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In larger freedom in the UK

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In 2005, on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United Nations Association-UK carried out a public and expert engagement process to debate reform of the UN and its future role in …

In 2005, on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United Nations Association-UK carried out a public and expert engagement process to debate reform of the UN and its future role in international affairs. This FCO-UNA engagement process, inaugurated by Secretary of State Jack Straw and with keynote speeches provided by Prime Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, comprised a series of national and regional public debates around the country as well as expert contribution from 200 academic and policy specialists. In this report we now present these views.

This engagement process took as its basis the recommendations put forward by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report to the General Assembly (In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all) and also gave detailed consideration to the recommendations of two earlier reports (the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change & the UN Millennium Project). This unique process gave government ministers and civil servants direct and sustained feedback on the proposals of the UN Secretary-General as the UK engaged in negotiations leading up to the World Summit.

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  • 1. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page i in larger freedom in the UK AN AGENDA FOR ACTION FOLLOWING THE 2005 UN WORLD SUMMIT REPORT OF THE FCO-UNA NATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON UN REFORM
  • 2. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page ii Edited by Sarah Carter and Laura Mucha Designed by John Schwartz Printed by Marstan Press Limited © United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UNA-UK) London, 2005 ISBN 0-901796-23-9 UNA-UK 3 Whitehall Court London SW1A 2EL www.una-uk.org Any omissions or errors in the representation or attribution of public and expert views are solely the responsibility of UNA-UK. The views expressed in this report are not in any way attributable to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Nor do they necessarily reflect official UNA-UK policy as estab- lished through UNA-UK Annual Conference. The national engagement process was conducted by UNA-UK as part of its programme of events to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations and UNA-UK. The UN60 logo is used in this publication for educational and informational purposes only, and does not imply that the views expressed are in any way attributable to the United Nations.
  • 3. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page iii Contents Foreword v by the Foreign Secretary List of abbreviations and key documents vii Acknowledgements x Executive Summary with Post-Summit Recommendations 1 A. Freedom from want 1 B. Freedom from fear 3 C. Freedom to live in dignity 5 D. Strengthening the United Nations 6 I. Introduction 13 II. Freedom from Want 15 A. A shared vision of development 17 B. National strategies 20 C. Making Goal 8 work: trade and financing for development 24 D. Ensuring environmental sustainability 36 E. Other priorities for global action 39 F. The implementation challenge 42 III. Freedom from Fear 45 A. A vision of collective security 47 B. Preventing catastrophic terrorism 49 C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 54 D. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war 57 E. Use of force 69 iii
  • 4. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page iv IV. Freedom to Live in Dignity 73 A. Rule of law 75 B. Human rights 81 C. Democracy 84 V. Strengthening the United Nations 87 A. General Assembly 90 B. The Councils 94 C. The Secretariat 105 D. System coherence 108 E. Regional organisations 111 F. Updating the Charter of the United Nations 113 Annex I: 2005 World Summit Outcome A/60/L.1 115 Annex II: List of Public Events 134
  • 5. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page v Foreword by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP Eight months ago I launched the public debate on the High Level Panels report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility". At the time, I expressed my hope that as many people as possible would be able to influence our thinking on the United Nations in this momentous year for the organisation. I am delighted that so many people were able to take part in the debates, organised by the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom. A total of ten national public debates were held: London, Cambridge, Leeds, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Belfast, Aberystwyth, Manchester, Bath and Southampton. More local debates were also held. UNA organised a number of expert consultations on specific areas of the reform agenda with prominent UN-watching civil society organisa- tions. This report expertly summarises these discussions. It illustrates one simple fact. For most people, the United Nations remains the only global organisation able to tackle the challenges that we face today. The British Government is a strong and committed supporter of the UN. We worked tirelessly for a successful outcome to the UN World Summit in September. Overall, I believe that the Summit delivered a worthwhile package of reforms and commitments that will enable the UN to be better equipped to tackle the interrelated challenges of development, security and human rights. As EU Presidency, the UK played an important role in the often difficult negotiations on the Summit outcome document. The views received from the British public and from UK civil society fed directly into this process. Of the reforms agreed in New York, the "Responsibility to Protect" will be a vital tool for the UN should states fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The agreement to create by the end of this year a new Peacebuilding Commission will close an institutional gap in the UNs conflict architecture and will assist countries emerging from conflict. The Summit agreed on an unequivocal condemnation of terrorism, and called for urgent work to agree the UNs counter-terrorism strategy. The agreement to establish a new Human Rights Council will place the protection of human rights at the heart of the UNs architecture. The Summit strongly endorsed the outcomes agreed at the G8 Summit at Gleneagles on development and climate change. These included the need to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and to address the special needs of Africa. Important new EU commitments on overseas development were welcomed by the broader UN membership. The Summit also endorsed further work to strengthen UN effectiveness in operational activities for tackling humanitarian crises and to ensure more coherent international institutional arrangements for environmental action. All this was underpinned by agreement on a number of reforms for the UN Secretariat, including a v
  • 6. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page vi In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform mandate to the Secretary General to make proposals for further reforms in such areas as ethics, accountability, oversight, and financial and human resource management. In some areas, the final text did not meet all our aspirations. Our efforts to secure stronger language on non-proliferation and disarmament were unsuccessful. We also pushed for more extensive reforms of the UN Secretariat. As a result, some have criticised the Summits document as modest. It was always going to be a formidable task to gain agreement across the board, reflecting the broad agenda on the table and the diverse nature of the UN membership. However, as the Prime Minister said in his speech in New York, if all the reforms agreed at the Summit are fully implemented, it will represent an important step forward for the UN. The Government is committed to the full and early implementation of the reforms. I am greatly appreciative of the work of the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom in organising the public debates, and for compiling such a comprehensive report. Jack Straw October 2005 vi
  • 7. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page vii List of abbreviations and key background documents 2005 UN World Summit Also called the Millennium Review Summit, the World Summit, which took place from 14 to 16 September 2005, marked the start of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. Heads of state and government made decisions related to UN reform and the proposals contained in In Larger Freedom. ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries A more secure world: Our (December 2004) The report of the High-Level Panel on shared responsibility Threats, Challenges and Change, an independent panel of experts appointed by the Secretary-General to review new and existing threats to international peace and security. CfA Commission for Africa DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group: a regional armed force aligned with ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States ECOSOC Economic and Social Council EPA Economic Partnership Agreement FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice IFIs International Financial Institutions vii
  • 8. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page viii In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform In Larger Freedom: towards (March 2005) The report of the Secretary-General development, security and submitted to the General Assembly in advance of the human rights for all 2005 UN World Summit. It draws largely from two earlier reports: that of the High-Level Panel and that of the Millennium Project. Often refered to as ‘ILF’ throughout this publication Investing in development: a (February 2005) The report of the Millennium Project, practical plan to achieve the an international team of development experts led by Millennium Development Professor Jeffrey Sachs, which puts forward an action Goals plan to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Also called the Sachs Report. MDGs Millennium Development Goals: a series of eight, time- bound goals encompassing targets related to poverty reduction, health, gender equality and other development indicators. Millennium Declaration The declaration, signed by a record number of govern- ments at the 2000 General Assembly, which contained what later became articulated as the MDGs Monterrey Conference (March 2002) The International Conference on Financing for Development produced important agree- ments on how to mobilise national and international resources to support development. NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NGO Non-governmental organisation NNWS Non-nuclear-weapon state NWS Nuclear-weapon state OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OHRM Office of Human Resources Management viii
  • 9. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page ix List of abbreviations and key background documents OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services PRSP Poverty reduction strategy papers SDT Special and differential treatment TCC Troop-contributing country UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNSC United Nations Security Council WHO World Health Organisation WMD Weapons of mass destruction ix
  • 10. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page x Acknowledgements We would like to thank all participants in the In Larger Freedom engagement process. In particular we would like to express our gratitude for the contribution of over a hundred UNA members - from Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England - who not only submitted their feedback on UN reform but also volunteered their time to assist us in the smooth running of the public events. We would have liked to have been able to acknowledge these individuals by name, but they are too numerous to list. We are grateful to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for funding the process and for working together with us on such an important initiative. We would like also to acknowledge explicitly those government representatives and academic and policy experts who contributed so crucially to the success of the debates by acting as keynote speakers, panellists and rapporteurs: Paul Bentall, Simon Burall, Chris Corrin, Joanne Coysh, Margaret Cund, Richard Dewdney, Lord Hannay, Alistair Harrison, Andrew Hurrell, Mark Imber, Sir Richard Jolly, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, Tony Kay, Noel Lloyd, Vaughan Lowe, Anthony McDermott, Malcolm McIntosh, Des McNulty MSP, Phil Mason, Susan Matthew, Justin Morris, Tim Morris, Edward Mortimer, Marco Odello, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, Bill Rammell MP, Sir Adam Roberts, Martyn Roper, Diane Sheard, Gerry Simpson, John Simpson, Melanie Speight, Surya Subedi, Jennifer Welsh, Nick Wheeler and Geof Wood. Special thanks are due to Alexander Ramsbotham, Head of UNA’s John Bright Peace and Security Programme, who headed the unit which organised the national engagement process and the collation of expert input. Our National Rapporteurs, Sarah Carter and Laura Mucha, supported by other UNA staff and volunteers, also played a central role in the success of the engagement process by organising the debates and by recording, compiling and editing over 2000 pages of public and expert input. We are grateful to the Allan and Nesta Ferguson Charitable Trust for funding UNA’s educational and informational work on disarmament, WMD and nuclear non-prolifera- tion, which supported the compilation of those sections of this report. x
  • 11. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 1 Executive Summary with post-Summit recommendations A. FREEDOM FROM WANT A shared vision of development Development is an end in itself and a means to greater international stability; it is thus a responsibility to be shared between rich and poor countries within a global partner- ship for development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – informed by the understanding that human development depends upon not only economic but also social factors – constitute a comprehensive framework for international development, and provide a means of both harmonising donor and recipient development strategies and ensuring that the outcomes of these strategies are consistent with agreed develop- ment objectives. The MDGs should be given the full support of the international community. The UK government should use its political position in the international system – and in particular its influence with the US government and its status within the EU – to maintain and build momentum behind the Millennium Development Goals and to ensure that long-standing development pledges are now translated into concrete gains. National strategies National ownership of development strategies is fundamental to country-level progress towards the MDGs. In providing financial support for these strategies, donor countries should not impose conditionalities linked to liberalisation and fiscal austerity. Recipient governments should, however, be required to frame national development strategies around the MDGs to promote accountability and provide a means of evaluating develop- ment policies. To ensure that successes are sustained, recipient countries should concen- trate policies and investments in sectors of special relevance to development. A key priority should be the achievement of gender equality, given the pivotal role of women within development processes. The UK government should encourage partner countries to formulate their own development strategies based on the MDGs. The UK should not tie aid to privatisation of services, and should dissuade other donor countries from imposing conditionalities which do not directly contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. Making Goal 8 work: trade and financing for development To satisfy their collective responsibility under the global partnership for development, rich countries must reform the international regimes for aid, debt and trade, in order to create an enabling environment in which developing countries are able to implement 1
  • 12. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 2 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform domestic policies required to drive development. Those rich countries which have not yet done so should increase to 0.7% the portion of gross national income allocated to overseas development assistance (ODA), and provide clear timetables for reaching this target. Assessments of debt sustainability should be reconfigured to refer to the level of debt a country can service without compromising its achievement of the MDGs by 2015. Debts which prevent public spending in support of the MDGs should be restructured or, in some cases, entirely relieved; the HIPC initiative is too limited and cumbersome to allow seriously indebted countries the scope to reach the MDGs. The asymmetry of the international economy poses a fundamental obstacle to reaching the MDGs, and rich countries must take immediate and comprehensive steps to allow developing countries to participate productively in the global economy. Agricultural subsidies for producers in rich countries must be repealed and duty- and quota-free access for least developing country exports granted. In parallel, immediate measures should be implemented to secure short-term ‘gains’ towards the MDGs. Where needed, malaria bed nets should be distributed widely and without cost to the user. Such schemes should be properly incentivised through, wherever appropriate, collabo- ration with the private sector. The UK government should move forward its 2013 deadline to meet the 0.7% target, in order to free up the resources needed now for achieving the MDGs by 2015. Through its presidency of the EU, the UK government should seek the elimination of barriers to imports from developing countries, as well as guarantees that the EU will continue to allow poor countries to protect domestic industries until the latter are able to compete with producers in wealthy countries. The UK should also work, through the G8, the EU and wider international fora, to ensure that the development promise of the Doha Round is fulfilled. Ensuring environmental sustainability Environmental sustainability, as both an objective and a precondition of the MDGs, should underpin national and international development strategies. All development initiatives should encourage local and international action to address the challenges of desertification and the loss of biodiversity, including through implementation of the relevant international conventions. It is imperative that effective international mecha- nisms are found for mitigating and overcoming the threat of climate change, keeping in mind the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. While technological innovation should be harnessed to identify cleaner and more efficient sources of energy, this in itself is insufficient: the post-Kyoto international framework should reflect that although climate change is emphatically a global problem the major producers of greenhouse gases must bear primary responsibility for reducing emissions. The UK government should seek to ensure that, following the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol, an effective international framework is implemented which 1) encour- ages and utilises scientific advances to mitigate and adapt to climate change; 2) protects 2
  • 13. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 3 Executive summary with post-Summit recommendations developing country eco-systems to enhance resilience to the effects of climate change; 3) seeks concrete and comprehensive agreements on stabilisation targets for greenhouse gas emissions; and 4) incorporates policy mechanisms for rectifying unsustainable consump- tion patterns. Other priorities for global action The success of development strategies is contingent upon the ability of the international community to contain and reverse the spread of infectious disease and to mitigate the negative effects of natural disasters. The international community should meet any HIV/AIDS funding shortfalls, including that for the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, so that important targets – such as the goal of providing universal access to antiretroviral treatment for all HIV/AIDS sufferers by 2015 – are met. In recognition of the link between development and resilience to natural disasters, governments should implement the Hyogo Framework for Action, including the integra- tion of disaster risk reduction strategies within development policies and planning. To complement these efforts, an early warning system should also be established. A key focus of all development initiatives should be the promotion of regional cooperation, to improve infrastructure, enhance South-South trade, and encourage the establishment and use of peer review mechanisms, along the lines of NEPAD’s. The international financial institutions should be reformed further in order to provide a greater voice for the devel- oping world. The UK government should exert pressure on peers in the G8 and other fora to ensure sufficient funding for efforts to combat infectious disease, including HIV/AIDS. It should also provide leadership in international efforts to implement the Hyogo Framework for Action, and in fostering greater multi-sectoral burden-sharing among countries of regional groupings. B. FREEDOM FROM FEAR A vision of collective security A new consensus – based on the recognition that threats to security are interconnected and can only be overcome through multilateral action – is a precondition of collective security. Prospects for forging this consensus are lessened by divergent security concerns among member states, particularly (but not exclusively) between North and South. The UN is uniquely situated to reconcile these differences and so act as an effective forum for collective action, but, first, it requires comprehensive reform. Member states should support in full the agenda for UN reform set by the 2005 World Summit, and take prompt, decisive steps to implement the agreements enshrined in the Summit’s outcome document. The UK, as a leading member of the international system and a key ally of the world’s superpower, has an instrumental role to play in promoting a global consensus 3
  • 14. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 4 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform on threats and in driving forward the reform of the UN so that it can implement this consensus. Preventing catastrophic terrorism Effective multilateral counter-terrorism measures depend ultimately upon a common basis of understanding. The international community should continue to seek agreement on a definition of terrorism. Member states should fulfil the commitment made to agree a comprehensive convention on terrorism, to lend coherence and strength to international counter-terrorism strategies. All initiatives should respect human rights, humanitarian and refugee laws. The UK government – a vocal proponent of human rights – should ensure that both the proposed comprehensive convention and all international counter-terrorism measures in which the UK is involved are consistent with the highest human rights standards. The UK should give full support to the comprehensive strategy put forward by the Secretary-General, in which the defence of human rights forms one of five pillars of action. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons The threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is clear. It is imperative that efforts are directed at containing and diminishing stockpiles of not only nuclear but also chemical and biological weapons. Neither the most recent conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor the 2005 World Summit made progress towards overcoming the nuclear threat. Urgent and radical measures need to be taken to revive the NPT and to reinvigorate the bargain upon which it is based – namely that the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) progressively disarm, and the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) cooperate to stem proliferation. The NWS’ failure to disarm is counter-productive and contravenes the NPT: the NWS should now take concrete and irreversible steps towards disarmament, extend negative security assurances to the NNWS, conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty, and reaffirm commitment to a moratorium on nuclear test explosions until the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In parallel, and in support of non-proliferation, agreement should be secured on adopting the Model Additional Protocol for strengthening the capacity for verifying compliance with the NPT. The UK government should set an example among the NWS by complementing its support for counter-proliferation measures with concrete, and irreversible, steps towards nuclear disarmament. There should be a national debate on the merits of replacing Trident which should consider whether the resources recovered would be put to better effect in safeguarding the strategic security interests of the UK by being redirected elsewhere. Other uses could be as follows: funding an increase in overseas development assistance to enable the UK to realise the 0.7% target earlier than 2013; increasing the cultural and historical expertise of the UK’s intelligence services in order to enhance the success of its 4
  • 15. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 5 Executive summary with post-Summit recommendations ‘hearts and minds’ strategy for combating terrorism and addressing intra-state conflict; and improving the training, quantity, availability and readiness of military, police and civilian contingents available for UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and democracy-building. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war The UN’s capacity for conflict prevention should be enhanced, as proposed in In Larger Freedom. Among the range of tools available to the UN, sanctions should be applied only with selectivity. While regionalising peacekeeping can ease the strain on the UN’s resources, regional organisations cannot always intervene with impartiality, and have variable capacity for taking on peace operations. The establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission will furnish the UN with the means to effect and sustain the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Although the Commission will – indirectly – serve a preventive function by interrupting the cycle of conflict, consideration should be given to equipping it with explicit mechanisms for this purpose. The Commission should work closely with the international financial institutions and with civil society groups to ensure that the development needs of countries emerging from conflict are adequately taken into account. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 women should play a prominent role in the formulation and implementation of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives. The UK’s support for the Peacebuilding Commission has proved positive; it should now strive to effect its timely establishment. The government should ensure that the activities of the Commission are closely coordinated with those of the international financial institutions and that civil society, women and minorities are assured input into the Commission’s work. Use of force Except in cases of self-defence from imminent attack, the UN Security Council is the sole body that can legitimise the use of force under international law. In order to enhance the political legitimacy of the Council’s authorisation of military force, the Council should agree a resolution establishing criteria for the use of force, along the lines of those proposed in In Larger Freedom. The UK government should initiate negotiations on a draft resolution in informal consultations of the Council, with a view to seeking broad support among both non- permanent and fellow permanent members of the Council for criteria for the authorisa- tion of the use of force. C. FREEDOM TO LIVE IN DIGNITY Rule of law The endorsement at the 2005 UN World Summit of the principle of the responsibility to protect is potentially a landmark decision and, depending on whether the Security 5
  • 16. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 6 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Council can agree on guidelines and trigger mechanisms for non-military and military intervention, could equip the UN with the capacity to prevent genocide and a repeat of the gross abuses perpetrated in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and now occurring in Darfur. The UK government should table a Security Council resolution, following negotia- tions with other Council members, setting out guidelines for the practical application of the principle of the responsibility to protect. Human rights The UN’s human rights machinery has made a pivotal contribution to the formulation of human rights norms, and has played an indispensable role in monitoring compliance with human rights laws. Though central to these successes, the Commission on Human Rights has been undermined by politicisation and severe resource constraints, and the decision to replace the Commission with a new Human Rights Council is welcome. The agreement at the World Summit to double the regular budget of the Office of the High Commissioner over time is positive, but an increase in funding of a much greater magnitude is necessary if the UN human rights system is to respond effectively to the abuses reported to it. The treaty body system should be harmonised and reporting proce- dures made less cumbersome. Steps should also be taken to enhance the diversity of the membership of the treaty bodies. The UK should support the strengthening of the treaty body system as a means of enhancing the UN’s ability to promote and defend human rights, including by acting as an early warning mechanism for conflict prevention. Democracy Attempts to promote the principles of democracy should recognise that democracy has multiple manifestations. Imposing democracy on another society or political system is itself undemocratic and ineffective; democracy must be built upon a foundation of consent, by the host government and grass-roots society. The capacity of the UN to conduct democracy-building should be strengthened. Resources allocated to the Democracy Fund should be additional and not at the expense of other development initiatives. The UK government should support democracy-building and the UN’s role within these activities. The UK should advocate long-term approaches to democracy-building which focus on grass-roots involvement and which encourage the input of civil society, women and minority groups. The UK should provide financial resources to the Democracy Fund. D. STRENGTHENING THE UN General Assembly The General Assembly needs radical reform to match the legitimacy it derives as a universal forum with effectiveness and practical impact. The Assembly’s agenda must be 6
  • 17. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 7 Executive summary with post-Summit recommendations streamlined and focused on issues of substance, in keeping with the agreements made at the 2005 World Summit. The General Assembly will profit from a more open relation- ship with civil society and measures should be implemented to simplify access to UN bodies for all appropriate NGOs but particularly those from the South. Greater outreach by the General Assembly to the private sector is important but should be extended only on the basis that companies enact clear and concrete changes to practice and policy, in line with the principles of the Global Compact. The UK should work with other member states to reform the General Assembly, in particular focusing on restructuring its agenda in accordance with the mandate emerging from the 2005 UN World Summit. The Councils Security Council Security Council expansion should aim to increase the representative nature of the Council’s composition without compromising its effectiveness. Models for Security Council enlargement should not be restricted to what is politically feasible in terms of geographical distribution of membership, but should also address the Council’s primary function under Article 24 of the Charter – to take prompt and effective action to advance peace and security. Disagreements among member states over models for Security Council enlargement should not be permitted to obstruct the wider process of UN reform. In the absence of agreement on Security Council expansion, the UK should volun- tarily restrict the use of its own veto to Chapter VII resolutions and should foreswear the application of the British veto to the appointment of the Secretary-General. The UK could also spearhead a broader evaluation of types of Security Council decisions to determine which could be defined as procedural in nature and thus exempt from the veto. Economic and Social Council The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is in urgent need of reform if it is to make a substantive contribution to international development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. ECOSOC’s membership is presently too large, its remit too wide and its mandate too weak for it to have an impact in global decision- making with respect to economic and social issues. In the short-term the UK government should support efforts by ECOSOC to coordi- nate its work with the Bretton Woods Institutions and, when established, the Peacebuilding Commission. In the long-term, the government should support the replacement of ECOSOC with an Economic and Social Security Council, with a mandate to coordinate relevant activities of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN, and imbued with greater authority to galvanise resources in support of economic and social objectives. 7
  • 18. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 8 The new Human Rights Council The replacement of the Commission on Human Rights with a Human Rights Council is a positive step towards reforming the UN’s machinery to reflect more directly the UN’s commitment to human rights. The modalities of the new Council must be geared to avoid the politicisation which undermined the achievements of its predecessor. The UK should support the process of establishing the Human Rights Council, so that this body is equipped to fulfill its important mandate, including ensuring that the vital contribution of civil society to the work of the Council is reflected in access and participation rights. The Secretariat The Secretariat must be based on a culture of efficiency, accountability and transparency. To facilitate this, UN member states must curtail interference in Secretariat employment and micromanagement of the Secretary-General. Member states should empower the Secretary-General to manage the human and financial resources of the Secretariat and support the introduction of effective systems of independent management and financial oversight. Approval should be given to the one-time staff buy-out requested by the Secretary-General. Appointments at the UN should be on the basis of merit. Proactive ‘headhunting’ can ensure equitable geographical representation whilst promoting excel- lence in recruitment. The UK government should provide leadership in ensuring that the lessons learned from the Oil-for-Food Programme are implemented, in particular that 1) management practices and financial oversight within the Secretariat are improved and 2) programmes initiated by the Security Council are designed to minimise opportunities for corruption, with clear lines of responsibility drawn between member states and the Secretariat. System Coherence The sheer breadth of the UN’s activities has engendered, in some cases, the duplication and overlap of remits. These mandates need urgently to be rationalised, and member states should support this process by instructing diplomats on the governing boards of UN agencies to pursue policies which do not compromise the coordination of UN agencies. There is an urgent need for better international governance for the protection of the environment. The UK government should work with its partners in the international community to foster better coordination among UN agencies. With a view to improving environmental governance, the UK government should consider the utility of establishing a new UN Environment Organisation to replace UNEP. Regional Organisations Greater cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is a potentially valuable means of burden-sharing. Regional organisations have an important role to play in 8
  • 19. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 9 Executive summary with post-Summit recommendations fostering good governance, coordinating initiatives to combat infectious diseases, and reducing supply-side constraints to trade in poor countries. Member states should give full support to initiatives aiming to build capacity in regional organisations such as the African Union. The UK government should support regional capacity-building initiatives by scaling up financial and technical assistance to the AU and other suitable regional arrangements. Updating the Charter Although the UN Charter remains relevant 60 years after its creation, modifications are necessary. The references to the ‘enemy states’ are obsolete; the World Summit’s decision to delete these clauses from the Charter is welcome and constitutes a recognition of the contribution of Germany, Japan and Italy to the work of the UN. The decision to abolish the Trusteeship Council is welcome due to the expiry of the body’s purpose. Whatever decision is eventually taken with respect to the Military Staff Committee, it should not negate the quid pro quo upon which the privileges of the P5 are based – namely that, in exchange for the veto, these countries must make a special contribution in armed forces and/or resources for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the UK has a continuing special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter. In this context, the UK’s positive contribution of specialist expertise to the start-up, logistical support and command of peacekeeping operations is noted, as is its contribution of personnel in support of the UN-authorised operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan. The UK government should nevertheless also reverse the downward trend in the number of troops it sends to serve in UN peacekeeping operations. 9
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  • 21. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 11 I. Introduction
  • 22. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 12
  • 23. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 13 I. Introduction The FCO-UNA National Engagement Process During the spring and summer of 2005, the United Nations Association-UK, on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, carried out a public and expert engagement process to debate the reform of the United Nations and its future role in international affairs. The FCO-UNA engagement process took as its basis the recommendations put forward by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report to the General Assembly – entitled In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all – which formed a blueprint for the September 2005 UN World Summit. The engagement process also gave detailed consideration to the recommendations of two earlier reports – that of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and that of the UN Millennium Project – because their findings inform In Larger Freedom, and are in some cases endorsed explicitly by the Secretary-General. The FCO-UNA engagement process was inaugurated by Secretary of State Jack Straw at the Banqueting House in Whitehall, London, on 10 February 2005. Both Prime Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered keynote speeches. Following the launch, UNA organised a series of national and regional public debates around the country. These events provided the key vehicle for engaging with the public and were structured around workshops covering core aspects of the Secretary-Generals recommendations. This unique process gave government ministers and civil servants direct and sustained feedback on the proposals of the UN Secretary-General as the UK engaged in negotiations leading up to the World Summit. UNA-UK recorded hundreds of pages of public feedback and contacted over 200 academic and policy specialists to provide written submissions on specific areas of expertise. In this report, titled In Larger Freedom in the UK, we now present these views, making every attempt to express the broad range of opinion within the constraints of space. Where appropriate, we have supplemented the feedback and submissions with references to relevant academic, NGO and UN sources. This report also articulates the central messages emerging from the public engagement process: that there is overwhelming support in the UK for the UN, as well as a frank recognition of its imperfections, and that, while opinion differs on how exactly to correct these flaws, there is also broad agreement that to make the UN stronger and more accountable would bring us closer to that world foreshadowed in the Preamble to the UN Charter – a world of larger freedom. In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan states that the threats facing humanity are diverse and interconnected, and that they traverse development, security and human rights. To each of these three areas, the Secretary-General allocates a section of the report, entitling them, respectively, Freedom from want; Freedom from fear; and Freedom to live in dignity. The fourth, and final, section is cross-cutting and contains recommendations for the reform of the UN itself, so that it is equipped to take this bold agenda forward. 13
  • 24. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 14 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform For ease of reference we have followed as far as possible the structure of In Larger Freedom. The feedback from the FCO-UNA engagement process has thus been grouped under the headings of the corresponding recommendations in the Secretary-Generals report. We recommend that In Larger Freedom in the UK is read with the Secretary- Generals report to hand. The 2005 World Summit Outcome The 2005 World Summit has now concluded. Its declaration – the World Summit Outcome – is appended to this report. Defying the pessimism of some but also falling short of its full potential, the Summit has yielded mixed but, on balance, positive results. On most issues contained in In Larger Freedom, the Summit has produced notable, if incre- mental, progress. Member states have agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission to support the recovery of societies emerging from conflict. To renew the UNs human rights machinery, member states have agreed to form a new Human Rights Council, although its membership and modalities have yet to be negotiated. Member states have voiced clear support for reforming the UN Secretariat, but have requested that the Secretary-General put forward more detailed proposals for subsequent decision by the General Assembly. Member states have agreed to work towards a comprehensive convention on terrorism in coming months, though an internationally accepted definition of terrorism remains elusive. Of perhaps greatest significance, member states have endorsed the principle of the responsibility to protect, placing the Security Council at the heart of international responses to genocide and crimes against humanity. These achievements notwithstanding, member states have failed to commit significant additional resources to meet the Millennium Development Goals, and have failed to reflect in their response to climate change the magnitude of the challenge it represents. Most disap- pointingly they have failed, yet again, to take steps towards fulfilling their obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. After the Summit: an agenda for action The Summit represents a staging post, not a finishing line. It has generated what Lord Hannay has described as "a critical mass of decisions", out of which are possible landmark changes. The challenge is now one of realisation, and the next 12 months present a crucial opportunity to implement those of the Secretary-Generals proposals on which the Summit made a start, and to push for acceptance of those which were overlooked. We applaud the leadership of the UK delegation at the Summit. It is vital that the UK government builds upon these achievements and continues to demonstrate strong and active support for the UN. UNA-UK is committed to this process and will campaign tenaciously for development, security and human rights for all through a stronger, more credible and more effective UN. Veronica Lie Sam Daws Head of Advocacy Executive Director UNA-UK UNA-UK 14
  • 25. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 15 II. Freedom from want
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  • 27. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 17 II. Freedom from want A. A SHARED VISION OF DEVELOPMENT The ‘vision of development’ put forward in In Larger Freedom [We] share Kofi (ILF) is broad, placing particular emphasis on the linkages Annan’s view that among development, security and human rights. ILF’s develop- security and develop- ment agenda is centred on the framework provided by the ment are inextricably linked. Our experience Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and on the findings of working towards of the Millennium Project. Many of ILF’s recommendations sustainable develop- draw from the Millennium Project’s action plan for achieving ment has taught us the MDGs, set out in the report Investing in Development: a that we cannot hope to practical plan for achieving the MDGs. eradicate poverty The feedback presented in this section focuses on the utility without addressing the pervasive threats to of the development agenda put forward by ILF, and in partic- the safety and well ular the viability of the MDGs as guidelines and benchmarks being of people and for international development policies. their communities. Oxfam During the FCO-UNA public engagement process, support International was expressed for the comprehensive definition of develop- ment adopted in the Secretary-General’s report, in which There is an obvious ‘development’ is interpreted broadly, as an integral component, imbalance between and likely product, of increased security and human rights. environmental/poverty However, many participants viewed the emphasis on these issues and security putative interlinkages with some scepticism, noting the issues within In potential risk that urgent development priorities would be Larger Freedom and this could help to subordinated to security considerations, reflected for example explain why the US is in the distortion of aid to serve security interests. relatively supportive, Recommendations were accordingly put forward which a) because it more readily stipulated that necessary security measures should not be meets their own broad resourced at the expense of equally necessary development agenda. initiatives and b) asserted that development should be pursued Professor Vaughan Lowe, University of as an end in itself, rather than as a subsidiary wing of the ‘war Oxford on terror’. Participants agreed that development is a responsibility to be shared by rich and poor countries and supported recommenda- tion 5 (a) which urges heads of state and government to: Reaffirm, and commit themselves to implementing, the develop- ment consensus based on mutual responsibility and accountability 17
  • 28. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 18 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform I agree with the recog- agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for nition that the MDGs Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit should remain aspira- on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa. tional so that ways can Consistent with that historic compact, centred on the Millennium be developed to ensure that governments Development Goals: support each other in going for internation- i. Developing countries should recommit themselves to taking ally agreed targets. primary responsibility for their own development by strength- Professor Chris ening governance, combating corruption and putting in place Corrin, University of the policies and investments to drive private sector-led Glasgow growth and maximise domestic resources to fund national development strategies; and ii. Developed countries should undertake to support these efforts through increased development assistance, a more develop- ment-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt relief. ILF’s espousal of the Millennium Development Goals received strong support. The MDGs were seen by the majority of participants to constitute a useful global framework for improving the alignment of international development strate- gies and for providing clear benchmarks by which to hold both donor and recipient countries to account. We acknowledge that However, a number of contributors argued that the potential there needs to be effectiveness of ILF’s development agenda was compromised by coherence between flaws in the MDG framework. Though the Secretary-General poverty reduction acknowledges certain limitations of the MDGs, disappointment efforts and counter- was expressed that the subject had not been engaged with greater terrorism initiatives, analytical vigour. The following shortcomings were highlighted as but the Millennium Review Summit must areas of concern: explicitly acknowledge that the war on terror First, the MDGs are not exhaustive and suffer from notable and the war on gaps, which have been reproduced by the Millennium Project poverty require and ILF. According to the International Confederation of Free different and separate Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour, for strategies. Make Poverty instance, the Millennium Project did not consult adequately History with the International Labour Organisation, with the result that insufficient attention has been given to the contribution of ‘decent work’ to the processes of development. A ninth millennium development goal has accordingly been proposed, recognising the role of appropriate employment as a facet of development, and setting corresponding targets and indicators, 18
  • 29. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 19 II. Freedom from want to gauge improvements in working conditions for female, male It does seem that the strategy the UN is keen and young persons, including higher and rising wage levels to promote is precisely and more equitable distribution of income. that which has created poverty in the first place Second, the MDGs do not represent optimal standards of – the private sector, neo- human welfare; attaining the MDGs by the 2015 deadline will liberal orthodoxy, serve to ameliorate, and not eliminate, the problems posed by security of property rights and so on. extreme poverty and social inequality. For example, even if the Dr Ray Bush, MDG in support of poverty reduction is achieved, this would University of Leeds represent only a halving of the proportion of people living with acute poverty; the same is true of the MDG working towards improving access to water and sanitation. There is a fundamental flaw in using GDP as a measure of economic Third, the ILF recommendations on development – and the progress. Rather, a MDGs upon which these proposals are based – overlook the measure is needed that contribution of the ‘Washington Consensus’ to the prevailing factors in negative asymmetry of the international economic system and the points against economic ‘poverty traps’ which often constrain developing countries from growth such as numbers making progress on the MDGs. of people in hospital who cannot contribute to economic growth and Fourth, the MDGs privilege quantitative over qualitative indi- require money for cost of cators of human development, reinforcing the neo-liberal treatment. preoccupation with economic, rather than social, indicators of Edinburgh human well-being. Initiatives supporting the MDGs should encourage the redistribution of income as a means of securing In Larger Freedom gains towards poverty reduction and towards enhancing buys uncritically into standards of living. an analysis of poverty and increasing Fifth, the MDGs place disproportionate demands on devel- inequality in terms of oping countries to fulfil seven targets which are time-bound the liberal argument of and concrete; conversely, rich countries are allocated only one ‘lack of market access’, as opposed to one based task, which is furthermore ambiguous, calling vaguely for a on the kind of rich ‘global partnership for development’. Some participants historical under- predicted that it would be poor – rather than rich – countries standing of the social which would be blamed should the global partnership ulti- relations of power, and mately fail to bring about the achievement of the MDGs. critical reflections on the logic of liberalism. Dr Heloise Weber, Participants warmly welcomed, therefore, the Secretary- University of Sussex General’s challenge to rich countries to set aside the political considerations which have hitherto blocked the eradication of the ‘poverty that kills’. The Secretary-General’s stress on the 19
  • 30. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 20 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform practical achievability of the MDGs was similarly commended. The concept of sustain- able development To sum up: carries a heavy burden. It needs to cover the The ‘shared vision of development’ which is encapsulated in simultaneous achieve- recommendation 5 (a), and which frames the concept upon ment of three separate which the MDGs themselves are based, was supported sets of objectives – strongly by the majority of participants, in recognition of economic objectives like international development as a matter of fundamental justice, growth and efficiency, rather than charity. The MDGs were seen as a viable guiding social objectives like equity and poverty principle for international development strategies and a useful reduction, and ecolog- mechanism for maintaining political momentum towards the ical objectives such as realisation of development initiatives. natural resource The key message, therefore, was one of broad support, management. qualified by concern that the agenda should have been more Sam Daws, ambitious, that its provisions would not be carried out in UNA-UK practice, and that the MDGs would become yet another set of unfulfilled promises. The feedback relating to the Secretary-General’s specific recommendations for action by developing and developed countries is summarised below, under sections B and C, respectively. It is necessary to utilise B. NATIONAL STRATEGIES expertise at the national level; it is not While the global partnership for development, discussed in sufficient to provide the section above, highlights the obligation of rich countries money alone. to contribute resources and support towards sustainable inter- Birmingham national development, ILF stresses that the primary responsi- bility for a country’s development rests with the government Donor countries have and people of that country. A central aspect of ILF’s recom- remained a persistent mendations for development, therefore, is national ‘ownership’ problem by imposing of development policies, to strengthen the accountability of their own ideas rather developing country governments within processes of develop- than respecting what the local community ment and to ensure that development policies are tailored to want. In Larger address conditions specific to different countries. In keeping Freedom offers an with this, the Secretary-General sets out as a guideline for agenda for aligning nationally-derived development strategies seven investment the actions of donors and policy priorities to encourage sustainable development with the needs of local outcomes. people. Southampton The feedback presented in this section assesses ILF’s 20
  • 31. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 21 II. Freedom from want promotion of country ownership and evaluates the policy and If the responsibility of investment priorities put forward. development is given primarily to devel- oping countries, Participants in the public and expert engagement process corruption needs agreed with the Secretary-General’s assessment of extreme urgently to be stamped poverty as the product of a highly complex set of problems out. demanding, not only external financial assistance, but also the Southampton implementation of comprehensive domestic programmes with a range of economic and social objectives. Strong support was expressed for recommendation 5 (c) in which heads of state and government are urged to: Decide that each developing country with extreme poverty should by 2006 adopt and begin to implement a comprehensive national strategy bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015. Support was expressed for ILF’s emphasis on linking develop- ment efforts to local needs, evaluated on the basis of concrete and monitorable targets; to this end, participants endorsed the Secretary-General’s suggestion that developing country poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) be aligned explicitly with the Millennium Development Goals. However, one expert contributor noted that to link PRSPs to a unified set of global criteria was somewhat counterintu- itive, given that the ILF’s purported aim is to decentralise development policy. Also highlighted in the expert engagement process was ILF’s failure to address within its proposals for restructuring PRSPs whether the modified criteria will satisfy donors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It was not guaranteed that the interests of the international financial institutions (IFIs) would correspond to MDG-based PRSPs. A framework for action The Secretary-General proposes that country-level actions The international towards the achievement of the MDGs be supported by three financial institutions complementary features: transparent, accountable systems of have a lot to answer good governance; growth-oriented economic policies supporting for in their part in making countries a vibrant private sector; and the involvement of civil society dependent and poor. organisations at both the domestic and international level. Birmingham 21
  • 32. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 22 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Participants agreed that good governance was a precondi- tion to the success of development initiatives and that encour- aging national agency in the formulation and execution of development policies could help to foster better governance and shore up national capacities for combating corruption. Participants also acknowledged the potential contribution of the private sector to development, but were reluctant to endorse greater private sector involvement in the absence of effective mechanisms for holding it to account. The possibility of alterna- tive paths to economic growth were also highlighted, chal- lenging the prevailing view that interventionist governments are incapable of sound economic policies. The experiences of China and India were cited as examples in this context. The role of civil society was recognised, in particular its potential for sustaining pressure on government actors; for galvanising international political will; and for sharing best- practices with other development actors. National investment and policy priorities The Secretary-General outlines seven ‘clusters’ of public invest- ments and policies to inform wider development strategies. These areas of focus, which are derived from the Millennium Project and which overlap with the MDGs, are as follows: 1. Gender equality 2. The environment and better resource management 3. Rural development 4. Urban development It is rather disap- 5. Health systems pointing to see that 6. Education once again gender 7. Science, technology and innovation equality and improved access to education and Contributors to the engagement process gave broad endorse- reproductive health ment to the investment and policy clusters listed above, but care for girls and women is afforded only highlighted areas which were judged to have been accorded one explicit reference, insufficient attention. For example, some participants despite the fact that expressed the view that measures to improve natural resource poverty is heavily management should have been given greater urgency; others feminised. thought that the recommendation calling for intensified efforts Dr Jill Steans, towards containing and fighting HIV/AIDS should have cited University of Birmingham specific figures to illustrate the shortfall in resources. 22
  • 33. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 23 II. Freedom from want The most prevalent objection to ILF’s policy and invest- In Larger Freedom completely fails to ment clusters was that the relationship between gender acknowledge that the inequality and underdevelopment had been only cursorily MDGs cannot be acknowledged and that the recommendation relating to gender achieved without equality was too general to be effective. gender equality, Recommendation 5 (j) urges heads of state and government to: women’s empowerment and women’s rights. UN Non- Reaffirm gender equality and the need to overcome pervasive Governmental gender bias by increasing primary school completion and secondary Liaison Service school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property, ensuring access to reproductive health access to labour markets, providing opportunity for greater representation in government decision- Thie paragraph on making bodies, and supporting direct interventions to protect gender equality is weak and insufficient. women from violence. Rather than just ‘reaf- firming’ gender Several participants expressed the view that the language of equality, the time is recommendation 5 (j) and the text of the report should have now ripe for setting more explicitly acknowledged the feminisation of poverty. It agreed benchmarks to was strongly emphasised that, as a uniquely cross-cutting issue, be achieved in these areas in order that with implications for education, child mortality, HIV/AIDS these may be assessed etc., gender equality has crucial implications for all of the for ‘successful’ imple- MDGs. mentation and There was broad consensus that pervasive gender monitored over time. inequality compromised not only prospects for sustainable Professor Chris development but also the overall achievement of security and Corrin, University of Glasgow human rights. It was thought that gender should have been given due prominence in ILF, and that the report’s treatment of the subject – in both Freedom from Want and the report overall – should have been more vigorous. To sum up: There was robust support for the Secretary-General’s recom- mendation that developing country actors maintain ownership over formulating and executing development policy. It was stressed that nationally-led efforts needed to be complemented by the support of the international community. While it was agreed that the policy and investment priorities identified by the Secretary-General formed a viable blueprint for national development strategies, certain gaps and insufficiencies were noted, in particular the weak treatment of the links between gender and poverty. 23
  • 34. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 24 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform C. MAKING GOAL 8 WORK: TRADE AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT The development framework presented by ILF, and enshrined in the eighth Millennium Development Goal, requires devel- oping countries to accept principal responsibility for the management and implementation of development strategies. In keeping with this model, ILF states that, where possible, the resources required for executing development initiatives should be mobilised domestically, and primarily through a straightfor- ward reallocation of government expenditure, geared to facili- tate the policies necessary for delivering the MDGs. However, as ILF recognises, such a reallocation of revenue is practicable only where sufficient revenue exists – i.e. in middle-income and a very few low-income countries. The bulk of low-income countries and nearly all least developed countries lack the basic resources necessary to redirect expenditure towards projects in support of the MDGs. In this case, the terms of the partnership embodied in MDG 8 oblige rich countries to offset the deficit, by increasing flows of official development assistance (ODA); by cancelling and relieving the debt burdens of the poorest countries; and by making the international regime for trade more equitable . The feedback presented in this section is largely rooted in the objectives of the Make Poverty History movement, echoing its demands for more and better aid; debt relief; and fair trade. After 30 years, we are Aid still talking about a target of 0.7%. Participants in the engagement process repeated the Edinburgh Secretary-General’s call for considerable and steep increases in ODA to meet the shortfall in resources which currently obstructs progress on the MDGs, and gave support to recom- We need to move mendation 5 (d) of the report, which urges heads of state and beyond rhetoric to action on increasing government to: ODA. Leeds Undertake to ensure that developed countries that have not already done so establish timetables to achieve the target of 0.7% of gross national income for official development assistance by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching at least 0.5% by 2009. 24
  • 35. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 25 II. Freedom from want However, while participants welcomed the specificity of the The US has voiced timeline put forward, many expressed the view that the active opposition to the schedule’s demands on wealthy countries were too relaxed, and proposed ODA target of 0.7%, so does this that it was furthermore illogical to expect the required increase mean pursuing this in ODA to 0.7% GNI to translate, within the same year, into agenda is counterpro- the demonstrated achievement of diverse development objec- ductive? tives. Participants accordingly urged rich countries to scale up Oxford ODA commitments prior to 2015 and called on the UK government to provide leadership in this area. We deserve an update Participants largely welcomed the Secretary-General’s from the UK endorsement of the UK government’s proposals for the Chancellor on the creation of an International Finance Facility to ‘front-load’ International Finance future flows of aid to secure immediate gains in support of the Facility. MDGs. However, doubts were expressed regarding the initia- Edinburgh tive’s viability in light of US opposition to the scheme. A large number of participants felt also that support for the initiative might have been more robust had it been more fully explained. Apprehension was expressed that the UK government might abandon its commitment to the 0.7% target, should interna- tional support for the IFF ultimately fail. Noting the threat posed by corruption to the success of development targets, and the simultaneous imperative of increasing aid to facilitate the attainment of development objectives, participants welcomed the underlying logic of recommendation 5 (n), in which the Secretary-General calls on governments to: Decide that, starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward sound, transparent and accountable national strategies and require increased development assistance should receive a sufficient increase in aid, of sufficient quality and arriving with sufficient speed to enable them to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Two important qualifications were, however, added to the support expressed for this recommendation. First, it was stressed that the requirement to demonstrate ‘sound’ domestic policies should not serve as a means of imposing deleterious condition- alities on developing countries. Second, participants questioned the degree to which potential structural constraints to aid effec- tiveness in recipient countries had been considered by the archi- tects of ILF recommendation 5 (n) and the Millennium Project. 25
  • 36. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 26 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The Sachs report Expert submissions by the Overseas Development Institute overplays the aid expand upon these two qualifications; for convenience, related component of develop- feedback from the public engagement process is also included ment, but aid is not in the following section. the only relevant issue. Sir Richard Jolly, UNA-UK Conditionality: Conditionality is based on a principle of ‘bottom-up’ accountability (i.e. the obligation of recipients to donors) and was thus judged to be in direct contravention In the case of corrup- of the evolving norm which asserts common responsibility tion, it is necessary to for global development. The application and exercise of recognise that the resourcing of aid is far conditionality, furthermore, were noted to place an unneces- less important than sary burden on recipient countries by fostering financial what is done with it. uncertainty and by compromising the government’s capacity Southampton for forward-planning. This was seen to be a crucial point, given that one prominently cited reason for past failures of development projects has been the unpredictability of aid Aid needs to be more effective; channelling flows. more aid is not the It was advised, therefore, that no new mechanisms be complete solution. established for tying the allocation of ODA to conditions – Aberystwyth particularly since the MDGs themselves provide a structure for guiding and appraising the disbursement of funds earmarked for development purposes. To consolidate the principle of mutual responsibility for international develop- ment, a recommendation was put forward to enhance ‘downward accountability’ – that is, the responsibility of donor countries to deliver on ODA pledges and to maximise the ‘space’ available to developing country governments to manage development. In this context, contributors welcomed the Secretary- General’s endorsement of the Paris High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and ILF’s related proposal for donor countries to align mechanisms for aid delivery with the MDG-based PRSPs of recipient countries. This was seen by contributors as an important step towards harmonising donor behaviour, the fragmentation of which in the past has swelled the transaction costs of aid for developing countries. Structural constraints in recipient countries to aid effective- ness: The Secretary-General acknowledges the existence of ‘capacity constraints’ to aid effectiveness; nevertheless, the 26
  • 37. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 27 II. Freedom from want Millennium Project and the related ILF recommendations were criticised, by a number of expert contributors, for over- playing the need for greater volumes of ODA, without giving detailed consideration to structural limits to aid effectiveness arising out of a country’s absorptive capacity. It was noted that injecting large amounts of aid into an economy unpre- pared for it could actually retard development, by inciting inflation and thereby shrinking export revenue – the trends associated with ‘Dutch disease’. Contributors pointed also to a number of studies which suggest that aid has diminishing returns. It was noted that economies are thought to reach a sort of ‘saturation point’ when incoming aid equals 15-45% of gross domestic product. Marginal returns to aid subse- quently diminish and can in fact begin to exert a negative effect by incentivising corruption, waste and aid dependence. Contributors noted the adverse implications of this on the ‘exit strategy’ from aid which the Secretary-General cites in paragraph 47 of ILF as a precursor for truly autonomous sustainable development. To mitigate such constraints to aid effectiveness, alternative means were proposed for distributing ODA, such as disbursing development assistance in kind, through technical assistance, for example. Aid could also be focussed directly on developing infrastructure, which would reduce transport costs of goods for export, thus counteracting to some extent the effects of ‘Dutch disease’. An overarching proposal emerging from the contribu- tions was for the scaling up of development assistance to be carefully phased, so as to avoid fostering unwanted negative economic trends. Participants expressed robust support for the Secretary- General’s recommendation which calls for the immediate implementation of several ‘quick win’ initiatives to generate short-term but high-impact progress towards the MDGs. Recommendation 5 (h) urges governments to: Decide to launch a series of ‘quick win’ initiatives so as to realise major immediate progress toward the Millennium Development Goals through such measures as the free distribution of malaria bed nets and effective anti-malaria medicines, the expansion of home- grown school meals programmes using locally produced foods and 27
  • 38. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 28 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services. Many contributors stressed, however, the need to ensure that fundamentally sound plans, such as those proposing the free mass distribution of malaria bed nets, be structured carefully, with incentives aligned to achieve optimal results. It is important to note, for example, that bed nets cost more to distribute than to make, with past experience suggesting that relying on the public sector may not be the most effective method of securing the widest possible distribution to the groups in most urgent need of the nets. Participants high- lighted the Tanzanian government’s policy of distributing vouchers exchangeable for bed nets, and using as a vehicle for distribution the private sector, which has a vested interest in accumulating the vouchers. Debt Participants in the engagement process were generally in favour of the Secretary-General’s proposals for debt relief and cancellation, but stressed that the measures proposed were unlikely to remove definitively the obstacle posed by debt to the achievement of the MDGs. ILF recommendation 5 (e) urges governments to: Decide that debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt that allows a country to both achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in its debt ratios; that, for most HIPC countries, this will require exclusively grant-based finance and 100 per cent debt cancellation, while for many heavily indebted non-HIPC countries it will require signifi- cantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer; and that additional debt cancellation should be achieved without reducing the resources available to other developing countries and without jeopardising the long-term financial viability of international financial institutions. Contributors were highly supportive of the proposed reconfig- uration of debt in order to link assessments of sustainability to the ability to meet the MDGs. This aspect of the recommen- dation was commended in particular because it was seen to 28
  • 39. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 29 II. Freedom from want shift the focus of what constitutes ‘sustainable’ from the narrow interests of the creditor to the perspective of the devel- oping country. There were, however, a number of areas which were high- lighted as causes for concern. Foremost among these was ILF’s implicit approval of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) as it now stands. The Jubilee Debt Campaign ( JDC) has the following criticisms of HIPC: First, HIPC applies only to some of the most egregiously indebted countries, ignoring many other extremely poor countries which must divert, or forego, public spending on MDG-related sectors in order to service debts. Second, HIPC secures debt relief and debt cancellation for debts owed to only certain categories of creditors. For example, private banks are not covered under the terms of HIPC, yet – of the total debt service paid by sub-Saharan African countries in 2003 – roughly half went to private creditors. Third, the HIPC process is cumbersome and lengthy, draining the limited finances and resources of the debtor country. HIPC criteria are moreover so narrow that very few countries have actually qualified for debt relief under the scheme. Another shortcoming of the HIPC initiative, noted by the Commission for Africa (CfA), is that some debts written off under its auspices have been unpayable – i.e. the cancellation of debt has not released additional resources for crucial public sector investment and the wider pursuit of develop- ment objectives. Participants were also critical of the omission from ILF of any recognition of the role of the international financial insti- tutions and rich countries in precipitating the current debt crisis. It was accordingly felt that mechanisms should be put in place to enhance the accountability and transparency of fora for debt arbitration and crisis resolution. Several participants put forward as a possible model for reforming or replacing HIPC the ‘debt compact’ proposed by the CfA. The envisioned compact is to be transparent 29
  • 40. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 30 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform and more inclusive, and would cancel by up to 100% debt stock and debt service on both multilateral and bilateral debt. While participants judged that recommendation 5 (e) contained important first steps towards alleviating the problem of unsustainable debt, it was nevertheless felt that the report did not convey the urgency of freeing up resources currently absorbed by debt servicing. To illustrate, a few participants highlighted the fact that unsustainable debt burdens are thought both to discourage private invest- ment and to increase capital flight, two prominent trends associated with ‘poverty traps’. Debt relief, furthermore, has been identified as an efficient means of providing flexible and predictable resources for financing development. In light of the likely benefits of greater debt relief, and given the clear destructiveness of the status quo, participants called for 100% cancellation of the bilateral and multilateral debts of not only those countries qualifying for HIPC status, but also the 62 countries which have been identified by JDC as being at risk of failing to reach the MDGs as a result of high debt stocks and ratios. Trade The issue of trade was considered to be of paramount impor- tance to the development agenda overall. Participants welcomed the Secretary-General’s recognition of the urgent need for trade reform as a means of making progress towards poverty eradication. ILF recommendation 5 (f ) urges heads of state and govern- ment to: Complete the World Trade Organisation Doha round of multilat- eral trade negotiations no later than 2006, with full commitment to realising its development focus, and as a first step provide immediate duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the least developed countries. There was support for the Doha round’s focus on develop- ment, and for the Secretary-General’s deadline for completion of the round. The ‘first steps’ recommended – duty-free and quota-free market access for least developed countries’ exports 30
  • 41. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 31 II. Freedom from want – were also endorsed, though faulted for not being more inclusive and more ambitious. It was felt that the report rightly placed the onus on rich countries to take bold, concrete action towards trade reform. It was agreed that rich countries have for too long stymied the productive and equal participation of developing countries in the global economy, and that, before developing countries can enact the necessary domestic reforms to build supply-side trade capacity, rich countries must a) remove barriers to devel- oping country exports and b) end the practice of forcing market liberalisation. In the absence of such steps, the global partnership and the ‘shared vision of development’ will remain unrealised. Market access: Participants called for vigorous measures to While rich countries enhance market access for developing country exports, have apparently agreed demanding an end to import barriers in rich countries, which to get rid of the most adversely affect producers in the developing world. Attracting nefarious subsidies of intense criticism was the subsidising in rich countries of agri- all – export subsidies – cultural exports. This practice was judged particularly objec- in reality they will be tionable given that food stuffs produced in the developing able to keep their other forms of support that world are primarily for local consumption – agricultural act as a hidden export subsidies in rich countries therefore have serious implications subsidy. for food security. It was noted, furthermore, that many devel- Oxfam oping countries actually have a comparative advantage in the production of the goods typically involved: were rich countries to conform to the free trade orthodoxy commonly prescribed for poor countries, farmers in the developing world would be economically better off, as would consumers in the EU and the US. A prominent concern was the inherent difficulty in enforcing reforms to eliminate trade barriers in the North. It was noted that both the EU and the US have made attempts to circum- vent commitments to dismantling trade barriers by ‘re-labelling’ subsidies rather than eliminating them. To discourage such actions, mechanisms enhancing the transparency of trade policy were strongly recommended. Several participants voiced approval of the Doha recommendation proposing the establish- ment of a mechanism for monitoring commitments made with respect to removing barriers to trade and encouraging the export competitiveness of developing economies. 31
  • 42. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 32 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform However, it is not just country practices which demand greater scrutiny: many pointed out that the international trade regime itself suffers from a serious lack of transparency and from an acute democratic deficit, with decision-making power in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) overwhelmingly concentrated in the North. A large number of participants were therefore strongly in favour of identifying measures to correct the asymmetry of the WTO’s power structure, to make it more representative of developing countries. Liberalising trade does Forced liberalisation: A salient concern for participants was not automatically the practice, employed most visibly in the past by the IFIs translate into poverty and enshrined by the WTO, of forcing the liberalisation of reduction. developing countries’ economies in return for aid, debt relief, UN Non- access to markets, or other forms of external assistance. The Governmental following points were commonly raised with respect to this Liaison Service issue: First, policies advocating blanket liberalisation and privatisation, heedless of varying socio-economic condi- tions across different countries, were deemed to be fundamentally unsound, invalidated both by the past failure of ‘structural adjustment’ and by historical experi- ence suggesting that it is in fact a hybrid of liberal and interventionist economic policies, rather than an orthodox application of the former doctrine, which is likely to generate economic progress. The records of Korea, Malaysia, China and India, not to mention those of the US and the UK, were cited as testament to this. Multiple examples were put forward to justify the prevalent scepticism of forced liberalisation. It was noted, for instance, that in 1995 Haiti was directed by the International Monetary Fund to lower tariffs protecting its rice industry, with the result that Haitian imports of rice rose by 150% between 1994 and 2003; much of the registered increase benefited rice producers in the US. This point was accompanied by the recommendation that WTO rules be amended to permit developing countries to employ measures to protect domestic industries from more competitive goods on the international market, particularly since many of these products, as in the 32
  • 43. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 33 II. Freedom from want example above, have been made falsely competitive through subsidies in the country of origin. A large number of participants also pointed to the potential dangers associated with privatising the provision of public services, most notably water. The UK government was urged to discontinue its role in promoting these schemes, which undermine progress towards the achieve- ment of the MDGs, the seventh in particular. Second, many questioned the accepted dominance – both generally and implicit in ILF – of the neo-liberal model Countries like China of the international economic system, and the related and India may be view that globalisation is somehow irrevocable or useful models for inevitable. A few participants suggested that the focus of informing global the current discourse on merely modifying the forces of efforts to eradicate poverty. globalisation to spread its gains more equitably was Southampton misguided. They were of the opinion that globalisation is intrinsically rigged to exacerbate social and economic inequalities and that it is furthermore geared to exert unsustainable pressure on the environment. Those who put forward this view argued that alternatives to globali- sation were possible and highlighted ‘re-localisation’ as one such paradigm. Although proponents of re-localisa- tion take an extreme view of the global economic system, it was nevertheless thought that important lessons could be drawn from it. Re-localisation was thought by its supporters to address several of globalisation’s shortcomings, most notably by advocating the reintroduction of national, democratic controls over domestic industries and the reorientation of end-goals of trade towards the fostering of sustainable, value-added economic activity driven not only by profit but also by social and ecological goals. Under re-localisation, goods would, where possible, be produced and consumed locally; international trade would be undertaken only in those goods for which local production was not feasible. Such a shift would, according to the argument, end the practice of effec- tively exchanging virtually identical goods across long distances, ensuring a market for local producers and also reducing the escalating contribution to greenhouse gas 33
  • 44. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 34 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform In its current form, emissions of transport for the purposes of international trade is bringing about trade. a return to neo- colonial relations Participants agreed with the Secretary-General’s summary of between North and South. some of the supply-side factors hampering the trade competi- Aberystwyth tiveness of developing countries. The typically high depend- ence of the poorest countries on revenue earned from the export of primary commodities was agreed to be particularly problematic, and addressing this situation was judged to be of the utmost urgency. The Secretary-General’s disappointment with the international community’s lack of progress in this area was echoed. It was observed that a high dependence on primary commodity exports is associated with several negative phenomena having serious implications for trade competitive- ness: extreme vulnerability to environmental factors, such as drought; severe susceptibility to price fluctuations on the world market; and steadily declining terms of trade over the long-term. Participants corroborated the Secretary-General’s view that, to mitigate these phenomena, it was imperative that measures were implemented to encourage export diversification. This would help strengthen the country’s position in the global economy; insulate it from the price shocks characteristic of primary commodity markets and from the environmental factors which can impact so drastically on production; and, over the longer-term, reverse the downward trend in terms of trade. The failure of the report to provide formal proposals for facilitating export diversification was addressed. A number of measures were accordingly suggested, which focussed on affording developing countries some time and space for taking the necessary steps towards diversification. • One proposal put forward for consideration was the establishment, along the lines of an important CfA recommendation, of a compensatory ‘price shock mechanism’ as a short-term means for shielding economies from interim price fluctuations while the process of diversifying export bases was being managed. • A second was the reform of WTO rulings against Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing 34
  • 45. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 35 II. Freedom from want countries. Continuing SDT for those countries which need to protect ‘infant industries’ and small domestic producers was given almost unqualified support. Many participants expressed concern with regard to the re-negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Ending this arrangement threatens to force the more fragile ACP economies to compete with stronger EU producers, and the UK government was urged to exert pressure on its European partners to maintain preferential access for ACP goods. • A third recommendation centred on the imperative of boosting agricultural productivity. More efficient agricul- tural practices would also help bolster food security, improve quality standards for exports, and decelerate the environmental degradation linked to subsistence farming. To this end, participants welcomed the Secretary- General’s call for a ‘green revolution’ of sub-Saharan African farming practices. • A fourth proposal focussed on ‘aid for trade’ – that is, directing aid flows to public investments explicitly geared towards encouraging trade competitiveness. There was thus strong support for the Secretary-General’s emphasis on linking national strategies for achieving the MDGs with initiatives enhancing trade competitiveness. Many advocated investments in trade-related infrastructure to lower transport costs and encourage regional, South-South trade. To sum up: Participants in the engagement process judged the ILF recom- mendations falling under this section to be acceptable first steps, but believed that the proposals were not sufficiently candid about the active part the developed world has played in concentrating resources in the North – through, for instance, levying destructive agricultural subsidies, through irresponsible lending, through the application of venal conditionalities, and more generally through championing an international economic system which is skewed to the detriment of the world’s majority. The allegedly ‘new’ development consensus depends upon the principle of partnership and mutual 35
  • 46. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 36 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform accountability: participants felt that this demanded greater self-scrutiny by the North than was advocated by ILF. D. ENSURING ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY This area is under- The development agenda set out in ILF affirms the centrality strategised in terms of of environmental sustainability to long-term development lacking any real urgency, objectives. The seventh Millennium Development Goal, with just a passive containing targets for ensuring environmental sustainability, restatement of already similarly recognises that any improvements to health and agreed goals. Given that environmental sustain- education, or food and income distribution, will ultimately stall ability is something that and regress should member states fail to reverse environmental is urgently time-limited degradation and natural resource depletion. Environmental and the devastation that sustainability not only underpins the MDGs but also expedites can be caused needs progress towards their achievement. action now, the ILF The feedback presented in this section highlights environ- recommendations are insufficient. Rather than mental issues of prominent concern to civil society groups, ‘concerted global action field experts and members of the public, and identifies several to mitigate’, I would areas in which it was felt that bolder proposals should have suggest that concrete been made. guidelines are worked out to limit energy Contributors to the expert engagement process felt that the consumption both domestically and indus- Secretary-General’s assessment of threats to environmental trially. Listing some sustainability was incomplete, and that the ILF recommenda- agreed goals and ways to tions put forward were lacking in concrete ideas for action. In ensure participation of a submission from the Green Globe Network, a number of countries such as the points and proposals were proffered to offset perceived gaps. United States would go a long way towards giving this issue the First, steps need to be taken to address and rectify unsustain- urgent attention it able consumption patterns in the North. needs. Professor Chris Second, it is important that progress is made towards Corrin, University of strengthening environmental governance and enhancing the Glasgow transparency of policies having implications for environ- mental sustainability. It was recommended that environ- mental policies and principles of sustainable natural resource management be integrated into national PRSPs, as well as international development policies. It was noted in this context that individual country actions relating to MDG 7 were not currently being systematically reported. Also put forward was the idea of ‘green accounting’ – the ‘accounting 36
  • 47. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 37 II. Freedom from want in development decisions for environmental gains and losses Environmental degra- in macroeconomic terms’. dation is like a roller- coaster. It threatens to breakdown the whole of Third, the Secretary-General gives low priority to issues the ecological system. related to water resources, drinking water and sanitation. The Therefore, development recent trend illustrating a decline in aid to the water sector proposals are useless was criticised, and the CfA recommendation that donors without prioritisation retract this policy was endorsed. It was also noted that, of all being given to environ- the MDG indicators, that gauging access to suitable sanita- mental sustainability. Edinburgh tion was showing one of the least promising chances of success. The Green Globe Network also advised that priority be given to the recommendations made by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, an international work programme launched by the UN Secretary-General in 2001 to provide decision-makers with information on the consequences of ecosystem change. After introducing the broader issues, the Secretary- General identifies three major challenges to environmental sustainability: desertification, biodiversity and climate change. Desertification has not abated and may even Desertification be intensifying. While participants largely supported the Secretary-General’s Individual nations are call for international support for and implementation of the affected within their United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification own borders, making the problem seem to be (UNCCD), it was felt that the UNCCD in its current form the responsibility of would not succeed in reversing desertification. each nation itself, Desertification is still viewed as a matter for national, rather rather than the inter- than international, concern. More robust measures, under- national community as scoring the commonality of this problem, were recom- a whole. Even with mended. the UNCCD, therefore, the nature of the problem has Biodiversity prevented the richer Participants welcomed the Secretary-General’s support for the countries from Convention on Biological Diversity and the recognition that committing to help the downward trends in biodiversity threaten prospects for sustain- poorer countries with able development and the achievement of the MDGs. financial aid. Centre for Strategic However, many again expressed the view that bolder steps and International needed to be taken to reverse this threat. Studies (2002) 37
  • 48. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 38 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform If industrialised Climate Change countries do not make The Secretary-General’s recommendations for ensuring environ- attempts to curb energy mental sustainability give priority to overcoming the challenge of use, how can devel- climate change. To this end, recommendation 5 (l) urges heads oping countries be expected to do so? of state and government to: Bath Ensure concerted global action to mitigate climate change, including through technological innovation, and therefore resolve to develop a In Larger Freedom more inclusive international framework for climate change beyond focuses on mitigating 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both climate change as the key solution. However, developing and developed countries, taking into account the measures that enable principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. adaptation to climate change are so urgently Participants welcomed the prominence given to climate needed – the poor are change within ILF and were strongly supportive of the more vulnerable, less Secretary-General’s call for action based on the principle of able to adapt, and increasingly suffer the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. A clear majority effects of climate agreed that the major emitters should bear primary responsi- change. Very few bility for mitigating climate change and also that the post- countries have inte- Kyoto framework should be more inclusive. grated climate change One criticism put forward is that ILF puts disproportionate considerations into emphasis on mitigating the effects of climate change, but it is national decision- making processes and equally important to identify ways of adapting to these effects; development plans. the special relevance of this was noted for the poor who are far Green Global more vulnerable to the consequences. Participants noted as a Network possible template the CfA recommendation which calls for Consultation donors to integrate, by 2008, risk factors related to climate variability and climate change into national project planning. Other criticisms focussed on the failure to address in any meaningful detail the urgent importance of enhancing energy security by increasing energy efficiency, by creating greater incentives for the development of clean, renewable energy sources, and by reducing dependence on hydrocarbons, while phasing out environmentally-damaging subsidies. To sum up: There was broad support for the Secretary-General’s acknowl- edgement of the fundmental importance of environmental sustainability to sustainable development as a whole. The priority accorded to the issue of climate change was also commended. 38
  • 49. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 39 II. Freedom from want Participants urged the UK government to provide bold lead- ership in creating an effective, international framework for dealing with climate change beyond 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol expires. Participants emphasised the need for this framework to include measures beyond (but including) tech- nological innovation. E. OTHER PRIORITIES FOR GLOBAL ACTION In keeping with ILF’s broad approach to development, a number of other issues were highlighted by the Secretary- General as having profound implications for the achievement of the MDGs. This section presents the feedback received on these issues, including infectious diseases, natural disasters and migration. Infectious disease surveillance and monitoring Participants were generally supportive of the Secretary- General’s proposals for enhancing international responses to infectious diseases. Recommendation 5 (i) urges govern- ments to: Ensure that the international community urgently provides the resources needed for an expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, as identified by UNAIDS and its partners, and full funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Participants expressed alarm at the inadequacy of the global response to HIV/AIDS, and called on governments to fulfil and increase pledges to the Global Fund. Participants also called for support for the World Health Organisation’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative, which seeks to provide three million people in low- and middle-income countries with anti-retroviral treatment by 2005, with a view to making access to treatment a human right for those who need it. A submission by a public health expert considered the remit of the Global Fund potentially restrictive and noted that it ignored a number of other types of infectious diseases posing serious threats to development and human life. 39
  • 50. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 40 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Natural disasters In the wake of the human catastrophe precipitated by the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, participants agreed that natural disasters posed a serious challenge to the achieve- ment of the MDGs, through massive loss of life, destruction of livelihoods, and demolition of infrastructure. Participants welcomed the Secretary-General’s recognition of the dispro- portionate impact of natural disasters on poor people, and supported the call for the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. Recommendation 5 (m) urges member states to: Resolve to establish a world-wide early warning system for all natural hazards, building on existing national and regional capacity. Broad support was expressed for this recommendation as a means of enhancing the capacity of the international community to undertake disaster risk reduction, not just for tsunamis, but also for a range of potential natural disasters, including floods, droughts and volcanic eruptions. Participants agreed that existing national and regional mechanisms should be used as a basis for the development of international early warning systems. It was stressed that a number of relevant bodies already exist at the international level and that these should be closely involved in the framework of any new system. Among those organisations cited was the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), as well as UN bodies like OCHA, UNDP, UNEP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, FAO, the World Meteorological Organisation, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and the Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Several contributors advocated that measures supporting disaster risk reduction should be given high priority within development strategies and that steps should be taken to strengthen the capacity of the UN to provide leadership in the formulation and implementation of disaster reduction initia- tives. The Green Globe Network expressed the view that the Secretary-General gave overriding emphasis to the need for 40
  • 51. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 41 II. Freedom from want the creation of an early warning system, without giving The most advanced adequate attention to the utility of implementing a compre- monitoring and hensive range of local-level measures focussing on disaster analysis technology in the world is worthless mitigation and preparedness capacity-building. if there is no way to Participants agreed that improved early warning systems communicate in time needed to be complemented by more effective rapid response the threat to those in arrangements for providing humanitarian relief to populations danger. affected by disaster. For feedback received on ILF’s recom- Birmingham mendations for improving the global humanitarian response system, please see pages 109 to 110 in Strengthening the United Nations. Science and technology for development The Secretary-General considers the spread of science and tech- nology a key means of empowering developing countries to drive forward their own development. Recommendation 5 (k) urges heads of state and government to: Recognise the need for significantly increased international support for scientific research and development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy and climate. No explicit criticisms of this recommendation were expressed, and many agreed that harnessing science and technology for development could help to narrow the economic and social disparities between rich and poor countries. However, several participants stressed that increased resources for science and technology should not divert funds from other development purposes. Regional infrastructure and institutions Participants recognised that the achievement of the MDGs depends in many important ways on the development of regional infrastructure and institutions. Broad agreement was voiced for the Secretary-General’s assessment, derived in part from the findings of the Millennium Project, which empha- sises the unique obstacle facing landlocked or small island developing countries and which highlights the pivotal role of regional integration and cooperation through arrangements such as NEPAD as an avenue for overcoming these challenges. 41
  • 52. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 42 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Global institutions Participants strongly welcomed the Secretary-General’s call for the international financial institutions to undergo further reforms, consistent with the terms of the ‘global partnership for development’, to increase the representation of developing countries. Such reforms were judged essential in order to reverse the erosion of legitimacy which has undermined the efficacy of the IFIs in carrying out their development functions. Migration ILF’s treatment of migration provoked little feedback during the engagement process, though its relevance to prospects for development was acknowledged. The UK government was urged to reverse its position on the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. To sum up: Participants supported the Secretary-General’s call for member states to ensure that the Global Fund is fully funded. Participants supported the recommendation proposing the establishment of an early warning system which would encompass a broad typology of natural disasters. The preven- tive focus – i.e. disaster risk reduction – also received the backing of participants. Participants endorsed the recommendation that greater efforts be made to harness science and technology for the purposes of development and the achievement of the MDGs. Support was also expressed for the proposal that regional cooperation be integrated into national development strategies, and that this process should be given firm support by interna- tional donors. Participants agreed that the IFIs were in need of further reform; it was felt that that precise proposals for such reforms should have been put forward. F. THE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGE After highlighting the chief obstacles to the fulfilment of the MDGs, and putting forward recommendations for surmounting them, the Secretary-General sets out the primary 42
  • 53. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 43 II. Freedom from want challenge for member states: the creation of ‘a pact for action, to which all nations subscribe and on which all can be judged’. Additional pledges are not necessary; the financial and verbal political commitments required to reach the MDGs are already in place – what is missing is concrete action to fulfil these promises. The Secretary-General stresses that steps taken to implement the ILF proposals for advancing development need to occur in parallel with initiatives in support of improving security, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. In all sectors, special consideration needs to be accorded to Africa, where challenges to the wider development agenda are disproportionately severe. Participants echoed the Secretary-General’s call for the formu- lation of a comprehensive action plan, simultaneously taking into account development, security, human rights and the rule of law. The imperative of addressing the severity of Africa’s situation was emphasised, but it was stressed that a focus on Africa should not compromise efforts directed at other regions. 43
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  • 55. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 45 III. Freedom from fear
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  • 57. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 47 III. Freedom from fear A. A VISION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY The Secretary-General urges member states to forge a consensus on the security threats facing humanity and the collective response needed. In Larger Freedom’s (ILF) vision of collective security, informed primarily by the December 2004 report of the High- Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, is predicated on an understanding of security which takes into account a) the proliferation of types of threats to include not only tradi- tional or ‘hard’ security threats but also ‘soft’ threats; b) the mutual interconnectedness of these threats; and c) the dimin- ishing significance of wealth, geography or power as indicators of a state’s insulation against this range of threats. The feedback presented in this section explores the Secretary-General’s vision of collective security, and considers how feasible it will be to implement the proposed package of reforms. Taking as its basis the Secretary-General’s assessment that future international action in support collective security is contingent upon the formulation of a security consensus, recommendation 6 (a) urges heads of state and government to: Affirm and commit themselves to implementing a new security consensus based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdepen- dent, that no state can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all states need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system; and therefore commit themselves to agreeing on, and imple- menting, comprehensive strategies for confronting the whole range of threats, from international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious disease, extreme poverty and the destruction of the envi- ronment. There was broad support throughout the FCO-UNA engage- ment process for the fundamental concept of the Secretary- General’s vision, but scepticism was expressed over how this 47
  • 58. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 48 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Why not move the UN concept could be translated effectively into practice. Doubts headquarters from arose primarily from two related concerns: 1) that perceptions New York to of security among member states were prohibitively diverse, Strasbourg? France precluding the achievement of consensus and in turn making would be proud to host the UN, which would untenable an agenda to carry this consensus forward; and 2) be closer to its second that the misgivings of the remaining superpower – towards base in Geneva and to both the UN and multilateralism more broadly – had become much of the Third too entrenched to reverse. World. The UN would In respect of the US’s scepticism of the UN, the UK be out from the under government was urged to use its position of privilege with the the US thumb, and the European Union could US to make an effective case for multilateralism, expressly cover the costs. linking American long-term interests with a strong, credible Edinburgh system of collective security centred on the UN. In providing this leadership, the UK government was urged to give consis- tent and explicit support for the primacy of the Security In practice the term Council, under the UN Charter, in the sphere of international collective security is too visionary, particularly peace and security. the UN’s role at the Despite the widespread support expressed for the Secretary- centre of it all. It General’s vision of collective security, a number of participants raises false hopes about were critical of its state-centrism. It was felt that excessive the UN’s capacity and emphasis was given to the capacity of states to address inter- could lead to failure linked security threats, with the result that the role of UN and recrimination. Professor Adam agencies, NGOs and, crucially, local actors was overlooked. Roberts, University This state-centrism was also judged inconsistent with the of Oxford principle of human security, which prioritises human interests over those of the state. Several participants stressed the importance of identifying a means of reconciling this inconsis- Supporting collective tency, in order to address the rights and needs of the individual security does not exclude unilateral while also preserving the capacity of the state and the strength action – the important of state institutions. thing is agreeing to the fundamental princi- To sum up: ples. Strong support for the scope of the Secretary-General’s vision Aberystwyth of collective security was tempered by doubts over the capacity of the UN and the international community to translate concept into practice. Obstacles highlighted were the reticence of certain countries to commit to a system of collec- tive security based on such a consensus; the difficulty of accommodating highly varied interpretations of security arising out of differing historical, cultural, economic, geographical and other factors; and the potential fall-out from 48
  • 59. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 49 III. Freedom from fear neglecting the role of non-state actors as contributors to, and At present, in conflict instruments of, the new security consensus. zones across the world, A major concern expressed was that the recommendations there is far more emphasis on building tended to focus on the security concerns of the North, such as the shell of the state terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflict resolution and than there is on the use of force, and this failed to reflect the breadth of the addressing community ILF vision. Feedback on these issues is outlined in sections B, security issues, espe- C, D and E below. cially in the short- to medium-term. This is made worse by a lack B. PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM of coordination, resources and facilities The Secretary-General pronounces terrorism a fundamental on the part of the challenge to the UN’s core principles. To eliminate terrorism peacebuilding the Secretary-General proposes a strategy informed by a community. common definition of terrorism and based on five pillars of Dr Oliver Richmond, action. University of St. The feedback presented in this section explores the definition Andrews of terrorism endorsed by ILF, focussing on the implications of a) excluding states from the scope of the definition, and b) including those resisting foreign occupation in the same Preventing cata- category as suicide bombers. Also included is the feedback strophic terrorism should not be confined which examines the viability of the Secretary-General’s five- to preventing nuclear pillar strategy and that which assesses the capacity of the existing terrorism – it should international legal framework to address terrorism. incorporate the biolog- ical, chemical and Transnational terrorism radiological threat too. The Secretary-General’s strategy for combating transnational Belfast terrorism is rooted in action across five pillars. Recommendation 6 (e) urges heads of state and government to: Resolve to implement the comprehensive UN counter-terrorism strategy presented by the Secretary-General to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; deny terrorists access to funds and materials; deter states from sponsoring terrorism; develop state capacity to defeat terrorism; and defend human rights. Of the five pillars of action (or ‘Ds’), the fifth, which calls for the defence of human rights, generated the most commentary. A large number of participants stressed that the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures depended on the ability of the 49
  • 60. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 50 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Economic and social international community to understand and address the root issues do affect causes of terrorism. Defending human rights was judged to be terrorism and it is a viable means of doing so. good to have attention However, a potential conflict was noted between the fifth drawn to this. Rather than focus on terrorism ‘D’ and what was judged by participants to be the likely as a single issue, ILF thrust of counter-terrorism measures away from the respect considers the root for individual human rights. Many participants voiced strong causes and the ‘mesh’ of scepticism of the compatibility of counter-terrorism strate- issues that play a part gies and international human rights standards, pointing to in terrorism. the human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib and in Guantanamo Cambridge Bay as examples. While support was expressed for the proposal put forward in ILF to designate a special rapporteur Only one of the five Ds to report to the Commission on Human Rights on the really deals with the compatibility of counter-terrorism strategies and human underlying causes. If rights standards, many judged this measure insufficient, we are going to have suggesting that appeals procedures also be put in place for an effective strategy, we must get to grips individuals on sanctions lists, and that measures be devised with the real issues. for enforcing compliance with international human rights Aberystwyth law. In this context, the UK government was urged to provide leadership to ensure that human rights were not sacrificed to counter-terror initiatives. Those who are Participants agreed with the Secretary-General that contin- concerned by the effect of legislation on uing disagreement over what actually constitutes terrorism is human rights are forestalling effective collective action to combat this threat. being labelled sympa- The Secretary-General accordingly endorses definition of thetic to terrorists. It terrorism proposed by the High Level Panel, and puts forward is more important to recommendation 6 (d) which urges heads of state and govern- maintain human ment to: rights than it is to find some blanket defini- tion of terrorism. But Affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, the proposed anti- justifies the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non- terror laws in the UK combatants; and declare that any action that is intended to cause are actually denying death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when human rights. the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate Manchester a population or to compel a government or an international organ- isation to do or to abstain from doing any act, constitutes an act of terrorism. The Secretary-General contends that the HLP definition, the wording of which forms part of the recommendation above, overcomes one of the principal challenges to consensus on 50
  • 61. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 51 III. Freedom from fear terrorism in the past – namely the perception that acts classifi- I think it unwise to able as terrorism may be legitimate if the primary motivation support the Secretary- is to resist foreign occupation. The Secretary-General argues General’s suggestion ‘to set aside debates on so- also that the issue of state-sponsored terrorism should no called state terrorism’. longer bar agreement on a definition, maintaining that the use Historically, terrorism of force by states is already adequately regulated under interna- by states has dwarfed tional law. the acts of terrorism Participants agreed that identifying, and uniting behind, a committed by non- broadly accepted definition of terrorism was a prerequisite to a state actors. If the UK government is serious viable counter-terror strategy. However, many considered the about using Kofi dismissal of the long-standing debates on the treatment of Annan’s five Ds as a state terrorism and ‘freedom fighters’ to be arbitrary and way of preventing wrong. A number of points arose out of this concern: catastrophic terrorism, it should argue against First, removing state activities from the remit of the definition ring-fencing certain subjects as being of terrorism was judged to imply that ‘state terrorism’ did not outside the bounds of exist. Many participants cited instances in which states had legitimate interna- carried out, within the existing international legal framework, tional debate. acts potentially classifiable as terrorism. Dr Paul Williams, University of Second, there was broad agreement with the general emphasis Birmingham of the definition – that an action is deemed a terrorist act if it is intended to kill, injure or maim civilians as a means of The definition of forcing a given outcome. However, a few expressed the view terrorism should cover that the definition had potentially negative implications for the actions of individ- groups suffering under violent oppression. uals or irregular organisations, rather than armies, because Third, the definition’s focus on acts intending ‘to cause death the latter are bound by or serious bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants’ was the rules of war and regarded by some participants to be too exclusive. It was need not be covered by proposed that consideration should be given to expanding the additional language definition, to include also the destruction of property and prohibiting terrorism. infrastructure, as well as kidnapping and extortion. American Interests and the UN ( June 2005) A few participants expressed uncertainty about the Secretary- General’s proposed action with respect to a definition of terrorism: it was unclear whether endorsing the HLP’s ‘call for a definition of terrorism’ signalled the Secretary-General’s approval of the definition as it now stands, or whether the HLP definition had been judged a suitable template for nego- tiating the terms of a new definition. 51
  • 62. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 52 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform International law A key aspect of the Secretary-General’s proposals for prescribes how states can enhancing the ability of the international community to combat and should use force. If they break the law, they terrorism centres on strengthening the relevant international can also be held to legal framework – through the entry into force of a convention account. So that side on nuclear terrorism, through the conclusion of a new compre- has been taken care of. hensive convention on terrorism informed by a broadly accepted UN Secretary- definition, and through increasing support for the 12 existing General Kofi Annan, international conventions on terrorism (summary below). UN Press Conference (21 March 2005) 12 International Conventions Against Terrorism The dropping of atomic Subject Date bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were acts Aircraft hijacking or sabotage 1963, 1970, 1971 of terrorism. Any defi- Special protection for certain persons (such as heads of state) 1973 nition must be explicit Taking hostages 1979 Unlawful possession of nuclear materials 1980 in its applicability to Sabotage at airports 1988 states. Ship hijacking or sabotage 1988 Southampton Sabotage on offshore platforms 1988 Facilitating easier detection of plastic explosives 1991 Unlawful use of lethal devices against certain public places 1997 For a hundred years Suppression of financing terrorist organisations 1999 the United States has been intervening in the affairs of others, In relation to the 12 existing conventions, the Secretary- intimidating popula- General puts forward recommendation 6 (f ) which urges tions and compelling governments to: governments. It is the United States that is the terrorist. Resolve to accede to all 12 international conventions against Aberystwyth terrorism; and instruct their representatives to: i. conclude a convention on nuclear terrorism as a matter of urgency; and 1 Would you hold it ii. conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before against the people of the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. Zimbabwe for engaging in an armed uprising? Is it right to Participants raised no substantive objections to recommenda- foreclose the only tion 6 (f ) but expressed concern that adding to the treaty option left open to regime might exacerbate the fragmentation and inconsistency people in desperate of approach which undermine the regime’s efficacy as a whole. circumstances? We There was also general agreement that denying terrorists need to face reality – and this definition is not sustainable. 1 The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by Manchester the General Assembly on 13 April 2005. It opened for signature in September 2005. 52
  • 63. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 53 III. Freedom from fear access to nuclear materials was an urgent priority but some Apartheid terrorism participants expressed the view that dealing effectively with and 9/11 terrorism are this threat should not detract from addressing the potential different things. The UN should not stop acquisition by terrorists of other weapons of mass destruction freedom fighters. (WMD). There must be wording included that protects Organised crime those who are seeking The Secretary-General highlights links between transnational justice – justifiable terrorism and organised crime, which undermines state stability, violence does exist and it needs to be written saps economic productivity, fuels conflict, hampers peace- in to the definition. If building efforts and finances terror. Recommendation 6 (g) the UN is not meeting encourages heads of state and government to: its responsibility to protect, then violence is Commit themselves to acceding, as soon as possible, to all justified. relevant international conventions on organised crime and Southampton corruption, and take all necessary steps to implement them effec- tively, including by incorporating the provisions of those conven- tions into national legislation and strengthening criminal justice systems. Participants gave broad support to integrating approaches to terror and organised crime. Many participants also expressed the view that the financial and political strength of organised crime networks was growing, as was the capacity of these networks to influence decision-making at the national and even international level, necessitating, therefore, a stronger and more coordinated international response. To sum up: The Secretary-General’s attempt to galvanise international efforts to prevent catastrophic terrorism was widely viewed among participants as a priority. Participants also agreed that a broadly accepted definition of terrorism would lend cohesion to collective responses to terror. However, some expressed misgivings about the proposed definition, in particular its implications for the right to resist occupation and for the ability of the international community to deal effectively with state sponsors of terror. Considerable support was demonstrated for tackling the roots of terrorism by promoting and defending human rights. 53
  • 64. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 54 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform However, there was concern that some national strategies would continue to contradict international human rights prin- ciples, thereby undermining counter-terrorism efforts as a whole. C. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ILF emphasises the notable contribution of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to inter- national peace and security, highlighting in particular the NPT’s past successes in achieving progress towards two often conflicting aims: containing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, while allowing for the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. ILF also acknowledges, however, that the NPT regime is currently under severe strain, undermined by the first withdrawal of a party to the Treaty, as well as by growing pressure on its verification and enforcement procedures. Soon after the public release of ILF in March 2005, the NPT suffered a further setback, with the 2005 NPT Review Conference ending in failure. The Secretary-General also assesses the international security regimes for biological and chemical weapons and calls for past progress in these areas to be consolidated. The feedback presented in this section highlights perceived challenges to the NPT regime, and evaluates the Secretary-General’s proposals for taking action. Very few participants addressed in any detail the ILF recommenda- tions centring on the biological and chemical weapons regimes. The Secretary-General’s proposals with respect to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are outlined in recom- mendation 6 (b), which urges heads of state and govern- ment to: Pledge full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to further strengthen the multilateral framework for non- proliferation and disarmament, and in particular: 54
  • 65. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 55 III. Freedom from fear i. resolve to bring to an early conclusion negotiations on a fissile The attitude of the material cut-off treaty; British government ii. reaffirm their commitment to a moratorium on nuclear test towards Iran is blatant hypocrisy, in explosions and to the objective of the entry into force of the light of their own Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; failure to fulfil the iii. resolve to adopt the Model Additional Protocol as the norm spirit or letter of for verifying compliance with the Treaty on the Non- Article VI of the NPT. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Bath iv. commit themselves to expediting agreement on alternatives, consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Most non-nuclear- Nuclear Weapons principles of the right to peaceful uses and weapon states perceive the obligations for non-proliferation, to the acquisition of nuclear weapon states domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation as not having taken facilities; adequate steps to fulfill v. commit themselves to further strengthening the Biological and their NPT commit- ment on disarmament. Toxin Weapons Convention; and Important non-nuclear vi. urge all chemical-weapon states to expedite the scheduled weapon states are destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles. reluctant to support stronger measures Several participants expressed the view the NPT regime’s designed to prevent the current crisis had been precipitated by the failure to carry out proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is a the fundamental provisions of the Treaty, in which the need for a more radical nuclear-weapon states (NWS) undertake verifiable steps re-visitation of the towards nuclear disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon bargain between the states (NNWS) forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons in recognised nuclear return for access to nuclear technology, provided it can be weapon states and the shown the application of this technology will support non-nuclear weapon states. peaceful purposes. Dr Andrew Cottey, The Secretary-General’s acknowledgement of the valuable University College contribution of the NPT was supported, but many noted that Cork successes had been uneven, with greater progress being made in the area of non-proliferation and only very modest strides made towards disarmament. This was judged to have rein- Why is no one being held accountable? We forced the inequality of the international security regime, keep returning to the fostering resentment between the NWS and the NNWS and same old issues every rendering more difficult the forging of a security consensus. It few years. If states are was thus considered that the Secretary-General should have not going to uphold given greater emphasis to measures in support of disarmament, their commitments, as opposed to non-proliferation. what use is the NPT? Manchester The perceived failure of the NWS to take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament was of great concern to partici- 55
  • 66. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 56 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The global nuclear pants. They agreed with the Secretary-General’s emphasis on weapons situation is the ‘unique responsibility’ of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) extremely precarious. and welcomed the related proposals for action by these states, Could not the UK lead including the call for future steps towards disarmament to be the way in living up to its commitments to based on the principle of irreversibility – in keeping with the disarm under the Programme of Action set out at the 2000 NPT Review NPT, by agreeing now Conference – and for the NWS to reaffirm commitment to not to replace Trident? negative security assurances. A significant number of partici- Cheltenham pants expressed strong misgivings about the UK government’s plans to replace Trident, as well as about its cooperation with ILF makes no the US on a series of defence initiatives which were perceived reference to the 2000 to contravene the UK’s Article VI commitments. NPT Review While there was clear support for measures to enhance the Summit. What are we regulation of nuclear technology in support of non-proliferation, to read into this? Has several participants expressed their concern that the Secretary- it already been left for General’s recommendations demanded more of the non- dead? Bath nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) than of the NWS. Many were therefore sceptical of the Secretary-General’s assertion that progress towards disarmament should not be held hostage to progress towards non-proliferation, and vice versa, positing that this approach ignored certain legitimate grievances of the NNWS. For example, it was argued that non-nuclear-weapon states were not tangibly benefiting from their right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Some participants were accordingly critical of the Secretary- General’s endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and UN Security Council resolution 1540 because of the perceived bias of these initiatives towards counter-prolifera- tion, rather than on exacting NWS commitments towards disarmament. The PSI, introduced by the US in September 2003, is a voluntary agreement which focuses on restricting the supply of WMD through coordinating international efforts to prevent shipments of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and associated delivery systems. UNSC resolution 1540 is similarly focussed on supply-side factors, having as its principal aim the prevention of the acquisition by non-state actors of WMD or technology or material facilitating the use or production of WMD. Participants expressed the view that supply-side strategies reinforced the unequal distribution of responsibilities which currently characterises the nuclear sphere, calling into question the sustainability of initiatives 56
  • 67. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 57 III. Freedom from fear that increase the burden on non-nuclear-weapon states with The UN must tackle no appreciable quid pro quo in the benefits they receive. issues of NPT reform It was also noted more generally that the Secretary- proactively if it is to retain any interna- General’s recommendations primarily focussed on galvanising tional credibility. support for existing mechanisms and legal frameworks for London which political support is waning. It was expressed that the Secretary-General should have put forward new and innova- tive structures, in acknowledgement of the weaknesses of How far is non-prolif- previous approaches and to counteract the alarming trend in eration actually a UN issue, rather than one the nuclear sphere away from multilateral cooperation. for national govern- ments? To sum up: Southampton Participants expressed the view that the ILF recommendations for countering the threat posed by WMD did not sufficiently recognise the failure of the nuclear-weapon states to satisfy Verifying compliance is full of ambiguities. their obligations under international law. The main crime of Iran so far has been reluctance to volunteer D. REDUCING THE RISK AND PREVALENCE OF WAR information, breaking The ILF recommendations in this section are grouped under the spirit of the NPT, five categories which reflect the range of instruments available rather than evidence of any nuclear weapons to the UN for reducing the risk and prevalence of war. These programme, breaking categories are as follows: mediation; sanctions; peacekeeping; the letter. They are peacebuilding; and disarmament initiatives reducing the entitled to develop a supply of small arms, light weapons and landmines. civil programme, but The feedback presented in this section examines the from there it may be Secretary-General’s proposals for reducing the risk and preva- easy simply to withdraw from the lence of war, focussing particularly on the responsibility of treaty and make member states to equip the UN with the requisite resources deadly weapons. and support to fulfil this function. Aberystwyth Mediation There was strong support among participants for additional For the UN truly to be the ‘world’s policeman’, resources to be allocated to the Executive Office of the it must be given the Secretary-General, in order to strengthen the Secretary- right tools for the job. General’s contribution to the mediation of disputes through Southampton the exercise of his ‘good offices’ function. Participants commended the UN’s leadership in mediating conflicts over the past 15 years. However, a number of participants were critical of the failure in ILF to specify by which mechanisms and processes 57
  • 68. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 58 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform the proposed increase in resources and personnel would be translated into an enhanced capacity for mediation. Sanctions Sanctions affect Among the instruments available to the Security Council, citizens more than sanctions are cited in ILF as a particularly valuable and governments and those versatile tool for conflict prevention. Sanctions are applicable in power. They are as a deterrent to intended actions, as well as a means of forcing not the way forward. a peaceful settlement between parties, of bolstering UNSC Leeds resolutions, and of weakening and/or isolating groups acting as obstacles to the peaceful settlement of disputes. ILF recom- mendation 6 (k) accordingly urges heads of state and govern- ment to: Ensure that Security Council sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced, including by strengthening the capacity of member states to implement sanctions, establishing well resourced moni- toring mechanisms, and ensuring effective and accountable mecha- nisms to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. A large number of participants raised concerns regarding the effectiveness and moral legitimacy of sanctions, in light of the historic difficulty associated with ensuring that sanctions exert pressure on the appropriate party rather than on vulnerable civilian populations. It was observed that, historically, sanctions have been effective only in highly specific social, political and economic contexts. An expert submission by Professor Norrie MacQueen, of the University of Dundee, noted that the sanctions which were levied against the South African apartheid regime achieved their objective because of the stark socio-economic differences setting apart the small white minority from the black majority and because of the solidarity of purpose within the international community. Many participants cited the failure of sanctions against the Ba’athist regime in Iraq during the Gulf War to illustrate the consequences of applying sanctions in an unsuitable environment. In keeping with this analysis, a large number of participants urged the Security Council to consider lessons learned from South Africa, Iraq and elsewhere, before applying sanctions in 58
  • 69. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 59 III. Freedom from fear future, and to ensure that any sanctions levied are ‘smart sanctions’. Given the potential value of sanctions as a preventive instrument, and in light of their demonstrated humani- tarian impact, many participants expressed concern that ILF did not put forward concrete recommendations for operationalising smart sanctions, so as to ensure their effec- tiveness while mitigating any adverse impact on civilian populations. The following themes for devising and applying sanctions recurred over the course of the engagement process: First, sanctions should be targeted at effecting change in the behaviour of political and military leaders. Second, adequate resources must be mobilised for insulating local populations from the negative effects of sanctions. Third, the support of key local, regional and international actors must be sought, so as to ensure consistency of external pressure on the sanctions’ intended target(s). Fourth, sanctions should be integrated into wider conflict resolution strategies. Peacekeeping Participants welcomed the fact that there are more UN peacekeeping operations on the ground than ever before. It was noted that demand still exceeds supply, particularly for operations in Africa. Concern focused on the need for rapidly deployable strategic reserves of peacekeepers at a time when many developed countries had scaled down troop contributions. Broad agreement was accordingly expressed with ILF recommendation 6 (j), which urges governments to: Create strategic reserves for United Nations peacekeeping; support the efforts by the European Union, the African Union and others to establish standby capacities as part of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities; and establish a United Nations civilian police standby capacity. 59
  • 70. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 60 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform In Larger Freedom The feedback set out in the following section examines issues should give more related to 1) the regionalisation of peacekeeping; 2) the related emphasis to durable establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping UN operations: capacities; 3) efforts to eradicate the sexual exploitation of missions that pull out too early undermine local populations by peacekeepers; and 4) the role of civilians achievements. in peace operations. (For additional feedback on the potential Manchester role of regional organisations, please see page 111) There was vibrant debate on the efficacy and legitimacy of regionalising peacekeeping, and in particular on the appro- Devolving peace- priate balance to be struck between these two aims. The keeping to regional organisations is a good central debates are summarised below. idea in principle. In Many participants argued that regional organisations have a practice, it is often a comparative advantage with respect to conducting peace- way of abdicating keeping operations – through knowledge of the historical and essential UN responsi- cultural context in which the dispute is taking place; through a bilities. practical familiarity with local topography; and through a Edinburgh heightened interest in effecting the peaceful and prompt reso- lution of the dispute given the vulnerability of borders to the While a potentially effects of conflict. greater role for However, several participants countered this argument by regional organisations pointing out that potential comparative advantages are in peacekeeping is outweighed by other, more important factors. First, regional interesting, and could help take advantage of organisations are unlikely to be able to intervene with impar- local knowledge, we tiality; contiguous states often have long-standing histories of need to be conscious of animosity, and experience has shown that certain actors within regional power issues. a given regional organisation may have an interest in actually Norwich perpetuating the conflict. Second, the fact that regional organisations often reflect regional hegemonies – with Some regional organi- powerful states using regional arrangements as a means of sations have greater asserting or reinforcing political, economic or military regional capacity than others as dominance – was also considered a powerful argument against agencies for peace- delegating too much responsibility to regional organisations. keeping. Efforts need Third, some key regional organisations suffer from even more to be made to systema- serious financial and logistical constraints than those tise relationships with the UN – the UN hampering the UN, leading many to question the logic of should be prepared to offsetting the UN’s resource gap by farming out responsibili- finance regional peace- ties to bodies under potentially greater resource constraints. keepers. A number of issues were raised about the implications for Southampton legitimacy of regional peacekeeping. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter clearly allows scope for regionally-conducted peace operations, but also stipulates that no action involving 60
  • 71. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 61 III. Freedom from fear the use of force should be undertaken in the absence of The UN system fails in Security Council authorisation. While many participants its ability to intervene argued for the stringent application of this provision, others in a timely fashion. We need international noted that waiting for UNSC authorisation might undermine agreement on rapid effectiveness, given the link between the early and rapid response. deployment of peacekeeping troops and effective conflict Manchester resolution. As a means of reaching an optimal compromise between legitimacy and efficacy, several participants favoured the High-Level Panel’s approach to the authorisation of regional peacekeeping missions – namely that, where possible, UNSC authorisation should be sought prior to the execution of the operation, but that it may be necessary, in acute situations, for such authorisation to be sought after the operation has been initiated. Participants were generally supportive of the Secretary- General’s proposal for greater, more efficient burden-sharing amongst relevant actors within the peacekeeping sphere, and expressed agreement with the call for the further development of EU and AU standby arrangements in support of an inter- locking system of peacekeeping capacities. Participants placed particular emphasis on the need to ensure that standby arrangements were strengthened as part of a concerted push to enhance global peacekeeping capacity, centred on the UN. In a submission by Dr Andrew Cottey, of University College Cork, a suggestion is made for the UK government to spearhead a review of global peacekeeping demand and capacity, as a basis for discussion and action for enhancing global capacity, at the UN and elsewhere. It was emphasised that the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capabilities should not lead to a two- tier system of peace operations, in which regionally- or locally- led missions are utilised as a politically less contentious means of carrying out peace operations in regions of weak strategic interest. It was also noted that the implementation of the proposed arrangement needed to take into account a number of factors. The following section, based on a submission by Professor Norrie MacQueen, outlines some of these issues. The concept of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities, aiming to coordinate multi-agency input and based on greater regionalisation of peacekeeping respon- 61
  • 72. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 62 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform sibilities, has been put forward in the past – most notably in An Agenda for Peace – yet efforts to implement this concept have met with negligible success. In fact, there are indications that operationalising this system could engender problems. For example, the relationship between ECOMOG and the UN, during the peace oper- ations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, was seriously fraught, with ECOMOG’s conduct in both countries considered highly questionable. Many observers have also criticised the French intervention following the Rwandan genocide in 1994 for the reason that Opération Turquoise effectively prevented the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, from pursuing the génocidaires across the Rwandan border into the DRC; the French were accused in some circles of having intervened at that point to protect their Hutu allies rather than to interpose between the victims of the genocide and its perpetrators. Professor MacQueen advises the following. First, in order to ensure as far as possible the political impartiality of the body carrying out the peace operation, the motives and interests of local, regional or other groupings need to be evaluated against the overall objective of the peace- keeping mission before the respective grouping is sanc- tioned by the UN to conduct the intervention. Second, in order to ensure that the operation has legitimacy, the UN should retain ultimate control over the intervention, with the relationship between the peacekeeping body and the UN defined clearly by a set of protocols. Third, in order to promote ethical conduct, all participants in peace operations should undergo standardised training which reinforces the ‘ethos’ of peacekeeping, including zero- tolerance for the sexual exploitation of local populations by peacekeepers. Participants expressed shock and disappointment in response to the instances of sexual exploitation by personnel engaged in UN peace operations, in particular that based in the DRC (MONUC). The Secretary-General’s stated commitment to eradicating these offences was strongly welcomed, as were steps taken thus far in support of the policy of zero-tolerance – including the establishment within the Department for 62
  • 73. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 63 III. Freedom from fear Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of a permanent unit on sexual abuse to work in collaboration with an interagency task force on sexual abuse, as well as the formal requirement that troop-contributing countries (TCCs) provide additional training both on the zero-tolerance policy and on the partic- ular vulnerability of women and children in conflict situations. Participants were also encouraged by the efforts of the Jordanian Ambassador to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al- Hussein, who was appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to develop proposals for reforming disciplinary and training procedures for peacekeeping personnel: among Prince Zeid’s recommendations was that the General Assembly should require TCCs to investigate charges of sexual miscon- duct and report back to the Assembly on the outcome, and that convicted offenders should be required to pay to the victim financial compensation and, if applicable, child support. However, many participants expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of progress to date, highlighting findings of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) which show that existing systems to enforce the zero-tolerance policy are inadequate. It was noted that the UN’s capacity for enforce- ment was constrained by the fact that member states retain ultimate control over their own troops and have been tradi- tionally reluctant to cede to the UN control over nationals. How can we balance It is thus the TCC’s responsibility to ensure compliance with troops’ loyalty to the directives on conduct, with the UN empowered only to UN with their alle- request that the suspected offender is repatriated and prose- giance to their own states? cuted by the TCC’s national judiciary. Although the govern- Bath ments of France, Morocco and South Africa were commended by participants for having repatriated and formally brought charges against nationals suspected of There are many committing sexual abuse, participants remained sceptical of existing resources to the degree to which other TCCs could be relied upon to draw on in the form of non-military peace- follow the example of these countries. keepers, for instance There was support among participants for the Secretary- mediators and other General’s call for the establishment of a UN civilian police civilian peace forces. standby capacity to complement peace operations. However, There needs to be the view was put forward that ILF did not deal with the issue better connection in sufficient detail, and that the report focussed excessively on between military and civilian elements. the military aspects of peacekeeping. The High-Level Panel’s Manchester treatment of civilian input to peace operations was considered 63
  • 74. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 64 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform more thorough, in particular the Panel’s stress on deploying police contingents with sufficient rapidity. Peacebuilding Commission The Peacebuilding Peacebuilding was a salient concern among participants, who Commission is the expressed strong support for the Secretary-General’s recom- most concrete example mendation that a Peacebuilding Commission and a of realising Kofi Peacebuilding Support Office be established. This proposal Annan’s broad vision was widely considered an urgent priority and was judged to of collective security in provide a possible means of addressing the institutional gap at practice. Aberystwyth the UN which has constrained its ability to effect the shift from peacekeeping to longer-term development. ILF recommendation 6 (i) urges heads of state and govern- ment to: Agree to establish a Peacebuilding Commission along the lines suggested in the present report [In Larger Freedom], and agree to establish and support a voluntary standing fund for peace- building. Within the text of the report, the Secretary-General proposes that the Peacebuilding Commission specifically act to: • improve UN planning, in the period immediately following conflict, for sustained recovery, focusing partic- ularly on establishing the institutions most vital for peacebuilding efforts; • ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, The Peacebuilding Commission must be in part by providing an overview of assessed, voluntary capable of engaging at and standing funding mechanisms; the micro-level as well • improve coordination of post-conflict activities, including as coordinating donors those of UN funds, programmes and agencies, and also and local elites. act as a forum for the exchange of information on post- Dr Oliver conflict recovery strategies among major bilateral donors, Richmond, University of St troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organisa- Andrews tions, the international financial institutions and the national or transitional government of the country concerned; and • sustain the political attention of the international community to cover the period of post-conflict recovery. 64
  • 75. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 65 III. Freedom from fear The Secretary-General proposes that the core membership of The Peacebuilding the Peacebuilding Commission be drawn from a subset of the Commission should Security Council; ECOSOC; major donors to a (voluntary) address all stages of complex conflict situa- standing fund for peacebuilding; and principal TCCs. It is tions from conflict also recommended that the input of local stakeholders, such as prevention to post- national representatives, regional organisations, and principal conflict peacebuilding. donors to the country, as well as that of the international NGLS report financial institutions, be integrated into the Peacebuilding Commission’s activities. Depending on the phase of the The Secretary-General conflict, the Secretary-General envisions that the body would should not have report in sequence to the Security Council and ECOSOC, as watered down the conditions stabilise and become more amenable to develop- Peacebuilding ment initiatives. Commission by taking The feedback received on recommendation 6 (i) examines out its preventive role. the focus of the Peacebuilding Commission envisioned in Southampton ILF, as well as the proposed range of inputs into its opera- tions. A number of participants expressed disappointment that the Secretary-General did not deem appropriate an early warning or monitoring function. However, it was recognised that, by intervening to prevent the relapse into violence following a peace agreement, the Peacebuilding Commission would serve to interrupt the cycle of conflict. To illustrate the potential impact of the Peacebuilding Commission in this respect, many participants cited a point made by the High-Level Panel which speculates that if two peace agreements – the 1991 Bicesse Agreement for Angola and the 1993 Arusha Accords A Peacebuilding Commission will for Rwanda – had been successfully implemented, deaths merely create more attributable to war during the 1990s would have been dimin- bureaucracy and red ished by several million. tape. Emphasis should Global Witness submitted a recommendation relating to be on improving the proposed remit of the Peacebuilding Commission. Given relations between the high degree of correlation between natural resource existing expert NGOs and other peace- exploitation and instability, a trend perhaps most visible in building actors. sub-Saharan Africa but equally relevant elsewhere, Global Cambridge Witness urged that the responsible management of natural resources be a focus of the Commission’s mandate and that, over the longer-term, this focus should be mainstreamed into peacebuilding. Participants welcomed the Secretary-General’s emphasis on a broad spectrum of inputs into the Peacebuilding 65
  • 76. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 66 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Commission’s work, but stressed that women, minorities and grass-roots civil society groups also be incorporated into the body’s composition. It was deemed equally essential that the Commission’s composition and procedures foster effective coordination between the international financial institutions and the UN in the Commission’s work to ensure that agree- ments reached with regard to peacebuilding are reflected in country-level plans and their implementation. The engagement process showed particular support for the establishment of formal mechanisms to guarantee civil society input into the Peacebuilding Commission’s activities. To this end, participants recommended that a civil society representa- tive be appointed to the Commission to facilitate vital civil society participation in the processes supporting the shift from instability to sustained development and peace. Participants supported the Secretary-General’s proposal for sequential reporting to both the Security Council and ECOSOC, depending on the phase of peacebuilding. The political implications of privileging the Council over ECOSOC incited some discussion, as this was judged to be a means of consolidating the control of the North over security matters and of marginalising the developing world, given the weaker influence of the latter within the Security Council. Small arms, light weapons and landmines The UN will have to Participants expressed emphatic support for more stringent tackle proactively the international mechanisms for regulating and restricting the issue of arms trading if it is to maintain inter- global availability of small arms, light weapons and landmines, national credibility. and considered the Secretary-General’s proposals for reversing London the proliferation of these weapons helpful first steps. Recommendation 6 (c) urges heads of state and government to: What really needs to Develop legally binding international instruments to regulate the happen is that the UK needs to stop selling marking, tracing and illicit brokering of small arms and light arms to Pakistan and weapons; and ensure the effective monitoring and enforcement of India. UN arms embargoes. Southampton Small arms were considered an issue of high importance, because of their close association with the incidence of conflict, and because of their wider implications for prospects 66
  • 77. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 67 III. Freedom from fear for development. Frequently highlighted was the nexus It is not necessary to linking small arms to child soldiers and underdevelopment: the have an international fact that small arms are prevalent, because they are relatively agreement to reduce the flow of weapons inexpensive – to purchase, to transport and to maintain – made in the UK or by coupled with the fact that they are light and easily operated, UK firms. The UK encourages the practice of recruiting, often forcibly, children to government should fight as soldiers. It was noted that this has serious conse- stop immediately its quences for the MDGs: through downward pressure on school arms exports and so enrolment rates; through the negative impact of psychological prevent further examples of weapons trauma on individual productivity; and through increased produced by UK exposure to HIV/AIDS. The link between small arms and manufacturers turning organised crime was also noted. up in several African In light of these considerations, recommendation 6 (c) was wars. judged to have been insufficiently forceful; participants were Dr Paul Williams, particularly dissatisfied that the Secretary-General had not been University of Birmingham more explicit in pinpointing the role of developed countries in proliferating small arms via active involvement in the arms trade. In this context, the preoccupation of ILF with the illicit trade in arms attracted strong criticism, many participants arguing that it is the arms trade itself which encourages, and even causes, conflict and that it simultaneously uses resources which could be more productively directed to international development, thereby also contributing to greater peace and security. Participants urged the UN to continue to work towards an international arms trade treaty, and welcomed the UK govern- ment’s stated commitment to this process. However, partici- pants expressed alarm at the attempts by certain countries to dilute the provisions of the treaty and called on the UK The biggest arms government to provide decisive leadership in ensuring that the exporters are the P5. final agreement would not be compromised by loopholes. The Money made from the following criteria were put forward as essential components of arms trade is not bene- an effective international arms trade treaty to control the ficial to a country. global supply of small arms: Money spent on national security to protect against the • Arms which are banned, such as landmines, should not very arms that were be sold or transferred. sold exceeds what is • Arms should not be sold or transferred to states or gained monetarily groups under embargo. from the trade. • Arms should not be sold or transferred if it is apparent Southampton that they will be used illegally, either in illegitimate acts of aggression against other states or groups, or in contraven- 67
  • 78. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 68 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform tion of human rights or international humanitarian law. • Arms should not be sold or transferred where they could contribute to instability or exacerbate underdevelopment. It was noted that, within the Secretary-General’s assessment of the problem posed by small arms, there was no mention of the disproportionate impact of small arms on the lives of women. Participants were highly critical of not only the failure in ILF to deal comprehensively with the relationship between gender and disarmament but also the report’s lack of meaningful engagement with the interplay between gender and conflict more broadly. Participants argued that the Secretary-General should have highlighted UNSC resolution 1325, on women, peace and security, in recognition that women are not merely victims of conflict but key players in conflict prevention, conflict resolu- tion and peacebuilding. Participants commended the progress made under the auspices of the Ottawa Convention towards reducing the threat of landmines, and reiterated the Secretary-General’s call for work in this area to continue. However, it was perceived that successes were being weakened by a number of important factors: the unwillingness of certain powerful states to sign or ratify the convention; the insufficiency of progress towards clearing landmines in former conflict zones; and the failure to address adequately the deleterious impact of other indiscrimi- nate forms of ordnance on human security, in particular cluster munitions. To sum up: Participants were generally sceptical of sanctions and urged that this instrument be applied only selectively. The UN’s status as a uniquely legitimate agent of peace operations was reaffirmed, with qualified support expressed for the enhanced involvement of regional bodies in peacekeeping. Participants supported a greater focus on long-term peacebuilding as a means of interrupting the cycle of conflict, and were strongly in favour of the Peacebuilding Commission. The debilitating link between small arms, landmines and underdevelopment was emphasised, and partici- pants favoured strong international legal instruments for reducing the global supply of these weapons. The weak treatment 68
  • 79. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 69 III. Freedom from fear of the role of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was highly criticised. E. USE OF FORCE A fundamental component of the security consensus advocated by the Secretary-General is agreement on the use of force in international peace and security. After acknowledging that member states disagree sharply on when recourse to force is justified and on the manner in which it should be applied, the Secretary-General summarises the central strands of the debate: • whether states have the right to use military force pre- emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; • whether states have the right to use military force The enforcement clauses of Chapter VII preventively, to defend themselves against non- were more or less out of imminent threats; and date before the Charter • whether states have the right to use military force protec- was signed. tively, to rescue citizens of other states from genocide or Professor Norrie comparable crimes. MacQueen, University of Dundee According to the Secretary-General, the UN’s future relevance as a forum for identifying and taking effective action to solve global problems is contingent upon securing agreement on the While some members of above questions. It is argued in ILF that the UN Charter the Security Council provides a sound foundation upon which a consensus can be continued to fight for built and that the Charter’s provisions provide a viable inspections and sanctions [in Iraq] on framework for governing the use of force, despite the funda- the understanding that mental changes which have occurred in the international system the threat could not since 1945. The continuing relevance of Article 51 and the otherwise be legiti- primacy of the Security Council in international peace and mately combated, the security are noted in particular. The Secretary-General puts US and UK govern- forward a set of criteria for the use of force and recommends ments exercised what they believed to be that the Security Council commit to be guided by them when their right to ‘legiti- considering the authorisation of military action. mate’ pre-emptive self- The feedback presented in the following section reflects defence against the concerns about the use of force, and the criteria put forward ‘threat’ of Iraq’s by the Secretary-General. potential ‘WMD’ capabilities British American A large portion of the feedback received with regard to the legit- Security Information imate use of force tended to be framed within the context of the Council 69
  • 80. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 70 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Under Article 51, there 2003 invasion of Iraq, with many expressing the view that the are some cases where military action was illegitimate because it had not been explicitly pre-emptive action authorised by the Security Council. Emphasis was placed on may be needed. applying lessons learned from the Iraq crisis to comparable situa- Agreement here may negate the need for tions in the future. It was in particular noted that a mechanism formal Charter for addressing schisms in the Security Council was urgently revision. needed, so as to avoid paralysis and the subsequent recourse of Oxford states to military action outside the framework of the UN. Recommendation 6 (h) urges heads of state and government to: Discussions over the use force tend to forget Request the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the use of force that Article 51 of the that sets out principles for the use of force and expresses its intention UN Charter allows to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorise or mandate military action in self- the use of force; such principles should include: a reaffirmation of the defence until the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to the Security Council has use of force, including those of Article 51; a reaffirmation of the taken measures necessary to maintain central role of the Security Council in the area of peace and security; a international peace reaffirmation of the right of the Security Council to use military force, and security. including preventively, to preserve international peace and security, York including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity; and the need to consider – when contemplating whether to authorise or endorse the use of force – the seriousness of the Kofi Annan’s criteria are not far different threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether from Thomas Aquinas’s means short of the use of force might reasonably succeed in stopping definition of the just the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat at war in the thirteenth hand and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. century. How relevant will these be Broad support was expressed for the above recommendation, to the modern world? Aberystwyth with the following aspects of the proposal receiving explicit endorsement: First, that Article 51 provides a sufficient mechanism for responding to threats which are imminent. Article 51 of the UN Charter Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 70
  • 81. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 71 III. Freedom from fear Second, that genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes The UK should clarify against humanity should be seen as threats on which the the following: its Security Council should act. The Secretary-General poses this stance on what consti- tutes an ‘imminent as a question, but there was unanimous support in the public threat’; the circum- debates both for the Security Council to take action in these stances in which cases and for the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. military force should be Please see page 76 for more feedback on the responsibility to used preventively; protect. what mechanisms should be used to interpret Security Third, that the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council resolutions; Council to use military force preventively. and what mechanisms should be used to Fourth, that the task was not to find alternatives to the resolve disputes within Security Council but to make it more effective. In that respect the Security Council. there was considerable support for the recommendation that Dr Paul Williams, University of the Security Council adopt a resolution on principles for the Birmingham use of force and express its intent to be guided by them. There was support for the criteria delineated by the Secretary- General and for the recommendation that the Security What if the Security Council should use these criteria as guiding principles for the Council is unable to authorisation of the use of force. reach consensus on whether there is a reasonable chance of ILF Principles for the Use of Force success? Belfast • The seriousness of the threat • The proper purpose of the proposed military action • Whether means short of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat What is highly inno- • Whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand vative about the • Whether there is a reasonable change of success High-Level Panel report is that it argues While there was general support for the Secretary-General’s that the Council has approach to an issue which sharply divides member states, the the authority – and following concerns were also expressed: indeed the responsi- bility – to use force preventively to uphold First, that the criteria for the use of force could be misused, as international peace a pretext for inactivity rather than as a set of conditions for and security. action. Professor Nick Wheeler, University Second, that the Secretary-General’s proposals added no new of Wales, elements to the debate on the use of force, and thus did not Aberystwyth provide the momentum required to reach agreement. 71
  • 82. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 72 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform It is not clear how to Third, that the criteria were based on ambiguities. It is identify latent threats unclear what makes a threat ‘imminent’, and therefore what and agree decisions on circumstances make military action justified is also unclear. imminence. London Fourth, that the Security Council would be more likely to agree on principles for the use of force if a more permanent When force is resorted to, mechanism (such as a UN standing army) was available to the UN and the Security support collective action mandated by the Security Council. Council have, in a sense, already failed. Leeds Fifth, that the use of force per se was insupportable, and that a more radical review of Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be undertaken. To sum up: Participants expressed agreement with the Secretary-General that the wider project of UN reform depended on securing agreement on the legitimate use of force; the fall-out over Iraq was cited repeatedly to illustrate both how fractious the issue was and how urgent the need to reach consensus. The feedback received during the public engagement process demonstrated agreement that the Charter and the Security Council remain the legitimate safeguards of interna- tional peace and security. Participants also voiced strong support for the criteria set out in ILF; it was expressed that the guidelines provided by such criteria would help enhance the transparency of the Security Council’s deliberations with regard to the decision to endorse the use of force. 72
  • 83. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 73 IV. Freedom to live in dignity
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  • 85. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 75 IV. Freedom to live in dignity A. RULE OF LAW The rule of law is represented in In Larger Freedom as the overarching framework for advancing global human security. The Secretary-General argues that existing international laws need now to be implemented, respected and enforced. Implicit in this body of recommendations is a recognition of the tension between sovereignty and international humani- tarian law, and of the need to reach consensus on the threshold beyond which the international community is empowered, and perhaps obligated, to bypass state sovereignty in defence of human rights. The feedback presented in this section focuses primarily on the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the interna- tional community embrace the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Also included is commentary on the International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice, and the proposed creation of a Democracy Fund. Participants in the engagement process welcomed the Secretary-General’s emphasis on human rights as the basis for development and security. They expressed strong agreement that the international community needed to move beyond declaratory commitments to human rights norms and the rule of law, and take definitive steps to implement and act upon legislation. Participants were accordingly supportive of recom- mendation 7 (a), which urges governments to: Reaffirm their commitment to human dignity by action to strengthen the rule of law, ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote democracy so that universally recognised principles are implemented in all countries. There was also broad support for the emerging norm positing that the international community has a responsibility to protect citizens from gross human rights violations and should intervene in cases where the government of the citizens being abused is unable or unwilling to take remedial action. The 75
  • 86. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 76 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Do we want another failure of the Security Council to respond effectively to the Srebrenica or situation in Darfur was cited repeatedly to illustrate the need Rwanda? Is taking to establish a framework for conducting interventions to action deemed incorrect prevent or stop genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against for fear that the inter- vention is wrong? Or, humanity. Many participants expressed approval of the UK are these events so government’s support for this principle, and for recommenda- awful that not to tion 7 (b), which urges heads of state and government to: intervene would be wrong, even if on Embrace the ‘responsibility to protect’ as a basis for collective action occasions the interven- against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, tion transpired to be a mistake? What we and agree to act on this responsibility, recognising that this respon- need is a framework sibility lies first and foremost with each individual state, whose for intervention. duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities London are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsi- bility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian popula- tions, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required. Several issues were raised which related to the concept of the responsibility to protect and its perceived implications. These issues include the tension between state sovereignty and human rights; the legitimacy of intervening militarily in support of humanitarian aims; and likely obstacles to formal- ising agreement on the responsibility to protect and to imple- menting it in practice. Participants recognised within the responsibility to protect an inherent friction between state sovereignty and human rights, and echoed the Secretary-General’s repudiation of the practice by some governments of employing sovereignty as a screen behind which human rights obligations are contravened with impunity. There was broad agreement that ‘sovereignty’ was not an immutable legal principle and that, as the interna- tional system has evolved, the frame of reference for the concept of sovereignty has correspondingly shifted, to focus not on the inviolability of a ‘sovereign’ but rather on that of a ‘people’. Therefore, sovereignty now has to be considered within the context of the current international legal framework, in which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights forms a key pillar; sovereignty furthermore had to be 76
  • 87. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 77 IV. Freedom to live in dignity understood as a legal right which is contingent upon a govern- Ninety per cent of the ment’s fulfilment of what are considered to be the core respon- ‘responsibility to sibilities of the state, among which the protection of citizens is protect’ relies on finding alternate paramount. methods: war should However, while participants appreciated the potential always be the last conflict between the rights of states and the rights of the indi- option. vidual, many also expressed the view that an incompatibility Southampton was neither self-evident nor insurmountable. Many reiterated the Secretary-General’s argument that strengthening respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law enhances state stability, encourages good governance and provides condi- tions conducive to economic development. Many also noted that respecting Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, in which the principle of non-intervention is enshrined, encourages respect for international law more broadly, which in turn fosters the protection of human rights and the advancement of develop- ment and security. Although it was recognised that the Secretary-General refers to both military and non-military forms of intervention in support of the responsibility to protect, the debates of the engagement process generally centred on intervention which entailed the use of force without the consent of the host government. A number of participants cast doubt on the legitimacy of undertaking military action to secure humani- tarian objectives, with some expressing the view that force was never justifiable and others emphasising its applicability only as a means of last resort. In this context, participants supported the Secretary-General’s five criteria for the use of force, one of which stipulates that force should be used only when all other means have been exhausted (for more detailed feedback on the criteria for the use of force, please see pages 69–72). Another key concern was that the discourse on the respon- sibility to protect seemed to be concentrated on securing inter- national support for military intervention to react to serious human rights violations, rather than on undertaking preventive non-military action to prevent the occurrence of these abuses. Several participants indicated that agreement on the concept of the responsibility to protect faced important obstacles. In particular, the perceived vulnerability of the principle to exploitation within a ‘neo-imperialist’ agenda, 77
  • 88. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 78 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform coupled with its close association with the ‘West’ and former colonial powers, was pinpointed as a potential barrier to endorsement by developing countries. In this context, the active support of developing countries was considered vital to the legitimacy of the principle of the responsibility to protect, and participants emphasised that the responsibility to protect should be used neither as a pretext for ‘regime change’, nor as a vehicle for furthering the narrow geostrategic interests of any state or group of states. Others argued that the responsibility Endorsing the ‘respon- to protect could actually serve to constrain great power inter- sibility to protect’ in New York does not ventionism by setting out clear guidelines, based on humani- automatically enhance tarian objectives, against which states would be required to the authority of the justify military intervention. Security Council. The Participants argued that the responsibility to protect did not same arguments can be provide a means of overcoming the most fundamental impedi- used to bypass the ment to international action to address severe human rights Council when it cannot – or will not – abuses within national borders – namely the absence of make the right political will in the international community, and particularly decision. among members of the Security Council. Professor Nick Aberystwyth Wheeler, of the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, observed, for example, that it was not respect for sovereignty but the unwillingness to provide troops that caused the Security We need to be realistic. The UN is a political Council’s apparent stupor during the Rwandan genocide; he body: this plays into speculates that, had any state, or group of states, sought a decisions over how and mandate for the use force in 1994, it is unlikely that this when to intervene. would have been refused. Professor Wheeler therefore Leeds questions whether elaborating a new norm for humanitarian intervention will necessarily translate into effective action by the Security Council in instances of serious human rights abuses. That said, he also maintains that establishing a normative framework for intervention based on the responsi- bility to protect might compel Security Council members to account for inaction in the face of genocide and mass killings. In his submission to the expert engagement process, Professor Wheeler notes further that the terms of the respon- sibility to protect are open to interpretation, and indeed manipulation: to illustrate he notes that those Security Council members opposed to applying sanctions on Khartoum in response to the crisis in Darfur – i.e. China and Russia – justified their position using the discourse of the responsibility to protect, arguing that the situation in Darfur had not yet 78
  • 89. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 79 IV. Freedom to live in dignity reached the point at which the government’s response could be pronounced deficient and at which the Security Council, a state, or group of states could be legitimately authorised to intervene on behalf of the international community. A commonly voiced concern focused on the consistency with which the responsibility to protect would be imple- mented, given the impact of national interests on a govern- ment’s decision to support or participate in an intervention. The selective enforcement of universal human rights was heavily criticised, but some participants argued that a degree of selectivity was inevitable, given the importance of basing a decision to intervene on the likely success of the intervention. Intervening militarily in a powerful state, for example, could exacerbate instability and incur greater loss of life, by provoking retaliatory measures by the state at which the inter- It is terribly disap- pointing that there is vention was directed. In such cases, military intervention in still no consensus at the aid of human rights could worsen and not improve the human UN over how to rights of those people the intervention intended to help. respond to humani- tarian disasters like Participants supported the upcoming treaty event, hosted by Darfur. the Secretary-General, which aims to secure universal partici- Harpenden pation in multilateral conventions, and noted the success of the 2000 treaty event in significantly increasing the number of state signatures to, and ratifications of, major instruments. Support was expressed for recommendation 7 (c), which urges governments to: Support the 2005 treaty event, focusing on 31 multilateral treaties, and encourage any government that has not done so to agree to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians. While it was hoped that the 2005 treaty event would repeat the success of the exercise in 2000, many participants were concerned that existing mechanisms for monitoring state compliance with international instruments were inadequate. There was broad support for the emphasis within ILF on the vital role of justice in encouraging the rule of law, and participants welcomed the Secretary-General’s call for greater cooperation with the International Criminal Court 79
  • 90. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 80 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform How can the ICC (ICC). However, some participants expressed the view that succeed without US international courts, such as the ICC and ad hoc tribunals, support? could erode national sovereignty and impede domestic Birmingham judicial capacity-building. Several participants were therefore of the view that crimes should be tried by the When key suspects are judicial system of the societies in which they were not brought to trial, or committed. when Western powers Others argued that the complementarity provisions of the engage in peace negoti- ICC, which give the Court jurisdiction over a case only ations with obvious when a national system itself lacks the capacity to try the war criminals like Slobodan Milosevic, case or is prevented from doing so, provide sufficient safe- this discredits the rule guards against undermining national judiciaries. Mixed of law and interna- courts, involving international and domestic judiciaries, such tional justice. as in Sierra Leone, were judged to be a viable way of Leeds ensuring that crimes against humanity do not go unpun- ished while also encouraging the strengthening of national judicial capacity. The UN system has Participants concurred with the assessment that the International not sufficiently stressed Court of Justice (ICJ) should be strengthened and that its proce- the importance of the dures should be radically improved. However, many expressed ICJ’s role. Besides the disappointment that the Secretary-General had not put forward general recognition of compulsory jurisdic- any specific recommendations for reform. Recommendation 7 (e) tion, UN Member urges governments to: States could include the mandatory jurisdiction Recognise the important role of the International Court of Justice of the ICJ in all future in adjudicating disputes among countries and agree to consider new treaties. means to strengthen the work of the Court. Professor Marco Odello, University of Nottingham It was noted that Security Council expansion had important potential implications for the composition of the ICJ. The ICJ’s 15 judges are elected as individuals, rather than representatives of member states. However, in practice the nationality of a judge is an important consideration in the process of appointment. In particular, there is a tacit interpretation of Articles 3 and 9 of the ICJ Statute which has guaranteed seats on the Court to nationals of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The question was therefore raised whether the composition of the Court would change and, if so, how it would change, should the number of permanent members on the Security Council be increased. 80
  • 91. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 81 IV. Freedom to live in dignity To sum up: Participants strongly endorsed the responsibility to protect, but were divided over a number of its implications. On the one hand, participants privileged human rights over the rights of states but on the other, echoed the suspicion of developing countries that the responsibility to protect would sanction the erosion of state sovereignty in order to give licence to neo- imperial interventionism in the developing world. Participants voiced support for strong measures to address crises such as that in Darfur but simultaneously considered the use of force to secure humanitarian aims both contradictory and counter- productive. Security Council authorisation was judged to be a sine qua non of military intervention, but some also doubted the P5’s ability to act as an ‘honest broker’, given the frequent conflict between short-term national interests and the interests of the international community. While the criteria for the use of force, put forward by the Secretary-General in section III of ILF, were commended by participants as a potentially useful means of reconciling the concerns above, it was noted that, ultimately, the capacity of the international community to act effectively in the face of genocide or crimes against humanity was constrained by the political will of member states, regard- less of whether governments agree on the responsibility to protect and on criteria for the use of force. The feedback supported mechanisms for securing universal participation in multilateral conventions, and accordingly welcomed the Secretary-General’s provision of facilities for states to sign or ratify treaties. Participants expressed broad support for both the ICC and the ICJ. B. HUMAN RIGHTS The Secretary-General emphasises the need to continue mainstreaming human rights across the work of the United Nations, by improving its human rights machinery and by increasing the resources available to support the UN’s efforts to promote and uphold human rights around the world. The feedback presented in this section considers efforts to strengthen the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and to harmonise the seven UN human rights treaty bodies. 81
  • 92. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 82 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The UN’s human Feedback from the engagement process indicated strong rights machinery support for overhauling the UN’s human rights machinery. remains too ad hoc Participants were supportive of the Secretary-General’s recom- and disjointed. mendations for greater cooperation between inter-agency Manchester country teams and member states, in order to support the protection of human rights at the national level, and for enhancing the field presence of human rights actors during crises. Participants applauded the moves made to mainstream human rights across the remits of UN bodies, and strongly endorsed the proposal to regularise input from the High Commissioner for Human Rights into the deliberations of the Security Council and the proposed Peacebuilding Commission. Participants also strongly supported the Secretary-General’s efforts to increase the flow of resources to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Participants noted that the Commission on Human Rights had played an important role in developing human rights norms and monitoring compliance but that it was now in urgent need of radical reform. The Secretary-General’s proposal for the Commission on Human Rights to be replaced by a Human Rights Council is addressed on page 101. In general, participants endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal to harmonise the seven treaty bodies for human rights and concurred with the assessment that the treaty body system was facing notable challenges, including severe under-resourcing; poor coordination with other human rights mechanisms; delays by states in submitting or considering reports; non-reporting; and inefficient duplication of reporting requirements among treaty bodies. These challenges caused concern among participants, not least because treaty bodies serve to make legally binding state obligations to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Participants were broadly in favour of simplifying the treaty system, but there was some disagreement on what form this process should take. Some proposed, for example, that a unified treaty body could serve as a human rights ‘court’ of last resort to adjudicate individual complaints, fulfilling a function similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights. Others disagreed, arguing that another ‘court’ could act as a deterrent to participation and noting that the fact that the 82
  • 93. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 83 IV. Freedom to live in dignity treaty body system is essentially not judicial is one of its attrac- If strengthened, the tions for both individuals and governments. treaty bodies could become a powerful force in the prevention The UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies [with corresponding treaties] of conflict, as well as in 1. Human Rights Committee [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] fostering human rights 2. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [International Covenant improvements. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] Edinburgh 3. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] 4. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women] 5. Committee against Torture [Convention against Torture] 6. Committee on the Rights of the Child [Convention on the Rights of the Child] 7. Committee on on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families [International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families] Many participants argued that national human rights commissions, where they exist, would find it easier to supple- ment government submissions with independent observations if these did not have to be fragmented to cover many areas of human rights. Others cautioned, however, that harmonising the treaty bodies could dilute the specificity of each body, which would correspondingly reduce their value, not least as juridical implementation was judged to be more likely within the frameworks of specific, rather than general, treaties. In an expert submission to the engagement process, Baroness Whitaker notes the unrealised potential of the treaty bodies to contribute meaningfully to the protection and promotion of human rights. Given the specificity of their respective remits, for example, treaty bodies comprise useful mechanisms for iden- tifying systematic abuses across a range of institutions and practices, in both the formal and informal spheres. Baroness Whitaker argues that treaty bodies could be harnessed within wider genocide prevention activities, noting that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) can, for example, be used to monitor relevant indica- tors such as the lack of legislative protection for a specific group; the formal or informal exclusion of specific groups from positions of authority; and/or the incidence of school segrega- tion, forced relocation and/or the use of targeted identity cards. Baroness Whitaker’s evaluation of the weaknesses of the treaty body system echoes and expands upon the assessment put forward 83
  • 94. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 84 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform in ILF. At the root of the system’s problems is an entrenched shortage of resources, which not only constrains the quality of output and encourages ineffective procedures but also has a signifi- cant impact on the representiveness, diversity and expertise of treaty body members. For instance, the fact that members generally receive as remuneration only a modest honorarium or per diem allowance acts as a major disincentive to prospective members from developing countries; this practice also has the effect of effec- tively homogenising the treaty body members, most of whom are academics or government representatives, and thus able to spend six to eight weeks per year in Geneva. Baroness Whitaker also recommends that guidelines for selecting members be univer- salised, to facilitate the comparison of candidates and to make easier the identification of potential conflicts of interest. According to Baroness Whitaker structural reform of the treaty body system should focus on encouraging and formalising interaction between the treaty bodies and the Commission on Human Rights, as well as the relevant UN agencies (i.e. ILO, UNESCO, WHO etc) and Special Rapporteurs. Baroness Whitaker also urges that independent NGOs be granted access to all hearings, noting in this context that the field of human rights is the optimal conduit for civil society input into the UN. It is furthermore recommended in this submission that all UN operations having relevance to human rights be linked with the treaty bodies, so as to reflect the growing prominence of rights- based approaches in other areas of the UN’s work. To sum up: Participants in the engagement process supported the Secretary-General’s call for greater resources to be allocated to the UN’s human rights machinery, to reflect the level of priority accorded to human rights in the UN Charter. However, it was also recognised that a radical overhaul of the machinery – involving both the Commission on Human Rights and the treaty bodies – needed to be undertaken in parallel with any increase in resources. C. DEMOCRACY The Secretary-General emphasises the link between democracy and the United Nations, noting the role of the 84
  • 95. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 85 IV. Freedom to live in dignity Universal Declaration of Human Rights in championing the We must question the core elements of democracy and calling attention to the pledge very concept of made in the Millennium Declaration in which member states promoting democracy, since to impose it is in commit to promote and consolidate democracy. The itself undemocratic and Secretary-General further claims that the realisation of ‘larger can have serious conse- freedom’ depends upon the spread of democratic principles. quences, as Iraq and The feedback presented in this section examines the issue Afghanistan have of democratisation and, to this end, the ILF recommendation shown. for establishing a Democracy Fund. Leeds Participants in the FCO-UNA engagement process were The rule of law must supportive of efforts to encourage the growth and strengthening be at the heart of any of democratic practices and institutions around the world. democratic process, There was broad agreement that the UN should continue to anywhere in the support democratic processes, particularly given the volatility of world. Belfast fledgling democracies, and also because democracy was judged to provide the best framework for the realisation of other rights. Support in principle was expressed for recommendation 7 Democratisation is not (d), which urges heads of state and government to: an event; it is a process. It takes many Commit themselves to supporting democracy in their own countries, years, even decades, to realise the full promise their regions and the world, and resolve to strengthen the United of democratic reform. Nations’ capacity to assist emerging democracies, and to that end Manchester welcome the creation of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations to provide funding and technical assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy. What exactly is meant by democracy? Is it simply an electoral Participants’ endorsement of the recommendation above was system, or is it a heavily qualified. In particular, many participants highlighted byword that implies the Secretary-General’s failure to acknowledge that ideas of political liberalisation ‘democracy’ vary widely and expressed the view that Western and a whole economic governments have often tried to impose models of democracy ethos? onto other political and social systems. In particular the Belfast invasion of Iraq was interpreted by a number of participants to have been an exercise in exporting through force the ‘American’ version of democracy; this was judged to have been not only undemocratic but also ineffective – the prevailing view among participants was that democracy must evolve from the grassroots level if it is to be sustainable. This scepticism notwithstanding, many noted that govern- ments presiding over an undemocratic political system were 85
  • 96. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 86 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Historically, it is the unlikely to relinquish power by soliciting external help for the period of transition purposes of democratisation. Some form of intervention – by, from authoritarian to for example, providing support to civil society groups – might democratic rule that is therefore be necessary to help citizens secure political rights. most unstable and prone to violence. In these cases, it was considered essential that the intervention Targeting stability at occurred under the UN’s auspices, so as to enhance the legiti- this vulnerable time macy of the action. may be a valuable use Participants highlighted the notable contribution of the UN of resources, without in promoting and strengthening democracy, primarily through requiring any ‘unde- election support and through the provision of technical, mocratic’ attempts to impose democracy. financial and legal assistance. It was simultaneously noted, Manchester however, that the UN’s role within this area should be extended beyond the setting of norms, and participants supported the Secretary-General’s call for greater coordination Democracy and demo- of the UN’s democracy-building activities and for more cratic governance effective resource mobilisation to support this process. should be more explic- itly endorsed in the Participants were generally supportive of the Democracy mandate of the United Fund but stressed that any resources directed to this fund Nations. Despite the should be allocated over and above financial commitments to mentioned Warsaw the 0.7% target for ODA, debt relief, etc., and that the Fund Declaration and the should complement the MDGs. The Fund should not be used 2002 Seoul Plan of as a means of levying harmful conditionalities on poor Action, there is not a clear institutional countries. The need to involve local populations in mandate in the UN democracy-building was also emphasised, and it was advised Charter to promote that the Fund should be geared to give special support to tran- democracy. This issue sitional democracies given their characteristic instability. should be better clarified in its rela- To sum up: tionship with the principles of sover- While democracy was endorsed as both an end in itself and a eignty and self-deter- means to securing human rights and better standards of living, mination of peoples. a large number of participants were wary of using democracy- Democratic principles building as a veil for imposing externally-derived political should not only be systems on societies potentially unsuited for ‘Western’ models promoted, but also of democracy. To ensure that democracy-building initiatives included more generally in the struc- supported the development of systems of government truly tures and functioning expressive of the peoples being represented, participants of United Nation’s emphasised the need for constant and direct local input into bodies and institu- democracy-building activities. This should be complemented tions. by the international community’s recognition that democracy Professor Marco is a long-term process, rather than a commodity for export. Odello, University of Nottingham 86
  • 97. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 87 V. Strengthening the United Nations
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  • 99. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 89 V. Strengthening the United Nations To advance the cause of ‘larger freedom’ – from both want and fear – as well as the freedom to live in dignity, the Secretary-General argues that the UN must adapt institution- ally; it must be made more accessible to a range of interna- tional actors, including civil society; and it must be made more accountable and reflective of the current international system. This section of the Secretary-General’s report produced a strong response from the public debates. Feedback indicates a wide spectrum of views on the recommendations of the Secretary- General for reforming and strengthening the Organisation but, overall, this body of recommendations was welcomed, with broad support expressed for recommendation 8 (a) which urges heads of state and government to: Reaffirm the broad vision of the founders of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, for it to be organised, resourced and equipped to address the full range of challenges confronting the peoples of the world across the broad fields of security, economic and social issues, and human rights, and in that spirit to commit themselves to reforming, restructuring and revital- ising its major organs and institutions, where necessary, to enable them to respond to the changed threats, needs and circumstances of the twenty-first century. There was much debate on how to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the principal organs of the UN, and how to improve the internal functioning of the UN Secretariat. Comprehensive reform of the UN was generally judged to be long overdue, with progress to date considered inadequate in a number of areas. There was recognition that important reforms had been made which had not required UN Charter amendment; for example, in particular areas improved coordination of existing mecha- nisms had done much to enhance efficacy. The fact that the Millennium Development Goals now serve as a common policy framework for the entire UN system was welcomed as a viable means of integrating more closely the work of the UN with the 89
  • 100. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 90 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform international financial institutions. There was also praise for the development of more multi-faceted peacekeeping operations, in the wake of the Brahimi Report, which had widened the range of tools available for the settlement of conflicts. Many also commended the improvements to the UN’s external communi- cations, noting in particular innovations to the UN website such as the News Centre and the Cyber-School Bus. On the other hand, there was criticism of the failure of member states and the UN Secretariat to improve human resources policies. The management and accountability issues made evident by the corruption linked to the Oil-for-Food Programme were debated at length. Participants were highly critical of the closure of the London UN Information Centre, and noted that the pan-European Regional UN Information Centre in Brussels (RUNIC) has proved expensive and that it has yet to demonstrate that it can provide the support formerly given by the London centre. A. GENERAL ASSEMBLY The Secretary-General contrasts the General Assembly’s centrality to the UN with the declining quality of its output and the growing inefficiency of its procedures. The recom- mendations in ILF address this discrepancy and propose reforms which seek to match the Assembly’s importance as the world’s most representative body with the capacity to carry out its mandate as the primary deliberative organ of the UN. The feedback presented in this section indicates general approval of the Secretary-General’s recommendations for reforming the General Assembly, and emphasises in particular the need to streamline the Assembly’s agenda and to assure improved access for civil society into its deliberations. Participants noted that the unique function of the General Assembly (GA) as a forum for humanity was often taken for granted. Many commented that it was often easy to forget the extent to which the international community had progressed in the development of universal multilateral institutions designed to overcome global challenges, and that this progress had been remarkably rapid, occurring over just a few generations. The UN began as a coalition of the 90
  • 101. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 91 V. Strengthening the United Nations victors of war: its complexion, and its purpose, is very different 60 years on. There was accordingly general support for recommendation 8 (b) which calls on governments to revitalise the General Assembly by: i. instructing their representatives to adopt, at its sixtieth session, a comprehensive package of reforms to revitalise the General Assembly, including by rationalising its work and speeding up the deliberative process, streamlining its agenda, its committee structure and its procedures for plenary debates and requesting reports, and strengthening the role and authority of its President; ii. resolving to give focus to the substantive agenda of the General Assembly by concentrating on addressing the major substantive issues of the day, such as international migration and the long- debated comprehensive convention on terrorism and; iii. establishing mechanisms enabling the Assembly to engage fully and systematically with civil society. Participants agreed that the General Assembly needed to be rein- Semantic delays on vigorated, and concurred with the Secretary-General’s analysis mundane topics may be that the GA’s overriding focus on taking decisions by consensus frustrating, but for has fostered an unhealthy tendency towards ineffective generalisa- many small countries tions. Concerns were expressed, however, that the reforms these are the only tactics available for proposed in ILF were neither radical nor specific enough, and exercising any real that the relevant recommendation merely recapitulates debates influence at the UN. which have been prominent at the UN for years and which have Manchester ultimately failed to stimulate any substantive changes. Participants supported the Secretary-General’s recommenda- tions that the GA’s agenda needed to be made both more progressive and more streamlined. The formulaic repetition of agenda items year after year, with similarly formulaic reports produced by the Secretariat, was seen to undermine the dynamism of the Assembly. It was recommended that the General Assembly’s agenda should be restructured around the themes of the Millennium Declaration of 2000, and should concentrate on the mandate which emerges from the 2005 World Summit. It was argued that debates on contemporary issues, such as ‘honour killings’, should be made a priority for the Assembly. There were also strong calls for giving more authority to the 91
  • 102. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 92 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform president of the GA and for enhancing the continuity of the Assembly’s work. Participants recommended that the General Assembly President should be elected 18 months in advance of his or her term of office, to allow a troika of past, present and future presidencies to work together to sculpt the GA’s agenda. Many called for an end to the practice by which the only action usually taken by the current GA is that items are in effect auto- matically inscribed on the agenda of the next GA, and a report from the Secretariat sought. The office of the General Assembly President should be augmented by additional Secretariat staff and/or additional secondees from member states, reflecting a sufficiently broad geographical distribution. Participants were strongly in favour of strengthening the The call is made for GA’s engagement with civil society. In this context, many the UN to be open to civil society. But expressed the view that relations between civil society and nothing more is said. the UN had declined since Kofi Annan took office as Would civil society Secretary-General in 1997; access to meetings and informa- representatives come in tion by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was seen to as NGOs and would have deteriorated rather than improved since the series of they be accepted by the world conferences were held under UN auspices in the General Assembly? More thought, together 1990s. with ideas on While the input of civil society into the work of the UN operation, needs to be was generally judged to be valuable, a number of issues were given to these raised. First, the utility of the phrase ‘civil society’ itself was questions, including questioned, deemed too inexact and inclusive to be mean- thorough consideration ingful. Many therefore favoured a return to a more specific to the benefits that the UN would actually nomenclature in which non-governmental organisations gain from this devel- (NGOs) are distinguished from the private and public sectors, opment. as well as other groupings. Second, several participants ques- Professor Sally tioned the prevailing assumption that civil society organisa- Morphet, University tions and NGOs were intrinsically better equipped to of Kent at represent grassroots views and the interests of politically Canterbury marginalised groups. It remains the case that most NGOs with leverage at the UN are from developed countries. If civil society organisations are to make contributions to develop- ment, human rights and security which are both effective and legitimate, it was judged essential that this imbalance in repre- sentation be remedied. To enhance the representation at the UN of developing country NGOs and to improve civil society access more broadly, many participants called for the implementation of the recom- 92
  • 103. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 93 V. Strengthening the United Nations mendations made by the Cardoso Panel. This panel, appointed in 2003 by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, under the chair- manship of former Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso conducted a review of the UNs relationship with civil society and proposed measures for making this interaction more open and constructive. Professor Peter Willetts of City University argues that, where the Cardoso Panel puts forward sound recommendations for enhancing NGO access to the UN, it does not go far enough, particularly with respect to improving NGOs understanding of the consultative arrangements by which NGOs engage with the UN. To make these consultative arrangements less opaque, Professor Willetts argues that: • the UN website should feature a basic history of each of its bodies, a glossary of diplomatic terms, a guide to documents and procedures, and a list of NGO contacts; • the Secretariat should run a workshop in advance of each session to provide training on documentation and proce- dures for NGOs new to the UN; and • appeals should be made to a charitable foundation to fund an accommodation centre for visiting NGO repre- sentatives. The principle of greater outreach to the private sector was also ILF neglects the input of civil society into welcomed, given the significance of that sector to the long- establishing collective term realisation of development, peace and human rights, but security under the UN it was felt that the voluntary nature of the UN’s Global Charter. Compact had seemingly given blanket UN endorsement to a Golders Green number of transnational corporations, with only a minority demonstrating changes to policies and practice as a result of There is asymmetry involvement in the Compact. between resolutions of A number of participants argued that there should be a the Security Council strengthening of mechanisms by which the General Assembly and those from the could hold the Security Council to account under Article 24 of General Assembly, and the UN Charter. There was concern that the non-binding an unwelcome nature of General Assembly resolutions marginalised it as a disparity between intention and imple- forum for action. Greater use could be made of the ‘Uniting mentation in the for Peace’ precedent invoking the existing secondary responsi- latter. bility of the General Assembly in the field of peace and Aberystwyth security. 93
  • 104. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 94 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform To sum up: Participants in the engagement process were broadly supportive of the Secretary-General’s proposals for reforming the General Assembly. Many expressed the view that the asymmetry of power dividing the Security Council and the General Assembly should be corrected, but that the Assembly needed to adopt more effective procedures and to tackle issues in a meaningful way before such a redress of power was justified or indeed possible. In particular, the GA needed to avoid producing outcomes geared to be innocuous and consensual rather than effectual. Participants criticised the perceived erosion of civil society access to the United Nations and urged that this be reversed. B. THE COUNCILS The Secretary-General brings attention to the fact that the archi- tects of the UN endowed the Organisation with three councils – the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Trusteeship Council – and, in noting the stark asymmetry of influence between the Security Council and ECOSOC, recommends that the envisioned balance be restored, in order that the UN is able to fulfil its responsibilities in all the areas of its work. It is recommended in a subsequent sub-section that the Trusteeship Council be abolished, in light of the virtually universal independence of former colonies. The feedback presented below examines the Secretary- General’s proposals for strengthening the Security Council, and in particular explores the merits and deficiencies of the two models put forward for its expansion. The recommenda- tions for enhancing ECOSOC are also reviewed, as are those for the radical overhaul of the UN’s human rights machinery. Security Council Participants were strongly in favour of expanding the Security Council, and voiced support in principle for recommendation 8 (c) which urges governments to: Reform the Security Council to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole and the geopolitical realities of today, and to expand its membership to meet these goals, by: 94
  • 105. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 95 V. Strengthening the United Nations i. supporting the principles for the reform of the Council and It is important to ensure that a reformed considering the two options, models A and B,2 proposed in the Council is an effective present report, as well as any other viable proposals in terms Council: this is not just of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either a semantic change. If model; and the Council continues ii. agreeing to take a decision on this important issue before the to be seen as impotent, summit in September 2005. It would be far preferable for there is a real danger that it will be bypassed Member States to take this vital decision by consensus. If, by Washington and however, they are unable to reach consensus, this must not London, as it was over become an excuse for postponing action. Iraq. Manchester There was widespread support for an expansion of the Security Council which would increase the representativeness of the Council without compromising its effectiveness. Participants’ views were divided into two categories: those advocating fundamental change beyond what is politically achievable at present, and those proposing immediate progress within the restrictions arising out of the Charter’s procedures for amendment and out of the political priorities of member states. Within the latter category a further division of views was evident – between support for new permanent seats with or without a veto, and support for an expansion of non-permanent seats or the creation of semi- permanent seats. The feedback summarised below a) explores issues related to the privileges of the permanent members, in particular the perceived inequity represented by the veto and b) evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each of the models put forward for Security Council expansion. A primary concern among participants – in particular those advocating more fundamental change – was that the proposals contained in ILF did not seek to curtail the privileges of the permanent members. The veto was seen to be an anachronism of 1945, approved by the smaller powers at San Francisco only on the basis of a tacit, but crucial, quid pro quo – namely that, in exchange for the veto, the permanent members would contribute to a UN standing army, under the control of the Military Staff Committee. Since agreement on a standing 2 Summaries of the proposed models for Security Council expansion appear on page 98. 95
  • 106. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 96 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The very concept of a army has not been reached, and direct involvement by the P5 ‘permanent’ member of in UN peacekeeping has waned considerably in recent years, it the Security Council is undemocratic. It is an was felt by some that the permanent members had effectively unrepresentative and reneged on this implicit bargain and could therefore no unaccountable body. longer justify their permanent status and associated privi- Aberystwyth leges. In order to equalise the status of Security Council members, and erode the disproportionate influence of the P5, some support was expressed for extending the veto to new developing country permanent members. This view met, however, with strong opposition by a larger number of participants who argued that the influence of the veto should be diminished rather than extended. To this end, a number of measures to curtail the use of the veto were proposed. It was recognised that, since any erosion of the veto would require the agreement of the P5, such a change would likely occur on a voluntary, informal or de facto basis. Proposals included: • restricting the veto to Chapter VII resolutions; • disallowing its use with relation to acts of genocide; In the UN Charter it is stated that states who • requiring two or more vetoes to be cast for a veto to are party to a partic- count (although this was thought likely to isolate China ular dispute would not more than the Western permanent members); vote on it. But this has • removing the applicability of the veto to the process of been laid by the appointing the UN Secretary-General; and wayside – Washington • undertaking a review of what decisions should be has frequently exercised its veto on Middle East considered procedural in nature and therefore exempt questions. from the veto, such a review taking as its basis the Belfast reports of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly during the 1940s. There should be a coun- It was noted in the context of curtailing the use of the veto terweight to the veto; a way of limiting its that there had already been de facto changes to the Charter power without abol- brought about by consensus or implicit agreement, in partic- ishing it. States that ular the requirement of the Charter that the ‘concurring’ abuse the power the vote of a permanent member is required for a non-proce- UN gives them should dural vote to pass, whereas in practice an abstention by a face punishment, such as permanent member has not counted as a veto. One partici- impeachment. Bath pant drew attention to the fact that under Article 27 of the Charter Security Council members party to a dispute should abstain on decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 96
  • 107. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 97 V. Strengthening the United Nations 3 of article 52, but that this had rarely been observed in Realistically, the veto practice. cannot now be Many noted that the exercise of the veto had become less abolished. However, Britain and France common since the end of the Cold War, and the UK and could publicly lay France were praised by some participants for not having down the criteria applied it during this period. However, others argued that the under which they threat of the use of the veto remained a powerful obstacle to would use it. action within the Security Council, and noted that both the London UK and France had wielded this threat since 1989. Many speculated that, had the procedures for amending the UN The permanent seats Charter been less onerous, the French and British veto – and have been funda- possibly also that of the Russian Federation – would have mental to the enduring long since been rescinded. success and relevancy Some participants noted that the veto had actually served a of the Security vital purpose, arguing that the UN Security Council, in which Council, enhancing capabilities and aiding five states possess vetoes, constitutes an advance over the the implementation of League of Nations Council in which all members possessed resolutions. the veto. The veto, which helped reflect the reality of power Aberystwyth within the UN system, was noted to have been a key means of ensuring the participation of powerful countries such as the US and China, which are less dependent on multilateral coop- An expanded Council will make the credi- eration to achieve foreign policy objectives. In this sense, the bility cost of using the Security Council aims to marry power and representation, veto even greater, and both of which are required to ensure that the Council’s buying votes more decisions are deemed legitimate, and that it has the practical difficult. Expansion capacity to maintain international peace and security. can thus work to make The continued existence of permanent seats per se was the Council more legit- imate in many ways. questioned, and such seats were seen to offer privileges Manchester beyond the possession of the veto. These include the ‘cascade effect’, or ‘permanent member convention’, whereby the permanent members, or their nationals, are elected by precedent to most UN bodies of restricted membership, such as the International Court of Justice. Permanent membership of the Council also entails institutional memory of the Council’s procedures, longer-term relationships with the UN Secretariat, and greater opportunities to serve as the monthly president of the Council. All these factors were seen to give permanent members advantages over non-permanent members, by providing disproportionate opportunities for shaping the Council’s agenda and for using it as forum for advancing national objectives. 97
  • 108. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 98 V. Strengthening the United Nations ILF Models for Security Council Reform Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows: Regional area No. of Permanent Proposed Proposed Total States seats new two-year (continuing) permanent non-renewable seats seats Africa 53 0 2 4 6 Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 Europe 47 3 1 2 6 Americas 35 1 1 4 6 Totals model A 191 5 6 13 24 Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four- year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows: Regional area No. of Permanent Proposed Proposed Total States seats four-year two year (continuing) renewable non-renwable seats seats Two years is far too Africa 53 0 2 4 6 Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 short for non- Europe 47 3 2 1 6 permanent member- Americas 35 1 2 3 6 Totals model B 191 5 8 11 24 ship of the Security Council. Belfast There was widespread discussion over the two models put forward in ILF for Security Council expansion. The debate The UN should not be focussed on 1) the size of the expanded Council; 2) the respec- based on pragmatism tive representativeness of each of the models; and 3) the impli- but ideals. The intro- cations of redrawing the regional electoral groups. duction of new It was noted that both models seemed to have been formu- permanent members lated primarily to satisfy the two conditions for change, as set will maintain control amongst the rich: to out by the UN Charter: the initial support of two-thirds of the facilitate real change, UN membership, plus subsequent ratification by all five it will be necessary to permanent members. This focus on what was feasible, rather give more power to the than on what was best-suited to strengthen the UN’s capacity weakest countries. for advancing international peace and security, received consid- Bath erable criticism, with many participants stressing that reform proposals should not lose sight of the original purpose of the Representation on the Security Council, as enshrined in Article 24 of the UN Charter. Security Council could be proportional to factors such as popula- Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter tion size and economic In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the power. Such weighted United Nations, its members confer on the Security voting could alleviate Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of the need for a veto. Manchester international peace and security. 98
  • 109. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 99 I. Introduction Participants commented on the implications of increasing Withholding the veto from the new the size of the Security Council, with some arguing that a permanent members is Security Council of 24 or more members would be too large simply a way of main- and cumbersome, with its efficacy undermined by bloated taining the status quo bureaucracy and sluggish decision-making. It was consequently under the guise of suggested that expanding Council membership to 19 or 21 change, countering any members would strike a more effective balance between repre- real reform process. Bath sentation and effectiveness. It was noted that, under both models, if the voting majority required to pass resolutions is increased, it would effectively enhance the ability of devel- Has the UN forgotten oping countries to block resolutions, even if only China among its peace and security them possesses the veto. It was feared that shifting the balance mandate? Neither in favour of developing countries might deter powerful model addresses the need to promote the countries such as the US from using the Council as a reliable core values of peace source of legitimation and as an appropriate vehicle for the and security. implementation of cooperative measures in pursuit of interna- Bath tional peace and security. Such countries may then increasingly regard the UN as marginal to the pursuit of their national interests. Do the proposed changes to the structure of the Participants discussed the merits of each of the models put United Nations help or forward in ILF. Model A was seen to improve the represen- hinder the relationship tative nature of the Council, both in terms of major contrib- between developed and utors to the UN’s budget, by allowing for the allocation of developing countries? seats to Japan and Germany, and in terms of increasing the Cambridge proportion of developing countries on the Council. Model B was praised for increasing developing country representation, I think the discussion on whilst not extending the inequality of the permanent expanded seats is made member category. On balance participants favoured model A more problematic by over model B, but several stated a preference for objective suggesting that the criteria for new permanent members, and that after 15 or 20 current permanent years a review of new (and potentially existing) permanent members are representa- tives of a regional area: members should be undertaken. There were also some calls this used not to be the for extending the period of service of some or all non- case and is not correct permanent members. anyway. I consider that There was criticism of ILF proposals for the redrawing of permanent members the regional electoral groups, and of including the existing should continue to be permanent members under regional headings. Whilst there seen as global not regional. were valid reasons for revisiting the electoral group system, to Professor Sally do so as part of an agreement on Council expansion was Morphet, University considered likely to open a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of claims, and delay of Kent at progress on Security Council reform. Others questioned the Canterbury 99
  • 110. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 100 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The proposals for continued reliance on primarily geographical groups for expansion are election to the Security Council and other UN bodies. There organised by region, not civilisation, were suggestions that, at a time when there was a need for a leaving a gaping hole ‘dialogue among civilisations’, consideration be given to greater with no Islamic Islamic representation on the Council, either through an country representation. Islamic permanent seat, or through other means. A provision Southampton of the ICJ’s Statute was cited in this context as a possible precedent. What price must be paid to make China Article 9 of the Statute of the ICJ states the following with accept Japan as a regard to the process of appointing its judges: permanent member? Southampton [The] persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole This is an ideal oppor- the representation of the main forms of civilisation and of tunity for the UK the principal legal systems of the world should be assured. government to propose that, in 15 years time, the veto arrangements Economic and Social Council be changed so that it Participants were in favour of measures to strengthen the UN’s will require negative votes from two or even contribution to development by reforming the Economic and three permanent Social Council (ECOSOC), and expressed general support for members for the veto to recommendation 8 (d) which calls on governments to support become operative. this objective by: Norwich i. mandating ECOSOC to hold ministerial-level assessments of 15 years is far too long progress towards agreed goals, particularly the Millennium to wait for a review Development Goals; conference – the distri- ii. deciding that it should serve as a high-level development bution of world power cooperation forum, reviewing trends in international devel- changes quickly. opment cooperation, promoting greater coherence among the Furthermore, they plan development activities of different actors and strengthening only to review the changes made this year the links between the normative and operational work of the when the whole UN; concept of the Security iii. encouraging it to convene timely meetings as required, to Council should be assess threats to development, such as famines, epidemics and considered. major natural disasters, and to promote coordinated responses Southampton to them; and iv. deciding that the Council should regularise its work in post- conflict management by working with the proposed Peacebuilding Commission. 100
  • 111. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 101 V. Strengthening the United Nations Participants did not consider the Secretary-General’s proposals I would add cultural rights to the suggestion for ECOSOC reform to be sufficiently far-reaching and felt that monitoring of the that a valuable opportunity for galvanising support for change economic and social in this area had been missed. Participants expressed the view dimension of conflict is that there was a need for ECOSOC to work more closely with important. And I the Bretton Woods Institutions, with a focus on the design would also add that and implementation of country-level plans. It was urged that thinking about minorities is essential. consideration be given in the longer-term to replacing Professor Sally ECOSOC with an Economic and Social Security Council, Morphet, University smaller than ECOSOC with its membership and voting of Kent at procedures requiring the support of both donor and recipient Canterbury countries. The expansion of ECOSOC from 18 to 27 and then to 54 members was seen as having contributed to its declining relevance and impact. The contribution of a reformed ECOSOC to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission was considered a potentially valuable means of addressing the economic, social and cultural aspects of conflict. Proposed Human Rights Council Participants supported the Secretary-General’s evaluation of the Commission on Human Rights – namely that, while the Commission had played a central role in the development of human rights, its capacity to sustain its constructive contribu- tion to the UN’s human rights machinery was becoming severely undermined by eroding credibility and profession- alism, as well as by the growing politicisation of its decision- making. Participants endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal for replacing the Commission on Human Rights with a standing Human Rights Council. Recommendation 8 (e) urges heads of state and government to: Agree to replace the Commission with a smaller standing Council, as a principal organ of the UN or subsidiary body of the General Assembly, whose members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. In ILF and in an addendum to the report, the Secretary- General proposes that the Council be structured along the following guidelines. First, the Council should be a standing body. This would allow regular meetings, provide means for responding to crises, and permit follow-up on decisions and 101
  • 112. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 102 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform A change in name and resolutions. Second, the Council would be smaller than the elevation in the UN Commission, which would help focus its mandate and stream- organisational hierarchy, by raising line decision-making. Third, the Council would be elected the status of the directly by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly; it is principal political envisioned that this would make the Council more account- human rights body able and representative. Fourth, the Council should be based within the UN system, in Geneva, in order to permit ease of communication and would be an important cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for beginning. To be truly effective, though, the Human Rights. Fifth, the Council should act as a chamber for Council must form peer review and a forum for universal scrutiny of human rights part of a package of records; the Secretary-General argues that the peer review comprehensive reform system, if structured fairly and transparently, would mitigate of the whole human the politicisation which has done so much to undermine the rights machinery, to Commission. integrate rights across the work of the UN. The Secretary-General entrusts member states to decide Oxford whether the Council should be a principal organ of the UN or a subsidiary body of the General Assembly; the Secretary- General also leaves to member states decisions regarding the The proposed Council composition of the Council, on what basis elections to it are should be a principal conducted, and the term of office and rotation of its members. body of the UN and not a subsidiary body, Participants agreed that a standing human rights body albeit one with a would allow for greater continuity; that substituting the higher status than the Commission with a Council would be in keeping with the Commission on Charter’s prioritisation of human rights; and that an additional Human Rights. This council would increase opportunities for member states to would demonstrate the serve on at least one of the three UN councils. The proposal Secretary-General’s stated commitment to for the Human Rights Council to be an elected body was also mainstreaming human favoured as a vehicle for strengthening accountability, and rights throughout the support was expressed for the proposed peer review function as UN. a means of reaffirming the universality of human rights. Belfast Participants were broadly supportive of the key features of the proposed Human Rights Council, but stressed that while the Council should avoid the shortcomings of the Commission, it should also build upon the Commission’s strengths, by continuing to develop human rights standards; by elaborating a system of independent human rights experts (the ‘special procedures’); by exerting pressure on governments to act upon human rights obligations; and by enlarging the space available for multilateral dialogue on human rights. Participants were particularly in favour of maintaining the Commission’s openness to NGO input, and it was urged that 102
  • 113. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 103 V. Strengthening the United Nations the Council be equipped with mechanisms to facilitate civil society engagement. A number of participants stipulated that the Council should be given a strong mandate and recommended that it should have the authority, resources and mechanisms to: • address serious human rights situations, and maintain the existing functions and responsibilities granted to the Commission under ECOSOC resolutions 1235 and 1503 (i.e. to investigate gross violations of human rights); • respond quickly, throughout the year, to human rights crises through monitoring, adopting resolutions and alerting the international community; • respond effectively to early warning on the basis of reports from OHCHR, special procedures and NGOs; and • follow up and implement country-specific commitments and decisions and recommendations from special proce- dures and treaty bodies. Some scepticism was expressed over the viability of the peer review system as a means of preventing the politicisation which has plagued the Commission. It was noted that the politicisation The fundamental of the Commission stems not only from its structure but also problem in trying to from the failure of members to exercise their collective political address [the criticisms mandate to uphold human rights. Linked to this, members have of the Commission on Human Rights] is that shown a traditional lack of interest in those components of the they are a reflection of UN’s human rights machinery which are less overtly intergovern- the state of the world mental, such as the treaty bodies, special procedures and rather than being a OHCHR. It was not clear to participants how structural changes structural problem of to the Commission would reverse this tendency. the Commission. The Participants generally supported the Secretary-General’s danger is, therefore, that in trying to ‘fix’ decision to reject the High-Level Panel’s recommendation that these problems, more the membership of the Commission be universalised. Many may be lost than will argued that universalisation would have rendered the actually be gained. Commission a more cumbersome forum and that this proposal Rachel Brett, Quaker did not address whether some states’ human rights records UN Office should disqualify them from positions on the world’s human rights body. Some participants were broadly in favour of estab- Should the proposed lishing a set of criteria for membership to the proposed Council consist of both Council; it was suggested, for example, that a prospective ‘saints and sinners’? member’s domestic record of ratifying and implementing Bath 103
  • 114. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 104 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The Council must human rights legislation and of establishing national human attract members with rights institutions should be used for assessing eligibility to the a demonstrated Council, with many participants emphasising that Council commitment to the members should abide by the highest human rights standards. highest human rights standards because, to a A number of participants also argued, however, that placing large extent, this will restrictions on membership would compromise the inclusiveness determine its effective- and, by extension, also the legitimacy of the Council. These ness and legitimacy. individuals argued that all member states should be eligible to The commitment apply to sit on the Council but that mechanisms should be put should extend to a in place for both ensuring members’ respect for human rights readiness to be held accountable for human and for revoking membership in the event of misconduct. rights obligations and Many participants expressed concern that the Secretary- effective cooperation General had not taken forward the recommendation made by with human rights the High-Level Panel which proposed that members designate mechanisms. as heads of delegation prominent human rights experts, rather Aberystwyth than diplomats seeking to advance narrow national interests. However, others were doubtful that this change was practical, There is a danger that given that the proposed Council would remain part of a defin- the Human Rights itively intergovernmental process. There was also concern that Council will reinforce ‘de-politicising’ the proposed Council could reduce its impor- the lack of developing tance as a forum for governments. country representation at the highest levels. To sum up: Political and civil rights, or alternatively Participants in the engagement process agreed that the General economic and social Assembly needed to be made more dynamic and that its proce- rights, could become dures should be overhauled in order to re-focus the Assembly’s the criteria for election work. Reforming the General Assembly was seen to be especially and these are still only urgent given its status as the most globally representative body. being progressively realised by developing There was broad support for expanding the Security countries. Council, and this issue was noted to have fundamental impli- London cations for the entire package of reforms put forward by the Secretary-General. Participants urged that any plans for expansion balance considerations of representation with those of efficacy. It was also emphasised that disagreement over Security Council reform should not be used to hold the wider process of UN reform hostage. There was considerable support for the establishment of a Human Rights Council – along the lines set out in ILF – as a means of reflecting in practice the UN Charter’s commitment to human rights, in parallel with security and development. 104
  • 115. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 105 V. Strengthening the United Nations C. THE SECRETARIAT The Secretary-General stresses that Secretariat reform is a precondition of the UN’s future effectiveness and credibility. The recommendations put forward in this section focus on enhancing the accountability, transparency and efficiency of this UN organ. The feedback received demonstrates strong support for these proposals and also explores some of the implications of the fall-out from the Oil-for-Food Programme. There was almost unanimous support for the Secretary- General’s proposals for reforming the Secretariat, to improve the quality of UN staff, including through minimising micro- management and interference by member states in recruitment and promotion. Recommendation 7 (f ) urges heads of state and government to support the reform of the Secretariat by: The United Nations has no unified inter- • endorsing the Secretary-General’s request that the General national civil service Assembly review all mandates older than five years to see if identity or corporate the activities concerned are still genuinely needed or culture – elements whether resources assigned to them can be reallocated in which are essential if response to new and emerging challenges; the Secretariat is to • agreeing to provide the Secretary-General with the authority and remain a viable governing body. resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and Aberystwyth realign the staff to meet current needs; • deciding that member states should work with the Secretary- General to undertake a comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules under which the Organisation operates; • endorsing the package of management reforms that th Secretary-General is undertaking to improve accountability, transparency and efficiency within the Secretariat; and • commissioning a comprehensive review of the Office of Interna Oversight Services with a view to strengthening its independ- ence and authority, as well as its expertise and capacity. Many participants supported the Secretary-General’s call for a one-time staff buyout to enhance the quality of staff and to mitigate interference by member states in staffing, although a 105
  • 116. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 106 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Why is it not possible few questioned whether such an extreme measure was in fact simply to get rid of necessary. That member states frequently demanded greater poorly performing workers and bad professionalisation of UN staff was considered hypocritical, managers, like a given their simultaneous lobbying in support of the appoint- company would? Why ment of their own nationals. must money be spent Concerns were expressed by some participants and experts in an expensive buy- that, while the Secretary-General’s desire to improve the out process? Secretariat was sound, the diagnosis and solution may not Southampton necessarily be correct. In particular participants highlighted the implications of following an approach based on ‘managerialism’. Unless member states It was noted that managerialism is centred heavily on indices abandon their jealous such as performance targets, competences, etc. and that it could protection of the potentially engender another set of problems. existing structure, the It was argued that managerialism fosters a working culture Secretary-General will be unable to make the driven ultimately by the achievement of targets which can widespread changes become divorced from fundamental aims. This was considered that are necessary. to be of particular relevance to a body such as the UN, the aims Aberystwyth of which are not uniformly quantifiable. It was argued by some contributors that implementing managerialist policies at the UN would create an environment in which outputs have meaning only if they can be measured. The potential pitfalls of managerialism The employment of Dr Arvind Sivaramakrishan, Southampton international civil servants should better First, the kinds of metric favoured by managerialism are not neutral; they reflect the contribu- show the already-advantaged in a disproportionately good light. tions made by member states. The present Second, in response to problems, managerialism assumes an input- situation is biased output logic which obscures the complexity of human situations. It also against British obscures the empirical and conceptual problems involved in establishing employees. causal links in human and social situations. Southampton Third, managerial rubrics and their derivatives, namely outputs, targets, and mainly quantitative performance criteria, are appropriate, albeit The Secretary-General disputedly, to activities in which the ends are not broadly in dispute, such should be more like a as the production of commodities, or sales figures in the private sector. chairman of a board However, they are less demonstrably appropriate to areas in which the than a CEO, setting ends themselves are often in question or at least have to be negotiated an agenda that is then and sometimes renegotiated, perhaps as a result of problems, failures, or to be debated. This unforeseeable developments on the ground. A serious problem for those will, however, require who have the responsibility of carrying out policy or mandates is that any structural change discussion of qualitative factors which even implies a need to renegotiate within the UN. ends and targets cannot be accommodated within a managerialist Manchester grammar. 106
  • 117. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 107 V. Strengthening the United Nations How far has the UN reform process been The problems exposed by Oil-for-Food damaged by the succes- sion of scandals and Though not addressed explicitly in ILF, the Oil-for-Food situation negative publicity, and was highlighted by participants as a particular area of concern and as the appointment of a persuasive case for overhauling and bolstering management and John Bolton as US oversight procedures in the Secretariat. While some participants Ambassador? praised the decisive response of the UN Secretary-General and his Cambridge new chief of staff in proposing reforms to improve accountability, transparency and management in the Secretariat, many also felt that these steps were long overdue, and expressed disappointment that a Secretary-General with a Master’s degree in management, and a professional background involving top management posts at the UN, should have failed to deliver in this area. A number of participants felt that disproportionate focus had been directed at allegations of corruption or inappropriate action by Secretariat staff members whereas, in reality, only four had – to date – been found to have acted improperly or imprudently. Some argued that the Secretary-General was being personally and unjustly targeted by apologists for, and proponents of, the war in Iraq, in light of his contro- versial statement that the military action had been illegal. It was noted that, in fact, there had been a much greater failure in scrutiny by the Security Council and its 661 Sanctions Committee. In this context, a number of participants referred to a report, published by Democrat minority members of the US Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations, in which the US administration is accused of having turned a blind eye to the activities of certain US firms, which were profiting from illegal trade with the Iraqi regime outside of the Sanctions Committee’s rules. It was also noted that the Coalition Provisional Authority, which effectively governed Iraq following the closure of the Oil-for-Food Programme, had been criticised by US auditors for having lost track of billions of dollars and for awarding lucrative contracts without conducting an adequate competitive bidding process. Views varied on the desirability of moving away from the current system of geographical quotas for recruitment, but it was pointed out that there existed highly talented individ- uals in each region and country – the challenge for the UN was creating a work environment which attracted these indi- viduals, and to move from passive to active recruitment through a fundamental reorientation of the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) so that it began to ‘head hunt’ quality candidates rather than just rely on 107
  • 118. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 108 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform those who happened to hear about, and then apply for, available positions. To sum up: Participants voiced support for strengthening the Secretariat whilst simultaneously advocating reforms to enhance its accountability and transparency. Participants urged member states to minimise interference in Secretariat staffing procedures and to cease micro-managing the Secretary-General. D. SYSTEM COHERENCE The Secretary-General highlights the need to rationalise the work of UN bodies to avoid the inefficient and wasteful dupli- cation of mandates and ensure that the demands of an expanded membership are met. The feedback presented here assesses the Secretary-General’s recommendations to improve the coherence of the UN system. Participants in the engagement process acknowledged the need for greater coherence of the UN system, specifically in light of its expanded membership, the concomitant multiplication of mandates across the breadth of the Organisation’s work, and the proliferation of bodies to carry out these mandates. Endorsement was expressed for the Secretary-General’s proposals for strengthening the UN’s operations at the country-level, for improving its humanitarian response system, and for integrating the efforts of global environmental bodies. The United Nations at the country level Participants supported ILF recommendation 8 (g) which urges heads of state and government to: Ensure stronger system-wide coherence by resolving to coordinate their representatives on the governing boards of the various devel- opment and humanitarian agencies so as to make sure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system. It was felt by participants that this proposal would lend vital cohesion to the UN’s work – particularly in development – and 108
  • 119. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 109 V. Strengthening the United Nations thus to its ability to support efforts to reach the MDGs, the attainment of which depend so crucially on strong multi- agency cooperation. In this context, governments were criticised for simultane- ously calling – in the debating halls of the General Assembly and Security Council – for greater cooordination among UN specialised agencies, whilst their diplomats on the governing boards of those agencies were endorsing organisational strate- gies which would lead to the opposite result. Humanitarian response system Participants were unanimous in supporting the Secretary- General’s call for the implementation of robust measures to strengthen the UN’s humanitarian response system and by extension the international community’s capacity to address disasters such as the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Secretary-General’s proposals for reform in this area focus on clarifying exactly what resources are available to humanitarian response operations, what gaps need to be filled, and under what sort of constraints humanitarian workers act. Participants endorsed recommendation 8 (h) which calls on governments to: Commit themselves to protecting humanitarian space and ensuring that humanitarian actors have safe and unimpeded access to vulner- able populations; resolve to act on proposals to accelerate humanitarian response by developing new funding arrangements to ensure that emergency funding is available immediately; and support the Secretary-General’s effort to strengthen the inter-agency and country- level responses to the needs of internally displaced persons. Participants were particularly supportive of the Secretary- General’s call for more predictable funding, potentially via the establishment of a type of ‘trust fund’ for future crises, and endorsed the call for guaranteed access for humanitarian workers to disaster areas. The need to address the gap in present capacity for addressing the unique plight of internally displaced persons was noted to be particularly pressing. The high level of priority accorded by the UK government to improving the global humanitarian response system was commended by participants. 109
  • 120. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 110 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform A key concern – raised by both participants and expert contributors – was that, while greater integration of the various humanitarian response mechanisms was necessary to improve the impact of operations, this should not compromise the impartial and quintessentially humanitarian objective of humanitarian actions. Thus, it was stressed that humanitarian missions should be authorised strictly according to need, and that efforts to improve the coherence of the UN’s humani- tarian response capacity, potentially involving greater coordina- tion among humanitarian, political and military bodies, should be undertaken with a view to preserving the independence of humanitarian actors. Governance of the global environment Participants endorsed the Secretary-General’s view that, in improving the coherence of the UN system, particular attention should be paid to rationalising the international agreements and agencies which are related to global environ- mental governance. Recommendation 8 (i) proposes that member states: Recognise the need for a more integrated structure for environ- mental standard-setting, scientific discussion and monitoring, and treaty compliance that is built on existing institutions, such as UNEP, as well as the treaty bodies and specialised agencies, and that assigns environmental activities at the operational level to ensure an integrated approach to sustainable development. Most participants were supportive of the above recommendation. However, many felt the UN institutions dealing with environ- mental issues were inadequate in securing state compliance with agreements made and suggested that a new UN Environment Organisation with greater powers should be established. To sum up: Participants in the engagement process welcomed the Secretary-General’s proposals for improving system coherence at the UN, with specific reference to its humani- tarian response capacity and global environmental gover- nance. It was emphasised, however, that the impartiality of humanitarian response operations should be maintained, with 110
  • 121. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 111 V. Strengthening the United Nations the activities of humanitarian actors insulated as far as possible from politicisation. E. REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS The Secretary-General notes the growing importance of regional arrangements in the areas of development, peace and security, and human rights. The feedback below explores the ILF recommendations advocating greater cooperation between regional organisa- tions and the United Nations. Participants supported in principle recommendation 8 (j) in I consider that there is too much emphasis on which member states are advised to: regional and sub- regional organisations Support a stronger relationship between the UN and regional organ- at the moment. All isations, including by, as a first step, developing and implementing a appropriate organisa- 10-year plan for capacity-building with the AU, and by ensuring tions need to be consid- that regional organisations that have a capacity for conflict preven- ered, including others like the G7/8; the tion or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacities in Group of 77; the non- the framework of the UN Standby Arrangements System. aligned; and the Organisation of the It was agreed that shortfalls in UN capacity could be addressed Islamic Conference. through more efficient burden-sharing in the international Professor Sally system and that enhanced cooperation with regional organisa- Morphet, University of Kent at tions constituted a viable means of carrying this forward. Canterbury There was support for using the UN’s partnership with the African Union (AU) as a model for rationalising the UN’s relationship with other regional organisations and for taking While some regional advantage of Chapter VIII of the Charter to exploit the organisations are potential benefits of increasing regional involvement in peace- making significant strides in collaborating keeping and in the provision of public goods more broadly. with the UN, others However, opinion was divided over the extent to which the appear uninterested in UN’s relationship with regional organisations should be pursuing closer formalised. relations. On the one hand, it was argued that formalising the relation- Aberystwyth ship between the UN and regional bodies would help realise the potential benefits of joint operations. It was suggested that formal clarification of the partnership could entail granting an organisation official Chapter VIII status; setting out criteria for cooperation and transparent decision-making; and delineating a 111
  • 122. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 112 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform The Secretary-General clear structure for the division of labour, in which the Security argues that the UN Council would maintain final authority. and regional organisa- tions should play On the other hand, a number of participants held that ‘complementary roles formalisation might be prohibitively difficult given the in facing the challenges diversity of regional bodies, their differing remits and widely to international peace varying levels of capability. The view was also expressed that and security’, but says making the relationship more concrete would stymie one of little of substance in the perceived comparative advantages of regional organisa- this area. More serious consideration should be tions, namely flexibility. given to the issue of Participants were supportive of the Secretary-General’s burden-sharing and attempt to address the characteristic financial weakness of cooperation between many regional organisations by proposing that regional opera- the UN, other global tions authorised by the Security Council might, in exceptional institutions (in partic- circumstances, be financed though assessed contributions from ular the Bretton Woods Institutions) and the UN budget. However, it was thought by some to be regional organisations. unlikely that non-UNSC member states would support such a In some areas, in proposal and concern was expressed over the implications for particular democrati- accountability, management and financial oversight in joint sation, state-building operations. and the development of The Secretary-General’s emphasis on capacity-building to global peacekeeping capacity, there is a empower regional organisations to undertake peacekeeping strong case that was welcomed, including through training initiatives regional organisations (although several participants were sceptical of the success of could and should play previous and ongoing attempts to enhance African countries’ a much greater role. capacity to mount peace operations). Concerns were also Dr Andrew Cottey, expressed that donor-driven capacity-building initiatives Senior Lecturer and Jean Monnet Chair were vulnerable to manipulation to reflect donor priorities, in European Political rather than the needs of the populations involved. For a Integration, more extensive account of the debate on regional organisa- University College tions, specifically within the context of peacekeeping, see Cork page 60. To sum up: There was broad support for strengthening cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. However, it was simultane- ously felt that there were a number of issues which need to be carefully considered, including the diversity of mandate and structure among regional arrangements; the implications for financial management of allocating assessed contributions to regional operations authorised by the Security Council; and how to ensure the success of future training initiatives. 112
  • 123. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 113 V. Strengthening the United Nations F. UPDATING THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS In putting forward the wide-ranging set of recommendations contained in ILF, the Secretary-General acknowledges that the UN needs to undergo comprehensive change to reflect the realities of the current international system. In order to modernise thoroughly the Organisation’s structure and mandate, its constitutional foundations also require some modi- fication. Thus, while the Charter has retained its relevance over the last six decades, it too needs to be updated. The feedback presented below endorses the ILF recom- mendation for updating the UN Charter and explores related implications. An additional amendment was also proposed. While it is affirmed, in an earlier section of ILF, that the UN Charter retains its relevance to international relations 60 years after its inception, the Secretary-General also notes that there are elements in the document which are clearly obsolete. Recommendation 8 (k) therefore urges heads of state and government to: Decide to eliminate the references to “enemy states” contained in Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations; to delete Article 47 on the Military Staff Committee and the references to the Committee contained in Articles 26, 45 and 46; and to delete Chapter XIII on the Trusteeship Council. Participants expressed strong support for the proposal to remove the enemy state clauses as a measure of solidarity with the peoples of Germany, Italy and Japan. There was general support for abolishing the Military Staff Committee, but it was emphasised that this should not nullify the tacit quid pro quo linking the P5’s veto privileges with their special responsibility to maintain international peace and security through the provision of troops and equipment and other support. The recommendation for abolishing the Trusteeship Council was also supported. However, participants advised that, if member states did not decide to do so, the body should be reconfigured and put to use. A reinvigorated Trusteeship Council could be utilised as a guardian of the global environmental commons, or as a repository of expertise for nation-building in failed states. 113
  • 124. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 114 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Concern was expressed that some states had, in the past, withheld assessed contributions to the UN for political reasons. It was felt that the existing deterrents for late payment were inadequate and that Article 19 of the UN Charter should be amended to reduce the acceptable period of being in arrears to one year before a state loses its vote in the General Assembly. Since the assessed contribution for least developed countries is just 0.001%, instances in which a state would be genuinely unable to pay would be rare. Article 19 of the UN Charter A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the organisation shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribu- tions due from it for the preceeding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member. To sum up: Participants endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal to delete from the UN Charter the references to enemy states, as well as the articles dealing with the Military Staff Committee and the Trusteeship Council. 114
  • 125. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 115 Annex I: 2005 World Summit Outcome United Nations A/60/L.1 General Assembly 20 September 2005 Sixtieth Session The General Assembly Adopts the following 2005 World Summit Outcome: 2005 World Summit Outcome I. VALUES AND PRINCIPLES 1 We, Heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 14 to 16 September 2005. 2 We reaffirm our faith in the United Nations and our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law, which are indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world, and reiterate our determination to foster strict respect for them. 3 We reaffirm the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which we adopted at the dawn of the twenty-first century. We recognize the valuable role of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields, including the Millennium Summit, in mobilizing the international community at the local, national, regional and global levels and in guiding the work of the United Nations. 4 We reaffirm that our common fundamental values, including freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for all human rights, respect for nature and shared responsibility, are essential to international relations. 5 We are determined to establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect their territorial integrity and political independence, to refrain in our international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and princi- ples of the United Nations, to uphold resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the right to self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and the fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter. 6 We reaffirm the vital importance of an effective multilateral system, in accordance with international law, in order to better address the multifaceted and interconnected challenges and threats confronting our world and to achieve progress in the areas of peace and security, development and human rights, underlining the central role of the United Nations, and commit ourselves to promoting and strengthening the effectiveness of the Organization through the implementation of its decisions and resolutions. 7 We believe that today, more than ever before, we live in a global and interdependent world. No State can stand wholly alone. We acknowledge that collective security depends on effective cooperation, in accordance with international law, against transnational threats. 8 We recognize that current developments and circumstances require that we urgently build consensus on major threats and challenges. We commit ourselves to translating that consensus into concrete action, including addressing the root causes of those threats and challenges with resolve and determination. 9 We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being. We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. 10 We reaffirm that development is a central goal by itself and that sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental aspects constitutes a key element of the overarching framework of United Nations activities. 11 We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger. 12 We reaffirm that gender equality and the promotion and protection of the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all are essential to advance development and peace and security. We are committed to creating a world fit for future generations, which takes into account the best interests of the child. 13 We reaffirm the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights. 14 Acknowledging the diversity of the world, we recognize that all cultures and civilizations contribute to the enrichment of humankind. We acknowledge the importance of respect and understanding for religious and cultural diversity throughout the world. In order to promote international peace and security, we commit 115
  • 126. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 116 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform ourselves to advancing human welfare, freedom and progress everywhere, as well as to encouraging tolerance, respect, dialogue and cooperation among different cultures, civilizations and peoples. 15 We pledge to enhance the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and credibility of the United Nations system. This is our shared responsibility and interest. 16 We therefore resolve to create a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic world and to undertake concrete measures to continue finding ways to implement the outcome of the Millennium Summit and the other major United Nations conferences and summits so as to provide multilateral solutions to problems in the four following areas: • Development • Peace and collective security • Human rights and the rule of law • Strengthening of the United Nations II. DEVELOPMENT 17 We strongly reiterate our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits, including those agreed at the Millennium Summit that are described as the Millennium Development Goals, which have helped to galvanize efforts towards poverty eradication. 18 We emphasize the vital role played by the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields in shaping a broad development vision and in identifying commonly agreed objectives, which have contributed to improving human life in different parts of the world. 19 We reaffirm our commitment to eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable devel- opment and global prosperity for all. We are encouraged by reductions in poverty in some countries in the recent past and are determined to reinforce and extend this trend to benefit people worldwide. We remain concerned, however, with the slow and uneven progress towards poverty eradication and the realization of other development goals in some regions. We commit ourselves to promoting the development of the produc- tive sectors in developing countries to enable them to participate more effectively in and benefit from the process of globalization. We underline the need for urgent action on all sides, including more ambitious national development strategies and efforts backed by increased international support. Global partnership for development 20 We reaffirm our commitment to the global partnership for development set out in the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. 21 We further reaffirm our commitment to sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law, and to mobilize domestic resources, attract international flows, promote international trade as an engine for devel- opment and increase international financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing and external debt relief and to enhance the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems. 22 We reaffirm that each country must take primary responsibility for its own development and that the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasized in the achievement of sustainable development. We also recognize that national efforts should be complemented by supportive global programmes, measures and policies aimed at expanding the development opportunities of developing countries, while taking into account national conditions and ensuring respect for national ownership, strategies and sovereignty. To this end, we resolve: (a) To adopt, by 2006, and implement comprehensive national development strategies to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals; (b) To manage public finances effectively to achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability and long-term growth and to make effective and transparent use of public funds and ensure that development assistance is used to build national capacities; (c) To support efforts by developing countries to adopt and implement national development policies and strategies through increased development assistance, the promotion of international trade as an engine for development, the transfer of technology on mutually agreed terms, increased investment flows and wider and deeper debt relief, and to support developing countries by providing a substantial increase in aid of sufficient quality and arriving in a timely manner to assist them in achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals; (d) That the increasing interdependence of national economies in a globalizing world and the emergence of rule-based regimes for international economic relations have meant that the space for national economic policy, that is, the scope for domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development, is now often framed by international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations. It is for each Government to evaluate the trade- off between the benefits of accepting international rules and commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is particularly important for developing countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives, that all countries take into account the need for appro- priate balance between national policy space and international disciplines and commitments; (e) To enhance the contribution of non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders in national development efforts, as well as in the promotion of the global partner- ship for development; (f ) To ensure that the United Nations funds and programmes and the specialized agencies support the efforts of developing countries through the common country assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework process, enhancing their support for capacity-building; (g) To protect our natural resource base in support of development. 116
  • 127. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 117 Annex I: World Summit Outcome Financing for development 23 We reaffirm the Monterrey Consensus and recognize that mobilizing financial resources for development and the effective use of those resources in developing countries and countries with economies in transition are central to a global partnership for development in support of the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. In this regard: (a) We are encouraged by recent commitments to substantial increases in official development assis- tance and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimate that official development assistance to all developing countries will now increase by around $50 billion a year by 2010, while recognizing that a substantial increase in such assistance is required to achieve the internationally agreed goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, within their respective time frames; (b) We welcome the increased resources that will become available as a result of the establishment of timetables by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance by 2015 and to reach at least 0.5 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance by 2010 as well as, pursuant to the Brussels Programme of Action for the least developed countries, 0.15 per cent to 0.20 per cent for the least developed countries by no later than 2010, and urge those developed countries that have not yet done so to make concrete efforts in this regard in accordance with their commitments; (c) We further welcome recent efforts and initiatives to enhance the quality of aid and to increase its impact, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and resolve to take concrete, effective and timely action in implementing all agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, with clear monitoring and deadlines, including through further aligning assistance with countries’ strategies, building institutional capacities, reducing transaction costs and eliminating bureau- cratic procedures, making progress on untying aid, enhancing the absorptive capacity and financial management of recipient countries and strengthening the focus on development results; (d) We recognize the value of developing innovative sources of financing, provided those sources do not unduly burden developing countries. In that regard, we take note with interest of the inter- national efforts, contributions and discussions, such as the Action Against Hunger and Poverty, aimed at identifying innovative and additional sources of financing for development on a public, private, domestic or external basis to increase and supplement traditional sources of financing. Some countries will implement the International Finance Facility. Some countries have launched the International Finance Facility for immunization. Some countries will implement in the near future, utilizing their national authorities, a contribution on airline tickets to enable the financing of development projects, in particular in the health sector, directly or through financing of the International Finance Facility. Other countries are considering whether and to what extent they will participate in these initiatives; (e) We acknowledge the vital role the private sector can play in generating new investments, employment and financing for development; (f ) We resolve to address the development needs of low-income developing countries by working in competent multilateral and international forums, to help them meet, inter alia, their financial, technical and technological requirements; (g) We resolve to continue to support the development efforts of middle-income developing countries by working, in competent multilateral and international forums and also through bilateral arrangements, on measures to help them meet, inter alia, their financial, technical and technological requirements; (h) We resolve to operationalize the World Solidarity Fund established by the General Assembly and invite those countries in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to the Fund; (i) We recognize the need for access to financial services, in particular for the poor, including through microfinance and microcredit. Domestic resource mobilization 24 In our common pursuit of growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development, a critical challenge is to ensure the necessary internal conditions for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private, sustaining adequate levels of productive investment, increasing human capacity, reducing capital flight, curbing the illicit transfer of funds and enhancing international cooperation for creating an enabling domestic environment. We undertake to support the efforts of developing countries to create a domestic enabling environment for mobi- lizing domestic resources. To this end, we therefore resolve: (a) To pursue good governance and sound macroeconomic policies at all levels and support devel- oping countries in their efforts to put in place the policies and investments to drive sustained economic growth, promote small and medium-sized enterprises, promote employment genera- tion and stimulate the private sector; (b) To reaffirm that good governance is essential for sustainable development; that sound economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people and improved infrastruc- ture are the basis for sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and employment creation; and that freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human rights, including the right to development, the rule of law, gender equality and market-oriented policies and an overall commit- ment to just and democratic societies are also essential and mutually reinforcing; (c) To make the fight against corruption a priority at all levels and welcome all actions taken in this regard at the national and international levels, including the adoption of policies that emphasize accountability, transparent public sector management and corporate responsibility and accounta- bility, including efforts to return assets transferred through corruption, consistent with the United Nations Convention against Corruption. We urge all States that have not done so to consider signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention; 117
  • 128. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 118 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform (d) To channel private capabilities and resources into stimulating the private sector in developing countries through actions in the public, public/private and private spheres to create an enabling environment for partnership and innovation that contributes to accelerated economic develop- ment and hunger and poverty eradication; (e) To support efforts to reduce capital flight and measures to curb the illicit transfer of funds. Investment 25 We resolve to encourage greater direct investment, including foreign investment, in developing countries and countries with economies in transition to support their development activities and to enhance the benefits they can derive from such investments. In this regard: (a) We continue to support efforts by developing countries and countries with economies in transi- tion to create a domestic environment conducive to attracting investments through, inter alia, achieving a transparent, stable and predictable investment climate with proper contract enforce- ment and respect for property rights and the rule of law and pursuing appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks that encourage business formation; (b) We will put into place policies to ensure adequate investment in a sustainable manner in health, clean water and sanitation, housing and education and in the provision of public goods and social safety nets to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors of society; (c) We invite national Governments seeking to develop infrastructure projects and generate foreign direct investment to pursue strategies with the involvement of both the public and private sectors and, where appropriate, international donors; (d) We call upon international financial and banking institutions to consider enhancing the trans- parency of risk rating mechanisms. Sovereign risk assessments, made by the private sector should maximize the use of strict, objective and transparent parameters, which can be facilitated by high-quality data and analysis; (e) We underscore the need to sustain sufficient and stable private financial flows to developing countries and countries with economies in transition. It is important to promote measures in source and destination countries to improve transparency and the information about financial flows to developing countries, particularly countries in Africa, the least developed countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries. Measures that mitigate the impact of excessive volatility of short-term capital flows are important and must be considered. Debt 26 We emphasize the high importance of a timely, effective, comprehensive and durable solution to the debt problems of developing countries, since debt financing and relief can be an important source of capital for development. To this end: (a) We welcome the recent proposals of the Group of Eight to cancel 100 per cent of the outstanding debt of eligible heavily indebted poor countries owed to the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Association and African Development Fund and to provide additional resources to ensure that the financing capacity of the international financial institutions is not reduced; (b) We emphasize that debt sustainability is essential for underpinning growth and underline the importance of debt sustainability to the efforts to achieve national development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, recognizing the key role that debt relief can play in liberating resources that can be directed towards activities consistent with poverty eradication, sustained economic growth and sustainable development; (c) We further stress the need to consider additional measures and initiatives aimed at ensuring long-term debt sustainability through increased grant-based financing, cancellation of 100 per cent of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of heavily indebted poor countries and, where appropriate, and on a case-by-case basis, to consider significant debt relief or restructuring for low- and middle-income developing countries with an unsustainable debt burden that are not part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, as well as the exploration of mechanisms to comprehensively address the debt problems of those countries. Such mechanisms may include debt for sustainable development swaps or multicreditor debt swap arrangements, as appropriate. These initiatives could include further efforts by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to develop the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries. This should be achieved in a fashion that does not detract from official development assistance resources, while maintaining the financial integrity of the multilateral financial institutions. Trade 27 A universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, as well as mean- ingful trade liberalization, can substantially stimulate development worldwide, benefiting countries at all stages of development. In that regard, we reaffirm our commitment to trade liberalization and to ensure that trade plays its full part in promoting economic growth, employment and development for all. 28 We are committed to efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, especially the least-developed countries, participate fully in the world trading system in order to meet their economic development needs, and reaffirm our commitment to enhanced and predictable market access for the exports of developing countries. 29 We will work towards the objective, in accordance with the Brussels Programme of Action, of duty-free and quota-free market access for all least developed countries’ products to the markets of developed countries, as well as to the markets of developing countries in a position to do so, and support their efforts to overcome their supply-side constraints. 118
  • 129. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 119 Annex I: World Summit Outcome 30 We are committed to supporting and promoting increased aid to build productive and trade capacities of developing countries and take further steps in that regard, while welcoming the substantial support already provided. 31 We will work to accelerate and facilitate the accession of developing countries and countries with economies in transition to the World Trade Organization consistent with its criteria, recognizing the importance of universal integration in the rules-based global trading system. 32 We will work expeditiously towards implementing the development dimensions of the Doha work programme. Commodities 33 We emphasize the need to address the impact of weak and volatile commodity prices and support the efforts of commodity-dependent countries to restructure, diversify and strengthen the competitiveness of their commodity sectors. Quick-impact initiatives 34 Given the need to accelerate progress immediately in countries where current trends make the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals unlikely, we resolve to urgently identify and implement country- led initiatives with adequate international support, consistent with long-term national development strategies, that promise immediate and durable improvements in the lives of people and renewed hope for the achieve- ment of the development goals. In this regard, we will take such actions as the distribution of malaria bed nets, including free distribution, where appropriate, and effective antimalarial treatments, the expansion of local school meal programmes, using home-grown foods where possible, and the elimination of user fees for primary education and, where appropriate, health-care services. Systemic issues and global economic decision-making 35 We reaffirm the commitment to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international economic decision-making and norm-setting, and to that end stress the importance of continuing efforts to reform the international financial architecture, noting that enhancing the voice and participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in the Bretton Woods institutions remains a continuous concern. 36 We reaffirm our commitment to governance, equity and transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are also committed to open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial systems. 37 We also underscore our commitment to sound domestic financial sectors, which make a vital contribution to national development efforts, as an important component of an international financial architecture that is supportive of development. 38 We further reaffirm the need for the United Nations to play a fundamental role in the promotion of interna- tional cooperation for development and the coherence, coordination and implementation of development goals and actions agreed upon by the international community, and we resolve to strengthen coordination within the United Nations system in close cooperation with all other multilateral financial trade and development institu- tions in order to support sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development. 39 Good governance at the international level is fundamental for achieving sustainable development. In order to ensure a dynamic and enabling international economic environment, it is important to promote global economic governance through addressing the international finance, trade, technology and investment patterns that have an impact on the development prospects of developing countries. To this effect, the international community should take all necessary and appropriate measures, including ensuring support for structural and macroeconomic reform, a comprehensive solution to the external debt problem and increasing the market access of developing countries. South-South cooperation 40 We recognize the achievements and great potential of South-South cooperation and encourage the promotion of such cooperation, which complements North-South cooperation as an effective contribution to develop- ment and as a means to share best practices and provide enhanced technical cooperation. In this context, we note the recent decision of the leaders of the South, adopted at the Second South Summit and contained in the Doha Plan of Action and the Doha Declaration, to intensify their efforts at South-South cooperation, including through the establishment of the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership and other regional coop- eration mechanisms, and encourage the international community, including the international financial institu- tions, to support the efforts of developing countries, inter alia, through triangular cooperation. We also take note with appreciation of the launching of the third round of negotiations on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries as an important instrument to stimulate South-South cooperation. 41 We welcome the work of the United Nations High Level Committee on South-South cooperation and invite countries to consider supporting the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation within the United Nations Development Programme in order to respond effectively to the development needs of developing countries. 42 We recognize the considerable contribution of arrangements such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries fund initiated by a group of developing countries, as well as the potential contribution of the South Fund for Development and Humanitarian Assistance, to development activities in developing countries. Education 43 We emphasize the critical role of both formal and informal education in the achievement of poverty eradica- tion and other development goals as envisaged in the Millennium Declaration, in particular basic education and training for eradicating illiteracy, and strive for expanded secondary and higher education as well as voca- 119
  • 130. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 120 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform tional education and technical training, especially for girls and women, the creation of human resources and infrastructure capabilities and the empowerment of those living in poverty. In this context, we reaffirm the Dakar Framework for Action adopted at the World Education Forum in 2000 and recognize the importance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization strategy for the eradication of poverty, especially extreme poverty, in supporting the Education for All programmes as a tool to achieve the millennium development goal of universal primary education by 2015. 44 We reaffirm our commitment to support developing country efforts to ensure that all children have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality, to eliminate gender inequality and imbalance and to renew efforts to improve girls’ education. We also commit ourselves to continuing to support the efforts of developing countries in the implementation of the Education for All initiative, including with enhanced resources of all types through the Education for All fast-track initiative in support of country-led national education plans. 45 We commit ourselves to promoting education for peace and human development. Rural and agricultural development 46 We reaffirm that food security and rural and agricultural development must be adequately and urgently addressed in the context of national development and response strategies and, in this context, will enhance the contributions of indigenous and local communities, as appropriate. We are convinced that the eradication of poverty, hunger and malnutrition, particularly as they affect children, is crucial for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Rural and agricultural development should be an integral part of national and international development policies. We deem it necessary to increase productive investment in rural and agricultural development to achieve food security. We commit ourselves to increasing support for agricultural development and trade capacity-building in the agricultural sector in developing countries. Support for commodity development projects, especially market-based projects, and for their preparation under the Second Account of the Common Fund for Commodities should be encouraged. Employment 47 We strongly support fair globalization and resolve to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies as well as our national development strategies, including poverty reduction strategies, as part of our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. These measures should also encompass the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, as defined in International Labour Organization Convention No. 182, and forced labour. We also resolve to ensure full respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work. Sustainable development: managing and protecting our common environment 48 We reaffirm our commitment to achieve the goal of sustainable development, including through the imple- mentation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. To this end, we commit ourselves to undertaking concrete actions and measures at all levels and to enhancing international cooperation, taking into account the Rio principles. These efforts will also promote the integration of the three components of sustain- able development — economic development, social development and environmental protection — as interde- pendent and mutually reinforcing pillars. Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development are overarching objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development. 49 We will promote sustainable consumption and production patterns, with the developed countries taking the lead and all countries benefiting from the process, as called for in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. In that context, we support developing countries in their efforts to promote a recycling economy. 50 We face serious and multiple challenges in tackling climate change, promoting clean energy, meeting energy needs and achieving sustainable development, and we will act with resolve and urgency in this regard. 51 We recognize that climate change is a serious and long-term challenge that has the potential to affect every part of the globe. We emphasize the need to meet all the commitments and obligations we have undertaken in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and other relevant international agreements, including, for many of us, the Kyoto Protocol. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the appropriate framework for addressing future action on climate change at the global level. 52 We reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate objective of the Convention: to stabilize greenhouse gas concen- trations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 53 We acknowledge that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation and partici- pation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with the principles of the Convention. We are committed to moving forward the global discussion on long-term cooperative action to address climate change, in accordance with these principles. We stress the importance of the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, to be held in Montreal, Canada, in November 2005. 54 We acknowledge various partnerships that are under way to advance action on clean energy and climate change, including bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives. 55 We are committed to taking further action through practical international cooperation, inter alia: (a) To promote innovation, clean energy and energy efficiency and conservation; improve policy, regu- latory and financing frameworks; and accelerate the deployment of cleaner technologies; (b) To enhance private investment, transfer of technologies and capacity-building to developing countries, as called for in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, taking into account their own energy needs and priorities; (c) To assist developing countries to improve their resilience and integrate adaptation goals into their sustainable development strategies, given that adaptation to the effects of climate change due to 120
  • 131. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 121 Annex I: World Summit Outcome both natural and human factors is a high priority for all nations, particularly in those most vulner- able, namely, those referred to in article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; (d) To continue to assist developing countries, in particular small island developing States, least developed countries and African countries, including those that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, in addressing their adaptation needs relating to the adverse effects of climate change. 56 In pursuance of our commitment to achieve sustainable development, we further resolve: (a) To promote the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development and the International Decade for Action, “Water for Life”; (b) To support and strengthen the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, to address causes of desertification and land degradation, as well as poverty resulting from land degradation, through, inter alia, the mobilization of adequate and predictable financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity-building at all levels; (c) That the States parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety should support the implementation of the Convention and the Protocol, as well as other biodiversity-related agreements and the Johannesburg commitment for a significant reduction in the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010. The States parties will continue to negotiate within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. All States will fulfil commitments and significantly reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010 and continue ongoing efforts towards elaborating and negotiating an international regime on access to genetic resources and benefit- sharing; (d) To recognize that the sustainable development of indigenous peoples and their communities is crucial in our fight against hunger and poverty; (e) To reaffirm our commitment, subject to national legislation, to respect, preserve and maintain the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization; (f ) To work expeditiously towards the establishment of a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards with regional nodes, building on existing national and regional capacity such as the newly established Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System; (g) To fully implement the Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 adopted at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, in particular those commitments related to assistance for developing countries that are prone to natural disasters and disaster- stricken States in the transition phase towards sustainable physical, social and economic recovery, for risk-reduction activities in post-disaster recovery and for rehabilitation processes; (h) To assist developing countries’ efforts to prepare integrated water resources management and water efficiency plans as part of their national development strategies and to provide access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation in accordance with the Millennium Declaration and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, including halving by 2015 the proportion of people who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water and who do not have access to basic sanitation; (i) To accelerate the development and dissemination of affordable and cleaner energy efficiency and energy conservation technologies, as well as the transfer of such technologies, in particular to developing countries, on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed, bearing in mind that access to energy facilitates the eradication of poverty; (j) To strengthen the conservation, sustainable management and development of all types of forests for the benefit of current and future generations, including through enhanced international cooperation, so that trees and forests may contribute fully to the achievement of the internation- ally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, taking full account of the linkages between the forest sector and other sectors. We look forward to the discussions at the sixth session of the United Nations Forum on Forests; (k) To promote the sound management of chemicals and hazardous wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, aiming to achieve that by 2020 chemicals are used and produced in ways that lead to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment using transparent and science- based risk assessment and risk management procedures, by adopting and implementing a voluntary strategic approach to international management of chemicals, and to support devel- oping countries in strengthening their capacity for the sound management of chemicals and hazardous wastes by providing technical and financial assistance, as appropriate; (l) To improve cooperation and coordination at all levels in order to address issues related to oceans and seas in an integrated manner and promote integrated management and sustainable develop- ment of the oceans and seas; (m) To achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020, recognizing the urgent need for the provision of increased resources for affordable housing and housing-related infrastructure, prioritizing slum prevention and slum upgrading, and to encourage support for the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation and its Slum Upgrading Facility; (n) To acknowledge the invaluable role of the Global Environment Facility in facilitating coopera- tion with developing countries; we look forward to a successful replenishment this year along with the successful conclusion of all outstanding commitments from the third replenishment; 121
  • 132. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 122 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform (o) To note that cessation of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of small island developing States is an ultimate desired goal of small island developing States and some other countries and recognize the right of freedom of navigation in accordance with interna- tional law. States should maintain dialogue and consultation, in particular under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization, with the aim of improved mutual understanding, confidence-building and enhanced communication in relation to the safe maritime transport of radioactive materials. States involved in the transport of such materials are urged to continue to engage in dialogue with small island developing States and other States to address their concerns. These concerns include the further development and strengthening, within the appropriate fora, of international regulatory regimes to enhance safety, disclosure, liability, security and compensation in relation to such transport. HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other health issues 57 We recognize that HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases pose severe risks for the entire world and serious challenges to the achievement of development goals. We acknowledge the substantial efforts and financial contributions made by the international community, while recognizing that these diseases and other emerging health challenges require a sustained international response. To this end, we commit ourselves to: (a) Increasing investment, building on existing mechanisms and through partnership, to improve health systems in developing countries and those with economies in transition with the aim of providing sufficient health workers, infrastructure, management systems and supplies to achieve the health-related Millennium Development Goals by 2015; (b) Implementing measures to increase the capacity of adults and adolescents to protect themselves from the risk of HIV infection; (c) Fully implementing all commitments established by the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS through stronger leadership, the scaling up of a comprehensive response to achieve broad multisectoral coverage for prevention, care, treatment and support, the mobilization of additional resources from national, bilateral, multilateral and private sources and the substantial funding of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as well as of the HIV/AIDS component of the work programmes of the United Nations system agencies and programmes engaged in the fight against HIV/AIDS; (d) Developing and implementing a package for HIV prevention, treatment and care with the aim of coming as close as possible to the goal of universal access to treatment by 2010 for all those who need it, including through increased resources, and working towards the elimination of stigma and discrimination, enhanced access to affordable medicines and the reduction of vulner- ability of persons affected by HIV/AIDS and other health issues, in particular orphaned and vulnerable children and older persons; (e) Ensuring the full implementation of our obligations under the International Health Regulations adopted by the fifty-eighth World Health Assembly in May 2005, including the need to support the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network of the World Health Organization; (f ) Working actively to implement the “Three Ones” principles in all countries, including by ensuring that multiple institutions and international partners all work under one agreed HIV/AIDS framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners, with one national AIDS coordinating authority having a broad-based multisectoral mandate, and under one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system. We welcome and support the important recommendations of the Global Task Team on Improving AIDS Coordination among Multilateral Institutions and International Donors; (g) Achieving universal access to reproductive health by 2015, as set out at the International Conference on Population and Development, integrating this goal in strategies to attain the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, aimed at reducing maternal mortality, improving maternal health, reducing child mortality, promoting gender equality, combating HIV/AIDS and eradicating poverty; (h) Promoting long-term funding, including public-private partnerships where appropriate, for academic and industrial research as well as for the development of new vaccines and microbi- cides, diagnostic kits, drugs and treatments to address major pandemics, tropical diseases and other diseases, such as avian flu and severe acute respiratory syndrome, and taking forward work on market incentives where appropriate through such mechanisms as advance purchase commit- ments; (i) Stressing the need to urgently address malaria and tuberculosis, in particular in the most affected countries, and welcoming the scaling up of all efforts in this regard of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Gender equality and empowerment of women 58 We remain convinced that progress for women is progress for all. We reaffirm that the full and effective implementation of the goals and objectives of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly is an essential contribution to achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, and we resolve to promote gender equality and eliminate pervasive gender discrimination by: (a) Eliminating gender inequalities in primary and secondary education by the earliest possible date and at all educational levels by 2015; (b) Guaranteeing the free and equal right of women to own and inherit property and ensuring secure tenure of property and housing by women; (c) Ensuring equal access to reproductive health; 122
  • 133. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 123 Annex I: World Summit Outcome (d) Promoting women’s equal access to labour markets, sustainable employment and adequate labour protection; (e) Ensuring equal access of women to productive assets and resources, including land, credit and technology; (f ) Eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence against women and the girl child, including by ending impunity and by ensuring the protection of civilians, in particular women and the girl child, during and after armed conflicts in accordance with the obligations of States under inter- national humanitarian law and international human rights law; (g) Promoting increased representation of women in Government decision-making bodies, including through ensuring their equal opportunity to participate fully in the political process. 59 We recognize the importance of gender mainstreaming as a tool for achieving gender equality. To that end, we undertake to actively promote the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, and further undertake to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations system in the area of gender. Science and technology for development 60 We recognize that science and technology, including information and communication technology, are vital for the achievement of the development goals and that international support can help developing countries to benefit from technological advancements and enhance their productive capacity. We therefore commit ourselves to: (a) Strengthening and enhancing existing mechanisms and supporting initiatives for research and development, including through voluntary partnerships between the public and private sectors, to address the special needs of developing countries in the areas of health, agriculture, conserva- tion, sustainable use of natural resources and environmental management, energy, forestry and the impact of climate change; (b) Promoting and facilitating, as appropriate, access to and the development, transfer and diffusion of technologies, including environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how, to developing countries; (c) Assisting developing countries in their efforts to promote and develop national strategies for human resources and science and technology, which are primary drivers of national capacity- building for development; (d) Promoting and supporting greater efforts to develop renewable sources of energy, such as solar, wind and geothermal; (e) Implementing policies at the national and international levels to attract both public and private investment, domestic and foreign, that enhances knowledge, transfers technology on mutually agreed terms and raises productivity; (f ) Supporting the efforts of developing countries, individually and collectively, to harness new agri- cultural technologies in order to increase agricultural productivity through environmentally sustainable means; (g) Building a people-centred and inclusive information society so as to enhance digital opportuni- ties for all people in order to help bridge the digital divide, putting the potential of information and communication technologies at the service of development and addressing new challenges of the information society by implementing the outcomes of the Geneva phase of the World Summit on the Information Society and ensuring the success of the second phase of the Summit, to be held in Tunis in November 2005; in this regard, we welcome the establishment of the Digital Solidarity Fund and encourage voluntary contribution to its financing. Migration and development 61 We acknowledge the important nexus between international migration and development and the need to deal with the challenges and opportunities that migration presents to countries of origin, destination and transit. We recognize that international migration brings benefits as well as challenges to the global community. We look forward to the high-level dialogue of the General Assembly on international migration and development to be held in 2006, which will offer an opportunity to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize their development benefits and minimize their negative impacts. 62 We reaffirm our resolve to take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and members of their families. 63 We reaffirm the need to adopt policies and undertake measures to reduce the cost of transferring migrant remittances to developing countries and welcome efforts by Governments and stakeholders in this regard. Countries with special needs 64 We reaffirm our commitment to address the special needs of the least developed countries and urge all countries and all relevant organizations of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institu- tions, to make concerted efforts and adopt speedy measures for meeting in a timely manner the goals and targets of the Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010. 65 We recognize the special needs of and challenges faced by landlocked developing countries and therefore reaffirm our commitment to urgently address those needs and challenges through the full, timely and effective implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action and the São Paulo Consensus adopted at the eleventh session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. We encourage the work undertaken by United Nations regional commissions and organizations towards establishing a time-cost methodology for indicators to measure the progress in implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action. We also recognize 123
  • 134. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 124 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform the special difficulties and concerns of landlocked developing countries in their efforts to integrate their economies into the multilateral trading system. In this regard, priority should be given to the full and timely implementation of the Almaty Declaration and the Almaty Programme of Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked Developing Countries within a New Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries. 66 We recognize the special needs and vulnerabilities of small island developing States and reaffirm our commit- ment to take urgent and concrete action to address those needs and vulnerabilities through the full and effective implementation of the Mauritius Strategy adopted by the International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, the Barbados Programme of Action and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly. We further undertake to promote greater international cooperation and partnership for the implementation of the Mauritius Strategy through, inter alia, the mobilization of domestic and international resources, the promotion of international trade as an engine for development and increased international financial and technical cooperation. 67 We emphasize the need for continued, coordinated and effective international support for achieving the devel- opment goals in countries emerging from conflict and in those recovering from natural disasters. Meeting the special needs of Africa 68 We welcome the substantial progress made by the African countries in fulfilling their commitments and emphasize the need to carry forward the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development to promote sustainable growth and development and deepen democracy, human rights, good governance and sound economic management and gender equality and encourage African countries, with the participation of civil society and the private sector, to continue their efforts in this regard by developing and strengthening institutions for governance and the development of the region, and also welcome the recent decisions taken by Africa’s partners, including the Group of Eight and the European Union, in support of Africa’s development efforts, including commitments that will lead to an increase in official development assistance to Africa of $25 billion per year by 2010. We reaffirm our commitment to address the special needs of Africa, which is the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the Millennium Declaration by 2015, to enable it to enter the mainstream of the world economy, and resolve: (a) To strengthen cooperation with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development by providing coherent support for the programmes drawn up by African leaders within that framework, including by mobilizing internal and external financial resources and facilitating approval of such programmes by the multilateral financial institutions; (b) To support the African commitment to ensure that by 2015 all children have access to complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality, as well as to basic health care; (c) To support the building of an international infrastructure consortium involving the African Union, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development as the main framework, to facilitate public and private infrastructure investment in Africa; (d) To promote a comprehensive and durable solution to the external debt problems of African countries, including through the cancellation of 100 per cent of multilateral debt consistent with the recent Group of Eight proposal for the heavily indebted poor countries, and, on a case-by- case basis, where appropriate, significant debt relief, including, inter alia, cancellation or restruc- turing for heavily indebted African countries not part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative that have unsustainable debt burdens; (e) To make efforts to fully integrate African countries in the international trading system, including through targeted trade capacity-building programmes; (f ) To support the efforts of commodity-dependent African countries to restructure, diversify and strengthen the competitiveness of their commodity sectors and decide to work towards market- based arrangements with the participation of the private sector for commodity price-risk management; (g) To supplement the efforts of African countries, individually and collectively, to increase agricul- tural productivity, in a sustainable way, as set out in the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development as part of an African “Green Revolution”; (h) To encourage and support the initiatives of the African Union and subregional organizations to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts with the assistance of the United Nations, and in this regard welcomes the proposals from the Group of Eight countries to provide support for African peacekeeping; (i) To provide, with the aim of an AIDS-, malaria- and tuberculosis-free generation in Africa, assis- tance for prevention and care and to come as close as possible to achieving the goal of universal access by 2010 to HIV/AIDS treatment in African countries, to encourage pharmaceutical companies to make drugs, including antiretroviral drugs, affordable and accessible in Africa and to ensure increased bilateral and multilateral assistance, where possible on a grant basis, to combat malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases in Africa through the strengthening of health systems. III. PEACE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 69 We recognize that we are facing a whole range of threats that require our urgent, collective and more deter- mined response. 70 We also recognize that, in accordance with the Charter, addressing such threats requires cooperation among all the principal organs of the United Nations within their respective mandates. 124
  • 135. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 125 Annex I: World Summit Outcome 71 We acknowledge that we are living in an interdependent and global world and that many of today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are interlinked and must be tackled at the global, regional and national levels in accordance with the Charter and international law. 72 We therefore reaffirm our commitment to work towards a security consensus based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no State can best protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and efficient collec- tive security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Charter. Pacific settlement of disputes 73 We emphasize the obligation of States to settle their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, including, when appropriate, by the use of the International Court of Justice. All States should act in accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter. 74 We stress the importance of prevention of armed conflict in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and solemnly renew our commitment to promote a culture of prevention of armed conflict as a means of effectively addressing the interconnected security and development challenges faced by peoples throughout the world, as well as to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for the prevention of armed conflict. 75 We further stress the importance of a coherent and integrated approach to the prevention of armed conflicts and the settlement of disputes and the need for the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretary-General to coordinate their activities within their respective Charter mandates. 76 Recognizing the important role of the good offices of the Secretary-General, including in the mediation of disputes, we support the Secretary-General’s efforts to strengthen his capacity in this area. Use of force under the Charter 77 We reiterate the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. We reaffirm that one of the purposes and principles guiding the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, and to that end we are deter- mined to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. 78 We reiterate the importance of promoting and strengthening the multilateral process and of addressing inter- national challenges and problems by strictly abiding by the Charter and the principles of international law, and further stress our commitment to multilateralism. 79 We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security. We stress the importance of acting in accor- dance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 80 We also reaffirm that the Security Council has primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. We also note the role of the General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. Terrorism 81 We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. 82 We welcome the Secretary-General’s identification of elements of a counterterrorism strategy. These elements should be developed by the General Assembly without delay with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and inter- national levels, to counter terrorism, which also takes into account the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. In this context, we commend the various initiatives to promote dialogue, tolerance and under- standing among civilizations. 83 We stress the need to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. 84 We acknowledge that the question of convening a high-level conference under the auspices of the United Nations to formulate an international response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations could be considered. 85 We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity with interna- tional law, including the Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. 86 We reiterate our call upon States to refrain from organizing, financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities and to take appropriate measures to ensure that their territories are not used for such activities. 87 We acknowledge the important role played by the United Nations in combating terrorism and also stress the vital contribution of regional and bilateral cooperation, particularly at the practical level of law enforcement cooperation and technical exchange. 88 We urge the international community, including the United Nations, to assist States in building national and regional capacity to combat terrorism. We invite the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the General 125
  • 136. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 126 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform Assembly and the Security Council, within their respective mandates, to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and to enhance the coordination of United Nations activities in this regard. 89 We stress the importance of assisting victims of terrorism and of providing them and their families with support to cope with their loss and their grief. 90 We encourage the Security Council to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in counter-terrorism, including by consolidating State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies. We are committed to cooperating fully with the three competent subsidiary bodies in the fulfilment of their tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions. 91 We support efforts for the early entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and strongly encourage States to consider becoming parties to it expeditiously and acceding without delay to the twelve other international conventions and protocols against terrorism and implementing them. Peacekeeping 92 Recognizing that United Nations peacekeeping plays a vital role in helping parties to conflict end hostilities and commending the contribution of United Nations peacekeepers in that regard, noting improvements made in recent years in United Nations peacekeeping, including the deployment of integrated missions in complex situations, and stressing the need to mount operations with adequate capacity to counter hostilities and fulfil effectively their mandates, we urge further development of proposals for enhanced rapidly deploy- able capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations in crises. We endorse the creation of an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity to provide coherent, effective and responsive start-up capability for the policing component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise. 93 Recognizing the important contribution to peace and security by regional organizations as provided for under Chapter VIII of the Charter and the importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations, and noting in particular, given the special needs of Africa, the importance of a strong African Union: (a) We support the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements; (b) We support the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union. 94 We support implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. 95 We urge States parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to fully implement their respective obligations. We call upon States in a position to do so to provide greater technical assistance to mine-affected States. 96 We underscore the importance of the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s adviser on sexual exploita- tion and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel, and urge that those measures adopted in the relevant General Assembly resolutions based upon the recommendations mentioned above be fully imple- mented without delay. Peacebuilding 97 Emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Nations in that regard, we decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body. 98 The main purpose of the Peacebuilding Commission is to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. In addition, it should provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery. The Commission should act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members. 99 The Peacebuilding Commission should make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions. The Peacebuilding Commission should submit an annual report to the General Assembly. 100 The Peacebuilding Commission should meet in various configurations. Country-specific meetings of the Commission, upon invitation of the Organizational Committee referred to in paragraph 101 below, should include as members, in addition to members of the Organizational Committee, representatives from: (a) The country under consideration; (b) Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations; (c) The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort; (d) The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations repre- sentatives; (e) Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant. 126
  • 137. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 127 Annex I: World Summit Outcome 101 The Peacebuilding Commission should have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for devel- oping its procedures and organizational matters, comprising: (a) Members of the Security Council, including permanent members; (b) Members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups, giving due consid- eration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery; (c) Top providers of assessed contributions to the United Nations budgets and voluntary contribu- tions to the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including the standing Peacebuilding Fund, that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above. (d) Top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above. 102 Representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors should be invited to participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements, in addition to a representative of the Secretary-General. 103 We request the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments. The objec- tives of the Peacebuilding Fund will include ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery. 104 We also request the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat and from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission. The office should draw on the best expertise available. 105 The Peacebuilding Commission should begin its work no later than 31 December 2005. Sanctions 106 We underscore that sanctions remain an important tool under the Charter in our efforts to maintain inter- national peace and security without recourse to the use of force, and resolve to ensure that sanctions are carefully targeted in support of clear objectives, to comply with sanctions established by the Security Council and to ensure that sanctions are implemented in ways that balance effectiveness to achieve the desired results against the possible adverse consequences, including socio-economic and humanitarian consequences, for populations and third States. 107 Sanctions should be implemented and monitored effectively with clear benchmarks and should be periodically reviewed, as appropriate, and remain for as limited a period as necessary to achieve the objectives of the sanctions and should be terminated once their objectives have been achieved. 108 We call upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to improve its monitoring of the implementation and effects of sanctions, to ensure that sanctions are implemented in an accountable manner, to review regularly the results of such monitoring and to develop a mechanism to address special economic problems arising from the application of sanctions in accordance with the Charter. 109 We also call upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions. 110 We support efforts through the United Nations to strengthen State capacity to implement sanctions provisions. Transnational crime 111 We express our grave concern at the negative effects on development, peace and security and human rights posed by transnational crime, including the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings, the world narcotic drug problem and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and at the increasing vulnerability of States to such crime. We reaffirm the need to work collectively to combat transnational crime. 112 We recognize that trafficking in persons continues to pose a serious challenge to humanity and requires a concerted international response. To that end, we urge all States to devise, enforce and strengthen effective measures to combat and eliminate all forms of trafficking in persons to counter the demand for trafficked victims and to protect the victims. 113 We urge all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the relevant international conven- tions on organized crime and corruption and, following their entry into force, for them to implement them effectively, including by incorporating the provisions of those conventions into national legislation and by strengthening criminal justice systems. 114 We reaffirm our unwavering determination and commitment to overcome the world narcotic drug problem through international cooperation and national strategies to eliminate both the illicit supply of and demand for illicit drugs. 115 We resolve to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, within its existing mandates, to provide assistance to Member States in those tasks upon request. Women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts 116 We stress the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. We also underline the importance of integrating a gender perspective and of women having the opportunity for equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, as well as the need to increase their role in decision-making at all levels. We strongly condemn all violations of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and the use of sexual exploitation, violence and abuse, and we commit ourselves to elaborating and implementing strategies to report on, prevent and punish gender-based violence. Protecting children in situations of armed conflicts 117 We reaffirm our commitment to promote and protect the rights and welfare of children in armed conflicts. We welcome the significant advances and innovations that have been achieved over the past several years. We 127
  • 138. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 128 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform welcome in particular the adoption of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). We call upon States to consider ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. We also call upon States to take effective measures, as appropriate, to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, contrary to international law, by armed forces and groups, and to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 118 We therefore call upon all States concerned to take concrete measures to ensure accountability and compliance by those responsible for grave abuses against children. We also reaffirm our commitment to ensure that children in armed conflicts receive timely and effective humanitarian assistance, including education, for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 119 We recommit ourselves to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule of law and democracy and recognize that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations, and call upon all parts of the United Nations to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their mandates. 120 We reaffirm the solemn commitment of our States to fulfil their obligations to promote universal respect for and the observance and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments relating to human rights and interna- tional law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question. Human rights 121 We reaffirm that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually rein- forcing and that all human rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 122 We emphasize the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 123 We resolve further to strengthen the United Nations human rights machinery with the aim of ensuring effective enjoyment by all of all human rights and civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. 124 We resolve to strengthen the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, taking note of the High Commissioner’s plan of action, to enable it to effectively carry out its mandate to respond to the broad range of human rights challenges facing the international community, particularly in the areas of technical assistance and capacity-building, through the doubling of its regular budget resources over the next five years with a view to progressively setting a balance between regular budget and voluntary contributions to its resources, keeping in mind other priority programmes for developing countries and the recruitment of highly competent staff on a broad geographical basis and with gender balance, under the regular budget, and we support its closer cooperation with all relevant United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council. 125 We resolve to improve the effectiveness of the human rights treaty bodies, including through more timely reporting, improved and streamlined reporting procedures and technical assistance to States to enhance their reporting capacities and further enhance the implementation of their recommendations. 126 We resolve to integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into national policies and to support the further mainstreaming of human rights throughout the United Nations system, as well as closer coopera- tion between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and all relevant United Nations bodies. 127 We reaffirm our commitment to continue making progress in the advancement of the human rights of the world’s indigenous peoples at the local, national, regional and international levels, including through consulta- tion and collaboration with them, and to present for adoption a final draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples as soon as possible. 128 We recognize the need to pay special attention to the human rights of women and children and undertake to advance them in every possible way, including by bringing gender and child-protection perspectives into the human rights agenda. 129 We recognize the need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed full enjoyment of their rights without discrimination. We also affirm the need to finalize a comprehensive draft convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. 130 We note that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to political and social stability and peace and enrich the cultural diversity and heritage of society. 131 We support the promotion of human rights education and learning at all levels, including through the imple- mentation of the World Programme for Human Rights Education, as appropriate, and encourage all States to develop initiatives in this regard. Internally displaced persons 132 We recognize the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons and resolve to take effective measures to increase the protection of internally displaced persons. 128
  • 139. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 129 Annex I: World Summit Outcome Refugee protection and assistance 133 We commit ourselves to safeguarding the principle of refugee protection and to upholding our responsibility in resolving the plight of refugees, including through the support of efforts aimed at addressing the causes of refugee movement, bringing about the safe and sustainable return of those populations, finding durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations and preventing refugee movement from becoming a source of tension among States. We reaffirm the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing and resolve to support nations in assisting refugee populations and their host communities. Rule of law 134 Recognizing the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international levels, we: (a) Reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law and to an international order based on the rule of law and international law, which is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States; (b) Support the annual treaty event; (c) Encourage States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to all treaties that relate to the protection of civilians; (d) Call upon States to continue their efforts to eradicate policies and practices that discriminate against women and to adopt laws and promote practices that protect the rights of women and promote gender equality; (e) Support the idea of establishing a rule of law assistance unit within the Secretariat, in accor- dance with existing relevant procedures, subject to a report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, so as to strengthen United Nations activities to promote the rule of law, including through technical assistance and capacity-building; (f ) Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, in adjudicating disputes among States and the value of its work, call upon States that have not yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with its Statute and consider means of strengthening the Court’s work, including by supporting the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice on a voluntary basis. Democracy 135 We reaffirm that democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. We also reaffirm that while democracies share common features, there is no single model of democracy, that it does not belong to any country or region, and reaffirm the necessity of due respect for sovereignty and the right of self-determination. We stress that democracy, development and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 136 We renew our commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’ capacity to implement the prin- ciples and practices of democracy and resolve to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to assist Member States upon their request. We welcome the establishment of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations. We note that the advisory board to be established should reflect diverse geographical representation. We invite the Secretary-General to help ensure that practical arrangements for the Democracy Fund take proper account of existing United Nations activity in this field. 137 We invite interested Member States to give serious consideration to contributing to the Fund. Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 138 Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accor- dance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139 The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-bycase basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140 We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. Children’s rights 141 We express dismay at the increasing number of children involved in and affected by armed conflict, as well as all other forms of violence, including domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation and trafficking. We 129
  • 140. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 130 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform support cooperation policies aimed at strengthening national capacities to improve the situation of those children and to assist in their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 142 We commit ourselves to respecting and ensuring the rights of each child without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status of the child or his or her parent(s) or legal guardian(s). We call upon States to consider as a priority becoming a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Human security 143 We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly. Culture of peace and initiatives on dialogue among cultures, civilizations and religions 144 We reaffirm the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace as well as the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations and its Programme of Action adopted by the General Assembly and the value of different initiatives on dialogue among cultures and civilizations, including the dialogue on interfaith cooperation. We commit ourselves to taking action to promote a culture of peace and dialogue at the local, national, regional and international levels and request the Secretary-General to explore enhancing implemen- tation mechanisms and to follow up on those initiatives. In this regard, we also welcome the Alliance of Civilizations initiative announced by the Secretary-General on 14 July 2005. 145 We underline that sports can foster peace and development and can contribute to an atmosphere of tolerance and understanding, and we encourage discussions in the General Assembly for proposals leading to a plan of action on sport and development. V. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS 146 We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen the United Nations with a view to enhancing its authority and efficiency, as well as its capacity to address effectively, and in accordance with the purposes and principles of its Charter, the full range of challenges of our time. We are determined to reinvigorate the intergovernmental organs of the United Nations and to adapt them to the needs of the twenty-first century. 147 We stress that, in order to efficiently perform their respective mandates as provided under the Charter, United Nations bodies should develop good cooperation and coordination in the common endeavour of building a more effective United Nations. 148 We emphasize the need to provide the United Nations with adequate and timely resources with a view to enabling it to carry out its mandates. A reformed United Nations must be responsive to the entire member- ship, faithful to its founding principles and adapted to carrying out its mandate. General Assembly 149 We reaffirm the central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policymaking and repre- sentative organ of the United Nations, as well as the role of the Assembly in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. 150 We welcome the measures adopted by the General Assembly with a view to strengthening its role and authority and the role and leadership of the President of the Assembly and, to that end, we call for their full and speedy implementation. 151 We call for strengthening the relationship between the General Assembly and the other principal organs to ensure better coordination on topical issues that require coordinated action by the United Nations, in accor- dance with their respective mandates. Security Council 152 We reaffirm that Member States have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the main- tenance of international peace and security, acting on their behalf, as provided for by the Charter of the United Nations. 153 We support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. We commit ourselves to continuing our efforts to achieve a decision to this end and request the General Assembly to review progress on the reform set out above by the end of 2005. 154 We recommend that the Security Council continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the involve- ment of States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance its accountability to the membership and increase the transparency of its work. Economic and Social Council 155 We reaffirm the role that the Charter and the General Assembly have vested in the Economic and Social Council and recognize the need for a more effective Economic and Social Council as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development, as well as for implementation of the international development goals agreed at the major United Nations summits and confer- ences, including the Millennium Development Goals. To achieve these objectives, the Council should: (a) Promote global dialogue and partnership on global policies and trends in the economic, social, environmental and humanitarian fields. For this purpose, the Council should serve as a quality 130
  • 141. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 131 Annex I: World Summit Outcome platform for high-level engagement among Member States and with the international financial institutions, the private sector and civil society on emerging global trends, policies and action and develop its ability to respond better and more rapidly to developments in the international economic, environmental and social fields; (b) Hold a biennial high-level Development Cooperation Forum to review trends in international development cooperation, including strategies, policies and financing, promote greater coherence among the development activities of different development partners and strengthen the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations; (c) Ensure follow-up of the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits, including the internationally agreed development goals, and hold annual ministerial-level substantive reviews to assess progress, drawing on its functional and regional commissions and other international institutions, in accordance with their respective mandates; (d) Support and complement international efforts aimed at addressing humanitarian emergencies, including natural disasters, in order to promote an improved, coordinated response from the United Nations; (e) Play a major role in the overall coordination of funds, programmes and agencies, ensuring coherence among them and avoiding duplication of mandates and activities. 156 We stress that in order to fully perform the above functions, the organization of work, the agenda and the current methods of work of the Economic and Social Council should be adapted. Human Rights Council 157 Pursuant to our commitment to further strengthen the United Nations human rights machinery, we resolve to create a Human Rights Council. 158 The Council will be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner. 159 The Council should address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make recommendations thereon. It should also promote effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system. 160 We request the President of the General Assembly to conduct open, transparent and inclusive negotiations, to be completed as soon as possible during the sixtieth session, with the aim of establishing the mandate, modali- ties, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods and procedures of the Council. Secretariat and management reform 161 We recognize that in order to effectively comply with the principles and objectives of the Charter, we need an efficient, effective and accountable Secretariat. Its staff shall act in accordance with Article 100 of the Charter, in a culture of organizational accountability, transparency and integrity. Consequently we: (a) Recognize the ongoing reform measures carried out by the Secretary-General to strengthen accountability and oversight, improve management performance and transparency and reinforce ethical conduct, and invite him to report to the General Assembly on the progress made in their implementation; (b) Emphasize the importance of establishing effective and efficient mechanisms for responsibility and accountability of the Secretariat; (c) Urge the Secretary-General to ensure that the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity shall be the paramount consideration in the employment of the staff, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter; (d) Welcome the Secretary-General’s efforts to ensure ethical conduct, more extensive financial disclosure for United Nations officials and enhanced protection for those who reveal wrong- doing within the Organization. We urge the Secretary-General to scrupulously apply the existing standards of conduct and develop a system-wide code of ethics for all United Nations personnel. In this regard, we request the Secretary-General to submit details on an ethics office with independent status, which he intends to create, to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; (e) Pledge to provide the United Nations with adequate resources, on a timely basis, to enable the Organization to implement its mandates and achieve its objectives, having regard to the priori- ties agreed by the General Assembly and the need to respect budget discipline. We stress that all Member States should meet their obligations with regard to the expenses of the Organization; (f ) Strongly urge the Secretary-General to make the best and most efficient use of resources in accordance with clear rules and procedures agreed by the General Assembly, in the interest of all Member States, by adopting the best management practices, including effective use of informa- tion and communication technologies, with a view to increasing efficiency and enhancing orga- nizational capacity, concentrating on those tasks that reflect the agreed priorities of the Organization. 162 We reaffirm the role of the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, in accor- dance with Article 97 of the Charter. We request the Secretary-General to make proposals to the General Assembly for its consideration on the conditions and measures necessary for him to carry out his managerial responsibilities effectively. 163 We commend the Secretary-General’s previous and ongoing efforts to enhance the effective management of the United Nations and his commitment to update the Organization. Bearing in mind our responsibility as Member States, we emphasize the need to decide on additional reforms in order to make more efficient use of the financial and human resources available to the Organization and thus better comply with its principles, objectives and mandates. We call on the Secretary-General to submit proposals for implementing management reforms to the General Assembly for consideration and decision in the first quarter of 2006, which will include the following elements: 131
  • 142. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 132 In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform (a) We will ensure that the United Nations budgetary, financial and human resource policies, regu- lations and rules respond to the current needs of the Organization and enable the efficient and effective conduct of its work, and request the Secretary-General to provide an assessment and recommendations to the General Assembly for decision during the first quarter of 2006. The assessment and recommendations of the Secretary-General should take account of the measures already under way for the reform of human resources management and the budget process; (b) We resolve to strengthen and update the programme of work of the United Nations so that it responds to the contemporary requirements of Member States. To this end, the General Assembly and other relevant organs will review all mandates older than five years originating from resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs, which would be complementary to the existing periodic reviews of activities. The General Assembly and the other organs should complete and take the necessary decisions arising from this review during 2006. We request the Secretary-General to facil- itate this review with analysis and recommendations, including on the opportunities for program- matic shifts that could be considered for early General Assembly consideration; (c) A detailed proposal on the framework for a one-time staff buyout to improve personnel structure and quality, including an indication of costs involved and mechanisms to ensure that it achieves its intended purpose. 164 We recognize the urgent need to substantially improve the United Nations oversight and management processes. We emphasize the importance of ensuring the operational independence of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Therefore: (a) The expertise, capacity and resources of the Office of Internal Oversight Services in respect of audit and investigations will be significantly strengthened as a matter of urgency; (b) We request the Secretary-General to submit an independent external evaluation of the United Nations, including the specialized agencies’, auditing and oversight system, including the roles and responsibilities of management, with due regard to the nature of the auditing and oversight bodies in question. This evaluation will take place within the context of the comprehensive review of the governance arrangements. We ask the General Assembly to adopt measures during its sixtieth session at the earliest possible stage, based on the consideration of recommendations of the evaluation and those made by the Secretary-General; (c) We recognize that additional measures are needed to enhance the independence of the oversight structures. We therefore request the Secretary-General to submit detailed proposals to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session for its early consideration on the creation of an inde- pendent oversight advisory committee, including its mandate, composition, selection process and qualification of experts; (d) We authorize the Office of Internal Oversight Services to examine the feasibility of expanding its services to provide internal oversight to United Nations agencies that request such services in such a way as to ensure that the provision of internal oversight services to the Secretariat will not be compromised. 165 We insist on the highest standards of behaviour from all United Nations personnel and support the consider- able efforts under way with respect to the implementation of the Secretary-General’s policy of zero tolerance regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel, both at Headquarters and in the field. We encourage the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the General Assembly leading to a comprehensive approach to victims’ assistance by 31 December 2005. 166 We encourage the Secretary-General and all decision-making bodies to take further steps in mainstreaming a gender perspective in the policies and decisions of the Organization. 167 We strongly condemn all attacks against the safety and security of personnel engaged in United Nations activ- ities. We call upon States to consider becoming parties to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and stress the need to conclude negotiations on a protocol expanding the scope of legal protection during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. System-wide coherence 168 We recognize that the United Nations brings together a unique wealth of expertise and resources on global issues. We commend the extensive experience and expertise of the various development-related organizations, agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system in their diverse and complementary fields of activity and their important contributions to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the other development objectives established by various United Nations conferences. 169 We support stronger system-wide coherence by implementing the following measures: Policy • Strengthening linkages between the normative work of the United Nations system and its oper- ational activities • Coordinating our representation on the governing boards of the various development and humanitarian agencies so as to ensure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system • Ensuring that the main horizontal policy themes, such as sustainable development, human rights and gender, are taken into account in decision-making throughout the United Nations Operational activities • Implementing current reforms aimed at a more effective, efficient, coherent, coordinated and better-performing United Nations country presence with a strengthened role for the senior resident official, whether special representative, resident coordinator or humanitarian coordi- nator, including appropriate authority, resources and accountability, and a common management, programming and monitoring framework • Inviting the Secretary-General to launch work to further strengthen the management and coor- dination of United Nations operational activities so that they can make an even more effective 132
  • 143. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 133 Annex I: World Summit Outcome contribution to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, including proposals for consideration of Member States for more tightly managed entities in the field of development, humanitarian assistance and the envi- ronment Humanitarian assistance • Upholding and respecting the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and ensuring that humanitarian actors have safe and unhindered access to populations in need in conformity with the relevant provisions of international law and national laws • Supporting the efforts of countries, in particular developing countries, to strengthen their capac- ities at all levels in order to prepare for and respond rapidly to natural disasters and mitigate their impact • Strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations humanitarian response, inter alia, by improving the timeliness and predictability of humanitarian funding, in part by improving the Central Emergency Revolving Fund • Further developing and improving, as required, mechanisms for the use of emergency standby capacities, under the auspices of the United Nations, for a timely response to humanitarian emergencies Environmental activities • Recognizing the need for more efficient environmental activities in the United Nations system, with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, strengthened scientific knowledge, assessment and cooperation, better treaty compliance, while respecting the legal autonomy of the treaties, and better integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework at the operational level, including through capacity- building, we agree to explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to address this need, including a more integrated structure, building on existing institutions and internationally agreed instruments, as well as the treaty bodies and the specialized agencies Regional organizations 170 We support a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, and therefore resolve: (a) To expand consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subre- gional organizations through formalized agreements between the respective secretariats and, as appropriate, involvement of regional organizations in the work of the Security Council; (b) To ensure that regional organizations that have a capacity for the prevention of armed conflict or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacity in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System; (c) To strengthen cooperation in the areas of economic, social and cultural fields. Cooperation between the United Nations and parliaments 171 We call for strengthened cooperation between the United Nations and national and regional parliaments, in particular through the Inter-Parliamentary Union, with a view to furthering all aspects of the Millennium Declaration in all fields of the work of the United Nations and ensuring the effective implementation of United Nations reform. Participation of local authorities, the private sector and civil society, including non-governmental organizations 172 We welcome the positive contributions of the private sector and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in the promotion and implementation of development and human rights programmes and stress the importance of their continued engagement with Governments, the United Nations and other international organizations in these key areas. 173 We underline the important role of local authorities in contributing to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. 174 We encourage responsible business practices, such as those promoted by the Global Compact. 175 We welcome the dialogue between those organizations and Member States, as reflected in the first informal interactive hearings of the General Assembly with representatives of non-governmental organizations, civil society and the private sector. Charter of the United Nations 176 Considering that the Trusteeship Council no longer meets and has no remaining functions, we should delete Chapter XIII of the Charter and references to the Council in Chapter XII. 177 Taking into account General Assembly resolution 50/52 and recalling the related discussions conducted in the General Assembly, bearing in mind the profound cause for the founding of the United Nations and looking to our common future, we resolve to delete references to “enemy States” in Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the Charter. 178 We request the Security Council to consider the composition, mandate and working methods of the Military Staff Committee. 133
  • 144. una report text FINAL.qxd 10/11/2005 16:59 Page 134 Annex II: list of public events FCO-UNA National and Regional Public Debates on UN Reform 2005 Date City Venue Keynote Speaker 10 March London Foreign and Commonwealth Office Bill Rammell MP Former FCO Minister with responsibility for the UN 15 March Cambridge University of Cambridge Lord David Hannay Former UK Ambassador to the UN & member of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 17 March Leeds Leeds Council Chambers Bill Rammell MP FCO Minister with responsibility for the UN 19 May Birmingham Birmingham & Midland Institute Sir Emyr Jones Parry UK Ambassador to the UN 1 June Edinburgh Scottish Parliament Tim Morris Head of International Organisations Department, FCO 13 June Belfast Malone House Alistair Harrison Former head of International Organisations Department, FCO & High Commissioner Designate to Zambia 17 June Aberystwyth University of Aberystwyth Lord David Hannay Former UK Ambassador to the UN & member of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 23 June Manchester Hulme Hall, Victoria Park Martyn Roper Deputy Head of International Organisations Department, FCO 28 June Bath Assembly Rooms Diane Sheard Head, UN Political Team, International Organisations Department, FCO 4 July Southampton Southampton Institute Lord David Hannay Former UK Ambassador to the UN & member of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Special Events 12 May London Foreign Press Association Edward Mortimer Director of Communications in the Office of the UN Secretary-General 20 May Oxford University of Oxford Sir Emyr Jones Parry UK Ambassador to the UN Academic panel: Prof Vaughan Lowe, Prof Sir Adam Roberts & Dr Jennifer Welsh with introduction by Prof Sir Richard Jolly and Dr Andrew Hurrell as chair Sub-regional events were also held in Golders Green (18 April); York (21 May); Cheltenham (24 May); Kendal (26 May); Harpenden (4 June); and Norwich (11 June). 134