deep implications in several domains of motor neuroscience. Action simulation could represent the basis for learning skills: for example, mental rehearsal, learning by observing others’ actions or motor rehabilitation techniques, would be direct implementations of this ability to internally represent or simulate an action. This work on action representations also opens new avenues on the way one identifies and recognizes one’s own actions. Normal subjects seem to achieve this task of self-recognition by internally monitoring the efferent signals generated when an action is intended, represented and eventually executed. These efferent signals are matched with the afferent signals (e.g., visual, kinesthetic) that result from the execution
  • itself, and the degree of correlation between these internal and external signals determines their origin. We showed that this correlation is achieved in the inferior parietal lobule, a cortical area where the efferent motor information and the afferent visual and somatosensory information merge together. Indeed, focal parietal lesions lead to striking deficits in self-recognition: patients with such lesions may fail to recognize their own actions and their own body parts, which they may even attribute to someone else. One direct consequence of action recognition is self-recognition. By identifying myself as the agents of my actions, I distinguish myself from other selves. We know from clinical psychiatry that certain psychotic states are characterized by difficulties in attributing actions to their proper agent. Schizophrenic patients, for example, may experience verbal hallucinations by attributing their own internal speech to someone else. We found that such patients show abnormal activity in their inferior parietal lobule while attempting to disentangle their own actions from those of other agents. This finding demonstrates the validity of a trait approach of complex entities like schizophrenia. Here we have an indication that a defective monitoring of one’s actions may lead to pathological symptoms like hallucinations, delusions or depersonalization.