SIP Trunking & Security in an Enterprise Network

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    SIP Trunking & Security in an Enterprise Network - Presentation Transcript

    1. SIP Trunking & Security in an Enterprise Network Dan York, CISSP VOIPSA Best Practices Chair September 17, 2008
    2. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    3. Privacy Availability Compliance Confidence Mobility Cost Avoidance Business Continuity © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    4. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    5. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    6. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    7. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    8. TDM security is relatively simple... PSTN Gateways TDM Switch Physical Voicemail Wiring © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    9. VoIP security is more complex Operating Desktop PSTN E-mail Systems PCs Gateways Systems Network Web Firewalls Switches Servers Standards Voice over PDAs Wireless Instant IP Devices Messaging Directories Internet Databases Physical Voicemail Wiring © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    10. VoIP can be more secure than the PSTN if it is properly deployed. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    11. VoIP Security Concerns
    12. Security concerns in telephony are not new… Image courtesy of the Computer History Museum © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    13. Nor are our attempts to protect against threats… Image courtesy of Mike Sandman – http://www.sandman.com/ © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    14. Security Aspects of IP Telephony Media / Voice Manage TCP/IP Call ment Network Control PSTN Policy © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    15. Media Eavesdropping Degraded Voice Quality Encryption Virtual LANs (VLANs) Packet Filtering © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    16. Signaling Denial of Service Impersonation Toll Fraud Encryption Encrypted Phone Software Proper Programming © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    17. Management Web Interfaces APIs! Phones! Encryption Change Default Passwords! Patches? We don’t need... © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    18. PSTN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    19. Geography © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    20. Internet LAN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    21. SIP Trunking
    22. The Challenge of SIP Trunking PSTN SIP Service Provider Internet IP-PBX LAN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    23. SIP Trunking PSTN SIP Service Provider Carrier Network IP-PBX LAN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    24. The Challenge of SIP Trunking PSTN SIP Service Provider Internet IP-PBX LAN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    25. SIP Trunking - Business Continuity PSTN SIP Service Provider SIP Service Internet Provider IP-PBX LAN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    26. SIP Trunking - Business Continuity PSTN SIP Service Provider SIP Service Internet Provider IP-PBX SIP Service LAN Provider © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    27. Cloud Computing
    28. Geography © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    29. Moving Voice Applications into “the Cloud” Application Platform Internet / WAN IP-PBX LAN PSTN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    30. Moving Telephony into “the Cloud” Hosted “IP-PBX” Internet / WAN Firewall LAN PSTN © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    31. Can you trust “the Cloud” to be there? © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    32. Questions for SIP Trunk Providers or Cloud Computing Platforms? • What kind of availability guarantees / Service Level Agreements (SLAs) does the platform vendor provide? • What kind of geographic redundancy is built into the underlying network? • What kind of network redundancy is built into the underlying network? • What kind of physical redundancy is built into the data centers? • What kind of monitoring does the vendor perform? • What kind of scalability is in the cloud computing platform? • What kind of security, both network and physical, is part of the computing platform? • Finally, what will the vendor do if there is downtime? Will the downtime be reflected in your bill? © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    33. Spam / SPIT
    34. What about SPIT? (“SPam over Internet Telephony”) • What does a traditional telemarketer need? • Makes for great headlines, but not yet a significant threat • Fear is script/tool that: – Iterates through calling SIP addresses: • 111@sip.company.com, 112@sip.company.com, … • Opens an audio stream if call is answered (by person or voicemail) – Steals VoIP credentials and uses account to make calls • Reality is that today such direct connections are generally not allowed • This will change as companies make greater use of SIP trunking and/or directly connect IP-PBX systems to the Internet (and allow incoming calls SPAM from any other IP endpoint) • Until that time, PSTN is de facto firewall © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    35. Resources
    36. What is the Industry Doing to Help? Security Vendors VoIP Vendors “The Sky Is Falling!” “Don’t Worry, Trust Us!” (Buy our products!) (Buy our products!) © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    37. Voice Over IP Security Alliance (VOIPSA) • www.voipsa.org – 100 members from VoIP and security industries • VOIPSEC mailing list – www.voipsa.org/VOIPSEC/ • “Voice of VOIPSA” Blog – www.voipsa.org/blog • Blue Box: The VoIP Security Podcast – www.blueboxpodcast.com • VoIP Security Threat Taxonomy • Best Practices Project underway now Security Research Market and Social Classification Best Practices Outreach Objectives and Taxonomy of for VoIP Communication Constraints Security Threats Security of Findings Security System Testing LEGEND Published Active Now Ongoing © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    38. www.voipsa.org/Resources/tools.php © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    39. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    40. Tools, tools, tools... • UDP Flooder • Asteroid • IAX Flooder • enumIAX • IAX Enumerator • iWar • ohrwurm RTP Fuzzer • StegRTP • RTP Flooder • VoiPong • INVITE Flooder • Web Interface for SIP Trace • AuthTool • SIPScan • BYE Teardown • SIPCrack • Redirect Poison • SiVuS • Registration Hijacker • SIPVicious Tool Suite • Registration Eraser • SIPBomber • RTP InsertSound • SIPsak • RTP MixSound • SIP bot • SPITTER © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    41. Security Links • VoIP Security Alliance - http://www.voipsa.org/ – Threat Taxonomy - http://www.voipsa.org/Activities/taxonomy.php – VOIPSEC email list - http://www.voipsa.org/VOIPSEC/ – Weblog - http://www.voipsa.org/blog/ – Security Tools list - http://www.voipsa.org/Resources/tools.php – Blue Box: The VoIP Security Podcast - http://www.blueboxpodcast.com • NIST SP800-58, “Security Considerations for VoIP Systems” – http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-58/SP800-58-final.pdf • Network Security Tools – http://sectools.org/ • Hacking Exposed VoIP site and tools – http://www.hackingvoip.com/ © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    42. VoIP can be more secure than the PSTN if it is properly deployed. © 2008 VOIPSA and Owners as Marked
    43. Q&eh? www.voipsa.org Dan York - dyork@voxeo.com

    + Dan YorkDan York, 9 months ago

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