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Firefox security (prasanna)


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  • Xp Connect is the scripting front end to underlying Xpcom interfaces
  • Introduction to extensions
  • Xp Connect is the scripting front end to underlying Xpcom interfaces
  • Discuss about Z:\\
  • Xp Connect is the scripting front end to underlying Xpcom interfaces
  • Transcript

    • 1. Firefox (in)Security
      Prasanna K
      Dead Pixel
    • 2. What & Who
      This presentation demonstrates strength of the Mozilla platform and how some of the features could be misused by malicious users.
      This presentation is intended to dispel a common myth
      Just using FIREFOX keeps you SECURE
    • 3. Agenda
      Basic premise
      Understanding the Mozilla Platform
      Attacking Firefox
      Malicious Extensions
      Some basic points to watch….
      That’s All Folks …
    • 4. Introduction
      • Browser of the choice for millions
      • 5. Multi Platform
      • 6. Modular and Scalable !
      • 7. Pluggable Extension Code !
      • 8. Browser of my Choice 
    • Mozilla Platform
    • 9. Mozilla Platform
      It could be used to indicate a “Special Trusted Zone” within the Mozilla Platform
    • 10. Mozilla Platform
      XUL (pronounced "zool") :
      Mozilla's XML-based language that lets you build feature-rich cross platform applications that can run connected or disconnected from the Internet.
      <?xml version="1.0"?>
      <?xml-stylesheethref="chrome://global/skin/" type="text/css"?>
      <window id="vbox example" title="Example 3...."
      <button id="yes" label="Yes"/>
      <button id="no" label="No"/>
      <button id="maybe" label="Maybe"/>
    • 11. Mozilla Platform
      XML-based markup language used to declare the behavior and look of XUL-widgets and XML elements.
      scrollbar { -moz-binding: url('somefile.xml#binding1'); }
      -- “binding1” is the id of the binding
    • 12. Mozilla Platform
      Cross platform component model from Mozilla.
      Nerve center of the Mozilla platform.
      XPCOM has some Similarity to CORBA and Microsoft COM.
    • 13. Important Components of Mozilla Platform
    • 14. Mozilla Platform
    • 15. Extension Installation – Mozilla Site
      • Reviewed before being added to the Mozilla site.
      • 16. Review process is manual lapses have been found
      • 17. Over 2 billion add-ons as of today and growing
      • 18. Add-ons can be distributed through Mozilla without review as well
    • 19. Extension Installation – How else?
      • There is no restriction on any site hosting Mozilla extensions (XPI files)
      • 20. When installing from any site Mozilla pops a warning but the same message appears on the official site (confusing!).
      • 21. Extensions can be installed without warning by other software, USB autorun, login scripts etc.
    • Extension Installation – Alternate Method
      • Place a file in the extensions folder in the Mozilla profile directory.
      • 22. The filename should be the id of the extension to be loaded
      • 23. The content of the file should be the location of the extension code
      Beware: When this file exists in the folder the extensions is installed automatically it does not require any human interaction.
    • 24. Extension Security!
      Mozilla extension security model is completely flat
      Extension code is treated as fully privilegedby Firefox
      Vulnerabilities in extension code can result in full system compromise
      No security boundaries between extensions An extension can silently modify/alter other extensions
    • 25. The Potential
      Statistics – Firefox Browser Market Share
      Beyond 20% globally since November 2008, more than 50% in certain regions/countries
      Source: Marketshare -
      Over 2 billion add-ons and growing
    • 26. Extensions are Everywhere
    • 27. Concerns on AMO
      Everyone can write extension and submit to AMO (even us  )
      AMO review process lacks complete security assessment
      Few extensions signed in AMO. Extensions are generally not “signed”. Users trust unsigned extensions.
      Experimental extension (not approved yet) are publicly available
    • 28. This sums it up
    • 29. Extension and Malware
      Some people have already exploited this concept
      FormSpy - 2006
      Downloader-AXM Trojan, poses as the legitimate NumberedLinks 0.9 extension
      Steal passwords, credit card numbers, and e-banking login details
      Firestarterfox - 2008
      Hijacks all search requests through multiple search engines and redirects them through Russian site
      Vietnamese Language Pack - 2008
      Shipped with adware
      Vietnamese Language Pack - 2008
      Shipped with adware
      Might happen in the near future…
      Malware authors bribe/hack famous/recommended extension developer/vendor
      Initial benign extension, malware is introduced in a 3rd/4th update
    • 30. Attacking Firefox !
      Now that we have seen the basic architecture & problem, let’s have some fun 
    • 31. Anatomy of an Extension
      These are the components of every extension. They are archived together into the XPI file format.
      Sample Files inside a XPI file
    • 32. Malicious Extensions
      We will build a malicious extension which will
      Log all Key Strokes and send them remotely
      Execute native code
      Extract stored passwords
      Add a malicious site to the NoScriptwhitelist
    • 33. Interesting Finds
      In the course of making this presentation I found some interesting things
    • 34. XCS (Cross Context Switching)
      • Cross Context Switching is the art of injecting malicious content into the trusted Chrome Zone.
      • 35. XCS injections occur from untrusted to the trusted zone.
      • 36. PDP was the first person to exploit XCS.
    • Attacking Event & DOM Handlers
      • Event Handlers implement element properties attributes and behavior.
      • 37. DOM nodes when dragged and dropped move the properties attributes and behavior
      • 38. An extension that trusts DOM content can be subverted by providing malicious content
      • 39. CreateEvent() DOM function can be used to send malicious content to the extension
    • 40. Bypassing Wrappers
      • Multiple wrappers exist in Firefox and are used to protect privileged interfaces, functions and objects.
      • 41. wrappedJSObject can be used to strip the wrapper protection.
    • 42. What Can We Look For?
      Suspicious single file(s) in the extension folder.
      XPI are archives - can be un-Zipped and checked for any packaged executables
      Check the install.rdf for common pitfalls mainly <em:hidden>
      Verify chrome.manifest does not point to other extension folders as it can overwrite functionality.
    • 43. What Should a Developer Do?
      That’s a whole presentation by itself
      Don’t bypass wrappers
      Don’t trust content From the un-trusted context.
      Don’t use eval()
      Follow this link :
    • 44. Tools
    • 45. Last Words
      We discussed some ways to subvert the Mozilla Platform
      This list is not by any means exhaustive
      There are some strategies like sandboxes which can be bypassed
      New features like themes open new avenues !
      Last, Mozilla is a secure platform but can be made to do lots of tricks… So some care should be taken.
    • 46. Questions
    • 47. Thank You