• Like
LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda

  • 1,349 views
Published

Presented at the CAPRi International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management. June 28th to July 1st, 2010, Siem Reap, …

Presented at the CAPRi International Workshop on Collective Action, Property Rights, and Conflict in Natural Resources Management. June 28th to July 1st, 2010, Siem Reap, Cambodia.
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wks_0610.asp

  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
1,349
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
2

Actions

Shares
Downloads
2
Comments
0
Likes
0

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide
  • Local Government Acts of 1997; Uganda’s decentralization reforms have been generally acknowledged as fairly successful in terms of devolving a significant amount of autonomy and decision-making powers to the lower levels, including certain fiscal powers.Table: five-tiered structure of decentralized authorities; Only functions related to NRM or conflict resolution are listed here.
  • Using UNHS 2002/03 data, rural poverty status of a district was ranked using poverty incidence, which is the share of people living in households with real consumption per adult equivalent below the poverty line of the region. The poverty incidence rate is classified into three major groups: low (below 40%), medium (from 40% to 50%), and high (above 50%).2 Agricultural potential is an abstraction of many factors—including rainfall level and distribution, altitude, soil type and depth, topography, presence of pests and diseases, presence of irrigation, and others—that influence the absolute (as opposed to comparative) advantage of producing agricultural commodities in a particular place (Ruecker et al., 2003).
  • 1Other conflicts reported include destruction of cropland by livestock, cutting trees on private land, erosive land management by upland farmers, conflict over use of public vs. private road, sale of land without consultation with other household members, conflict over use of a common market ground, and dumping of refuse by municipal officials.Potential market integration is the travel time from a location to the nearest five markets, weighted by the population size of those markets (a higher value of PMI indicates better market access) (Wood et al., 1999). PMI is a continuous variable and decision to assign a given area a degree/level of market access (example, high market access or low market access) is arbitrary.Land conflicts in areas with customary land tenure in Uganda have been lower and higher in areas with freehold and mailo tenure (UBOS, 2007).

Transcript

  • 1. LOOKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: Uncovering the features of natural resource conflicts in Uganda
    Ephraim Nkonya and Helen Markelova (with Edward Kato)
  • 2. Overview
    Introduction: NR conflicts in Africa and their causes
    Trends in conflict resolution in Africa
    Conflict in Uganda: brief overview
    Theoretical framework
    Results
    Conclusions and policy implications
  • 3. NR embedded in production systems:
    Overlapping claims
    External and internal pressures (environmental, demographic, etc)
    • Types of conflict according to level: farm-level, community-level, inter-community, and supra-community
    Impacts:
    Economic (Zimbabwe)
    Human costs (Rwanda)
    Resource depletion
    • Causes of NR conflicts:
    • 4. Increasing resource scarcity
    • 5. Domestic and international trade flows
    • 6. Complex PR systems
    • 7. Political instability and mismanagement
    Natural resource conflicts in Africa
  • 8.
    • Legal pluralism: multiple institutions outline rules of access
    • 9. Two broad categories of conflict resolution mechanisms: traditional (informal) vs. statutory (formal)
    • 10. Traditional institutions: crafted endogenously, based on social norms, enforced by traditional authorities, perceived more trustworthy, but not always egalitarian. Capacity to deal with new trends?
    • 11. Formal institutions: written laws/regulations enacted by a legislative body (parliament, local government agencies)—third party. Various perceptions, esp with decentralization
    Conflict resolution in Africa
  • 12. Decentralization---more responsive to local needs; effectiveness depends on degree of decision-making power
    “Hybrid” systems (e.g. Rural Code of Niger)
    Literature: preference toward formal institutions due to decline in customary institutions
    Policy/practice: growing interest in community-based NRM
    Trends in conflict resolution
  • 13. Resource-related conflicts: mostly land related---boundary disputes, disagreements over grazing lands and small plot fragmentation, encroachment on common lands
    Tenure arrangements:
    Customary in the North
    Freehold in the South (agreement between the British and kingdoms in Western Uganda)
    Mailo in central Uganda (previously awarded to absentee landlords during British rule in Buganda kingdom)
    Leasehold (introduced by British as agreement between lessor and lessee---lessee has exclusive possession of the land for a certain period, can be private and statutory---mostly found in urban areas)
    Land and natural resources in Uganda
  • 14. Decentralization in Uganda
  • 15. Framework of determinants of NR conflicts and choice of institutions
    Legitimacy and strength of existing institutions
    Community-level socio-economic characteristics
    Characteristics of conflict
    Cost of conflict resolution
    Stock and condition of natural resources
    External institutions and market conditions
  • 16. Community level data covering 123 LC1s (drawn from a sample of 972 rural LC1s sampled randomly in the 2002/03 Uganda National Household Survey)
    Representative of 3 levels of poverty and NR endowments (proxied as agricultural potential---abstraction of many factors—including rainfall level and distribution, altitude, soil type and depth, topography, presence of pests and diseases, presence of irrigation, and others—that influence the absolute (as opposed to comparative) advantage of producing agricultural commodities in a particular place)
    Data
  • 17. Descriptive Statistics
  • 18. Objective: to analyze the determinants of conflict occurrence and the choice of institutions used to resolve such conflicts.
    Given that the type of conflict also determines the choice of institution for conflict resolution, use maximum likelihood bivariateprobit model, which is recursive and therefore addresses the endogeneity.
    Empirical model
  • 19. Results 1: Type of conflicts reported
  • 20. Results 2: Conflict resolution institutions
  • 21. Determinants of occurrence of conflicts
  • 22. Discussion of results 1
    Greater poverty  higher probability of conflict over private land boundaries, but lower probability of conflicts over access to water/other conflicts (effective customary water management institutions)
    Low literacy rates higher likelihood of conflicts over commons (low capacity to access legal documents/implement bylaws)
    Higher PMI  higher probability of private land conflicts (higher land values)
    NR conditions:
    Higher pasture/cropland degradation  more conflicts over commons, but fewer conflicts over private land and access to water (?)
  • 23. Determinants of conflict resolution institution
  • 24. Discussion of results 2
    Type of conflict:
    Communities with private land, water, and other conflicts formal institutions
    Communities with commons conflicts customary institutions
    Poverty: based on coefficients
    Poor more likely to choose customary institutions for private land conflicts; formal for other conflicts
    Higher population density with private land and water conflicts formal institutions
  • 25. In Uganda, formal institutions (local and central) government: resolved 85% of the reported conflicts---effective
    Occurrence of conflict: poverty, population density, human capital, environmental conditions, remoteness
    Choice of resolution institution:
    Private land, water, others: formal institution (but other factors)
    Commons: customary institutions (but also other factors)
    Summary
  • 26. Support formal institutions in conflict resolution roles (fiscal powers, capacity building)
    Customary institutions: weakening, esp with increasing socio-cultural diversity within community---but still important in customary tenure and for the poor. How can they be strengthened/integrated into conflict resolution?
    Potential complementarity between formal and informal
    Conclusions/recommendations