1
Chapter One – Historic Preservation: An Alternative to Urban Renewal Policy Stimulates
Revitalization in Milwaukee’s Third Ward
Fighting freeways, reclaiming old neighborhoods, and preserving historic
buildings were all activities that expressed a new ethic, a new aesthetic, a new way of
looking at urban life. After decades of neglect, Milwaukeeans began to value their city
again, to rediscover the nooks and crannies, quirks and qualities that had always made
the community unique.1
On my only previous visit to Milwaukee 20 years ago, I left with an overall impression
of a rather downtrodden Midwest city suffering, like Detroit, from the downturn in
American manufacturing plants. Last summer[,] I returned to find that the brick
warehouses along an oily river had been transformed into trendy restaurants, with
alfresco dining along a new [R]iverwalk of brick and stone. The downtown galleries,
shops, museums[,] and free concerts reminded me more of a mini-Chicago than a
factory town turned to rust.2
Urban renewal, a federally-adopted program in the United States, primarily began
in the 1940s as the attention paid to urban cores decreased, and especially with the rise of
suburbs. Historians call the Housing Act of 1949 the beginning of urban renewal policy
in the U.S. because it funded the demolition of urban slums for new, tax-generating
residential developments. The Housing Act of 1949 “contained a ‘predominantly
residential’ requirement, mandating that funds spent under the act be concentrated on
housing rather than office buildings or redevelopment plazas.”3 Following the 1949 act,
political debate grew over whether redevelopment or public housing was the best way to
achieve urban renewal. Redevelopment, a way to revive residential slums and blighted
commercial areas, “was essentially designed to eliminate slums, and provide for
consequent re-use of cleared land with predominantly residential, yet limited commercial
emphasis.”4 This means that economically-declining urban areas, mostly slums, were
destroyed and rebuilt with better, high quality housing structures that sold at higher
prices, as well as commercial or business developments that could reap profit for the area

2
and increase tax bases so long as that area was aesthetically improved to attract interested
investors. Public housing, however, “was designed to provide low-rent dwellings for
low-income families exclusively, and was [not] intended to alleviate the economic
problems besetting inner cities.”5
Over time, urban renewal in the U.S. primarily focused on redevelopment to
achieve economic revitalization of urban cores. But urban renewal was also a
controversial topic as it often resulted in urban sprawl, the demolition of large areas of
cities, and the construction of freeway and housing projects. For example, “[t]he value of
the Third Ward land purely for parking purposes was overwhelmingly clear throughout
the fifties and can be attested to by the acres of parking still present along the lakefront.”6
Urban renewal may have helped to transform and revitalize some U.S. cities, but this
often came at high costs to communities and neighborhoods, even the destruction of
rundown areas. Since national leaders have reevaluated the costs and effects of this
country’s earlier urban renewal policies, renewal has taken on a much different role as it
focuses less on destruction and more on renovation and reinvestment. This chapter will
show how urban renewal was a topic of debate that gradually evolved from its earliest
forms into a more moderate approach, helped by the preservation movement.
Milwaukee’s Urban Renewal Program Gives Way to Human Renewal
In the 1950s, Milwaukee’s Common Council was unsure of the best approach to
urban renewal – public housing versus redevelopment. Public housing had been the
federal government’s focus as far back as the Housing Act of 1934 that created the
Federal Housing Authority. Fifteen years later, the Housing Act of 1949 also directed
federal funds toward housing, rather than commercial or office redevelopment; this act

3
continued the federal government’s long-accepted application of public housing to help
economically-distressed urban areas. But those in favor of redevelopment were making a
case. Redevelopment was geared toward the elimination of slums through the re-use of
land that emphasized residential as well as commercial uses.7
Feeling pressure from businesses and real estate developers to consider the
economic effects of federally-sponsored and subsidized inner-city redevelopment,
Milwaukee’s Common Council felt it had to act soon to settle the public housing versus
redevelopment debate. Inner-city alderman in the council felt the heat to act on behalf of
the areas they represented. For example, as renewal projects progressed many aldermen
were forced to deal with matters of residential displacement and relocation and possible
reimbursement to those residents who were forced to relocate. As displacement occurred,
some aldermen saw their base of political support decrease because their constituencies
were forced to relocate throughout the city, meaning the effects of declining
neighborhoods were affecting aldermen’s political careers.8
To complicate matters, the legal definitions of redevelopment were becoming
ambiguous, and the federal government became concerned that urban renewal policy
should become a unified set of directives and objectives for the nation. In the late-1950s,
Milwaukee’s declining tax base became the major concern for the Common Council, and
this issue was influential in changing opinions in the council to support redevelopment
plans. However, many aldermen believed that this would mean more public housing,
which is housing owned by the government and rented at low prices to those in need. To
those aldermen, the city did not need more public housing, especially because

4
Milwaukee’s outer wards refused to accept relocation housing or support new public
housing that resulted from the many city-sponsored urban renewal projects.9
Milwaukee’s Common Council became concerned about whether or not
Milwaukee could, in fact, develop a long-term, “workable” plan for redevelopment with
its own resources.10 A workable plan might need assistance from the state level. Mayor
Frank Zeidler with the help of Wisconsin State senator Henry Maier took action and
began lobbying the State legislature to consider changing the “statutes to allow for the
creation of an independent [Redevelopment] Authority,…which would be solely
concerned with the implementation of redevelopment projects in the city.”11 As a result of
the lobbying, Governor Vernon Thompson convened a special session of legislature in
June 1958. This special session debated urban renewal legislation that would allow for
the creation of urban authorities, “vested with the power to condemn slum clearance
project lands without a jury verdict of necessity as required by the state constitution.”12
The special session also targeted the matter of eminent domain – property owner
rights versus the need for city governments to engage in redevelopment for the
betterment of their entire cities. Eminent domain was an urban renewal instrument to
reclaim private property for civic projects; this issue is another reason why urban renewal
has been approached with such criticism and debate. The issue of eminent domain
stemmed from the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court case Berman vs. Parker. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the “general welfare” powers of Congress authorized eminent
domain to “remedy [slum] conditions injurious to health, safety, and morals.”13 In June
1958, Wisconsin passed redevelopment legislation in Madison. This new legislation led
to Milwaukee’s Common Council passing a resolution “pursuant to the new legislative

5
directives” that declared the need for “blight elimination, slum clearance[,] and urban
renewal projects” (the debate of eminent domain, however, continued into 1960).14 “The
new law established that the [m]ayor…should give due consideration to the general
interest [of those affected by] a redevelopment, slum clearance[,] or urban renewal
program[,]” particularly those to be relocated.15
The new Redevelopment Authority was established under Mayor Frank Zeidler as
a seven-member board appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the Common Council.
The authority acted as the City’s agent in redevelopment, and it worked cooperatively
between public and private interests. Because it worked between both interests, questions
eventually arose over its true role in Milwaukee’s political arena. The authority was one
of three independent citizen boards (Housing Authority, Redevelopment Authority, and
Planning Commission) that businesses looked to in the 1950s as an agent to sponsor plans
for inner-city revitalization because it was an independent corporation established by the
State legislature, operable “outside of normal [local] government channels.”16 This was
important because Zeidler had a rather uncooperative relationship with Milwaukee’s
business community.17
Under Milwaukee’s new resolution that created the Redevelopment Authority, the
mayor recommended members for the authority; however, he had to negotiate his
appointments through the Common Council. Daniel C. McCarthy wrote,
Not only this, but the law allowed the [c]ouncil to appoint up to two of its
members to the [seven-]member board. The tradition of Milwaukee’s
‘weak mayor’ system allowed the [c]ouncil to flex its political muscles.
Mayor Zeidler[,] therefore[,] faced the immediate task of finding suitable
appointees, who would be confirmed by the [c]ouncil, yet who would also
represent the broad spectrum of interests outlined in the legislative
directive [– members from the general public, labor, industry, finance or
business groups, and civic organizations].18

6
Unfortunately, the general public usually had limited knowledge of redevelopment
processes, so it was often excluded. A continued lack of community involvement was a
growing problem for Milwaukee’s future; through the tense decades of the 1950s to the
1970s, Milwaukee leaders repeatedly failed to properly consider public opinion regarding
the City’s redevelopment matters. Zeidler firmly believed that Milwaukee needed an
urban renewal program, but he had to satisfy both the Common Council and the business
community to effectively bring change; however, his relationship with the business
community was difficult. When it came to appointing representatives to the authority, he
had to make concessions to the Common Council and the business community. He had
to work closely with the council in getting the Redevelopment Authority passed, and the
council had to confirm the mayor’s appointments to the authority. At the same time, he
was aware of the vital role the city’s business community played in redevelopment, so he
had to satisfy the business leaders and improve his relationship with them. The business
community knew it needed an ally to gain approval for its agenda for city redevelopment.
“Initially unable to strike a viable dialogue with the [m]ayor, the business
community…set about aligning itself with certain powerful interests in the Common
Council[,]” which controlled the Redevelopment Authority and, ultimately, the City’s
redevelopment agenda.19 As a result, Zeidler’s first appointees to the Redevelopment
Authority represented his predicament in satisfying both parties; all of his appointees
were connected to council or corporate interests.20
The beginning for the Redevelopment Authority in city matters was slow at first;
in fact, the authority accomplished little between 1958 and 1961. For the first two years,
it was held back by battles in the Wisconsin Supreme Court over whether the authority

7
could exercise eminent domain. In addition, the authority lacked a full staff, and there
was much confusion over its purpose. A Common Council that was still uncertain about
redevelopment programs also kept it in check. Confusion over urban renewal at the
national level fueled council uncertainty. The Common Council believed that federal
involvement in the local political arena, particularly in matters of urban renewal, would
usurp its power over city affairs. In 1958, the council learned that the federal government
threatened to withdraw funds for urban renewal projects, which caused the City to skip
ahead in its plans in order to “create the appropriate bureaucracy to satisfy federal
requirements” and to continue receiving aid.21 The concern over the city’s declining tax
base kept the Common Council on board, at least. Council suspicions intensified when
Richard Perrin, director of the Housing Authority, declared in April 1958 that not all
buildings in the Second Ward, or East Side A, renewal project area were blighted. This
caused the council to question renewal. The Third Ward renewal project area was the
subject of scrutiny and political debate, so news about the blighted buildings in East Side
A puzzled a Common Council that was already quizzical over renewal’s benefits. As a
result, an increased chasm formed between Mayor Zeidler and Common Council
members.22
Maier became Milwaukee’s mayor in 1960, and he served until 1988. He
believed that the City’s prior and existing urban renewal programs lacked local direction,
so his new administration focused on renewal. But urban renewal still lacked direction
from the federal government. In fact, federal guidelines for urban renewal kept changing.
As the federal government began changing its area of emphasis from slum clearance and
public housing to urban economic rehabilitation and tax base revitalization in 1961,

8
Maier preached the positive effects of urban renewal to Milwaukeeans so that they would
willingly support his future programs aimed at redevelopment.23 According to Maier, a
critical problem holding back Milwaukee’s urban renewal program was a dispute
between the City Planning Commission and the Redevelopment Authority over which
one would be the primary planning agency to run urban renewal programs.24 This is why
the mayor “concerned himself with coordinating the various [C]ity departments involved
with planning and development” almost immediately after he was sworn into office.25
Maier combined the Housing and Redevelopment Authorities with the Planning
Commission and the Office of Economic Development into one Department of
Community Development (DCD) in 1961, and appointed Richard Perrin (confirmed by
the Common Council) as the first leader of the DCD.26
Maier believed that only one planning agency was necessary. Maier’s previous
six years in the State Senate gave him experience with urban renewal’s political
framework.27 Because the creation of a consolidated DCD meant the removal of other
director positions, it also strengthened Maier’s political control of urban issues.28 Of
course, Maier’s critics claimed the mayor was attempting to control city government
through the DCD.29 Since a chief executive appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the
Common Council guided the DCD, Maier was able to effectively push the new
department to work cooperatively with the local business community, and Milwaukee’s
business community, in turn, actively supported the new department.30 By trying to
reverse Zeidler’s conflictive relationship with the business community, Maier sent a
message to business leaders that he was willing to cooperate. In doing so, businesses

9
began to take an active interest in downtown redevelopment, which was key to Maier’s
program.31
“After [the DCD] was formed the guidelines for a Community Renewal Program
[CRP] were created in order to bring more federal dollars into Milwaukee.”32 The CRP
was a change in local planning policy within Maier’s administration, but it was not a new
concept. The CRP was added to the federal redevelopment statute in 1959, “as a specific
response to planning difficulties that had arisen in the early years of the renewal
program.”33 The ultimate goal of the CRP was to introduce large scale renewal projects.
In fact, Milwaukee was one of the first cities in the U.S. to complete its CRP in 1964,
“but thereafter, it was marred by continual conflict between federal and local authorities,
as well as by conflict between local neighborhoods and [the DCD].”34 The CRP plan
called for citizen participation and a strategy for beautification to end Milwaukee’s
blight. This program was the DCD’s agent to provide fresh insight into the city’s
problems, needs, goals, and resources, especially as urban renewal was changing. At this
time, neighborhood conservation and land clearance were the major strategies to achieve
renewal. “Conservation was designed to halt the decline of…sound but deteriorating
neighborhoods, in order to reverse the trend before clearance was necessary.
Clearance…was designed to totally clear a [designated] area to provide new and modern
improvements.”35 Some of the CRP’s strategies “were systematic blight elimination at a
rate sufficient to catch [up] with and stay ahead of spreading blight, eliminating the worst
housing conditions in the city, containing or ringing the areas with the most blight, and
increasing citizen participation.”36 A 1964 CRP planning report indicated that 50 percent
of Milwaukee’s total population lived in areas with a high proportion of substandard

10
housing, and it called for the razing of 4,170 dilapidated houses. The DCD supported the
CRP’s $30 million plan.37
Milwaukee residents did not eagerly welcome the CRP plan because they feared
the effects of urban removal. For example, Kilbourntown-3 and Midtown Projects were
the first major CRP projects, which were adjacent to one another and separated the inner-
city from the near west side. Both projects resulted in demolition and clearance between
1964 and 1971, when the government ordered a halt in further acquisitions. Every
building but one in the 104-acre Kilbourn-3 clearance project area was scheduled for
demolition. The Midtown Project, which covered the area west of 27th Street between
State and Vliet Streets, was the first in Milwaukee to seek a balance between
rehabilitating and demolishing buildings, so preservationists hoped that many houses
would be spared. What began as a “conservation” project with most of the area’s
buildings slated for rehabilitation, ended with 1,700 buildings (totaling approximately 50
percent of the area’s structures) demolished. By 1975, only 340 new units had been built
in Midtown.38 But because the federal government sponsored Midtown, “[o]ne of the
problems that had surfaced in the Midtown experience…was that federal regulations
called for specific alterations in the character of the neighborhood, and these changes
offended local advocacy groups.”39 A neighborhood coalition called the Midtown
Neighborhood Association (MNA) sought to preserve the neighborhood’s structures and
to maintain the area’s urban character. Unfortunately for Midtown, the MNA was unable
to accomplish any of these goals during the 1960s and 1970s, thanks, in part, to a lack of
preservation legislation and government-sponsored protection. In 1960, the MNA had
petitioned the City for assistance in maintaining the character of the Midtown

11
neighborhood, but federal regulations required changes to various buildings. This
ultimately compromised the neighborhood’s character, upsetting the MNA members.40
Maier’s interest in eliminating Milwaukee’s blight translated into promoting
redevelopment that involved land clearance.41 Affected neighborhoods stood little chance
of survival in a city with a mayor-business community alliance, especially after the DCD
adopted a controversial urban renewal policy in mid-1964 that called for the razing of
blighted neighborhoods.42 Under Maier, redevelopment projects dominated Milwaukee’s
landscape into the early-1960s – Marquette University Project; Midtown Conservation
Area; Halyard Park District; Kilbourntown’s One, Two, and Three; East Side Juneau
Village Area; and Lower Third Ward.43 “Redevelopment was essentially designed to
eliminate slums, and provide for consequent re-use of cleared land with predominantly
residential, yet limited commercial emphasis.”44
Clearance for expressways also helped to change Milwaukee’s landscape.
Milwaukee’s leaders ordered miles of land and thousands of buildings cleared for
redevelopment and expressway projects in the 1950s and 1960s, but most redevelopment
projects never occurred as piles of rubble and acres of vacant land were left in the wake.
Worse, redevelopment projects displaced thousands in Milwaukee, though the actual
number of displaced is unknown. Maier’s renewal campaign destroyed many of
Milwaukee’s significant buildings, including the Carlton Hotel, the Girl’s Club, and the
David Benjamin House. It is easy to blame the DCD for the failures of redevelopment
projects, but federal support/aid and clearance went hand-in-hand. Since Milwaukee
actively applied for federal funding for urban renewal projects, more buildings were lost.
“Even though thousands of buildings were demolished during the urban renewal era,

12
most of the destruction goes unnoticed today since most of the areas are now parking lots,
high rise apartment buildings, office structures, or parks.”45
The 1960s were a “new Dark Age” for cities, and additional national programs –
New Frontier, Great Society, Economic Development Administration, War on Poverty,
and Model Cities – brought about a period of human renewal in which programs for
rehabilitating human behavior joined those for reconstructing buildings, transportation
facilities, and the urban infrastructure. Largely financed by the federal government’s
War on Poverty program, human renewal attacked issues pertaining to disadvantaged
urbanites with the same confidence that characterized the earlier physical renewal
schemes.46 Eventually, the federal government focused more on social and physical
decay with proposals geared at stimulating investment in depressed cities and
neighborhoods; these proposals began to replace active welfare programs designed to
directly remedy poverty through a redistribution of surplus.47 Furthermore, several bills
(1967) actually gave tax credits and deductions to businesses willing to locate in
depressed inner cities.48
When U.S. cities failed to rebound from decline during the 1960s, U.S. leaders
grew more willing to lend an ear to preservation ideas and tactics. And preservationists
saw in the unresolved urban renewal matters their chance to make a case for preservation
as a way to renew cities. On October 15, 1966, Congress passed the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA), which emphasized a new approach to urban renewal –
preservation.49 Along with the NHPA, the 89th Congress also passed the Department of
Transportation Act, which “directed the [S]ecretary of [T]ransportation to identify and
avoid infringing on parkland, wildlife refuges, and other invaluable resources in

13
developing our national road network[,]”50 and the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act that authorized the Housing and Urban Development
agency to support preservation, something the agency had not previously done.51 The
NHPA, in turn, created the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, which the
National Parks Service (NPS) directed. The NPS, “through its new Office of
Archaeology and Historic Preservation, became the locus for implementation of these
new initiatives.”52 In addition, the NHPA gave financial matching grants for newly-
created historic preservation programs – 50 percent matching grants developed to assist
with statewide surveys to formulate state historic preservation plans, which were a
requirement of the act.53 It called for the Secretary of the Interior to create and expand a
list of properties and structures worth preserving (now called the National Register of
Historic Places) and authorized grants to the states and the National Trust.54 Following
the passage of the act, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall “decided to decentralize
the preservation program under his authority and wrote to the governors of the states and
territories, asking each of them to appoint an individual to carry out the law’s new
responsibilities.”55 Udall’s directive triggered the formation of state historic preservation
officers (SHPO) and offices in every state and in many local areas. The offices became
“the heart of the national preservation program, as embodied in the [NHPA]….”56 As a
result, statewide surveys of historic structures, which had been overlooked when only a
single, national governing body existed, became more focused on local sites and local
histories.57
Preservation was still largely a museum-oriented, volunteer-based movement until
the 1960s as most preservation programs lacked major funding.58 But the NHPA was a

14
milestone in the history of U.S. legislation because it marked a move away from urban
renewal philosophy. Officials had begun to realize the importance of preserving the past
and that preservation was growing as a movement. The National Trust for Historic
Preservation grew in membership, and the NHPA led to massive education efforts about
national landmarks (i.e., literature, workshops, and seminars). When the U.S. celebrated
its Revolutionary Bicentennial in 1976, renewed hope for preserving the historical past
followed, sparking citizen awareness. Officials hoped that by celebrating 200 years in
U.S. history, governments and citizens would gain a respect for preservation.59
The period of human renewal that began in the 1960s spurred a variety of
community programs. It included community development corporations (CDC), which
grew out of the political turmoil and policies of the 1960s as community activists formed
organizations to gain local control over federal, state, and municipal efforts to revitalize
their neighborhoods (about 100 CDCs had been formed in the U.S. by 1970; by 1990,
over 2,200 nonprofit CDCs were involved in housing and economic improvement
activities in cities).60 CDCs were established to help organize associations of
neighborhood merchants, administer loan funds for facade improvements by local
merchants, work with local governments to plant trees and expand parking facilities, and
tackle major commercial projects to redevelop downtowns. Some created industrial
parks to attract new businesses, some created downtown malls, while others directed
employment training to help low-income individuals market themselves to potential
employers. Most CDCs negotiated with powerful private and public institutions to
guarantee that local residents and adjacent communities received a share of the jobs and
business created by high-impact development projects such as sports complexes or

15
convention centers, or by the expansion of university or medical complexes. In the
process, they educated the public about urban issues that affected their neighborhoods,
conducted research on social problems, and lobbied government officials. Their efforts
recognized that revitalizing the intangible asset of community fabric and community
relationships aided in attracting businesses and residents to a certain location, particularly
areas most devastated by urban decline.61 The rise in preservation legislation, officials at
national and state levels, and other initiatives marked the initial move toward a
framework for community organizations such as the Historic Third Ward Association
(HTWA), although it would be another decade before the association would be formed.
The next section describes how HTWA’s eventual formation was the product of both
national and local preservation programs.
The Backlash Against Demolition and the Move Toward Preservation
While the previous section set the stage for preservation, this section shows how
many communities, organizations, and individuals stepped forth to oppose razing.
Preservationists looked to save the country from bulldozers and to preserve its past for
future generations. Many looked around and saw their cities, histories, and cultural
identities lost to failed urban renewal policies. At first, preservationists were seen by
political systems as “pariahs, fighting alone against the federal government and assorted
city powers, with few resources other than a belief in historic buildings and their social
value.”62 But as the preservation movement grew in strength, the federal government
finally heard local residents’ pleas for an end to demolition, and federal urban renewal
programs once again changed. In fact, the destructive era of renewal gradually started
coming to end in the late-1960s and early-1970s because the emphasis of renewal shifted

16
to a more conservative approach as urban conservation replaced urban renewal by the
mid-1970s.63 What was happening elsewhere in the U.S. regarding preservation directly
affected Milwaukee’s Third Ward. Community organizations such as the HTWA formed
as a result of community mobilization. Milwaukee shifted its renewal strategy from
demolition to preservation. And because of the respect that preservation finally received
at the national level, organizations like the HTWA were able to include historic
preservation strategies aimed at economic revitalization.
Many cities across the country were engaging in demolition and clearance plans
in the 1960s. As mentioned before, Milwaukee’s redevelopment campaign cost
thousands of displacement victims their neighborhoods and homes, creating an increased
rift between City Hall and residents, and Milwaukee’s political leaders were criticized.
This became an opportunity to save Milwaukee’s history through the retention of
architecture and smarter land use choices.64 This proactive movement was fueled, in part,
by the understanding that preserving old buildings was practical as well as culturally
enriching. At the same time, a dislike for the architecture of the present, including
shopping malls, commercial strips, high rise apartment complexes, office and industrial
parks, and the federal government’s ambitious highway program bolstered the movement.
Preservationists looked around and saw a lack of character, variety, and purpose in new
buildings.65 Because Milwaukee was relatively conservative in redevelopment matters,
preservationists saved many more buildings compared to other major U.S. cities that
enacted more aggressive urban renewal programs. But Milwaukee also had more
structures worth saving than other cities of its size.66

17
Under Maier’s leadership, renewal projects that had been started under Zeidler,
such as the Hillside community, were pushed to completion during the 1960s. Maier also
encouraged the transformation of sizable sections of Milwaukee, such as clearing land for
the development of Juneau Village, downtown’s first luxury high-rise apartment
complex. Maier also eliminated any nonconforming uses of Marquette University’s
campus and paved the way for the opening of the Haymarket area on the city’s north side
to industrial and commercial redevelopment. Rather than rehabilitate buildings, officials
insisted on reducing every project to rubble and starting again from scratch. But these
projects were only a drop in the bucket; only approximately 250 acres in Milwaukee had
been redeveloped, barely ten percent of the acreage had been cleared for county
expressways.67
The poor planning for Milwaukee’s undeveloped land was beginning to anger
preservationists and Milwaukee residents alike, so much, in fact, that the preservation
movement gained momentum. By the late-1960s, some Milwaukeeans became
convinced that post-WWII developments in the city such as freeways and road systems
had undone much of the city’s historic fabric. As City officials failed to seek input from
the community about renewal, more anger ensued. This led to a conflict between the
City with preservationists on the West side and Sicilians in the Third Ward, who saw
their pink Blessed Virgin of Pompeii Church vanish for freeway expansion. The
overwhelming belief by those opposed to the City’s policies and actions was that urban
renewal translated into urban removal.68 Opponents of renewal began speaking out
against the destruction of the historic fabric of many of the nation’s urban districts. This,
in turn, further fueled the growing preservation movement – “urban renewal drove the

18
preservation movement’s rapid growth. [The more cities adopted urban renewal], the
more preservationists grew in numbers to oppose it.”69
In 1963, the Redevelopment Authority presented its plans for Milwaukee’s
Juneau Village renewal project. Milwaukee’s Redevelopment Authority received more
than $1 million in federal grants to proceed with this project; however the proposed site
included Inbusch Apartments, which housed members of the arts community and was
considered a prime example of historic architecture. Eleanor Bell, one of Milwaukee’s
first preservationists, appeared before the Development Committee and Milwaukee’s
Common Council to save the complex, but it was too late – Richard Perrin,
Commissioner of the Department of Community Development, stated the appeal was too
late because federal grant money had already been allocated. Sensitive to Bell’s request,
Perrin did suggest that a commission be created to protect historically-significant
landmarks in the city. Perrin’s suggestion, in turn, resulted in the formation of the
Milwaukee Landmarks Commission (MLC), which received approval from the Common
Council. Perrin served as head of both the DCD and the MLC, which complicated his
assignment because the two groups failed to cooperative at first, and each worked toward
different goals.70
The preservation community viewed the MLC as a significant contribution to the
preservation of Milwaukee’s historic fabric and to the fight against urban renewal. The
Milwaukee County Historical Society could not guarantee the protection of historic
structures; thus, it needed an ally with more political influence.71 Preservationists hoped
that MLC could exercise political power to protect historic structures. The reality is that
the MLC set standards to determine the buildings that were worth preserving, but it

19
lacked the political backing to maintain the structures, so nothing guaranteed that
buildings would be preserved. Consider, for example, the situation with Milwaukee’s
North Western Railroad Depot. Located at 915 E. Wisconsin Avenue, the depot was
designed in 1889 by Charles Frost of Chicago. Composed of brick and granite, the depot
was considered a fine example of U.S. railroad architecture, and preservationists deemed
it worth preserving. The Milwaukee County Parks Commission acquired the station in
1964 under a federal grant to provide open space for parks along the lakefront and for
expressway development. In 1966, the last train left the depot to make room for a
proposed lakefront expressway. The County Park Superintendent claimed the depot was
unfixable, but Eleanor Bell of Land Ethics, Inc., a preservation group that Bell formed in
1964 to protect the historical and architectural buildings in Wisconsin, claimed it could
be easily fixed. Bell’s group proposed alternatives to save the depot, resulting in a four-
year battle. In 1968, the City’s Building Inspection Department ordered that the structure
be repaired or razed within 30 days. A public hearing was held to support saving the
structure, but few attended. When individuals looked to the MLC to intervene, the sad
reality was that it possessed no power to override such decisions. In fact, the MLC only
held advisory power, which it had already practiced during its four-year battle with the
Superintendent.72
In addition to the depot, the MLC fought the razing of Blessed Virgin of Pompeii
Church in the Third Ward. In February 1967, the congregation asked the MLC to
designate the building as a landmark, hoping to prevent the Expressway Commission
from approving plans to build a freeway through the Italian Third Ward community.
Sensing that little could stop the Expressway Commission, Perrin, director of the MLC,

20
agreed to help relocate the church. “Relocating the church [was a real] concern of the
archdiocese because they did not feel an adequate number of parishioners would stay
with the parish if it were relocated to another site.”73 The pastor at nearby St. Rita’s
offered his parish as a home to the members of Pompeii; however, he may have acted
because the City offered St. Rita’s and the archdiocese $95,540 as a renewal benefit. In
October 1967, Pompeii Church was razed. Making matters worse, the building was
looted before demolition.74 According to Joyce Lynn Knippel,
[MLC]…had all the right ingredients to obtain power, although in reality it
had none. Initially, when the [c]ommission was established the members
were selected to represent prestigious institutions, but during the first five
years, it became evident that the [c]ommission lacked the clout necessary
to influence the future of historically significant structures in Milwaukee.75
Not only did the MLC have to fight to save Milwaukee’s historic structures, but it
had to fight for more power. Maier refused Perrin’s request for a new ordinance that
would give the MLC more power to prevent demolition of historic structures. Maier had
not cooperated with the MLC since its beginning. To show his lack of support for the
MLC, Maier even amended the 1964 ordinance that created the MLC, now requiring all
new MLC members to reside in Milwaukee city limits, which resulted in every member
except one being dismissed and, thereby, reduced the power of the commission. After
Maier caused the MLC to disband when he amended the 1964 ordinance, the mayor then
appointed new members to the commission, often choosing those with limited political
backgrounds. “Maier’s office kept a tight lid on the power of the [c]ommission so as not
to let them interfere with his plans for redevelopment.”76 In fact, many believed that
Maier disliked Perrin on a personal level and that is why the mayor failed to cooperate
with the MLC. When the Common Council passed an ordinance to form a permanent

21
MLC in May 1967, the mayor’s office never even activated the ordinance, which was
viewed as a deliberate move by Maier to avoid recognizing the MLC. During Maier’s
administration, the MLC struggled to have any influence in Milwaukee’s urban renewal
plans, much less protect Milwaukee’s structures from demolition. Maier’s plans for
urban renewal gained a boost when Perrin resigned from positions on both boards in 1971
(MLC and DCD).77 Perrin had served as the leader of the DCD since its creation in 1961;
when he announced his resignation in 1971, Perrin was considered one of the city’s
“most outspoken and powerful department heads.”78 But he was under great pressure to
coordinate the growing redevelopment program in Milwaukee. “Whereas Perrin had
once viewed the federal public housing program…and early urban renewal program…as
beneficial to city development, by 1971 his position had changed”79 because the federal
Model Cities program attempted to incorporate citizen input and community control over
the redevelopment process as new planning mechanisms, which clashed with the
“bureaucratic centralization of planning activities” that Maier had worked toward since
1960.80 William Ryan Drew, former Common Council president, took over for Perrin on
the DCD. Drew worked to improve the ties between the DCD and the Common Council.
His connection with Maier proved to be a link between the mayor and the redevelopment
process in the city.81 Mary Ellen Pagel replaced Perrin on the MLC.
The MLC changed when Perrin resigned in 1971. Members of the MLC began to
identify and promote cultural items in Milwaukee that were tied to past events and
historical locations. The MLC also took another approach by establishing educational
programs consisting of slide shows, art exhibits, and lectures to raise awareness of its
mission and the importance of historic preservation. “The [c]ommissioners knew they

22
had no power to protect buildings from demolition, but they continued to make attempts
to change the ordinance.”82 The commission’s lack of influence was once again
demonstrated when a fight ensued over Northwestern Mutual Life’s (NML) razing of the
Elias Friend House. The MLC believed the house was significant enough for
preservation. NML disagreed, and it sought outside expert architectural opinions. In
fact, NML offered to sell the house for $1 to any person interested in moving the house
for restoration at another site. NML believed this would indicate a true measure of public
support for the building, but no one bought it. The house was razed on September 3,
1974. The MLC did not push the issue further. Rather than save one building, the MLC
simply believed that NML was too strong as a business and that it was more important to
avoid conflict with a major corporation that contributed an enormous tax base and had
members on political boards that influenced Milwaukee’s development.83
A second, similar situation that proved the MLC’s lack of power and influence
involved the Third Ward’s Commission Row buildings (305-346 N. Broadway). The
MLC first proposed the buildings for landmark designation in 1972, “reconsidered again
in 1974 at the request of the Urban Real Design Group, and again in 1975 at the request
of [c]ommission member, Elenaor Bell.”84 The DCD along with district alderman Kevin
O’Connor strongly opposed MLC interference in development matters. O’Connor stated
that the DCD had plans to redevelop the area using federal dollars to either sell the land
to private developers or raze the buildings for a parking structure. The objectives of the
DCD were largely development/profit driven, whereas the MLC sought preservation
work. On May 16, 1975, the MLC again backed down and voted not to designate
Commission Row as a landmark. O’Connor then negotiated with the mayor’s office and

23
the Common Council in December 1975 to amend the MLC ordinance with further
restrictions. With more limits on its power, the MLC could accomplish even less. Like
Perrin before her, Mary Ellen Pagel resigned. The MLC did not nominate any buildings
as landmarks in 1976.85
Pagel’s successor was James Boerner, an architect for the Department of
Buildings and Bridges. William Ryan Drew first appointed Boerner to the MLC in 1974;
Boerner was able to assume leadership of the MLC with Pagel’s resignation. In his
opinion, he was appointed to “redirect the [c]ommission towards governmental
procedures and to work closely with the mayor’s office and the DCD.”86 In 1978, the
Water Tower Trust Landmark Preservation organization went to the MLC with
opposition to the expansion of St. Mary’s Hospital into their neighborhood. The
organization requested an ordinance be passed to protect their area from future
development. The ordinance would restrict “the right of property owners to make
changes on their buildings without the approval of a government body, if the properties
were of historical value.”87 While the ordinance was greeted with much criticism by
Milwaukee’s City departments, Alderman Sandra Hoeh requested that the city attorney’s
office draft Wisconsin State legislation that would allow Milwaukee to write its own law.
In June 1980, the Wisconsin State Legislature passed legislation:
any first class city, as an exercise of zoning and police powers, to protect
by ordinance any place or structure with historic significance or aesthetic
value and that the city could create a [l]andmarks [c]ommission to
designate landmarks and historic districts as needed.88
This legislation paved the way for a new City ordinance that was drafted in December
1980 to include the entire city, rather than creating a new district to protect the Water
Tower area. “[On] June 16, 1981[,] the Common Council repealed Section 2-335 of the

24
Code of Ordinances relating to…[MLC] and replaced it with a new section creating the
new Milwaukee Historic Preservation Commission” (HPC).89 The HPC, consisting of
nine citizens appointed by Milwaukee’s mayor and a small staff provided by the DCD,
was placed in charge of determining the structures, sites, and districts that possessed
architectural, cultural, or historic significance, as well as the properties worth designating
as historic sites.90
Following surveys by the HPC, owners of the historic structures or sites were
required to submit to the HPC for review any proposed changes that could affect the
exterior appearance of the properties; changes had to be consistent with the rest of the
architecture on the buildings and in the area. If approved, a Certificate of
Appropriateness was issued. If the HPC did not approve the proposed changes, a hearing
was scheduled to discuss maintaining the historic integrity of the structures and to reach
an agreement with the owner. Any appeals were directed toward the Common Council,
which could reverse or modify the HPC’s decision by a two-thirds majority vote. The
HPC possessed more power than the MLC since the historic designations given out by
the MLC were simply honorary.91 “[W]hen the new [HPC] ordinance became effective in
1981, all of the buildings which had been nominated by the previous [MLC] were no
longer considered landmarks under the new jurisdiction.”92 The creation of the HPC
pleased the preservation community, which finally had a convincing, politically-backed
voice for change. While the MLC was seen as a failure on many levels, its work in
pinpointing many of the city’s historically-significant buildings for later preservation,
educating the local public about preservation, and raising awareness about the need to
save Milwaukee’s past had lasting effects on future programs.93

25
The creation of the HPC was a victory for the preservation community because
the new group possessed more power that could discourage demolition and
redevelopment in Milwaukee. Maier saw the formation of the HPC as interfering with
his plans for Milwaukee’s redevelopment. He had created Milwaukee’s reputation as a
city that worked carefully and cooperatively with developers (and businesses). He had
formed the DCD in 1961 so he could appoint a commissioner as head of the department
who would be in agreement with his plans. The DCD was designed to handle city
planning, so Maier disliked MLC and HPC interference because they stood in the way of
DCD-organized developments.94
The work of the MLC and its follow-up, the HPC, allowed historic preservation to
grow in popularity and awareness. As cities across the U.S. embarked upon similar
preservation strategies, federal involvement also grew through the 1970s. New federally-
funded organizations formed, and “preservationists began dealing with city edges,
waterfronts, parks, sculpture[s], and street furnishings as well as buildings” through the
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), which had formed in 1965 as a small, federal
agency to preserve this country’s cultural and artistic traditions.95 In addition, many
private preservation groups that focused on specific architectural interests formed, such
as the Victorian Society of America and Friends of Cast Iron Architecture. As these new
groups formed in the U.S., they looked to other countries for guidance and effective
tactics in preservation, uniting preservationists globally. Whether these groups were
formed to preserve whole cities or simply to save specific structures, preservation was
moving forward.96

26
In 1973, Carolyn Stephens, a Milwaukee Downer alumna, formed the Committee
for the Renovation of the Downer Buildings to save the Downer College buildings on the
campus of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM). Built between 1899 and
1913, these buildings represented English Tudor domestic Gothic styles and were
composed of red sandstone and St. Louis pressed brick. UWM purchased the closing
Downer College in 1964 and scheduled demolition for 1973. Composed of private
individuals, Stephens’ committee set out to save Holton, Merrill, Johnston, and Greene
Halls, as well as the Greene Museum. The committee raised $35,000 for repairs of
interior ornamentation, and it worked with various state and local agencies, such as the
State Historical Preservation Board, for preservation of the exteriors. In 1974, the
committee got the buildings accepted on the National Register of Historic Places. In
1977, UWM’s System Board of Regents approved their renovation for $5 million.97
In addition to UWM’s buildings, other local projects were a result of dedicated
independent groups. Preservation groups saved the Pabst Theatre (144 E. Wells Street),
Tivoli Palm Garden (500 W. National Avenue), and the Grain Exchange Room in the
Mackie Building (225 W. Michigan Avenue). The Grain Exchange was, perhaps, the
most significant as it was nationally recognized for its gilded archways, stained glass, and
murals from Edward Townsend Mix’ 1879 design in the Italian Renaissance Revival
Style. The Grain Exchange was originally used when Milwaukee had become the largest
wheat market in the world, but it fell into disrepair in the 1930s when the wheat market
crashed along with the depressed economy.98
As these independent groups began stepping forward, an awareness of local
preservation continued to grow. Let’s See Magazine (1956-1964) added to the local

27
preservation movement when it printed bold statements against urban renewal. Its “Let’s
Save the Pieces” campaign urged Milwaukeeans to stop urban renewal before buildings
were gone, and it suggested the formation of an official archive for architectural art and
ornamentation of buildings. In addition, it called for the photography of all Milwaukee
buildings along with saving their architectural blue-print plans, specifications, and
documents. Richard Perrin, the first director of the MLC, contributed to the early local
preservation movement when he wrote Historic Wisconsin Buildings, A Survey of
Pioneer Architecture, 1835-1870 (1962), which was aimed at preventing further
destruction of state buildings. In April 1964, the Milwaukee Art Center played a role
when it showed “Heritage Milwaukee,” which featured photographs of historic buildings
and their artifacts and blueprints. Walking tour guidebooks by Mary Ellen Young (nee
Pagel) and Virginia Palmer focused on Juneatown, Kilbourntown, and Walker’s Point;
these books published between 1965 and 1973 highlighted the architecture in those areas.
Perrin later wrote Milwaukee Landmarks, An Architectural Heritage[,] 1850-1959
(1968). In addition, H. Russell Zimmerman took over 13,000 slides of historic buildings
in Milwaukee. Basing his follow-up works on these slides, he proceeded to give lectures,
write articles, and publish The Heritage Guidebook, Landmarks and Historical Sites in
Southeastern Wisconsin (1976). Perrin again aided the preservation movement by
writing Milwaukee Landmarks, Revised and Enlarged (1979). Perrin had learned from
his time as city planning commissioner that demolition was not the best strategy for cities
like Milwaukee. Most importantly, more local landmark commissions were authorized,
such as the Milwaukee County Landmarks Commission in 1974 and the Wauwatosa
Landmarks Commission in 1978. Preservation-related groups that were not linked with

28
the State Historical Society’s Historic Preservation Division formed, such as the Bay
View Historical Society in 1979. These paved the way for the HTWA.99
In 1976, the federal government passed the Tax Reform Act, which
balanced the incentives and disincentives of owning depreciable historic
property. In essence, these changes made it economically attractive for a
developer to recycle existing historic building stock rather than demolish it
for reimbursement, which previous tax laws allowed.100
Designed to make it financially-advantageous for owners to preserve buildings, the Tax
Act allowed owners of rehabilitated structures to depreciate the cost basis of the buildings
as if they were new. This permitted the cost of certified rehabilitation to be written off or
amortized over six months, rather than over the entire remaining life of the structure.
Prior to Tax Reform, one could deduct the demolition costs and the remaining
undepreciated basis of the buildings as current expenses, as long as the properties were
not acquired for demolition. But high costs for restoration caused historic preservation to
be slowed until Tax Reform gave developers more profitable incentives and options for
preserving.101 After the legislation, “the demolition[-]related costs had to be added to the
value of the land and offered no benefit until the sale of the property. Thus, the after tax
cost of demolition to the owner of an historic structure was increased.”102 Tax Reform
also imposed penalties for demolition of certified historic structures.103 Finally, the Tax
Act “prompted the secretary of the interior in 1977 to develop the Standards for
Rehabilitating Historic Buildings. These have become the basis for much restoration and
rehabilitation practice around the country.”104
Still, guidelines for tax credit were complicated for investors and the Internal
Revenue Service. In 1981, the Reagan administration passed the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA). In it, the Internal Revenue Code was revised to add a new accelerated

29
cost recovery system, to repeal existing incentives for the rehabilitation of certified
structures, and to substantiate a new three-tiered investment tax credit for rehabilitation.
It also allowed tax credits of 25 percent, plus a 15-year straight line capital cost recovery
period. Unfortunately, few in Milwaukee could find economic advantage with the
ERTA. “[Tax] credits have not been very lucrative in Milwaukee because it is difficult to
locate buildings which are eligible for the certification.”105 Milwaukee buildings cost too
much for investment purposes, since they are in relatively good condition and generally
need little work. To qualify for the ERTA, buildings must be on the National Register of
Historic Places, and they must be contributing structures in an historic district and meet
the Secretary of Interior’s rigid standards, which could discourage investors.106
Because ERTA qualifications could be confusing and discouraging to investors,
owners began to combine tax credits with other types of creative financing to make
projects successful. Milwaukee’s Grand Avenue project is an example of owners and
developers using creative financial packages for a rehabilitation project. In October
1977, the Milwaukee Redevelopment Corporation announced plans to redevelop the
Grand Avenue retail center, using government-funded incentives. Plans involved the
“use of creative incentives and disincentives…arranged by [the DCD].”107 According to
Joyce Lynn Knippel,
[the DCD] prepared the application for the [federal] Urban Development
Action Grant [UDAG], worked on the design of the mall, prepared the Tax
Incremental Financing [TIF], and worked with the Redevelopment
Authority to acquire property for clearance and demolition. [It] also
provided clearance of acquired property, the installation of public
improvements, the construction of parking structures and the public
concourse areas of the mall, and improvements to streets around the
area.108

30
The Grand Avenue project was financed through a combination of private funds,
Milwaukee Redevelopment Corporation funds, historic tax credits, UDAG, and TIF. In
1977, President Carter encouraged the UDAG program to further target slum areas
through low-income developments.109 The State of California first passed a TIF law in
1952. Through the 1960s and 1970s, TIF laws spread throughout the U.S. as a way to
encourage economic development. At Grand Avenue in 1977, TIF allowed the city to
pay “public costs for the retail center with property tax revenues that resulted from the
increased value.”110 Furthermore, Milwaukee’s Theater District on N. Water Street also
used historic tax credits and development incentives in the 1980s. “The financial
package [was] one of the most sophisticated packages ever put together with
commitments from federal, municipal, and private sources.”111
Tax incentives allowed more people to save more structures. By saving more
structures, the local economy was actually helped, reversing the negative trend of urban
renewal. Knippel has stated that
[t]he benefits from rehabilitation have been in the form of increased
property tax bases and revenues, support of the commercial business
segment, the recreation of a community atmosphere, increased use of
utility systems, a feeling of community identity, and pride of ownership.
…Projects contribute to the labor market.112
Because preservation projects are extremely labor-intensive, almost 75 percent of the
project costs go directly to pay for labor, whereas new construction is a 50/50
relationship with half going toward labor and the other half toward construction
materials. Money for rehabilitation projects goes directly into the local economy for
local employment, goods, and services, and to support commerce; in addition,
rehabilitation benefits investors, who might not otherwise be attracted to local areas

31
devoid of rehabilitation because economic gain in such places is difficult to achieve.
“[The] cost of adaptive reuse is [generally] from 30 to 40 percent less than the cost of
new construction.”113 While not every situation is the same in terms of project costs,
adaptive reuse “falls within an overall range less costly than new construction” thanks, in
part, to lower structural and mechanical expenses.114
Preservation Spurs Revitalization, Formation of Historic Third Ward Association
By the 1970s, most cities’ attempts to spur urban redevelopment through
demolition and reconstruction had failed. This caused city leaders to reevaluate their
redevelopment programs. While Mayor Maier had always been devoted to economic
redevelopment, he, too, reevaluated his urban agenda. According to Harry H. Anderson
and Frederick I. Olson in Milwaukee: At the Gathering of the Waters,
[the] major thrust of [Maier’s] economic development program [was]
commercial and industrial expansion and rebuilding to maintain retail
sales and employment levels but also to rebuild such older areas as the
downtown and the Menomonee Valley and to develop the newly[-
]annexed and more lightly[-]settled fringes of the city.115
Activated citizens and business owners at the neighborhood level and community
organization members understood that most city leaders and urban renewal authorities
could never truly revitalize cities; it might have to begin with the neighborhoods
themselves.116 Urban renewal philosophy was changing drastically. City leaders shifted
their tactics and began denouncing large scale clearance, redevelopment, and proposed
superhighways that threatened to slash through cities’ hubs. At the heart of these new
beliefs was the need to encourage public and private reinvestment to give cities new
life.117 To Pamela Plumb in Past Meets Future, “[w]ithout reinvestment, communities
will decay and die, and so will their history.”118 This new approach supported the

32
formation of many community organizations, grassroots action, and a focus on the urban
neighborhood. Some city leaders looked to restoring mass transit systems, which had
been the skeleton of America’s healthy urban body during the early 1900s, with
neighborhoods serving as mass transit’s flesh and blood. Considered a way to
rehabilitate older neighborhoods, the restoration of mass transit received further support
in the 1970s due to issues over fuel and the federal government’s encouragement.119
By the 1970s, Milwaukee’s downtown resembled downtowns across much of the
U.S. where renewal was largely unsuccessful – it became poorer and was sparsely settled,
crime increased, and civic pride was lacking. The downtown area ultimately unraveled
into a dirty urban core. Failed programs pushed away many residents or displaced them.
This often stretched into the neighboring downtown wards. Author Alexander von
Hoffman indicated that many cities across the U.S., including Los Angeles and Boston,
uprooted thousands of residents from their homes during the redevelopment phase of
urban renewal, thus destroying working-class neighborhoods. In the Historic Third
Ward, this happened primarily before the 1970s, with the construction of freeways and
the destruction of vacant, historic buildings.120 Urban renewal’s own blight also created
opportunities for pornographic businesses to move into vacant ward properties. The
invasion by “red light,” pornographic businesses in the Third Ward was the epitome of
urban decline.
In 1976, adult bookstores threatened to creep into the Third Ward to the dismay of
property owners and the few remaining residents. Even a City official suggested
designating the Third Ward as a “red light” district because not many lived in the
“dilapidated warehouse district” and “few people worked there.”121 Fearing the worst for

33
their beloved, historic-natured neighborhood, residents waged a protest against the Third
Ward becoming a “red light” district.122 Ward loyalists kept the area alive by community
action and civic pride –
during the late 1970s, business owners joined together to successfully
combat a proposed ‘red light’ district in the neighborhood. Their
dedication and spirit helped renew interest in the district's potential
commercial viability[,] and entrepreneurs began to renovate the
dilapidated buildings. This, in turn, attracted residents and new types of
businesses.123
A notable community organization, the Historic Third Ward Association (HTWA),
formed in 1976, though the Third Ward would not be “officially” recognized as an
historic area until 1984. In fact, Kathy Baillargeon, former executive director of the
HTWA, stated that one reason for the HTWA’s formation was to prevent the area from
being transformed into such a “red light” district.124 The HTWA is a nonprofit
organization formed by local property owners who realized the ward’s potential as a
gentrified warehouse neighborhood with nineteenth century architecture, available for a
residential component, proximity to hotels, and a strategic location between Lake
Michigan and the Milwaukee River. Perhaps these could springboard the ward from
decline toward revitalization.125
Milwaukee’s HTWA is financially supported mostly by the Business
Improvement District-2 (BID-2), which is an extension of City government; however,
paid membership support (i.e., businesses, friends, and residents) also funds the
association.126 The association formed to help preserve the area’s history and to guide its
economic future through business retention, expansion, and recruitment by working with
residents, developers, leasing agents, and schools (to name a few).127 These other
involved parties also complemented the association’s main objective: “[to strengthen]

34
the commercial activity in the downtown community.”128 This statement shows that the
HTWA, while it had the ward’s best interests in mind, was profit-motivated. In other
words, its success weighed heavily on the economic turnaround of local businesses and
their increased dollars.
To achieve a renewed, economically-improved HTW involved a committed effort
on behalf of the HTWA and various other groups such as Renner Architects, Hunzinger
Construction, and BID-2, as well as local residents, business owners, and politicians. The
HTWA was seen as the engine that could keep revitalization running for this renewal
project. It worked (and continues to work) with neighborhood residents, businesses,
merchants, real estate developers and brokers, community organizations, and civic
leaders to stimulate business activity in the area.129 For example, BID-2 “traditionally
provided the strategic direction and financing for projects in the [w]ard. The
HTWA,…primarily funded by…[the] BID,…provided the horsepower and creative
energy for implementing goals and objectives.”130
When the HTWA formed in 1976, it was intended as a catalyst to transform the
ward into an innovative, livable, exciting neighborhood, while also preserving its historic
character.131 To achieve this, the HTWA documented its objectives:
1. Reinforce and enhance the historic character through renovation.
2. Encourage retail, entertainment, and other activities at the street level
with office and residential use.
3. Foster compatible new developments on vacant sites.
4. Provide public improvements and facilities.
5. Improve the visual and environmental quality of the area.
6. Provide adequate parking space.132
The need to encourage reinvestment was at the root of these objectives, showing that
profit was a significant factor in the preservation-revitalization strategy for the ward.

35
Around the same time as the formation of the HTWA, other major U.S. cities were
experiencing similar circumstances related to decline and were in need of revitalization.
Reinvestment was becoming the aim for many cities. For example, promoting
reinvestment in central business districts, or CBDs, was evidenced by Detroit’s
Renaissance Center, Boston’s Quincy Market, and Baltimore’s waterfront and Charles
Plaza developments – all of which received favorable publicity for the economic
revitalization that was accomplished.133
Third Ward residents had disappeared before the association’s work began, due,
in large part, to Milwaukee’s redevelopment plans, freeway construction, and the
continuing economic decline of central cities. If the local government spared the homes
of families or ethnic groups from demolition or reconstruction, these groups quickly grew
tired of Milwaukee’s renewal plans and sought other neighborhoods, especially as
Milwaukee’s wide scale plans for the future became evident. Many families were left
alone in shattered neighborhoods and sought belonging in other ones. For example, the
Third Ward’s Italian community was divided and displaced.
With displacement, city leaders became concerned over attracting residents back
to older neighborhoods. However, a new group of home-seekers began rediscovering a
taste for city life, which helped relieve questions over who would move into vacant,
revitalized downtown neighborhoods. New urban home-seekers were eclectic groups of
all ages, races, and political loyalties. While affluent residents continued to move to the
suburbs in the late-1970s and into the 1980s, this new group of home-seekers shared an
aversion to the architectural blandness and social homogeneity of most post-WWII
suburbs and a desire for such features as historical authenticity and architectural

36
diversity. With the gradual rebirth of urban neighborhoods, more residents followed.
Milwaukee’s Bay View, Walker’s Point, Brewer’s Hill, and Riverwest became targets for
preservation so that revitalized residential neighborhoods could be established. In these
areas, warehouses and small factories awaited conversion to condominiums, lofts,
galleries, and specialty shops. The Third Ward’s warehouses and small factories were
attractive, as well.134
City officials welcomed this back-to-the-city movement as a possible solution to
the decline of urban areas. Some U.S. cities even took a suburb-in-the-city approach,
which involved taking the conveniences of the suburbs such as shopping, dining, and
residential uses and copying them within distinct urban neighborhoods. The conversion
of older buildings into condos and shops in local areas like the Third Ward supported the
suburb-in-the-city approach because older buildings could be rehabilitated and filled with
modern conveniences without much of the hassle of new construction in sometimes
already-tight city blocks.135
At the same time, lifestyles that had previously supported suburbanization were
changing, which aided the back-to-the-city movement. With the baby boom era over,
younger citizens were marrying later, and many young couples remained childless for
longer periods of time.136 There were more young, single-adult households that sought
greater involvement with downtown culture and entertainment venues – features that
often lacked in suburban neighborhoods.137 Quality school systems in the suburbs were
not major reasons for these new urban youths to move to or remain in suburban
neighborhoods. With different goals and wants, this new group sought escape from
suburban life for a more culturally-enriching experience, and many from this group began

37
seeking downtown residency. In most of the older central cities during the 1970s, certain
neighborhoods attracted young, middle-class, childless residents who were rehabilitating
townhouses, boosting property values, and raising hopes that the long-expected back-to-
the-city movement had finally arrived.138 Some looked to a city renaissance in New York
City, no longer believed to “be a magnet for the poor and the homeless, but a city
primarily for the ambitious and educated – an urban elite.”139
According to author Alexander von Hoffman, a Harvard historian and specialist in
housing and urban affairs, the migration of upper middle-class residents to downtown
neighborhoods has been one of the great forces in urban revival. Hoffman claims that
middle-class newcomers have been “elevating the tone of old neighborhoods since the
early twentieth century.”140 According to W. Brown Morton III in Past Meets Future,
“before [WWII], such activity had been limited, for the most part, to the artistic and the
rich. However, almost as a counterpoint to the wasteful roar of the bulldozers, people
began returning to old neighborhoods.”141 Places such as Greenwich Village in
Manhattan, Society Hill in Philadelphia, and Georgetown in Washington, D.C., had been
destinations for immigrants and poor residents that now “attracted bohemians and
intellectuals who savored [these areas’] old-fashioned buildings and old-world
atmosphere.”142 Over time, rundown neighborhoods with their historic character became
desirable residential areas again. While a small number of younger, single residents and
youthful couples (many were homosexual) began living in and restoring historic
buildings in the 1960s, the back-to-the-city movement gained strength in the 1970s. In
the 1980s, young urban professionals, often labeled as yuppies due to their extensive
materialism, joined the influx, which expanded the zone of rehabilitated residences. With

38
this return to the cities, displacement became a growing concern for the less-wealthy
population that inhabited the former-rundown neighborhoods into the 1980s. New waves
of downtown residents arrived and spurred gentrification by driving real estate prices to
“heights beyond even the reach of the original rehabilitators.”143
The Carter administration adopted reindustrialization as its motto, but President
Carter continued the national government’s ineffectiveness in handling urban issues.
Ronald Reagan suggested that federal aid actually contributed to urban problems rather
than resolved them, and he cut back on funding for social services and urban programs.
Reagan believed that the government had undercut economic vitality by collecting too
many taxes to support expensive social programs and burdensome regulations.144 Later,
Reagan cut federal grants and created enterprise zones, “a relatively inexpensive program
that was supposed to promote private sector investment.”145 Reagan’s enterprise zone
concept shared similarities with Robert Kennedy’s proposed “Kennedy Plan” of 1967,
which aimed to provide tax credits and deductions for businesses locating in ghettos. The
“Kennedy Plan” legislation never passed. According to authors Michael Peter Smith and
Dennis R. Judd in Cities in Transformation: Class, Capital, and the State, Kennedy and
Reagan’s plans advocated that
[f]irms locating in specified depressed areas would have become eligible
for a multitude of subsidies, including accelerated depreciation on plant
and equipment, a tax deduction for the salaries of low-income resident
workers, training allowances, a tax credit for the purchase of machinery
and equipment, carry-back credit, credit carry-over for ten taxable years,
and other subsidies.146
Out of enterprise zones grew the National Self-Sufficiency Project, the Quality of Life
Initiatives, and the Minority Youth Training Initiative. “All of these programs supported
and subsidized active, community-based interest organizations.”147 Despite widespread

39
criticism of the Reagan administration, author Margit Mayor gave it high praise for its
continued support of the 1981 formation of the National Center of Neighborhood
Enterprise, “which tested and propagated the capacity of neighborhood groups to become
entrepreneurial.”148 Community groups such as the HTWA became a “[legally-]required
partner in bargaining structures[,]” and they were “allowed to function as conduits for
community development funds.”149 Federally-sponsored groups such as the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and private groups such as the National
Community Development Association pledged support to community-based
organizations, further helping their cause.
A variety of nonprofit organizations also appeared to help cities. Some “were
born of battles against urban renewal and highway projects, others were founded by
churches to help the impoverished, and still others were started as neighborhood
improvement associations.”150 Such organizations targeted the national government to
reinstate lost programs, organized crime watches, built new homes and restored old ones,
expanded businesses, and introduced medical clinics. Also, a new type of institution
called a financial intermediary resulted from this community development movement.
Philanthropic groups included the Ford Foundation and Catholic Charities, and the
aforementioned community development corporations (CDC) continued to increase.
These large, private intermediaries “became major financiers to the community
development movement.”151
In the early-1980s, progress, recovery, and revitalization hit a snag when a
recession again gripped the nation. Recession hit Milwaukee, primarily an industrial city,
particularly hard. “Tens of thousands of blue-collar families had to scramble to make

40
ends meet, and the community as a whole faced a seismic shift in its economic
underpinnings and a disturbing challenge to its historic self-image.”152 Despite a strong
manufacturing base in Milwaukee, 1980s’ interest rates rose to record highs, which
encouraged foreign investment and created a strong dollar. High interest rates made it
more expensive to produce goods, while the strong dollar crippled export sales. This
opened the door to a flood of inexpensive foreign products. U.S. manufacturers had to
charge more as their global competitors charged less. A steep decline in the market for
U.S. capital goods resulted, thereby increasing unemployment.153
As unemployment added problems for the local economy, Milwaukee’s future
was uncertain, creating a need for an identity transformation. By the 1980s, many
Milwaukeeans believed that their city needed a new image beyond brats, beer, and
bowling. It needed to adjust to the changes that were affecting its manufacturing base, its
job market, and the local economy if it wanted to compete on a national scale or even
exist as a respectable working city. Following the recession in the 1980s, the employees
of Milwaukee’s bankrupt, moved, or struggling factories were unable to find comparable
employment elsewhere, leaving them to mull over early retirement, retraining for another
specialized job, or working more hours at multiple jobs to make up for the loss in income.
As many men took second jobs to support their families, most women also took an active
role and sought employment. Between 1979 and 1987, Milwaukee lost 28,386 jobs while
the suburbs gained 33,672.154
With the national recession easing up in 1985, Milwaukee’s metropolitan
employment rebounded and showed signs of growth. While earlier statistics from the
recession pointed to Milwaukee’s rapid decline, the city’s industrial sector saved

41
Milwaukee. Yes, the recession hit Milwaukee particularly hard, but manufacturing
continued to serve the city as a backbone of strength, not allowing the city to feel the
horrible effects of the recession on a worse level.155 A number of factories, foundries, and
machine shops that produced steel, grey iron, bronze, brass, and aluminum were still
around into the 1980s. These remaining businesses marked Milwaukee’s still-detectable
strength as a major industrial center.156 The city’s industrial companies did not all die
despite facing unfriendly odds; rather, on a per capita basis, Milwaukee was the third
largest industrial center in the nation by 1990 behind Detroit and San Jose.157
Despite strong rebounds in the local economy, many of Milwaukee’s surviving
businesses were unable to resume normal operations, especially if they wanted to survive
among changes in employment in an expanding global economy. Business did not
resume as usual; rather downsizing, outsourcing, automation, and re-engineering changed
the look of employment in Milwaukee in the 1980s. In time, service-sector jobs appeared
throughout the city and suburbs. Tax attorneys, teachers, telemarketers, and restaurants
became prominent in the metro area, replacing many of the factories and providing new
employment opportunities. By 1986, service jobs exceeded manufacturing employment
for the first time in the city’s history. It was evident – Milwaukee’s economy was
opening up to white-collar business. Temp agencies, health care services, and the food
business were pushing Milwaukee to a white-collar kind of town. By 1987, Milwaukee
was headed toward economic recovery, and confidence in the local economy was
restored.158
Harry H. Anderson and Frederick I. Olson stated in Milwaukee: At the Gathering
of the Waters that despite the growth of the suburbs

42
[Milwaukee’s] office buildings [were] still the most important and
prestigious ones. [Its downtown was] still headquarters for all Milwaukee
utilities, its largest banks, insurance companies[,] and savings and loans
operations. It still contain[ed] the chief offices of the federal, state,
county[,] and city governments. It [had] the largest concentration of the
community’s cultural resources and [was] the site of its most important
meetings, conventions, entertainment and sporting events.159
Despite urban decline that had been affecting central cities since WWII, Milwaukee’s
downtown sector actually showed signs of remaining intact. These events allowed the
HTW to be transformed into a professional, white-collar district, attracting more
businesses to Milwaukee’s downtown. In this relationship, Milwaukee helped the HTW,
and the HTW aided future growth in the city.
After successful recovery after the recession of the 1980s, it was evident that
rumors of demise for U.S. cities had been premature. Despite their many problems, U.S.
cities remained, and their health remained essential to the nation’s well-being.160 From
1940 to 1985, the urban core continued to serve a vital function in the U.S. economy.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, office construction flourished in the aging hubs and
continued with only a lull in the mid-1970s. “Billions of dollars of private investment
proved that in the 1950s and 1960s[,] as well as in the 1970s and 1980s[,] downtown[s
were] not washed up as…center[s] of financial institutions and business and professional
services.”161 Furthermore, many central city residential neighborhoods survived four
postwar decades largely unchanged (Baltimore’s Roland Park, Philladelphia’s Chestnut
Hill, Pittsburgh’s Squirrel Hill, Cincinnati’s Hyde Park and Mount Lookout, and
Minneapolis’ Lake District). What does this mean? U.S. central cities did not die; they
survived in a different world than that which existed before WWII. A long-awaited city
renaissance materialized as cities slowly crept back onto the national agenda. The 1980s

43
marked a downtown building boom that saw the opening of festival marketplaces and the
rehabilitation of some inner-city neighborhoods.162
Urban centers had scored some notable financial triumphs between 1940 and
1985. Cities found ways to obtain new sources of revenue to keep them from
bankruptcy. For example, U.S. central cities had imposed income taxes, sales taxes,
cigarette taxes, and other levies to enable them to reach into the pockets of the suburban
commuters and recover some of the wealth that had migrated to suburbia. Also in the
1980s, central cities had successfully shifted some responsibilities to metropolitan
authorities and the states, thus relieving themselves of unwanted financial burdens.163
As the 1980s moved toward recovery and progress, hindsight allowed city leaders
to realize that they had been trying too hard to beat the suburbs at their game rather than
be effective in adapting to their own urban problems and the changing times.164 Jon C.
Teaford in The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-
1985, indicated that prior to the 1980s,
[t]he suburbs were gaining an ever increasing competitive advantage, and
the central cities needed to adapt to the changing times. During the post-
[WWII] era, the boom in office employment and the growth of the white-
collar sector did appear to bode well for the downtown business district,
offering one positive portent for the central cities. But suburban office
complexes could blunt this advantage unless the central city adapted to the
automobile[;] curbed crime and general disorder[;] retained white, middle-
class residents[;] and pursued a public policy friendly to commercial real
estate development.165
By the 1980s, Milwaukee was a city in transformation. While Milwaukee’s
downtown had lost its near-monopoly on the business and professional classes, it
experienced a resurgence in the professional service sector by the 1990s, with the HTW
absorbing a large portion of professional jobs. The ward was part of this downtown

44
renaissance. A mere 112 businesses found home there in 1985. By 1990, the HTW
housed more than 250 businesses with over 5,200 employees. As the shift toward
downtowns continued, Milwaukee’s HTW continued to experience growth, and it
gradually transformed from an industrial-intensive economy into a professional-service
sector. By the end of the 1980s, over one-third of the HTW businesses were directly
related to creative or graphic arts – Milwaukee Magazine, Wisconsin Woman Magazine,
and Milwaukee Weekly were all published in HTW offices. This change toward
professional service jobs paved the way for more growth.166
Despite recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, the local preservation community was
also fully intact. In fact, preservationists emerged from the 1980s recession with a strong
agenda fueled by the changes that were taking place in urban areas across the country.167
Thanks to the growing historic preservation movement, groups like the HPC enforced
rules and policies without much public backlash because the general public and affected
neighborhoods became more convinced of the necessity of preservation, especially after
being exposed to urban renewal’s destruction. In fact, the outlook of preservation
changed immensely since the 1960s; even the “theoretical right to use your land as you
wish, provided only that you do no direct harm to others, has given way in practice to a
recognition that the public itself has rights, in its cultural heritage as well as in the
protection of its landscape and natural resources.”168
More importantly, the HPC helped to secure a bid for the Third Ward on the
National Register of Historic Places in 1984 because of the area’s unique architecture
from the 36-year rebuilding campaign that followed the devastating fire of 1892. It also
allowed further benefits to be introduced, helping economic revitalization to be achieved

45
in a neighborhood that urban renewal tore apart. The National Register of Historic Places
certified 71 buildings in a ten square-block area as the only area in Milwaukee zoned for
mixed use – manufacturing, warehousing, retail, commercial and fine arts, and
housing.169 With the historic certification in place, the HTWA could work to restore the
area’s historic integrity and recreate an area of the city that had been vital to the local
economy for so long.
In time, the HTWA attracted new businesses and professionals away from the
suburban appeal. This gradual transformation encouraged outsiders back into the HTW
by the 1990s, and they brought along investment dollars and new hope for securing the
ward’s changing identity. Despite Milwaukee’s (and the Midwest’s) declining
population, single, young, childless professionals (followed by empty-nesters and
retirees) continued to seek relocation in central U.S. cities, and these people aided in the
identity change of urban neighborhoods. The HTW became a popular destination for this
group.170 By the 1990s, theaters; dance companies; upscale retailers; fashion, jewelry,
and interior design companies; art galleries featuring gallery nights; graphic
design/illustration firms; a $6.4 million renovation of the former Milwaukee Terminal
Building into Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design’s (MIAD) art studios, student
galleries, 3-D labs, and computer graphics facilities; and a $6.8 million Italian
Community Center located on the edge of the HTW all became a part of the changing,
revitalized economy. Heading into the next century, signs pointed toward restoring the
vibrant activity that the HTW had once experienced at the time of the great fire.171
As mentioned previously, the HTW underwent an identity transformation;
however, similar transformations were occurring in cities across the country. The face of

46
employment, manufacturing, and the economy completely changed. As companies
engaged in global export of manufacturing to Third World sites, U.S. cities became
places where business, service, and communication jobs intersected. With automation
and advancements in technology, middle-income U.S. labor forces were shrinking. New
jobs tended to be either highly-professional and well-paid or low-skilled and low-paid.
Limited job security, career lines, and unions characterized this new employment sector –
a result of small scale firms in the service sector instead of the once predominant large
corporations engaged in manufacturing.172
As the class structure in central cities was transformed, a focus on the
neighborhood again surfaced. Of course, much at the national and local levels went into
making this renewed focus possible, but it depended on a changing urban philosophy to
preserve what remained of older urban neighborhoods. This was then combined with
bringing suburban conveniences to these older urban neighborhoods. In an effort to
compete with the suburbs, many city leaders adopted agendas to build upon urban
strengths while also incorporating various aspects from the suburbs that seemed to work.
The neighborhood, an age-old concept, attracted residents toward the suburbs beginning
in the early-1920s. In order to attract a new group of residents into downtown areas
again, city leaders strategically reflected the neighborhood in much the same way.173
In fact, the suburb was a model for downtown revival. For example, city leaders
recreated suburban shopping malls in U.S. central cities.174 Take, for example, the revival
of downtown Milwaukee’s Grand Avenue Mall in 1982. Seen as a way to help a
downtown that had experienced the disappearance of urban neighborhood shopping
districts in the 1960s, Grand Avenue Mall aimed to bring shoppers back to the city,

47
focused on the urban neighborhood, and utilized the momentum-gaining preservation
movement. Grand Avenue Mall was one of Milwaukee’s earliest preservation projects
resulting from government-funded incentives and 1980s legislation.
Also, small, independently-owned shops began appearing again in Milwaukee.
These shops, resemblances of the corner shops that used to line Milwaukee’s streets at
the turn of the last century, supported the neighborhood focus. A change in local politics
helped along these transformations. Mayor John Norquist (Milwaukee’s mayor from
1988 to 2003) was a leader who believed in a pedestrian-friendly, visually-stimulating
city. Under his leadership, much of urban renewal’s devastation would begin to be
reversed with more urban improvements and redevelopment. Headed into the next
century, signs of improvement, growth, and economic prosperity seemed to be returning
to cities, proving that cities were successful in competing with the suburbs. It was noted
in Milwaukee: At the Gathering of the Waters that by this time,
[Milwaukee’s people] realize[d] that the city’s continued prosperity, its
survival as a desirable place to work[,]…live[,] and play, depend[ed]…on
[their] own determination to create the kind of community [they] wanted.
…Today, the power lies in their hands to decide if Milwaukee will remain
productive and competitive in the emerging world economy….175
The following chapters will show specifically how the HTW was transformed
from a primarily blue-collar, industrial area into a mixed-use neighborhood that includes
white-collar businesses, and from a declining urban location into an area of economic
revitalization and growing prosperity. The following chapters will also demonstrate how
neighborhood empowerment combined with the work of the HTWA allowed for this
transformation to happen. Having read through Chapter One and having been exposed to
a brief history of cities, urban renewal, and preservation-oriented legislation, Chapter

48
Two begins a more thorough, in-depth look at what all of this means for the local Third
Ward neighborhood.

49
Notes – Chapter One
1. John Gurda, The Making of Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI: Milwaukee County
Historical Society, 1999), 397.
2. Cindy Loose, “Milwaukee: Something's Brewing,” Washington Post, 27
March 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1007-
2005Mar25.html?sub=new (accessed 25 February 2006).
3. Daniel C. McCarthy, “The Quest for Authority: A Survey of the History of
Milwaukee’s Redevelopment Process, 1900-1975” (master’s thesis, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1983), 54.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Joy Berman, “Demographic History of an Urban Block: North Jefferson Street
from Clybourn to St. Paul: 1922-1957” (master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, n.d.), 15.
7. McCarthy, 55-57.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 57.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 59.
14. Ibid., 61, 80.
15. Ibid., 62.
16. Ibid., 7.
17. Ibid., 3, 5, 7.
18. Ibid., 62.
19. Ibid., 63.

50
20. Ibid., 62-65.
21. Ibid., 65.
22. Ibid., 53, 55, 61, 62, 65, 69.
23. Ibid., 80-81.
24. Joyce Lynn Knippel, “Redefining Progress: A History of Historic
Preservation in Milwaukee, 1964-1984” (master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, 1984), 71.
25. McCarthy, 80.
26. Ibid., 66, 67, 80, 85.
27. Knippel, 71-72.
28. Ibid.; McCarthy, 85.
29. Knippel, 73.
30. McCarthy, 85.
31. Ibid., 3, 5, 7.
32. Knippel, 73.
33. McCarthy, 86.
34. Ibid., 53, 55, 61, 62, 65, 69, 86.
35. Knippel, 74.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 73-74.
38. McCarthy, 86.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 86-87.
41. Gurda, 366.

51
42. McCarthy, 86-88.
43. Knippel, 74-75.
44. McCarthy, 58.
45. Knippel, 77.
46. Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in
America, 1940-1985 (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 8.
47. Ibid; Michael Peter Smith and Dennis R. Judd, “American Cities: The
Production of Ideology,” in Cities in Transformation: Class, Capital, and the State, ed.
Michael Peter Smith, 178 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984).
48. Smith and Judd, 178.
49. William J. Murtagh, “Janus Never Sleeps,” in Past Meets Future: Saving
America’s Historic Environment, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 52 (Washington, D.C.: The
Preservation Press, 1992).
50. Ibid., 53.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. The Advisory Council separated from the NPS in 1976 and became an
independent agency.
53. Knippel, 7.
54. H. Bryan Mitchell, “The States: 25 Years in the Middle,” in Past Meets
Future: Saving America’s Historic Environments, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 65 (Washington,
D.C.: The Preservation Press, 1992).
55. Murtagh, 53.
56. Mitchell, 65.
57. Knippel, 7.
58. Mitchell, 66.
59. Knippel, 7.

52
60. Manuel Pastor Jr., Peter Dreier, J. Eugene Grigsby III, and Marta Lopez-
Garza, Regions That Work: How Cities and Suburbs Can Grow Together (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 86.
61. Ibid., 88-91.
62. Arthur P. Ziegler, Jr., “The Early Years,” in Past Meets Future: Saving
America’s Historic Environments, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 60 (Washington, D.C.: The
Preservation Press, 1992).
63. Knippel, 78.
64. Berman, 15.
65. Richard Longstreth, “When the Present Becomes the Past,” in Past Meets
Future: Saving America’s Historic Environment, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 213-214
(Washington, D.C.: The Preservation Press, 1992).
66. Gurda, 390, 392, 394.
67. Ibid., 366-367, 390.
68. Ibid.
69. Ziegler, Jr., 60. The federal government finally acknowledged preservation
as a legitimate revitalization tool and intervened in 1966 with the NHPA, which directed
national attention to the preservation field. It is important to note that there is no official
beginning to preservation; a preservation community has existed for over a century.
While it took time for a national preservation movement to unify (post-WWII) because of
a lack of national recognition and political backing, local preservationists had been
quietly at work protecting historic sites in the U.S. since the 1800s. Preservationists were
largely responsible for house museums at that time; such museums were seen as ways to
preserve space and time. In Milwaukee, early preservationists were the Old Settlers Club
of 1837. In 1935, the Milwaukee County Historical Society became the active agent in
preserving the city and county’s historical past. Over time, the preservation community
grew in membership, but it is not until after WWII when preservationists stepped up their
vigilance, mostly due to the federal government’s approach to urban issues and renewal.
The NHPA of 1966 was merely the federal government’s overdue recognition of
preservation as a potential benefit to urban economic revitalization.
70. Knippel, 14, 17-18.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 10, 18-20, 45, 48. Eleanor Bell of Land Ethics, Inc., fought to save the
depot.

53
73. Ibid., 22.
74. Ibid., 22-24.
75. Ibid., 23-24.
76. Ibid., 25.
77. Ibid., 24-25.
78. McCarthy, 89.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 88.
81. Ibid., 90.
82. Knippel, 26-27.
83. Ibid., 26-28.
84. Ibid., 29.
85. Ibid., 29-30.
86. Ibid., 32.
87. Ibid., 33.
88. Ibid., 34.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., 34, 112-113.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., 113.
93. Ibid., 34.
94. Ibid., 36.
95. Ziegler, Jr., 62; Knippel, 82-84.

54
96. Knippel, 84-85.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 48, 88-94.
99. Ibid.
100. Murtagh, 55.
101. Knippel, 99-100, 111.
102. Ibid., 100.
103. Ibid., 99-100, 111.
104. Murtagh, 55.
105. Knippel, 105-106.
106. Ibid., 101-106.
107. Ibid., 107.
108. Ibid.
109. Smith and Judd, 179.
110. Knippel, 107.
111. Ibid., 108.
112. Ibid., 114.
113. Ibid., 115.
114. Ibid.
115. Harry H. Anderson and Frederick I. Olson, Milwaukee: At the Gathering of
the Waters (Tulsa, OK: Continental Heritage Press, 1981), 159.
116. Teaford, 236-240, 242-243.
117. Anderson and Olson, 242-243.

55
118. Pamela Plumb, “Affecting Public Policy,” in Past Meets Future: Saving
America’s Historic Environment, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 128 (Washington, D.C.: The
Preservation Press, 1992).
119. Teaford, 231.
120. Alexander von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block: The Rebirth of
America’s Urban Neighborhoods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 7-10,
114.
121. Janet Raasch, “The Historic Third Ward,” in Milwaukee, the Best of All
Worlds: A Contemporary Portrait, by Ruth Fromstein, 213 (Chatsworth, CA: Windsor
Publications, 1990).
122. Chester Sheard, “Third Ward sees hope in complex,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 1
August 1988, folder 33, box 2, Historic Third Ward Association (Milwaukee, WI), 1976-
1997, UWM Manuscript Collection 101, Archives, UWM Libraries, University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee (hereafter cited as HTWA Collection).
123. Historic Third Ward Association, “Take a Tour,” Historic Third Ward
Association, http://www.historicthirdward.org/tour/welcome2.php (accessed 18 February
2006).
124. Chester Sheard, “Third Ward sees hope in complex,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 1
August 1988, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
125. Ibid.
126. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information,” Historic Third Ward Association,
http://www.historicthirdward.org/tour/htwgeneralinformation.php (accessed 18 February
2006).
127. Raasch, 213.
128. John C. Wolter (Westown Association, president) and Elizabeth A. Nicols
(Westown Association, executive director) to Alderman Daniel Schramm, letter, 9
November 1993, folder 22, box 2, Business Improvement District No. 2 (Milwaukee,
WI), 1987-1997, UWM Manuscript Collection 102, University Manuscript Collection,
Archives, UWM Libraries, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (hereafter cited as BID-2
Collection).
129. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
130. Ibid.

56
131. Joan Zepecki (Historic Third Ward Association, executive director), guest
editorial, “Discover the Urban Romance of the Historic Third Ward,” 25 February 1991,
folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
132. Peter Moegenburg, “Third Ward,” Esprit, n.d., folder 33, box 2, HTWA
Collection.
133. Donald B. Rosenthal, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Urban Revitalization, ed.
Donald B. Rosenthal, 9 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980).
134. Gurda, 389, 392-393. Some may feel that the HTWA was to blame for
displacement, but it simply stepped in when the City had already displaced and
destroyed. Perhaps the question historians will never know the answer to is whether or
not displacement would have happened in the HTW if urban renewal had not displaced so
many ward residents first. If one were to ask a HTWA member, the answer would most
likely be no. But hindsight tells today’s historians that displacement was happening in
most other U.S. cities that were attempting to recover from decline by using urban
renewal methods. It is difficult to imagine a HTWA revitalization strategy that did not
involve the slightest amount of displacement of some residents had they remained in the
neighborhood. The scope and scale of the ward’s improvement projects was just too
great.
135. Ibid.
136. Teaford, 232.
137. Goldfield and Brownell, 384.
138. Teaford, 232, 249.
139. Martin D. Abravanel and Paul K. Mancini, “Attitudinal and Demographic
Constraints,” in Urban Revitalization, ed. Donald B. Rosenthal, 29 (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1980).
140. von Hoffman, 124.
141. W. Brown Morton III, “Forgiving New Values in Uncommon Times,” in
Past Meets Future: Saving America’s Historic Environment, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 40
(Washington, D.C.: The Preservation Press, 1992).
142. von Hoffman, 124.
143. Ibid.
144. Smith and Judd, 179.

57
145. Howard P. Chudacoff and Judith E. Smith, The Evolution of American
Urban Society, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000), 303.
146. Smith and Judd, 178.
147. Margit Mayor, “Urban Movements and Urban Theory in the Late-20th-
Century City,” in The Urban Moment: Cosmopolitan Essays on the Late-20th-Century
City, ed. Robert A. Beauregard and Sophie Body-Gendrot, 218 (Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications, Inc., 1999).
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
150. von Hoffman, 14.
151. Ibid., 16.
152. Gurda, 413.
153. Ibid., 416-417.
154. Ibid., 419-421.
155. Ibid., 421-423.
156. Anderson and Olson, 152, 156, 162.
157. Gurda, 421-423.
158. Ibid.
159. Anderson and Olson, 158.
160. Fritz W. Wagner, Timothy E. Joder, and Anthony J. Mumphrey Jr.,
“Introduction” in Urban Revitalization: Policies and Programs, ed. Fritz W. Wagner,
Timothy E. Joder, and Anthony J. Mumphrey Jr., vii (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 1995).
161. Teaford, 309.
162. Ibid., 9, 309.
163. Ibid., 310.

58
164. Ibid., 6, 311.
165. Ibid., 6.
166. Raasch, 213.
167. Gurda, 394.
168. Peter H. Brink and H. Grant Dehart, “Findings and Recommendations,” in
Past Meets Future: Saving America’s Historic Environments, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 20
(Washington, D.C.: The Preservation Press, 1992).
169. Brett Murphy (communicator) to Joan Zepecki, letter, 10 January 1992,
folder 14, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
170. Rosenthal, 9.
171. Raasch, 214.
172. Smith and Judd, 188.
173. Goldfield and Brownell, 393.
174. Ibid.
175. Anderson and Olson, 176.

59
Chapter Two – Preservation-Revitalization Strategy Aids Historic Third Ward
Redevelopment, 1980s and 1990s
The recent transformation and emergence of Milwaukee’s HTW as mentioned at
the end of Chapter One was the product of various partnerships among residents,
businesses, and City and Third Ward organizations and governing bodies. With much
credit given to the HTWA for its work in revitalizing the ward, the recent transformation
was not the product of one organizational body dictating change over the others; rather, it
took various groups to enact the preservation-revitalization strategy. In fact, unlike many
revitalized neighborhoods in Milwaukee (i.e., Brady Street neighborhood) and the U.S.,
the ward transformation was unique in that it was not the work of one individual investor
(such as in New York City where Donald Trump has financed neighborhood strategies)
or even a sole developer interested in revitalizing the area. Many were involved with
hands-on revitalization – residents, government sectors, businesses, developers,
neighborhood association, construction crews, architects, and more. Effective leadership
was a key to revitalization and to organize, not to dictate or to control, the many
partnerships. The HTWA was established and commissioned by the neighborhood’s
private and business sectors to carry out the leadership role, as well as stimulate
revitalization and business retention, growth, and expansion. Through its operations, the
HTWA could also work with local government agencies and other involved parties to
move toward economic revitalization.
The Historic Preservation Commission’s bid for the Third Ward as an historic
area in the National Register of Historic Places secured a place for preservation in the
local revitalization strategy, and it protected the ward from any outside threats that might
mimic urban renewal’s destructiveness. The National Register officially accepted the bid

60
in 1984, and approximately 11 city blocks became the HTW area (the area containing
rebuilt structures from the post-fire period). This chapter will also demonstrate how this
designation as an historic area helped the ward’s future on several levels, including
financing of major projects. The ward is bordered by Highway 794 on the north, the
Italian community’s Coachyards on the east, and the Milwaukee River to the south and
west. At one time, the HTW was one of the largest warehouse districts on the National
Register of Historic Places. Today, an asphalt marker sits at 333 N. Water Street, where
the historic fire of 1892 reportedly began. After all, without a fire, there would have been
no rebuilding campaign and essentially no case for historic preservation, both of which
played major roles in the ward’s economic revitalization, despite being over a half a
century apart.
The return of economic prosperity to the Third Ward was not an overnight
experience. The historic designation of the ward in 1984 ensured that the ward would be
protected from further demolition. Knowing that, preservation and revitalization could
move forward into the 1980s and beyond. This chapter will highlight three main phases
that were led by the HTWA after the 1984 designation to stimulate the preservation-
revitalization strategy for the HTW – tax incremental financing (TIF), the Streetscape
Project, and parking shortages and traffic flow and congestion problems. These phases
all went hand-in-hand, and they made other future developments possible. For example,
TIF opened the door for Streetscape and provided a financial solution for the parking and
traffic congestion; following these, more developments targeted the area. In other words,
these three phases laid the foundation for future economic growth in the ward – the
Italian Community Center and the improvements to the Riverwalk and (what is today

61
called) Henry Maier Festival Park. Other HTWA-affiliated projects and more
redevelopment began or continued during the three phases discussed in this chapter. The
aim here is not to discuss every new development in the ward. At the end of this chapter
is a brief discussion of the Architectural Review Board and the Coalition for Historic
Preservation because these governing agencies were integral to the HTWA’s
preservation-revitalization strategy.
Residential Developments Spur Tax Incremental Financing
HTW developments, even residential ones, were important to revitalization
because they encouraged pedestrian and vehicular street activity, which made the
renewed areas look active, and led to an increase in shoppers, residents, and visitors, and
further reinvestment. The Department of Community Development (see Chapter One)
joined the HTWA in 1985 to pay $50,000 for a study conducted by three Chicago firms
to determine how to spur more interest in the HTW.1 The firms sent questionnaires to
4,000 workers in Milwaukee’s downtown, where 8,600 lived at the time of the study, in
order to uncover the level of interest by these workers for living downtown. Returned
questionnaires (1,900 returned) revealed that approximately one of eight workers
indicated some interest in living in a downtown neighborhood; 12.4 percent of surveyed
workers were “definitely interested.”2 Using these statistics, the study claimed that this
housing demand could fill up to 225 new residential units per year.3 Young, childless,
and unmarried individuals were most interested and, as demonstrated in Chapter One, had
pioneered the return-to-the-city renaissance in many U.S. cities. Forty-six percent of this
group made more than $30,000 per year; 16.3 percent made more than $50,000 per year.
Those who were most interested (under 30 years of age) were least likely to afford rent in

62
new downtown developments, which could potentially cost $600 on the low end. If only
the upper-class could afford downtown living, shopping, and dining, then the HTW
would likely become an isolated center for the upper elite. This came at a time when
Yankee Hill, a new downtown residential living center, opened its doors to renters at
premium costs. The HTWA urged developers to obtain grants and low-interest loans to
reduce the cost of rent, which promised to be otherwise “out-of-reach” for more than half
of the potential residents.4
The HTWA’s request for loans and grants may have saved the ward’s future as a
burgeoning urban residential market. It was also a major step in the revitalization
strategy, especially since the Department of Community Development study also
demonstrated interest for up to 300 hotel rooms; 104,000 to 116,000 square feet of retail
space; 70 to 100 new boat slips; and 517,000 to 713,000 square feet of office space.5
Because the ward was designated as an historic area, special incentives were available to
buyers and developers through preservation-oriented state and national legislation. Such
incentives could help to redevelop areas like the HTW and could potentially reduce costs
for interested residents. Buyers and investors in the HTW were eligible for a 25 percent
investment tax credit for the rehabilitation of historic structures.6 For example, when
TRIAD Engineering sought to move to the HTW at 325 E. Chicago Street, Milwaukee’s
historic preservation staff reviewed TRIAD’s restoration plans, which, in the end, did not
significantly alter the historic architectural character of the Chicago Street building. (The
preservation staff considered the significant alteration of historic architecture of HTW
buildings as the central factor before granting permission for restoration plans in the
neighborhood.) TRIAD’s rehabilitation preserved the building and was a significant

63
reinvestment in the HTW.7 With no such tax credits, many of the original structures in
the HTW may not have been saved. In fact, the Conference of Urban Land Institute of
Washington, D.C., credited the HTWA for its leadership in securing loans and financing
plans for interested developers.8
The HTWA’s strategy for securing loans and financing plans was based on 1975
legislation that created tax incremental financing (TIF), which became a common way in
many historic areas to provide improved streets, sewers, streetlights, and landscaping to
spur development. Basically, the future tax revenue produced by predicted increases in
property values was borrowed to pay for public improvements within an area. As other
forms of financing were “drying up” in the 1970s and as the 1980s proved economically
poor because of recession, TIF districts were welcomed in many distressed urban areas in
need of redevelopment.9 However, Milwaukee’s mayor, Henry Maier, vetoed a proposed
TIF district for the HTW in October 1987. This proposal called for the financing of up to
$13.5 million in streetscaping, but Maier believed that this would hurt the city’s bond
rating. “His concern [was] to maintain a high-level of protective housekeeping and
cultural services balanced with fiscal conservatism to protect the city’s credit rating.”10
By 1988, the HTWA reworked the proposal for approval by Milwaukee’s next mayor,
John Norquist.11
Supported by TIF, tax increment finance districts (TI districts or TIDs) are areas
of the city established by a planning commission and/or a common council. Such
districts must meet certain conditions of blight, suitability for industry, and a need for
rehabilitation. Once approved, the tax revenues from the increased property values can
be used by the City to pay for improvements and redevelopment projects. Basically, the

64
projects pay for themselves by earmarking local revenue for local rehabilitation. The
Milwaukee Public School Board (MPS), Milwaukee Area Technical College (MATC),
and Milwaukee County taxing units receive taxes on the original value in the district
(base value). The City receives taxes levied on increased values, or incremental values.12
But in the HTW (according to a Third Ward TIF District Economic and Financial
Feasibility Study), “the taxes on these increased values [were not] available to the other
taxing jurisdictions[,] including the Milwaukee School District, Milwaukee City…,
Milwaukee County[,] and the others [once a HTW TID was formed].”13 At the TID’s
(future) closing, much greater tax revenues will be available for the other jurisdictions.
The City received tax increments until all HTW project costs were covered; however, all
HTW project expenditures had to be made in the first seven years of the TID’s formation.
Initial financing of project costs may come from City bond, note issues or cash
expenditures; tax increments are then used to retire bonds and to reimburse the City for
cash outlays. The tax rate paid by individual property owners inside the district is the
same as the rate paid by property owners outside the district; there is no additional tax
levy on district properties, nor is there a tax freeze on district properties. All TIF project
plans must be approved by the City before tax increments can be received to pay for the
project costs. Every plan must specify the following: kind, number, and location of
proposed public improvements; estimated costs; a method of initial financing; and an
economic feasibility study. Furthermore, governing city bodies cannot create another
TID if the property value in all other such districts exceeds seven percent of the total city
equalized value, or if the increased value in all districts exceeds five percent of the total
city equalized value.14

65
The projected total equalized real property value within the HTW was expected to
increase from $29.2 million in 1988 to greater than $60 million in 2000. This was based
on the assumption that there would continue to be remodeling and renovation, and it
assumed a four percent annual appreciation rate that represented the area’s increasing
market potential for purchasers, tenants, and upgraders. Furthermore, the financial
feasibility study estimated that the HTW would generate more than $21 million in TIF
revenues by 2008, when the district had to be closed out.15 Through 1991, the City of
Milwaukee created 13 TIF districts (12 since 1976); the TI value of all TIDs in
Milwaukee totaled $383,336,660 (figure taken in 1990).16 TIF helped other Milwaukee
redevelopment projects such as the Grand Avenue Retail Center (site assembly, public
concourses, and parking ramps), Yankee Hill Apartments (subordinated loans and street
improvements), Schlitz Park (subordinated loans and street improvements), Park East
Redevelopment (street improvements and loans), and Historic King Place (subordinated
loans).17 The following lists Milwaukee’s TIDs through 1991:
Table 1. Tax increment finance districts in Milwaukee through 1991.18
TID Number Location
TID-1 Menomonee Valley
TID-2 Dissolved in 1977 before a project plan was established
TID-3 Lakeshore (Dissolved in 1989 in anticipation of full
recovery of all project costs in 1990; this allowed for the
creation of TID-12 and TID-13 later that year.)
TID-4 Downtown/Grand Avenue
TID-5 Theater District
TID-6 Yankee Hill
TID-7 Blatz Brewhouse
TID-8 Schlitz Park
TID-9 Faison/Skywalks
TID-10 Park East Corridor
TID-11 HTW
TID-12 Milwaukee Square
TID-13 Schlitz Park C Facility/Milwaukee River

66
Milwaukee’s Common Council Resolution approved the HTW TID (TID-11) on
September 20, 1988, for the potential of lasting 20 years (2008). Under the TIF plan,
construction costs and expenditures for improvements, new construction, and
streetscaping could happen no later than seven years (1995) after the TID was created
(the Wisconsin State Legislature approved a two-year extension for all TID expenditures
through 1995).19 After the district was created, the City required the Business
Improvement District-2 (BID-2) Board to guarantee the TIF plan, which involved input
from the HTWA; therefore, if the amount of new developments anticipated to pay for
these improvements failed to occur, then the BID-2 Board was required to assess all
properties within the BID to make up the shortfall. This suggests that there was plenty of
pressure on the BID-HTWA partnership to encourage reinvestment, meaning that profit
was a major motivator. The project plan as approved by the Common Council included
$4 million for the construction of a parking facility. BID-2 was held liable for any
project costs that could not be offset through tax increments created by the project. The
City actually owned, operated, and managed the TIF plan. This meant that if a parking
structure was built under the TIF plan, it would be the property of the City.20 This
proposed parking facility will be discussed in detail later.
Many TIDs in the U.S. generally involve a single major development. A financial
and market analysis usually indicates the public improvements or assistance needed to
make a project feasible in terms of market support and return on equity investment. But
the HTW was different. It contained approximately 86 different parcels with many
owners; therefore, estimating the effect(s) brought about by the presence or absence of
public improvements and parking was dependent on several parties – owners, developers,

67
and purchasers (to name a few). These groups relied on the projected growth figures
from the financial feasibility study for TID-11 to gain a better understanding of market
support and return on equity investment. Such growth figures indicated the following:21
·In the early stages of TID-11, The Broadway Distinctive Apartments
project served as a test for market support for future rental residential
developments. All other projects would follow if suitable buildings
became available. Slow absorption of Broadway’s leaseable space would
discourage future residential unit developments. Fast absorption would
increase the demand for more residential units and parking, making a
parking structure feasible.
·In 1988, the HTW contained approximately 900,000 square feet of vacant
and storage space; however, most of this space would be remodeled or
rehabilitated into office, residential, and retail space by 2000. Without
TIF public improvements, possibly only one-third of the total available
space would be developed, even if the HTW market was within close
proximity to downtown (proving that public improvements were catalysts
for future phases of development).
·Forecasters looked to the continual decline of warehouse operations in the
HTW because many of the companies that used the warehouses preferred
to relocate to the suburbs and did not desire old, multi-story buildings in
urban areas for their operations; therefore, these buildings would become
readily available for future redevelopment.
·In 1988, the value of the district was $29.2 million, which could
skyrocket to $46.4 million by 2000 if the projected improvements under
the TIF plan became realities.
Based on these growth projections, it seemed likely that TID-11 held potential for market
support, that TIF expenditures could be repaid based on increased tax revenues, and that
return on equity investments could be positive. TIF could economically benefit the HTW
in other ways, as well. Consider the following projections:22
·60 full-time jobs would be created annually for ten to 15 years; this would
contribute $2 million annually to the local economy.
·The number of HTW employees could increase from 2,900 in 1990 to
4,100 in 1995 (2,338 employees were reported in 1986).

68
·Income earned by the increased number of employees could reach
approximately $4.5 million annually by 1995 and nearly $7 million by
2000.
In addition to economic benefits in the immediate HTW area, the creation of TID-11
aided in revitalizing the downtown economy, showing that the greater metro-region and
local urban neighborhoods are interdependent on the success of the others. While the
HTW helped the greater city’s economy, Milwaukee’s rebound from urban decline, in
turn, greatly helped the HTW. In the end, employee and residential uses in TID-11
provided additional market support for downtown businesses.23
These TID-11 projections complemented the goals set forth earlier by BID-2 to
attract new developments and to bring in added revenue to pay for the TIF improvements.
BID-2 was formed in autumn of 1987. “This designation [requires] a self-imposed tax on
nonresidential property owners that is set aside to fund improvements within the
[BID].”24 A nine-member BID Board governed the district – “a state statute-enabled
entity created…by the City [that has] the power to levy assessments on business
property[.]”25 Milwaukee’s mayor appointed the BID Board members, and the board was
subject to Common Council approval.26 According to the HTWA,
[e]ach year[,] the BID Board [was] responsible for submitting an operating
plan, which include[d] the budget and goals for the year, to the Common
Council as part of the City's budget. The operating plan include[d] any
proposed assessments, which the BID Board…approved[,] and the
assessment formulas, which determine[d] the assessments paid by
individual property owners. The BID [was] classified as a quasi-
governmental body, which [was] treated as an extension of the City.27
Essentially, BIDs are self-help organizations; property owner assessments finance BID
activities, and in return property owners select their own leadership. The formation of
BID-2 was integral to the HTWA accomplishing its objectives for revitalization; thus, the

69
two parties engaged in a working partnership. Special assessments levied against
property owners in the district funded BID-2, and these assessments were attached to
1988 tax bills collected by the City. The first members of the BID-2 Board as proposed
by Mayor Maier matched the candidates that the HTWA recommended.28 Joan Zepecki
indicated in a letter that
[t]his BID [was] the only one in the [c]ity structured so the property
owners within it ‘guarantee[d]’ the performance of the…TID…. If the
TID [fell] short of projected increment[s] to pay the debt service on the
public improvements, [HTW] property owners [were] charged special
assessments until the debt [was] retired.29
The TID was created mainly for the purpose of providing necessary financial support to
develop streetscape improvements and a parking structure to facilitate growth in the
HTW (Streetscape did not entirely address the need for additional parking to
accommodate further development; this will be detailed later).30
This historic bid for the area allowed for special tax incentives and financing that
would possibly attract outside developers and encourage reinvestment. As stated before,
the historic designation of the ward was one of many steps in the process of
revitalization, but it secured several other victories for the area along the way, including
TIF. TIF helped the area by bringing in interested parties looking to renovate preserved
buildings in a mixed-use district. TIF ensured that preservation would continue and grow
in the ward because of financial aid to developers in historically-designated areas. In the
end, this led to even more economic improvements. Thanks to the pressure by the
growing preservation movement in the U.S., areas like the HTW could be protected and
historically designated, and preservation/economic aid and legislation could help the
future of these areas.

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The Streetscape Project, 1989-1992
The Streetscape Project created a consistent urban environment in the HTW. It
also made the ward aesthetically-pleasing to attract white-collar and service businesses
and arts, entertainment, and tourist venues. This project, a blending of old and new
elements, was perhaps the most visible improvement project to target the ward and was
supported by TIF.
Neighborhood residents and business leaders who felt that the area had been
neglected and was in much need of revitalization commissioned the one-of-a-kind, $3.4
million Streetscape Project. With design begun in April 1989, Streetscape enhanced the
historic ambiance and provided greater aesthetic appeal by successfully implementing
adequate light fixtures, pedestrian malls, vintage brick and granite walls, flower beds,
trees, and a fountain.31 “Further enhancements [were] made such as coordinating garbage
cans, flower containers, hanging flower baskets, a seasonal banner program,…graffiti
removal, snow removal, power washing and grass cutting.”32 Jack Gardner, former
president of the HTWA, said, “Our goal is to develop a mixed style of our [1890s] history
and our future as an innovative living, business, and social center of Milwaukee.”33
Streetscape was not a preservation project like the others mentioned in this paper.
Streetscape elements were supposed to help create a unified historic district through
historic period-appropriate designs that matched and blended with the original ward
buildings from the post-1892 fire period. Future developments were also to match that
same historic period design. Peter Renner of Renner Architects indicated in a letter to the
HTWA that his company observed what was done in other historic neighborhoods

71
regarding similar streetscaping projects, including collecting samples, performing tests,
and gathering opinions from other designers on the samples.34
Nearly one-third of Joan Zepecki’s (executive director of the HTWA at the time)
crew was in charge of the overall maintenance of Streetscape. Those involved agreed to
prevent the decay of such an expensive project. Citizen backlash would have likely been
tremendous if Streetscape was not maintained or well kept. A poorly-maintained project
would also have disappointed neighborhood owners because Streetscape was funded
through TIF, which meant that property taxes from district businesses financed the
project. This Business Improvement District was the only one structured so that property
owners actually guaranteed the performance of the TID, so owners took interest and
ownership in the maintenance and success of such projects. If the TID fell short of
projected increments to pay debt service on public improvements, BID-2 charged HTW
property owners special assessments until the debt was retired. BID-2 officials worked
closely with the HTWA and the City of Milwaukee on Streetscape and other projects.35
BID-2 officials closely examined the budget and project costs, and they collected figures
for total expenditures that were charged to TID-11. BID-2 officials wanted to have
accurate accounting of all actual and anticipated costs since BID-2 guaranteed the
project. The BID-2 Board requested an updated accounting of TID-11 expenditures as
they directly related to Streetscape, as well as a formal budget for the successful
completion of Streetscape, including actual costs, administrative costs, and overhead of
all City departments that charged items to TID-11.36 In the end, the price of the project
seemed justified. For example, the HTW became, statistically, the safest neighborhood in

72
Milwaukee; increased sales in local businesses skyrocketed by 300 percent; and $25.5
million in private investment enhanced the local economy through 1994.37
A project of the cost and magnitude of Streetscape benefited from effective
partnerships led by the HTWA. But at the same time the participation of local residents
and business owners in ward projects and issues suggests that they actually led much of
the revitalization in the ward. The fact that neighborhood involvement was the origin of
the Streetscape plan indicates a strong sense of neighborhood ownership and support of
the project, despite concern by the HTWA over how the neighborhood residents and
owners would respond to the project’s high costs.38 The HTWA’s skepticism was quieted
when the neighborhood continued to actively support Streetscape, as well as continued
revitalization and rehabilitation.
The Streetscape Project was actually the first part of the HTWA’s two-phase plan
for the HTW. With a downtown renaissance happening across the U.S. and in
Milwaukee, the HTW was in a transition period as white-collar work and service-oriented
jobs replaced some, not all (remember that the HTW was Milwaukee’s only designated,
mixed-use area), blue-collar and manufacturing jobs. Along with employment changes
during this transition phase, developers remodeled old, abandoned warehouses into
residential units, and interest gradually returned to the area. The second phase of the
HTWA’s plan involved the construction of a parking facility, which was supposed to
complement Streetscape and was also a part of the BID-2 plan. An increase in vehicular
traffic was needed in order to justify the construction of a parking facility. That is where
Streetscape came into play. Streetscape was supposed to spur the parking facility
because Streetscape should attract more economic activity, leading to more traffic as

73
people enter the ward for business, shopping, and living. Streetscape was designed to
increase the retail, residential, and commercial uses of the ward, while maintaining the
existing manufacturing firms. Streetscape’s improvements were to help the ward
compete for new businesses, which tended to locate near heightened economic activity.
HTWA officials hoped that Streetscape could heighten the economic activity and catapult
the HTW into a new age of renewed interest and revitalized activity.39
Because of Renner Architects’ ongoing knowledge of the HTW and the various
projects within the ward, the HTWA hired the architectural firm to construct Streetscape,
which was designed by M. Paul Friedberg and Partners.40 M. Paul Friedberg had been
contracted by BID-2 in June 1989 to develop a design for streetscape improvements for
the eight-block core of the HTW.41 Renner’s familiarity with the area proved important
when the firm was considered for the job, and the company’s familiarity with ward
projects proved increasingly important as project deadlines and timely construction
became key issues. A time line of the project revealed that Renner had 75 business days
to finish the construction portion of the project, which began on September 4, 1990. Not
only was the architecture firm to be aware of the intricate details of the project, but it had
to maintain vehicular traffic at all times, ensure that pedestrian traffic to apartments and
commercial establishments along N. Broadway and adjoining streets went uninterrupted,
and replace concrete walks in a timely fashion.42
Peter Renner’s familiarity with the HTW and the visions for the ward as held by
the HTWA extended back to earlier projects he completed in the ward. Renner’s other
projects included placing green space at the 100 and 200 blocks of N. Broadway Street,
as well as revamping the existing Catalano Square with a fountain, performance space,

74
and amphitheater seating (also at N. Broadway Street). Catalano Square was a pillar to
the HTW’s history, so Renner preserved it for future generations. The preservation
needed to complement the area surroundings, as well as be combined with modern
features to make the square a useable space in a tight urban environment.43
Streetscape’s success depended heavily on Renner Architects’ design approach
for providing an “old world” look, ability to control complicated budgets and projects,
and interest in preserving the HTW. The HTWA especially considered the latter when
contracting Renner for the job. Because the HTWA believed it saw in Renner Architects
all these qualities, the architecture firm beat out competing companies such as BMR
Design Group, Kubala Washatko Architects, TRIAD Engineering, and Schroeder/Pivoni,
Inc., for the job of coordinating the project. Renner even beat out Streetscape’s designer,
M. Paul Friedberg and Partners, for the bid.44
After a conceptual plan was adopted from Friedberg’s design, the City of
Milwaukee and an engineering staff developed construction documents and a budget and
began the paving portion of the project in the summer of 1990. Even the paving
materials were compatible with the materials used in area buildings, continuing the theme
of a unified, consistent look for all elements in the ward. In September 1990, Renner was
hired to review the plans and specifications as prepared by the City. In time, Renner
became the architect of choice. Renner developed a computerized budget (along with a
series of design recommendations regarding the budget by the HTW Streetscape
Committee) of all TIF elements contained in the project, and the firm suggested alternate
building materials or methods that could offer aesthetic concepts without exceeding the
budget. BID-2 officials, who pushed for the project to be completed on time during the

75
1991 construction season, adopted a time line for the Streetscape Project, which Renner
Architects worked to match. The chosen contractor for Streetscape was involved in a 30-
day Design Development Phase (plus ten days for Christmas) that allowed for more
thorough base drawings, refined light fixture designs, street sign options, bench designs,
and more; a 30-day Construction Documents Phase; and 30 days of bidding. Following
these were six months of Construction Monitoring, which can involve onsite construction
inspections, material and workmanship verification to ensure that the work complies with
design plans and specifications, building permit completions and sign-off verification,
financial summaries for final projects, soil and concrete testing, preparation of
certification forms and construction reports, and preserving natural habitats for trees and
animals.45
During the Design Development Phase, Renner’s responsibilities were to resolve
any basic design issues that remained unresolved in the Friedberg plan, update and add
detail to the budget for TIF projects, determine the cost implications for each design
option, use Arris Software to compile and develop a thorough base drawing for the entire
district, and refine the light fixture design (location, photometrics, uplights, outlets, and
holders for banners) to the satisfaction of the City and BID-2. In addition, Streetscape
Project officials allowed Renner to design, illustrate, and estimate the costs for entry gate
options; select and detail the lighting for the arcades; suggest improvements for arcade
designs; develop options for street signage; draw illustrations of every granite piece
required for Streetscape; document the City’s requirements for parking signs; and detail
trash containers. A construction document phase involved blue-line prints of the plans
for all bid work, as well as the specifications that included the City’s requirements. The

76
Bidding Phase involved Renner’s work with the City and BID-2 to develop a strategy for
bidding and its assistance in developing bid packages and bid forms. Construction
Monitoring enabled Renner to monitor the progress of Streetscape. In the event of
deviations from the contract, Renner had to notify City and BID-2 officials. In the
meantime, the firm reviewed shop drawings and samples relevant to the project, prepared
change orders, and negotiated changes with the City.46 Because Renner made many
design changes from the initial plans that were drawn up by Streetscape designer M. Paul
Friedberg and Partners, the HTWA exercised the fourth clause in its contract with the
original designer. In 1991, the HTWA terminated its contract with Friedberg, and the
HTWA began communicating design changes to the other design consultant, Renner.47
Renner Architects then worked and communicated with contractor Hunzinger, a local
Brookfield-based construction company out of Waukesha County, to construct the
project.
Having secured another Third Ward project, Renner Architects, in a letter to the
HTWA, highlighted its goals and objectives for Streetscape. The letter reinforced that
involvement on every level – from property owners to architects – was critical for such a
large scale project to be successful and to be consistent with the ward’s historic character.
HTW officials intended Streetscape to enhance the HTW’s image as a neighborhood with
its own special character, as well as to enhance the HTW’s image as the region’s
innovative mixed-use area. If done correctly, Streetscape could encourage shopping,
dining, and living in the ward. Because of Renner’s familiarity with the HTW and
Milwaukee, the HTWA felt sure that it was getting the best value for the construction
dollar in a $2.7 million budget. The HTWA also believed that Renner’s work would be

77
consistent with and complement the historic character, scale, and architecture of the
neighborhood, from the major implementations to the lights, and that the overall plan
would be reasonable for the City to maintain.48
Yet another letter to Don Burda of the Department of Public Works (DPW) from
Peter Renner of Renner Architects stressed the architecture firm’s belief that cooperation
at every level was critical to Streetscape’s success. Cooperation was a task for more than
just the HTWA. Peter Renner wrote, “In order to resolve all the open design issues
during the month of January, the Streetscape Committee, Third Ward Board, the BID
Board, and everybody involved from the City of Milwaukee will have to be involved in
and make prompt design decisions.”49 In response to this letter, those involved in
Streetscape agreed upon three follow-up dates for all involved parties to meet, discuss,
and get involved with design issues, which will be discussed later.
Perhaps Renner’s idea that cooperation would make or break Streetscape spilled
over to the other parties. For example, acting upon the request for neighborhood
cooperation, Milwaukee’s Department of Public Works issued letters to HTW property
owners who had utility vaults in the public way and who were affected by the
improvement project. These letters encouraged their cooperation with and compliance to
construction codes, while inconvenient at times. The letters stated that an awareness of
Streetscape and its effects on neighborhood properties could encourage cooperation
between the parties. The City of Milwaukee, particularly the DPW, hoped that
cooperation would eliminate undue costs, delays, and inconvenience, helping to ensure
that the project moved forward in a timely manner.50 The local property owners may have
complied with construction codes in any case, but the HTWA stepped in and exercised its

78
mediating power to work on behalf of those affected. Supposedly, this mediation could
give the owners the peace-of-mind that local leadership was effectively working on their
behalf to protect their interests, as well as the neighborhood in a fiscally-responsible way.
In other words, HTWA mediation could eliminate the feelings held by local property
owners that they were alone or defenseless against the City in neighborhood matters. For
example, operation and maintenance of vaulted walks, under normal circumstances, were
considered the financial responsibility of the property owners. Vaulted walks are
sidewalks built over basement spaces; they require maintenance and careful attention to
prevent collapsing or cracking under heavy weights. The HTWA worked with the City
of Milwaukee to establish a “Pedestrian Lighting Construction, Operation and
Maintenance Agreement.” This agreement reimbursed property owners for both the
engineering work and the installation of pedestrian light fixtures on vaulted walkways as
long as HTW owners hired a professional engineer licensed by the State of Wisconsin.
The professional engineers assessed the structural condition of the vaulted sidewalks.51
When Streetscape coincided with a local business’ own remodeling and
construction project, complications could have poorly affected both Streetscape and the
business’ project, so it was important that officials for both projects cooperate. As an
indicator that interest was returning to the HTW, the Skylight Opera Theatre embarked
upon a remodel campaign and new construction phase for a building located at 158 N.
Broadway Street. Unfortunately, Skylight’s project was set to happen at the same time as
Streetscape. Skylight Opera officials indicated in a letter to BID-2 officials that it did not
want to interfere with Streetscape because it would “better serve the interests of [the
HTW].”52 Perhaps Skylight officials realized the economic impact that Streetscape could

79
have on the local area and on their own business. At the same time, HTWA and BID-2
officials did not prevent the theater remodel. Major complications and project
slowdowns were avoided in this matter as the involved parties cooperated to better
enhance the HTW.53
While having two simultaneous projects planned for the ward may have required
additional planning and could have caused delays or construction complications, the
situation actually benefited all parties by reducing some costs. For example, officials
worked out an agreement that eliminated the need for some of the work around Skylight
to be done twice, which also decreased the amount of materials. In the terms of the
agreement, Hunzinger Construction Company installed the light fixtures as planned, but
Skylight paid the City of Milwaukee to remove the fixtures in the way of its private
construction, and to store them until the end of Skylight’s construction. As a way to save
money for the HTW, the sidewalks on Menomonee Street were not replaced until after
Skylight’s construction, rather than install new ones that would be destroyed again by
Skylight’s campaign. In addition, bollards and trees were not brought in until after both
projects were completed; this, too, saved money because trees did not have to be
unnecessarily dug up and replanted. Furthermore, as a way to combine “old world”
charm with modern accommodations in the HTW, Streetscape officials began providing
sloped wheelchair access, particularly in front of Skylight’s entrance as requested by
Skylight officials (the next closest sloped walkway was on the corner of Broadway and
Menomonee Streets).54 As a result, these arrangements spared labor costs in that the
sidewalk on Menomonee Street, the bollards located on the northeast side of Broadway
and Menomonee Streets, and the lampposts from the south and west property lines of

80
Skylight were all delayed until after Skylight’s construction.55 This was part of an
“Operation and Maintenance Agreement” for TID-11 Streetscape Project. This
agreement stated that BID-2 was responsible for providing and paying for ten percent of
replacement materials as well as storing materials in a HTW warehouse, and the City was
responsible for providing and paying for the labor to perform any necessary repair work
as well as storing light fixtures at a Canal Street storage facility.56 Because of these
arrangements made through the City-business partnership, the Skylight Theatre
construction and Streetscape Project were conducted (and completed) by limiting
unnecessary financial costs for the other party through the combination of several
procedures into one step (rather than repeat the same action for each project).
In most cases, local business owners were willing to collaborate with Streetscape
officials to ensure that the project operated smoothly. Many in the local business
community supported the project because of the potential economic boost or financial
gain it could also bring. Some business owners may have even relied on the project for
the economic survival of their businesses. For example, Tom Wamser, who owned the
Beck Carton Building, enthusiastically supported Streetscape and what it meant for the
redevelopment of the ward. He believed that street improvements were necessary, and he
also understood the potential financial gain for his company as a result of Streetscape
improvements. Hopefully, Streetscape would encourage increased economic and
pedestrian activity within the ward, which would benefit Wamser’s own business. As a
result, he agreed to open up the ground floor of his building to retail use as a way to
encourage more pedestrian and economic activity. When asked, Wamser also agreed to
construct an elaborate stairway and ramp system to provide easier access to the retail

81
floor; this combined modern accessibility with historic architecture and showed how
older buildings could be adaptively reused. And when Streetscape plans called for
repaving only at street ends, Wamser welcomed Renner’s proposal to repave Chicago
Street from Broadway to Milwaukee Streets.57
Streetscape Project, divided into four phases (Electrical, Forestry, Paving, and
Administrative), was intended to make the HTW a unique and distinctive place both
during the day and at night.58 This was to be achieved through the implementation of
welcoming archways that read “Historic Third Ward” as a way to alleviate the confusion
some had between the HTW and Milwaukee’s Old World Third Street. Adequate
lighting featured unified fixtures that blended with the historic character of the
surroundings (high bay, high security cobra head-style lights, which tended to cast a
dreary yellow glow upon the ward, were eliminated59). New greenery did not obstruct
views of historic buildings. In addition, trash receptacles, mid-block parks, trees, and
even plant holders were strictly managed and researched. A HTWA press release
indicated that Streetscape incorporated 287 double luminaire light fixtures, two mid-
block arcades, two gateway arches, a fountain park (the drainable fountain was designed
to be transformed into a performance stage, featuring ampitheater-style seating, picnic
tables, and two 6 x 20 feet raised flower beds), a pedestrian mall, 130 uplights, 100
percent integrated signage, and finally, re-routed traffic along Broadway Street.60
Streetscape addressed some of the HTW’s parking and traffic-related issues.
Parking and Streetscape were meant to complement each other, and a parking structure
was to be Streetscape’s follow-up. For example, the 100 block of N. Broadway was
changed from a one-way to a two-way street; Streetscape officials ordered the removal of

82
all parking meters along that street from E. Erie Street to E. Buffalo Street with imposed
60-minute parking restrictions between 7:00 A.M. and 3:30 P.M. and no overnight
parking between December 1 and March 1.61 Parking regulations enforced two-hour,
metered, parallel parking between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. on both sides of all east-west
streets: E. St. Paul Street from N. Water Street to N. Van Buren Street, E. Buffalo Street
from N. Water Street to N. Jefferson Street, and E. Chicago Street from N. Water Street
to N. Jackson Street.62 Even the parking meters complemented Streetscape’s objective:
“If we are gong to incorporate these machines, they should be integrated into the overall
design, as we have spent endless hours coordinating all the other [S]treetscape elements
in the district.”63 Parking meters, operable with nickels, dimes, and quarters, were
comprised of heavy duty, vandal-resistant construction; nine-gauge steel; an error
detection system; and communication system capability (among others).64 Furthermore,
two-way traffic was retained on N. Jefferson between E. St. Paul and E. Erie with angled,
meter parking on one side and parallel parking on the other, and N. Jackson was
converted from a one-way street to a two-way between E. St. Paul and E. Buffalo.65
The Streetscape Project resulted in the removal of the three traffic islands on N.
Water Street at E. Buffalo (2) and E. Chicago (1) to permit better truck turning
movements onto E. Buffalo and E. Chicago Streets, where curb pushouts had been
constructed.66 Since the mixed-use HTW was still the site for some warehousing, truck
traffic was not uncommon. In fact, problems with trucks were noticeable since the
1980s. In 1989, numerous traffic problems and complaints were filed regarding loading
zones at 230 E. Buffalo Street. Trucks tended to block sidewalks or double-park on
streets, and general allegations rose about the abuses of loading zone privileges.67

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Those involved with Streetscape considered the project, which was completed in
1992, a success and a great achievement for Milwaukee, particularly the HTW. Some of
the success may have been due to cooperation in the neighborhood. For example, the
HTWA and BID-2 seemed to share a clear, unified vision for the district and formulated
goals to achieve that vision. Perhaps the TIF plan had something to do with their close
relationship and sharing of a unified vision. If Streetscape failed, then the local HTW
economy would also likely have failed, causing problems for BID-2 because it
guaranteed the plan. The architecture firm had to share the same goals with the HTWA
and BID-2. Perhaps HTWA and BID-2 officials felt this was important or else very little
would be accomplished. Cooperation also meant strong client involvement at every level
was integrated into the plan. To its credit, the HTWA’s Streetscape Committee involved
the neighborhood on almost every issue. At weekly meetings, selected design
committees held open discussions and reviewed and approved all design elements, cost
estimates, schedules, documents, and bids. Design committees were involved in every
step from the beginning talks with Renner through the final construction documents. In a
HTWA document, the HTWA indicated (along with Renner Architects) that
neighborhood-wide cooperation helped to achieve the goals for Streetscape – create an
identity of a mixed use, innovative district that articulated the area’s special arts
character; emphasize the historical significance and unique architecture in the area; and
implement the vision of property owners, tenants, and residents by involving them in a
design process that included them in every element of design and budget options.68 So did
Streetscape officials consider the project a success because it enhanced the historic look

84
and feel of the neighborhood in a unified way or because the economic intake resulting
from the project increased? What determined Streetscape as a success?
The matter of Streetscape’s success has been measured using the following facts
and figures, and Streetscape supporters tend to use these in defense of the improvement
project. Immediately after project completion, media exposure, word-of-mouth
awareness, and pedestrian traffic increased. In addition, approximately 7,000 local
employees found work as a result of Streetscape in new HTW businesses and
construction-related employment, and Renner won the Wisconsin Main Street Award for
the best downtown development in Wisconsin.69 The HTW’s 11-block, $25.5 million
redevelopment campaign attracted more attention and new businesses, and the HTWA
won the Achievement Award from the International Downtown Association for “trend
setting in the [U.S.]” and for its “innovative management style.”70 The HTWA’s award
was in the category of “Physical Improvement Projects.”
A BID-2 press release on September 28, 1993, indicated that at the Achievement
Award ceremony in Richmond, Virginia, the HTWA and the City of Milwaukee took
Streetscape one step further by signing an ongoing “Maintenance and Operation
Agreement,” in which the HTWA assumed the major responsibilities for upkeep and for
underwriting maintenance costs.71 In 1991, there had been speculation over which legal
body had the decision-making authority regarding Streetscape. BID-2 was the
contracting agent along with the City of Milwaukee, but the HTWA Board and its
subcommittees had authority (as stated in the “Cooperation Agreement” between BID-2
and the HTWA) to carry out all the services outlined in Section III(C) of BID-2’s “Year
Four Operating Plan.” In that section, it was specified that the HTWA was responsible

85
for “managing the affairs of the district and implementing the [TID]-11 Plan[,]” which
referred to Streetscape specifically.72 Therefore, the HTWA and its appointed
subcommittees had the power to make and implement design decisions for Streetscape.
Since the HTWA deemed its project a success, the association anticipated future
improvements for the HTW such as a 500-car parking facility and an increase in owner-
occupied housing, additional retail, and commercial real estate developments.73
While the HTW received accolades and awards and was recognized both locally
and nationally as a major success story in terms of design and economic revitalization,
some critics were not pleased with the HTW’s Streetscape developments. For example, a
1992 Milwaukee Magazine article blamed those involved with the HTW for wasting
money on one of Milwaukee’s costliest neighborhood improvement projects. Critics said
the project achieved nothing but bland conformity, evident in the uniform sage-colored
lampposts, parking meters, and trash cans. While critics acknowledged that the picnic
tables, miniature parks, bandstands, and amphitheater provided possibilities for outdoor
recreation and relaxation, they criticized the gateways for looking more postmodern than
historic. Critics looked to the concrete posts for serving as pedestrian obstacles, rather
than providing visual definition. In addition, critics blamed curb cuts for hindering
traffic, benches for not facing the streets or bus stops, and lamps for being positioned too
close together and not blending with the rest of downtown’s lights. These same critics
called out an overabundance of the following: pedestrian malls, overly-designed streets,
and unified signage. Editorialist Judith Woodburn said that cities must refrain from
trying to become like suburban centers that are homogenous, uniform neighborhoods
comprised of people with similar backgrounds. Cities, she said, thrive on diversity to

86
inject new life into the area; the visual character of cities should reflect the fact that cities
are places where anything can happen. To her, the HTW is unique because it contains
beauty and grace – too much décor hides these and robs the HTW of its authenticity.74
Rebuttals to such critiques cited the improved economy, increased vehicular and
pedestrian traffic, and revitalized developments in the area. Furthermore, defendants of
the HTW’s Streetscape activity pointed to a reduction in the HTW crime rate by 80
percent (property crime and vandalism), a 300 percent increase in sales at some retail and
restaurant establishments, an increase in media coverage and attendance at special events
(highest attendance recorded at the 1992 Annual Best Block Party), and $23 million in
private investments in the ward.75 Streetscape supporters progressively added more fuel
to their fire – declines in retail space vacancy and increases in property values by 1998.76
Again, supporters of Streetscape continued to look at success in terms of economic
figures that showed the ward’s increasing revenue.
Parking and Traffic Issues
With the completion of Streetscape, proposals for a new parking structure in the
ward moved forward. As mentioned earlier, Streetscape was the first step of the two-part
plan for the HTW; the second step involved the parking facility. But that did not mean
HTW officials were not preparing for the parking facility during Streetscape’s progress.
As anticipated by HTW officials, Streetscape did not entirely resolve every parking and
traffic issue for the ward, so the TIF plan included a much-needed parking facility.
While Streetscape was underway, leaders began the task of planning the parking structure
so that it would be built by 1994 – just two years after the completion of the Streetscape
Project.

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This section will provide a brief history of the planning and politics that went into
the proposed parking facility. This project, like Streetscape, had a major impact on the
HTW’s economy and revitalization efforts. At the same time, the facility had to blend
with the surrounding historic environment. This brief history will lead to a better
understanding of the parking and traffic issues in the HTW, and it will document the
struggles that went into planning the structure.
Traffic in the HTW was causing problems as far back as 1985 when the City, the
Department of Community Development, and the HTWA commissioned Bennet-
Ringrose-Wolsfeld-Jarvis-Gardner, Inc., a Minneapolis consulting firm, for a parking and
traffic study (the HTWA contributed $20,000). This study was issued because changes in
land use were encouraging new interest in the ward as a result of the protection from the
National Register of Historic Places. This new interest was expected to increase parking
demand and traffic volumes. At the time of the study, one-third of the land in the area
was vacant, but was anticipated to decline to only 16 percent of the gross leasable land by
1994. Manufacturing had decreased in the gross leasable area, and warehouses,
wholesale businesses, and manufacturing decreased in the total area and became
concentrated in the southern part of Subarea A (Subarea A will be detailed in the
following paragraph). Retail space, offices, and restaurants increased in the total area
with offices serving as the predominant land use by 1994. Furthermore, an increase in
HTW residential units (127 total) was expected for 1994 with the Kolmar Building
hosting most of the new units; 16 units existed at the time of the study.77 By 1993,
650,000 square feet of vacant space existed within TID-11 boundaries, and 800,000

88
square feet of vacant space belonged to the HTW proper. The HTWA expected that
former warehouses could be put to more commercial uses based on the projected growth
of the area, meaning that more parking would be needed.78 As a result of these land use
changes, new parking space could help to ease the transition. Parking availability could
aid in redevelopment by keeping the HTW competitive with other local areas by
attracting customers and new businesses.79 The Minneapolis consulting firm confirmed
that a parking shortage hindered the HTW, and the ward would continue to experience
problems if no action was taken (see Table 2, Parking Forecast).80
Table 2. Parking Forecast for the Historic Third Ward area.
Parking Forecast81
(Short-Term Parkers: Visitors and Customers)
(Long-Term Parkers: Employees and Residents)
Parking Supply: 400 On-Street 1,232 Off-Street
Parking Demand
1984 236 Short-Term 1,537 Long-Term
1989 299 Short-Term 1,814 Long-Term
1994 313 Short-Term 2,011 Long-Term
Surplus (Deficiency)
1984 164 Short-Term (305) Long-Term
1989 101 Short-Term (582) Long-Term
1994 87 Short-Term (779) Long-Term
The study identified two types of parking problems: an overall shortage of
parking spaces for residents and workers and a shortage of spaces for short-term use by
visitors and customers. In addition, the study indicated two types of traffic circulation
problems: a lack of alternative direct access routes connecting the HTW to the central
business district and occasional blockage of traffic by trucks loading and unloading at
places like Commission Row. Again, truck-related problems continued to affect the

89
HTW. The Minneapolis firm recommended alternatives for short-term parking shortages,
including utilizing on-street spaces, converting parallel parking to diagonal, and utilizing
off-street surface lots. Alternatives for long-term parking shortages included using
excess on-street spaces, constructing a parking facility on the fringe of the HTW, and
constructing a remote parking facility. Furthermore, alternatives for the access and
circulation problems were retaining existing circulation patterns, using Broadway and
Milwaukee Streets as a one-way pair, and emphasizing Milwaukee Street as a through,
north-south route. To support these proposals, the 1985 traffic study included a three-
part survey in the data. This space occupancy survey, which was conducted in 1984, was
supposed to determine the characteristics of the current parking supply and the current
uses for parking. This survey used interviews with visitors, residents, and employees in
order to understand the current parking practices in the area. The survey divided the
geographic areas covered into Subarea A and Subarea B.82
Researchers for the traffic study collected space occupancy data for Subarea A on
October 9-11, 1984. They observed 500 on-street and 2,370 off-street parking spaces.
Results from this part of the survey included the following: parking supply was fully
utilized from 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M., parking demand peaked during mid-morning and
fell at mid-afternoon, 99 percent of public spaces were utilized during peak hours, and
essentially no short-term parking was available for customers or visitors. In Subarea B,
90 percent of public spaces in the northern half was utilized during normal, peak parking
periods, and was considered fully utilized. The lowest occupancy rates existed in remote
areas. Interviews, which targeted the existing and future land uses, utilized questions
about the current parking problems, the length of stay required for a legitimate parking

90
need, sensitivity to walking distances, and the location of parking facilities to reveal that
public parking under the freeway was used primarily by the workers employed on its
north side. Results also showed that employees, customers, and visitors often walked
more than three blocks to reach their destinations in the HTW and that loading zones
were limited in some areas (deliveries were held back in some areas because of limited
parking). In summary, parkers fully utilized almost all available space in both subareas
between 9:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. Workers north of the freeway used most of the public
parking in Subarea A, leaving little for customers and visitors. A 98 percent occupancy
level for on-street parking between 11:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M. suggested that off-street
lots were reserved for specific users rather than the public. Furthermore, Subarea A
employees seemed to adjust to parking conditions by using mass transit, carpooling, and
obtaining rides to work.83
Bennett-Ringrose-Wolsfeld-Jarvis-Gardner, Inc., factored Summerfest, located in
Subarea A, into the parking and traffic study because the growing summer music festival
heavily impacted parking. Festival attendees often fully used on-street parking within six
blocks of Henry Maier Festival Park during Summerfest’s hours of operation. Cars often
double parked and blocked alleys during the summer festival, resulting in congestion and
difficult parking conditions. The study revealed that Summerfest attendees preferred to
park at no cost, which meant walking several blocks to avoid paying for closer parking,
but exiting the HTW more quickly by avoiding traffic congestion after the festival.84 The
Minneapolis firm believed that “[p]arking in the Third Ward will probably always be
difficult during Summerfest.”85

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Parking was one side of the issue. Traffic flow problems made up the other side.
Many HTW streets were actually barriers to safe and easy access to the ward. Harbor
Drive, which averaged 2,000 vehicles per day, was limited due to a lack of direct
connections to downtown and local streets across the Milwaukee River. Milwaukee and
Broadway Streets did not continue as a one-way pair from downtown into the HTW to
allow on-street truck parking along Commission Row. Jackson and Van Buren Streets
failed to serve the entire HTW because the latter terminated one block south of the
freeway at Buffalo Street. Chicago Street was the only continuous east-west street south
of the freeway; it linked Water Street on the west with Harbor Drive on the east. Finally,
St. Paul Avenue and Clybourn Street made up a one-way pair that served mainly as a
collection and distribution function for freeway traffic.86
One suggestion for improving the parking and traffic situation was turning the
County-owned Coachyards site into a parking lot. Milwaukee County and interested
developers had debated the future of this land for nearly ten years; in fact, Milwaukee
County rejected bids by local developers, the City of Milwaukee, and Italian Community
Center officials earlier in 1985. Bennet-Ringrose-Wolsfeld-Jarvis-Gardner, Inc., believed
that one-fourth of Coachyards land should be turned into surface parking. If the
remaining portion of land was developed, a parking structure should be constructed.
During the day, employees could access the structure, and festival-goers and other
visitors could use it during the evening hours. Once long-term parkers moved to
Coachyards, short-term parking needs could be satisfied with adequate space on the
streets. In addition to this plan, the firm suggested opening N. Milwaukee Street as a

92
two-way road from downtown to E. Erie Street; this would provide another direct entry
route to and from the HTW.87
Retail growth, already generating the parking problems, suggested an increase in
problems. Prior to Streetscape, a small amount of retail attracted some pedestrian
activity, but HTW officials expected retail to be distributed throughout the HTW as
redevelopment and increased exposure of the ward continued; thus, some believed that
short-term parking should be distributed. Two alternatives existed – utilize on-street
parking (this maximized the ability to change numbers and location of spaces designated
for short-term parking) or build long-term parking. Those in favor of Coachyards as a
parking facility believed its use would also generate revenue in addition to provide
parking. Proponents stressed two options for the continued use of the area for Third
Ward parking if the Coachyards site was developed: reserve a portion of the site for a
long-term surface parking lot, or allow an even greater development on Coachyards that
would provide parking in structures. But the latter option required relocation of
Commission Row and changes in traffic flow patterns in the northern part of the HTW.
If this site was unavailable for HTW parking, some claimed a structure could be
constructed on the north block of Chicago Street and east of Milwaukee Street. Yet a
third alternative existed. It recommended changing Milwaukee Street to a continuous
two-way street between Kilbourn Avenue and Erie Street, making Milwaukee Street
more useable. If this was not possible, study officials suggested improvements to the
transition from a two-way street to a one-way. Those in favor of this third alternative
believed that business activity or pedestrian traffic along Broadway would not be
disrupted. In addition to this alternative, a review of loading zone regulations and

93
practices in the HTW would help, and truck activity needed close regulation to preserve
parking and traffic capacity. Some believed that the aforementioned third alternative
could also reduce the negative impact that Summerfest had on parking and circulation in
the HTW. On-street parking regulations could reduce or eliminate parking on HTW
streets by festival-goers. Additional parking facilities in the area could also serve festival
visitors at times when HTW demand was low.88
Because the parking shortage was based mainly on retail potential, officials
believed that the overall shortage of parking spaces in the HTW could intensify
significantly over a short period of time as the area was revitalized. Short-term parking
demands could be accommodated in existing, on-street spaces by removing long-term
parkers, or employee parking. This long-term parking demand could best be
accommodated in the aforementioned proposed parking structure on the south or east side
of the HTW, possibly Coachyards. At the time of the 1985 traffic and parking study, the
HTW contained approximately 3.1 million square feet of development space. This
development space was anticipated to be converted to office and retail use by 1994,
indicating a change in land use. Projections were accurate. As land uses changed, a
greater need for parking was inevitable; therefore, new development in the HTW
depended on effective parking solutions.89 Due to the HTW’s revitalization, it was
important to make the area as appealing as possible to attract prospective businesses and
tenants, as well as afford existing businesses the opportunity to grow and expand. A
proposed parking structure was key to keeping the area viable and was an important
element in enabling Milwaukee to compete with its suburban counterparts.90 The
following will expand these ideas.

94
When the City created TID-11 in 1988, Graven and Associates (also of
Minneapolis, Minnesota) suggested in its Historic Third Ward Tax Increment Financing
District Economic and Financial Feasibility Study/Joint Review Board Criteria Analysis
that a parking ramp be delayed until 1990 or 1991. By delaying construction, market
values and the amount of redevelopment activity could be better estimated in TID-11.
Also, it allowed for more accurate projections in evaluating the risks to the City and
HTW property owners. Moreover, a delay allowed officials to better assess development
activity in the HTW as a result of public improvements or nearby developments. In the
end, this decision helped to avoid unnecessary risks for Milwaukee and its property
owners.91
As plans progressed by 1991, officials pointed to a lack of funds in the upcoming
year’s budget (1992) for the project’s completion, especially since the HTWA favored
building a high quality structure. In the short run, capital costs would be higher, but in
the long run, maintenance and replacement costs would be lower and more spread out,
especially since technology improved the quality and life of structures. Alderman Paul
Henningsen headed the charge against the speculation over the lack of funds. He
believed that adequate increases in the HTW tax base were enough to support funding.
He vowed to spearhead an effort to get the appropriate funds if designing, bidding, and
constructing were to move forward in 1992.92 Recalling the TIF plan from 1988, a
parking structure within the HTW could be an eligible project cost for TID-11. The City
could pay for initial construction of a parking structure through TIF.93 In 1992, the
Common Council of Milwaukee approved entering a “Preliminary Agreement” with
BID-2 to provide TID funds to BID-2 for the retention of legal counsel to assist the BID-

95
2 Board with the necessary legal documents for undertaking construction and operation
of the parking ramp. The Common Council also approved a “Cooperation Agreement”
with the Redevelopment Authority to provide $300,000 in TID funds for undertaking
environmental and soil testing and acquisition of the proposed site for the ramp.94
But the problem with the parking ramp plans was that the TID borrowing
authority within the DCD Capital Improvement Budget could not fund every project
planned by the DCD, so a budget amendment was pursued for the 1994 budget.
Sponsored by Alderman Paul Henningsen, the amendment was introduced on November
4, 1993.95 This amendment to the TIF plan increased the TID borrowing authority by $5
million, which allowed for funding a parking structure without affecting the capacity to
complete other TID projects.96 TID expenditures had to be paid by September 1995,
which meant that construction had to be finished by the end of 1994 in order to give the
City time to close the account. If the project was not funded by 1994, the parking
structure could not be built, which could have a negative impact on Milwaukee’s tax
base, including causing many existing and prospective tenants to choose the suburbs for
the location of their businesses.97 With serious talk heating up, more than just the HTWA
believed a parking facility was the answer to the parking problems in the ward.
Even the BID Association commented that a parking structure was required to
serve the increasing parking needs of the HTW, as well as retain existing businesses and
enhance the HTW’s competitive position relative to suburban locations.98 But the HTW
was constantly losing ground to the suburbs, because they offered ample parking. For so
long, the HTW could not assure potential businesses that sufficient parking would be
available for their employees or customers.

96
The following are specific instances in which the HTW lost tenants for
Milwaukee based solely on the parking shortage in the area. The Mortenson
Construction Company needed 20,000 square feet with approximately 25 to 30 parking
spaces. Allied Computers required 25,000 square feet with 35 parking spaces (or more).
Barger Bakeries called for 8,000 square feet with ten spaces for employees and additional
spots for customers. In addition to these prospective tenants, other potential tenants
contacted the HTWA because they were considering moving from the suburbs into the
HTW. Systems Programming and Resources of Brookfield required 7,500 square feet
with 12 spaces for employees. Elite Embroidery asked for 20,000 square feet for offices
and manufacturing capabilities along with 12 employee parking spots. Gilded Edge Art
Gallery and Framing Shop requested 2,500 square feet with three employee parking
spaces and additional ones for customers. Greater Milwaukee Open’s (GMO) request for
10,000 square feet and 15 parking spaces was too great to receive assurance from the
HTWA that adequate space would be available.99 Herman Weingrod, owner of The
Phoenix Building, issued a letter to Milwaukee’s Common Council in October 1993
stating that he was forced to lease over 30 spaces from other surface parking lot owners
to provide adequate parking for his current tenants. In addition, Weingrod delayed his
plans for a 16,000-square foot renovation because he could not lease additional spaces
from other lot owners, who notified him of rather lengthy waiting lists for parking spots.
When the renovation began, The Phoenix Building was unable to provide parking for
additional employees brought in by the renovation.100 Still more, Curtis C. Gielow,
president and CEO of Gielow Associates, Inc., wrote Joan Zepecki, requesting a parking
structure be constructed because he was renting several spaces in three different locations

97
with some employees actually parking on the streets. Not only was this a hassle, but it
was expensive because he leased 12 to 15 spaces on a monthly or annual basis.101 Jeffrey
Posner, owner of the Posner Building, made clear his dissatisfaction with the parking
shortage and his belief that a structure was vital; he lost a tenant looking for 25,000
square feet because of a lack of parking. The prospective tenant was searching for at
least 30 parking spots. Instead of investing in Milwaukee, particularly the HTW, the
tenant chose to build a new facility in a nearby suburb. At the same time, Posner was
working with another tenant who needed 300 spaces; however, only 150 could be
provided.102 After these failed attempts to attract new businesses based on parking needs,
the parking deck became the “cornerstone of continued development in [the] area.”103 It
seems that the parking structure, by this time, meant more for revitalization than
Streetscape.
Having operations in a business district in transition, HTW property owners
desperately wanted a parking structure for the economic survival of the ward, which also
meant the economic survival of their own businesses. As the ward became more active
with employees, residents, and tourists, and as traffic increased due to the changing use
of the warehouse buildings toward commercial, residential, and manufacturing, parking
demands in the HTW also increased, according to a BID-2 document.104 One local
apartment landlord (147 N. Broadway) said, “This latest parking ‘squeeze’ is affecting
my tenants and having a negative impact on the residents who cannot find parking
anywhere near their apartments. This impacts my ability to lease my building.”105 A
parking structure was an “integral part of continued development of [the]
neighborhood.”106 Another local business owner (The Gardner Group Ltd.) commented,

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“The structure is absolutely necessary if the [HTW] is going to remain competitive in
today’s changing economy.”107 As mentioned earlier, HTW property owners lost many
suburban tenants interested in moving to the city because the ward could not meet the
parking demands or adjust to changes in the local economy. A property owner
commented,
Property owners in the [HTW] are trying to adjust to the changes in our
economy. We have worked hard to become a center for high tech and
professional service businesses. If our momentum is going to continue,
we need to provide the same amenities that the suburbs do[,] and the
reality is that parking is one of those amenities.108
Developers were converting more urban shopping centers to match suburban malls. Why
not do the same for parking structures? But for historic areas, how would parking
facilities blend in with the surroundings?
HTW officials believed that property east of Milwaukee Street would continue to
develop, so more surface parking lots could be lost. For example, 150 spaces were lost
when W.W. Grainger developed at 232 N. Jackson Street. Additionally, the new
Broadway Theatre and the relocated Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design resulted in
even more parking demands, and the Skylight Opera Theatre believed that a parking
structure could help 400 to 500 nightly visitors to its shows find secure, convenient
spaces to park. This could enhance the visitors’ experience by giving patrons a
pleasurable, safe visit.109 A BID-2 document stated that a centrally located structure could
assist in the development of the HTW and could also provide an important infill
structure.110 Zepecki indicated that the HTW’s problem rested on the fact that there was
ample vacant building space for prospective tenants to redevelop the area but little space
for them to park.111 But was surface parking the best use of land within the HTW?

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Even those businesses that were minimally impacted by the parking structure
iterated a need for more parking. Paul Armstrong, owner of Miller-Armstrong Costume
Service stated,
As a property and business owner…on Water Street, the structure’s impact
on my business may only be minimal[;] however, my support is
unwavering because I know that the structure is necessary if we are going
to continue on our path of redevelopment [in the HTW]….112
Frank Krejci of White Elephant Partners noted,
[The] parking structure’s direct impact on my property and its tenants will
be minimal. Nonetheless, I support the project even though it puts me at
some financial risk through the [BID]. I have been a part of this
neighborhood’s transition and therefore realize that the structure is vital to
continue the area’s redevelopment momentum.113
As part of the TID-11 plan and as a follow-up to Streetscape, the parking structure
became a central issue. BID-2 was committed to building a 500-stall structure. Events
involving a local company, Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI), generated the acquisition of a
site between N. Milwaukee and Jefferson Streets (212 N. Milwaukee).114 By undertaking
this project, BID-2 ensured that the City was using TID-11 funds exactly as intended; in
fact, TID funds allowed for a moderately-priced parking structure.115 BID-2 owned,
operated, managed, and maintained the TID-financed parking structure, and it paid
property taxes and guaranteed that the full amount of the TID-11 debt service was paid to
the City.116 In other words, the parking structure, which was subject to property taxes,
was developed with City funds through TID-11 but was owned by BID-2, making it the
financial responsibility of property owners in the BID. BID-2 had to enter an “Operation
and Maintenance Agreement” with the City in order to solidify the promise by BID-2 to
allow the parking garage be opened for public parking at market rates, to properly
maintain the site, to provide revenues for repair and replacement, and to turn over excess

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funds to the City for early retirement of the TID (BID-2 retained all revenue from festival
and off-hour parking).117
The location for this new structure was a site that was owned by JCI. After it
bought the former American Appraisal Building, JCI officials tried to reach a deal for
employee parking at 535 N. Milwaukee Street. If JCI got enough parking spaces for its
workforce, then officials promised to make $6 million in improvements to its corporate
building on N. Milwaukee Street; however, JCI threatened to move its operations to
Glendale, a Milwaukee suburb, if HTW parking availability did not satisfy demand.118 In
1994, an agreement was reached between JCI, the City of Milwaukee, and the HTW BID.
JCI officials agreed to pay $150,000 per year for 50 years to lease a city garage; in
exchange, it would renovate as promised, as well as allow HTW businesses to build a
public parking garage on JCI-owned land near Henry Maier Festival Park on N.
Milwaukee Street.119 In May 1994, the six-year, $5.5 million parking structure plan was
moving ahead. The HTW BID agreed to lease the site for the proposed parking structure
from JCI, which, at the time, paid property taxes on the site and used it for employee
parking (employees could now park at the new leased location).120
Approved as Phase Two of the Streetscape Project, this ramp could proceed only
if TIF revenues were sufficient to make construction feasible. But TID-11 was one of
Milwaukee’s best performing TIDs; only the Northwestern Mutual Life and Grand
Avenue TIF districts performed better. The value of TID-11 increased from $29.5
million in 1988 to $39.3 million in 1993, resulting in a 33.2 percent increase. Since the
formation of TID-11, the tax base in the area increased by $9.8 million, which was more
than enough to pay for Streetscape. “It is far more beneficial for the City of Milwaukee

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to develop local revenues through increased property values than to rely on the [S]tate
awarding [it] for disinvestment or blight maintenance.”121
In exchange for the site and for accepting the parking inconvenience during
construction, JCI also secured 192 free parking spots (6:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday
through Friday) in the new parking structure for additional employee parking; these spots
were closest to the building and were occupied during specific hours because BID-2
received use of the ramp for evenings, weekends, and special events, which brought in
approximately $50,000 per year to cover the maintenance and operation of the “free” JCI
spaces. Also, projections estimated that retail space could bring in $60,000 more each
year. In other words, “[t]he entire structure can be more than adequately operated and
maintained on the revenue projected….”122 Without this arrangement with JCI, the HTW
would have lost many benefits. These benefits included the additional development of
300,000 square feet in the HTW, a direct result of the ramp, and the creation of
approximately 1,200 new local jobs (excluding construction jobs). Already much growth
in the HTW had occurred because of the mere promise of a new parking facility.123
The $4.5 million structure was slated to include ground floor retail to encourage
pedestrian activity, and it complemented the historic fabric of the HTW, complying with
the Architectural Reveiew Board’s “Design Guidelines.”124 The list of users of the four-
level facility included Johnson Controls’ employees, customers of HTW businesses,
Broadway Theatre patrons, and overnight parkers. The price for using the deck actually
encouraged mass transit use for the average employee so as not to significantly
jeopardize mass transit use in the city. Remember that mass transit relied on these
neighborhoods as its lifeline and for its continual operation. A parking facility seemed to

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enhance the marketability of the HTW.125 Together with architects Eppstein-Keller-Uhen,
Inc. (a local company from Brookfield); general contractor C.G. Schmidt; structural/civil
engineer TOKI and Associates, Inc.; prime design engineer Arnold and O’ Sheridan;
traffic engineer Traffic Engineering Services; owner representative Stephen Perry Smith;
and operator Imperial Parking, the long-awaited plan by BID-2 became a reality.126
Not everyone was in favor of building a parking structure in Milwaukee’s HTW.
Wally Martin Morics, City Comptroller, believed that the growth of the HTW occurred in
the absence of a parking ramp. No ramp meant that the TID could be closed and taxpayer
benefits set to begin in 2001. Construction of a ramp meant that TID-11 would close in
2006. Furthermore, Morics believed that the presence of JCI was economically
devastating to the ramp issue. He claimed that employee spaces were constructed as part
of this new ramp, resulting in over $2 million, or 40 percent, of the $5.5 million project
costs, and they generated nothing in daily parking revenue. Basically, JCI employees
occupied spaces rent-free, but these spaces still required operation and maintenance
costs.127 Later, he stated, “[TIDs] were designed so that taxpayer[-]funded public
improvements would produce future tax base expansion[,] which would not have
occurred without the improvements.”128 He followed up this statement by suggesting that
the increase in value of TID-11 did not justify spending the increment. Morics firmly
believed that the City and its taxpayers were not better off by building a garage in the
HTW. He simply failed to support it because the City had to build and pay for a $5.5
million structure, then transfer it free of charge to a limited group of private property
owners. In the end, city taxpayers were expected to pay 40 percent or more of the cost,
even after all property tax benefits were considered. Morics, who usually supported

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HTW projects that were “close calls” as long as future property values and job expansion
were justified in the equation, called a HTW parking structure “infeasible.”129 Alderman
Paul Henningsen, Moric’s opposition, said that Moric’s financial analysis complicated
the issue. He stated that the ramp was more than a financial transaction; it was an
investment in what he called a blossoming part of Milwaukee. The availability of
parking in the HTW could enable retention and recruitment of businesses, and develop
linkages between residents and city-based employment opportunities. Furthermore,
Henningsen confirmed that an error in the comptroller’s analysis was misleading – 300
parking stalls (those not used by JCI) were not solely intended to pay the $5.5 million in
project costs. Instead, the total TID-11 increment repaid this debt. After all, TID-11
generated $9.8 million between 1988 and 1994.130 In addition, the five-year pro-forma for
the parking garage contained the statistics in Table 3 regarding projected revenue and net
income.131
Table 3. Projected revenue and net income for Historic Third Ward parking facility,
1995-1999.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Revenue $224,900 $235,300 $268,700 $280,700 $296,400
Expenses 141,000 145,400 149,900 154,400 158,900
Net Income* 83,900 89,900 118,800 126,300 137,500
*Excludes property taxes, estimated at $38,000 annually.
By building the structure, the TID that included the proposed site was not closed
(if no structure was built, the TID dissolved in 2001132), the property was not put on tax
rolls until 2006, and the facility created approximately 1,200 local jobs. Nearly 21
percent of the project workers were locals, meaning increased employment for
Milwaukee area residents. Not only did it help alleviate a parking shortage in the area as

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a lack of parking prevented shoppers and visitors from frequenting the HTW, the
proposed parking structure aided Milwaukee’s economy. Joan Zepecki declared that the
ramp “provide[ed] opportunities for disadvantaged business enterprises and unemployed
central city residents….”133 With the cooperation of the general contractor, C.G. Schmidt,
Inc., an agreement helped disadvantaged residents – 21 percent of construction workers
had to be from Milwaukee’s Community Development Block Grant area and be
unemployed for 30 days or more. Michael L. Morgan, Commissioner of the DCD, said,
“This project is important because it stimulates the economy and creates jobs for city
residents. We are committed to providing opportunities for the people and businesses
[that] need them most.”134
When C.G. Schmidt estimated approximately 44,000 hours of labor, it became
more difficult to meet the goal of allowing 21 percent of the work force to be inner-city
residents. In turn, the general contractor hired an administrative assistant to work on the
project and to hire other individuals who qualified for and helped match the 21 percent.
In addition, C.G. Schmidt asked the subcontractors to make a commitment to hire one or
more qualifying individuals in order to meet the balance. This equal employment
opportunity was perhaps another partnership for Milwaukee, and it proved important to
Milwaukee’s local economy and to the public’s reception of the parking structure.
Moreover, it represented the continuing efforts in the HTW to cooperatively involve as
many local people as possible in helping to revitalize the area. In other words, local
residents actually led the revitalization efforts. Zepecki commented that new ground was
broken through these equal employment efforts. Tom Williams, Workplace Training
Program Coordinator, indicated, “To the best of my knowledge, this is the first private-

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sector employer and private-sector project seeking to meet the…standards which, in the
past, have been used by the City for public works projects.”135
In 1994, the five hundred-spot, Imperial-operated parking structure, which could
be expanded to 250 more spots, was slated for a December finish.136 At 4:45 P.M. on
December 19, 1994, Mayor Norquist cut the ceremonial ribbon to officially open the new
$5.5 million parking structure.137 To members on the BID-2 Board, the HTWA, and the
Architectural Review Board, the structure had to provide parking relief as well as
architectural uniformity. “I can also assure you that as [c]hair of the [w]ard’s [ARB], the
proposed structure will be held to a high architectural standard – it will have to blend in
with the district’s architecture.”138 A Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article reported that
with its red-brick face, glass stair towers[,] and neighborhood-friendly
details, this award-winning ramp [was] a vast improvement over the visual
house of cars. Its ground-level retail, a feature that the city [was] trying to
encourage in all new ramps, [added] vitality to the street.139
In fact, this innovative design set a precedent for other proposed parking structures in the
ward. For example, a 1999 proposal for another new structure received very little
support, especially from Eppstein-Uhen Architects, because plans were disappointingly
generic – a plain vanilla structure of poured concrete with only a minimal nod to its
surroundings.140 But “[early] in 2000, a second structure [at 225 E. Chicago Street] was
opened with room for 436 cars and [17,000 square feet] of retail space; it cost $5.8
million.”141 Parking and traffic flow can be seen as essential components in making
downtown areas work in terms of revitalization, so the HTW parking structure was not an
issue that was taken lightly. In fact, economic survival for the ward relied heavily on the
possibility for a parking structure. It is not surprising that local property owners wrote so

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many letters and indicated so strongly the expressed need for more parking. With the
completion of the parking structure, the HTWA made known that it
…has taken on the task of coordinating parking and transportation issues.
Rates at the [w]ard's parking structures are kept at the high end of the
market to prevent erosion of private property rental rates. Parking
solutions are crafted for each business that asks. The [a]ssociation also
contributes cash and services to downtown transportation coordination and
programs, like the Downtown Trolley.142
Architectural Review Board and Coalition for Historic Preservation: Setting Standards
for Historic Preservation
The major improvement projects – Streetscape and parking structures –
mentioned in this chapter resulted from TIF, demonstrating how important this was to the
revitalization of the ward. These projects were also under the jurisdiction and review by
two new governing agencies in the HTW. By 1990, Milwaukee city planners and
property owners had ironed out an unusual compromise toward preserving buildings and
fostering development in the HTW; this is further evidence that Milwaukee’s
preservation community was active in the city, creating partnerships and helping to pass
local legislation. This compromise fostered the creation of the Architectural Review
Board (ARB), which oversaw the exterior renovation of existing buildings and the
construction of new ones. Before HTW property owners began an improvement project,
they were required to gain approval by the ARB. “By placing the responsibility for
safeguarding the district’s aesthetic heritage with the current building owners, [the ARB
put] owner-developers on the spot, forcing them to shepherd the [HTW’s] revival
themselves.”143 The ARB was simply the overseer to make sure the ward’s historic
character was maintained and never comprised.

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A prime example of the ARB’s role involved the five-story Wellauer Building.
Constructed in 1913, the building possessed Prairie School detailing, original two-over-
two, wood, double-hung windows on the principal facade, three-over-three windows on
the secondary elevations, and original commercial storefronts. The ARB viewed the
building as an important structure in the historic ward and a pivotal structure on the
National Register Nominations. When Wellauer’s owners intended to rehabilitate the
structure, plans were denied because they failed to meet the “Standards for
Rehabilitation” (Standards 1, 2, and 5) as set by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, who
was responsible for establishing standards for all programs under departmental authority
and for advising federal agencies on the preservation of historic properties listed on or
eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Federal agencies used
“Standards for Rehabilitation” in carrying out their historic preservation responsibilities
for properties in federal ownership or control and by state or local officials in the review
of both federal and nonfederal rehabilitation proposals. Many historic districts and
planning commissions across the country adopted such standards because the standards
defined rehabilitation: the process of returning a property to a state of utility, through
repair or alterations, which makes possible an efficient contemporary use while
preserving those portions and features of the property that are significant to its historic,
architectural, and cultural values. In past years, the secretary’s standards mainly
determined if rehabilitation projects qualified as certified pursuant to the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, the Revenue Act of 1978, and the Economic Recovery Act of 1981. Moreover,
these standards determined whether the historic character of a building was preserved in
the process of rehabilitation.144

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Rehabilitators of the Wellauer Building sought to remove and replace the existing
historic storefronts, but these were deemed in fair condition and intact, except the glass
bulkhead located east of storefront bay. Furthermore, their removal and replacement
violated Standard 2, which stated that the removal of “distinguishing original qualities”
shall be avoided.145 Additionally, rehabilitators proposed that the existing wood windows
on the north elevation and the steel, three-over-three windows on the west and south
elevations be removed and replaced with one-over-one, aluminum windows. The ARB
also denied this. The proposed new windows “diminish[ed] the authenticity of the
historic structure,” plus the existing wood and metal windows were in fine condition and
showed minimal deterioration.146 It was also proposed that the multilite sash be watered
down, but this could change the character of the building’s industrial look to a more
residential quality. Such a residential quality was considered inappropriate for a
warehouse district. Finally, the ARB prohibited the proposed rigid insulation finish
system on the west and east elevations and the removal of the existing exterior on the first
floor’s west wall and loading dock. These actions could diminish the important
character-defining features of the Wellauer Building.147
Additional ARB codes that property owners in ARB jurisdictions were expected
to follow included the following: street walk basements were permitted to have windows
or doors in basement walls, closed with a twelve-inch concrete block that was either
keyed or doweled to the basement wall (no building permit needed); concrete floors
below removal levels were to be broken up sufficiently to permit drainage; and the
restoration of curbs, sidewalks, or driveways was to conform to the specifications noted
in the “Street Maintenance Section of the Bureau of Street and Sewer Maintenance.”148

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HTW property owners also had to comply with building codes specific to the HTW’s
historic preservation; these codes established a sense of historic uniformity within the
ward. For example, HTW buildings could not contain collapsible and rolling security
grills and grates on street and riverfront display windows and doors. Eye-level, exterior
wall plaques were to be made of metal, stone, or other approved materials that reflected
the nature of the business and its architectural design type; in addition, plaques were not
to exceed 75 percent of the width of the column where such plaques were placed.149 Even
when Jack Sheehey of Delta Lighting Systems installed cast brass signs into the paving,
they were regulated for crisp, well-proportioned graphics, 40 inches by eight inches with
polished lettering and a 1.25-inch polished border that projected 1/8-inch from the rough
cast background surface. Basically, these regulations helped create a consistent
appearance with the cast aluminum street signs hung from poles.150 Sheehey took a
proactive approach to preservation and to ensure that all elements of his property blended
with the ward’s historic nature. He had the same company apply a powder coat finish to
ensure a complete match, and he had all mounting hardware painted to match the
fixtures.151 This suggests that local property owners really did take a vested interest in the
ward’s image and revitalization. As stated before, the ARB guidelines put owners on the
spot and forced them to shepherd the revival themselves.
Furthermore, the ARB prohibited “For Rent” or other sale signs on the exterior of
buildings; however, pre-existing nonconforming signs were grandfathered for a short
period because they supposedly showed evidence of previous economic activity within
the ward. The displaying of merchandise for sale on public walkways was acceptable as
it was an indicator of social activity on the streets; however, displays were to be orderly,

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attractive, and secure, and they were subject to City ordinances and codes. The ARB
encouraged well-designed streetscape signage that enriched the quality and image of the
streets. In a document to the HTWA, the ARB considered “ghost signs” acceptable
because such signs were authentic remnants that recorded memories of previous
commercial activity; signs were simply allowed to “age gracefully.”152 The ARB
encouraged wall murals as art forms; however, murals had to be of the highest aesthetic
quality (HTW as a higher arts center) with the ARB – “a City-created
entity…[that]issue[d] certificates of appropriateness, based on guidelines adopted by the
Common Council” – in charge of reviewing items such as concepts, technical factors, and
durability.153
By 1991, Milwaukee’s HTW was an exciting and unique downtown area and a
model of historic preservation for the city. Revitalization of the once-struggling ward
demonstrated how historic preservation can function in the revival of an urban area. In
response to this, the Coalition for Historic Preservation (CHP) formed to “make
Milwaukee a national leader in historic preservation by developing a working partnership
between the government and [the] private sector.”154 This is another example of a
partnership involved in the HTW preservation-revitalization strategy. The CHP was
comprised of organizations with over 600 corporate, business, and individual members
and more than 300 downtown buildings valued at several hundred million dollars. It also
shared goals with the HTWA for revitalization and historic preservation:155
1. Develop a streetscape to give the area an historic look in
keeping with the historic nature of the times. Preservation
research in other cities would determine this. (This was already
underway.)
2. Encourage the restoration and renovation of older buildings in
keeping with the outside architectural theme.

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3. Promote the construction of new establishments based on a
predetermined historic design.
4. Restructure state and local building codes to make restoration
more feasible.
5. Apply for tax credits and low interest loans to attract investors.
6. Develop an archway (or archways) that declares the HTW.
Those who knew the ward during its struggles long hoped for a list similar to the
six goals shared between the HTWA and the CHP for revitalization and historic
preservation. Such a list meant the HTW was moving toward economic recovery and
that interest was being renewed for the area. Since mid-twentieth century urban decline,
Milwaukee’s HTW was in need of revitalization and a strategy that effectively overturned
urban renewal’s devastation on distressed urban areas. The progression of preservation
and preservation-oriented legislation around the time of the 1970s set in motion a
renewed HTW, but pieces were still out of place. The formation of the HTWA in 1976
continued the momentum of effective change. Then, events mentioned in this chapter
further pushed the goal of a revitalized ward to fruition, setting the stage for a brighter
future into the late-1990s and the following century. TIF, the Streetscape Project, and a
solution to traffic flow problems and congestion were key, complementary ingredients in
the overall recipe for an eventual turnaround of the ward from depression to
rehabilitation. These three main phases discussed in Chapter Two were responsible for
increasing awareness, reinvestment and redevelopment, traffic, and residential interest to
the once-struggling ward. And the formation of the ARB and the CHP carried the ward’s
revitalization a step further, strengthening the position of the HTWA and serving as
further protection of the ward’s historic borders. The HTWA, the ARB, and the CHP all
demonstrated that historic preservation had finally cemented itself as a strategy that can
help urban areas fight decline. Chapter Three will demonstrate the effects of the

112
preservation-revitalization strategy since 2000, a new era for the HTW. The following
chapter will also describe the use of similar strategies in other depressed U.S. cities. By
the end of this paper, the HTW will have come full circle, from prosperity to decline to
revitalization, and from populated to abandonment to hot commodity.

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Notes – Chapter Two
1. Bauer, “A Third Ward boom?” Milwaukee Journal, 9 September 1986, folder
33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
2. Bauer, “Many in poll say they’d live Downtown,” Milwaukee Journal, 17
November 1985, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Bauer, “A Third Ward boom?”
6. Karen Rothe, “Riverwalks south of Downtown backed,” Milwaukee Sentinel,
15 October 1983, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
7. Ricardo Diaz (Department of City Development, commissioner) to Brian
McCormick (State Historical Society), letter, 30 March 1990, BID-2 Collection.
8. “Many developers liked what they saw in visit here,” Milwaukee Journal, 3
January 1988, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
9. “As federal funding shrinks, communities turn to TIF districts,” Milwaukee
Business Journal, 18 July 1988, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
10. Anderson and Olson, 158.
11. “As federal funding shrinks, communities turn to TIF districts,” Milwaukee
Business Journal, 18 July 1988, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
12. “Tax Increment Financing Districts,” n.d., folder 7, box 4, BID-2 Collection,
1-2.
13. Graven and Associates, Historic Third Ward Tax Increment Financing
District Economic and Financial Feasibility Study/Joint Review Board Criteria Analysis
(Minneapolis, MN: Graven and Associates, 1988), folder 10, box 4, BID-2 Collection,
22.
14. “Tax Increment Financing Districts,” n.d., BID-2 Collection, 2-4.
15. Graven and Associates, 8.
16. “Tax Increment Financing Districts,” n.d., BID-2 Collection; Diaz to the
Honorable Common Council of the City of Milwaukee, letter, 25 October 1989, folder 8,
box 4, BID-2 Collection.

114
17. “Tax Increment Financing Districts,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
18. Diaz to Common Council, 25 October 1989, BID-2 Collection.
19. Nancy M. Leary, Michael Best, and Friedrich Attorneys at Law to Thomas L.
Meinholz (TRIAD Engineering, Inc., president), letter, 12 September 1991, folder 17,
box 1, BID-2 Collection; “Amendment 12: Finance and Personnel Committee,” n.d.,
folder 19, box 1, BID-2 Collection, 1; Historic Third Ward Association, parking structure
committee meeting synopsis, 23 July 1990, folder 23, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
20. Leary, Best, and Friedrich to Meinholz, 12 September 1991, BID-2
Collection; “Amendment 12: Finance and Personnel Committee,” n.d., BID-2
Collection, 1; Leary to Meinholz, letter, 12 September 1991, folder 18, box 1, BID-2
Collection; “Historic Third Ward Parking Structure,” n.d., folder 23, box 1, BID-2
Collection.
21. Graven and Associates, 14, 16-17, 20.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Raasch, 214.
25. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Tom Miller to Michael Dawson, memorandum, 20 April 1988, folder 7, box
1, BID-2 Collection.
29. Zepecki to Lorraine McNamara McGraw (Common Council), letter, 1
November 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
30. Ibid.
31. Response #1 to Judith Woodburn’s article, folder 29, box 2, HTWA
Collection; “History no mystery in redevelopment bid,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 5 March
1984, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
32. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”

115
33. Jack Gardner (Historic Third Ward Association, president) to Mayor
Norquist, letter, 22 June 1990, folder 3, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
34. Renner to Zepecki, letter, 5 March 1990, folder 3, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
35. “Cities of Vision Exhibit: Design of Urban Place Category,” n.d., folder 22,
box 3, BID-2 Collection.
36. Posner to Commissioner Diaz, letter, 11 November 1991, folder 13, box 3,
BID-2 Collection.
37. “Cities of Vision Exhibit: Design of Urban Place Category,” n.d., BID-2
Collection.
38. Kubala Washatko Architects, Inc., “Historic Third Ward Renaissance: Re-
streetscaping: Transforming an old district into an exciting new opportunity,” proposal,
n.d., folder 21, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
39. “Petition in Support of the HTW Streetscape Plan,” letter, n.d., folder 8, box
3, BID-2 Collection.
40. Unsigned letter to Charles Schmidt (Reycon Construction, Inc., vice president
of business development), 14 August 1990, folder 2, box 3, BID-2 Collection; “Special
Provisions from Supplemental Specifications and Detail Drawings for Third Ward
Streetscape,” n.d., folder 2, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
41. Request for Proposal, 13 November 1990, folder 5, box 3, BID-2 Collection;
M. Paul Friedberg and Partners, “Proposal for Historic Third Ward Streetscaping,” 17
April 1989, folder 28, box 2, BID-2 Collection, 8.
42. Unsigned letter to Charles Schmidt, 14 August 1990, BID-2 Collection;
“Special Provisions from Supplemental Specifications and Detail Drawings for Third
Ward Streetscape,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
43. “Public Improvement Committee Reports,” 15 May 1984, file 83-1990,
folder 1, box, 3, BID-2 Collection. In 1884, five Catalano brothers emigrated from Italy
to Milwaukee, where they established themselves in the fruit and vegetable business.
Their first fruit stand existed along Milwaukee Street before the family business moved
to Broadway Street. By 1910, the brothers’ success warranted them the title of the largest
wholesale fruit distributors in Milwaukee. But their contributions to Milwaukee
transcended food distribution. They represented a pioneering influence in the
development of the Third Ward. The Catalano family also helped to found the
aforementioned Blessed Virgin of Pompeii Church. The brothers raised the necessary
funds for the church, signed the deed, and served it along with their descendants until it
was razed in 1958 as part of Milwaukee’s urban renewal program, which ripped through

116
the Third Ward. The Catalano family consisted of more than 100 descendants in over 30
business establishments, serving as a pillar of economic and civic values in Milwaukee.
And because the Catalanos’ activities resided in the lower Third Ward’s Broadway,
Menomonee, and Young Streets, the Common Council of Milwaukee decided to name
Catalano Square as the area bounded by these streets.
44. Meinholz to Zepecki, letter, 3 December 1990, folder 5, box 3, BID-2
Collection.
45. Request for Proposal, 13 November 1990, BID-2 Collection; “Historic Third
Ward Renaissance: Re-streetscaping: Transforming an old district into an exciting new
opportunity,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
46. “Exhibit A: Description of the Work for the Contract Between Renner
Architects and the BID-2 Board,” n.d., folder 6, box 3, BID-2 Collection, 1-3.
47. Mark B. Sullivan (M. Paul Friedberg and Partners) to Zepecki, letter, 26
February 1991, folder 7, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
48. Renner Architects to Posner, letter, 4 October 1990, folder 2, box 3, BID-2
Collection, 2; “Historic Third Ward Renaissance: Re-streetscaping: Transforming an old
district into an exciting new opportunity,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
49. Renner to Burda, letter, 10 January 1991, folder 6, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
50. Henry J. Balconi (Department of Public Works, deputy commissioner) to Ron
Thessin, letter, 20 August 1990, folder 2, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
51. Jeffrey Posner (Historic Third Ward Association, president) to Tom Wamser
(Beck Carton Company), letter, 1 March 1991, folder 7, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
52. Jane Keegan (Skylight Opera Theatre, general director) to HTW BID No. 2,
letter, 23 August 1991, folder 10, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Robert Stroo (D. G. Beyer Construction, Inc., project manager) to Scott
Georgeson (Beckley/Myers Architects), letter, 14 August 1991, folder 10, box 3, BID-2
Collection.
56. Zepecki to Don Burda (Department of Public Works) and Dan McCarthy
(Department of Public Works, Milwaukee), memorandum, 8 January 1992, folder 14, box
3, BID-2 Collection.

117
57. Renner to John R. Bolden (Department of Public Works, commissioner),
letter, 5 November 1991, folder 13, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
58. Zepecki to HTWA Board of Directors, letter, 15 February 1990, folder 1, box
3, BID-2 Collection, 1.
59. Gardner to Norquist, letter, 22 June 1990, folder 3, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
60. HTWA, press release, 28 September 1993, folder 22, box 3, BID-2
Collection.
61. Posner to Richard Batula, letter, 19 January 1990, folder 1, box 3, BID-2
Collection, 1.
62. Ibid., 2.
63. Unsigned correspondence to Posner, 24 September 1991, folder 11, box 3,
BID-2 Collection.
64. Bill Manly (Wm. Manly Associates, Inc.) to HTWA Board, memorandum,
“Architecture Review Board Design Guideline Additions 67a and 70a,” n.d., folder 1,
box 2, HTWA Collection.
65. Posner to Batula, 19 January 1990, BID-2 Collection, 2.
66. Bolden to Louis DeMers (Superintendent of Bureau of Street and Sewer
Maintenance), letter, 22 October 1991, folder 12, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
67. Posner to Brian O’Connell (Department of City Development), letter, 17
February 1989, folder 7, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
68. HTWA, “HTW Streetscape Project,” n.d., folder 16, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
69. “Prosperity returning to Third Ward,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 16 November
1993, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection; Response #1 to Judith Woodburn’s article.
70. “Prosperity returning to Third Ward.”
71. Press release, 28 September 1993, BID-2 Collection.
72. Zepecki to HTWA and BID-2 Board Members, letter, 21 January 1991,
folder 6, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
73. “HTW Streetscape Project,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.

118
74. Judith Woodburn, “Too Much Good Taste,” Milwaukee Magazine, December
1992, folder 29, box 2, HTWA Collection.
75. Gardner to John Fennel, response #2 to Judith Woodburn’s article, 18
December 1992, folder 29, box 2, HTWA Collection.
76. Natasha Kassulke, “A cultural rebirth in Milwaukee,” Madison (WI) State
Journal, 6 December 1998.
77. “Consultants urge Coachyards parking,” Milwaukee Journal, 21 May 1985,
folder 20, box 2, BID-2 Collection; Gardner to William Drew (Department of
Community Development, commissioner), letter, 12 April 1984, folder 20, box 2, BID-2
Collection; Bennett-Ringrose-Wolsfeld-Jarvis-Gardner, Inc., “Historic Third Ward
Parking and Traffic Study,” study, 30 April 1985, folder 21, box 2, BID-2 Collection, 1.
78. Zepecki to McGraw, 1 November 1993, BID-2 Collection.
79. Bennett-Ringrose-Wolsfeld-Jarvis-Gardner, Inc., 30 April 1985, BID-
Collection, 1.
80. “Consultants urge Coachyards parking.”
81. Bennett-Ringrose-Wolsfeld-Jarvis-Gardner, Inc., 30 April 1985, BID-2
Collection, 1.
82. Ibid., 2, 4, 6. Subarea A included loft-type commercial and industrial
buildings. Land use in this subarea began to change in the recent past toward residential,
office, and retail uses. Subarea B contained the southern edge of the central business
district, industrial-type buildings of recent construction, surface parking lots, festival
grounds, and vacant land.
83. Ibid., 10, 13, 14. Reasons for workers north of the freeway using most of the
public parking in Subarea A included the facts that off-street parking was readily
available along the northern edge of the HTW and parking north of the freeway was fully
used during the day, creating a greater demand for parking in Subarea A. In addition,
long-term parking accounted for most of the observed uses in Subarea A.
84. Ibid., 15.
85. Ibid., 17.
86. Ibid., 15.
87. “Consultants urge Coachyards parking.”

119
88. “Historic Third Ward Parking and Traffic Study,” study, n.d., folder 17, box
1, BID-2 Collection.
89. Gardner to Supervisor Thomas F. Ament, letter, 18 June 1985, folder 20, box
2, BID-2 Collection.
90. Alderman John R. Kalwitz to Herman Weingrod (Phoenix Building
Partnership), letter, 29 October 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
91. Graven and Associates, 13.
92. Renner to Meinholz, letter, 11 September 1991, folder 17, box 1, BID-2
Collection; Historic Third Ward Association, parking structure committee meeting
synopsis, 2 May 1990, folder 19, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
93. Diaz to Grant Langley (city attorney) and Julie Penman (tax commissioner),
letter, 11 February 1992, folder 17, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
94. “Historic Third Ward Parking Structure,” n.d., BID-2 Collection; TRIAD
Engineering, Inc., “Environmental Site Assessment for Proposed Parking Structure,”
study, 31 January 1991, folder 21, box 2, BID-2 Collection. An environmental site
assessment was ordered for site two, which was currently paved and used as a parking
lot. Prior to that, Milwaukee Chemical Company occupied the site. The site did not
appear to have any major environmental problems, and no visual signs of contamination
were apparent; in addition, unsuccessful attempts were taken to identify the specific
nature of the chemical company’s activities on the soil, so soil samples were necessary to
test for volatile organic compounds prior to developing the design of the structure.
95. Zepecki to McGraw, 1 November 1993, BID-2 Collection.
96. “Amendment 12: Finance and Personnel Committee,” n.d., BID-2
Collection, 1.
97. Zepecki to McGraw, 1 November 1993, BID-2 Collection.
98. “Amendment 12: Finance and Personnel Committee,” n.d., BID-2
Collection, 1.
99. Curtis C. Gielow (HTWA Board of Directors, vice president) to Alderman
Michael J. Murphy, letter, 11 October 1993, folder 19, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
100. Weingrod to Common Council, letter, 26 October 1993, folder 22, box 2,
BID-2 Collection.
101. Gielow to Zepecki, letter, 14 October 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2
Collection.

120
102. Posner to Common Council, letter, 22 October 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-
2 Collection.
103. Gielow to Murphy, 11 October 1993, BID-2 Collection.
104. Business Improvement District No. 2, “Historic Third Ward Association
Parking Structure: Why We Need It/What Is the Benefit,” n.d., folder 19, box 1, BID-2
Collection.
105. Michael Guest (147 N. Broadway Street, owner) to Common Council, letter,
20 October 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
106. Ibid.
107. Gardner to Common Council, letter, 25 October 1993, folder 22, box 2,
BID-2 Collection.
108. Ibid.
109. “Historic Third Ward Association Parking Structure: Why We Need
It/What Is the Benefit,” n.d., BID-2 Collection; Joan Lounbery (Skylight Opera Theatre,
managing director) to Common Council, letter, 27 October 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2
Collection.
110. “Historic Third Ward Parking Structure,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
111. Larry Engel, “Breaking ground: Contractor aims to match public project
work goals,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 11 June 1994, folder 4, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
112. Paul Armstrong (Miller-Armstrong Costume Service, owner) to Common
Council, letter, 27 October 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
113. Frank Krejci (White Elephant Partners) to Common Council, letter, 3
November 1993, folder 22, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
114. HTWA, “Current Status and Timeline of Proposed Historic Third Ward
Parking Structure,” n.d., folder 19, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
115. “Historic Third Ward Association Parking Structure: Why We Need
It/What Is the Benefit,” n.d., BID-2 Collection; Parking structure committee meeting
synopsis, 2 May 1990, BID-2 Collection.
116. “Current Status and Timeline of Proposed Historic Third Ward Parking
Structure,” n.d., BID-2 Collection; “Historic Third Ward Association Parking Structure:
Why We Need It/What Is the Benefit,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.

121
117. BID-2, meeting #1 minutes, 4 November 1993, folder 19, box 1, BID-2
Collection.
118. Kim Charlton, editorial, n.d., folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
119. Larry Sandler, “City, firm reach deal on garage, building,” Milwaukee
Sentinel, 1 April 1994, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
120. Paul Henningsen to Wally Morics (city comptroller), letter, 4 May 1994,
folder 24, box 1, BID-2 Collection, 1-3.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid., 3-4; Meeting #1 minutes, 4 November 1993, BID-2 Collection.
123. Ibid.
124. “Current Status and Timeline of Proposed Historic Third Ward Parking
Structure,” n.d., BID-2 Collection; “Historic Third Ward Association Parking Structure:
Why We Need It/What Is the Benefit,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
125. “Historic Third Ward Association Parking Structure: Why We Need
It/What Is the Benefit,” n.d., BID-2 Collection.
126. “Parking structure to provide employment,” Milwaukee Courier 29, no. 49
(11 June 1994), folder 4, box 2, BID-2 Collection; HTWA, news press release, n.d.,
folder 4, box 2, BID-2 Collection, 1-2.
127. Morics to Common Council, letter, 26 April 1994, folder 24, box 1, BID-2
Collection, 1-2.
128. Morics to Henningsen, letter, 9 May 1994, folder 24, box 1, BID-2
Collection, 3.
129. Ibid.
130. Henningsen to Common Council, letter, 3 May 1994, folder 24, box 1, BID-
2 Collection, 1-2.
131. Imperial Parking, Inc., “Five Year Pro-Forma-Third Ward Parking Garage,”
n.d., folder 24, box 1, BID-2 Collection.
132. Kass, “3rd Ward parking facility gets common OK,” Milwaukee Business
Journal, 14 May 1994, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.

122
133. Zepecki, press release, 3 June 1994, folder 4, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
134. Ibid.
135. Engel, “Breaking ground: Contractor aims to match public project work
goals.”
136. “Parking Structure Underway,” 16 June 1994, folder 33, box 2, HTWA
Collection.
137. HTWA, press release, 15 December 1994, folder 37, box 2, HTWA
Collection.
138. William Manly to Common Council, letter, 1 November 1993, folder 22,
box 2, BID-2 Collection.
139. Whitney Gould, “New design for the Third Ward shows that even a parking
ramp can have style,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 18 January 1999.
140. Ibid.
141. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
142. Ibid.
143. Editorial, Milwaukee Business Journal, 5 November 1990, folder 33, box 2,
HTWA Collection.
144. Jeffrey Posner (Historic Third Ward Association, president) to McCormick,
letter, n.d., folder 27, box 2, BID-2 Collection; “The Secretary of the Interior’s Standards
for Rehabilitation,” n.d., folder 27, box 2, BID-2 Collection.
145. Posner to McCormick, n.d., BID-2 Collection.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. City of Milwaukee Department of Public Works, “General Rules Regarding
Street Walk Basements” in Section 245-5, Milwaukee Code of Ordinances, n.d., folder 2,
box 3, BID-2 Collection.
149. Bill Manly (Wm. Manly Associates, Inc.) to HTWA Board, memorandum,
“Architecture Review Board Design Guideline Additions 67a and 70a,” n.d., folder 1,
box 2, HTWA Collection.

123
150. Jeff Natrop to Jack Sheehey (Delta Lighting Systems, president), letter, 27
August 1991, folder 10, box 3, BID-2 Collection.
151. Sheehey to Natrop, letter, 26 August 1991, folder 10, box 3, BID-2
Collection.
152. Manly to HTWA Board, “Architecture Review Board Design Guideline
Additions 71a, 71b, and 77a,” n.d., HTWA Collection.
153. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information”; Manly to HTWA Board, “Architecture Review Board Design Guideline
Additions 77b,” n.d., HTWA Collection.
154. Timothy Dittmann, “A dynamic blueprint for downtown historic
preservation,” Milwaukee Business Journal, 25 March 1991, folder 8, box 2, HTWA
Collection.
155. Ibid.

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Chapter Three – Hot Commodity: The Historic Third Ward Since 2000
Chapter Three will look at some post-2000 developments in the HTW. This
chapter will document how the HTW developed in terms of economy, population, and
redevelopment compared to the years prior to 2000. An interview with Stephanie
Sherman, a HTWA member and a HTW business owner, will be factored into the
narrative to provide insight into the procedures and tactics of the neighborhood
organization, as well as the significance, challenges, and benefits of owning and
operating a small women’s boutique in the ward. With the HTW improvement projects
already mentioned in this paper, prosperity was returning to the HTW nearly 100 years
after the great fire, and the ward’s historic character, to most, was not compromised due
to the fact that upgrade projects complemented the ward’s older features, demonstrating
that past and future can be balanced in modern urban areas. Joan Zepecki, former
executive director of the HTWA, stated that her crew consulted other cities for similar
examples of blending the past with the future, but nothing of the same scope or financing
plan was found.1 This suggests that the HTW leaders may have set some standards for
revitalization or that they may have developed an effective model for the nation. This
chapter will show how other cities responded, as well.
Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design
Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design (MIAD) was founded in 1974 and was
formed from the Layton School of Art and Design.2 MIAD moved to the HTW in 1992
following a renovation of the Jane Bradley Pettit Building at 273 E. Erie Street; this
historic building became the institute’s main academic building, offering 245,000 square
feet of space on five floors.3 In 1994, MIAD officials announced that the school had

125
entered a 20-year lease to purchase and occupy a building at the corners of E. Chicago
and N. Water Streets (208 N. Water Street). Officials at MIAD, which enrolled
approximately 500 students in 1994, planned to turn the building into a dormitory hall
that housed 90 students on the first two floors and 59 more on the third, complete with
modern amenities. Continuing its contribution to the ward’s economic revitalization and
the ward’s growing reputation as a place for the arts, MIAD began in 2000 to makeover
its property at 208 N. Water Street.4
By 2000, the top floors had been turned into updated student living quarters, and
the lower floors were later transformed into a tourist and economic commodity for the
ward. This new development was seen by HTW officials as something to further
distinguish the ward from the rest of downtown, plus it was to assist in the ward’s
reputation as a place for Milwaukee’s art community. In 2000, JaroszLynch, a local
architecture firm owned by Matt Jarosz (professor in the School of Architecture and
Urban Planning at the University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee) and Bob Lynch (director of
MIAD’s interiors program), was hired to transform the 105-year-old warehouse into the
new, $4 million William F. Eisner Museum of Advertising and Design at E. Chicago and
N. Water Streets. This is the only museum in the nation dedicated to advertising.
“[W]ith the structural work nearly finished, it [was] not too early to imagine this as a
model for inventive [reconciliation] between past and present.”5 This suggests that
officials hoped to use the museum as a way to show that past and present elements can
coexist in an historic area, and that historic elements can blend with contemporary
concepts. Described as a “Renaissance Revival Jewel” due to its orange-hued brick, terra
cotta trim, foliate capitals, and double-arched pavilions, this project transformed an

126
original 1895 building, once used by a wholesale dry goods firm and later as a furniture
warehouse, into a museum that focused on advertising and design and their impacts on
U.S. culture.6 This renovation was not devoid of difficulty, though. A Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel article stated that
[w]hile the exterior was obviously worth preserving, the 22,000[-]square
foot interior lacked the decorative [plasterwork], carved woodwork, and
other historic features that…invite[d] a pure restoration. What it did
have…was honest, industrial character: high ceilings and generous
windows; square [white oak] supporting columns…; [and]…maple floors.7
Furthermore, the same newspaper article commented that
the open stairway that [zigzaged]…to the second floor deftly marri[ed]
natural and hard-edged materials; flooring of rosewood-stained oak;
railing of steel cables; trim of perforated metal. …The dorm entrance at
the rear [was] separated from the museum by a translucent enclosure made
of Polygal, a corrugated plastic that glows like a lantern at night.8
After the renovation, reminders of the building’s roots remained intact – columns,
sandblasted fir ceilings, maple floors, arched windows, sheet-metal ductwork, exposed
steel beams, and bronze doors from the former freight elevator. Another aspect of the
renovation involved handicap accessibility. This was especially important in HTW
buildings, in which first floors were generally a few steps above the street. To make the
museum more accessible in accordance with safety regulations, architects added an
elevator inside the Water Street entrance.9 Features such as handicap accessibility and
exit signs are must-haves in today’s buildings, historic and non-historic alike, but
contemporary standards are a challenge for some older buildings. For example, exit signs
can seem out of place in older buildings such as house museums, where preservationists
most likely attempt to keep the building and setting as close to the original place and time
as possible.

127
Because of these issues, many critics dislike the options available in older
buildings, particularly in the HTW. But others, such as MIAD officials, see in older
buildings a unique sense of character. According to the HTWA,
[m]ost old buildings in the [HTW] are massive brick structures built up to
the sidewalk. The result is a uniform setback as well as a dense urban
structure. The buildings are quite visually pleasing with a preponderance
of [Neo-classical] styles with window groupings between pilasters, capped
by arcades and…cornices. The diverse ornamentation ranges from
Victorian Gothic to Sullivansque to Art Deco in materials such as terra
cotta, metal[,] and stone.10
MIAD’s dorm-museum project represented the school’s
passion for re-interpreting older buildings. The school’s handsome
academic facility was carved out of…a 1921 warehouse, parts of its
student union date to 1854, and the school…bought two other nearby
properties…for conversion to dorm space and graduate school
classrooms….11
This project, along with MIAD’s educational programs, demonstrated the college’s
contribution to the ward’s growing art community. Today, MIAD is an accredited
college providing Bachelor of Fine Arts degrees in fields such as communication design,
drawing, illustration, industrial design, interior architecture and design, painting,
photography, and printmaking.12 It is Wisconsin’s only college devoted exclusively to the
education of artists and designers; in fact, MIAD features four art galleries at its HTW
campus.13 According to MIAD’s official Web site, the campus is located in “the city’s
official arts district…. The college offers one of the largest, safest, and most
comprehensive art and design environments in the [U.S.]” in historic buildings – the
aforementioned Jane Bradley Pettit Building, the aforementioned museum (208 N. Water
Street) and residence hall (222 E. Chicago Street) that features loft-style suites on the top
three floors, the Student Union (266 E. Erie Street) that was renovated in summer 1997

128
by MIAD students and designed by MIAD’s Interior Architecture and Design
department, and the Strange Brew Cafe and Gallery (143 N. Broadway) that is really an
extension of the Student Union.14
Housing Demands Increase
By 2000, housing demands continued to increase. In the 1980s and 1990s, there
had existed some speculation about similar, competing residential properties having a
negative impact on the HTW. Such speculators did not think similar residential
developments built around the same time and place could attract a new group of urban
residents without stealing tenants from other HTW residential units. The speculation was
over how the new units could stay afloat financially while not hurting competing
residential properties. Speculators did not think this activity was advantageous for the
ward. By 2000, more-than-expected residents were moving into the downtown. That
year, Mayor Norquist stated that the demand for housing in the HTW specifically was
exceeding supply. According to a Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article,
[r]ecently released census data show[ed] that the census tract covering the
[HTW] reported 505 residents in the count…compared with 188 residents
reported in the 1990 census. That place[d] it among the fastest [growing]
census tracts in the metropolitan Milwaukee area.15
One reason for increased population included living near Summerfest, the downtown
theater district, and work.16
High rents and more residents came to the HTW, so condominium projects were
planned for the area as “’more downtown condos were sold in 2001 than in either of the
previous two years,’ said Robert Monnat, chief operating officer at [Mandel].”17 Reports
indicated that that number could increase by 2002 because the “’downtown phenomena
[was] a bona fide trend that continue[d] to grow…’ due to the increased number of empty

129
nesters…and childless professionals in the 20s and early-30s, [all of whom were]
embracing urban living.”18 The HTWA looked to capitalize on these numbers and remain
competitive with the rest of downtown Milwaukee. From 1998 to 2001, 399 condos were
built near downtown Milwaukee. At the start of 2002, 382 condos were under
construction, of which 179 had been sold even before construction began. New
downtown condo sales were expected to total approximately 200 by the end of 2002.
Although the current supply of unsold units seemed to equal the expected demand, 482
new condos were planned for following years, including The Lofts on Broadway, The
Trestle, and The Waterfront.19
The increased demand for condo living in the first years of the twenty-first
century suggests a decline in apartment demand, which is especially surprising since
condo sales usually require an incredible amount of equity through investors and pre-
sales. The 782 new apartment units that were built between 1998 and 2001 were
complemented by an additional 496 apartment units, but the 496 were not expected to be
ready until 2003. According to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, “[m]ost downtown
condos [sold] at much higher prices than new condos built in the suburbs…. In 2001, 44
[percent] of condos sold downtown had prices ranging from $250,000 to $400,000.”20
Seven percent of suburban condos fit into the price range. But a decline in interest rates
helped to make downtown condos more affordable for those not wanting to rent units.21
According to Ellen Hickock-Wall of The Daily Reporter, the HTW had just a handful of
projects by 2002 – high-end and affordable – that catered to “empty nesters, young
professionals[,] or anyone with an interest in living near the city’s cultural hub.”22 To
Hickock-Wall, empty nesters prefer the ease of condo ownership without the

130
maintenance issues of a house, and young professionals like living near work and
downtown amenities.23 Overall, prices for housing suggests that as more residents poured
into downtown, the HTW was becoming a destination for upscale, white-collar living.24
This was happening across the U.S. as many cities experienced a rebirth of their
downtown areas. The downtown renaissance seemed to show no signs of slowing.
Milwaukee Public Market
An increase in housing demand supported other proposals such as a new public
market, where approximately 40 vendors could sell produce, meat, poultry, seafood,
cheese, baked goods, and specialty items under a single roof. The proposed site was a
Milwaukee County-owned parking lot at N. Broadway Street and St. Paul Avenue.25
Such a market would rely heavily on the increasing residential population for revenue
support. The public market project began in February 1997 when Milwaukee’s Common
Council agreed to contribute $10,000 of a $50,000 feasibility study to determine the
possibility for a public market, as well as its main sources for financial support.26 The
Common Council, however, was planning a study of the ward’s potential to support a
market for later that year. According to the HTWA Web site,
[a] feasibility study was started in 1997 to build a year-round indoor
public market in the [HTW]. It [would] provide an important bridge to
the downtown, bring in an additional [million] visitors, provide a fresh
market amenity to downtown residents[,] and act as a year-round regional
draw to tourists and suburban residents.27
The idea for an urban market was loosely based on design concepts for similar
successful projects in Cincinnati, Ohio; Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and
Vancouver, British Columbia. Mark Ernst, architect with Engberg-Anderson Design
Partnership, stated that “from an urban design standpoint, this could be the thing that

131
kind of gets the [HTW] kicked into gear and also could be a link between downtown and
the [HTW].”28 The project was really a combination of past and present elements and
concepts, which is another reason why its originators looked to the HTW as a place for
the market. According to Einar Tangen, who served as HTWA president and is currently
on the HTWA Board of Directors as the chairman of BID-2, “‘These markets used to be
the soul of the city…. They were how towns came into being….’”29 Tangen and the
HTWA believed that a public market could spur economic activity in the ward, and it
could complement the historic character of old-time market selling, which used to take
place in the ward. As a matter of fact, the HTW had always been a commercial area as
past chapters have proven, and the new market idea simply drew upon this piece of
history. Even in the distressed years of the 1970s, the ward was the home to many
commercial secondhand shops and antique and art stores because of cheap rents in a
struggling urban environment; by the 1990s, the ward was transitioning into an upscale-
style neighborhood.
The new market was not built by 1999; in fact, the results of the aforementioned
study, or the Greater Milwaukee Committee Task Force, were not announced until
November 1999 at a luncheon held with downtown business leaders. On a positive note,
the study indicated favorable results for the possibility of a market. While it was unclear
from where all the money to build the market would come, the public market could
potentially generate $10 million in annual sales, spark spin-off downtown developments,
and help keep small farmers afloat, particularly organic farmers. According to the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, the study projected that 54 percent of sales “would come
from people living within 12.5 miles of the downtown; downtown residents and workers

132
represented another 25 percent…. The rest would come from tourists and residents
throughout the region.”30
In 2001, the project received a $300,000 grant from the federal government with
the aid of Wisconsin Senator Herb Kohl. According to the HTWA, “[o]f the $8.5 million
dollars needed to build the market, $5.4 million [was] raised [by 2004]. The last piece
was an [Economic Development Administration] grant for $2.5 million, which was
received in June 2004.”31 Wisconsin Representative Paul Ryan, an advocate for
Wisconsin’s First Congressional District that includes the greater Milwaukee area,
announced the grant; in fact, he “was credited with breaking the bureaucratic logjam that
had held up the money from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Economic
Development Administration.”32 According to Tangen, co-leader of the market project,
Ryan was very helpful. Ryan said the project “caught his imagination and then got held
up by red tape and the appropriations process. ‘We were pushing the boulder uphill for a
long time,…but I'm a believer in the market. It will bring more economic development to
the [area].’”33 Construction for the market began in July 2004, and it opened for business
in summer 2005.
A New Identity Emerges
From immigrant dwellings to heavy industry and manufacturing to blight and
revival, the ward has experienced multiple transformations and many extremes. The
most recent transformation in the ward has been its shift toward a mixed-use area that
includes the arts, retail, dining, residential, and business communities (many of which are
upscale). The HTWA indicated that “…2004 saw an influx of upscale women's
boutiques,…children's clothing shops, [and] high-end home furnishing businesses,…”

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and even more growth is anticipated in coming years due to the recent opening of the
year-round public market, which could attract over 20,000 people per year.34 Across from
the public market is Groom (located in the Commission House Building at 330 E. St.
Paul Avenue), an upscale men’s salon in an older building that complements the area
surroundings. The ward is Groom’s fourth location in six years. Owner Theri DeJoode
stated about the ward’s new identity, “‘The Third Ward is the retail area now, so we'll do
more sales. We'll be the resting spot for gentlemen when their women are shopping the
boutiques and the new [p]ublic [m]arket.”35 In an interview on March 23, 2006, Stephanie
Sherman credited the recent growth in the number of HTW retail establishments as being
the biggest change in the area since joining the HTWA three years ago; in fact, she called
retail the last piece of the puzzle toward economic revitalization, and the ward’s identity
as residential, tourism, and dining destinations have already been established. Sherman
co-owns a business in the HTW (Lela, 321 N. Broadway) and is a HTWA member; she
volunteers her time on the executive committee by encouraging business owners to work
together, which actually empowers them toward becoming leaders in revitalizing the
area.36 This has been suggested all along in this paper – local business owners led much
of the ward’s revitalization.
Small business owners in the area mostly depend on their partnership with and the
work of the HTWA. The HTWA has been successful in attracting visitors, or shoppers,
and supporting small businesses. This results in a partnership between the business
community and association. As a business owner, Sherman said that the presence of the
HTWA attracted her to the ward. She moved Lela, a women’s boutique, into the area
because an organization was already present, marketing the district as an up and coming

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retail, residential, and tourist destination. The many public events sponsored by the
HTWA draw thousands of new and regular visitors each year. In addition, the ethnic and
music festivals that have grown in popularity (held at Henry Maier Festival Park) are
opportunities for local business owners if in-state and out-of-state guests increase
pedestrian activity on HTW streets. Businesses such as Lela often depend on this
pedestrian activity for exposure and word-of-mouth advertising, both of which lead to an
increased cash flow.37
As a new HTW identity continues to materialize, more business owners are taking
a chance on the ward. According to the Madison Capital Times,
[t]he area is moving away from its ‘Laverne and Shirley’ reputation.
[Milwaukee] has become ‘a hip metropolis that has been receiving more
[national] attention for architect Santiago Calatrava's $100 million
addition to the Milwaukee Art Museum than the city's breweries and
cheesehead hats.’38
Some owners feel that the HTW economic transformation is likely not yet complete.
Some have said the ward would benefit from a hotel and shoe and men's clothing
boutiques. Some also hope for Pottery Barn, Gap, or Banana Republic stores to “fuel
business in a bigger way.”39 On the other hand, the HTW is fast becoming known for its
authentic, privately-owned businesses, which is why some owners dislike the idea of
chain stores overtaking the area and stealing business away from small, independent
firms. Moreover, the issue becomes whether or not such chain stores can blend with the
area’s historic environment. Some chain stores, however, might be a welcome sight to
draw in more people. For example, since there are no bookstores in the area, Sherman
indicated that a Barnes and Noble Booksellers could fuel added activity and revenue for
small businesses.40

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Many entrepreneurs in the ward see their biggest challenge as “attracting
suburbanites to the area and deciding what potential customers want.”41 After years of
urban decline, it may take more of an effort to convince outsiders that downtown
Milwaukee is good again.
’There are misnomers about Milwaukee that still exist, that it's unsafe,
empty, with nothing going on,’ [said Jennifer] Hemberger, 34, [co-owner
of J. Bird Boutique] who also lives in the Third Ward. ‘It takes time for
that (image) to adjust.’42
And it takes time for a new identity to catch on all across the metro-region. Increasing
numbers of shoppers have frequented small businesses in the HTW over the past several
Christmas shopping seasons, resulting in more exposure and additional revenue for the
businesses; in fact, shoppers have indicated that they prefer shopping in the HTW
because parking at Mayfair Mall and other suburban shopping malls can be complicated,
and stores are often overcrowded. For many, the HTW can offer an intimate, fun, and
casual retail experience. Sherman indicated the following other reasons, mainly
regarding personal service matters, for shopping at HTW businesses: customers can park
in front of stores, the HTW provides unique offerings and a wide product mix, and
business owners are often present in HTW retail establishments, creating better customer
service.43
The emergence of the white-collar, service employment sector also shaped the
new HTW identity. Many of the workers in this sector also make homes in the ward,
increasing the demand for downtown residential units. As a mixed-use neighborhood
many business types operate in the HTW; however, the area is primarily dominated by
service jobs, which mirrors the situation in many U.S. central cities. Many of these
service jobs in the ward are due to retail growth. The HTWA claims that today

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the [HTW] is home to over 400 businesses, and maintains an unparalleled
position within the retail and professional service community…. The
neighborhood's renaissance is anchored by many extraordinary shops,
restaurants, art galleries, [theater] groups, dance companies,
photographers, advertising agencies[,] and graphic artists.44
But while white-collar business and upscale living are trends that have helped the ward’s
new identity to emerge, the area still clings to and has not compromised its historic roots.
While a new identity has emerged for the ward, the historic character of the area remains
its underlying identifier. Sherman said, “It is the HTW’s rich history that has made it an
interesting and dynamic marketplace.”45 The HTWA stated that
[i]n addition to representing the latest trend in Milwaukee's economic
development efforts toward professional and white-collar business, the
[ward] also maintains its heritage in the retention of several businesses
with great longevity. Most prominent in that category are the Commission
Row establishments, which provided Milwaukee with the bulk of its fruit
and vegetable produce since the late [1800s].46
Not Just a Local Phenomenon
How have other U.S. central cities responded to preservation legislation and the
negative effects of urban renewal? As evidence that the preservation-revitalization
strategy can (and did) work in a variety of markets outside of Milwaukee, this section
will briefly look at several old, depressed urban areas in major U.S. cities (located in
various geographic regions) that were protected by historic bids and were transformed
into revitalized historic districts in recent decades. In these depressed areas of cities,
rehabilitation and preservation of old warehouses, railroad depots, and empty piers, all
once major contributors to thriving downtown economies, were among cities’ plans to be
converted into urban industrial parks, aquariums, playgrounds, riverwalks with
restaurants and shops, and parks as part of urban economic revitalization strategies. For
example, cities such as Detroit, Michigan; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; San Antonio, Texas;

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and Baltimore, Maryland, experienced some economic success by embarking upon
preservation-revitalization plans that involved converting older structures into modern
venues. In each of these cities, the older, depressed areas became part of their respective
local preservation organization’s plans to recreate the spatial elements of the past. For
example, Detroit’s Renaissance Center, a mixed use development, was built along the
Detroit River, which is a key transportation route in the Great Lakes system that links
Lake St. Clair with Lake Erie. Fifty years ago, Pittsburgh’s downtown was a bleak,
depressed area where steel mills dominated the landscape, but a revitalization strategy
helped transform downtown Pittsburgh into the Golden Triangle that features a
nineteenth-century city center.47 To a degree, the leaders of the cities mentioned here
helped transform their depressed downtowns into revitalized areas because they based
strategies upon renewed historic city identities, which were hidden beneath the effects of
failed urban renewal – abandonment, decay, and demolition. In addition to the cities
already mentioned here, this section will specifically look at historic districts in four other
cities that used revitalization models similar to the HTW – Old Town in Alexandria,
Virginia; The Strand in Galveston, Texas; Pioneer Square in Seattle, Washington; and
Historic District in Savannah, Georgia.
The historic areas presented in this section are all former industrial and
commercial urban areas, where hhistoric preservation strategies contributed to economic
revitalization of depressed districts. Preservation also played a major role in socially,
physically, economically, and aesthetically rejuvenating the immediate areas surrounding
the historic districts. It contributed to a back-to-the-city movement through the
preservation of historic and architecturally-important properties, the restoration of

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exceptional buildings, and the renovation and adaptive reuse of noteworthy structures.48
In Seattle’s Pioneer Square, for example, tax values rose 800 percent, and crime rates
declined from 15 percent of the city’s total to 0.5 percent because city services were
added to protect the area, maintain its quality as a tourist destination, and prevent it
falling back into deterioration.49 Prior to the recent redevelopment of these historic areas,
their respective cities (and other major U.S. cities such as Milwaukee) experienced
increases in the number of deteriorating and substandard buildings in the 1950s through
the 1970s, along with a rising percentage of low-income families and rising costs of
social services, fire protection, education, and transportation. As many U.S. central cities
declined after the 1950s, their economic bases and much of their middle- to upper-income
populations shifted into other jurisdictions, resulting in a significant loss of revenue from
property, sales, and income taxes.50 As affluent populations (middle- to upper-income
residents) departed, increasing proportions of African Americans and other minorities
were also left behind. “The affluent [sought] schools in the suburbs, leaving central-city
schools to decline further.”51
The situation in Alexandria, Virginia, fit the national pattern of urban problems
and is an example of how preservation strategies became a glimmer of hope to revitalize
struggling downtown economies in the U.S. The central city lost jobs and people to
suburban communities, reducing the role and importance of downtown Alexandria. This
resulted in a suburban city on the outskirts of Alexandria. This means that downtown
became vacant, and the suburban sector grew to resemble the vibrant downtown activity
that most U.S. cities experienced before urban renewal. Alexandria’s suburban city
attracted more residents and firms away from downtown by expanding with jobs,

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services, and land for building, expanding, and living.52 In addition, the city experienced
wrecking ball demolition during the mid-1960s, which resulted in the disappearance of a
large number of local landmarks. As demolition increased, the preservation movement
grew; in fact, a significant number of preservation projects had begun in time for the
nation’s Bicentennial in 1976.53 By the early 1990s, “[m]ost central cities [held] 25 to 30
percent of the people and jobs in their metropolitan areas.”54 In addition to these losses,
the central-city economy in Alexandria was changing because manufacturing was leaving
the U.S. for foreign markets; the U.S. had begun its transformation into a service
economy. The decline of U.S. manufacturing as well as population and employment
flight gave U.S. cities such as Alexandria little hope. During urban renewal in the U.S.,
many of the nation’s cities shared these and many other things in common – economic
decline, white flight, and demolition – as the preservation movement gained support by
the 1970s. City leaders employed preservation as a part of their economic revitalization
strategies.
Preservation became a major hope for depressed urban areas, and increasing
numbers of U.S. city leaders began to take advantage of what it could offer. While many
cities are alike in this respect, they differ in the methods of preservation their leaders
chose to incorporate into their plans. There are many ways to preserve. City officials can
attempt to restore an entire historic district as a living museum of the time(s). Or they
can look to retain the existing character of an area by preventing the addition of new
forms of architecture. Still other city leaders might seek retaining and renovating old
buildings, often by adaptive reuse, and yet providing for the inclusion of new architecture
and new uses; this is the most popular option, and it was chosen for the HTW. When the

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decision is made how to preserve a city’s historic neighborhood(s), city leaders must also
factor into their decision how to use historic sites. Will they renovate the area and return
it to its original uses (if possible), or restore the district as a collection of museums to
provide educational and cultural resources?55 The option chosen for Milwaukee’s HTW
was to adaptively reuse a former commercial and industrial ward for shops, restaurants,
offices, and living space.
Adaptive reuse, or modifying buildings to meet contemporary demands, became
popular in the U.S. because many believed it offered positive benefits in economic and
social terms. For example, depending on the state and repair of an older building,
recycling the space and bringing it up to modern codes can be substantially cheaper than
building new. This means that adaptive reuse can be cost effective. New foundations do
not need to be laid because buildings already exist, and in many cases, buildings’
functions and operations can continue during renovation. Adaptive reuse can be more
energy efficient because it produces less of a drain on resources, and such a process can
cost less to operate. According to America’s Forgotten Architecture, “’adapted buildings
offer vastly reduced lifetime energy expenditures. Assuming a soundness of structural
elements and shell, the reuse of older buildings substantially reduces demand for energy
intensive building materials.’”56 And due to the craftsmanship involved in an adaptive
reuse project, it tends to be labor intensive, which can create additional local jobs and
help the local economy in return. In addition, unique craftsmanship found on older
structures offers individuality that many modern structures often lack. These are reasons
why more residents are seeking downtown living. Adaptive reuse is not always
successful, which is why developers and architects tended to shy away from it during its

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inception in the 1970s. But opinions shifted as many began realizing the economic
potential of refurbishing older structures such as factories, warehouses, train stations, and
churches.57
At the same time, today’s property and business owners need to be careful when
deciding how to adaptively reuse buildings. E. Blaine Cliver in Past Meets Future wrote,
“A major loss of historic fabric and character is caused by introducing incompatible new
uses in existing buildings. Because buildings must be used if they are to survive, the
uses…are of critical importance.”58 In today’s age of quick turnaround for restored
buildings, a growing number of older buildings will likely become available for new
uses. How should today’s developers handle such an issue? A strategy to find
compatible uses for historic structures often begins with planning on a larger scale. This
involves developing a way to match structures and uses. Cliver also said that
“[a]rchitects must better understand the interrelationship of materials in a building and
the impact a new use will have on the character of a historic building.”59 For example,
architects might have to determine if modern mechanical and electrical systems have a
place in historic buildings, and they will have to decide how to incorporate such systems.
This all centers around the idea that historic buildings have limits that today’s buildings
do not. Air conditioning units, climate control gauges, and other comfort devices are all
important in today’s developments; however, they can cause deterioration in some older
buildings. Also, buildings, past and present, have life spans. It is for this reason that the
restoration of older buildings must be addressed in terms of eventual replacement. To
Cliver, “[a]ll treatments and materials should be considered from the standpoint of the
overall effect they will have on a structure.”60 Modern treatments and materials might

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preserve some parts of buildings or cause deterioration. Some might slightly change the
appearance of a building or an element of a building but might also prevent decay.
Through this dilemma, all those involved would benefit from a common vision to
properly care for architecture by balancing technology and history, to keep architecture
alive, and to care for and preserve the past.61
Regardless of the method of preservation, the examples here affirm that a variety
of historic preservation methods can be adopted as successful pathways to economic
revitalization. As preservation has become more widely adopted, more city leaders are
learning to incorporate it into their revitalization.
Festival marketplaces, convention centers, hotels, stadia, waterfront
development, office development, mixed use development, luxury
housing, aquariums…are some of the most popular types of urban
development projects undertaken in U.S. cities during the past two
decades.62
At the beginning of the preservation movement, architects often sided with city leaders
and developers in their urban renewal quests for new structures rather than the
refurbishing of older ones. If even architects support this option today, then historic
preservation is making a case as a preferred choice for major city developments. Instead
of building new, architects, developers, and the growing number of professionals in
various trades are getting involved in the preservation movement and are profitably
supporting physical improvements and renovations. This allows the focus of the public
sector to shift toward providing supplementary infrastructure improvements necessary to
upgrade the area.63 Specifically, Galveston has promoted the coexistence of wholesale
and warehouse businesses (with refurbished exteriors and signage to complement the
uniform gas street lights) with shops and apartments in renovated older buildings.

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Physical upgrades such as facade improvements recreated historic neighborhoods in
Alexandria, Galveston, Savannah, and Seattle, and parks and plazas were created to
become centers of activity.64
In the historic neighborhoods in these four cities, physical upgrades to public
infrastructure were a part of the economic revitalization. Transforming depressed urban
neighborhoods into aesthetically-pleasing areas helped to attract businesses, convince
business leaders that the once-struggling areas were experiencing economic turnaround,
and reassure developers that investment in the revitalized neighborhoods was safe. The
updated, renovated areas attracted new businesses, which led to an increase in the volume
of people who shop, eat, work, and live in the historic neighborhoods. Significant among
the new businesses were restaurants that contributed to the creation of a night life in the
areas, art galleries that added to the art and high class images, and office centers. Parks
and plazas, which added green space to dense urban streets, became centers of activity
where visitors and residents alike could rest, enjoy recreation and time outdoors, and
interact. These parks and plazas could also host mini-festivals, music performances, and
cart vendors. In each of the four historic neighborhoods being looked at in this section,
local housing conditions and property values were also upgraded. The increase in
property values generated increased revenue in most cases, even where reappraisals did
not completely reflect the effects of renovations. Furthermore, tourism brought
additional revenue.65 “Based on specific mail inquiries and on volume trends, the interest
in visiting historic districts is constantly increasing and attracting both tourists and
visitors living in the major metropolitan areas of the historic districts.”66

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Even private funds, once lacking, became more readily available. “Once the
historic district was so designated, usually after initial private investment and renovation,
lenders were more receptive to requests for long-term loans and investors more willing to
purchase properties.”67 Again, securing the historic designation is usually the first step in
the revitalization of older neighborhoods. This often leads to tax incentives and special
financing that can attract investors who might otherwise shy away from such
neighborhoods. This sets development and investment in historic neighborhoods apart
from anywhere else in the city. In time, a renewed image and identity will ideally
emerge, thus attracting more investment as people in the area also boast a renewed sense
of economic confidence. In time, more developers will ideally seek to become a part of
this hot commodity – a potential up-and-coming, economically-strong urban
neighborhood with historic character – especially as employment and the value of the
neighborhoods increase.
In cities containing historic neighborhoods, local residents, business owners, and
government officials have generally agreed that a positive change occurred in the social
climate of the historic district via the preservation-revitalization sequence. For example,
the quality of life increased in the four historic neighborhoods mentioned here, reflected
by the decreased crime rate, a reconsideration of once incompatible land uses, and
increased urban activity.68 In some cases, however, these positive changes affected others
in the area in more negative ways. For example, low-income residents (often minorities)
were excluded from the newly-created upscale, white-collar culture due to increasing
property values and rising rent costs as most affordable housing was pushed to other
areas.

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In these four historic neighborhoods, preservation was factored into the
revitalization process. As a result, preservationists were involved in the neighborhood
transformations. Their work in the once-blighted areas included raising funds, attracting
realtors and investors by securing and renovating a particular area, obtaining political
support, and educating the public. Preservationists also allied themselves with
professionals in other fields as the movement grew. This was an effective way for
preservationists in each of the four historic neighborhoods to expand preservation’s
services and to get more people and trades involved in the preservation movement.69
As revitalization continued in the four historic neighborhoods featured in this
section, economic benefits also appeared throughout their respective metro-regions. For
example, permanent employment for metropolitan-area workers (i.e., construction
workers, architects, craftsmen, realtors, engineers, unskilled laborers, and new business
employees) increased in each of the four cases. In addition, vacancy rates, unsound
housing, and overcrowded conditions were reduced in each city proper. More people
moved to the historic areas of the four cities and began to take part in the preservation
process. According to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
[n]ot only can the middle and upper income groups afford to renovate
older housing, but the younger couples and individuals who can do much
of the work themselves and the low to moderate income homeowners who
qualify for low interest home improvement loans can also participate in
home ownership and the creation of a strengthened neighborhood.70
Furthermore, preservation created renewed identities for each historic neighborhood. In
each of the four cities, a link was created between the arts and preservation as officials
from arts establishments sought older areas for the distinct character they can provide, but
these officials also looked to areas that possessed economic potential for the survival of

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their businesses. This helped to preserve the architecture of the older buildings and
allowed the buildings to be utilized for cultural and aesthetic benefits for the entire city.71
“[The] arts interests have an infinite number of opportunities and resources in the old
buildings alone, in the national attention they attract and in the backdrop they provide for
special arts events.”72
In the four cases of historic preservation outside of the HTW presented in this
section, each historic district experienced economic revitalization, increased interest in
downtown developments, expanded business and residential sectors, and added traffic
and tourism. In the HTW, historic preservation helped double the number of businesses;
old warehouses turned into apartments and lofts continue to be in high demand; and the
neighborhood has become known as a center of “Milwaukee’s creative community”
thanks to the presence of arts establishments such as theaters, MIAD, and a multitude of
specialty shops.73
Milwaukee, too, contributed to the HTW’s revitalization. For example,
Milwaukee’s manageable, smaller size aided certain areas such as the HTW. The city
can be viewed as being small enough that small businesses in the HTW can get noticed
and succeed financially, yet the city is big enough that downtown neighborhoods can
possess a certain urban allure to attract visitors from the metro-fringes. In addition,
Milwaukee has a reputation of a strong work ethic, which can be an added value in
convincing employees, renters, homebuyers, and outside business firms to relocate in
urban neighborhoods like the HTW. Compared to Chicago or Minneapolis, some have
said that Milwaukee is more authentic in that it resembles what cities used to be – street
level mass transit systems are in place, street activity is encouraged as city blocks can be

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traveled by foot, the various downtown neighborhoods incorporate small town feel, and
the city has clung to its historic roots. In Minneapolis, skywalks connect buildings to aid
pedestrians in the winter; however, skywalks can detract from pedestrian activity at the
street level, making cities look scarce and deterring economic activity at street-level
businesses. In neighborhoods such as the HTW, increased pedestrian activity is a major
goal of local businesses and the HTWA because it makes neighborhoods look busy,
which can, in turn, attract other interested businesses that are looking to relocate.74
Conclusion
Based on the many accounts of revitalization in this brief history of the HTW and
through the examples in other major U.S. cities, historic preservation and economic
revitalization can go hand-in-hand in partnership. Thanks to the growing preservation
movement, preservationists changed legislation and made preservation a legitimate factor
in downtown revival. Without the preservation aspect of revitalization, economic
renewal strategies are spin-offs of the unsuccessful strategies of 1950s and 1960s urban
renewal. The preservation-revitalization strategy can be a key in transforming abandoned
areas or older neighborhoods into economically-viable, competitive areas. For example,
consider the following from the HTWA as it pertains to the ward:
To date, there has been about $20 million of public investment, $10.5
million of which is in progress. This in turn has generated over $205
million in private investment. Over the last 20 years, property values
climbed from $1 to $40 per square foot for unimproved buildings, rental
rates for commercial space have gone from $1.50 to as high as $18 per
square foot[,] and the assessed value of the [w]ard has gone from $40 to
$240 million.75
Many long-time owners pay property taxes on undeveloped property or buildings and sit
on the properties. Decades ago, this was not the case as HTW properties did not possess

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the same potential for economic development.76 But today, the HTW is a different place
with obvious potential for growth, thanks to the preservation-revitalization strategy.
This strategy worked in the HTW because various agents were in place. First, the
ward has a rich tradition in history; this is a key element in a strategy that involves
preservation. Later as the preservation movement grew and as more residents began
seeking urban life, HTW leaders were able to build upon an aversion to suburban life by
connecting the ward with the past and by boasting a sense of historic charm and character
that was unavailable in the suburbs. Similar revitalization strategies for areas that do not
possess rich, cultural histories (such as suburban neighborhoods) might be especially
difficult to achieve because such areas lack the same connection with the past found in
older urban neighborhoods. Second, the ward grew vacant and economically depressed
during the urban renewal years, but neighborhood pride worked to ensure that the
neighborhood’s history and old world character remained intact; in fact, residents and
business owners in the ward mobilized to protect the neighborhood by fighting off a “red
light” district and by calling for the creation of the HTWA.
Third, the HTWA and its various partners, in turn, continued to utilize citizen
participation and empowerment to lead revitalization and preservation. The HTWA was
integral to the preservation-revitalization strategy because it acted as the organizational
agent on behalf of the neighborhood. The HTWA helped to obtain federal aid, pass
legislation, and mediate with local politicians and government branches. Fourth, the
HTW preservation-revitalization strategy owes much success to the preservation
movement because it opened eyes and changed minds that urban renewal was ineffective;
preservation introduced a new and effective way to rehabilitate economically-depressed

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urban areas. The preservation movement resulted in the formation of federal and local
protection programs and government agencies that worked for the continued preservation
of historic buildings and areas, it created national awareness of the true harm that urban
renewal was causing U.S. cities, and it showed that preservation can work in a
contemporary setting, thus creating historic neighborhoods that also offer modern
conveniences.
Today, a National Center for the Revitalization of Central Cities (NCRCC) exists
to assess recent urban policy and reappraise future programs. The NCRCC, which is “a
consortium of academic institutions that conduct basic and applied research on the
problems plaguing our nation’s cities,” was established by Congress in 1990 at the
University of New Orleans in its College of Urban and Public Affairs.77 Its main
objective is to determine how to maintain today’s urban areas for economic growth and
prosperity. Its findings aid the federal government in formulating a national policy for
revitalizing central cities.78 Centers such as the NCRCC have been invaluable to the
revitalization of cities today; however, the HTWA was mostly without such support
during the ward’s major projects. In fact, the HTWA was formed at a time when
preservation was slowly becoming recognized, meaning that urban renewal theory
continued to linger well into the time of the HTWA’s first projects. Because preservation
was first becoming an adopted and applied method, the HTW stood at the cutting edge of
historic preservation and urban revitalization in Milwaukee, setting the tone for future
developers in the city. Joyce Lynn Knippel stated that
Milwaukee’s government has established a nationwide reputation through
the cooperative efforts of [the DCD], [the HPC], the Redevelopment
Authority, and the Community Development Agency. These agencies
have aided and supported the work of private developers and corporate

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ventures over the years in order to bring new development and progress
to…Milwaukee.79
Preservation is no longer limited to restoring historic buildings as museums or art
centers; rather, it is often referred to as renovation, adaptive reuse, rehabilitation,
facadism, or architectural conversion. The underlying meaning of preservation has
remained the same. To Knippel, “[p]lanners and preservationists must create new uses
for historic buildings which were designed for specific functions 100 years ago but are
now obsolete in today’s market.”80 For example, old, abandoned warehouses can become
lofts, apartments, or entertainment venues. Some preservationists dislike the option of
adaptive reuse because it means that buildings are not used for their original purposes.
But just as preservation has expanded, so, too, can the uses for historic buildings.
So what is preservation? Its definition has certainly changed, but it can be applied
and adopted as a method in various ways with adaptive reuse being one of the most
popular. Some preservationists have argued that the HTW is not a site for historic
preservation because the buildings have been reused to fit into a modern context, but
others claim that this is misleading. Opponents of adaptive reuse in the preservation
community believe that reuse does not preserve the historic fabric of certain
neighborhoods or the built environments of cities. But historic neighborhoods that are
not intended to serve solely as actual time period museums must also serve an economic
function for the survival of the neighborhoods – they must compete for dollars through
investment and development. When the novelty of renewed historic areas wears off, such
areas must have an economic plan for the future. Reusing historic buildings as
contemporary businesses can help to ensure that older neighborhoods will remain
economically viable into the future so that developers continue to take interest in such

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neighborhoods; adaptive reuse also helps to ensure that the historic character of the
buildings and neighborhoods remains intact. The method of preservation can be different
from city to city because every city is unique, but preservation’s expanded definition
means that city leaders can adapt it to their needs.
Thanks to the HTWA, the HTW has become an example for Milwaukee and the
U.S. In the HTW, preservation was used to transform the area into an area that some
have compared to a new SoHo, which is an acronym for South of Houston Street. SoHo
is an eclectic neighborhood in lower Manhattan, New York, that has become known as
New York City’s artistic haven. In the 1850s, SoHo was a neighborhood complete with
cast-iron warehouses and cobblestone streets. At that time, companies such as Tiffany’s
used the ornate buildings; the lower floors were designed for displays. But by the late-
1900s, fashionable businesses like Tiffany’s moved uptown and SoHo developed into a
“seedy, sweatshop-filled slum known as ‘hell’s hundred acres’” until new labor laws
forced these shops to evacuate, which left SoHo vacant and economically depressed.81
Some have said that it resembled a ghost town, yet, it contained potential for change.
Through the 1960s, “artists quietly moved into the abandoned buildings which provided
‘lofty’ spaces to contain their creativity.”82 By the 1970s, SoHo was transformed into a
community with residential, commercial, and artistic zones. Today, SoHo is quite
different from the SoHo of the 1970s. For example, loft apartments have become popular
and sell in the million dollar range. It has become known for its creative trends, due, in
part, to the art galleries that use the space. In addition, visitors to SoHo frequent the area
for its independent diners and small shops, which cannot be found in shopping malls.

152
In the HTW, preservation has also allowed the ward to function as a mixed-use
area (much like the different zones in SoHo’s community) with historic architecture.
Twenty years ago, most people had not heard about the HTW nor had they any reason to
visit it. That is became many of the economic and business elements that had made the
HTW viable during the first part of the twentieth century had disappeared by the 1950s;
the ward, too, resembled a ghost town throughout much of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
But like New York’s SoHo, the HTW rebounded from residential and business vacancy
and economic depression caused by urban renewal to become a prime location for high-
class living and creative arts establishments such as galleries. Many visitors to
Milwaukee might not expect to find an upscale neighborhood like the HTW in a Rustbelt
city. Today, “[p]eople stop by Milwaukee and are surprised what they see here [in the
ward].”83

153
Notes – Chapter Three
1. “Prosperity returning to Third Ward,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 16 November 1993,
folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
2. Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design, “About MIAD,” Milwaukee Institute
of Art and Design, http://www.miad.edu/content/view/124/45/ (accessed 11 March 2007).
3. Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design, “Quick Facts,” Milwaukee Institute of
Art and Design, http://www.miad.edu/content/view/286/59/ (accessed 11 March 2007).
4. Tom Daykin, “Third Ward building will become dorm,” Milwaukee Sentinel,
30 March 1994, folder 33, box 2, HTWA Collection.
5. Gould, “Museum design gives historic building some sass,” Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, 31 January 2000.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Historic Third Ward Association, “Take a Tour.”
11. Gould, “Museum design gives historic building some sass.”
12. Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design, “About MIAD.”
13. Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design, “Quick Facts.”
14. Ibid.
15. Daykin, “Third Ward would add housing,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 14
March 2001.
16. Ibid.
17. Daykin, “Downtown condo demand grows,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 20
January 2002.
18. Ibid.

154
19. Ibid; Ellen Hickock-Wall, “Milwaukee sees rebirth of downtown housing,”
Milwaukee Daily Reporter, 26 June 2002.
20. Daykin, “Downtown condo demand grows.”
21. Ibid.
22. Hickock-Wall, “Milwaukee sees rebirth of downtown housing.”
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Gould, “Proposed Third Ward market could spur downtown development,
group told,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 9 November 1999.
26. Mike Nichols, “Public Market considered for HTW attraction; Leaders say
plan could spur development,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 5 February 1997.
27. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
28. Nichols, “Public Market considered for HTW attraction; Leaders say plan
could spur development.”
29. Gould, “Proposed Third Ward market could spur downtown development,
group told.”
30. Ibid.
31. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
32. Gould, “Third Ward market gets key funding: Grant may enable project to
break ground in June,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 22 April 2004,
http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/apr04/224222.asp (accessed 25 February 2006).
33. Ibid.
34. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
35. Jeff Sherman, “Nomadic groom salon says it’s finally found a home,”
OnMilwaukee.com, 28 January 2005,
http://onmilwaukee.com/market/articles/groom.html (accessed 25 February 2006).

155
36. Stephanie Sherman (Historic Third Ward Association, business owner)
interview by Cory Grassell, 23 March 2006, Alterra at the Lake.
37. Ibid.
38. Mary Bergin, “Women make mark in business,” Madison (WI) Capital
Times, 21 July 2005, http://www.madison.com/tct/features/stories/index.php?ntid=47665
(accessed 25 February 2006). Comment was made by writer Rebecca Kleinman in her
article titled ‘Brewing to Boutiques: Milwaukee’s Style Evolves.’
39. Ibid.
40. Stephanie Sherman, interview.
41. Bergin, “Women make mark in business.”
42. Ibid.
43. Stephanie Sherman, interview.
44. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
45. Stephanie Sherman, interview.
46. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
47. Goldfield and Brownell, 395-396.
48. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, The Contribution of Historic
Preservation to Urban Revitalization (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, January 1979), 1, 4.
49. Ziegler, Jr., 62.
50. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 1, 4.
51. Henry G. Cisneros, “Bridging America’s Visions,” in Past Meets Future:
Saving America’s Historic Environments, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 89 (Washington, D.C.:
The Preservation Press, 1992).
52. Ibid.

156
53. The Lyceum: Alexandria’s History Museum, “Alexandria’s History,” The
City of Alexandria, Virginia, http://oha.alexandriava.gov/lyceum/ly-historic.html
(accessed 11 March 2007).
54. Cisneros, 89.
55. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 4.
56. National Trust for Historic Preservation, Tony P. Wrenn, and Elizabeth D.
Mulloy, America’s Forgotten Architecture (Washington, D.C.: Pantheon Books, 1976),
274.
57. Ibid., 270-274.
58. E. Blaine Cliver, “Visiting Past Rehabilitation Practices,” in Past Meets
Future: Saving America’s Historic Environments, ed. Antoinette J. Lee, 178
(Washington, D.C.: The Preservation Press, 1992).
59. Ibid., 179.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., 178-179.
62. Alex Schwartz, “Rebuilding Downtown: A Case Study in Minneapolis,” in
Urban Revitalization: Policies and Programs, ed. Fritz W. Wagner, Timothy E. Joder,
and Anthony J. Mumphrey Jr., 163 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995).
63. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 5; Schwartz, 163.
64. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 6, 20.
65. Ibid., 6, 8, 9, 17, 22.
66. Ibid., 9.
67. Ibid., 8.
68. Ibid., 11.
69. Ibid., 17.
70. Ibid., 20.
71. Ibid., 18, 19, 20, 24.

157
72. Ibid., 24.
73. Raasch, 213.
74. Stephanie Sherman, interview.
75. Historic Third Ward Association, “Historic Third Ward General
Information.”
76. Stephanie Sherman, interview.
77. Community Outreach Partnership Center, “Community Development
Resources,” UVM/Burlington Community Outreach Partnership Center,
http://www.uvm.edu/~copc/projects/CDres10.php3 (accessed 11 November 2006).
78. Ibid.
79. Knippel, 117-118.
80. Ibid., 117.
81. NYCTourist.com, “SoHo,” NYCtourist.com,
http://www.nyctourist.com/soho1.htm (accessed November 11, 2006).
82. Ibid.
83. Stephanie Sherman, interview.

158
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