WILL REDD+« ONLY SUCCEED IF IT RESPECTSINDIGENOUS RIGHTS »?rights-based and performance-based approachesfor Bolivia and Peru Deborah Delgado-Pugley UCL Louvain – EHESS Paris
Introduction• Indigenous peoples have struggled hard to achieve recognition for community-based management of forests.• We will focus on the political obstacles they find, arising from competition over rights & access to resources, and over the benefits from forests, (including REDD incentives).• Claims for forests and forestlands may involve: Wealthy farmers & agribusiness agents b. Displaced peasants c. Business consortia (logging, mining) d. The expansion of protected areas. On the top of these competing actors and claims, both countries have large, state-supported infrastructure projects.
Analysing strategies of competing actors onthe groundAmbitious reforms on governance for the Amazon Basin are still insecure.Useful to analyse strategies displayed by actors on the ground related to IPs orcommunity rights :1. What are the strategies of competing interest groups to undermine existing indigenous rights?2. How will third parties try to take advantage of communities who have gained rights?3. What are the most effective available strategies for indigenous peoples to defend and continue to deepen rights granted to them by national regimes? (including the right to participate in opportunities such as REDD+) (adapted from Larson, 2011)
Structure of the presentation• Brief overview of the legal framework on Indigenous Peoples rights in Peru and Bolivia (Rights to land and FPIC).• Analysis of the current political processes that engages Indigenous Peoples rights and REDD, (employing questions identified by Larson et al 2011) for Bolivian and Peruvian cases.• Draw out some practical lessons, for both a rights-based and performance-based approach to REDD in national contexts.
Indigenous peoples rights to landBolivia Peru1990s: Series of executive decrees 1979: The Constitution recognizedrecognizing areas as under indigenous indigenous land rights as inalienable,control and possession. unmortgageable, and imprescriptible.1996: National Agrarian Reform Service 1993: Current Constitution represents aLaw. Serious obstacles. 5.4 million step backward on this issue making themhectares of indigenous land entitled. subject to being bought and sold. 2009: AIOC (Autonomias indigenas 2009: Intention to weaken the legaloriginario campesinas [Indigenous framwork lead to IPs mobilizationoriginary peasant autonomies]) is (Bagua)recognized in the Constitution.
Free Prior Informed ConsentBolivia Peru• Ratified ILO (1992) • Ratified ILO 107 and, ILO 169 (1994)• Evo Morales administration (MAS) • Peruvian law on FPIC was one of the actively promoted the approval of first strong measures adopted by the UNDRIP at the UN General Assembly. new government (in power since• Bolivia is the first country to August 2011). incorporate this UNDRIP in its Constitution. Law on Consultation and its reglament are designed (August 2011-March 2012). TheFPIC is now a constitutional right, but Congress has to vote them. All peasantindigenous peoples are still waiting for and indigenous national organizations (6)specific regulations to enforce it. have presented their objections and reserves on both texts.
Bolivia in REDD at a glance• First country to host a large forest carbon project for voluntary markets: the Noel Kempf Mercado in Santa Cruz.• Receives direct support from the UN-REDD Programme. The 4th policy board (Nairobi, March 2010) approved $4.7M for Bolivia.• First working plan (2010 – 2013). Bolivia’s international position on REDD (against market schemes) and the TIPNIS conflict caused significant delay in the project start up.• Bolivia is not part of the FCPF or FIP.• COP17 Bolivia presented its approach regarding integral and sustainable management of forests as a non-market alternative.
Bolivia’s position on UNFCCC COP16in Cancun “The text replaces binding mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions with voluntary pledges that are wholly insufficient. These pledges contradict the stated goal of capping the rise in temperature at 2C, guiding us instead to a rise of over 4C or more. ” Pablo Solon – Bolivian Ambassador to the UN• Bolivia organized critical social gatherings as the First ‘Peoples World Conference on Climate and the Rights of Mother Earth’ after Copenhagen talks (April 2010).
Peru in REDD at a glance• Part of FIP and receives indirect support from the UN-REDD.• Part of the FCPF since 2008. FCPF Policy Committee positively assessed Peruvian R-PP during its 8th PC (March, 2011). IDB will probably accompany Peru as a Delivery Partner as soon as the PC adopts the Common Approach to environmental and social safeguards for multiple delivery partners (Oslo, June 2011) and once a Transfer Agreement between World Bank & the Delivery Partner is signed.• Peru has ‘pilot projects’ ongoing on indigenous peoples’ land: Community attitudes to REDD+ range from expectation to suspicion.
Bolivian contradictions: The TIPNIS Case• Both a protected area and an indigenous territory• Entitled to three indigenous peoples: moxeños, yuracarés and tsimanes D.S. Nº 22610, 1990; ‘Titulo Ejecutorial’ TCO-1997 for 1.236296,3317 Has.• Identified as one pilot project for Bolivian UN-REDD GIZ (Germany).
2 main drivers of deforestation:1. Growing deforestation in the south of the protected area because of agriculture (coca leaf production). Increasing pressure on land from new settlers.1. Projected road by the core zone of the protected area. Bank loan approved in 2010 by the BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank). 3 años después 195.792 ha de la construcción Deforestadas
[The road project]• Very high probability of important impacts in the environment and livelihoods for the population (core zone of the park directly affected).• No public information on the project (key-in-hand).• A way open for new coca leaf production settlements (rumours of land allocations ‘lotizacion’ as already underway).• No FPIC and…Evo Morales declarations (June 2011)
June 1990 1st Indigenous March for the Territory and Dignity15 August 20118th Indigenous March for thelife, indigenous rights and theenvironment follows the same path.
What are the strategies of competing interest groupsto undermine existing indigenous rights?From competing social actors in the TIPNIS case:• Strengthen of a peasant-indigenous ‘syndicate’ inside the TIPNIS territory (Conisur- Indigenous Council of the South, a group representing 12 of the 69 indigenous communities from the TIPNIS).• Organization of a contested ‘Counter-marche’ with support of the State: Pro-road march is led by Conisur.
Strategies of competing interest groups toundermine existing indigenous rightsFrom the State in the TIPNIS case:1. Attempts at ex post and biased consultation processes to Indigenous Peoples (Law Nº 222) - without a national regulation on FPIC. - Intending to include in the consultation populations who are not part of the IPs entitled to the territory (cf. Conisur). - On a context of direct intervention in the territories by Ministers and the President himself in exchange for consent for the road development, widely documented by national media.
« El presidente Evo Morales empezó ayer a honrar suscompromisos con el Consejo Indígena del Sur (Conisur). »LA RAZON (Oromomo – March 2012)
From the State:2. Interfering in co-administration of the protected area and the right of gathering in the territory: A: Regional and national authorities of SERNAP werechanged arbitrarily. Productive projects have been blocked(wood and tourism concessions as well as communitymanagement of fauna). B: Militarization of the territory: “The army is setting up camps within communities” C: Limited access to transport inside the territory (Commercialization of petroleum derivate is controlled; IP organization is not allowed to buy fuel, because of anti-drug trafficking policies).3. Excluding progressively lowland IP (CIDOB members) from decision-making on the allocation of resources from the ‘Indigenous Fund’ (for indigenous and peasant communities).4. Undermining the CIDOB alliance by negotiating other regional vindications case-by-case.
‘Climate change, the Green Fund and REDD’ (Act of negotiations 23th October 2011)The government says no to REDD, but it has received money for REDD programs. What is demanded by CIDOB is to know to which activities this funding will be allocated for. We, Indigenous peoples, as owners of most of the forests of the country, have claimed to know on what we will work. “ Dilfredo Moreno, enlace técnico de la CIDOB-REDDDemand:"We demand that the government recognizes our right to receive direct• )retributions (payments) in compensation for the mitigation of greenhouse gasesemission that our territories ensure (environmental services)."Agreement:1. The Government and the IP agree to enforce the agreements of the World Conferenceof Peoples held in Tiquipaya in April 2010 through a common agreement.2. Based on the agreed Plan, build programs and concrete projects that strengthen thecapacity of the indigenous communities for the management of their forests and toensure that the benefits meet the social needs of communities in indigenous territories.3. Socialize existing documents of the National Strategy for Forest and Climate Change,CIDOB proposals and other existing initiatives.”
Effective strategies for Indigenous peoples todefend and deepen rights 1. Building on ILO 169 and UNDRIP. Assembly (February 13th -15th) to evaluate the regulation of the Peruvian law on Consultation (N°29785). 4 of 6 finally asked for ‘amendements’ of the law arguing that it had articles that were against ILO 169. 2. Strengthening supra communal - regional organisations and building autonomous indigenous REDD committees. Regional organizations in Peru have agreed not to sign REDD+ contracts until IP’ and local communities’ rights are guaranteed, due processes for FPIC are agreed and the nature of REDD+ projects and programmes have been clearly defined.
Effective strategies for Indigenous peoples todefend and deepen rights3. Mobilisation seeking for solidarity among the nationalsociety: The impact on public opinion proves to be crucial. A new mobilization is programed for the 22th April, although in harder conditions, as the government starts breaking alliances among indigenous organizations.
4. Acting in different political arenas UNFCCC COP 17 (Durban) Press Conference CONAMAQ, CIDOB, COICAVIII March. Negotiationwith State representatives(Puerto San Borja – Bolivia)
Reinforcing rights through performance?Phase 1 The development of strategies or action plans, policies and measures andcapacity building (the readiness phase)Phase 2 The implementation of these strategies or plans, policies and measures thatcould involve further capacity building and technology transfer;Phase 3 Results-based actions that are measured reported and verified.• Opportunity-cost calculations and result-based approach defined as emission reductions is dominant on REDD proposals.• In order to to address drivers of deforestation and degradation finance would need to catalyse the structural change in forest governance: policy and legal reform and long-term strategic planning.• Performance-based: measure and directly pay for ‘co-benefinits’ as core- benefits that result in reversing forest cover & carbon loss.
Some lessons• As the Bolivian case shows, governments can act against Constitutions that recently represented their biggest political achievement; confronting them to important segments of society that brought them to power.• As Governments don’t put in practice legal principles, this contentious space continues to be insufficient: confrontations, which aren’t free of violence, still the way to get claims heard.• Development imperatives undermines IP rights: Constitutions specifically let the central governments override indigenous and tribal land titles (Roldan Ortiga, 2004); as well as co- management of protected (TIPNIS co management contract 1.8).
Some lessonsHow does REDD places itself in this context?• In both cases there is a lack of national debate / public information on REDD.• REDD is setting up incentives that increase the value of a contested asset leading to conflict.• Procedural issues and expectations with no contract: Opening of misunderstandings and competition.• Pushing for improvements in governance?