MIS Case Study Geneva Pharma


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A presentation on ERP implementation at Geneva Pharma

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MIS Case Study Geneva Pharma

  1. 1. SAP R/3 IMPLEMENTATION AT GENEVA PHARMACEUTICALS <ul><ul><li>Presented By: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Gaurav Bansal – Roll No 16 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Dhiraj Gaur – Roll No 15 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ashok Pershad – Roll No 14 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Aranya Adhkari – Roll No 13 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Anubha Prasad – Roll No 12 </li></ul></ul>
  2. 2. HISTORY <ul><li>Sandoz(formerly known as Geneva Pharmaceuticals) is one of the largest generic drug development and manufacturing companies in the United States. Long a respected leader in the U.S. generics market, Sandoz is a pioneer in the growing U.S. healthcare marketplace, the largest globally for generic drugs. </li></ul><ul><li>In the U.S., Sandoz produces, markets and distributes in excess of 7 billion units annually composed of more than 200 individual pharmaceutical tablet and capsule products. </li></ul>
  3. 3. HISTORY <ul><li>Geneva had its genesis in Detroit, Michigan, as a sales division of pharmaceutical company S.J.Tutag & Company – 1946 </li></ul><ul><li>With the generic segment sales posted at $10 million and 67 employees, the company merged with Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., and this generics arm was known as Geneva Generics with products provided principally from Cord Laboratories, Inc., a manufacturing subsidiary – 1979 </li></ul><ul><li>Geneva was able to absorb nearly all of Cord’s manufacturing capacity by 1985. The facility focused primarily on the development and manufacture of solid oral dosage forms, i.e., tablets and capsules – 1985 </li></ul><ul><li>Geneva Generics rebranded and became Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc – 1991 </li></ul><ul><li>The company relocated its headquarters to New Jersey and established its Dayton, New Jersey, facility as its primary research and development center. At this time, the company employed nearly 1,000 people in its three locations. Geneva becomes a leader in a highly competitive market – 2001 </li></ul><ul><li>On December 1, Geneva officially became Sandoz-NOVARTIS. The company has more than 1,300 employees - 2003 </li></ul>
  4. 4. Company Background <ul><li>Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., one of the world’s largest generic drug manufacturers, is the North American hub for the Generics division of Swiss pharmaceutical and life sciences company Novartis International AG. </li></ul><ul><li>Today, the Basel (Switzerland) based life sciences company employs 82,500 employees worldwide, runs 275 affiliate operations in 142 countries, and generates annual revenues of 32 billion Swiss Francs. </li></ul><ul><li>Novartis’ global leadership in branded pharmaceuticals is complemented by its generic drugs division, Novartis Generics </li></ul><ul><li>Geneva had revenues of $300 million, employed nearly 1000 employees, and manufactured over 4.6 billion dosage units of generic drugs. </li></ul><ul><li>Generic drugs are pharmaceutically and therapeutically equivalent versions of brand name drugs with established safety and efficacy. For instance, acetaminophen is the equivalent of the registered brand name drug Tylenol </li></ul>
  5. 5. Generic Drugs Industry Backdrop <ul><li>The generic drug manufacturing industry is fragmented and highly competitive </li></ul><ul><li>Margins in the generics sector has therefore remained extremely low, and there is a continuous pressure on Geneva and its competitors to reduce costs of operations. </li></ul><ul><li>Opportunities for international growth are limited because of two reasons. First, consumers in some countries such as Mexico are generally skeptical about the lack of branding because of their cultural background. Second, U.S. generics manufacturers are often undercut by competitors from India and China, where abundance of low-cost labor and less restrictive regulatory requirements (e.g., FDA approval) makes drug manufacturing even less expensive. </li></ul>
  6. 6. Business Processes <ul><li>Geneva’s primary business processes are manufacturing and distribution </li></ul><ul><li>Geneva’s manufacturing process is scientific, controlled, and highly precise and is performed at Broomfield. Raw materials are sourced from supplier, tested for quality, weighed based on dosage requirements, granulated (i.e. mixed, wetted, dried and blended), and compressed into a tablet </li></ul><ul><li>Based on consumer demand, the packaging of the medicines is different. This variation add several layers of complexity and requires separate tracking of the raw materials, bulk materials and finished goods. </li></ul><ul><li>Bulk materials and finished goods are warehoused in Broomfield and Knoxville distribution centers. Since all manufacturing is done was done at Broomfield, inventory replenishment of manufactured products is done first at Broomfield and then at Knoxville. Geneva also purchases finished goods from smaller manufacturers, who manufacture and package generic drugs under Geneva’s level. Since most of these outsourcers are located along the east coast, and hence, they are distributed first to the Knoxville and then to Broomfield. </li></ul><ul><li>Purchasing is simpler than manufacturing because it requires no bill of materials, no bulk materials management, and no master scheduling; Geneva simply converts planned orders to purchase requisitions, and then to purchase orders, that are invoiced upon delivery. </li></ul>
  7. 7. Geneva Customer Segments <ul><li>Geneva supplies to a total of about 250 customers, including distributors, grocery chains with in-store pharmacies, mail order pharmacies </li></ul><ul><li>About 70 percent of Geneva’s sales goes to distributors, another 20 percent goes to drugstore chains, while HMOs, government, retail pharmacies, and others account for the remaining 10 percent. Distributors purchase generic drugs wholesale from Geneva, and then resell them to retail and mail order pharmacies, who are sometimes direct customers of Geneva. </li></ul><ul><li>One emerging customer segment is Internet-based drug retailers such as Drugstore.com and PlanetRx.com. These drugstores do not maintain inventory of their own, but accept customer orders and pass on those to any wholesaler or manufacturer that can fill in short notice. These small, customized, and unpredictable orders do not fit well with Geneva’s wholesale, high-volume production strategy, and hence, the company has decided against direct retailing to consumers at least for the near future. </li></ul>
  8. 8. Customer Order Process <ul><li>The majority of Geneva’s orders come through EDI. These orders are passed checked to see if the customer has an active customer number and sufficient credit, if the item ordered is correct and available in inventory. Customers are then assigned to either the Broomfield or Knoxville DC based on quantity ordered, delivery expiration dates, and whether the customer would accept split lots. </li></ul><ul><li>If the quantity ordered is not available at the primary DC (say, Knoxville), a second allocation is made to the secondary DC (Broomfield, in this case). If the order cannot be filled immediately, a backorder will be generated and the Broomfield manufacturing unit informed of the same. Once filled, the distribution unit will print the order and ship it to the customer, and send order information to accounts receivable for invoicing. </li></ul><ul><li>Matching customer demand to production schedules is often difficult because of speculative buying on the part of customers. Prices of drugs are typically reassessed at the start of every fiscal year, and a distributor may place a very large order at the end of the previous year to escape a potential price increase at the start of the next year </li></ul>
  9. 9. Limitations of existing systems <ul><li>Up until 1996, Geneva’s information systems (IS) consisted of a wide array of software programs for running procurement, manufacturing, accounting, sales, and other mission critical processes. </li></ul><ul><li>Each business unit had deployed applications in an ad hoc manner to meet its immediate needs, which were incompatible across business units. </li></ul><ul><li>These systems were not interoperable, and data that were shared across systems (e.g., accounts receivable data was used by order management and financial accounting packages, customer demand was used in both sales and manufacturing systems) had to be double-booked and rekeyed manually. This led to higher incidence of data entry errors, higher costs of error processing, and greater data inconsistency. </li></ul><ul><li>Further, data was locked within “functional silos” and were unable to support processes that cut across multiple business units (e.g., end-to-end supply chain management). It was apparent that a common,integrated company-wide solution would not only improve data consistency and accuracy, but also reduce system maintenance costs </li></ul>
  10. 10. Solution: Bring in SAP R/3 <ul><li>In view of these limitations, in 1996, corporate management at Geneva initiated a search for technology solutions that could streamline its internal processes, lower costs of operations, and strategically position the company to take advantage of new value-added processes. </li></ul><ul><li>It wanted an enterprise resource planning (ERP) software that could: (1) implement best practices in business processes, (2) provide operational efficiency by integrating data across business units, (3) reduce errors due to incorrect keying or rekeying of data, (4) reduce system maintenance costs by standardizing business data, (5) be flexible enough to integrate with new systems (as more companies are acquired), (6) support growth in product and customer categories, and (7) is Y2K (year 2000) compliant. </li></ul><ul><li>Geneva decided to implement SAP R/3 and following was the schedule </li></ul>
  11. 11. SAP R/3 Schedule at Geneva Nov 97- Feb 99 APO, MES, BIW Data Warehouse, SCM, Sales & Op Plann Supply/Demand Side Integration III Oct 98- Feb 2000 Fin Goods, SD, Acct Recv Sales, Cust Service, Order mgmt Demand Side Mgmt II Nov 97- Feb 99 Raw Mat., Prod Plan, Acct Pay MRP, purchasing, inventory mgmt Supply Side Mgmt I Implement Timeframe SAP Modules Business Process Phase Description Phase
  12. 12. SAP R/3 Implementation: Phase I <ul><li>The supply processes were previously very manual and labor intensive. A Macpac package running on an IBM AS/400 machine was used </li></ul><ul><li>The objectives were to migrate existing processes from Macpac to R/3, automate supply side process not supported by MacPac, and integrate all supply-side data in a single, real-time database so that the synergies could be exploited across manufacturing and purchasing processes. System integration was expected to reduce inventory and production costs, improve performance-to-master scheduling, and help managers make more optimal manufacturing and purchase decisions </li></ul><ul><li>4 months later, Geneva found little progress had been made in the implementation process despite substantial investments. System requirements were not defined correctly or were lacking in detail, there was little communication/coordination of activities among consultants, IS personnel, and user groups, and the project manager was unable to identify or resolve problems because he had no prior R/3 experience. </li></ul>
  13. 13. SAP Implementation: Phase I (contd)‏ <ul><li>Consultants employed by Whitman-Hart were technical specialists, and had little knowledge of the business domain. The ASAP methodology seemed to be failing, because although it allowed a quick canned implementation, it was not flexible enough to meet Geneva’s extensive customization needs, did not support process improvements, and alienated functional user groups from system implementation </li></ul><ul><li>To bring things back on track, a new CIO (Randy Weldon) was hired who had prior experience on SAP/R3. Weldon knew that ERP was fundamentally about people and process change, rather than about installing and configuring systems, and that successful implementation would require the commitment and collaboration of all three stakeholder groups: functional users, IS staff, and consultants. He instituted a new project management team, consisting of one IS manager, one functional manager, and one senior R/3 consultant. </li></ul>
  14. 14. Phase I contd. <ul><li>By February 1999, the raw materials and manufacturing component of R/3’s MM module was “up and running.” But this module was not yet integrated with distribution (Phase II) and therefore did not have the capability to readjust production runs based on current sales data. However, several business metrics such as yield losses and key performance indicators showed performance improvement following R/3 implementation. For instance, the number of planning activities performed by a single individual was doubled. Job roles were streamlined, standardized. </li></ul>
  15. 15. Phase –II Demand Side Processes <ul><li>Started in Oct-98 with goals to redesign demand side processes like marketing, order fulfillment ,customer sales and services and account receivables and implement reengineered processes using R/3. </li></ul><ul><li>Demand side processes suffered form lack of data integration and real time excess. Software like Mac Pac and FYI planner were unable to accommodate business transformation due to change in market conditions. </li></ul><ul><li>Major Challenges- Non standard and inherently complex nature of sales and services processes. </li></ul>
  16. 16. Phase-II Project Planning <ul><li>Phase-II was implemented in 3 stages. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Conceptual design </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Conference room pilot. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Change management. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Arthur Anderson Business Consulting was given the task to implement 2 nd and 3 rd phase of R/3 implementation. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Oliver White, a consulting firm specializing in operational processes from manufacturing firm was hired to redesign sales and distribution process based on “best practices”. </li></ul></ul>
  17. 17. Conceptual Design <ul><li>An iterative process was employed to identify and eleminate activities that did not add value and generate alternative process flows. The goal was to identify bottlenecks and problem areas and thereby to create re-engineered processes. </li></ul><ul><li>Project Team – IS Personnals, Users and consultants for 2.5 months. </li></ul><ul><li>Core team was divided into five groups to examine different aspects of distribution process: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1) Product & Business Planning </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>2) Pre Order </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>3) Order Processing </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>4) Fulfillment </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>5) Post Order </li></ul></ul>
  18. 18. Conference Room Pilot <ul><li>Purpose – To test and refine different aspects of redesigned processes like forecast planning, contract pricing, charge back strategy determination, receivables creations, pre- transaction credit checking, basic reporting </li></ul><ul><li>Modifications was done several times to accommodate user feedback and the final version were targeted for roll-out using the ASAP methodology. </li></ul>
  19. 19. Change Management <ul><li>Created employee awareness about impending change in job role through company newsletters, notice boards, ad campaign, surveys and helpline. </li></ul><ul><li>Five Trainign rooms were set up to train users on redesigned processes and new R/3 environment. </li></ul><ul><li>Training imparted by change management professionals and trainers </li></ul><ul><li>Super users were identified who could influence the behaviour of collegues and subordinates in an effort to drive a grassroot program for change. </li></ul><ul><li>Hands-on, team oriented and continuously mentored training oriented around employees job roles rather than how to use R/3 system. </li></ul>
  20. 20. Learnings of Phase –II <ul><li>There was considerable degree of confusion among employees regarding job responsibilties. It was taken care by imparting additional training to such employees and clearing their confusion. </li></ul><ul><li>Departments were highly functionally oriented rather than process oriented. Structural changes were initiated by intervention of senior management. </li></ul><ul><li>Change management was also required at customer side to make them aware of the benefits of the new system and make them use it appropriately. </li></ul>
  21. 21. Phase –III Integrating Supply and Demand <ul><li>Mission – To integrate suppliers and customers through integration of Manufacturing resource planning (MRP-II) and Sales and Operations Planning (SOP) to achieve “just-in time” production. </li></ul><ul><li>Challenges – Manual process, time consuming, error prone due to data reentry and validation required across sales, production and financial systems. System not sensitive to changes in customer order places less than a month from their requested delivery dates. </li></ul><ul><li>SOP module of R/3 lacked the “intelligence” required to generate an “optimal” production plan from continuosly changing supply and demand data even when all data were available in a common database. </li></ul>
  22. 22. Implementation of Phase -III <ul><li>Redesigned SOP process of Geneva </li></ul><ul><li>R/3 SOP module integrated with Advanced purchase Optimizer(APO) to help in data analysis and provide simulation capabilities </li></ul><ul><li>Qliver White created a template that could aggregate all relevent data required for SOP from distribution, operations, purchasing, quality control and other functional databases and tie these data to their source processes. </li></ul><ul><li>Inclusion of Available to Promise (ATP) functionality to R/3 system to integrate customer service level and business performance. </li></ul>
  23. 23. Additional Information <ul><li>Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., has successfully completed implementation of the ORTEMS advanced planning and scheduling (APS) software solution for managing production scheduling in its Broomfield, CO facility to augment its SAP R/3 implementation to fast-track plant-floor scheduling benefits. ( 23 Oct 2000)‏ </li></ul>
  24. 24. Lessons <ul><li>Lessons: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A solid design reflecting system requirements is important. The more resources spent at this stage may reduce costs further into development. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The design process should highlight existing problems within an organization. Parallel improvements with policy changes will ultimately help the organisations efficiency beyond that of the system capability. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Manage change effectively to avoid resistance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>For any process to be highly effective, in-depth planning is a must </li></ul></ul>
  25. 25. Conclusions <ul><li>It is obvious that during the implementation of a major project, set-backs often occur. However, from reviewing the Geneva case, we learn that such problems can be overcome through good management and better planning. Emphasised also is the significance which people have on the outcome of a project. With Geneva, human failures disrupted the project significantly during the initial stages. Although, through the subsequent appointment of more suitably experienced individuals, the importance of having the right project team was highlighted. </li></ul><ul><li>Through the use of effective management processes Geneva successfully improved the main business functions by incorporating a suitable, efficient ERP system. </li></ul>
  26. 26. <ul><li>THANK YOU </li></ul>