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2009 04.s10-admin-topics4 2009 04.s10-admin-topics4 Presentation Transcript

  • Solaris 10 Administration Topics Workshop 4- Security By Peter Baer Galvin For Usenix Last Revision Apr 2009 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights ReservedSaturday, May 2, 2009
  • About the Speaker Peter Baer Galvin - 781 273 4100 pbg@cptech.com www.cptech.com peter@galvin.info My Blog: www.galvin.info Bio Peter Baer Galvin is the Chief Technologist for Corporate Technologies, Inc., a leading systems integrator and VAR, and was the Systems Manager for Brown Universitys Computer Science Department. He has written articles for Byte and other magazines. He was contributing editor of the Solaris Corner for SysAdmin Magazine , wrote Petes Wicked World, the security column for SunWorld magazine, and Pete’s Super Systems, the systems administration column there. He is now Sun columnist for the Usenix ;login: magazine. Peter is co-author of the Operating Systems Concepts and Applied Operating Systems Concepts texbooks. As a consultant and trainer, Mr. Galvin has taught tutorials in security and system administration and given talks at many conferences and institutions. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 2Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Objectives Explore the new Solaris 10 security features, from an admin point of view Some app/dev points made to guide developers Convey their current status, usability, and future functionality Help prepare for Solaris 10 deployment Some pre-Solaris 10 coverage when needed Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 3Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Prerequisites Recommend at least a couple of years of Solaris experience Or at least a few years of other Unix experience Best is a few years of admin experience, mostly on Solaris Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 4Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • About the Tutorial Every SysAdmin has a different knowledge set A lot to cover, but notes should make good reference So some covered quickly, some in detail Setting base of knowledge Please ask questions But let’s take off-topic off-line Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 5Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Fair Warning Sites vary Circumstances vary Admin knowledge varies My goals Provide information useful for each of you at your sites Provide opportunity for you to learn from each other Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 6Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Why Listen to Me? 20 Years of Sun experience Seen much as a consultant Hopefully, youve used: My Usenix ;login: column The Solaris Corner @ www.samag.com The Solaris Security FAQ SunWorld “Petes Wicked World” SunWorld “Petes Super Systems” Unix Secure Programming FAQ (out of date) Operating System Concepts (The Dino Book), now 8th ed Applied Operating System Concepts Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 7Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Slide Ownership As indicated per slide, some slides copyright Sun Microsystems Feel free to share all the slides - as long as you don’t charge for them or teach from them for fee Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 8Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Overview Lay of the Land Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights ReservedSaturday, May 2, 2009
  • Schedule Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 10Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Coverage Solaris 10 is a moving target This tutorial based on FCS (Jan / Mar 05) Plus “Nevada” build 53 How to get Solaris 10 Download from Sun Media Kits now shipping How to get Solaris 10+ Join Solaris Express for month releases Opensolaris.org for “untested” releases Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 11Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Outline Overview Sun Overview DTrace (lab?) RBAC (lab) Privileges NFS V4 Flash archives and live upgrade Moving from NIS to LDAP FTP client and server enhancements Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 12Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Outline PAM enhancements Auditing enhancements BSM Solaris Cryptographic Framework Smartcard interfaces and APIs Kerberos enhancements Packet filtering BART Trusted Extensions Overall Solaris 10 Security Conclusions References Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 13Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Your Objectives? Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 14Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Lab Preparation Have device capable of telnet on USENIX network Or have a buddy Learn your “magic number” Telnet to 131.106.62.100+”magic number” User “root, password “lisa” It’s all very secure Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 15Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Lab Preparation Or... Use virtualbox Use your own system Use a remote machine you have legit access to Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 16Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Introduction Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 17Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Overview Solaris 10 includes lots of new security features Security is important to administrators It usually annoys users We’ll look at each new feature, how useful, powerful and annoying it is Should provide a good roadmap for what to use, when How can they be used to solve the following problems Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 18Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Sun Overview Quick high-level overview of Sun’s view of Solaris security Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 19Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 20Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 21Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 22Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 23Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 24Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 25Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 26Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 27Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • S10 Security Status According to Sun: Solaris 10 11/06 is currently in evaluation at EAL4+, one of the highest level of Common Criteria Certification, with three Protection Profiles: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) and Role-Based Access Control Protection Profile (RBACPP). In addition, Solaris 10 3/05 has completed evaluation at EAL4+ with CAPP and RBACPP. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 28Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Good Security Hygiene Checklist #1 - Use before making a change Is the syntax of the command correct? Is the command the right one to make the change? Is there a better way to make the change? Are the right options entered / selected? Is today Friday? Is today some other day on which it would be exceptionally bad to break something (such as the day before leaving for a vacation or conference)? What are the chances that executing this will break something? If this change would break something, can I undo the action? Is this a documented way to accomplish the task? If this is a new way to make a change, should I document it? And finally, what effect might this action have on security? Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 29Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Virtualization and Security Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 30Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Virtualization Options Containers / Zones (more below) Xen (xVM server) - bare metal hypervisor + guests Run other OSes (linux, win) with S10+ has the host Industry semi-standard Para-virtualization, x86 only LDOMs - hard partitions, shipped in May 2007 Run multiple copies of Solaris on the same coolthreads chip (Niagara, Rock in the future) Some resource management - move CPUs and mem VMWare - solaris as a guest, not a host so far, x86 only Traditional Sun Domains - SPARC only, Enterprise servers only Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 31Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Impact Lots of security issues around virtualization How many “systems” are in a given environment? Hidden / unknown systems “System” audit could involve dozens of OSes! Separately secure HW - servers, storage, devices, etc OS - per-os security regardless of HW Apps Virtualization infrastructure (ESX management, Solaris server, Hypervisor management, and on and on) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 32Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Zones Overview Think of them of chroot on steroids Virtualized operating system services Isolated and “secure” environment for running apps Apps and users (and superusers) in zone cannot see / effect other zones Delegated admin control Virtualized device paths, network interfaces, network ports, process space, resource use (via resource manager) Application fault isolation Detach and attach containers between systems Cloning of a zone to create identical new zone Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 33Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Zones Overview - 2 Low physical resource use Up to 8192 zones per system! Differentiated file system Multiple versions of an app installed and running on a given system Inter-zone communication is only via network (but short-pathed through the kernel No application changes needed – no API or ABI Can restrict disk use of a zone via the loopback file driver (lofi) using a file as a file system Can dedicate an Ethernet port to a zone Allowing snooping, firewalling, managing that port by the zone Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 34Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From System Administration Guide: N1 Grid Containers, Resource Management, and Solaris Zones) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 35Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • (From the Solaris 10 Sun Net Talk about Solaris 10 Security) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 36Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • LDOMs Logical domains Released April ’07 Only on Niagara and future CMT chips (Niagara II, Rock) Like enterprise-system domains but within one chip Slice the chip into multiple LDOMs, each with its own OS root, boot independently, et Now can run multiple OSes on 1 SPARC chip Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 37Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 38Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • LDOMs - Details Can create up to 1 LDOM per thread(!) Best practice seems to be max one LDOM per core i.e. 8 LDOMs on Niagara I and II Nice intro blog http://blogs.sun.com/ash/entry/ultrasparc_t2_launched_today And nice flash demo http://www.sun.com/servers/coolthreads/ldoms/ Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 39Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 40Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace and Security New tool has security implications DTrace so cool we need to take a quick look Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 41Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Overview Best tool ever for understanding system behavior Uses language D, based on C Fully dynamic, full probing of kernel and user apps Fully scalable Enabled in Solaris 10 – no custom kernel or configuration changes needed Use DTrace today to solve non-S10 problems Move the “problem” to a test / dev S10 machine, debug, and then back port the solution to the original machine Way to much to cover here So I’ll whet your appetite Got example code available at http://users.tpg.com.au/adsln4yb/ dtrace.html All DTrace resources at http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/content/ dtrace/ Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 42Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace and Security DTrace doesn’t “weaken” security model Root with or without DTrace is God But with DTrace easier to be a bad God Watch ssh typing Watch shell I/O DTrace disabled in zones by default As of Nevada build 37 (and probably S10 U2), can give DTrace user and process privileges to a zone Zone can’t get DTrace kernel priv Can’t see outside of the zone # zonecfg -z myzone zonecfg:myzone> set limitpriv=default,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user zonecfg:myzone> ^D Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 43Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Example - 1 connections.d snoop inbound TCP connections as they are established, displaying the server process that accepted the connection # ./connections.d UID PID IP_SOURCE PORT CMD 0 254 192.168.001.001 23 /usr/sbin/inetd -s 0 254 192.168.001.001 23 /usr/sbin/inetd -s 0 254 192.168.001.001 79 /usr/sbin/inetd -s 0 254 192.168.001.001 21 /usr/sbin/inetd -s 0 254 192.168.001.001 79 /usr/sbin/inetd -s 100 2319 192.168.001.001 6000 /usr/openwin/bin/Xsun :0 - nobanner 0 254 192.168.001.001 79 /usr/sbin/inetd -s [...] Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 44Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Example - 2 The following script counts number of write(2) calls by application: syscall::write:entry { @counts[execname] = count(); } Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 45Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Example - 4 # dtrace -s write-calls-by-app.d dtrace: script write-calls-by-app.d matched 1 probe ^C dtrace 1 login 1 sshd 2 sh 6 telnet 6 w 7 df 12 in.telnetd 25 mixer_applet2 61 gnome-panel 108 metacity 125 gnome-terminal 197 # Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 46Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Example - 5 Let’s have a look at the size of the writes to file descriptor 5, per section of user code (!) syscall::write:entry /execname == "sshd" && arg0 == 5/ { @[ustack()] = quantize(arg2); } Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 47Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Example - 6 bash-2.05b# dtrace -s write-sshd-fd-5.d dtrace: script write-sshd-fd-5.d matched 1 probe ^C libc.so.1`_write+0xc sshd`atomicio+0x2d 805b59c sshd`main+0xd59 805b1fa value ------------- Distribution ------------- count 8 | 0 16 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ 1 32 | 0 libc.so.1`_write+0xc sshd`packet_write_poll+0x2e sshd`packet_write_wait+0x23 sshd`userauth_finish+0x19f 805f42e sshd`dispatch_run+0x49 sshd`do_authentication2+0x7c sshd`main+0xdc7 805b1fa value ------------- Distribution ------------- count Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 48Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Example - 7 #!/usr/sbin/dtrace -s #pragma D option flowindent pid$1::$2:entry { self->trace = 1; } pid$1:::entry, pid$1:::return, fbt::: /self->trace/ { printf("%s", curlwpsinfo->pr_syscall ? "K" : "U"); } pid$1::$2:return /self->trace/ { self->trace = 0; } Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 49Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 50Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Toolkit DTrace Toolkit with lots (> 90) of great scripts Includes scripts for Python, Perl, Java, PHP, Ruby, Tcl, Javascript Best starting point for learning DTrace Means you don’t have to be DTrace expert to use DTrace (for good or evil) http://www.opensolaris.org/os/community/dtrace/ dtracetoolkit/ Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 51Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Toolkit Hits dexplorer - run a lot of tools for a few seconds and log output to a file Other key scripts include dtruss, dvmstat, execsnoop, hotkernel, hotuser, errinfo, iopattern, iosnoop, iotop, opensnoop, procsystime, rwsnoop, rwtop, statsnoop Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 52Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace One-Liners Snarfed from http://www.solarisinternals.com/wiki/index.php/DTrace_Topics_One_Liners Processes * New processes with arguments, dtrace -n proc:::exec-success { trace(curpsinfo->pr_psargs); } Files * Files opened by process name, dtrace -n syscall::open*:entry { printf("%s %s",execname,copyinstr(arg0)); } * Files created using creat() by process name, dtrace -n syscall::creat*:entry { printf("%s %s",execname,copyinstr(arg0)); } Syscalls * Syscall count by process name, dtrace -n syscall:::entry { @num[execname] = count(); } * Syscall count by syscall, dtrace -n syscall:::entry { @num[probefunc] = count(); } * Syscall count by process ID, dtrace -n syscall:::entry { @num[pid,execname] = count(); } * Read bytes by process name, dtrace -n sysinfo:::readch { @bytes[execname] = sum(arg0); } I/O * Write bytes by process name, dtrace -n sysinfo:::writech { @bytes[execname] = sum(arg0); } * Read size distribution by process name, dtrace -n sysinfo:::readch { @dist[execname] = quantize(arg0); } * Write size distribution by process name, dtrace -n sysinfo:::writech { @dist[execname] = quantize(arg0); } Physical I/O * Disk size by process ID, dtrace -n io:::start { printf("%d %s %d",pid,execname,args[0]->b_bcount); } * Disk size aggregation dtrace -n io:::start { @size[execname] = quantize(args[0]->b_bcount); } * Pages paged in by process name, dtrace -n vminfo:::pgpgin { @pg[execname] = sum(arg0); } Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 53Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • More DTrace One-liners Memory * Minor faults by process name, dtrace -n vminfo:::as_fault { @mem[execname] = sum(arg0); } User-land * Sample user stack trace of specified process ID at 1001 Hertz dtrace -n profile-1001 /pid == $target/ { @num[ustack()] = count(); } -p PID * Trace why threads are context switching off the CPU, from the user-land perspective, dtrace -n sched:::off-cpu { @[execname, ustack()] = count(); } * User stack size for processes dtrace -n sched:::on-cpu { @[execname] = max(curthread->t_procp->p_stksize);} Kernel * Sample kernel stack trace at 1001 Hertz dtrace -n profile-1001 /!pid/ { @num[stack()] = count(); } * Interrupts by CPU, dtrace -n sdt:::interrupt-start { @num[cpu] = count(); } * CPU cross calls by process name, dtrace -n sysinfo:::xcalls { @num[execname] = count(); } * Trace why threads are context switching off the CPU, from the kernel perspective, dtrace -n sched:::off-cpu { @[execname, stack()] = count(); } * Kernel function calls by module dtrace -n fbt:::entry { @calls[probemod] = count(); } Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 54Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • DTrace Lab (!) Try some one-liners Which work in a non-global zone? Try some of the scripts in /usr/demo/dtrace How useful is non-global zone DTrace? Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 55Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 56Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC Been in Solaris since release 8 Basis for access control on Solaris A bit, um, complicated Quick review here How many of you are using RBAC? Let’s take the nickel tour to get up to speed: http://mediacast.sun.com/share/bartbl/ blog-5cent-rbac-tour.mov Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 57Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 58Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC Terminology Administrative Roles – (or just “roles”) for grouping authorizations, profiles and commands together as a common set of functions. Think of these as special user accounts to which profiles are assigned. Profiles -- (also known as "execution profiles" or "rights profiles") a collection of authorizations, commands, and/or other profiles that together provide for performing a set of administrative tasks. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 59Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC Terminology - 2 Authorizations – permissions that grant access to restricted actions that are otherwise prohibited by the security policy. These are typically assigned in a profile, but can also be assigned to a user or a role. Think of this as tokens that can be checked by RBAC-aware programs. Rather than checking if UID=0 to allow an action, such programs can check if, for example, the user has authorization token “solaris.admin.diskmgr.read”. Privileged program – a program with security attributes that enables special functions depending on a check of user-id, group-id, privileges, or authorizations. These are setuid or setgid programs, or programs with assigned privileges. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 60Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 61Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC Use User assumes a role - placed in a special profile-understanding shell pfcsh, pfksh, and pfsh Shells know how to read through the various config files in /etc/ security (and /etc/user_attr) Determines the rights profiles of the role and the components of those profiles, enforces them I.e., if a role had the Name Service Security rights profile, then user would be allowed to run /usr/bin/nischown with the effective user-id of 0 (from /etc/security/exec_attr) The administrator creates a profile of authorizations and privileged commands for task or tasks Can be assigned directly to a user or to (better) a role Without authorizations, user is prevented from executing a privileged application, or prevented from performing operations within a privileged application Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 62Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC Use - 2 Easiest RBAC admin is to use the Solaris Management Console (smc) User is allowed to assume zero or more roles by knowing the password of the roles Similar to using the su command When the user assumes a role, the capabilities of the role are available List of roles available to that user is displayed by the roles command User su’s to an available role to accomplish privileged tasks No default roles Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 63Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/security/exec_attr # head exec_attr Application Server Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/appserver/bin/ asadmin: Software Installation:suser:cmd:::/usr/bin/pkgparam:uid=0 Network Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/in.named:uid=0 File System Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/mount:uid=0 Software Installation:suser:cmd:::/usr/bin/pkgtrans:uid=0 Name Service Security:suser:cmd:::/usr/bin/nisaddcred:euid=0 Mail Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/makemap:euid=0 FTP Management:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/ftprestart:euid=0 File System Management:solaris:cmd:::/sbin/ mount:privs=sys_mount Software Installation:suser:cmd:::/usr/sbin/install:euid=0 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 64Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Roles Typical types of roles: primary administrator - the traditional superuser, with all privileges, system administrator – an administrator without security- modification privileges, operator – an administrator with a limited, specific set of privileges, advanced user – a user with privileges to debug and fix her own system or programs Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 65Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Solaris Privileges Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 66Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privileges Really known as “least privilege” Only the minimum privileges to get a job done should be available Alternative to being root or no one Done at the API level SetUID programs can dictate fine grain access to kernel features Can limit what privs children have Should further help can buffer overflows and other privilege escalation methods Done at the user or role level All specific users to perform specific operations regardless of the programs being run Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 67Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privileges - 2 New level of management of rights within a Solaris 10 system Fine-grained privileges that can be assigned to entities The kernel enforces the new requirement that, to perform a special function, the entity must have the privilege to do so. Can work in parallel with traditional superuser functionality for backward compatibility. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 68Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privilege Sets E - Effective privilege set – the current set of privileges that are in effect I - Inheritable privilege set – the set of privileges that a process can inherit across an exec() P - Permitted privilege set - the set of privileges that are available for use L - Limit privilege set – the outside limit of what privileges are available to a process and its children Used to shrink the “I” set when a child is created, for example Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 69Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privileges Example traceroute is now privilege enabled $ ls -l /usr/sbin/traceroute -r-sr-xr-x 1 root bin 35392 Jul 3 14:42 /usr/sbin/traceroute $ /usr/sbin/traceroute 1.2.3.4 & [2] 7841 # pcred 7841 7841: e/r/suid=101 e/r/sgid=14 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 70Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privileges Example - 2 # ppriv -v 7841 7841: /usr/sbin/traceroute 1.2.3.4 flags = PRIV_AWARE E: file_link_any,proc_exec,proc_fork,proc_info,proc_sess ion I: file_link_any,proc_exec,proc_fork,proc_info,proc_sess ion P: file_link_any,net_icmpaccess,net_rawaccess,proc_exec, proc_fork,proc_info,proc_session L: none Note exploit needs to execute fully in the context of traceroute to make use of its privileges because the "Limit“ set is empty Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 71Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privileged Daemon Example # ppriv `pgrep rpcbind` 153: /usr/sbin/rpcbind flags = PRIV_AWARE E: basic,!file_link_any,net_privaddr,! proc_exec,!proc_info,!proc_session,sys_nfs I: basic,!file_link_any,!proc_exec,! proc_fork,!proc_info,!proc_session P: basic,!file_link_any,net_privaddr,! proc_exec,!proc_info,!proc_session,sys_nfs L: basic,!file_link_any,!proc_exec,! proc_fork,!proc_info,!proc_session Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 72Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC and Privileges Use RBAC to assign specific privs to roles or users By default, all non-setuid processes have the “basic” set of privileges assigned Create a role with that privilege and then allow the user to assume that role The list of available privileges is available in the privileges(5), and via the all important ppriv command (the “-lv” options) Divided into categories, including file, ipc, net, proc, and sys privileges For example, enable users in role “test” to do process management and use DTrace features Create “test” role in /etc/user_attr Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 73Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC and Privileges - 2 # roleadd -u 201 -d /export/home/test -P "Process Management" test # rolemod -K defaultpriv=basic,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user, dtrace_kernel test # grep test /etc/user_attr test::::type=role;defaultpriv=basic,dtrace_ proc,dtrace_user,dtrace_kernel;profiles=Pr ocess Management # passwd test New password: Re-enter new password: # mkdir -p /export/home/test The user would need to switch to the role “test” to use Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 74Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC and Privileges - 3 $ ppriv $$ 10897: -bash flags = <none> E: basic I: basic P: basic L: all $ dtrace -s bitesize.d dtrace: failed to initialize dtrace: DTrace requires additional privileges $ su - test password: Roles can only be assumed by authorized users su: Sorry # usermod –R test pbg (then login as pbg) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 75Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • RBAC and Privileges - 4 $ roles test $su test password: $ ppriv $$ 11022: pfsh flags = <none> E: basic,dtrace_kernel,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user I: basic,dtrace_kernel,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user P: basic,dtrace_kernel,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user L: all $ dtrace –s bitesize.d . . . Alternately, privileges can be directly assigned to users, as in: pbg::::type=normal;roles=primary_administrator,test; defaultpriv=basic,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user,dtrace_kernel Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 76Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privilege Assignment To add a privilege to a specific user, use the usermod command to add the privilege to the user’s default privileges, as in # usermod –K defaultpriv=basic,proc_clock_high_res jdoe Unfortunately, to be able to assign a specific privilege to a specific command, the command must be written to be privilege aware Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 77Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Privilege Assignment - 2 Currently, native system programs are becoming privilege aware and having a limited set of privileges assigned to them Includes most setuid-root and network daemons API available with privileges to allow Solaris programmers to write privilege aware programs ppriv command can be used on a program that is failing due to a lack of privilege, to determine exactly the privileges that the program needs to succeed Appropriate privileges can be assigned to the program, or assigned to a role or user to allow that program to run properly when the appropriate set of users runs it Good white paper by Sun about privilege-enabling an arbitrary set-UID program: http://www.sun.com/blueprints/ 0406/819-6320.pdf Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 78Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Final Privilege Notes ppriv allows examination of a command to determine what privileges it would need $ ppriv -e -D cat /etc/shadow cat[418]: missing privilege "file_dac_read" (euid = 21782),needed at ufs_access +0x3c cat: cannot open /etc/shadow ppriv -l lists all available privileges -v does so with details Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 79Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/passwd # cat /etc/passwd root:x:0:1:Super-User:/:/sbin/sh daemon:x:1:1::/: bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin: sys:x:3:3::/: adm:x:4:4:Admin:/var/adm: lp:x:71:8:Line Printer Admin:/usr/spool/lp: uucp:x:5:5:uucp Admin:/usr/lib/uucp: nuucp:x:9:9:uucp Admin:/var/spool/uucppublic:/usr/lib/uucp/uucico smmsp:x:25:25:SendMail Message Submission Program:/: listen:x:37:4:Network Admin:/usr/net/nls: gdm:x:50:50:GDM Reserved UID:/: webservd:x:80:80:WebServer Reserved UID:/: nobody:x:60001:60001:NFS Anonymous Access User:/: noaccess:x:60002:60002:No Access User:/: nobody4:x:65534:65534:SunOS 4.x NFS Anonymous Access User:/: pbg:x:101:14::/export/home/pbg:/bin/bash test:x:201:1::/export/home/test:/bin/pfsh Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 80Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/user_attr # cat /etc/user_attr # # Copyright (c) 2003 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. # # /etc/user_attr # # user attributes. see user_attr(4) # #pragma ident "@(#)user_attr 1.1 03/07/09 SMI" # adm::::profiles=Log Management lp::::profiles=Printer Management root::::auths=solaris.*,solaris.grant;profiles=Web Console Management,All;lock_after_retries=no test::::type=role;defaultpriv=basic,dtrace_proc,dtrace_user,dtr ace_kernel;profiles=Process Management pbg::::type=normal;roles=test Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 81Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Labs Create new user “foo” Create new role “operator” Find list of profiles Add some profiles to role “operator” Add user foo to role “operator” Find list of privileges Add some privileges to role “operator” Add some privileges to user “foo” Test user foo in role “operator” Test user “foo” privileges Explore the system to find all of the changes associated with the new user and role What file would you need to look in during an audit to check a user for more privileges? Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 82Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • NFS V4 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 83Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • NFS V4 Overview Stateful rather than stateless All traffic uses one port number (2049) Can negotiate security authentication protocol, including using Kerberos (SEAM) and DES The /etc/default/nfs file uses keywords to control the NFS protocols that are used by both the client and the server Uses the string representations to identify the owner or group_owner via the nfsmapid daemon Supports mandatory locking (multiple lock types) When you unshare a file system, all the state for any open files or file locks in that file system is destroyed Servers use a pseudo file system to provide clients with access to exported objects on the server Server provides a view that just includes the exported file systems Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 84Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • NFS V4 Overview - 2 Supports client and server recovery from a crash Supports client fail-over between multiple replicated copies of a file system on different servers Supports volatile file handles Delegation, a technique by which the server delegates the management of a file to a client, is supported on both the client and the server. I.e. the server could grant either a read delegation or a write delegation to a client. Does not use the following daemons: lockd mountd nfslogd statd Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 85Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • NFS V4 Use Enable it via NFS_CLIENT_VERSMIN and NFS_CLIENT_VERSMAX in the /etc/ default/nfs file Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 86Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Solaris Flash Archives Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 87Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • System Build Technology What does it have to do with security? Capture state of system just after virgin build Fast restore Useful for comparison Also good for DR / BC This is available pre-Solaris 10, but generally under-utilized Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 88Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Flash Archives Create master system – single reference installation Then replicate master to clone systems Initial install overwrites all filesystems on target clone Update only includes differences between two system images (on master and clone) Differential update changes only specified files of a clone based on a master Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 89Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Flash Archives Initial Install Install master server however you’d like (Optional) Prepare customization scripts to reconfigure or customize the clone system before or after installation Create the Solaris Flash archive. The Solaris Flash archive contains a copy of all of the files on the master system, unless you excluded some nonessential files Install the Solaris Flash archive on clone systems Master and clone system must have the same kernel architecture Can run scripts to customize clone or install extra packages using custom jumpstart (Optional) Save a copy of the master image If you plan to create a differential archive, the master image must be available and identical to the image installed on the clone systems Note – best to start from Entire Plus OEM install image to get all drivers clones might need Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 90Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Flash Archives Deployment Create archive after full master install but before software configuration I.E. No Solaris Volume Manager config Master should be as inactive as possible Create archive with flar create –n name options path/filename Save it to disk or tape Make a copy for differential archive creation Can keep multiple archives – just costs disk Can compress archives To install from an archive, select Solaris Flash installation during standard installation procedures Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 91Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 92Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Updating Clone with Flash Differential Archive 1. Start from master identical to clone 2. Prepare the master system with changes 3. (Optional) Prepare customization scripts to reconfigure or customize the clone system before or after installation 4. Mount the directory of a copy of the saved-unchanged master image 1. Second image is to be used to compare the two system images 2. Mount it from a Solaris Live Upgrade boot environment 3. Mount it from a clone system over NFS 4. Restore from backup using the ufsrestore command 5. Create the differential archive with the -A option of the flar create command 6. Install the differential archive on clone systems with custom JumpStart 1. Or, use Solaris Live Upgrade to install the differential archive on an inactive boot environment Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 93Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Moving from NIS to LDAP Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 94Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Why Move? NIS is old, limited, not secure Weak authentication Not much encryption Nonstandard NIS+ is complicated and EOL Sorry if you already moved to it Don’t move to NIS+ if you haven’t already LDAP is the wave of the future “Standard” Full features Expandable, flexible, interoperable Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 95Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • NIS to LDAP Overview The NIS–to–LDAP transition service (N2L service) replaces existing NIS daemons on the NIS master server with NIS–to– LDAP transition daemons The N2L service also creates a NIS–to–LDAP mapping file on that server Specifies the mapping between NIS map entries and equivalent Directory Information Tree (DIT) entries in LDAP A transitioned server is called an N2L server Slave servers do not have an NISLDAPmapping file, so they continue as usual The slave servers periodically update their data from N2L server Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 96Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • NIS to LDAP Overview - 2 Behavior of the N2L service is controlled by the ypserv and NISLDAPmapping configuration files A script, inityp2l, assists with initial setup of configuration files. Once N2L server has been established, you can maintain N2L by editing configuration files The N2L service supports: Import of NIS maps into LDAP DIT Client access to DIT information with speed and extensibility of NIS When using N2L LDAP directory is source of authoritative data Eventually, all NIS clients can be replaced by Solaris LDAP naming services clients Many gory details in SysAdmin Guide to Naming and Directory Services Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 97Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • FTP Server Enhancements Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 98Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • FTP Server Enhancements The sendfile() function is used for binary downloads New capabilities supported in the ftpaccess file flush-wait controls the behavior at the end of a download or directory listing ipcos sets the IP Class of Service for either the control or data connection passive ports can be configured so that the kernel selects the TCP port to listen on quota-info enables retrieval of quota information recvbuf sets the receive (upload) buffer size used for binary transfers rhostlookup allows or disallows the lookup of the remote hosts name sendbuf sets the send (download) buffer size used for binary transfers xferlog format customizes the format of the transfer log entry -4 option which makes the FTP server only listen for connections on an IPv4 socket when running in standalone mode Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 99Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • FTP Server Enhancements - 2 ftpcount and ftpwho now support the -v option, which displays user counts and process information for FTP server classes defined in virtual host ftpaccess files The FTP client and server now support Kerberos Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 100Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • PAM Enhancements Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 101Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • PAM Enhancements Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) framework enhancements The pam_authtok_check module now allows for strict password checking using new tunable parameters in the /etc/default/passwd file. The new parameters define: A list of comma separated dictionary files used for checking common dictionary words in a password The minimum differences required between a new password and an old password The minimum number of alphabetic or nonalphabetic characters that must be used in a new password The minimum number of uppercase or lowercase letters that must be used in a new password The number of allowable consecutive repeating characters Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 102Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • PAM Enhancements - 2 The pam_unix_auth module implements account locking for local users. Account locking is enabled by the LOCK_AFTER_RETRIES parameter in /etc/ security/policy.conf and the lock_after-retries key in /etc/user_attr The pam_unix module has been removed and replaced by a set of service modules of equivalent or greater functionality. Many of these modules were introduced in the Solaris 9 release. Here is a list of the replacement modules: pam_authtok_check pam_authtok_get pam_authtok_store pam_dhkeys pam_passwd_auth pam_unix_account pam_unix_auth pam_unix_cred pam_unix_session Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 103Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • PAM Enhancements - 3 The functionality of the pam_unix_auth module has been split into two modules. The pam_unix_auth module now verifies that the password is correct for the user. The new pam_unix_cred module provides functions that establish user credential information. Additions to the pam_krb5 module have been made to manage the Kerberos credentials cache using the PAM framework. A new pam_deny module has been added. The module can be used to deny access to services. By default, the pam_deny module is not used Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 104Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/default/passwd $ cat /etc/default/passwd #ident "@(#)passwd.dfl 1.7 04/04/22 SMI" # # Copyright 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. # Use is subject to license terms. # MAXWEEKS= MINWEEKS= PASSLENGTH=6 # NAMECHECK enables/disables login name checking. # The default is to do login name checking. # Specifying a value of "NO" will disable login name checking. # #NAMECHECK=NO Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 105Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/default/passwd - 2 # HISTORY sets the number of prior password changes to keep and # check for a user when changing passwords. Setting the HISTORY # value to zero (0), or removing/commenting out the flag will # cause all users prior password history to be discarded at the # next password change by any user. No password history will # be checked if the flag is not present or has zero value. # The maximum value of HISTORY is 26. # # This flag is only enforced for user accounts defined in the # local passwd(4)/shadow(4) files. # #HISTORY=0 # Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 106Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/default/passwd - 3 # Password complexity tunables. The values listed are the defaults # which are compatible with previous releases of passwd. # See passwd(1) and pam_authtok_check(5) for use warnings and # discussion of the use of these options. # #MINDIFF=3 #MINALPHA=2 #MINNONALPHA=1 #MINUPPER=0 #MINLOWER=0 #MAXREPEATS=0 #MINSPECIAL=0 #MINDIGIT=0 #WHITESPACE=YES Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 107Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/default/passwd - 4 # # # passwd performs dictionary lookups if DICTIONLIST or DICTIONDBDIR # is defined. If the password database does not yet exist, it is # created by passwd. See passwd(1), pam_authtok_check(5) and # mkdict(1) for more information. # #DICTIONLIST= #DICTIONDBDIR=/var/passwd Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 108Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Stronger Password Crypto Modify /etc/security/policy.conf to use stronger password crypto CRYPT_DEFAULT=md5 Passwords less likely to be “crack”ed if found encrypted Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 109Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BSM Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 110Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BSM Solaris Basic Security Module Also known as Solaris auditing Part of Solaris for a while, but little used Very detailed accounting of system / user activities Can be too much – watch your disk space Good article at http://www.deer-run.com/ ~hal/sysadmin/SolarisBSMAuditing.html Except for disk space, not very resource intensive Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 111Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BSM Setup BSM not enabled by default bsmconv configures BSM Creates files in /etc/security audit_startup runs at startup, configuring auditing via auditconfig commands /usr/bin/echo "Starting BSM services." /usr/sbin/auditconfig -setpolicy +cnt /usr/sbin/auditconfig -conf /usr/sbin/auditconfig -aconf Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 112Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BSM Setup – cont audit_control is primary config file dir:/var/audit flags: minfree:20 naflags:lo flags defines audit events to pay attention to naflags defines non-attributable events to pay attention to audit_event can fine-tune auditing (defines events and divides them into classes) audit_class defines masks for accessing classes Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 113Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BSM Setup - cont Run audit –n out of cron to cycle the (otherwise infinite) log file: 0 * * * * /usr/sbin/audit –n Compress and move the audit log to secure storage Do so rapidly on security-conscious machines (i.e. web servers) auditreduce can extract specific info from and audit log praudit can dump native audit binary data for readability Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 114Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BSM Tuning Recommended auditing settings for more security-conscious systems from http://www.cisecurity.com/bench_solaris.html Generated via this awk script: awk BEGIN { FS = ":"; OFS = ":" } ($4 ~ /fm/) && ! ($2 ~ /MCTL|FCNTL|FLOCK|UTIME/) { $4 = $4 ",cc" } ($4 ~ /p[cms]/) && ! ($2 ~ /FORK|CHDIR|KILL|VTRACE|SETGROUPS|SETPGRP/) { $4 = $4 ",cc" } { print } audit_event >audit_event.new And associated audit_control configuration: dir:/var/audit minfree:20 flags:lo,ad,cc naflags:lo,ad,ex Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 115Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Auditing Enhancements Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 116Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Auditing Enhancements Can use the syslog utility to store audit records in text format Enable and configure in /etc/security/audit_control dir:/var/audit flags: lo,ad,-fm minfree:20 naflags:lo,ad plugin: name=audit_syslog.so;p_flags=lo,+ad; qsize=512 Add audit.notice /var/adm/auditlog to /etc/ syslog.conf touch /var/adm/auditlog Use logadm to manage the logs The praudit –x creates output formatted in XML Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 117Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Auditing Enhancements - 2 Audit metaclasses provide an umbrella for finer-grained audit classes The bsmconv command no longer disables the use of the Stop-A key The Stop-A event can be audited The timestamp in audit records now displays in ISO 8601 format Three audit policy options have been added: public – Public objects are no longer audited for read-only events, reducing the audit log size perzone – A separate audit daemon runs in each zone zonename – The name of the Solaris zone in which an audit event occurred can be included in audit records Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 118Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Auditing Enhancements - 3 Five audit tokens have been added: The cmd token records the list of arguments and the list of environment variables that are associated with a command The path_attr token records the sequence of attribute file objects that are below the path token object The privilege token records the use of privilege on a process The uauth token records the use of authorization with a command or action The zonename token records the name of the non-global zone in which an audit event occurred Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 119Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Solaris Cryptographic Framework Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 120Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Crypto Framework Provides common store of crypto algorithms and PKCS #11 libraries optimized for SPARC and x86 PKCS #11 – public key crypto standard defining technology-independent API for crypto devices Currently provides IPSec and Kerberos to kernel, libsasl and IKE to users via plugins: User-level plugins – Shared objects that provide services by using PKCS #11 libraries, such as pkcs11_softtoken.so.1 Kernel-level plugins – Kernel modules that provide implementations of cryptographic algorithms in software, such as AES Hardware plugins – Device drivers and their associated hardware accelerators i.e. Sun Crypto Accelerator 1000 board Framework implements a standard interface, the PKCS #11, v2.11 library, for user-level providers. Can be used by third-party applications to reach providers Third parties can add signed libraries, signed kernel algorithm modules, and signed device drivers to the framework plugins are added when the pkgadd utility installs the third-party software Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 121Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Figure 8–1 Overview of the Solaris Cryptographic Framework                                                                         (From Solaris 10 Solaris Security for Developers Guide) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 122Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Crypto Framework Admin Administration via cryptoadm command: $ cryptoadm list user-level providers: /usr/lib/security/$ISA/pkcs11_kernel.so /usr/lib/security/$ISA/pkcs11_softtoken.so kernel software providers: des aes arcfour blowfish sha1 md5 rsa swrand kernel hardware providers: Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 123Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Crypto Framework User Commands digest– Computes a message digest for one or more files or for stdin. A digest is useful for verifying the integrity of a file. SHA1 and MD5 are examples of digest functions. mac – Computes a message authentication code (MAC) for one or more files or for stdin. A MAC associates data with an authenticated message. A MAC enables a receiver to verify that the message came from the sender and that the message has not been tampered with. The sha1_mac and md5_hmac mechanisms can compute a MAC. encrypt – Encrypts files or stdin with a symmetric cipher. The encrypt -l command lists the algorithms that are available. Mechanisms that are listed under a user-level library are available to the encrypt command. The framework provides AES, DES, 3DES (Triple-DES), and ARCFOUR mechanisms for user encryption. decrypt – Decrypts files or stdin that were encrypted with the encrypt command. The decrypt command uses the identical key and mechanism that were used to encrypt the original file. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 124Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Key Generation For MAC and encryption, need symmetric key Determine algorithm to use and length of key needed $ encrypt -l Algorithm Keysize: Min Max (bits) ------------------------------------------ aes 128 128 arcfour 8 128 des 64 64 3des 192 192 $ mac -l Algorithm Keysize: Min Max (bits) ------------------------------------------ des_mac 64 64 sha1_hmac 8 512 md5_hmac 8 512 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 125Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Encrypting Use a random number generator, or dd to create a key Note that bs is in bytes, so divide bits by 8 $ dd if=/dev/random of=keyfile bs=n count=1 Protect the key in the keyfile $ chmod 400 keyfile Example for AES: $ dd if=/dev/random of=$HOME/keyf/05.07.aes16 bs=16 count=1 $ chmod 400 ~/keyf/05.07.aes16 Now use the key to create an MD5 MAC: $ mac -v -a md5_hmac -k $HOME/keyf/05.07.mack64 email.attach md5_hmac (email.attach) = 02df6eb6c123ff25d78877eb1d55710c % echo "md5_hmac (email.attach) = 02df6eb6c123ff25d78877eb1d55710c" >> ~/mac.daily.05.07 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 126Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Decrypting and verifying Example - Use AES for encryption using a keyphrase $ encrypt -a aes -i ticket.to.ride -o ~/enc/e.ticket.to.ride Enter key: <Type passphrase> The opposite of encrypt is decrypt: $ decrypt –a aes –i ~/enc/e.ticket.to.ride Enter Key: <decrypted message is output> Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 127Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Labs Pick an encryption algorithm and key length and encrypt and decrypt a sample message How do we use the MAC shown in the above slides? Compute a MAC or digest, modify a sample message, and then recompute Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 128Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Kerberos Enhancements Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 129Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Kerberos Enhancements The KDC software, the user commands and applications now support TCP Support for IPv6 was added to kinit, klist and kprop commands. Support for IPv6 addresses is provided by default. There are no configuration parameters to change to enable IPv6 support. No IPv6 support is available for the kadmin and kadmind commands. A new PAM module called pam_krb5_migrate has been introduced. Helps in the automatic migration of users to the local Kerberos realm, if they do not already have Kerberos accounts. The ~/.k5login file can now be used with the GSS applications ftp and ssh The kproplog utility has been updated to output all attribute names per log entry Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 130Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Kerberos Enhancements - 2 Kerberos protocol support is provided in remote applications, such as ftp, rcp, rdist, rlogin, rsh, ssh, and telnet The Kerberos principal database can now be transferred by incremental update instead of by transferring the entire database each time Increased database consistencies across servers The need for fewer resources (network, CPU, and so forth) Much more timely propagation of updates An automated method of propagation Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 131Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Kerberos Enhancements - 3 A new script to help automatically configure a Kerberos client Several new encryption types have been added to the Kerberos service The AES encryption type can be used for high speed, high security encryption of Kerberos sessions. The use of AES is enabled through the Cryptographic Framework. ARCFOUR-HMAC provides better compatibility with other Kerberos versions. Triple DES (3DES) with SHA1 increases security. This encryption type also enhances interoperability with other Kerberos implementations that support this encryption type. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 132Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Kerberos Enhancements - 4 A new -e option has been included to several subcommands of the kadmin command. This new option allows for the selection of the encryption type during the creation of principals. Additions to the pam_krb5 module manage the Kerberos credentials cache by using the PAM framework. Support is provided for auto-discovery of the Kerberos KDC, admin server, kpasswd server, and host or domain name-to-realm mappings by using DNS lookups A new configuration file option makes the strict TGT verification feature optionally configurable on a per-realm basis Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 133Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Kerberos Enhancements - 5 Extensions to the password-changing utilities enable the Solaris Kerberos V5 administration server to accept password change requests from clients that do not run Solaris software. The default location of the replay cache has been moved from RAM- based file systems to persistent storage in /var/krb5/rcache The GSS credential table is no longer necessary for the Kerberos GSS mechanism The Kerberos utilities, kinit and ktutil, are now based on MIT Kerberos version 1.2.1 The Solaris Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) is now based on MIT Kerberos version 1.2.1 Note that Kerberos V5 support means that (theoretically) NFS traffic can now be encrypted Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 134Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Packet Filtering Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 135Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Packet Filtering Overview Solaris used to have nothing, then SunScreen was commercial, then SunScreen was included, now ipfilter is standard Solaris IP Filter is a host-based firewall that is derived from the open source IP Filter code, developed and maintained by Darren Reed Based on version 4.0.33 of the open source IP Filter Uses the STREAMS module, pfil, to intercept packets By default, pfil is not autopushed onto network interface cards (NICs). Autopush of pfil is disabled for all drivers Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 136Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Packet Filtering Overview - 2 Provides packet filtering and network address translation (NAT), based upon a user-configurable policy Rules are configurable to filter either statefully or statelessly Command line interface only ipf for loading or clearing packet filter rules ipnat for loading or clearing NAT rules ippool for managing address pools associated with IP rules ipfstat for viewing per-interface statistics ipmon for viewing of logged packets Good info at http://www.obfuscation.org/ipf/ Only works in the global zone (so far) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 137Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • ipfilter Details Can match on the following IP header fields Source or destination IP address (including inverted matches) IP protocol TOS (Type of Service) IP options or IP security classes Fragment In addition it can: Distinguish between various interfaces Return an ICMP error or TCP reset for denied packets Keep packet state information for TCP, UDP, and ICMP packet flows Keep fragment state information for any IP packet, applying the same rule to all fragments in that packet Use redirection to set up true transparent proxy connections Provide packet header details to a user program for authentication Provide temporary storage of pre-authenticated rules for passing packets Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 138Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • ipfilter Details - 2 Special provision is made for the three most common Internet protocols, TCP, UDP and ICMP. Can match based on: TCP or UDP packets by port number or a port number range ICMP packets by type or code Established TCP packet sessions Any arbitrary combination of TCP flags Note IPMP only supports stateless packet filtering Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 139Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Enable ipfilter Disabled by default Assume a role that includes the Network Management rights profile, or become superuser Edit /etc/ipf/pfil.ap Uncomment the interface(s) to filter on Put filter rules in /etc/ipf/ipf.conf for automatic use at boot Put NAT rules in /etc/ipf/ipnat.conf for automatic use at boot Put config info in /etc/ipf/ippool.conf for pooling of interfaces at boot time Reboot or run svcadm restart pfil Activate filtering via svcadm enable ipfilter unplumb and replumb the interface(s) to filter (or reboot) Now enable ipfiltering Enable filtering: ipf –E Activate filtering: ipf -f filename Activate NAT if wanted: ipnat –f filename Monitor with ipfstat Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 140Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/ipf/ipf.conf Rules processed top to bottom Entire ruleset is run, not just until a match Last matching rule always has precedence “quick” rule option says to stop processing if match pass in quick on lo0 all pass out quick on lo0 all block in log all block out all pass in quick proto tcp from any to any port = 113 flags S keep state pass in quick proto tcp from any to any port = 22 flags S keep state pass in quick proto tcp from any port = 20 to any port 39999 >< 45000 flags S keep state pass out quick proto icmp from any to any keep state pass out quick proto tcp/udp from any to any keep state keep frags Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 141Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/ipf/ipnat.conf Very feature rich translation of address and ports Some examples: map eri1 192.168.1.0/24 -> 20.20.20.1/32 map eri1 192.168.1.0/24 -> 0/32 portmap tcp/udp auto map eri1 192.168.1.0/24 -> 20.20.20.1/32 proxy port ftp ftp/tcp rdr eri1 20.20.20.5/32 port 80 -> 192.168.0.5, 192.168.0.6, port 8000 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 142Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • /etc/ipf/ippool.conf Pool of addresses used by ipfilter Used for defining a single object that contains multiple IP address / netmask pairs Then rule can be applied to a pool ipf rule: pass in from pool/100 to any table role = ipf type = tree number = 100 { 1.1.1.1/32, 2.2.0.0/16, !2.2.2.0/24 }; Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 143Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • ipfilter status ipfstat –io shows current filter rules ipfstat shows the current state table ipfstat –s shows state statistics ipfstat –t shows top-like status information ippool –s shows pool statistics ipnat –s shows NAT statistics ndd -get /dev/pfil qif_status shows pfil statistics in the kernel ipmon –a shows the ipfilter log Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 144Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • ipfilter Lab (only for Global Zone) Install ipfilters Build a rule to allow everything but finger in Modify the rule to allow everything but ftp out Test the rules Examine the firewall state Examine the log files Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 145Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 146Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART Basic Auditing and Reporting Tool Quick and easy way to collect info on filesystem object and attributes Then use to look for changes Much like tripwire, but integral to Solaris 10 Create and compare modes Create Entire system, specific dirs, subset of files, or specific rules based Creates manifest Compare Take two manifests and optional rules and output comparison information Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 147Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART Good info on centralizing, securing, and automating use of BART from http:// blogs.sun.com/roller/page/gbrunett/ 20041001#automating_solaris_10_file_inte grity Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 148Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART – Set up Accounts First create non-login, profile shell account to collect file system info and create BART manifests # mkdir -p /export/home # useradd -d /export/home/bartadm -m -s /bin/pfsh bartadm # passwd -N bartadm passwd: password information changed for bartadm Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 149Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART Setup Security Access Consider setting up a “manager” system and doing key and BART manifest management there $ ssh-keygen -t dsa Generating public/private dsa key pair. Enter file in which to save the key (/export/home/bartadm/.ssh/ id_dsa): Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): Enter same passphrase again: Your identification has been saved in /export/home/bartadm/.ssh/ id_dsa. Your public key has been saved in /export/home/bartadm/.ssh/ id_dsa.pub. The key fingerprint is: 42:ca:d7:fa:ab:1c:f8:c0:5b:2c:7b:56:28:85:dc: 65 bartadm@manager Now copy public key (id_dsa.pub) from manager to client system and rename it to “authorized_keys” And limit SSH via that key to run only one command, add to beginning of “authorized_keys”: command="/usr/bin/bart create -r -" <key> Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 150Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART Create Rights Profile Allows “bartadm” user to run BART with sufficient privs Add to /etc/security/prof_attr File Integrity:::File Integrity Management: Add to /etc/security/exec_attr: File Integrity:solaris:cmd:::/usr/bin/bart :privs=file_dac_read,file_dac_search Enable the File Integrity right to user “bartadm” # usermod -P "File Integrity" bartadm Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 151Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Configure and Run BART Create client.rules file on manager to tell BART what to do This example checks /usr/sbin: /usr/sbin CHECK all Now run BART from manager to client $ cat ./client.rules | ssh -T -l bartadm client > ./ client.manifest.1 Periodically rerun that command and BART the differences: $ bart compare -r ./client.rules ./client.manifest.1 ./ client.manifest.2 . . . Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 152Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • BART Next Steps Information on tying BART together with the Solaris Fingerprint Database (available for free from SunSolve - http:// www.sun.com/blueprints/0501/Fingerprint.pdf ) to find changes to files shipped by Sun available from http://www.securitydocs.com/library/2693 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 153Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Trusted Extensions Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 154Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Overview Used to be Trusted Solaris Some of that baked into “standard” Solaris 10 Some now available as Trusted Extensions Reimplementation of Trusted Solaris 8 based on new security features in Solaris 10 Renamed because delivered as an optional set of extensions to Solaris Extends Solaris security by enforcing a mandatory access control (MAC) policy Meets requirements of Common Criteria Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) and Role-Based Access Protection Profile (RBAC) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 155Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Components Consists of a set of label-aware services that are derived from Trusted Solaris 8 Labeled Networking Label-aware Filesystem Mounting and Sharing Labeled Printing Labeled Desktops Java Desktop System Common Desktop Environment Label Configuration and Translation Label-aware System Management Tools Label-aware Device Allocation Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 156Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Implementation No app changes, file system changes needed Built on zone technology For each label, entire app environment virtualized within a container Can be multiple instances of each resource and service at each label Very efficient Labels made up of classifications (levels) and compartments (categories) Classifications are hierarchical, compartments disjoint At least 256 of each allowed Labels can be specified as ranges Admin roles can assign label ranges to users, network attribs, workstations, and devices via the Trusted Path All zones administered from protected global zone to manage Trusted Computing Base (TCB) known as Trusted Path Zones share an LDAP directory containing network-wide policy Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 157Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Implementation - cont IPSec is used for source IP authentication and data encryption Loop back mounts and NFS mounts allow for file sharing Zones with matching labels can share r/w access Zone with lower-level label has r/w access, higher label- zone has r/o access One-way guards for tamper-proof logging possible via named pipe loop-back mounted to higher-level zone Mounts automatically labeled by kernel based on zone and host labels Least Privs can be used to modify abilities of zones and processes in zones User interface is CDE or Java DS Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 158Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • administrator. Figure 1–4 shows a typical multilevel Trusted Extensions session on a system that is configured to display labels. The labels and trusted stripe are indicated. Trusted Path menu Window label stripe Window icon label stripe Front panel Trusted stripe Trusted symbol Workspace label FIGURE 1–4 Typical Solaris Trusted Extensions (CDE) Session Containers andTrusted Extensions User’s Guide) (From Solaris Labels Trusted Extensions uses containers for labeling. Containers are also called zones. The global zone is an administrative zone, so is not available to users. Non-global zones are called labeled zones.Saturday, May 2, 2009 Labeled zones are used by users. The global zone shares some system files with users. When these
  • Enabling Trusted Solaris Extensions Built into Solaris 10 11/07 and beyond Disabled by default in S10, enabled via one bit, then Sensitivity labels are automatically applied to all sources of data (networks, filesystems, windows) and consumers of data (user and processes) Access to all data is restricted based on the relationship between the label of the data (object) and the consumer (subject) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 160Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Secure Browsing Laptop Install latest Solaris 10 Create a file system called “zone” Enable TX via install DVD commands Solaris_10/ExtraValue/CoBundled/TrustedExtensions or Solaris_11/ExtraValue/CoBundled/TrustedExtensions In those dirs (read the instructions) and either Double-click the wizard.class file in the CDE File Manager or Open a terminal window and type: # java wizard Download http://www.opensolaris.org/os/community/laptop/ downloads/inetmenu-1.9.pkg.gz and http:// www.opensolaris.org/os/community/security/projects/tx/tx- laptop-install/inetmenu-tx.tar for ease of network re- configuration (i.e. laptop use) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 161Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Networking Unconfigure your systems network identity Remove any network interface configuration files, such as /etc/hostname.* and /etc/dhcp.* Update your /etc/hosts and /etc/inet/ipnodes as follows: 127.0.0.1 localhost loghost 10.1.2.3 your-hostname Create the /etc/nodename file # hostname >/etc/nodename Add the following entry to the /etc/security/tsol/tnrhdb file: 10.1.2.3:cipso Specify the virtual network interface (VNI) for your system by adding the following to / etc/hostname.vni0 # echo `hostname` all-zones >>/etc/hostname.vni0 Add to LOCAL DEFINITIONS section of /etc/security/tsol/label_encodings: Default Label View is Internal; (Optional) If your system has NIS enabled, disable it by doing the following: # cp /etc/nsswitch.files /etc/nsswitch.conf # mv /var/yp /var/yp.save Reboot the system The system is running the Solaris Trusted Extensions software Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 162Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Trusted Extensions 1. Log in to Trusted Extensions CDE as superuser 2. Open a terminal window 3. Verify that the VNI interface is up and that the all-zones option is specified # ifconfig -a 4. IP address for the vni0 interface should be same as inthe hosts and ipnodes files vni0 interface should include the all-zones option 5. Start the Solaris Management Console via # smc & 6. From the Toolboxes menu, select the entry for your system that shows Scope=Files, Policy=TSOL Click Open 7. Add yourself as a normal user From the Navigation bar, select System Configuration, and then double-click the Users icon The login window opens Log in as root Click User Accounts, and then select Add User With Wizard from the Action menu Follow the instructions to add the user Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 163Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Trusted Extensions (cont) 8. After your account is created, double click your user icon to modify settings Open the Trusted Extensions Attributes tab and modify these items: Set the Clearance value to CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED Set the Lock Account After Maximum Failed Logins value to No Set the Idle Time value to Forever Click OK 9. Edit the /etc/user_attr file to append the following to your user entry: ;roles=root (temporary workaround until you have verified that your system is working correctly. At that time, you should configure root as a role) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 164Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Trusted Extensions (cont) 10. Create security templates for the public and internal zones From the Navigation bar, select System Configuration, and then double-click the Computers and Networks icon Click Security Templates, and then choose Add Template from the Action menu Specify the template name as public Set the default label to PUBLIC Set the Domain of Interpretation value to 1 Click OK Choose Add Template from the Action menu Specify the template name as internal Set the default label to CONFIDENTIAL : INTERNAL USER ONLY Set the Domain of Interpretation value to 1 Click OK 11. Manually update the kernel cache with trusted networking parameter values # tnctl -T /etc/security/tsol/tnrhtp 12. Exit the Solaris Management Console Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 165Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Labeled Zones 1. Run the txzonemgr script and follow each of these steps (You must click OK each time to continue) 2. Create a new zone called public Select Create A New Zone and click OK Specify the zone name of public Choose Select_Label and click OK Choose PUBLIC Choose Install to install the public zone A window opens to show you the progress of the zone installation process Choose Initialize to initialize the public zone Choose Zone_Console to open the zone console window Choose Boot to boot the zone The public zone is rebooted automatically The public zone will reboot again automatically Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 166Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Labeled Zones (cont) 3. From the zone terminal console window, log in as superuser and run the following commands: Run these commands on a Solaris 10 11/06 system: # rm /etc/auto_home_public # netservices limited # svcadm disable auditd # svcadm disable cde-login # exit Run these commands on a Solaris Express system: # rm /etc/auto_home_public # svcadm disable auditd # svcadm disable cde-login # exit Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 167Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Configure Labeled Zones (cont) 4. From txzonemgr, create the internal, needtoknow, and restricted zones Choose Halt to halt the public zone Choose Create_Snapshot to create a snapshot of the public zone Choose Boot to boot the public zone Choose Select Another Zone and click OK Choose Create A New Zone and click OK Name the new zone internal Choose Select_Label and specify a value of CONFIDENTIAL : INTERNAL USE ONLY Choose Clone and select zone/public@snapshot Choose Zone_Console to open the zone console for the new zone Choose Boot to boot the new zone Repeat Steps d-j for the needtoknow and restricted zones, which use labels CONFIDENTIAL : NEED TO KNOW and CONFIDENTIAL : RESTRICTED, respectively Choose Exit to exit the txzonemgr program Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 168Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Example - Install and Use inetmenu 1. Caution - The inetmenu program might be replaced with another utility in the future 2. Become superuser 2. Change to the /opt/tx directory 4. Unzip and install the inetmenu software # gunzip inetmenu-1.9.pkg.gz # pkgadd -d inetmenu-1.9.pkg 5. Apply the Trusted Extensions modifications to inetmenu # cd /; tar xvf /opt/tx/inetmenu-tx.tar 6. Run inetmenu # inetmenu 7. Select the DHCP-NoNIS option Now, your network should be up with PUBLIC as the default label. You can run the txnetmgr command to verify that it is all-zones. Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 169Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Resources http://www.opensolaris.org/os/community/ security/projects/tx/TrustedExtensionsArch.pdf http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/coll/175.12 http://opensolaris.org/os/community/security/ projects/tx/tx-laptop-install/ Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 170Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • JASS / SSTSaturday, May 2, 2009
  • JASS Solaris Security Toolkit Add-on Security tool to harden Solaris Can be automated Free Supported with support contract Solaris > = 8, but probably works < 8 The Solaris Security Toolkit 4.2 documentation is now available at: http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/coll/sstoolkit4.2 You can also find extensive Sun BluePrints articles at: http://www.sun.com/software/security/ blueprints/index.html Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 172Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • JASS Details Understands containers, LDOMS, System controllers, SMF, Secure by Default Backs-up every file before it modifies the file Can automatically undo all changes Can be run to determine the state of a system compared to a secured state Can be run periodically to reset a system to a secured state Been around for a while (i.e tested and well used) Use integrated with some other Sun tools Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 173Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • JASS Installation Get SUNWjass-4.2 (or current version) pkgadd -d . SUNWjass Tools now in /opt/SUNWjass Lots of scripts, each to harden one aspect of the system Put into use via “drivers” Important safety tip - have a root connection to the system before running any driver Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 174Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • JASS Use Look in /opt/SUNWjass/Drivers Find a driver matching your desires Change the driver to meet your requirements Execute the driver via #cd /opt/SUNWjass/bin/ #jass-execute <your>.driver Can undo what was just done #jass-execute -u Consider creating a .driver for each class of system, using jumpstart to create the systems, and using JASS to harden each class of systems Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 175Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Overall Solaris 10 SecuritySaturday, May 2, 2009
  • Secure By Default Shipped in S10 8/07 Default set of SMF services configure default hardened state, local-only operation (ssh only default enabled service) netservices command to broadly change network services status http://www.opensolaris.org/os/community/ security/projects/sbd/ Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 177Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Securing an S10 System Use knowledge from tutorial to secure a general purpose portable system See the security Sun Blueprints: http:// www.sun.com/blueprints See especially the Solaris 10 Benchmark published by the Center for Internet Security: http://www.cisecurity.org/ bench_solaris.html From Glen Brunette blog http://blogs.sun.com/ gbrunett/category/Solaris+10+Security See also Clingan’s approach at http:// blogs.sun.com/jclingan/?entry=securing_my_x2100 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 178Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Solaris Security Toolkit Solaris Security Toolkit at http://www.sun.com/ software/security/jass/ Tool that can automate system security changes For Solaris 8, 9, 10 Supported if you have a Solaris support contract Download the tool and a patch to update for latest Solaris 10 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 179Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Settings - 1 Consider automating much of this with SST / JASS Disable ssh - now no services % pfexec svcadm disable ssh % svcs ssh STATE STIME FMRI disabled 21:30:12 svc:/network/ssh:default Enable ipfilter Uncomment or add the network interfaces to /etc/ipf/pfil.ap Install a firewall configuration (next slide) into /etc/ipf/ipf.conf Enable firewalling et al Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 180Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Settings - 2 # # ipf.conf # # IP Filter rules to be loaded during startup # # See ipf(4) manpage for more information on # IP Filter rules syntax. pass out quick all keep state keep frags # Drop all NETBIOS traffic but dont log it. block in quick from any to any port = 137 #netbios-ns block in quick from any to any port = 138 #netbios-dgm block in quick from any to any port = 139 #netbios-ssn # Allow incoming IKE/IPsec pass in quick proto udp from any to any port = ike pass in quick proto udp from any to any port = 4500 pass in proto esp from any to any # Allow ping # pass in quick proto icmp from any to any icmp-type echo # Allow routing info # pass in quick proto udp from any to port = route # pass in quick proto icmp from any to any icmp-type 9 # routeradvert # pass in quick proto igmp from any to any # Block and log everything else that comes in block in log all block in from any to 255.255.255.255 block in from any to 127.0.0.1/32 Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 181Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Settings - 3 Change the default crypt algorithm in /etc/security/policy.conf % cat /etc/security/policy.conf CRYPT_DEFAULT=md5 Enable core dump notifications and store them in protected directory: # coreadm global core file pattern: /var/core/core_%n_%f_%u_%g_%t_%p global core file content: default init core file pattern: core init core file content: default global core dumps: enabled per-process core dumps: disabled global setid core dumps: enabled per-process setid core dumps: disabled global core dump logging: enabled Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 182Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Settings - 4 Set the following parameters, create log files, disable login on serial ports # grep "noexec_user_stack" /etc/system set noexec_user_stack = 1 set noexec_user_stack_log = 1 # grep nfs_portmon /etc/system set nfssrv:nfs_portmon = 1 # grep TCP_STRONG_ISS= /etc/default/inetinit TCP_STRONG_ISS=2 # ls -l /var/adm/loginlog -rw------- 1 root sys 0 Sep 3 21:16 /var/adm/loginlog # ls -l /var/adm/debug -rw------- 1 root sys 0 Sep 3 21:16 /var/adm/debug # pmadm -d -p zsmon -s ttya # pmadm -d -p zsmon -s ttyb Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 183Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Settings - 5 Change system banners to warn away unauthorized users Change roots home directory, convert root to be a Solaris role, and assigned the rights to assume root to only my local account: $ getent passwd root root:x:0:0:Super-User:/root:/sbin/sh $ grep "^root:" /etc/user_attr root::::type=role;[...] $ roles root (Have a look in /etc/user_attr to determine if other users have privileges / roles that they shouldn’t.) Enable and configured Solaris auditing and BART for activity monitoring Also secure BIOS and GRUB Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 184Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Security Settings - Audit Check /etc/user_attr et al for security holes Does the system have zones / containers? Audit each of those Does the system have LDOMS? Audit each of those Does the system have a service processor, ILOM, ALOM? Audit each of those Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 185Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Solaris Security Benchmark Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 186Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Solaris Security Benchmark Published by Center for Internet Security (CIS) Document describing recommended security steps Appendix describing more advanced security steps Tool to test Solaris system and give it a security score (i.e. the “benchmark”) Note other benchmarks for other OSes http://www.cisecurity.org/bench_solaris.html Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 187Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Yet Another Security Tool Checklist #2 - Use before trying a new tool Do I already have a better tool? Is it multi-platform or one-off? Does it work, or just cause more work? Is it kept up-to-date? Does it change too-often (causing more work)? How much does it cost? Do I already know it or is it at least easy to learn? Is it likely to break or break something? (Go back to checklist #1.) Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 188Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • First Steps For Solaris 10 11/06 and 8/07, the best starting place is CIS_Solaris_Benchmark_v4.0 Benchmark document containing recommendations Appendix with an overview of Solaris 10 security controls Input from many security experts For each recommendation information about what hardware platforms it pertains to if it is the OS default if the change applies to zones or just the global zone if the Solaris Security Toolkit can be used to make the change Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 189Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 190Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 191Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 192Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Odds and Ends ZFS “dataset” is hidden from the global zone - be sure to check each zone for data New install cluster – reduced networking software group – SUNWCrnet Takes ~ 160MB Provides good core for minimal networked Solaris Use pkgrm to remove packages to avoid them being patched (sendmail et al) More details at http://www.securitydocs.com/ pdf/2644.PDF Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 193Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Lab Try these changes in your container What else should be done to secure a system? Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 194Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Conclusions Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 195Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Conclusions Lots of new security features in Solaris 10 Zones possibly most powerful for admins Privileges most powerful for system software Moves to become more industry-compatible ipfilter Kerberos NIS to LDAP Powerful new APIs Solaris Crypto Framework Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 196Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • Conclusions - 2 SMF allows fine grain service control, debugging Still use security best practices (host lockdown, good passwords, etc) Not new, but be sure sendmail is preventing relaying http://www.sun.com/bigadmin/features/ articles/config_sendmail.html Trusted Extensions complex, powerful, evolving Secure by default mode makes our lives easier Other interesting features not covered here Smart Card API SASL Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 197Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • References Sun Security Home Page http://www.sun.com/security Solaris Patches & Finger Print Database http://sunsolve.sun.com/ Sun Security Coordination Team http://sunsolve.sun.com/security Sun BluePrints for Security http://www.sun.com/blueprints Developing a Security Policy Trust Modelling for Security Arch. Development Building Secure n-Tier Environments How Hackers Do It: Tricks, Tips and Techniques Solaris OE Security http://www.sun.com/solaris http://www.sun.com/security/jass Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 198Saturday, May 2, 2009
  • References Trusted Solaris OE http://www.sun.com/solaris/trustedsolaris Java Security http://java.sun.com/security Network and Security Products http://www.sun.com/servers/entry/checkpoint http://www.sun.com/networking http://docs.sun.com Solaris 10 collection Sun security blogs portal: http://blogs.sun.com/security/ category/general Privilege Bracketing in Solaris 10 http://www.sun.com/blueprints/0406/819-6320.pdf Some slides copyright Sun Microsystems, all rights reserved Copyright 2009 Peter Baer Galvin - All Rights Reserved 199Saturday, May 2, 2009