June 11, 2004 Teaching Nonproliferation Summer Institute

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  • Different Faces Project: Mention that this study is the first part of a larger, comprehensive project assessing all major aspects of nuclear and radiological terrorism
    Co-directing that project with Dr. William Potter, CNS Director
    Team Effort: Thank Bill Potter, Sandy Spector (help on research, writing, and editing of the report), Tahseen Kazi, Judith Perera, Alex Tiersky, Kristin Thompson, Alexia Treble, and other CNS staff support. Also, thank the numerous colleagues – some of whom are in the audience who provided comments on drafts of the report.
    Funding: Thank MacArthur and Ploughshares for support.
  • The attacks of September 11, increased news media attention, and al Qaeda’s expressed interest in unleashing radiological terrorism have sparked heightened concern about the threats of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) – one type of which is a “dirty bomb.”
    RDDs would use either passive or active methods to spread radioactive material in order to contaminate cities or large areas.
    So far, there have been no terrorist attacks with dirty bombs, which would couple radioactive materials with conventional explosives to disperse radioactivity.
    Faced with this perceived increased threat, we must ask:
    Are radioactive materials secure?
  • It is important to realize that RDDs are NOT weapons of mass destruction.
    Few, if any, would die immediately after exposure to ionizing radiation from a typical RDD.
    However, there might be some specialized situations in which thousands could die from cancer over many years to decades due to receiving small doses from an RDD.
    Possibly many could die from a conventional explosive associated with a dirty bomb. This depends on the type of explosive and the setting (pop. Density and damage to buildings).
    We are mainly concerned that RDDs can be weapons of mass disruption.
    This would result in panic [Discuss blocking emergency response efforts and indirect deaths and injuries from car crashes, etc.]
    Economic costs could be steep (many billions) if rebuilding is necessary.
  • Good news: Most radioactive sources do not pose a high security risk.
    Right: Smoke detectors contain a minuscule amount of Am-241, a radioisotope. To build an effective dirty bomb would require millions of smoke detectors. Even though individual smoke detectors would not present a security concern, smoke detector factories could contain enough americium to pose a security concern.
    Left: The left photo depicts a radiation cancer treatment machine that contains cobalt-60. There could be enough cobalt-60 in such machines to present a security concern. [Mention 1987 Goiania, Brazil incident, which resulted in 4 deaths.]
  • This study found that only a small fraction of the millions of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks. Still, at least tens of thousands of sources worldwide are in this high-risk category.
    High-risk determination factors are:
    Portability
    Dispersibility
    Amount of radioactivity
    Photo shows two small (highly portable) radiography sources.
  • Here are some more examples of radioactive sources that present high security risks.
    [Name them.]
  • We also found that only seven reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concerns.
    Three of them [name] pose only internal health hazards only. Internal hazards arise from inhalation or ingestion of the radioactive material.
    The other four [name] are both internal and external health hazards. However, strontium-90 is mainly an internal hazard. It is especially pernicious because it can replace calcium and thus lodge in bones.
    The IAEA also tracks these radioisotopes as high safety and security concerns. Moreover, the NRC unofficially recognizes the security risks posed by these isotopes.
    Co-605.3 years
    Cs-13730 years
    Ir-19274 days
    Sr-9029 years
    Am-241433 years
    Cf-2522.7 years
    Pu-23888 years
  • [Mention that the rest of the presentation will explain why these areas are major concerns.]
  • [Define disused source.]
    More good news: Inadequate facilities can be fixed. For example, the DOE OSR program has already established an interim secure storage facility at LANL. This program is focused on an important class of high-risk sources – mainly transuranics.
    Focused efforts over the next few years would secure many thousands of high-risk disused sources in the U.S.
    Need to expand these efforts throughout the world – Lugar-Biden legislation would do that.
  • [Define]
    Do not really know how many there are. But no one really does.
    We analyzed available NRC data and estimated that no more than 20% of the roughly 300 sources orphaned per year in the U.S. are in the high security risk category. Comparing these numbers to the numbers of high-risk disused sources in the U.S. (about 27,000), it appears that less than 1% (roughly 0.2%) of high-risk disused sources become orphaned per year.
    However, the numbers of orphan sources are likely underreported because users are not inclined to report missing sources.
    Based on a recent EU report, we believe that a similar situation holds there.
    Could stem the flow of sources becoming orphaned by prioritizing securing high-risk disused sources.
  • The IAEA has had programs focused on this problem since the mid-1990s.
    It needs more support to expand these programs.
    Some 50 nations do not qualify from IAEA assistance – need to find a way to provide regulatory assistance to them.
    However, change does not occur instantaneously. It can take several years for a nation to develop a safety and security culture. Therefore, concerted effort is required. Just enacting a law or regulation is not enough.
    These nations should also be encouraged to pull themselves up.
    Mention the 170 teletherapy units in 62 Indian cities that use Co-60 sources generally containing 5,000-9,000 curies. On a per capita basis, this is not many teletherapy sources. The relative magnitude of the number of high-risk sources in the developing world is small.
  • We found a significant gap in the U.S. export licensing rules for high-risk radioactive sources.
    These rules currently permit the export of these sources under general licenses, which means that governmental review of the credentials of end-users are not required. Exporters are not required to report on transfers of these materials.
    Because plutonium is classified as a “special nuclear material” it falls under separate regulations. However, common practice has led to small quantities of plutonium-238 to non-restricted nations under general license. So, an importer could in a short period of time accumulate enough plutonium-238 to construct a dangerous dirty bomb.
    The NRC is considering new export control regulations but the initiative is moving slowly. The NRC is attempting to coordinate any changes in export licensing with changes in the IAEA’s Code of Conduct, which has not been finalized.
    In Canada, the regulations are very similar, but Canadian regulatory officials have contacted major source exporters to review their export practices, including the mechanisms for determining the legitimacy of end-users.
  • [Name them]
  • OSR: I would recommend moving responsibility of the OSR program from DOE’s Environmental Management division to the NNSA because this program is not just a radiation safety and environmental cleanup program. It is a national security program.
    OSR has already secured some 3,000 high-risk disused sources.
    I estimate that less than $70 million would be required to secure the 15,000 sources that the program has identified as remaining to be secured. This money could be directed to this program over the next few years to achieve a significant improvement in source security.
    Set up a disposal fee system. Fee could be collected when a source is purchased. This could go into a fund to operate disposal facilities.
    Need a confidential national tracking system.
    HPS has written a policy paper last year that focused on the disused and orphan source problems in the U.S.
  • About 50 nations do not qualify for IAEA assistance.
    IAEA Code of Conduct is being revised to focus more on security.
    Illicit commerce: radiation detection equipment, Customs officials (hand held detectors), training of Customs officials in FSU and in developing countries.
    Canadian and other developed countries have similar regulations and gaps.
  • [Discuss what is meant by non-radioactive alternatives.]
    [Mention beer can level checking.]
    [Discuss photo]
    Hospitals in the US are by and large switching to non-radioactive alternatives.
  • Need transition: Residual risk; much we can do to reduce the risk over the next five years; prepare for the worst so we are not caught unprepared.
    Need to be attentive to lessons learned from planning exercises.
    [Mention Biden-Lugar-Domenici legislation – Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002]
    Five regional shelters for disused and orphan sources.
    Cooperate with the IAEA to establish worldwide OSR program.
    3. Replace RTGs in lighthouses, weather stations, and other facilities throughout the FSU with non-radioactive power sources.
    4. Train emergency responders abroad.
    5. Require the State Dept. to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat
    6. Establish special representative for negotiations of international agreements to ensure inspections of cargo – coordinate with Customs Service.
    7. Encourage development of non-radioactive alternatives.
    Mention complementary Clinton-Gregg legislation -- Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002
    Plans to reintroduce; handles domestic side.
  • June 11, 2004 Teaching Nonproliferation Summer Institute

    1. 1. June 11, 2004June 11, 2004 Teaching Nonproliferation Summer InstituteTeaching Nonproliferation Summer Institute University of North Carolina, AshevilleUniversity of North Carolina, Asheville Dr. Charles D. FergusonDr. Charles D. Ferguson Scientist-in-ResidenceScientist-in-Residence Center for Nonproliferation StudiesCenter for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International StudiesMonterey Institute of International Studies Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation,Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiativethe Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Terrorism:Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment and PreventionAssessment and Prevention and Mitigation Strategiesand Mitigation Strategies
    2. 2. Four Faces of Nuclear TerrorismFour Faces of Nuclear Terrorism  Acquisition of an intact nuclear weaponAcquisition of an intact nuclear weapon  Crude nuclear weapon orCrude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)  Attack against or sabotage of a nuclearAttack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facilitypower plant or other nuclear facility  Radiological dispersal device (RDD)Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb”or “dirty bomb”
    3. 3. AssumptionsAssumptions  Unlike Cold War, today the main nuclearUnlike Cold War, today the main nuclear threat comes more from non-state actors,threat comes more from non-state actors, i.e. terrorists.i.e. terrorists.  Terrorists could not launch multiple numbersTerrorists could not launch multiple numbers of nuclear weapons at U.S., but if they hadof nuclear weapons at U.S., but if they had one, we cannot rule out them having many.one, we cannot rule out them having many.  Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable,Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable, would only be able to build low-yield device,would only be able to build low-yield device, but cannot rule out acquisition of intactbut cannot rule out acquisition of intact nuclear weapon from a state.nuclear weapon from a state.
    4. 4. Elementary, MyElementary, My Dear WatsonDear Watson  MotiveMotive  MeansMeans  OpportunityOpportunity
    5. 5. Assessing RiskAssessing Risk Risk = Probability X ConsequenceRisk = Probability X Consequence Large uncertaintiesLarge uncertainties Lack of dataLack of data Alternatively:Alternatively: Risk = Motivations X Intentions XRisk = Motivations X Intentions X Capabilities X ConsequenceCapabilities X Consequence Need to understand terrorist groupNeed to understand terrorist group motivations, capabilities, and dynamicsmotivations, capabilities, and dynamics
    6. 6. Key Security PrinciplesKey Security Principles  Understanding and Reducing RisksUnderstanding and Reducing Risks  Practicing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-layeredPracticing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-layered Security ApproachSecurity Approach  Leveraging Assets Both Nationally andLeveraging Assets Both Nationally and InternationallyInternationally  Understanding theUnderstanding the Chain of Necessary, but notChain of Necessary, but not Sufficient, ConditionsSufficient, Conditions to Terrorist Acquisitionto Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Nuclear Assetsand Use of Nuclear Assets
    7. 7. How to Become aHow to Become a Nuclear Terrorist?Nuclear Terrorist? 1.1. Highly-Motivated Terrorist Group DesiringHighly-Motivated Terrorist Group Desiring Extreme or Unconventional Levels ofExtreme or Unconventional Levels of ViolenceViolence 2.2. Technically Skilled or Can Hire Such SkillsTechnically Skilled or Can Hire Such Skills 3.3. Acquire Needed MaterialsAcquire Needed Materials 4.4. Smuggle Materials to Safe HavenSmuggle Materials to Safe Haven 5.5. Build/Acquire or Hire Other Group to BuildBuild/Acquire or Hire Other Group to Build or Acquireor Acquire 6.6. Deliver Weapon to TargetDeliver Weapon to Target 7.7. Detonate/Use Weapon at TargetDetonate/Use Weapon at Target
    8. 8. Terrorist MotivationsTerrorist Motivations  Why haven’t there been any RDD or crudeWhy haven’t there been any RDD or crude nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?  Those who study terrorist motivations areThose who study terrorist motivations are ““underwhelmed by the probability of suchunderwhelmed by the probability of such an event [radiological or nuclearan event [radiological or nuclear terrorism]terrorism] for most – but not allfor most – but not all –– terrorist groupsterrorist groups .” – Jerrold Post, IAEA.” – Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001presentation, Nov. 2001  Psychological and political constraints are greatPsychological and political constraints are great for most groupsfor most groups
    9. 9. TerroristTerrorist Motivations (Cont.)Motivations (Cont.)  Post identified two groups that might engage inPost identified two groups that might engage in large scale radiological dispersal:large scale radiological dispersal:  Non-traditional religious extremists (closed cults)Non-traditional religious extremists (closed cults)  Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious]Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious]  Several groups might be motivated to use limitedSeveral groups might be motivated to use limited radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes:radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes:  The above two, andThe above two, and  Social-revolutionary*Social-revolutionary*  Nationalist-separatist*Nationalist-separatist*  Right-wingRight-wing *Would not want to alienate their constituencies.*Would not want to alienate their constituencies.
    10. 10. Worst-Case Nuclear Threat:Worst-Case Nuclear Threat: Terrorists withTerrorists with Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Weapons  Even a crude nuclearEven a crude nuclear weapon could destroy theweapon could destroy the heart of a city.heart of a city.  100,000 or more could die100,000 or more could die immediately.immediately.  Devastating political andDevastating political and economic effects.economic effects.  $2 Trillion or more in$2 Trillion or more in immediate costs.immediate costs.  Global economicGlobal economic
    11. 11. Terrorist-ConstructedTerrorist-Constructed Nuclear WeaponNuclear Weapon (Improvised Nuclear(Improvised Nuclear Device)Device) 1.1. Terrorists must be motivated to conductTerrorists must be motivated to conduct extreme violence using nuclear weapons.extreme violence using nuclear weapons. 2.2. They must have or hire the technicalThey must have or hire the technical expertise to build an IND.expertise to build an IND. 3.3. They must acquire the necessary amountsThey must acquire the necessary amounts of fissile material (HEU or plutonium).of fissile material (HEU or plutonium). 4.4. They must be able to transport theThey must be able to transport the material without being detected andmaterial without being detected and caught.caught. 5.5. They must deliver the IND to a target.They must deliver the IND to a target. 6.6. They must be able to detonate it.They must be able to detonate it.
    12. 12. Ease of BuildingEase of Building Gun-type IND?Gun-type IND? ““With modern weapons-grade uranium, theWith modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so low thatbackground neutron rate is so low that terrorists, if they have such materials,terrorists, if they have such materials, would have a good chance of settingwould have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply byoff a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material ontodropping one half of the material onto the other half.the other half. Most people seem unawareMost people seem unaware that if separated HEU is at hand it’s a trivial jobthat if separated HEU is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion … [and]to set off a nuclear explosion … [and] even aeven a high school kidhigh school kid could make a bomb in shortcould make a bomb in short order.”order.” -- Luis Alvarez,-- Luis Alvarez, Adventures of a PhysicistAdventures of a Physicist
    13. 13. Required Skills to BuildRequired Skills to Build an INDan IND  Schematic drawings – widely availableSchematic drawings – widely available  Detailed drawings – not availableDetailed drawings – not available  Large numberLarge number of man-hours required to prepareof man-hours required to prepare  Need team skilled in:Need team skilled in:  Physical, chemical, and metallurgical propertiesPhysical, chemical, and metallurgical properties  Material characteristics affecting fabricationMaterial characteristics affecting fabrication  Neutronics and radiation effectsNeutronics and radiation effects  High explosives and chemical propellantsHigh explosives and chemical propellants  HydrodynamicsHydrodynamics  Electrical circuitryElectrical circuitry  Unlikely that an individual would possess allUnlikely that an individual would possess all these skills and knowledge even after yearsthese skills and knowledge even after years of trainingof training  Need a team.Need a team. Source: Mark et al. (1986)Source: Mark et al. (1986)
    14. 14. Gun-type vs.Gun-type vs. Implosion-type INDImplosion-type IND  Gun-type:Gun-type: – Simplest designSimplest design  Cannot use plutonium; must use HEUCannot use plutonium; must use HEU  Implosion-type:Implosion-type: – More sophisticated, but still first generationMore sophisticated, but still first generation weaponweapon  Can use either plutonium or HEUCan use either plutonium or HEU
    15. 15. Gun-type INDGun-type IND
    16. 16. Implosion-type INDImplosion-type IND
    17. 17. Major Hurdle:Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile MaterialAcquisition of Fissile Material Material TypeMaterial Type Global InventoryGlobal Inventory (metric tons)(metric tons) Military plutonium (Pu)Military plutonium (Pu) 250250 Civil Pu, unirradiatedCivil Pu, unirradiated 205205 Civil Pu, irradiatedCivil Pu, irradiated 1,0651,065 Military HEUMilitary HEU 1,6701,670 Civil HEUCivil HEU 2020 Ref: David Albright and Mark Gorwitz, ISIS, 1999
    18. 18. HEU First StrategyHEU First Strategy  Large stockpiles of HEU plus relativeLarge stockpiles of HEU plus relative ease of construction of gun-typeease of construction of gun-type devicedevice  Need to prioritizeNeed to prioritize securing,securing, consolidating, and eliminatingconsolidating, and eliminating HEU.HEU. Eliminate by down-blending into a low-Eliminate by down-blending into a low- enriched (non-weapons usable) form.enriched (non-weapons usable) form.
    19. 19. HEU Stocks ofHEU Stocks of Biggest ConcernBiggest Concern  Russia – about 500 metric tons outside ofRussia – about 500 metric tons outside of weaponsweapons  Pakistan – smaller stocks, but turbulentPakistan – smaller stocks, but turbulent regionregion  Research facilities – dozens of sites in someResearch facilities – dozens of sites in some 40 countries; about 20 tons of HEU40 countries; about 20 tons of HEU  Naval and maritime useNaval and maritime use  North Korea and Iran?North Korea and Iran?  United States?United States?
    20. 20. Accumulation of PuAccumulation of Pu  Some states such as France, Japan,Some states such as France, Japan, and Russia continue to separate tonsand Russia continue to separate tons of plutonium per yearof plutonium per year  Even reactor-grade Pu can be used inEven reactor-grade Pu can be used in nuclear bombsnuclear bombs
    21. 21. Acquisition of IntactAcquisition of Intact Nuclear WeaponNuclear Weapon  TheftTheft  PurchasePurchase  Gift?Gift?  CoupCoup
    22. 22. Arsenals ofArsenals of Nuclear-Armed NationsNuclear-Armed Nations NationNation Total ActiveTotal Active WeaponsWeapons Total InactiveTotal Inactive WeaponsWeapons United StatesUnited States 9,6509,650 2,7002,700 RussiaRussia 8,3808,380 8,000-10,0008,000-10,000 FranceFrance 288288 00 BritainBritain 200200 00 ChinaChina 400400 00 IsraelIsrael 75-20075-200 00 IndiaIndia 30-3530-35 00 PakistanPakistan 24-4824-48 00 North KoreaNorth Korea 1-3?1-3? 00 Ref:NRDC,“NuclearNotebook,”2002
    23. 23. Greatest Risks ofGreatest Risks of Terrorist AcquisitionTerrorist Acquisition  Russia –Russia – Large numbers of forward deployed tacticalLarge numbers of forward deployed tactical nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons  Pakistan –Pakistan – Presence of al QaedaPresence of al Qaeda Unstable political systemUnstable political system Parts of government (ISI) sympathetic toParts of government (ISI) sympathetic to terrorist causesterrorist causes Nascent nuclear command & control systemNascent nuclear command & control system
    24. 24. Highest Priority Efforts toHighest Priority Efforts to Prevent Terrorist Acquisition ofPrevent Terrorist Acquisition of Intact Nuclear WeaponsIntact Nuclear Weapons  Press Russia to bring forward deployedPress Russia to bring forward deployed TNWs into central storage – in general theTNWs into central storage – in general the most portable weapons are the mostmost portable weapons are the most vulnerable.vulnerable.  U.S.-Russia need to work toward mutual andU.S.-Russia need to work toward mutual and transparent nuclear weapons dismantlementtransparent nuclear weapons dismantlement  Provide security assistance to PakistanProvide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPTcontingent on constraints of NPT
    25. 25. Attacks on or Sabotage ofAttacks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Power Plants andNuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear FacilitiesOther Nuclear Facilities  Commercial nuclear power plantsCommercial nuclear power plants  Research reactorsResearch reactors  Spent fuel storage poolsSpent fuel storage pools  Reprocessing facilitiesReprocessing facilities
    26. 26. Attacks on NuclearAttacks on Nuclear Facilities –Facilities – Worst consequenceWorst consequence  Major consequence ofMajor consequence of successful attack: releasesuccessful attack: release of radioactivity off-siteof radioactivity off-site  Soviet-designed plantsSoviet-designed plants without containments, e.g.,without containments, e.g., Chernobyl-type plantsChernobyl-type plants (RBMKs)(RBMKs)  13 are still operating.13 are still operating.  Also, many reactors in theAlso, many reactors in the UK do not use containments.UK do not use containments.
    27. 27. U.S. Nuclear PowerU.S. Nuclear Power PlantsPlants Good NewsGood News::  All U.S. NPPs have reactorAll U.S. NPPs have reactor containments.containments.  All employ defense-in-depth safetyAll employ defense-in-depth safety systems.systems.  NRC responded quickly after 9/11 toNRC responded quickly after 9/11 to enhance security.enhance security.
    28. 28. U.S. NPPs (ContinuedU.S. NPPs (Continued Bad NewsBad News::  Vulnerability to airplane attack?Vulnerability to airplane attack?  Control rooms and most nuclear spentControl rooms and most nuclear spent fuel pools are outside containmentfuel pools are outside containment structures.structures.  External power supplies and waterExternal power supplies and water intakes could be vulnerable.intakes could be vulnerable.
    29. 29. Research ReactorsResearch Reactors Good NewsGood News::  Small inventory of radioactivity compared toSmall inventory of radioactivity compared to commercial NPPs.commercial NPPs. Bad NewsBad News::  Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable.Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable.  Many research reactors located in or nearMany research reactors located in or near universities.universities.  Many do not use or have weak containments.Many do not use or have weak containments.  Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-site.Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-site.  Mainly concern for foreign research facilities.Mainly concern for foreign research facilities.
    30. 30. Priorities forPriorities for Protecting NuclearProtecting Nuclear FacilitiesFacilities  Ensure that design-basis-threat accounts forEnsure that design-basis-threat accounts for 9/11-type attack and need to factor in beyond-9/11-type attack and need to factor in beyond- design basis threats.design basis threats.  Take quick fix actions to upgrade protectionsTake quick fix actions to upgrade protections around control rooms and spent fuel pools.around control rooms and spent fuel pools.  Make sure that research facilities also areMake sure that research facilities also are employing defense-in-depth securityemploying defense-in-depth security measures.measures.  Need performance-based, not compliance-Need performance-based, not compliance- based security system.based security system.
    31. 31. RDDs: A Rising ConcernRDDs: A Rising Concern • RDDRDD = Radiological Dispersal Devices such= Radiological Dispersal Devices such as “dirty bombs”as “dirty bombs” • Heightened ConcernHeightened Concern: Are: Are radioactiveradioactive materialsmaterials secure?secure? • Attacks of September 11, 2001Attacks of September 11, 2001 • Al QaedaAl Qaeda has expressedhas expressed interest in RDDsinterest in RDDs • Widespread news reportingWidespread news reporting
    32. 32. Characteristics of RDDsCharacteristics of RDDs  RDDs areRDDs are NOTNOT Weapons of Mass DestructionWeapons of Mass Destruction – Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortlyFew, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDDafter exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD  RDDs can be Weapons of MassRDDs can be Weapons of Mass DisruptionDisruption Major effects:Major effects:  Panic (psychological and social effects)Panic (psychological and social effects)  Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)
    33. 33. Components ofComponents of RadiologicalRadiological WeaponsWeapons  Radioactive materials:Radioactive materials:  Radioactive sources: Used in medicine, foodRadioactive sources: Used in medicine, food irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oil-irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oil- prospecting, etc.prospecting, etc.  Spent nuclear fuelSpent nuclear fuel  Nuclear wasteNuclear waste  Means of dispersal:Means of dispersal:  Conventional explosivesConventional explosives  Fizzle-yield improvised nuclear devicesFizzle-yield improvised nuclear devices  Aerosolized particlesAerosolized particles  Contamination of water suppliesContamination of water supplies
    34. 34. FAS Study: Cesium BombFAS Study: Cesium Bomb 2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT Inner ring: 1 cancer death/100 people due to remaining radiation Middle ring: 1 cancer death/1,000 people Outer ring: 1 cancer death/10,000 people: EPA recommends decontamination or destruction X Location of my home
    35. 35. Goiania, Brazil, 1987Goiania, Brazil, 1987 Cesium-137 DispersalCesium-137 Dispersal IncidentIncident  Scavengers broke into abandoned medical facilityScavengers broke into abandoned medical facility  Stole 1,375 curie Cs-137 sourceStole 1,375 curie Cs-137 source  Cut into pieces and distributed to friends and familyCut into pieces and distributed to friends and family  Junk dealer caused further dispersal of powderedJunk dealer caused further dispersal of powdered sourcesource  Results:Results:  Four deaths and one arm amputationFour deaths and one arm amputation  Some 200 people contaminatedSome 200 people contaminated  More than 110,000 monitored (Fear mongeringMore than 110,000 monitored (Fear mongering via news media)via news media)  Massive cleanup that captured most of theMassive cleanup that captured most of the materials (about 1,200 curie)materials (about 1,200 curie)
    36. 36. High-Risk Materials?High-Risk Materials? HIGH RISKHIGH RISK LOW RISKLOW RISK
    37. 37.  FindingFinding:: Only aOnly a small fraction of commercialsmall fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high securityradioactive sources pose inherently high security risksrisks  But still large numberBut still large number  High-risk sources are:High-risk sources are:  PortablePortable  DispersibleDispersible  More radioactiveMore radioactive High-Risk MaterialsHigh-Risk Materials (cont’d)(cont’d)
    38. 38. High-Risk RadioactiveHigh-Risk Radioactive Source ExamplesSource Examples Radiography Sources Mobile Cesium Irradiators Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)
    39. 39. Only 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes present highOnly 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concern:security concern: • Internal Health Hazards (Mainly):Internal Health Hazards (Mainly):  americium-241americium-241  californium-252californium-252  plutonium-238plutonium-238 • InternalInternal andand External Health Hazards:External Health Hazards:  cesium-137cesium-137  cobalt-60cobalt-60  iridium-192iridium-192  strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard)strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard) High-Risk MaterialsHigh-Risk Materials (cont’d)(cont’d)
    40. 40. Radioactive SourceRadioactive Source LifecycleLifecycle Radioisotope Production Source Manufacture Legitimate Users Illegitimate Users Orphan Sources Recycling/ Manufacturer Disposal Govt. Disposal Site Ref: Greg van Tuyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory; CNS Occasional Paper No. 11 Disused Sources
    41. 41. Major Areas of ConcernMajor Areas of Concern 1.1. ““Disused” SourcesDisused” Sources 2.2. ““Orphaned” SourcesOrphaned” Sources 3.3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and DevelopingRegulatory Controls in FSU and Developing CountriesCountries 4.4. U.S. Export and Domestic Licensing RulesU.S. Export and Domestic Licensing Rules 5. Consequence mitigation and public education5. Consequence mitigation and public education
    42. 42. 1. “Disused” Sources1. “Disused” Sources  Bad News:Bad News:  Large numbersLarge numbers  Vulnerable to theft, diversionVulnerable to theft, diversion  Potential safety hazardPotential safety hazard  Could become “orphaned”Could become “orphaned”  Inadequate disposal facilitiesInadequate disposal facilities  Good News:Good News: ”Disused” sources are largely”Disused” sources are largely accounted foraccounted for
    43. 43.  Bad News:Bad News: Many Thousands of High-RiskMany Thousands of High-Risk SourcesSources – Result of:Result of:  High disposal costsHigh disposal costs  Lack of adequate depositoriesLack of adequate depositories – Most in FSU – terrorist and illicit traffickingMost in FSU – terrorist and illicit trafficking activities cause concernactivities cause concern  Good News:Good News: Ongoing programs, e.g., IAEA,Ongoing programs, e.g., IAEA, U.S., and Russia efforts focused on FSU 2. “Orphaned” Sources2. “Orphaned” Sources
    44. 44. 3. Regulatory Controls in FSU3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countriesand Developing Countries  Bad News:Bad News: Regulatory controls are weakRegulatory controls are weak or non-existent –or non-existent – about half the world’sabout half the world’s nationsnations  Good News:Good News: NNumber of high-riskumber of high-risk sources outside the FSU issources outside the FSU is limitedlimited → Concentrate security efforts on FSUConcentrate security efforts on FSU
    45. 45. 4. U.S. Export Licensing Rules4. U.S. Export Licensing Rules  Bad News:Bad News: Rules are currently inadequateRules are currently inadequate to prevent illicit commerceto prevent illicit commerce  Unlimited, unregulated exports of high-riskUnlimited, unregulated exports of high-risk sources to most destinationssources to most destinations including Syriaincluding Syria  ExceptionsExceptions: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan are embargoed but noKorea, and Sudan are embargoed but no measures to prevent transshipments.measures to prevent transshipments.  Good News:Good News: Regulatory measures couldRegulatory measures could be implemented quicklybe implemented quickly if given priorityif given priority
    46. 46. Consequence MitigationConsequence Mitigation and Public Educationand Public Education  Bad NewsBad News: Little apparent effort by the: Little apparent effort by the government to prepare the public for agovernment to prepare the public for a radiological attack.radiological attack. – No apparent stockpiling of decon gear at regionalNo apparent stockpiling of decon gear at regional sitessites – Not apparent that credible spokespeople are beingNot apparent that credible spokespeople are being trainedtrained  Good NewsGood News: DHS, NRC, and CDC have: DHS, NRC, and CDC have useful info on Web sites.useful info on Web sites. – R&D is ongoing in decon technologies.R&D is ongoing in decon technologies. – Also, development of medicalAlso, development of medical treatments, e.g. Prussian Bluetreatments, e.g. Prussian Blue
    47. 47. Strengthening the RadioactiveStrengthening the Radioactive Source Security SystemSource Security System Recommendations:Recommendations: 1.1. Implement Source ControlsImplement Source Controls 2.2. Establish Regulatory MeasuresEstablish Regulatory Measures 3.3. Manage Security RisksManage Security Risks 4.4. Prepare for RDD AttackPrepare for RDD Attack
    48. 48. 1. SOURCE CONTROLS1. SOURCE CONTROLS a)a) Safely and securely dispose of disusedSafely and securely dispose of disused sourcessources • Example:Example: DOE Off-Site Source RecoveryDOE Off-Site Source Recovery Program needs additional supportProgram needs additional support a)a) Track down and secure orphan sources,Track down and secure orphan sources, especially those in the NIS, that pose theespecially those in the NIS, that pose the highest security riskhighest security risk Strengthening the RadioactiveStrengthening the Radioactive Source Security SystemSource Security System
    49. 49. 2. REGULATORY MEASURES2. REGULATORY MEASURES a)a) Assist nations with weak or essentiallyAssist nations with weak or essentially nonexistent regulatory controls (buttressnonexistent regulatory controls (buttress IAEA assistance programs)IAEA assistance programs) b)b) Protect against illicit commerce inProtect against illicit commerce in radioactive sourcesradioactive sources c)c) Implement improved U.S. export licensingImplement improved U.S. export licensing rulesrules Strengthening the RadioactiveStrengthening the Radioactive Source Security SystemSource Security System
    50. 50. 3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS Decrease security risks from futureDecrease security risks from future radioactive sources by:radioactive sources by: a)a) Encouraging producers to make fewerEncouraging producers to make fewer high-risk radioactive sourceshigh-risk radioactive sources b)b) Promoting use of non-radioactivePromoting use of non-radioactive Strengthening the RadioactiveStrengthening the Radioactive Source Security SystemSource Security System
    51. 51. 4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK a)a) Educate the public, the press, and politicalEducate the public, the press, and political leadershipleadership b)b) Equip and train first respondersEquip and train first responders c)c) Conduct planning exercisesConduct planning exercises Strengthening the RadioactiveStrengthening the Radioactive Source Security SystemSource Security System

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