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    Interpolique Interpolique Presentation Transcript

    • Interpolique(Or, The Only Good Defense Is Through A Brutal Offense)
      Dan Kaminsky
    • Announcement
      This is my new company. Woot.
      Recursion productizes significant research
      It’s time to do things a little differently
      This talk isn’t a sales pitch for Recursion, but it’s an idea regarding its philosophy
    • A Story
      Design flaw in SSL
      The server thought it was resuming, the client thought it was connecting
      Project Mogul spawned to fix it
      Several months in deep secrecy
      Thousands of hours spent on IETF fix
      The fix broke <1% of servers
      No big deal, right?
    • Reality
      “Note that to benefit from the fix for CVE-2009-3555 added in nss-3.12.6, Firefox 3.6 users will need to set their security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation preference to true. In Mandriva the default setting is false due to problems with some common sites.” – Mandriva Patch Notes
      They thought knocking out a few sites was acceptable for a remediation
      They were wrong
    • The Bad News
      We give bad advice
      Pen testers are very good at breaking things
      Our “remediation” advice tends towards myopia
      We consider only our own engineering requirements
      We assume tools are static, and bash the craftsman
    • The Good News
      We are the keys to there actually being good advice
      We are the one community that actually knows how things break
      We hold the knowledge to end the bugs we keep seeing
    • Session Management
    • A Simple Question
      When I log into two SSH servers, do I need to worry about one accessing the other?
      When I log into two web sites, do I need to worry about one accessing the other?
      Because SSH does not have totally broken session management
    • Simple Things, Simply Broken
      The web was never designed to have authenticated resources
      Auth was bolted on (because Basic/Digest never got fixed)
      Normal Mechanism For Managing Credentials
      Password causes Set-Cookie
      Cookie sent with each query to target domain
      Cookie is sent even with requests caused by third party domains
      User’s credentials are mixed with attacker’s URL
      This is why most XSS/XSRF attacks are dangerous
      Cross Site Scripting and Cross Site Request Forgery wouldn’t be nearly the big deal they are if they didn’t work cross site
    • The Pen Tester Reaction:DEV, DO MORE WORK
      XSRF Tokens
      Manually add a token to every authenticated URL
      Requires touching everything in a web app that generates a URL
      How’s that working out for us?
      This seems to be a lot of work
      If/when we come back six months later, it’s not usually done, is it?
    • A Modest Proposal
      Couldn’t the tools be better?
      The big debate: Should SVGs animate?
      Unsaid: Shouldn’t it be possible to easily log into a web site without other sites being able to use your creds?
    • An Attempt
      A fix that requires no change to the browser is better
      So I tried to find one
      Server Side Referrer Checking
      Client Side Referrer Checking
      Window.Name Checking
      Window.SessionStorage Checking
      It says SessionStorage! Surely it’s perfect for Session Management!
      They all failed
      Thank you Cstone, Kuza55, Amit Klein, David Ross, SirDarckcat
    • When Failure Is Success:Our Problem With Latency
      My suggested defenses were defeated early in development
      We, as a community, have a latency problem
      We don’t break during development
      We don’t break at release
      We don’t break when early adopters are deploying
      We break only when it gets really popular
      By then, it’s in customer hands, and the best we can do is give the customers really expensive advice on how to fix it
      We need to close the feedback loop
    • At Minimum
      Whatever’s going on with other defenses, I want mine to be thoroughly, even brutally audited as soon as possible
      Life is too short to back broken code!
      Session Management will require modifications to the browser
      Something else might not…
    • On Languages
      "The bottom-line is that there just isn't a large measurable difference in the security postures from language to language or framework to framework -- specifically Microsoft ASP Classic, Microsoft .NET, Java, Cold Fusion, PHP, and Perl. Sure in theory one might be significantly more secure than the others, but when deployed on the Web it's just not the case.” --Jeremiah Grossman, CTO, White Hat Security (a guy who has audited a lot of web applications)
      Question: Why aren’t the type safe languages safer against web attack than the type unsafe languages?
    • We Aren’t Actually Using Them
      Reality of web development
      HTML and JavaScript and CSS and XML and SQL and PHP and C# and…
      “On the web, every time you sneeze, you’re writing in a new language”
      How do we communicate across all these languages?
      And how type safe are strings?
      Not at all
    • All Injections Are Type Bugs
      select count(*) from foo where x=‘x' or '1'='1';
      The C#/PHP/Java/Ruby sender thinks there’s a string there.
      The SQL receiver thinks there’s a string, a concatenator, another string, and comparator, and another string there.
      The challenge: Maintaining type safety across language boundaries
    • Isn’t This A Solved Problem?
      Parameterized Queries?
    • No Escape
      $conn->query(“select * from foo where x=“$foo”;”);
      Is this secure or not?
      Who knows, depends on whether $foo has been escaped between when it first came in on the wire, and when it’s being passed into the DB
      This simple line of code is expensive to debug!
      If somebody removes the escape(), the code still works
      “Fails open”
    • Accidental Escape
      What does it mean to escape?
      “Block Evil Characters”
      Was very easy to determine evil characters when we just had ASCII
      Only 256 possible bytes
      Unicode changes that
      Millions of characters
      All of which could mutate (“best fit match”) into one another
      All of which have multiple possible encodings, and representations within encodings
      Escaping works by accident, without a solid contract
      Keeps getting updated
      escape(), escapeURI(), escapeURIComponent()
    • What About Parameterized Queries?
      Which would you rather write?
      $r = $m->query(“SELECT * from foo where fname=‘$fname’ and lname=‘$lname’ and address=‘$address’ and city=‘$city’”);
      $p->prepare(“SELECT * from foo where fname=‘$fname’ and lname=‘$lname’ and address=‘$address’ and city=‘$city’”);$p->set(1, $fname);$p->set(2, $lname);$p->set(3, $address);$p->set(4, $city);$r = $m->queryPrepared($p);
    • Reality of Parameterized Queries
      No developer has ever written a parameterized query without a gun to his head
      We should know
      We hold the gun
    • Positional Generation Isn’t Any Better (c/o Mike Samuel)
    • O(n) UI Work Fails(Best Case Eye Tracking)
    • How Injections Happen /How Devs Like To Write Code
      String Interpolation: select count(*) from foo where x=‘$_GET[“foo”]';
      String Concatenation:“select count(*) from foo where x=”“ +$_GET[“foo”]+ “”;”;
      Why they write code this way
      Devs are thinking inline
      They want to be writing inline
      See: Fitts’ Law
    • Is It Possible…
      …to let devs write inline code, without exposing the resultant strings to injections?
      Yes – by making String Interpolation smarter
      RETAIN: The language still sees the boundary between the environment(“select * from…”) and the variable ($_GET…).
      TRANSLATE: Given that metadata, the language can do smarter things than just slap unprocessed strings together
      (This overlaps with, and extends, Mike Samuel’s excellent “Secure String Interpolation” work, seen at http://tinyurl.com/2lbrdy.)
      Working with Mike
    • Interpolique Demo [0]
    • Interpolique Demo[1]
    • Interpolique Demo[3]
    • Interpolique Demo[4]
    • Interpolique Demo[5]
      Submit if($_POST[action] == "add"){ $conn->query(eval(b('insert into posts values(^^_POST[author] , ^^_POST[content] );‘)));}
      Return$r = $conn->query("select * from posts");while($row = $r->fetch_assoc()) { echo eval(sb('data: ^^row[author] ^^row[content]<br>n‘)); }
    • What’s Going On
      Language interpolators are blind – they just push strings into strings
      So we write custom interpolators – the dev puts in what he wants, the compiler sees what it needs
    • What To Interpolate Into
      Parameterized Queries are an obvious target
      Programmer writes:select * from table where fname=^^fname and country=^^country and x=^^x;
      Interpolique expands:$statement = $conn->prepare("select * from table where fname=? and country=? and x=? ");$statement->bind_param("s", $fname);$statement->bind_param("s", $country);$statement->bind_param("s", $x);
    • Could do escapes…
      …but no faith they actually work correctly
    • Base64: Escaping Done Right
      Programmer writes:select * from table where fname=^^fname and country=^^country and x=^^x;
      Interpolique expands:select * from table where fname=b64d("VEhJUyBJUyBUSEUgU1RPUlkgQUxMIEFCT1VUIEhPVyBNWSBMSUZFIEdPVCBUVVJORUQgVVBTSURFIERPV04=") and country=b64d("d2Fzc3Nzc3Nzc3Nzc3Nzc3NzdXA=") and x=b64d("eXl5eXk=") ;
    • Why This Works
      Type safe going into b64d() function
      That’s never getting interpreted as anything but a string
      Type safe coming out of b64d() function
      B64d() cast to return a string
      Not a subquery, not a conditional, not anything other than a string
      B64d() a MySQL UDF that’s already written, has no apparent time penalty, will be released with Interpolique
      Most other databases already have B64 support
      In a pinch, could use MySQL hex/unhex
    • Two Modes Of Base64
      Late binding
      Interpolation inserts the Base64 handler
      Text is plain until right before it crosses the frontend/backend layer
      SQL looks like this:select * from foo where x=^^foo;
      Early Binding
      Base64 the variable as soon as it comes in off the HTTP request
      SQL looks like this:select * from foo where x=b64d($foo);
      Pen testers: If somebody fails to escape $foo, everything still works. If somebody fails to Base64 Encode $foo, everything breaks immediately
    • Static Analysis
      You know what’s better than having a static analyzer?
    • Ahem
      Not needing a static analyzer
    • Base64 In The Other Direction
      <span id=3520750 b64text="Zm9v">___</span><script>do_decode(3520750)</script>
      Create a SPAN with a random ID and a dynamic attribute that contains its base64’d content
      Call do_decode with that ID, which can now look up the element in O(1) time
      Use this construction to retain streamability
      Thank/Blame CP for this
    • DOM Interaction: Simple
      Push to textContent
      ob = document.getElementById(id); ob.textContent = Base64.decode(ob.getAttribute("b64text"));
      We never go through the browser HTML parser
    • DOM Interaction: Complex
      Push to appropriate createElements
      ob = document.getElementById(id); raw = Base64.decode(ob.getAttribute("b64text")); safeParse(raw, ob);
      HTMLParser(src, { start: function( tag, attrs, unary ) { … if(tag == "i" || tag == "b" || tag == "img" || tag == "a"){ el = document.createElement(tag); …Basic idea is to have a simple HTML parser that extracts what it can, creates elements according to whitelisted rules, and importantly, never goes through the browser HTML parser
      See also: “Blueprint”, a system that moves all DOM generation to JS
    • Important Note
      Security Is Quantized
      There’s a set of elements that can be safely exposed
      There’s a set that can’t
      The game is to expose only those tags and attributes that don’t expand to arbitrary JS
      Either you have prevented wishing for more wishes, or you have not
      (We see this from the webmail attack surface)
    • How This Works
      Primary Mechanism: Eval
      Yes, there’s risk here, and yes we’re going to talk about that risk – we need this for scoping reasons
      Programmer written query: select * from table where fname=^^fname and country=^^country and x=^^x;.
      To Eval: return ("select * from table where fname=b64d("" . base64_encode($fname) . "") and country=b64d("" . base64_encode($country) . "") and x=b64d("" . base64_encode($x) . "") ;");
      Eval Out: select * from table where fname=b64d("VEhJUyBJUyBUSEUgU1RPUlkgQUxMIEFCT1VUIEhPVyBNWSBMSUZFIEdPVCBUVVJORUQgVVBTSURFIERPV04=") and country=b64d("d2Fzc3Nzc3Nzc3Nzc3Nzc3NzdXA=") and x=b64d("eXl5eXk=")
    • Can We Operate Without Eval?
      No Eval in Java or C#
      One approach: Combine variable argument functions with string subclass tagging
      public bwrap w = new bwrap();w.s(w.c("select * from foo where x="), argument1, w.c("and y="), argument2);
      If you forget to mark the safe code, it breaks
      Another approach:
      w.code(“select * from foo where x=“).data(argument1).code(“and y=“).data(argument2).toString()
      Similar to LINQ etc. but actually works for arbitary grammars
      If you mismark code as data, or vice versa, it breaks
      Both actually implemented! (Tiny HOPE Announce)
    • The Status Quo
      We see this doesn’t work:
      String s = “select * from foo where x = ”“ + escape(s) + “”;”;
      By doesn’t work: It is too similar to this:String s = “select * from foo where x = ”“ + s + “”;”;
      Devs mess this up, but the code works anyway
      As a matter of principle, devs will do enough work to make the code function
      If it works, it should work securely
      If it isn’t working securely, it shouldn’t be working at all
      The trick is to not make it easier to get around the security, than it is to do things right
    • Why Custom Interpolators Are Hard: The Ancient Scope War
      Lexical Scope: Scope Known At Compile Time
      Variables are “pushed” into child scopes
      Dynamic Scope: Scope Determined At Run Time
      Variables are “pulled” by child scopes
      Lexical scope has won, and has systematically removed methods that allow any code to access variables not explicitly pushed in
      This makes it rather difficult to write a function that sees ^^variable and thus deferences that variable
      There are silly “superclass” or “parent” modifiers in some languages, but they’re all special case
      In Java and C#, they went so far as to leave local variables unnamed on the stack, so you couldn’t just hop into previous stack frames and dereference from there!
    • To be clear
      Yes, there is risk to eval, and we’ll be talking about it
      Yes, there are very nice and very good reasons for lexical scope to be the default state
      The fact that the vast majority of programming languages, type safe or not, are repeatedly found to expose injection flaws is a direct sign that something is wrong
      Put simply, language design needs to be informed by the bloody findings of pen testers
      It is informed by performance engineers
      It is informed by usability engineers
      Memory safety didn’t come from security engineers, it came from reliability engineers
      I think we need a way to write functions that execute in present scope
    • Yes, this means
      (LISP) (WAS) (RIGHT)
      (((THEY ( HAD A POINT ( HERE ))))
      Crazy theory
      JavaScript has been successful because it’s been able to mutate to absorb almost any language construct
      “More dialects of JavaScript than Chinese”
    • Risks
      There are three things that can go wrong with any defensive technology
      It doesn’t work
      None of this mealy mouthed, “well, it depends on what your threat model is”
      Either it does what it says, or it doesn’t!
      It doesn’t work in the field
      Security: It is too easy to screw up
      It has side effects
      Fails other first class engineering requirements (too slow, unstable, hard to deploy, etc)
      I am looking for destructive analysis on these techniques, and will accept criticism on any of the above fronts
      Here is what I know so far
    • The Handlers Appear Relatively Solid
      No known SQL Injection bypasses for Base64 into a b64d() function
      Using a fast base64 decode – could be flaws here
      Could be databases that don’t type-lock return values
      No known flaws when putting arbitrary text into a span.textContent field
      Well, except it doesn’t work in IE  Will port to its wonky DOM
      Most testing is in Firefox -- Could be problems in Chrome/Safari, Opera, etc.
      No known flaws when creating arbitrary DOM elements and populating them, rather than pushing HTML
      IE6 is apparently slow at this
      Need to enumerate the full set of tags which are safe to put into HTML
    • Eval Adds Some Risk
      Don’t buy that a PHP server is safer if it isn’t running eval
      Month of PHP Bugs = PHP not safe against any arbitrary PHP, eval or not
      Eval in this context can make programmer errors more severe
      Correct: eval(b(“select * from foo where x=‘^^x’”));
      Incorrect: eval(b(“select * from foo where x = ‘$x’;”));
      Before we had SQLi. Now we potentially have front end code execution!
      This is why it’s now ^^foo instead of $!foo
    • Managing Risk Of Eval
      b() can be smarter
      It can be aware of strings that break out of string-returner
      It can be aware of SQL grammar, to the point that in order to write a right hand variable, it must be ^^’d
      Select * from foo where x=^^x and y=safe(1);
      It can even be self-auditing – in PHP, it can use debug_backtrace() to find the line that called it, and validate that that line doesn’t have an unsafe language deref
    • What Only Sort Of Works
      “Requiring” Single Quotes
      In some languages, ‘$foo’ doesn’t interpolate, while “$foo” does
      So, the thinking is, require eval(b(‘$foo’))
      This is a policy that cannot be enforced by present compilers or languages (both ‘$foo’ and “$foo” turn into a string in the parse tree)
      Could be enforced by a preprocessor
      At large shops, significantimprovements in security are won by blocking otherwise legal expressions as a coding policy
      Not convinced that smaller shops can/should absorb
    • Performance
      Eval is slower than compiled code
      Translating strings could be a major pain point in some languages
      Easy to cache the translation (because we retain the boundary, accessing the normalized query form is trivial)
      Could potentially parameterize/accelerate more, because it’s suddenly easy for the framework to autorecognize repeated queries
      Base64 is fast
      Slight bandwidth increase, but nothing compared to URLEncoding
    • Anything Else?
      I don’t know.
      Hope: There’s about two months till Black Hat. Lets find out!
      This isn’t a recommendation yet
      Clearly what we are doing right now is not working
      Lets find out the best things we can do with the present languages
      Lets find out what we’d want from future languages
      It’s time we got involved in the discussion of what software looks like