Models of Civil Protection and Their Italian Applications
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Models of Civil Protection and Their Italian Applications






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Models of Civil Protection and Their Italian Applications Models of Civil Protection and Their Italian Applications Presentation Transcript

  • Models of Civil Protection: The Italian Case Modelli di Protezione Civile: Il Caso Italia David Alexander University College London
  • Caveat lector: this 2010 publication is based on self-assessment.
  • The theoretical stuff (la roba teorica)
  • VulnerabilityHazard An asset is not vulnerable unless it is threatened by something A hazard is not hazardous unless it threatens something RISK Extreme events Elements at risk Resilience Exposure
  • Organisational systems: management Social systems: behaviour Natural systems: function Technical systems: malfunction VulnerabilityHazard Resilience
  • Emergency isolation The Phases of Disaster
  • needs to be shortenedneeds to be lengthened preparation for the next event warning and evacuation recovery and reconstruction repair of basic services emergency management and rescue isolation impact needs to be strengthenedRisk reduction and disaster mitigation
  • Armed aggression on the part of states Civil defence Natural disasters Civil protection "Homeland security" (civil defence) Armed aggression on the part of groups of dissidents "Generic" disasters "Civil contingencies" (resilience)
  • Civil defence Hazard Vulnerability Threat Exposure Risk Response Mitigation Protection Civil protection
  • Civil Defence Civil Protection Instability threats Enhanced natural hazards Complex hazards Natural hazards Evolving strategic situation Large technological hazards Evolving climate change 'Na-tech' (hybrid) hazards Major geophysical events
  • Civil contingencies Resilience management The risk environment Business continuity Civil protection Civil defence
  • DRR Knowledge of community vulerability Knowledge of hazards and their impacts Knowledge of coping capacity and resilience Disaster Risk Reduction
  • • civilian vs military command structure • command function principle versus support function principle • centrism versus devolution. Some dilemmas
  • Disaster risk reduction Incident management Population (community) protection Plans, procedures, protocols Human and material resources Hazard forecasting, monitoring, etc.
  • Broader scope and outcomes Changing objectives of emergency management Civil Protection Disaster Management Resilience Civil Contingencies Management Disaster Risk Reduction
  • Hierarchical divisions National, regional, local, etc. Geographical divisions Catchments, jurisdictions, areas, etc.Organisational divisions Police, Ambulance, Fire, etc. Functional divisions Government, healthcare, commerce, etc. Division and integration
  • Organised Spontaneous Established Kinship groups Individual citizens Disaster subcultures Emergent groups Citizens' organisations Charitable NGOs Some public stakeholders in disaster response Schools Workplace groups
  • Governance: democratic participation in decision making Livelihoods: diversity and security Hazards and risks: disaster preparedness RESILIENCE: managing risks adapting to change securing resources Uncertain future: long-term trends climate change capacity to adapt
  • Organisation Resources Self-organisation Imposed organisation Volunteerism Community disaster planning Laws, protocols, directives Standards, norms, guidelines Community resources Governmental resources Donations International resources
  • Military Civilian Armed Civil administration forces Volunteers (civil society) Emergency services (army) [residual role] Civil defence Civil protection Command and control Co-ordination and co-operation Chain of command Autonomy
  • Locus of control Locus of collaboration (support) Tension of opposites Command function principle Support function principle Spectrum of alternatives
  • Harmonisation from above (national or regional levels) Organisation and growth from below (local level: municipalities, volunteers, etc.) Central control Devolution
  • The natural tendency from above subordinate control repress restrict The less than natural tendency from above harmonise negotiate support accommodate act autonomously empower enable liberate The natural tendency from below conform cede comply submit The less than natural tendency from below The pressures of devolution and centrism
  • Global Supernational National National Regional Local Disaster relief as a barter market for resources DONATE REQUEST ALLOCATE DEMAND
  • Local incident Local response A Threshold of local capacity Small regional incident Co-ordinated local response B Threshold of intermunicipal capacity Major regional incident Intermunicipal and regional response B Threshold of regional capacity National disaster Intermunicipal, regional and national response C Threshold of national capacity International catastrophe Ditto, with more international assistance C
  • Around Italy in 80 disasters (giro d'Italia in 80 disastri)
  • Earthquakes: • Belice Valley, Sicily, 1968 • Friuli, NE Italy, 1976 • Irpinia-Basilicata, S. Italy, 1980 • Umbria-Marche, central Italy, 1997 Floods: • River Arno, 1966 (Florence), 1991-3 • Versilia, W. Tuscany, 1996 Landslides: • Valtellina landslide dam, N. Italy, 1987 • Sarno, Campania, S. Central Italy, 1998 Industrial hazards: • Seveso dioxin incident, Lombardy, 1976
  • Forgotten disasters: • Balvano 1944: world's worst rail disaster • dam collapse and mudflow at Val di Stava, Lombardy, 1985: 264 dead • etc., etc.
  • The death of Alfredino Rampi in a well at Vermicino, 1981: the "emotional birth" of modern Italian civil protection Molise 2002 earthquake collapse of a school: 26 children killed.
  • In Italy 60,000 schools are attended by 6.6 million children: 18,000 of the schools (30%) are located in the country's main seismic areas. Avaliable funds are insufficient for a complete retrofit.
  • 70% of population lives in seismically active areas, 40% in the 2965 municipalities subject to moderate and high seismicity. 13.8% of homes are anti-seismic (but 35.3% of those in the main seismic zones).
  • There are now an estimated 10,000 cars in the city centre of Florence Florence floods, 4-5 November 1966
  • Somma-Vesuvius Portici (pop. 80,000) 1631 pyroclastic flow
  • Few areas of the world have such complex and intractable volcanic problems.
  • Etna: population on flanks 700,000 In 1993-4 lava flowed for 431 days.
  • Some emergency preparedness lessons: • emergency planning is limited by physical, cultural and conceptual constraints • a major eruption of Vesuvius would instantly be a national and European emergency • the relationship between prediction and warning is absolutely critical here, especially with regard to timing • the relationship between reference scenario and response is critical: wrong scenario equals inefficient response.
  • The practical stuff (la roba pratica)
  • What is welfare? The provision of care to a minimum acceptable standard to people who are unable adequately to look after themselves. But we also need to focus on what welfare is NOT...
  • Analysis • registered • archived • forgotten • ignored Vulnerability maintained. - • utilised • adopted • learned Disaster risk reduced + Lessons Past events The process of disaster risk reduction (DRR)
  • • magnitude 6.3, duration 25 seconds • acceleration on hard rock 0.3g, on soft sediments 0.7-1.0g • part of an earthquake swarm that has lasted many months • the first earthquake with epicentre very near a major urban centre in Italy since 1915. The L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009
  • • 308 deaths • 1,500 injuries: 202 serious, 550 moderate, 750 light • 67,000 homeless survivors • 100,000 buildings seriously damaged • 16 towns devastated, 33 damaged. Impact of the L'Aquila earthquake
  • • c.21,000 people in tents for summer months, April-September 2009 • c. 22,000 people in hotels, some far away from L'Aquila • rapid construction of transitional accommodation for 65% of survivors. Government policy on shelter
  • • 4,600 apartments in 184 buildings on 19 sites • €280,607 per apartment (€3,875 per square meter of living space). C.A.S.E. - Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili
  • • €1,427 per base isolator @40 per bldg.
  • C.A.S.E. at Assergi - built on an unstabilised asbestos dump.
  • Lack of wastewater treatment facilities.
  • • standard prefabs without base isolation • 54 sites, half of them in L'Aquila city • 8,500 people accommodated. M.A.P. - Moduli abitativi provvisori
  • • social fragmentation leads to depression, isolation and marginalisation • total lack of services and transportation • induced dependence on private transport without infrastructure improvement • exclusion of single person 'families'. Problems with CASE and MAP sites
  • • stagnation of reconstruction through lack of funds and planning • political paralysis and intimidation by central government • massive rise in unemployment • local inflation, especially of house rents • loss of basic services. Problems with L'Aquila recovery policy
  • The L'Aquila recovery process is driven by short-term political expediency, leading to the repetition of ancient policy errors, particularly lack of democratic governance
  • Organisation Resources Self-organisation Imposed organisation Volunteerism Community disaster planning Laws, protocols, directives Standards, norms, guidelines Community resources Governmental resources Donations International resources
  • Earth- quake Political response National Regional Local Permanent reconstruction Bad (functional problems) Good (functionality maintained) Elections Public image of politicians Amelioration Political impact on reconstruction Suff- ering Reco- veryTransitional housing and settlement
  • Without participatory governance, disasters can open a Pandora's box of irrational, debatable, deleterious, noxious and arbitrary consequences.
  • Public participation in decision making Government paternalism Inclusive outcomes Social exclusion Discontent Satisfaction Discontent ...or...
  • The orthodox approach: emergency response begins at the local level. The Italian approach: in L'Aquila local administration was swept aside and remained paralysed for a long time.
  • The Italian approach: overwhelming force, regardless of cost. The orthodox approach: response should be proportional to the size of the emergency.
  • The Italian approach: there isn't one. The orthodox approach: emergencies need an incident command structure.
  • The Italian approach: either supply it all from Rome or abandon the local forces to their own devices. The orthodox approach: local self-sufficiency and autonomous decision making must be encouraged.
  • The Italian approach: mind-boggling sums of money have been spent on transitional settlement, and so far very few funds have been allotted to reconstruction. The orthodox approach: transitional settle- ment should not impede reconstruction.
  • The Italian approach: in L'Aquila no thought whatsoever was given to this problem and the result is a high incidence of socio-psychological pathologies among the survivors. The orthodox approach: in transitional settlement the social fabric should be preserved.
  • The Italian approach: the guidelines are incomplete and out of date, and the training has been foisted onto the regional governments without providing any harmonising criteria. The orthodox approach: guidelines, standards and norms should be issued to ensure integrated disaster response and training.
  • The Italian approach: in less than a decade 600 ordinances have authorised the expenditure of more than €10 billion, some of that on projects that had nothing to do with emergencies and were not really useful at all. The orthodox approach: emergency measures should be used when normal measures cannot be.
  • The Italian approach: disasters open a Pandora's box of bad practice. The orthodox approach: disasters lead to improvements in safety and security.
  • The Italian approach: three municipalities out of 8,104 have taken this to heart. The UN's Making Cities Resilient initiative has only one Italian signatory - Venice. The orthodox approach: disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a comprehensive process of creating resilience.
  • • 1980s Pastorelli era - aid to Irpinia • 1990s Barberi era - aid to Albania • 2000s Bertolaso era - misuse of ordinances • Zamberletti era - a remarkable interlude. Scandals:-
  • Conclusions
  • When the next disaster occurs... • firemen and military personnel will be in short supply • volunteers will be better trained and equipped than ever before • there are now trained emergency planners and managers • there is a national civil protection system Will that be sufficient?
  • Paramilitary forces (National Guard) Military forces Police forces Fire brigades Public administrations Civilian volunteer forces PMF MF FB PA CVF PF Italy PMF MF FB PA CVF PF UK CVF PMF MF FB PA PF USA
  • • Italian civil protection is democratic and well-organised at the local level. • Much is known about hazards in Italy - so it ought to be, as they are the most dangerous in Europe. • Despite the plethora of courses (1000 in Lombardy region alone), there is little effective training in emergency planning and management and no adequate standards exist. Conclusions
  • • Disasters are excellent opportunities for corruption and theft of public money, largely because surveillance of, and controls upon, expenditure are relaxed. • The concept of personal responsibility is not part of the civil protection culture. • Italian civil protection responds to a logic of political short-termism. Conclusions
  • The development of a viable civil protection system in Italy has been impelled (rather selectively) by certain key disasters, but the system is incomplete and its maturity varies considerably from one jurisdiction to another at all levels. Great improvements have been achieved in the professionalism of emergency planners and responders, but in a major event it is not clear whether this would compensate for the reduction in forces.
  • • separation of civil protection from single ministries and its attachment to the national Cabinet (Council of Ministers): non-binding EC national-level directive • fusion of domestic civil protection and international humanitarian work: EC CP/ECHO Directorate. Italian gifts to European civil protection
  • The recent Italian experiences of disaster illustrate the importance of creating a locally-based emergency management system and of involving the population in the creation of resilience.
  • The Italian civil protection is sophisticated, well-developed and based on proper democratic principles. Through the voluntary sector and growth of local structures, headed by elected mayors, it is well placed to tackle the main challenge of the 20th century in civil protection: the involvement of the general population in the maintenance of its own security.
  • 2009->: Neoliberalism or more assistentialism? Vote garnering versus economic stringency. 1908: Liberalism - the state is not a big source of disaster relief 1980: Assistentialism - the state is a major source of largesse.