White7e ppt ch03


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White7e ppt ch03

  1. 1. Jonathan R. White www.cengage.com/cj/white Chapter 3: Not Random Violence:Modeling, Structuring and Financing Terrorism Rosemary Arway Hodges University
  2. 2. Models of Terrorism Models of terrorism: o Rural: ▪ Guerilla warfare (Cuban Revolution, Che Guevara Revolution) ▪ Revolution starts with poor peasants that organize into isolated groups, which form guerilla columns, and finally organize into army o Urban ▪ Fanon: mental illness was a result imperialism, colonized nations practice terrorism against colonial masters ▪ Marighella: the basis of revolution is guerilla and unorganized violence → governmental repression → massive uprising in response to oppression → toppling of government o Insurrection ▪ Marighella
  3. 3. An American Understanding of Insurgency Re-evaluation of American strategy: o Viet Nam experience (averse to enter a war without clear objectives) o Insurgencies represent a new mix of operations and tactics that become possible with the advance of technology and globalization. o It is impossible to fight insurgencies with military tactics: ▪ Insurgences control information. ▪ Insurgences operate with global communication. ▪ Insurgences incorporate technological weapons. ▪ Insurgences require few personnel.
  4. 4. An American Understanding of Insurgency Counter-insurgency forces need to be massive because: o they must enforce laws o they also must form a partnership with a host of other agencies o they must develop networks of organizations Security forces must follow the model of community policing Insurgencies developed at the end of the Cold War as various tribal, national, ethnic and religious groups Insurgencies depend upon social and support networks
  5. 5. Changing Dynamics and Structures After WW II, terrorist groups tended to follow the IRA model of small units or cells. o Cells are the basic units of traditional terrorist organizations. o Each cell has its own mission and operates without knowledge of other cells in the area. Burton: o Two basic structure of terrorist subunits: ▪ Cells – specialized with 4 to 6 people; may be tactical or intelligence. ▪ Columns – created from groups of cells; semiautonomous conglomeration of cells with a variety of specialties with a single command structure.
  6. 6. Changing Dynamics and Structures Around the 1990s large terrorist groups developed more dynamic methods of organization. o Fraser and Fulton: ▪ Groups employ variations of command and control structures ▪ Typical organization is arranged in a pyramid ▪ Hierarchical structure of terrorists groups is divided into four levels: • Top level is the smallest level and is responsible for command. • Second level is the active cadre • Third level, second largest and most important, is the active supporters. • Fourth level, largest category is the organization’s passive supporters.
  7. 7. Umbrella Organizations and Modern Piracy Legitimate groups form umbrellas under which terrorist groups could operate. o Several small pyramids gather under a sheltering group that: ▪ manages supplies ▪ obtains resources ▪ creates support structures ▪ gathers intelligence Terrorist action on the High Seas o A seemingly legitimate business (sheltering organization) provides cover for pirates (the pyramid organization) while denying all connection with illegal activity.
  8. 8. Virtual, Chain, and Hub Organization RAND Corporation identifies several other types of new organizational styles. o Virtual organizations: created through computer and information networks o Chain organizations: small groups linked by some type of communications o Hub organization: centralized group with semiautonomous groups supported in other regions
  9. 9. Managing Terrorist Organization Terrorists need to organize like any other group: o Groups require management o Hierarchical groups use cell structure and top-down management o Small groups in networks are more autonomous o Management and other administrative functions are hampered by the need for secrecy
  10. 10. Managing Terrorist Organization Terrorist groups experience special organizational problems: o Secrecy o Decentralization o Training o Internal discipline o Gaining immediate tactical support for operations
  11. 11. Group Size and Campaign Length Gurr: o Group size: ▪ Most terrorist actions involve only a few people. ▪ Large groups or networks are more effective than smaller ones. ▪ Majority of successful groups embrace doctrines such as nationalism. o Campaign Length: ▪ Terrorism is short-lived. ▪ Most terrorist campaigns end within 18 months of the initial outburst of violence.
  12. 12. Group Size and Campaign Length  Implications of Gurr Analysis: o Most terrorist organization are small, short-lived operations which are law enforcement problems. o If terrorism is a result of popular social issue, sympathizers can enhance the power of the group. o Strong support for a group is more important than the actual number of operatives.
  13. 13. Group Size and Campaign Length  Hewitt reflects Gurr’s position: o Small groups do not have resources to damage an opponent over an extended length of time. o Terrorist campaigns are more important than isolated acts of terrorism. o Terrorist campaigns demand expanded political responses. o Large terrorist organizations accounted for the majority of the terrorism. o Large terrorist organizations can bring change in government politics.
  14. 14. Group Size and Campaign Length Analyst Livingstone describes terrorism as “warfare on the cheap.” o State Sponsorship ▪ Nation could support a terrorist group (Hezbollah) ▪ State support automatically creates a large group Scheuer o If state sponsorship and failed state approaches are applied to Islamic militants, it will be impossible to understands both the organization’s characteristics and growth of al Qaida and related groups.
  15. 15. Financing Modern Terrorism It takes money to fund organizations, and resources to support operations. Adams: o The appropriate method of attacking terrorism will be stopping of the flow of money. o A terrorist operation does not cost a lot of money. o The overall budget for a terrorist operation is quite high. The financial investigative debate: o Major counterterrorism strategies should be aimed at waging “financial warfare” with financial weapons. o The National Strategy for Combating terrorism endorses this approach by targeting two areas: ▪ The source of financing ▪ Mechanism use to transfer money
  16. 16. Importance of Financing Effective counterterrorist policy involves strategic efforts to deny fiscal resources to terrorists. Arguments are made, favorable and unfavorable, concerning the use of finances as a weapon. o Financial strategy against terrorism will reduce violence. o Working in an underground economy, terrorists are immune from formal government sanctions.
  17. 17. Importance of Financing Critique: o Financial warfare will not be effective because terrorists do not respond to formal controls, but participate in undergrad economies. o It is relatively easy for terrorist groups to hide their assets. o However, targeting flow of money may lead to important discoveries about terrorist groups and plans.
  18. 18. Underground Networks and Organized Crime  Three major categories: o The unlawful raising of funds ▪ Robbery, Fraud, Larceny, Smuggling, Dealing in contraband, Forgery, Counterfeiting, Identity theft, Extortion and protection rackets o The unlawful distribution of funds o The formal regulated economy o Economic targeting as force multiplier  Terrorists raise funds through traditional criminal methods and exchange resources in underground networks. o The differentiating factor between terrorism and traditional crime is motivation.
  19. 19. Underground Networks and Organized Crime  Terrorists around the world use a variety of criminal methods to raise funds. o Middle Eastern terrorists engage in smuggling and document fraud. o Central Asian terrorists trade illegal arms, launder money, and distribute drugs. o Latin American terrorism is tied to drug production and public corruption. o U.S. domestic terrorists engage in fraud schemes and robberies. ▪ International terrorists also engage in fraudulent activities in America.
  20. 20. Underground Networks and Organized Crime  Underground networks exists not only in the dimension terrorists/criminals, but also terrorists/terrorists, and terrorists/criminals/terrorists.  International linkages – the nexus of criminal syndicates – that exists between various terrorists group were best demonstrated in the case of the Japanese Red Army group in 1972: o The unit (Rengo Segikun) composed of Japanese citizens… o that have been trained in North Korea… o picked up funds in West Germany… o for further training in both Syria and Lebanon… o picked up its arms and ammunition in Italy… o and then attacked the Lod Airport in Israel on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
  21. 21. Legal sources of Funding In addition to traditional crime, terrorists raise money through legal operations. Frequently employed legal activities include: o Soliciting contributions o Operating businesses o Creating charities o Running non-government organizations o Using wire transfers o Forming or using banks o The Hawala system
  22. 22. Legal sources of Funding: Charities  Terrorists set up phony charities or skim proceeds from legitimate organizations.  Charities are difficult to investigate o Formed overseas o State supported o May hide true purpose o Supported by legitimate business o Difficult to infiltrate ▪ Benevolence International Fund ▪ Formed in U.S. & received tax-exempt status from IRS
  23. 23. Non-traceable Funding: Hawala System  Hawala system is a legitimate means of transferring money without using money. o Originated in China o Based on long term trust relationships and knowledge that each dealer is reliable for all debts.  Advantages of the Hawala system: o Money moves with no record. o Money crosses international borders with ease. o Money can be easily bartered for contraband. o Tax records do not exist.
  24. 24. The Political Economy of Terrorism  Globalization: o Napoleoni states that globalization created pockets in the world where failed states are left to govern with little economic and political power. ▪ Terrorist groups grow in such places. ▪ Terrorist group acts like a government in such a places.  Terrorist organizations are strong enough to resist the state and grow running their own underground economies.
  25. 25. Macroeconomic Theories Counterterrorism policies should be aimed at providing the world’s populace with economic stability, opportunity, and participation in the mainstream economy. Economic policies to counter terrorism: o Supporting states in threat of failure. o Providing opportunities for people to participate and benefit from economic systems. o Eliminating underground economic networks.
  26. 26. The Narco-terrorism Debate Idea of narco-terrorism is a controversial term linking drugs to terrorism in one of two ways: o Drug profits are used to finance terrorism. o Drug gangs use terrorism to control production and distribution networks. Proponents: o Terrorists use drugs to finance operations. Opponents: o Narco-terrorism is a convenient term for appealing to public emotions, which gives governments more power. o Use of the word narco-terrorism is an attempt to take political advantage of the fear of terrorism.