Dorothy English Mgmt Model pdf

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Dorothy Dankel explains her latest research on a bottom-up marine fisheries management model built on stakeholder preferences

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Dorothy English Mgmt Model pdf

  1. 1. meet Dorothy
  2. 2. meet Dorothy
  3. 3. (me)
  4. 4. I live in
  5. 5. Bergen
  6. 6. but come from
  7. 7. Indiana
  8. 8. I like to
  9. 9. &
  10. 10. I support
  11. 11. and I have a blog…
  12. 12. www.dorothydankel.blogspot.com So friends & family can stay updated
  13. 13. www.dorothydankel.blogspot.com and where interested people can comment on topics
  14. 14. I am a biologist…
  15. 15. and a PhD student in fisheries management
  16. 16. I am very interested in the social and economic sides of fisheries
  17. 17. Dorothy wants to make her science relavant to those it affects…
  18. 18. we know there are conflicts of interest in marine resource management
  19. 19. I want to explore ways conflicts of objectives in fisheries can be resolved
  20. 20. utility utility my fish my fish Utility functions can serve as common language between stakeholders
  21. 21. but, stakeholders have different ideas about how fish can be useful!
  22. 22. vs.
  23. 23. utility utility catch healthy fish stock therefore, natural conflicts of objectives between stakeholders arise
  24. 24. Then Ray Hilborn wrote a paper about fisheries conflicts…
  25. 25. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy Benefits (utility) 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  26. 26. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield here is a typical yield curve with maximum sustainable yield (MSY) at the top Benefits (utility) 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  27. 27. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield profit the profit curve has a maximum point to the left of MSY due to increasing costs of fishing effort Benefits (utility) 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  28. 28. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield profit employment here Hilborn describes employment as Benefits linearly increasing (utility) with increasing fishing effort 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  29. 29. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield profit employment but ecosystem protection linearly decreases with Benefits increasing fishing (utility) effort ecosystem preservation 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  30. 30. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield profit employment zone of traditional fisheries management Benefits (utility) ecosystem preservation 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  31. 31. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield profit employment zone of new zone of traditional consensus fisheries management Benefits (utility) ecosystem preservation 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  32. 32. Hilborn (2007) ”Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives” Marine Policy yield profit employment zone of new zone of traditional consensus fisheries management Benefits (utility) ecosystem preservation 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  33. 33. Dorothy asked herself: zone of new zone of traditional consensus fisheries management Benefits (utility) 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  34. 34. Can I model this? Does the zone of yield consensus really employment exist? zone of new zone of traditional consensus fisheries management Benefits (utility) 0 population crash Fishing Effort
  35. 35. I thought this would make a great summer project…
  36. 36. and Ulf and Mikko thought so, too!
  37. 37. Let’s bring Dorothy down to IIASA this summer. Mmmm… Ok. and Ulf and Mikko thought so, too!
  38. 38. So Dorothy stayed 90 days and 90 nights at the Schloss in Austria…
  39. 39. (not exactly this one, but similar…)
  40. 40. and came up with an idea that she wants to share with stakeholders
  41. 41. Management + = model
  42. 42. A model that quantitively describes Ray Hilborn’s discussion on conflicts of interests in fisheries
  43. 43. In order to answer this question:
  44. 44. Can stakeholder conflicts of objectives be reconciled in marine fisheries management?
  45. 45. Can stakeholder conflicts of objectives be reconciled in marine fisheries management? 1,2 1 1,2,3 Dorothy J. Dankel , Ulf Dieckmann & Mikko Heino 1 Evolution & Ecology Program, International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Laxenburg, Austria 2 Pelagic Research Group, Institute of Marine Research (IMR) Bergen, Norway 3 Evolutionary Fisheries Ecology Program, University of Bergen, Norway
  46. 46. Population model Utility model + = Management model Simplified modelling situation: don’t take terminology too seriously
  47. 47. The four utility components: YIELD PROFIT EMPLOYMENT ON LAND ECOSYSTEM PRESERVATION (translated to stock level in the model) I show here a ray to illustrate that rays and EMPLOYMENT skates are often caught as bycatch which is AT SEA detrimental to the ecosystem
  48. 48. The four utility components: YIELD PROFIT The size of these pictures show how much weight each stakeholder places on the different EMPLOYMENT utility components STOCK LEVEL
  49. 49. Modelled What they care about: stakeholders:
  50. 50. Modelled What they care about: stakeholders: Fishermen ”industrial” ”artisanal” Society ”employment-oriented” ”profit-oriented” Conservationists
  51. 51. Let’s go through each of the 5 stakeholders to get to know them and their differences Remember! The size of the utility component pictures show how much preference each stakeholder places on each utility component
  52. 52. Two types of fishermen: industrial (large fishing vessels) & artisanal (small fishing boats)
  53. 53. Stakeholders: What they care about: Fishermen
  54. 54. Two types of society: employment-oriented profit-oriented
  55. 55. Stakeholders: What they care about: Society
  56. 56. These two types of society may be thought of in a Norwegian perspective as the last two fishery ministers Norway has had: Helga Pedersen (current minister) & Svein Ludvigsen (past minister)
  57. 57. Stakeholders: What they care about: Society
  58. 58. And finally, conservationists (commonly called eNGOs [environmental non- governmental organizations])
  59. 59. Stakeholders: What they care about: Conservationists
  60. 60. Each modelled stakeholder has a preference for each of the 4 utility components based on stakeholder consultation
  61. 61. Stakeholder preferences utility YIELD EMPLOYMENT PROFIT STOCK LEVEL -year (tons) (days ) (€) (spawning stock biomass, tons) component FISHERMEN 0.2 0 0.8 0 ”industrial” 0.4 0 0.4 0.2 ”artisanal” SOCIETY 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 ”employment- oriented” 0.2 0.1 0.7 0 ”profit-oriented” 0.1 0.1 0 0.8 CONSERVATIONISTS assumptions: stakeholder group consensus
  62. 62. Stakeholder preferences utility YIELD EMPLOYMENT PROFIT STOCK LEVEL -year (tons) (days ) (€) (spawning stock Total weight of all components for biomass, tons) component each stakeholder = 1.0 FISHERMEN 0.8 0.2 0 0 ”industrial” 0.4 0.4 0 0.2 ”artisanal” SOCIETY 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 ”employment- oriented” 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 ”profit-oriented” 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 CONSERVATIONISTS assumptions: stakeholder group consensus
  63. 63. Caveat: stated stakeholder preferences do not always equal revealed stakeholder preferences…
  64. 64. So, back to Dorothy’s research question:
  65. 65. is there a basis for reconciling conflicting objectives? So, back to Dorothy’s research question:
  66. 66. let’s look at some results
  67. 67. Utility components & their tradeoffs with higher fishing levels 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 Proportion harvested
  68. 68. Utility components & their tradeoffs with higher fishing levels 1.0 profit 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 Proportion harvested
  69. 69. Utility components & their tradeoffs with higher fishing levels 1.0 profit 0.5 yield 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 Proportion harvested
  70. 70. Utility components & their tradeoffs with higher fishing levels 1.0 employment based on effort profit 0.5 yield 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 Proportion harvested
  71. 71. Utility components & their tradeoffs with higher fishing levels 1.0 employment based on effort profit 0.5 employment based on catch yield 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 Proportion harvested
  72. 72. Utility components & their tradeoffs with higher fishing levels 1.0 employment based on effort profit 0.5 employment based on catch yield stock level 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 Proportion harvested
  73. 73. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 0.5 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  74. 74. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 Fishermen 0.5 quot;artisanal fisheryquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 -0.5 quot;industrial fisheryquot; -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  75. 75. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 Society “employment-orientedquot; 0.5 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 “profit- -0.5 oriented” -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  76. 76. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 0.5 quot;conservationistsquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  77. 77. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 “employment-orientedquot; 0.5 quot;conservationistsquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 quot;artisanal fisheryquot; -0.5 “profit- oriented” quot;industrial fisheryquot; -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  78. 78. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 “employment-orientedquot; 0.5 quot;conservationistsquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 quot;artisanal fisheryquot; -0.5 “profit- oriented” quot;industrial fisheryquot; -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  79. 79. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 “employment-orientedquot; 0.5 quot;conservationistsquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 quot;artisanal fisheryquot; -0.5 “profit- oriented” quot;industrial fisheryquot; -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  80. 80. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 “employment-orientedquot; 0.5 quot;conservationistsquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 quot;artisanal fisheryquot; -0.5 “profit- oriented” quot;industrial fisheryquot; -1.0 -1.5 Proportion harvested
  81. 81. Stakeholder utilities 1.0 “employment-orientedquot; 0.5 quot;conservationistsquot; 0.0 Utility 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 quot;artisanal fisheryquot; -0.5 “profit- oriented” quot;industrial fisheryquot; -1.0 even with weight on employment , the ”zone of new consensus” is clear -1.5 Proportion harvested
  82. 82. to conclude…
  83. 83. The ”zone of new consensus” is illustrated in Dorothy’s simplified model even when employment is considered
  84. 84. So, what’s next?
  85. 85. What if I tried to model a real stock?
  86. 86. This is how stakeholder contact can help
  87. 87. Feedback from stakeholders Could this model work in the real world? application to North Sea herring or Western horse mackerel?
  88. 88. Feedback from stakeholders could stakeholder groups provide me with realistic stakeholder preferences and costs of effort and employment?
  89. 89. I look forward to hearing your feedback
  90. 90. Thanks for getting to know Dorothy and her project!
  91. 91. Acknowledgements 3 month stay at the Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) during the Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP) www.iiasa.ac.at financed by the Norwegian Research Council Thank you to the Evolution & Ecology Program & fellow YSSPers for insightful discussions For more information, please contact Dorothy Dankel dorothy@imr.no

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