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11. Potential exposure (769 KB)

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  • This is the BSS definition
  • Quotation from the BSS
  • This image and the following is an example how to perform a safety assessment. It should start with a definition of the different procedures involved. In this image is shown what is happening to the patient.
  • This image illustrates the history of the source and how it interferes with the worker.
  • This defines the factors that might cause exposure of the general public
  • These are examples of what can go wrong in the different procedures where a patient is involved. The next step is to identify the people that might be exposed and finally try to define what to do to prevent the identified accidents and incidents and to set up an emergency plan to follow in the case of an accident,
  • The same as in the previous image
  • This is the BSS definition
  • Data from USA
  • This image shows the relative activity displayed on the activity meter if the source is Tc99m but the setting is for another radionuclide
  • After presenting this image, the lecturer could lead the audience into a discussion about extra vascular injections. 100% of the radiopharmaceutical extra vascular, is that a misadministration? Where to put the limit?
  • This diagram shows the absorbed dose to the injection site in case of extra-vascular injection. The dose depends on the injected volume and the outflow rate of the radiopharmaceutical from the injection site. Note that the dose is generally very high. Data are for Tc99m. For other radionuclides the dose will be even higher due to emission of higher energies and type of radiation
  • Transcript

    • 1. Potential ExposurePotential Exposure Accidental Medical ExposureAccidental Medical Exposure IAEA Training Material on Radiation Protection in Nuclear Medicine Part 11Part 11
    • 2. Part 11. Potential exposure2Nuclear Medicine OBJECTIVEOBJECTIVE To be able to identify hazardous situations which can result in accidental exposure and to take the necessary corrective actions. Case studies on accidental exposures and lessons learned.
    • 3. Part 11. Potential exposure3Nuclear Medicine ContentContent Potential exposure, safety assessmentPotential exposure, safety assessment Accident prevention, lessons learnedAccident prevention, lessons learned
    • 4. IAEA Training Material on Radiation Protection in Nuclear Medicine Part 11. Potential ExposurePart 11. Potential Exposure Accidental Medical ExposureAccidental Medical Exposure Module 11.1. Potential exposureModule 11.1. Potential exposure Safety assessmentSafety assessment
    • 5. Part 11. Potential exposure5Nuclear Medicine Potential exposurePotential exposure Exposures that may or may not be delivered and to which a probability of occurrence can be assigned. (BSS)(BSS)
    • 6. Part 11. Potential exposure6Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT The licensee shall conduct a safety assessment applied to all stages of the design and operation of the nuclear medicine facility, and present the report to the Regulatory Authority if required. The safety assessment shall include, as appropriate, a systematic critical review of identification of possible events leading to accidental exposure (BSS IV.3–7).
    • 7. Part 11. Potential exposure7Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT A review of the aspects of design and operation of a source which are relevant to the protection of persons or the safety of the source, including the analysis of the provisions for safety and protection established in the design and operation of the source and the analysis of risks associated with normal conditions and accident situations .
    • 8. Part 11. Potential exposure8Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT Patient •Request and scheduling •Identification •Information •Administration of radiopharmaceutical •Waiting •Examination •Leaving the department
    • 9. Part 11. Potential exposure9Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT Source/worker •Ordering •Transport •Receipt and unpacking •Storage •Preparation and administration of radiopharmaceutical •Radioactive waste
    • 10. Part 11. Potential exposure10Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT General public •Transport •Storage •Handling of sources •Radioactive waste •Radioactive patient
    • 11. Part 11. Potential exposure11Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT What can happen?What can happen? Patient Procedure Incident •Request and scheduling Wrong patient •Identification Wrong patient •Information Pregnancy, nursing •Administration Misadministration of radiopharmaceutical •Waiting Contamination •Examination Contamination Bad quality •Leaving the department Medical emergency Death of patient
    • 12. Part 11. Potential exposure12Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT What can happen?What can happen? Source/worker Procedure Incident •Ordering Unauthorized •Transport Transport accidents Loss of shipment •Receipt and unpacking Damage to package •Storage Loss of sources •Preparation and administration High dose to worker of radiopharmaceutical Contamination •Radioactive waste Loss of sources
    • 13. Part 11. Potential exposure13Nuclear Medicine SAFETY ASSESSMENTSAFETY ASSESSMENT What can happen?What can happen? General public Procedure Incident •Transport Transport accident •Storage Loss of sources •Handling of sources Spread of contamination •Radioactive waste Loss of sources Contamination •Radioactive patient Uncontrolled exposure and contamination
    • 14. Part 11. Potential exposure14Nuclear Medicine EMERGENCY PLANS On the basis of events identified by the safety assessment, the licensee shall prepare emergency procedures (BSS V.2–6). The procedures should be clear, concise and unambiguous and shall be posted visibly in places where their need is anticipated. An emergency plan shall, as a minimum, list/describe: • predictable incidents and accidents and measures to deal with them; • the persons responsible for taking actions, with full contact details; • the responsibilities of individual personnel in emergency procedures (nuclear medicine physicians, medical physicists, nuclear medicine technologists, etc.); • equipment and tools necessary to carry out the emergency procedures; • training and periodic rehearsal; • recording and reporting system; • immediate measures to avoid unnecessary radiation doses to patients, staff and public; • measures to prevent access of persons to the affected area; and • measures to prevent spread of contamination.
    • 15. Part 11. Potential exposure15Nuclear Medicine • Check all possibilities in the hospital. • If still not found, call the company and inform them of the failure so they can trace the shipment and find out where the radioactive material is. • If not found the loss of the material should be reported according to rules given by the Regulatory Authority Loss of shipment
    • 16. Part 11. Potential exposure16Nuclear Medicine DAMAGE TO Tc-GENERATORDAMAGE TO Tc-GENERATOR • Evacuate the area immediately. • Inform the RPO, who should confirm the spillage and supervise the decontamination and monitoring procedures. • The event should be recorded and reported according to the rules given by the Regulatory Authority
    • 17. Part 11. Potential exposure17Nuclear Medicine • Use protective clothing and disposable gloves • Quickly blot the spill with an absorbent pad to keep it from spreading. • A plastic bag to hold contaminated items shall be available as well as some damp paper towels • Remove the pad from the spill • Wipe with a towel from the edge of the contaminated area toward the centre • Dry the area and perform a wipe test • Continue the cycle of cleaning and wipe testing until the wipe sample indicates that the spill is cleaned The procedures should be practiced! Small amounts of radioactive spills
    • 18. Part 11. Potential exposure18Nuclear Medicine •The RPO should immediately be informed and directly supervise the clean-up. •Absorbent pads may be thrown over the spill to prevent further spread of contamination. •All people not involved in the spill should leave the area immediately. •All people involved in the spill should be monitored for contamination when leaving the room. •If clothing is contaminated it should be removed and placed in a plastic bag labeled ’RADIOACTIVE’. •If contamination of skin occurs, the area should immediately be washed. •If contamination of eye occurs, flush with large quantities of water. The procedures should be practiced! LARGE AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE SPILLS
    • 19. Part 11. Potential exposure19Nuclear Medicine EMERGENCY KITEMERGENCY KIT Should be kept readily available for use in an emergency. It may include the following: • protective clothing e.g. overshoes, gloves • decontamination materials for the affected areas including absorbent materials for wiping up spills, • decontamination materials for persons • warning notices, • portable monitoring equipment • bags for waste, tape, labels, pencils.
    • 20. Part 11. Potential exposure20Nuclear Medicine FIREFIRE The normal hospital drill should be observed and the safe evacuation of patients, visitors and staff is the most important consideration. When the fire brigade attend, they should be informed of the presence of radioactive material No one is allowed to re-enter the building until it has been checked for contamination.
    • 21. Part 11. Potential exposure21Nuclear Medicine MEDICAL EMERGENCYMEDICAL EMERGENCY Contact the RPO for specific instructions. Medical personnel should proceed with emergency care while attempting to take precautions against spread of contamination: avoid direct contact with patient’s mouth, all members of the emergency team should wear impermeable protective gloves. Medical personnel shall be informed and trained in how to deal with a radioactive patient
    • 22. Part 11. Potential exposure22Nuclear Medicine • Notify the operating room staff. • Modify operating procedures under the supervision of RPO to minimize exposure and spread of contamination. • Protective equipment may be used as long as efficiency and speed is not affected. • Rotation of personnel may be necessary if the surgical procedure is lengthy. The RPO should monitor individual doses to members of the staff. • Notify the operating room staff. • Modify operating procedures under the supervision of RPO to minimize exposure and spread of contamination. • Protective equipment may be used as long as efficiency and speed is not affected. • Rotation of personnel may be necessary if the surgical procedure is lengthy. The RPO should monitor individual doses to members of the staff. MEDICAL EMERGENYMEDICAL EMERGENY Radiation protection considerations should not prevent or delay life-saving operations in the event surgery on the patient is required. The following precautions should be observed:
    • 23. Part 11. Potential exposure23Nuclear Medicine EMERGENCIESEMERGENCIES All people in the nuclear medicine department shall be trained in handling emergencies.
    • 24. IAEA Training Material on Radiation Protection in Nuclear Medicine Part 11. Potential ExposurePart 11. Potential Exposure Accidental Medical ExposureAccidental Medical Exposure Module 11.2. Accident preventionModule 11.2. Accident prevention Lessons learnedLessons learned
    • 25. Part 11. Potential exposure25Nuclear Medicine Prevention of accidents and mitigation of their consequences The licensee shall incorporate within the RPP (BSS IV.10–12): • defence in depth measures to cope with identified events, and an evaluation of the reliability of the safety systems (including administrative and operational procedures, and equipment and facility design); and • operational experience and lessons learned from accidents and errors. This information should be incorporated into the training, maintenance and QA programmes; The licensee shall promptly inform the Regulatory Authority of all reportable events, and make suitable arrangements to limit the consequences of any accident or incident that does occur.
    • 26. Part 11. Potential exposure26Nuclear Medicine AccidentAccident Any unintended event, including operating errors, equipment failures and other mishaps, whose consequences or potential consequences cannot be ignored from radiation and safety point of view and which can lead to potential exposure and subsequently to abnormal exposure conditions. (BSS)(BSS)
    • 27. Part 11. Potential exposure27Nuclear Medicine ACCIDENT EXAMPLEACCIDENT EXAMPLE A 87 y old patient was administered a therapy dose of I-131 (7.4 GBq) in the hope of relieving esophageal compression caused by metastatic thyroid carcinoma. About 34h after receiving the dose the patient had a cardiopulmonary arrest and expired. Attempts at resuscitation were made in the patient’s room by 16 staff members. The efforts included insertion of a pacemaker. Contaminated blood and urine were spilled and no surveys of the clothing of those present were done. The highest personnel monitoring reading was 0.3 mGy for one of nurses. Even though the contamination was extensive, subsequent thyroid uptake measurements showed no uptakes by involved staff. Initiating event:Initiating event: Heart failure of patient shortly after iodine therapyHeart failure of patient shortly after iodine therapy Contributing factor:Contributing factor: Contingency procedures for emergencyContingency procedures for emergency situations involving radionuclides were not available. Monitoringsituations involving radionuclides were not available. Monitoring instruments and decontamination equipment were not available. Noinstruments and decontamination equipment were not available. No simulation exercises had been performed.simulation exercises had been performed.
    • 28. Part 11. Potential exposure28Nuclear Medicine Lessons learned fromLessons learned from accidental exposureaccidental exposure A safety culture should include collection of information on unusual events which led or might have led to incidents and accidents. This information provides material that can be used to prevent future accidents. A safety culture should include collection of information on unusual events which led or might have led to incidents and accidents. This information provides material that can be used to prevent future accidents.
    • 29. Part 11. Potential exposure29Nuclear Medicine The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. (BSS)(BSS) Safety culture
    • 30. Part 11. Potential exposure30Nuclear Medicine Accidental Medical ExposureAccidental Medical Exposure BSS II.29. Registrants and licensees shall promptly investigate any of the following incidents: (a) any therapeutic treatment delivered to either the wrong patient or the wrong tissue, or using the wrong pharmaceutical, or with a dose or dose fractionation differing substantially from the values prescribed by the medical practitioner or which may lead to undue acute secondary effects; (b) any diagnostic exposure substantially greater than intended or resulting in doses repeatedly and substantially exceeding the established guidance levels; and ….
    • 31. Part 11. Potential exposure31Nuclear Medicine Accidental Medical ExposureAccidental Medical Exposure BSS II.30. Registrants and licensees shall, with respect to any investigation required under para. II.29: (a) calculate or estimate the doses received and their distribution within the patient; (b) indicate the corrective measures required to prevent recurrence of such an incident; (c) implement all the corrective measures that are under their own responsibility; (d) submit to the Regulatory Authority, as soon as possible after the investigation or as otherwise specified by the Regulatory Authority, a written report which states the cause of the incident and includes the information specified in (a) to (c), as relevant, and any other information required by the Regulatory Authority; and (e) inform the patient and his or her doctor about the incident.
    • 32. Part 11. Potential exposure32Nuclear Medicine •wrong radiopharmaceuticalwrong radiopharmaceutical •wrong patientwrong patient •wrong route of administrationwrong route of administration •wrong activitywrong activity therapy > 10% from prescribed activitytherapy > 10% from prescribed activity diagnosis > 50% from prescribed activitydiagnosis > 50% from prescribed activity MISADMINISTRATION
    • 33. Part 11. Potential exposure33Nuclear Medicine MISADMINISTRATIONMISADMINISTRATION IN NUCLEAR MEDICINEIN NUCLEAR MEDICINE 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 wrong pharmaceutical wrong patient wrong activity Percent
    • 34. Part 11. Potential exposure34Nuclear Medicine * Non justified exposure * Increased radiation risks * Delayed diagnosis * Increased costs * Increased workload * Reduced confidence * Non justified exposure * Increased radiation risks * Delayed diagnosis * Increased costs * Increased workload * Reduced confidence Misadministration consequences
    • 35. Part 11. Potential exposure35Nuclear Medicine MISADMINISTRATION (wrong patient)MISADMINISTRATION (wrong patient) A therapy dose of 350 MBq of I-131 was given to the wrong patient (patient A instead of patient B). Patient A was to receive 500 MBq Tc-99m for a bone scan. This dose was administered and the patient was seated in the waiting room. Patient B who was scheduled for an I-131 hyperthyroidism treatment arrived, completed an interview and was seated in the waiting room. The technologist prepared the activity of I-131 and called patient B. However, patient A responded. The technologist explained the treatment, scheduled a follow-up appointment and administered the activity. The patient then questioned the technologist and it became evident that the wrong patient had been treated. Patient A was immediately informed of the error and his stomach was pumped, retrieving about 1/3 of the activity. The patient was given perchlorate and Lugol’s drops to release any I-131 trapped in the thyroid and to block further uptake. The misadministration resulted in an absorbed dose to the thyroid of patient A of about 8 Gy. Initiating event:Initiating event: A patient responded to another patient’sA patient responded to another patient’s name being calledname being called Contributing factor:Contributing factor: Hospital protocol for identification ofHospital protocol for identification of patients was not followedpatients was not followed
    • 36. Part 11. Potential exposure36Nuclear Medicine Misadministration (wrong activity)Misadministration (wrong activity) A patient was to be administered 259 MBq I-131. The radiopharmaceutical was in two 130 MBq capsules and was so indicated on the vial label. Previous doses at the hospital had been administered in the form of one 259 MBq capsule. When the vial was inverted one of the two capsules fell out and the technologist assumed this was the entire dose. Much later the other capsule was detected. The patient received only 50% of the prescribed activity. Initiating event: One of two capsules remained stuck in the vial Contributing factor: Absence of cross check of the vial label with respect to both activity and number of capsules. No measurement of the activity before treatment.
    • 37. Part 11. Potential exposure37Nuclear Medicine Activity meterActivity meter Correct settings?
    • 38. Part 11. Potential exposure38Nuclear Medicine Activity meterActivity meter Setting Relative activity Tc-99m 1.00 Co-57 1.19 In-111 2.35 Tl-201 1.76 Ga-67 1.12 I-123 2.19 I-131 1.43
    • 39. Part 11. Potential exposure39Nuclear Medicine MisadministrationMisadministration (wrong radiopharmaceutical)(wrong radiopharmaceutical) A technologist injected a patient with what he believed to be a radiopharmaceutical used for bone scan. Several hours later the patient was scanned. There was no evidence of bone uptake. Instead the patient appeared to have been injected with a radiopharmaceutical used for brain and kidney imaging. Initiating event:Initiating event: Wrong radiopharmaceuticalWrong radiopharmaceutical Contributing factor:Contributing factor: Improper labeling of the radio-Improper labeling of the radio- pharmaceutical (syringe)pharmaceutical (syringe)
    • 40. Part 11. Potential exposure40Nuclear Medicine MisadministrationMisadministration (wrong route of administration)(wrong route of administration) A technologist scanned the nuclear medicine request form for a patient and noted that it involved Tc99m- DTPA. The technologist draw a standard activity of the radiopharmaceutical and injected it before noting that the requested study required inhalation of the radiopharmaceutical in aerosol form. Initiating eventInitiating event:: Wrong route of administrationWrong route of administration Contributing factorContributing factor:: No careful reading of the requestNo careful reading of the request formform
    • 41. Part 11. Potential exposure41Nuclear Medicine Absorbed dose at injection siteAbsorbed dose at injection site Radionuclide keV/disintegration Tc-99m 12.7 In-111 31.8 I-131 180.8 Sr-89 1463 Y-90 2283
    • 42. Part 11. Potential exposure42Nuclear Medicine A 43y female patient was scheduled for a thyroid scan. She called the department in the morning and told the technologist that she was trying to get pregnant but there was no evidence at the moment that she was. The technologist misunderstood the patient and she was persuaded to make the examination. Later it appeared that the patient was pregnant at a very early stage and she had a miscarriage Initiating event: Examination of a pregnant woman. Contributing factor: Communication failure. Not working local rules. Misadministration (pregnant women)
    • 43. Part 11. Potential exposure43Nuclear Medicine PREGNANCY (BSS)PREGNANCY (BSS) Registrants and licensees shall ensure for nuclear medicine that: Administration of radionuclides for diagnostic or radiotherapeutic procedures to women pregnant or likely to be pregnant be avoided unless there are strong clinical indications.
    • 44. Part 11. Potential exposure44Nuclear Medicine IF YOU THINK THATIF YOU THINK THAT YOU MIGHT BEYOU MIGHT BE PREGNANT, NOTIFYPREGNANT, NOTIFY STAFF BEFORESTAFF BEFORE TREATMENTTREATMENT
    • 45. Part 11. Potential exposure45Nuclear Medicine MISADMINISTRATIONMISADMINISTRATION Initiating event: A dose of I-131 was given to a nursing mother Contributing factor: The technologist was distracted and forgot to ask a standard list of questions A nursing mother was given 180 MBq of I-131 that resulted in absorbed doses to her infant estimated as 300 Gy to the thyroid and 0.17 Gy to the whole body. The error was detected when the patient returned to the hospital for a whole body scan. The scan indicated an unusual high breast uptake of I131. The infant will require artificial thyroid hormone medication for life to ensure normal growth and development
    • 46. Part 11. Potential exposure46Nuclear Medicine BREASTFEEDING (BSS)BREASTFEEDING (BSS) Registrants and licensees shall ensure for nuclear medicine that: For mothers in lactation, discontinuation of nursing be recommended until the radiopharmaceutical is no longer secreted in an amount estimated to give an unacceptable effective dose to the nursling
    • 47. Part 11. Potential exposure47Nuclear Medicine IF YOU ARE BREAST-IF YOU ARE BREAST- FEEDING, PLEASEFEEDING, PLEASE NOTIFY THE STAFFNOTIFY THE STAFF
    • 48. Part 11. Potential exposure48Nuclear Medicine MISADMINISTRATIONMISADMINISTRATION COUNTER MEASURESCOUNTER MEASURES Immediately use all available means to minimise any adverse effects. • Expedious removal of orally administered radiopharmaceuticals by emesis, gastric lavage, laxatives or enemas. • Accelerated excretion of intravenously administered radiopharma- ceuticals by hydration, diuresis etc. • Removal of urine by catheterization from patients who cannot void spontaneously. • When appropriate, use of blocking agents to diminish the absorbed dose to the thyroid gland, salivary glands and stomach.
    • 49. Part 11. Potential exposure49Nuclear Medicine If the conceptus is more than 8 weeks post conception (and the fetal thyroid may accumulate iodine) and the pregnancy is discovered within 12 hours of iodine administration, giving the mother 60±130 mg of stable potassium iodide (KI) will partially block the fetal thyroid and reduce thyroid dose. After 12 hours post radioiodine administration, this intervention is not very effective.
    • 50. Part 11. Potential exposure50Nuclear Medicine MISADMINISTRATIONMISADMINISTRATION (causes)(causes) • Communication problems • Busy environment, distraction • Unknown local rules • No training in emergency situations • Not clearly defined responsibilities • No efficient quality assurance
    • 51. Part 11. Potential exposure51Nuclear Medicine How to avoid accidents andHow to avoid accidents and misadministrationsmisadministrations • Safety culture • Safety assessment to define critical procedures and emergency situations • Reporting system (When? Where? Why?) • Education and training: initial, continuing
    • 52. Part 11. Potential exposure52Nuclear Medicine Investigation of accidentalInvestigation of accidental medical exposuremedical exposure • Inform responsible nuclear medicine physician • Inform patient and referring physician • Calculate dose • Indicate corrective measures • Implement measures • Submit report to RPC and Regulatory Authority
    • 53. Part 11. Potential exposure53Nuclear Medicine CONCLUSIONSCONCLUSIONS Misadministration of radiopharmaceuticals should not be characterized as random human errors The Initiating event and the contributing factors can always be identified.. This information provides material that should be used to prevent future accidents.
    • 54. Part 11. Potential exposure54Nuclear Medicine Questions??
    • 55. Part 11. Potential exposure55Nuclear Medicine DISCUSSIONDISCUSSION A shipment of 10 GBq I-131 was left unattended in the department. It disappeared. How to act!
    • 56. Part 11. Potential exposure56Nuclear Medicine DISCUSSIONDISCUSSION What type of accidents could happen in the room for preparation of radiopharmaceuticals?
    • 57. Part 11. Potential exposure57Nuclear Medicine DISCUSSIONDISCUSSION A patient containing 5 GBq I-131 has escaped from the isolation ward. How to act?
    • 58. Part 11. Potential exposure58Nuclear Medicine Where to Get More InformationWhere to Get More Information Other sessions Part 4 Safety of sources. Design of facilities Part 5. Occupational protection Part 6 Medical exposure Part 8 Radionuclide therapy Part 10 Radioactive waste Part 12 Protection of the public Further readings IAEA publications

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