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       Workshop Attack and Defense – November 2007




                                          Attacking The LAN 
                                             Spying The Wire



                                                              ATIK PILIHANTO
                                                     RISTI TELKOM BANDUNG
Global Trend Attack in Local Network


    1         Spoofing



    2         Man In The Middle


    3         Sniffing (Passive)


    4         TCP/IP session Hijacking


    5         Remote Code Execution


    6         Denial of Service (DoS)


                            
Spoofing


     Spoofing is sending packet with a forged source with the 
      purpose of concealing the identity of the sender.
     Spoofing example : 
        • IP address spoofing 
        • ARP cache spoofing (ARP cache poisoning) 
        • Email spoofing
     Spoofing in local network : ARP cache poisoning and IP address 
      spoofing




       ATIK PILIHANTO                                     RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                       
IP Spoofing in Action




      
Man In The Middle (MiTM)


     Man in The Middle is an attack in which an attacker is able to 
      read, insert and modify at will, messages between two parties 
      without either party knowing that the link between them has been 
      compromised.
     Man in The Middle technique
       • Switch port stealing
       • ARP cache poisoning
       • DNS spoofing
       • DHCP spoofing
     Man in The Middle in Local Network : Switch port stealing, DHCP 
      spoofing, ARP cache poisoning. 

                                                          RISTI TELKOM  2007
       ATIK PILIHANTO


                                       
Man In The Middle (MiTM)




          
Sniffing (Passive)


     Sniffing is a process intercepting and reading network traffic.
     Sniffing purpose :
        • Analyze network problems
        • Monitor network traffic
        • Spy on other network users and collect sensitive information
     In switched network, sniffing process is usually combined with 
      Man in The Middle.




       ATIK PILIHANTO                                           RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                         
Sniffing In Action




     
TCP/IP Session Hijacking


     TCP/IP Session Hijacking is an attack in which attacker is able 
      to hijack or take over an established TCP connection between 
      two parties.
     In case local network attacking, TCP/IP hijacking can be done by 
      combining MiTM and active sniffing, inserting RST or FIN, 
      predicting Initial Sequence Number (ISN), fully compromising 
      established TCP connection.




       ATIK PILIHANTO                                    RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                      
Remote Code Execution


     Remote code execution allows an attacker to execute any 
      arbitrary code in a target vulnerable machine.
     Need a flaw or vulnerability in target machine, example : 
        • DCOM RPC Remote Buffer Overrun ( WINDOWS )
        • IPv6 mbuff Remote Buffer Overflow (OpenBSD)
     Remote code execution is usually caused by flaw programming 
      in operating system, service daemon, or application.




       ATIK PILIHANTO                                    RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                      
Common Programming Mistakes

    1       Buffer Overflow



    2       Integer Overflow



    3       Error Format String



    4       SQL injection



    5       File Inclussion



    6       Cross Site Scripting


                             
Remote Buffer Overflow Exploit




                
Denial of Service (DoS)


     Denial of Service is an attack to make a computer resource 
      unavailable to its legitimate users.
     Denial of Service can be done by attacking
        • Protocol weakness : SYN Flooding, ICMP Smurfing
        • Service Daemon weakness : Buffer Overflow
        • Web Application weakness : WEB2 XSS Worm
     Denial of Service in local network : ARP cache poisoning, 
      Flooding (SYN/UDP/ICMP)




       ATIK PILIHANTO                                       RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                       
DoS in Vulnerable Daemon




           
Defense


 Defending spoofing attack in LAN is really difficult, but we can 
  minimize the risk.
 IP spoofing can be used for TCP SYN Denial of Service
    • Enabling SYN cookies “sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1”
 ARP cache spoofing can be used for MiTM
    • Static ARP entries
    • Passive monitoring arpwatch
    • Active monitoring ethercap
 Switch port stealing can be used for MiTM
    • Port security on the switch



    ATIK PILIHANTO                                          RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                      
Defense


     Manage risk of sniffing and TCP/IP session hijacking
        • Using SWITCH rather than HUB
        • Defending MiTM attack
        • VLAN segmentation
        • Encrypted traffic (SSH, SSL, IPsec)
     Manage risk of remote code execution
        • Enabling kernel exec shield and random virtual address 
              • sysctl kernel.exec­shield=1
              • sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space=1
        • Good firewall policy
        • Regular auditing and patching

      ATIK PILIHANTO                                          RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                               
Defense


     Manage risk of Denial of Service
        • Good firewall policy
        • Regular auditing and patching




      ATIK PILIHANTO                            RISTI TELKOM  2007



                                           
Discussion


     Discussion ??
     Question ??
     Suggestion ??




     ATIK PILIHANTO            RISTI TELKOM  2007



                       
LOGO




  ATIK PILIHANTO   RISTI TELKOM  2007

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Attacking and Defending the LAN

  • 1. LOGO Workshop Attack and Defense – November 2007 Attacking The LAN  Spying The Wire ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM BANDUNG
  • 2. Global Trend Attack in Local Network 1 Spoofing 2 Man In The Middle 3 Sniffing (Passive) 4 TCP/IP session Hijacking 5 Remote Code Execution 6 Denial of Service (DoS)    
  • 3. Spoofing  Spoofing is sending packet with a forged source with the  purpose of concealing the identity of the sender.  Spoofing example :  • IP address spoofing  • ARP cache spoofing (ARP cache poisoning)  • Email spoofing  Spoofing in local network : ARP cache poisoning and IP address  spoofing ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 4. IP Spoofing in Action    
  • 5. Man In The Middle (MiTM)  Man in The Middle is an attack in which an attacker is able to  read, insert and modify at will, messages between two parties  without either party knowing that the link between them has been  compromised.  Man in The Middle technique • Switch port stealing • ARP cache poisoning • DNS spoofing • DHCP spoofing  Man in The Middle in Local Network : Switch port stealing, DHCP  spoofing, ARP cache poisoning.  RISTI TELKOM  2007 ATIK PILIHANTO    
  • 6. Man In The Middle (MiTM)    
  • 7. Sniffing (Passive)  Sniffing is a process intercepting and reading network traffic.  Sniffing purpose : • Analyze network problems • Monitor network traffic • Spy on other network users and collect sensitive information  In switched network, sniffing process is usually combined with  Man in The Middle. ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 9. TCP/IP Session Hijacking  TCP/IP Session Hijacking is an attack in which attacker is able  to hijack or take over an established TCP connection between  two parties.  In case local network attacking, TCP/IP hijacking can be done by  combining MiTM and active sniffing, inserting RST or FIN,  predicting Initial Sequence Number (ISN), fully compromising  established TCP connection. ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 10. Remote Code Execution  Remote code execution allows an attacker to execute any  arbitrary code in a target vulnerable machine.  Need a flaw or vulnerability in target machine, example :  • DCOM RPC Remote Buffer Overrun ( WINDOWS ) • IPv6 mbuff Remote Buffer Overflow (OpenBSD)  Remote code execution is usually caused by flaw programming  in operating system, service daemon, or application. ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 11. Common Programming Mistakes 1 Buffer Overflow 2 Integer Overflow 3 Error Format String 4 SQL injection 5 File Inclussion 6 Cross Site Scripting    
  • 12. Remote Buffer Overflow Exploit    
  • 13. Denial of Service (DoS)  Denial of Service is an attack to make a computer resource  unavailable to its legitimate users.  Denial of Service can be done by attacking • Protocol weakness : SYN Flooding, ICMP Smurfing • Service Daemon weakness : Buffer Overflow • Web Application weakness : WEB2 XSS Worm  Denial of Service in local network : ARP cache poisoning,  Flooding (SYN/UDP/ICMP) ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 14. DoS in Vulnerable Daemon    
  • 15. Defense  Defending spoofing attack in LAN is really difficult, but we can  minimize the risk.  IP spoofing can be used for TCP SYN Denial of Service • Enabling SYN cookies “sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1”  ARP cache spoofing can be used for MiTM • Static ARP entries • Passive monitoring arpwatch • Active monitoring ethercap  Switch port stealing can be used for MiTM • Port security on the switch ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 16. Defense  Manage risk of sniffing and TCP/IP session hijacking • Using SWITCH rather than HUB • Defending MiTM attack • VLAN segmentation • Encrypted traffic (SSH, SSL, IPsec)  Manage risk of remote code execution • Enabling kernel exec shield and random virtual address  • sysctl kernel.exec­shield=1 • sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space=1 • Good firewall policy • Regular auditing and patching ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 17. Defense  Manage risk of Denial of Service • Good firewall policy • Regular auditing and patching ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 18. Discussion  Discussion ??  Question ??  Suggestion ?? ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007    
  • 19. LOGO ATIK PILIHANTO RISTI TELKOM  2007