2014 WMD Sanctions Presentation
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2014 WMD Sanctions Presentation



Presentation given at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations on implementation of sanctions with regard to DPRK and Iran.

Presentation given at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations on implementation of sanctions with regard to DPRK and Iran.



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  • Delete ‘is’ in first line of ‘Purpose’ box and capitalize ‘Intended’
  • Delete ‘and is intended to’ (repetition)
  • Should read ‘Member State reporting’ (remove s)
  • Change ‘versus’ to ‘and’ ?
  • Remove arrow no. 7 and combine
  • Red text on left should read ‘to and from Iran and DPRK’
  • This is also two-way. Should we say ‘supply of or purchase from’ ?
  • First line, comma after listBox on far right, should read ‘violates’
  • Small ‘c’ for components in bottom left box

2014 WMD Sanctions Presentation Presentation Transcript

  • 1. UN Sanctions ON Iran and DPRK: Implementation Manual Sponsored by: The Government of Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Global Peace and Security Fund Coordination: Developed by:
  • 2. PURPOSE  DPRK Sanctions Regime  Iran Sanctions Regime intended for free distribution to representatives of  UN Member States  International organizations  Companies and corporations
  • 3.  Searchable reference data  Layperson’s language  Annexed material Manual is intended to  Political language of sanctions resolutions  Technical language of list of prohibited commodities  Raise awareness  Inform and educate  Offer on-line sanctions implementation-assistance tools And offers to close the gap Between
  • 4.  UN non-proliferation sanctions  Case studies of DPRK and Iran proliferation methodologies  Compliance obligations  Catch-all provision  Best sanctions compliance practices for: Member State reporting Border Control practitioners Transport industry regulators and practitioners Finance industry regulators and practitioners Content Of Manual
  • 5.  Sanctions on Iran – UNSC resolution provisions and exemption procedures  Sanctions on the DPRK – UNSC resolution provisions and exemption procedures  Prohibited nuclear components identification guide  Prohibited nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material, software and related technology  Prohibited ballistic missile technologies identification guide  Prohibited chemical and biological weapons components identification guide Content Of Annexes
  • 6.  Biological weapons use pathogens (diseases) to attack the cells and organs of humans, animals or plants (crops), while toxic weapons use poisons to kill living organisms  Chemical weapons attack the nervous system and lungs of humans, and are usually dispersed by gas, but also may be transmitted through liquids or solids Manual explains three categories of WMD …  Nuclear weapons are explosive devices, which deliver high intensity heat, blast, radiation and radioactive fallout
  • 7.  Range of at least 300 km  Payload of at least 500 kg …Plus WMD Delivery Systems  Typically ballistic missiles are the primary means of delivery of nuclear weapons and sometime are also employed to transport other categories of WMD.
  • 8. Sanctions and Disarmament
  • 9.  Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)  Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)  Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)  Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Beyond Sanctions: Containing WMD proliferation Through multilateral treaties One UN priority: global WMD disarmament No Treaty but support mechanisms to contain spread of ballistic missiles  Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)  Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
  • 10. Supporting WMD Disarmament and Non-proliferation agenda  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)  Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)  Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the Biological Weapons Convention MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group AG Australia Group WA Wassenaar Arrangement 1540 Resolution 1540 Panel of Experts
  • 11. Sanctions against the DPRK and Iran
  • 12.  Iran ratified the NPT in 1970  DPRK ratified the NPT in 1985.  the DPRK withdrew from the NPT in 2003  conducted three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site  frequent test firings of ballistic missiles Why  Iran has not cooperated with IAEA,  at times has denied access to inspection teams  frequent test firings of ballistic missile
  • 13.  coercing the DPRK to change its WMD-proliferation policies  coercing Iran to change its suspected proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology  deny and constrain the DPRK in the acquisition of non-conventional and conventional arms  deny and constrain financing and transportation in support of WMD proliferation and embargoed conventional arms. Purposes of DPRK and Iran Sanctions
  • 14.  Two-way embargo of conventional arms  DPRK: Two-way embargo of WMD  Iran: Two-way embargo of nuclear and ballistic missile technology  Travel ban against listed individuals  Financial sanctions against listed individuals and entities  Ban on financial services, transfer of assets or insurances services that could help to support the prohibited WMD-program or the evasion of sanctions  Ban on luxury goods Specific Sanctions Measures On DPRK And Iran DPRK currently listed:  12 individuals  19 entities Iran currently listed:  35 individuals  73 entities
  • 15. P5+1 Joint Plan of Action  Terms of 6-month agreement  Implementation obligation on UN Member States remains in place So far - no impact on the implementation of UN 1737 sanctions regime So far - no new sanctions language to ease or lift measures in force
  • 16. Lists of prohibited items
  • 17. See Annex III See Annex IV UN document INFCIRC254Rev.11Part1 covers nuclear equipment, materials, technologies UN document INFCIRC254/Rev. 8/ Part 2 covers the transfer of nuclear- related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology Sanctions against nuclear weapons proliferation supply of these restricted items to and from Iran and DPRK violate UN Sanctions
  • 18. See Annex III See Annex IV
  • 19. Missile Technology Control Regime Annex Handbook of 2010 serves as the basis for the UN list of restricted items, the S/2012/947 No international treaty exists regulating ballistic missiles Sanctions against Proliferation of ballistic Missiles technology See Annex V Prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology related to ballistic missile weapons and drone programs supply of these restricted items to and from Iran and DPRK violate UN-Sanctions
  • 20. See Annex V
  • 21. The UN list, document S/2006/853 covers  Chemical Weapons Precursors  Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment and  related technology and software  Dual-use biological equipment / related technology and software  Human and Animal Pathogens and Toxins  Plant pathogens supply Of these restricted items to the DPRK violates UN Sanctions See Annex VI Sanctions against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons
  • 22. Widely available lower-level technology such as unrestricted components, technology, software, proliferation-relevant information…. The “Catch-all” Provision ….that could meaningfully contribute to the research, development, construction, use, and maintenance of a WMD program… …imposes under the “catch-all” provision on the supplier a regulatory and legal requirement to obtain an export license from his government
  • 23. If answer to any one question is yes = obtain an export license … Three criteria to “Catch-all” …will enable unsafeguarded nuclear activities and explosives, design, development, production, stockpiling use of ballistic missiles, drones, chemical biological weapon… Do inquiries with the recipient, in the public and confidential records, or past conduct of the recipient of the item give reasons to believe that an export…. …end-use in Iran or the DPRK? … may create an unacceptable risk of an WMD-embargo violation… …or risk that supply Of Unlicensed items to the DPRK or Iran violates UN Sanctions
  • 24. Patterns and methodologies Of WMD proliferation
  • 25. Sea-, airport, and road-access To the DPRK Airports Road - Rail Sea Ports Commercial airline: Air Koryo
  • 26. Sea-, airport, and road-access To Iran Commercial airlines Airports and Road Access: numerous Sea Ports
  • 27. One third of the DRPK’s foreign sales of WMD technologies appears to go to the Syrian Arab Republic Identification of government agencies, military units, auxiliary and parastatal organizations, front-companies, airline and shipping companies, diplomatic communities and expat networks Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate scientific and technological assistance between the DPRK and the Islamic Republic of Iran Characteristics of DPRK and Iran Procurement efforts
  • 28.  High quality valves  high-strength carbon fibers  Process control equipment  Stainless steel components and cables  Stainless steel bellows  Programmable logic controller  Process control equipment and software And Iran  Computer numerically controlled technology  Horizontal machining center  Ballistic missile design data  Liquid propellant engines  Cylindrical grinding machines  Automatic direct current magnetization characteristics recorder items of particular interest to the DPRK
  • 29. Best WMD-Sanctions Implementation Practices Indicators for suspicious activities Best Practices State Implementation Reporting Customs and border control practitioners: Recognized Diversion Strategies Financial Sector, Intermediaries, Insurances and Broker and Regulators Air and Maritime Transportation industry
  • 30. Researchers: Diane Barkley, Aleandro Carisch, William J. Haynes, III, Bryan Knouse, Shawna Meister, Niall P. Murphy Lindsey G. Zeichner Peer Reviewers: Christine Lee George Lopez Peter Scott Christine Wing Acknowledgments Government of Canada International Peace Institute Security Council Report