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part 2- Forum Nexus Finance Class Prof. Brian Butlers Lectures Final Part 2 Presentation Transcript

  • 1. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class – Part 2
  • 2. Brian David Butler Brian Butler is a specialist in international economic analysis, and is founder of the prestigious “GloboTrends“ ( www.globotrends.com ) online economics site, which has been featured as syndicated content on Nouriel Roubini’s RGE Monitor, Emerginvest.com, Business Week Exchange, Wikinvest.com, and other leading news outlets. Brian earned an MBA with distinction from the Thunderbird School of Global Management and he has taught Finance, Economics and Global Trade at Thunderbird’s Global MBA program in Miami. Brian is currently a teacher and country director for Forum-Nexus study abroad program in Brazil. He previously worked as financial analyst for the Columbia University Business School and for NextLogics, a boutique investment and consulting firm focused on early stage endeavors with social impact. A global citizen, Brian was born in Canada, raised in Switzerland (where he attended international schools), educated in the U.S., started his career with a Japanese company, moved to New York to work as a financial analyst, married a Brazilian, and has traveled extensively in Latin America, Asia, Europe and North America. [email_address] [email_address] LinkedIn/briandbutler Skype: briandbutler
  • 3. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class – France – last day before trip to Italy… Wednesday July 15 th , 2009
  • 4. Themes to cover Today
    • Exam review
      • Hedging example
    • Fixed vs Flexible exchange rates
      • Mundell Trilemma
      • Brief history
      • Financial liberalization
      • Series of crises
    • Pessimistic Forecasts
      • Tracking the great depression
      • Why doesn’t it “feel” feel like a depression (at the stock exchange / banks?)
  • 5. Hedging foreign currency risk
    • Example:
      • Answer:
        • Purchase from local US suppliers only (risk avoidance)
        • Change money to Euros today, deposit in Euro bank account, pay liability in 6 mo. (deposit hedge)
        • Contract with your bank to exchange Dollars for Euros in 6 months at specified rate (1.5:1) + fees (forward contract)
        • Similar choices: futures, options, etc…
  • 6. Hedging foreign currency risk
    • Example:
      • Lets assume… you are a US based company… buying machinery from a company in Germany
      • You agree to pay 1mm Euros in 6 months
      • Assume the currency exchange rate is currently 1.5 USD for each 1 Euro
      • Team assignment:
        • Assume the same exchange rate, how many US dollars do you expect to pay in 6 months?
        • In 10 words or less, describe “What is your currency risk”? (you could be harmed if WHAT happens?...)
  • 7. Hedging foreign currency risk
    • Example:
      • Answer:
        • You expect to pay $US 1.5mm
        • Risk = US dollar will depreciate (Euro will appreciate)… and you would owe more USD (for same bill in Euros)
    • Next question:
      • assume the exchange rate changes from 1.5 USD$ / Euro… and becomes 2 USD$ / Euro… how many US dollars will you owe in 6 months?
  • 8. Hedging foreign currency risk
    • Example:
      • Answer:
        • Instead of owing $US 1.5mm
        • You would owe $US 2 mm
    • Next question:
      • What could you do to avoid that risk?
  • 9. Themes to cover Today
    • Exam review
      • Hedging example
    • Fixed vs Flexible exchange rates
      • Mundell Trilemma
      • Brief history
      • Financial liberalization
      • Series of crises
    • Pessimistic Forecasts
      • Tracking the great depression
      • Why doesn’t it “feel” feel like a depression (at the stock exchange / banks?)
  • 10. Fixed vs. Flexible exchange rates
    • Important to INTERNATIONAL finance
      • why?
    • Fixed exchange rates
      • Any examples?
    • Floating exchange rates
      • Any examples?
    • What system is active today? (globally)
  • 11. The “dollar bloc”
    • “ currencies either pegged to the dollar or more or less actively managed against it (a group that includes Japan)”
        • Oil Exporters
          • Bahrain
          • Oman
          • Qatar
          • Saudi Arabia
          • UAE (Dubai included)
        • China
        • Japan
        • Russia
        • Singapore
        • Taiwan
        • Malaysia
        • Hong Kong
        • Thailand
        • India
        • Others: Ecuador, Panama, more…. Used to be Argentina!
        • Sources: figure 6.6 from Wolf “Fixing Global Finance”
        • And, Economist.com, May 23 2009, “Monetary Union in theGulf”
  • 12. Dollar bloc:
    • What is the impact on the Euro-zone?
  • 13. Difficult Choices… the “Mundell Trilemma”
    • Countries face a trade-off when deciding whether to fix or be flexible
    • Can only have 2 of the following 3 …
      • Monetary policy independence (interest rates)
      • Fixed exchange rates (predictable, stable)
      • Free flow of money (access to global capital)
  • 14. Mundell Trilemma
    • Country wants (example of USA)
    • Monetary Policy control (US wants to have control of interest rates to heat-up / slow-down economy)
    • Open access to international finance (US wants access to external funding, example from China)
    • Fixed, predictable exchange rates (US would like this, but according to the Mundell Trilemma, they need to give up one, and this is the one that the US lives without)
  • 15. Fixed vs. Flexible exchange rates
    • What system is Better? Why?
      • Groups of 2-3 students, answer
  • 16. Brief History – Key points
    • Key point: there is NO “best” system
    • It all depends on what you want to achieve…
    • History: Cycle from Fixed to Flexible to Fixed to Flexible……(future?)
    Fixed Fixed Flexible Flexible The gold standard (~1850–1914) Fixed exchange rates during the 1920s Great Depression era Post WWII Bretton Woods / IMF system (1944–1971) 1970’s –today: since U.S. left the gold/dollar standard ?????
  • 17. Brief History – Key points
    • QUESTION:
      • Why change from flexible to fixed? (give 1 reason)
      • Why change from fixed to flexible?
    Fixed Fixed Flexible Flexible The gold standard (~1850–1914) Fixed exchange rates during the 1920s Inter-war period Great Depression era Post WWII Bretton Woods / IMF system (1944–1971) 1970’s –today: since U.S. left the gold/dollar standard
  • 18. Brief History – Key points
    • ANSWER:
      • Why change from flexible to fixed?
        • CONTROL, STABILITY, LOWER INFLATION, END CHAOS
        • Note: Too chaotic in depression… so fixed for stability
        • Note: Argentina = fixed to dollar was “brilliant” at the time…but should have dropped sooner (not just in 2002)
      • Why change from fixed to flexible?
        • EASE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS, IMPROVE LOCAL MONETARY CONTROL, INCREASE GLOBAL FLOW OF FUNDS
  • 19. FIXED system…
    • Painful ADJUSTMENT mechanism:
    • Example: Under the GOLD Standard:
      • If exports > imports… build up gold reserves
      • If imports > exports… run out of gold reserves
    • KEY QUESTION:
      • Under a fixed system, how do you increase exports? (to stop burning through gold reserves)?
            • … .Group answer
  • 20. FIXED system…
    • Answer
      • need to decrease prices, wages
      • So exports more competitive
      • Can’t adjust FX rates, so adjustment has to be painfully with wages, prices
    • KEY POINT:
      • adjustment in fixed system is = painful process, slow, very unpopular!
  • 21. Automatic Adjustment Process
    • In General… with Gold standard (fixed exchange rates)
    • how does adjustment occur?
    • Imagine an importer, importing products from the US… if you pay your currency to the US, then the US will go to your country and return currency and ask for gold….
    • due to international rules… your country pays out gold,
    • With less gold, you “should” decrease $ supply
    • Home prices should fall (with M3 down)
    • Imports should fall, exports should rise, trade balance should re establish
    Note: For THIS class… you do NOT need to memorize this!
  • 22.
    • Flexible Exchange Rates
    • Key point:
    • Adjustment in currency FX rate; and doesn’t require a fall in WAGES….
      • Excess supply of home currency in the foreign market
      • S>D cause price of home currency to decline, i.e., currency devalues
      • Imports decline and exports rise
      • 4. Trade balance re-establishes
  • 23. Future…. ….Fixed vs. Flexible ?
    • Future… if crisis brought terrible volatility…
    • Will we move toward era of FIXED FX?
      • emerging markets DOLLARIZE?
      • More countries to join the EURO?
      • US / euro move to fixed?
      • New Breton Woods?
    • Or, move toward more flexibility?
      • “ Dollar Bloc” move toward flexibility?
      • Europe abandon the Euro?
      • Answer: no body knows what will happen, but HISTORY tells us the CHANGE = the only CONSTANT!!
  • 24. Take away: Key points
    • History: systems change
    • Business leaders NEED to watch carefully for SHIFTS in political attitude, and be READY for potential shifts in the system
    • Protect yourself!!
    Fixed Fixed Flexible Flexible The gold standard (~1850–1914) Fixed exchange rates during the 1920s Great Depression era Post WWII Bretton Woods / IMF system (1944–1971) 1970’s –today: since U.S. left the gold/dollar standard ?????
  • 25. Pessimistic Forecast “ Tale of 2 Depressions” Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 26. If you look just at the USA… If you look just at the US, you might be tempted to believe that this “Great Recession” of 2009 is not as bad as the “Great Depression of 1929-32
  • 27. A tale of 2 depressions:
    • This, however, is a misleading picture. The Great Depression was a global phenomenon. Even if it originated, in some sense, in the US, it was transmitted internationally by trade flows, capital flows and commodity prices. That said, different countries were affected differently. The US is not representative of their experiences.
    • Our Great Recession is every bit as global
    Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 28. A tale of 2 “GLOBAL” depressions: Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 29. A tale of 2 “GLOBAL” depressions: Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 30. The Volume of World Trade, Now vs Then (updated) Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 31. Industrial output, four big Europeans, then and now Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 32. Industrial output, four big Europeans, then and now Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 33. Industrial output, four Non-Europeans, then and now Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 34. Industrial output, four Non-Europeans, then and now Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 35. Industrial output, four small Europeans, then and now. Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 36. Industrial output, four small Europeans, then and now. Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 37. A tale of 2 depressions:
    • The “Great Recession” label may turn out to be too optimistic. This is a Depression-sized event .
    • That said, we are only one year into the current crisis, whereas after 1929 the world economy continued to shrink for three successive years.
    • What matters now is that policy makers arrest the decline. We therefore turn to the policy response .
    Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 38. Central Bank Discount Rates, Now vs Then (7 country average)
    • In the present crisis, rates have been cut more rapidly and from a lower level.
    • The central bank response has differed globally.
    Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 39. Money Supplies, 19 Countries, Now vs Then
    • Clearly, monetary expansion was more rapid in the run-up to the 2008 crisis than during 1925-29, which is a reminder that the stage-setting events were not the same in the two cases.
    • Moreover, the global money supply continued to grow rapidly in 2008, unlike in 1929 when it levelled off and then underwent a catastrophic decline .
    Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 40. Government Budget Surpluses, Now vs Then
    • fiscal deficits expanded after 1929 but only modestly.
    • willingness to run deficits today is considerably greater.
    Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 41. A tale of 2 depressions:
    • Conclusion
    • To summarize: the world is currently undergoing an economic shock every bit as big as the Great Depression shock of 1929-30.
    • Looking just at the US leads one to overlook how alarming the current situation is even in comparison with 1929-30.
    • The good news, of course, is that the policy response is very different. The question now is whether that policy response will work.
    Source: “A Tale of Two Depressions” , June 4, 2009, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke, © voxEU.org
  • 42. Repeat challenge to students:
    • Think critically, don’t accept “expert” forecasts, challenge accepted assumptions.
    • With critical analysis, any one can learn to spot macro trends
    • GET AHEAD OF THE TRENDS!!!
      • Tools for investors
      • Business leaders – position for threats / opportunities
  • 43. As late as 2008, the IMF forecasted growth in 2009
  • 44. Good NEWS!!
    • Todays lecture will NOT be on the midterm on Friday!
    • (bad news): it will be on the FINAL!!
  • 45. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class Italy– (1 st class after Midterm EXAM) Saturday July 18 th , 2009
  • 46. Themes to cover Today
    • Exam review
    • Appreciation vs Depreciation
    • Monetary policy
    • Inflation vs. Deflation
    • Fiscal Policy
    • Review: Fixed vs Flexible exchange rates
      • Mundell Trilemma
      • Brief history
      • Financial liberalization
      • Series of crises
  • 47. Exam review
    • Key lesson of international finance:
    • Currencies change, so…
      • Borrowing money in foreign currency = risky….
        • Why? Discuss
      • Lending money (being owed money) in foreign currency = risky….
        • Why? Discuss…
  • 48. Understanding Risks:
    • Risks
      • Account Payable
        • Borrowing abroad IN FOREIGN currency = risky
          • FEAR…. That you might end up owing MORE in your OWN currency (than you expected)
      • Account receivable
        • Someone abroad OWES you money in THEIR currency = Risky!
          • FEAR…That you might end up receiving LESS in your OWN currency (than you expected)
  • 49. Understanding Risks:
    • Risks
    • Need to UNDERSTAND this, in order to understand…
      • Global Economic crisis & Eastern Europe
      • SE Asian Crisis ‘97
      • Argentina Crisis ‘02
      • Any and all currency crises… (this lesson = key)
  • 50. Terms you need to know….
    • Appreciation :
      • Currency gets STRONGER vs other
      • Example:
        • US Dollar Appreciates
        • Goes from 2.0 USD per Euro to 1.0 USD per Euro
          • So, it takes LESS US dollars to buy one Euro
        • Goes from 1 usd buys 0.5 Euro…. Now; 1 usd buys 1 Euro
          • So, it 1 USD buys MORE Euros
    • Depreciation :
      • Currency gets WEAKER vs other
      • Example:
        • US dollar Depreciates
        • Goes from 1.0 USD per Euro to 2.0 USD per Euro
          • So, it takes MORE US dollars to buy one Euro
  • 51. Exam review – Hedging problem (Account Payable ): fear = you will owe MORE than expected…
    • Assume that you are a Mexican shoe manufacturer, and that you borrowed money abroad in order to finance expansion of your shoe factory. In 1 year, you will owe $1 million USD to repay that loan.
      • In 15 words or less, describe the foreign exchange risk (what are you afraid of?)
        • Answer: Mexican Peso Depreciates / US dollar appreciates (5 points)
  • 52.
    • Assume that you are a Mexican shoe manufacturer, and that you borrowed money abroad in order to finance expansion of your shoe factory. In 1 year, you will owe $1 million USD to repay that loan.
      • Assume that the exchange rate today is 10 Mexican Pesos to $1 US dollar, how many Mexican Pesos would you owe if the exchange rate were to remain the same in 1 year?
        • 10 MM Pesos (2 points)
      • If the exchange rate were to change and become a new rate of 13 Mexican Pesos per $1 US dollar, how many Mexican Pesos would it take for you to pay off your loan in 1 year?
        • 13 MM Pesos (3 points)
  • 53.
    • Assume that you are a Mexican shoe manufacturer, and that you borrowed money abroad in order to finance expansion of your shoe factory. In 1 year, you will owe $1 million USD to repay that loan.
      • Assume that you want to borrow abroad: in 20 words or less, describe one way you could limit this foreign currency risk?
        • Forward contract (5 points)
          • Buy dollars, sell pesos (5 points)
        • Other answers ok (partial credit): deposit hedge (but doesn’t make business sense)
  • 54. Exam review – Hedging problem (Account Receivable ): fear = you will receive LESS than expected…
    • Assume that you are a French Wine producer, and that you sold a full container of wine to an importer in the USA for $1.5 million dollars, to be paid in 6 months. Assume that today’s exchange rate is $1.5 US dollars to 1 Euro. (assume that the buyer always pays on time)
      • If the exchange rate were to remain the same, how many Euros would you expect to receive?
        • 1 mm Euros (2 points)
      • In 15 words or less, describe the foreign exchange risk (what are you afraid of?)
        • USD depreciate / Euro appreciate (5 points)
  • 55.
    • Assume that you are a French Wine producer, and that you sold a full container of wine to an importer in the USA for $1.5 million dollars, to be paid in 6 months. Assume that today’s exchange rate is $1.5 US dollars to 1 Euro. (assume that the buyer always pays on time)
      • If the exchange rate were to change from $1.5 US dollars per 1 Euro, and become $2 US dollars per 1 Euro;
        • How many US dollars would you expect to receive in 6 months? 1.5 MM USD (1 point)
        • How many Euros? 0.75 MM Euros (2 points)
  • 56.
    • Assume that you are a French Wine producer, and that you sold a full container of wine to an importer in the USA for $1.5 million dollars, to be paid in 6 months. Assume that today’s exchange rate is $1.5 US dollars to 1 Euro. (assume that the buyer always pays on time)
      • Assuming that you DO want to sell wine abroad (From France to the USA): In 20 words or less, describe one way you could limit this foreign currency risk?
        • Forward contract (or futures, options) (5 points)
        • Sell dollars, buy euros (5 points)
  • 57. Multiple Choice
    • If you are a manager at a company (GE, for example), and you expect the future exchange rate to change from $1.5 US dollars per Euro now, to $2.0 US dollars per Euro in 1 year. (you expect the US dollar to “depreciate”) What should you do?
      • Convert your cash to Euros today
      • Convert your cash to Dollars today
      • Neither, because both are speculation
      • Neither, because both are forms of hedging
      • Remember …. No body can predict the future exchange rate with any accuracy. Do not bet your company on future exchange rate predictions. Hedge. Protect. If someone tells you that they know what the exchange rate will be in the future, don’t believe it!!
  • 58. Multiple choice
    • The “business model” for commercial banks was described in class as:
      • Borrow long, lend long
      • Borrow short, lend short
      • Borrow short, lend long
      • Borrow long, lend short
  • 59. Borrow Short
      • Deposits are LIABILITIES for banks
      • They are BORROWING money from clients
      • But, deposits can be withdrawn at any time
      • So… their Liabilities are short term (might owe money tomorrow)
    Lend Long
      • Banks invest in Long term Assets
      • Mortgages, for example… 30 years duration
      • So, money is borrowed short (term), but lent out long (term)
  • 60. Banks Business model = fragile Borrow short, lend long Note: this is the HEART of the issue for why banks are “ fragile ” business models (answer to other question). This is why government issues guarantees (FDIC), which results in “moral hazard”, and why we need regulation
  • 61.
      • *** For FINAL exam, you will need to remember this order:
        • Fragile business model (borrow short, lend long)
        • Government guarantees (FDIC)
        • Moral Hazard (guarantees lead to risky behavior?)
        • Regulation (in exchange for guarantees)
    • must understand this…. In order to understand crisis, and to understand international finance.
  • 62. Multiple Choice
    • Prior to September 2008, the global financial crisis was primarily described in class to be:
      • Liquidity crisis
      • Solvency crisis
      • Neither
      • Both
    • After September 2008, the global economic crisis was primarily described in class to be:
      • Liquidity crisis
      • Solvency crisis
      • Neither
      • Both
  • 63. Solvent : not Solvent
    • Ok NOT OK
    • ASSETS
    • Include home mortgages
    • subprime
    Liabilities (Borrowing, debt) Equity
    • ASSETS
    • Include home mortgages
    • subprime
    Liabilities (Borrowing, debt) Equity
  • 64. Solvency v Liquidity
    • Insolvent: liabilities > assets (equity = 0)
      • “ I owe more than Im worth”
    • Illiquidity: long term asset, short term liability
      • “ I owe money NOW, but have money tied up in my house, car, etc…”
  • 65. Solvency v Liquidity Timeline
    • 2007 – September 2008
      • Mortgages (assets on Banks balance sheet) worth less than anticipated… write down
      • Solvency
    • ASSETS
    • Include home mortgages
    • subprime
    Liabilities (Borrowing, debt) Equity
  • 66. Credit Crisis timeline – key dates in September
    • September 7, 2008 : Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac [25] [26]
    • September 14, 2008 : Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America amidst fears of a liquidity crisis and Lehman Brothers collapse [27]
    • September 15, 2008 : Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection [28]
    • September 16, 2008 : Moody's and Standard and Poor's downgrade ratings on AIG 's credit on concerns over continuing losses to mortgage-backed securities, sending the company into fears of insolvency . [29] [30]
    • September 17, 2008 : The US Federal Reserve loans $85 billion to American International Group (AIG) to avoid bankruptcy.
    • September 19, 2008 : Paulson financial rescue plan unveiled after a volatile week in stock and debt markets.
    • September 25, 2008 : Washington Mutual was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation , and it's banking assets were sold to JP MorganChase for $1.9bn.
  • 67. Solvency v Liquidity Timeline
    • September 2008 - now
      • Crisis CHANGED
      • No longer just a SOLVENCY CRISIS
      • Became a MIXED crisis of BOTH solvency and liquidity
  • 68. Essay projects
    • East Europe & the Global Economic Crisis : many economists now talk about a potential debt and currency crisis in Eastern Europe. In 1 page or less, explain what are the key issues, and which countries are involved. How does this topic relate to our class discussion of the “risks of borrowing abroad”?
    • China – USA (global imbalances): In one page or less, explain how/ why the relationship between China & USA is important to global finance, and how the “global imbalances” (Breton Woods II) is often discussed among economists as contributing to the global economic crisis.
    • Anglo-Saxon style finance : many economists in main-land Europe (France, Germany, etc) discuss the “failure of Anglo-Saxon finance” during the global economic crisis. In 1 page or less, tell me “What do they mean”? What differences are they referring to? What changes would they recommend for the future? How would the US / UK respond to these suggestions?
    • Undergrad: 3 groups of 4 students
    • Grad: 1 group of 3 students
    • Assignment will be given in next class , groups will be assigned in next class
  • 69. Themes to cover Today
    • Exam review
    • Appreciation vs Depreciation
    • Monetary policy
    • Inflation vs. Deflation
    • Fiscal Policy
    • Review: Fixed vs Flexible exchange rates
      • Mundell Trilemma
      • Brief history
      • Financial liberalization
      • Series of crises
  • 70. Review: Difficult Choices… the “Mundell Trilemma”
    • Countries face a trade-off when deciding whether to fix or be flexible
    • Can only have 2 of the following 3 …
      • Monetary policy independence (interest rates)
      • Fixed exchange rates (predictable, stable)
      • Free flow of money (access to global capital)
    • Group assignment: in teams of 2-3, using the USA as an example, please explain which 2 the US selected, and which 1 the US gave up. Why were these selected?
  • 71. Mundell Trilemma
    • Country wants (example of USA)
    • Monetary Policy control (US wants to have control of interest rates to heat-up / slow-down economy)
    • Open access to international finance (US wants access to external funding, example from China)
    • Fixed, predictable exchange rates (US would like this, but according to the Mundell Trilemma, they need to give up one, and this is the one that the US lives without)
  • 72. Italy & the “Mundell Trilemma”
    • Using Italy (after joining the Euro-zone)
    • Group assignment: in teams of 2-3, using the Italy as an example, please explain which 2 the Italy selected, and which 1 Italy gave up.
      • Why were these selected?
      • What was given up? Why is this good / bad?
  • 73. Mundell Trilemma
    • Country wants (example of ITALY)
    • Monetary Policy control (Italy had to give this up… to ECB)
    • Open access to international finance (given)
    • Fixed, predictable exchange rates (achieved this within the Euro-zone)
  • 74. Monetary policy
    • “ interest” = cost of money
    • Increase interest = increased cost of money
        • Leads to slow down of economy
    • Decrease interest = decreased cost of money
        • Leads to speed up of economy
    • Group Question:
      • “ why would a government EVER want to increase interest (increase the cost of money) and SLOW down the economy?” answer, turn in, then discuss
  • 75. Inflation
    • How to think about it:
      • A general rise in prices (ok, but not useful)
      • A decrease in the value of money (better)… less purchasing power for $1 in future (than now)
      • Example: $1 will buy 1 apple now, but only 1/10 th of an apple in the future. This is inflation! Money is worth less (in terms of real goods) in the future
      • Question: if you think your money will be worth less in the future, what would you do today?
  • 76. SPEND today!!! (don’t save)
  • 77. Hyper-Inflation
    • Who has ever lived in a country with Hyper inflation?
    • What is it like?
    • How do consumers behave?
    • Do companies invest long term? Or short term?
    • What happens with interest rates? Why?
    • What happens to wages? Union contracts?
    • Can you plan for the future?
    • Examples:
      • Zimbabwe (now)
      • Brazil (recently), Latin America
      • Others…
  • 78. Inflation – why bad
    • Group assignment:
      • “ why is inflation bad?”
        • (a) from a savers perspective?
        • (b) from a banks perspective?
  • 79. Inflation: effect on life savings
    • What happens to your life savings during inflation?
    • Imagine if you had saved $1 mm USD in a retirement account, and you expected to live comfortably for the next 30 years off of principal + interest… you could be comfortable… unless…
    • Inflation!
      • Remember: Inflation = decreased value of money in future
      • Your money will buy less (food, travel, clothing, etc)
    • Conclusion: inflation = terrible for savers!!
  • 80. Inflation: bad for banks
    • What if you were a bank and you loaned out $10 mm USD to be paid back in 5 years. The borrower gets the money now, and pays back in the future.
      • Why is inflation bad for the bank?
        • Remember: Inflation = decreased value of money in future
        • So, bank will be paid back in future with dollars worth less
      • On the other hand why is this good for the borrower?
  • 81. Inflation – why bad
    • Inflation = 2 nd biggest fear of central bank
      • In US, the Fed has “dual mandate” for growth (employment) and inflation
      • In Europe, the ECB only has one: fight inflation
      • Inflation targeting
      • Generally want low but stable inflation (2-3% is ok)
    • Group question:
      • What do you think is the #1 fear of central bankers? (more than inflation)?
  • 82. Deflation –
    • If inflation = general increase in prices of goods and services
      • What do you think deflation is?
      • Why are central banks afraid of “deflation”?
        • Hints:
          • Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990’s,
          • and ongoing discussion during this Global Economic Crisis (especially early 2009)
  • 83. Deflation –
    • Example: if house prices are falling, do you think a bank would want to lend money to a person to buy a home? Do people want to borrow money to invest in homes?
    • This is the root of the problem with deflation: banks don’t want to lend, people don’t want to invest, economy stalls
  • 84. Monetary Policy + deflation
    • With fears of slowing economy, the Central Bank (Fed, ECB, etc) want to cut interest rates (make money cheaper to stimulate growth)… but what happens if the rates get cut to 0% and growth still hasn’t materialized? Can the Fed cut interest rates below 0%? No!
  • 85. Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy
    • Group assignment;
    • Who can describe the difference?
  • 86. Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy
    • Monetary Policy:
      • Think “interest rates”,
      • Central Bank (FED, ECB, etc)
      • Issue: inflation
      • Milton Friedman
    • Fiscal Policy
      • Think “government spending”
      • Fiscal Stimulus
      • Issue: budget deficits
      • John M. Keynes
  • 87. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class Italy– (2 st class after Midterm EXAM) Monday July 20 th , 2009
  • 88. Group Project – Under Grad , “The Euro Zone – before, during and after the Global Economic Crisis”
    • During this global economic crisis (2007-09),
      • What are the benefits to countries for being inside of the Euro-zone? What are the drawbacks of being inside?
      • What have been the benefits of being outside? What are the drawbacks of being outside?
      • Among other things, you must mention:
        • How does this discussion relate to our class lectures on “fixed vs. flexible exchange rates”,
        • The risks of borrowing abroad
      • Countries you must mention:
        • UK
        • At least one of the following from our trip: (Spain, France, Italy, Greece)
        • At least one of the “East-central” European states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
        • At least one of the Baltic States: (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)
      • Extra credit (5 points) - (1 page max)
        • Compare and contrast the experience of “Ireland vs Iceland” during the global economic crisis (with relation to “fixed, flexible exchange rates”, and to “borrowing in foreign currencies”
  • 89.
    • During this global economic crisis (2007-09),
      • What are the benefits to countries for being inside of the Euro-zone? What are the drawbacks of being inside?
      • What have been the benefits of being outside? What are the drawbacks of being outside?
      • Among other things, you must mention:
        • How does this discussion relate to our class lectures on “fixed vs. flexible exchange rates”,
        • The risks of borrowing abroad
      • Countries you must mention:
        • UK
        • At least one of the following from our trip: (Spain, France, Italy, Greece)
        • At least one of the “East-central” European states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
        • At least one of the Baltic States: (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)
        • At least one of the Balkans: (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria ,Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia)
      • Extra credit (5 points) - (1 page max)
        • Compare and contrast the experience of “Ireland vs Iceland” during the global economic crisis (with relation to “fixed, flexible exchange rates”, and to “borrowing in foreign currencies”
    Group Project – Grad , “The Euro Zone – before, during and after the Global Economic Crisis”
  • 90.
    • Who?
    • 12 undergrad students: split into 3 groups of 4
    • * tell me the groups tomorrow (assign?)
    • 3 grad students: one group of 3
    • What to turn in?
      • Undergrad: 3-5 pages
      • Grad: 5-6 pages
    • How?
    • - either (hand written, neatly!) or computer, email:
    • Resources:
      • Read Book: “An Introduction to Global Financial Markets” (Valdez), chapter 11, “European Economic and Monetary Union” 2007, (suggested focus: p. 287-305)
      • Read handout article: “Holding Together, A special report on the euro area”, from the Economist, June 13 th 2009 (p 1-16)
      • * Grad Students only:
      • Read handout: “Country Forecast, Economies in Transition, Eastern Europe”, from EIU, May 2009 (p. 5-10)
    Group Project, “The Euro Zone – before, during and after the Global Economic Crisis”
  • 91.
    • Grading:
    • 30% of final grade for course
    • comparative (one team compared to others)
    • there is no “right answer”, but grading will be based upon:
      • Cover all required topics
      • Answer the questions asked
      • Additional insights
      • Strength of arguments (pro / con)
      • Depth of analysis
      • Be concise!
      • Ability to capture “heart” of issue
    Group Project, “The Euro Zone – before, during and after the Global Economic Crisis”
  • 92. Themes still to cover – Martin Wolf Book “Fixing Global Finance”
    • Macro factors
      • Brief summary / history
    • Series of crises
      • Financial liberalization = age of crises
    • Response to crises:
      • NO current account deficits
      • “ smoke but don’t inhale” of global finance
      • USA as “borrower of last resort”
      • “ savings glut”, Flood of “cheap credit”
    • US unique position:
      • Reserve currency
      • Borrow in own currency
      • Can NOT face Solvency crisis
      • US is “in trouble”?
    • Fixing global finance:
      • Must borrow only in own currency
      • Need for local-currency bond markets
  • 93. What caused the crisis: a look at the “Macro Factors” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0zEXdDO5JU
    • MACRO FACTORS
    • While watching the video…
    • Look for discussion about “savings from abroad, flooding US with cheap credit”
    • This will be the focus of today's lecture.
  • 94. Macro Factors
    • Discuss…
    • What did you see in the video?
      • Comments?
      • Questions?
      • Observations
  • 95.  
  • 96. Comments:
    • During the lecture at OECD, he mentioned:
      • “ managed exchange rates in Asia”
      • Leading to “low interest rates” in USA
      • “ search for Yield”
      • “ risk was underpriced”
        • = “driving factors” of the crisis
        • Note: when asked to elaborate more…. Too political discussion …
  • 97.
    • Cheap money: Low interest rates:
      • why so low for so long?
  • 98.  
  • 99. Comments:
    • Low interest rates:
      • But, the key question…
      • why so low for so long?
      • Why was money supplied in such massive quantity to the US??
      • Lets take a look at the “MACRO FACTORS” more closely…
  • 100. Macro Factors… look back to the early 2000’s
    • Money was “cheap”
      • Volatility was low
      • Inflation was low
    • “ the Great conundrum”: Greenspan
      • With high growth, why are long term interest rates so low?
      • Typically long term interest rates would be high
    • Reason: cheap supply of money…
      • East Asia, Oil exporters,
      • But why? Why cheap? What happened BEFORE to lead to this situation?
      • Need to put this crisis in context, and understand what was happening BEFORE this one started…
      • Next discussion: a “series of crises” . Recommended reading: Martin Wolf book “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 101. Martin Wolf book “Fixing global Finance”
    • Why are we reading THIS book?
      • Gives a great background to understand background to this crisis, and to understand what was it that led to this crisis
      • Don’t make the mistake of just looking at this event in isolation
    • Need to consider past to understand present…
  • 102. Series of Crises
  • 103. Series of Crises
    • Financial liberalization = series of crises?
    • Finance is increasingly fragile. Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley and Michael Bordo of Rutgers University identify 139 financial crises between 1973 and 1997 (of which 44 took place in high-income countries), compared with a total of only 38 between 1945 and 1971. Crises are twice as common as they were before 1914, the authors conclude.
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 104. Series of Crises – 1990’s
    • Japanese recession - 1990 to 2003, collapse of a real estate bubble and more fundamental problems halts Japan's once astronomical growth, “lost decade”
    •   United Kingdom - 1992  - devaluation of currency, "broke the bank of England“, currency speculating against the European currency unit peg
    • Mexico crisis 1994  ”tequila crisis” - currency devaluation, debt crisis
    •   Asian Crisis 1997 : SE Asia Crisis - 1997 & 1998  - currency devaluation, debt crisis
    • South Korea - 1998 
    • Russia - 1998 
    • USA - Long term capital management - hedge fund meltdown -  1998 -  causes were SE Asia Crisis of 1997, and Russia crisis of 1998
    • Brazil - 1999  -  currency Real was pegged to US dollar, then forced to float – currency crisis
    http://globotrends.pbworks.com/history-of-economic-crisis-and-currency-devaluations
  • 105. Series of Crises – 1990’s
    • Critical event : SE Asia Crisis 1997-1998
      • Leading up to event: currencies were “pegged” to dollar
      • Interest rates much lower in the US
      • Investors bet that peg would last
      • Borrow money abroad at low interest rates
      • Invest in SE Asia at higher rates
      • Make bigger returns, use money to pay back loans abroad
      • Great way to make money!
    • Unless….
    • Group assignment: what is risk, what do you think happened?
    http://globotrends.pbworks.com/history-of-economic-crisis-and-currency-devaluations
  • 106. Series of Crises – 1990’s
    • Critical event: SE Asia Crisis 1997-1998
    • Unless….
      • Peg was ultimately unsustainable
      • Speculators lined up to bet against
      • Peg was broken, and local currencies fell, and fell, and fell more… = “currency crisis”
      • Group answer:
        • Then, what do you think happened to the debt?
    http://globotrends.pbworks.com/history-of-economic-crisis-and-currency-devaluations
  • 107. Series of Crises – 1990’s
    • Critical event: SE Asia Crisis 1997-1998
      • Debt crisis:
      • debts in foreign currency become too “expensive” to pay back
      • Massive defaults
      • “ Debt crisis + Currency crisis” = TWIN Crisis!
      • Note: a similar thing happened in Argentina in 2001/2… can anyone tell me what happened? Based on this story of SE Asia, give it a try (repeat story, substitute “Argentina” for “Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, etc”
    http://globotrends.pbworks.com/history-of-economic-crisis-and-currency-devaluations
  • 108. Series of Crises – 1990’s
    • Critical event: SE Asia Crisis 1997-1998
      • Lessons learned:
      • Dangers in borrowing abroad
      • Danger s in Relying on Foreign capital
      • Must be free from Current Account deficits! Current account deficits = dangerous!
      • Since financial liberalization: countries that run current account deficits = crisis
      • Right, or wrong… this is the main lesson that was learned (the hard way)
      • Who was watching?
        • China – right next door, ring-side seats to watch the damage!
        • Decision: never to let that happen to them! For all SE Asia… “never again!!”
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 109. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class Italy– (2 st class after Midterm EXAM) Tuesday July 21 st , 2009
  • 110.
    • Who?
    • 12 undergrad students:
      • split into 3 groups of 4
    • 3 grad students:
      • one group of 3
    Group Project, “The Euro Zone – before, during and after the Global Economic Crisis”
  • 111.
    • Resources:
      • Read Book: “An Introduction to Global Financial Markets” (Valdez), chapter 11, “European Economic and Monetary Union” 2007, (suggested focus: p. 287-305)
      • Read handout article:, A special report on the euro area”, from the Economist, June 13 th 2009 (p 1-16)
    • Today: each student to present portion of “Holding Together”, Economist report to rest of class…
    Group Project
  • 112. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class Greece– (1 st class) Friday July 24 th , 2009
  • 113. Themes to cover – Martin Wolf Book “Fixing Global Finance”
    • Series of crises
      • Financial liberalization = age of crises
    • Response to crises:
      • NO current account deficits
      • “ smoke but don’t inhale” of global finance
      • USA as “borrower of last resort”
      • “ savings glut”, Flood of “cheap credit”
    • US unique position:
      • Reserve currency
      • Borrow in own currency
      • Can NOT face Solvency crisis
      • US is “in trouble”?
    • Fixing global finance:
      • Must borrow only in own currency
      • Need for local-currency bond markets
  • 114. Essay projects
    • East Europe & the Global Economic Crisis : many economists now talk about a potential debt and currency crisis in Eastern Europe. In 1 page or less, explain what are the key issues, and which countries are involved. How does this topic relate to our class discussion of the “risks of borrowing abroad”?
      • Focus on:
        • companies, countries & individuals in CEE borrow abroad (in euros & Swiss Francs).
        • Then, when the Global Economic Crisis hit, local currencies depreciate (or, face pressure to depreciate).
        • Foreign debts (in Euros / Swiss Francs could become VERY difficult to service!)
  • 115. Essay projects
    • China – USA (global imbalances): In one page or less, explain how/ why the relationship between China & USA is important to global finance, and how the “global imbalances” (Breton Woods II) is often discussed among economists as contributing to the global economic crisis.
        • Most students had a good basic understanding… but, lets look closer…
        • Who can give me their answer? Discuss….
  • 116. Review last class Key event: Asian Crisis ‘97-98
    • Group :
      • Why was this important?
      • Who was watching?
      • What changed, what lessons were learned?
  • 117. Key event: Asian Crisis ‘97-98
        • Changed international finance
      • Who was watching?
        • China & all emerging markets
      • What key lesson was learned?
        • Relying on foreign capital = dangerous
  • 118. Key event: Asian Crisis ‘97-98
    • How the world changed…
        • From that point on…
          • … emerging markets try to be independent of foreign capital…
          • How?
            • If money comes in… send it back
            • Export earnings sent back overseas -
  • 119. response…
    • “… we now see the phenomenon of capital markets trying to put money into emerging economies even as the governments of these economies, with even greater determination, recycle the funds in the form of foreign currency reserves”
    Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance, p56
  • 120. Key lesson
    • Risk in borrowing abroad… why?
  • 121. Imagine…
    • “ The Indonesian rupiah lost 80% of its value almost overnight”
    • “ devastating effect on an economy”
    • “ it is a horrifying story for a country that had had no history of serious inflation”
      • Question: what do you think happened to companies that borrowed abroad (say, in US dollars)?
    Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance
  • 122. Question
    • How does the “Asian Crisis of ‘97” lead to…
      • Modern world of international finance
      • Strange situation where money flows from poor to rich?
        • From China to USA
  • 123. Answer
    • After the Asian Crisis of ‘97
      • Emerging markets no longer willing to accept international capital
    • Ok, but how?
    • How do you “reject” international capital?
      • Dynamics of “how” will be covered in “Balance of Payments” discussion… (current account / capital account)
  • 124. Summary
      • No “current account deficits
        • Fight to run “current account” surplus
      • Avoid devaluation
        • Fight to keep currency “undervalued”
      • Send money back…
        • buy US Treasuries (run “capital account” deficits)…
      • ** don’t worry, this will make sense soon…
  • 125. Current Account / Capital Account
    • Terms to learn…
      • Current Account
      • Capital Account
      • Reserves
      • Balance of Payments….
  • 126. Assignment
    • Everyone must read
    • “ Legacy of the crisis” section of
      • Martin Wolf “Fixing Global Finance”
      • p 55-57
    • Tomorrow – turn in ½ page report
    • 1 person will be chosen to present to class…
  • 127. Lessons…
    • “ current account deficits have come to mean crisis”!
    • “ policy makers are (now) frightened of running current account deficits”
    Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance, p40
  • 128. Current Account:
    • Approx:
      • Exports – imports
      • in a basic sense, its exports - imports....so, if its negative, then you are importing more than exporting...and you need to finance that deficit.
    • So, if you have more imports than exports
      • Deficit
      • Must be “financed” by “capital account”
    • Globally, must balance
      • If some countries run surplus, then others must run deficits
  • 129. Current Account
    • From an economic standpoint…
    • A current account could also be described as:
      • the current account surplus is determined by the gap between savings and investment
        • deficit: more aggregate spending than output.
        • to get rid of a deficit...need to reduce aggregate spending in relation to output
        • a surplus is = more savings, than investment
  • 130. Current Account Deficit
    • How does the country finance this excess spending?
      • Answer: It borrows.
      • Q: what do we do when we spend more than we earn?
      • A: we use a credit card (borrow money that has to be paid later).
    • The current account shows the amount of international lending or borrowing.
  • 131. From the book…
    • “ If a collection of people spend more than their income on goods and services, they must be receiving loans or investment from elsewhere, to finance the excess of their imports over their exports”.
    Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance
  • 132. Country’s Balance Sheet:
    • How does a country “finance” its current account deficit?
    • In order to answer this question…
    • First need to understand basic national accounts…
  • 133. National “Balance Sheet”
    • Key: must “balance”
    • 3 Important parts (for our class discussion):
      • Current account
        • Flow of goods and services, Roughly= exports - imports
      • Capital account
        • Paying for the current account - Money flows
        • Example: US government sells treasury bills
      • Reserves
        • Foreign currency, gold, etc
        • Used to finance gap between current & capital accounts
        • “ below the line”
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 134. What is a “current account deficit?
      • Group assignment: write down the answer to this:
      • What is a “current account”
        • When is it in “deficit”?
      • What is a “capital account”
        • When is it in “deficit”?
  • 135. National “Balance Sheet”
    • Current Account
      • Goods, services
        • (imports / exports, goods, services, gifts)
    • Capital Account
      • Money
        • (financials, treasury bonds, IBM shares, etc).
  • 136. National “Balance Sheet”
    • Key: must “balance”
        • If “current account” deficit,
          • then… by definition…
            • “ capital account” = surplus
  • 137. National “Balance Sheet”
    • GROUP:
      • So…If imports are > exports… what must be happening in the “capital account”?
  • 138. Answer…
          • SURPLUS!!
          • Money must be coming in from abroad to finance the current account deficits!
  • 139. National “Balance Sheet”
    • But…
      • What happens if you do NOT have money coming in from abroad
      • Note: just because you have a “current account” deficit… that doesn’t mean foreigners will pay the bill…
      • Group assignment:
        • What happens?
        • What must you do? (hint: 3 rd part of national accounts mentioned before)…
  • 140. Answer :
      • You must then dip into the Reserves (if you have any) and pay the difference… (gold, foreign currency)
    • Follow up question:
      • What if you don’t have enough reserves? Then what? What can you do?
        • (What happens if you are running a current account deficit, and if foreigners SUDDEN STOP supplying capital, but… you do not have enough reserves to pay the bill?)
  • 141. Answer :
    • You MUST cut the Current Account Deficit:
      • How?
      • If Imports are too BIG compared to Exports (deficit),
      • Then…You must… cut imports vs exports
      • Note: this sounds easy… but HOW does a country do this quickly? (GROUP)….
  • 142. Answer :
    • To cut a current account deficit…
      • Currency devaluation
        • Makes imports more expensive
        • Makes exports more competitive
        • Exports rise, imports fall… current account goes back to balance
        • Problems:
          • Devaluation is very painful…. Who can tell me why?
  • 143. Devaluation = answer to current account deficits
    • After the Asian Crisis ’97
    • Country after country was determined not to ever face devaluation again…
    • So, needed to AVOID current account deficits at ALL costs
    • How?
      • Artificially keep currency low… so that it wouldn’t later devalue…and cause trouble.
  • 144. But, what if devaluation doesn’t solve the problem
    • Question:
      • Who can you turn to if your country faces situation outlined above (running a current account deficit, and if foreigners SUDDEN STOP supplying capital, but… you do not have enough reserves to pay the bill?)
      • Who is there to “help”?
  • 145. Call for help!
    • IMF
      • Lender of last resort
      • The IMF (international monetary fund) came into existence after WWII in what was called the Breton Woods agreements that created both the IMF and the World Bank.
  • 146. IMF – “business model”
    • IMF as a "Bank" (not a "fund")
      • Its interesting that the IMF (international monetary fund) acts more like a bank, but the World Bank acts more like a fund.
      • Actually, the IMF acts more like a "credit union”...the 185 member countries put money in on deposit, and they receive interest payments back. The interest payments are small, because the IMF is seen as a high quality borrower (and there is a social cause behind the mission). The money borrowed then gets re-loaned out to countries in trouble.
  • 147. IMF – “business model”
    • The IMF receives its major inputs of funding from the member countries (quotas), but then sustains itself by making loans (investments). In a simplified sense, the IMF gets money from its members at very low interest rates, and then turns around and loans that money out to countries in trouble at higher interest rates (short term loans at higher rates).
  • 148. IMF – “business model”
    • Profits from Crisis?
    • In a strange way, the IMF is only profitable when there is a period of economic uncertainty or turmoil. If there is not a crisis, then there is no one taking the loans, and the IMF can not call on the quotas from its members.
  • 149. IMF – “conditionalities”
    • The first thing is that a country will have to make guarantees to the IMF that they will make hard policy changes to fix the underlying structural problems that caused the crisis (to fix the imbalance in the current account, they may have to raise taxes, raise interest rates, and other drastic measures).
    • Why is this controversial?
  • 150. Unpopular… scapegoat
    • Countries that are democracies are often reluctant to make the hard structural reforms that are necessary to fix their own internal balance of payments problems. Raising interest rates and taxes might help the governments books balance, but it would effectively slow down the economy and put people out of work.
  • 151. “ Conditionalities” – why?
    • You can think of the IMF as the tip of the iceberg in international lending.
    • They are the most visible part, but behind them there are government and commercial loans that makeup a bulk of the debt package to a developing country. IMF conditionalities and structural adjustment programs are necessary to give international confidence to the capital markets that a country is implementing the necessary structural changes that will ensure that future loans to the country will not be made in vain.
  • 152. “ Conditionalities” – why?
    • For example, without an IMF agreement, the Paris club in international lending governments will not meet with a debtor nation to reschedule (reduce) the debt payments. Its only after a country has already made a deal with the IMF (and accepted their conditionalities) that the other lenders will agree to meet with the country to reschedule their debt. For this reason, the IMF loans are extremely important in that they send a signal (to the rest of the iceberg of international lenders).
  • 153. Why is the IMF avoided “at all costs”?
    • IMF
      • Lender of last resort
      • Group assignment:
      • But why is the IMF lending avoided at all costs by borrowers? What were the lessons of the debt/ currency crises in SE Asia / Latin America?
      • Why are countries so reluctant to turn to the IMF for help?
  • 154. Conditionalities - controversial
    • But it is these very same structural adjustment programs (conditionalities) that make the IMF loans so controversial. From a mercantilist or structuralist perspective (of the borrowing countries), these conditionalities are seen as a weapon of the developed western nations to force the developing countries to conform to liberal economic policies (such as privatizations, lowering of trade barriers, deregulation of industries, floating exchange rates, increasing FDI, balancing budgets, removing price controls, and fighting corruption). These liberal goals are often called the “Washington Consensus
  • 155. Conditionalities - controversial
    • The mercantilists of the borrowing nations argue that the conditions dictated by the IMF limit their national sovereignty by placing external controls on how they are supposed to run their internal economy.
  • 156. Conditionalities - controversial
    • One of the most controversial conditions of the loans is that borrowing nations must cut back on government spending. These “austerity” measures are often blamed for the cutting of social programs that benefit the poor. For this reason, many blame the IMF for placing the needs of the rich over the needs of the poor. By requiring the borrowing nations must balance their budgets, the IMF is often blamed for the cut backs in social programs in these countries (such as education, public health, and other development projects for the poor).
  • 157. Conditionalities - controversial
    • Another criticism of the IMF is that they often recommend that a country should raise taxes and cut spending in order to balance their budgets. But economists of Keynesian school of thought argue that this is the exact opposite of what a country in recession needs. Keynes would argue that in order to jump start the economy, they actually need to do the opposite – cut taxes and increase government spending.
    • The IMF is therefore often criticized for making an economic recession into a depression as increased taxes and decreased spending slows the economy and decreases the chances for a quick recovery.
  • 158. IMF & Asian Crisis ‘97
    • Key lessons…
    • What do you think was learned?
    • Who was watching?
    • What has changed?
  • 159. Call for help!
    • IMF – lessons from previous crises…
      • During the SE Asia crisis ‘97-’98, country after country turned to the IMF to help
      • Money was available…
      • But “conditionalities” were very unpopular!
      • What conditions did the IMF tie to its loans?
      • Any guesses?
  • 160. Call for help!
    • IMF – lessons from previous crises…
      • During the SE Asia crisis ‘97-’98, country after country turned to the IMF to help
      • Money was available…
      • But “conditionalities” were very unpopular!
      • What conditions did the IMF tie to its loans?
        • Raise taxes
        • Cut spending
        • Goal of IMF: recipe to balance budget
        • why this was unpopular?
  • 161.
    • IMF – lessons from previous crises…SE Asia crisis ‘97-’98?
        • Raise taxes
        • Cut spending
        • Goal of IMF: recipe to balance budget
        • Unpopular:
          • Higher taxes + lower government spending = drag on economy, slower growth
          • Result: IMF ends up SCAPEGOAT – easy for politicians to blame for unemployment
          • Lesson: avoid the IMF at all costs!!!
  • 162. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class Athens, Greece– (2 nd class) Saturday July 25 th , 2009
  • 163. Group Project:
    • Due: Tuesday 28 th (before class)
      • How is your progress going? Has everyone READ the required readings? (you should have!)
      • Note: today is Saturday 25 th (and we travel tomorrow Sunday…boat to Rhodes, arrive Monday – boat, pool, resort, etc)
      • You should: do the project NOW in Athens BEFORE going to Rhodes
      • In today's lecture…
        • Everyone should have brought the reading handout + book.
        • We will try to make time (1/2 hour+) today for some group work…
      • Additional recommended reading:
        • Martin Wolf Book: “fixing global finance”, p 87 (1 page)
        • 2 nd paragraph… “in fact, there is only one region…”
        • Excellent material for your papers!!!
  • 164. Themes to cover – Martin Wolf Book “Fixing Global Finance”
    • Series of crises
      • Financial liberalization = age of crises
    • Response to crises:
      • NO current account deficits
      • “ smoke but don’t inhale” of global finance
      • USA as “borrower of last resort”
      • “ savings glut”, Flood of “cheap credit”
    • US unique position:
      • US is “in trouble”? No…
      • Reserve currency
      • Borrow in own currency
      • Can NOT face Solvency crisis
    • Fixing global finance:
      • Must borrow only in own currency
      • Need for local-currency bond markets
  • 165. Question…
    • Last class, we discussed the strange situation where…. “International finance generally flows more from the poor developing countries to the rich developed ones…”
    • Group assignment:
      • Explain why money flows from poor to rich countries… What caused this?
      • How?
      • Should international finance be like this?
  • 166. Answers…
    • Why?
      • Response to previous crises: emerging markets ‘smoke but don’t inhale’ from international finance (“throw it back”)
    • How?
      • Keep currency undervalued… promote EXPORTS
      • Current account surplus = money coming in
      • Accumulation of reserves (purchase of US treasuries) = money going out
    • Should international finance be like this?
      • No, clearly not!
      • Note: the purpose of Martin Wolf book “Fixing Global Finance”: propose changes
  • 167. National “Balance Sheet”
    • Key: must “balance”
    • 3 Important parts (for our class discussion):
          • Current account
            • Flow of goods and services, Roughly= exports - imports
          • Capital account
            • Paying for the current account - Money flows
            • Example: US government sells treasury bills
          • Reserves
            • Foreign currency, gold, etc
            • Used to finance gap between current & capital accounts
            • “ below the line”
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance” Must Balance!! If not… pay out reserves..
  • 168. Assignment
    • Everyone was supposed to have read:
    • “ Legacy of the crisis” section of
      • Martin Wolf “Fixing Global Finance”
      • p 55-57
    • Due TODAY– turn in ½ page report
    • 1 person will be chosen to present to class…
    • Discuss… present??
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 169. Legacy of the Crises
    • Danger in capital flows
      • avoid current account deficits
      • Result: run current account surplus + capital account deficits (sending $ abroad)
        • money flows from poor to rich
    • Avoid IMF
      • Conditionalities unpopular
    • Focus on self-insurance (build up own stock pile of reserves)
        • today's lesson: reserves
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 170. Legacy of the Crises – PART I
    • Managed Exchange rates:
      • After Asian Crisis ‘97, emerging markets fight to keep currency value down vs. Dollar…
    • Why? Discuss, group…
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 171. Legacy of the Crises - 1
    • Goal: keep FX undervalued for:
      • Avoid risk of devaluation in future (don’t get caught with debts in foreign currency)
      • Exports to increase
      • Avoid Current account deficit (keep imports low, exports high)
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 172. Legacy of the Crises – part 1
    • But, if “dollar bloc” ALL fight to keep currency LOW vs Dollar
      • See chart next page…
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 173. The “dollar bloc”
    • “ currencies either pegged to the dollar or more or less actively managed against it (a group that includes Japan)”
        • Oil Exporters
          • Bahrain
          • Oman
          • Qatar
          • Saudi Arabia
          • UAE (Dubai included)
        • China
        • Japan
        • Russia
        • Singapore
        • Taiwan
        • Malaysia
        • Hong Kong
        • Thailand
        • India
        • Others: Ecuador, Panama, more…. Used to be Argentina!
        • Sources: figure 6.6 from Wolf “Fixing Global Finance”
        • And, Economist.com, May 23 2009, “Monetary Union in theGulf”
  • 174. Legacy of the Crises – part 1
    • And, if ALL are determined to run current account surpluses….
    • Question:
      • Who MUST run current account deficits (remember, by definition SOMEONE must)!!
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 175. Legacy of the Crises – Part I
    • Answer:
    • The ONLY country on the planet that was willing and ABLE to run deficits (on a large scale) was the USA
    • Question :
      • why can the USA run large current account deficits without running the risk of a currency crisis? ….
        • We will try to answer this question TODAY
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 176. Legacy of the Crises – part 2
    • “ The overall consequence of these policies has been gigantic accumulations of foreign-currency reserves ”
    • Group Question:
      • What are foreign-currency reserves?
      • Why do they accumulate in a massive scale since ‘97-’98 Asian Crisis?
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 177. National “Balance Sheet”
    • 3 Important parts (for our class discussion):
          • Current account
            • Flow of goods and services, Roughly= exports - imports
          • Capital account
            • Paying for the current account - Money flows
            • Example: US government sells treasury bills
          • Reserves
            • Foreign currency, gold, etc
            • Used to finance gap between current & capital accounts
            • “ below the line”
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance” Must Balance!! If deficit… pay out reserves. If surplus.. Build up reserves.
  • 178. Foreign reserves = I.O.U’s (2008-09) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html
  • 179. Legacy of the Crises
    • By March 2007:
          • Both Taiwan & South Korea held more reserves than the entire Eurozone!
      • When? Almost all between 2000-2007
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 180. Foreign reserves = I.O.U’s
    • “ Gigantic accumulations of foreign – currency reserves, which are also, by definition, huge official capital OUTFLOWS!”
    • Who can explain this?
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 181. Foreign reserves = I.O.U’s
    • Important concept to understand…
    • Foreign currency reserves are NOT = a big pile of money.
    • Instead, they are a big pile of I.O.U’s
    • Example:
      • China buys Treasury bills
      • = promise to pay in future (remember the “pyramid of promises”?)
      • China alone is sitting on a pile of $1 trillion + I.O.U.’s
      • Question: what is the risk (to China)?
  • 182. China – USA
      • Question: what is the risk (to China) with respect to their accumulation of foreign-currency reserves?
  • 183. The risk to China:
    • #1. If the US dollar were to Depreciate
    • #2. Secondary: If the US inflation were to rise
    • Who can explain these two threats? How are they related? Why is #2 more important from the US perspective than the Chinese?
  • 184. 2 threats:
    • US dollar devalue (depreciate)….or, from a US perspective, we usually talk about Chinese YUAN (Renminbi) appreciating…this is the SAME as saying USD depreciating!
      • How would this effect Chinese reserves?
        • Remember: Think of China like a “bank”, and the US like a “borrower”
        • If a bank lends abroad to foreign borrower, what happens if foreign currency devalues?
        • Group…
  • 185.
    • If a bank lends abroad to foreign borrower, what happens if foreign currency devalues?
        • Bank still gets back SAME amount of foreign currency, but…
        • Bank gets back LESS than they anticipated (in local currency terms)…
        • Tell me again, what is the risk to China? What are they afraid of?
  • 186. 2 nd threat : Inflation
      • Question: who remembers my preferred definition of “inflation”?
  • 187. Inflation
    • How to think about it:
      • (ok definition, but not useful)
        • A general rise in prices
      • (better definition)
        • A decrease in the value of money in the future … less purchasing power for $1 in future (than now)
  • 188. QUESTION
    • Group assignment:
      • “ why is inflation bad?”
        • (b) from a banks perspective?
  • 189. Inflation: bad for banks
    • What if you were a bank and you loaned out $10 mm USD to be paid back in 5 years. The borrower gets the money now, and pays back in the future.
      • Why is inflation bad for the bank?
        • Remember: Inflation = decreased value of money in future
        • So, bank will be paid back in future with dollars worth less
      • On the other hand why is this good for the borrower?
  • 190. 2 nd threat (TO) China’s foreign-currency reserves : Inflation
    • Group:
    • tell me…
    • why is US inflation a threat to China’s accumulation of US debt (Treasuries, etc)
  • 191. 2 nd threat (TO) China’s foreign-currency reserves : Inflation
    • why is US inflation a threat to China’s accumulation of US debt (Treasuries, etc)
    • Answer:
    • remember: inflation is = decrease in value of money in the future.
    • remember: US treasury purchases = China giving US $$ today in exchange for promise to pay in future.
    • But, inflation = threat that the $$ in future is worth less in real terms!
  • 192. 2 nd threat (TO) China’s foreign-currency reserves : Inflation
    • US inflation
      • Note:
      • Inflation is a SLOWER, Indirect threat
        • Slower impact than currency devalue
        • From an external lenders perspective, LOCAL inflation is not a (huge) concern …
      • UNLESS
        • *** it has an effect on currency value
        • … and unless you import large quantity of products from that country
  • 193. US Threat…
    • On the other hand, politicians like to talk about the “threat” to the US from having China and others accumulate massive foreign-currency reserves…
    • Does anyone think this is a threat to the US?
    • Why?
    • This will be the topic of our next class on this topic
      • Monday: US position
      • Tuesday: “Fixing Global Finance”
    • For the rest of Today’s class… we will take some time to work on the Group Project…
  • 194. Group Project - presentations
    • Divide into 4 groups…
    • Each read 1 section
    • Group presentation (4 total)
      • Group 1 & 2
        • “ Soft Center”
          • Intro
          • “ rules of the game”
          • “ Good old ECB”
          • “ the beauty of a euro bond”
      • Group 3 & grads
        • “ Warmer Inside”
          • Intro
          • Deconstructed
  • 195. Group Project - presentations
    • Divide into 4 groups…
    • Each read 1 section
    • Group presentation (4 total)
      • Group 1 & 2
        • “ EMU – the benefits” – p 287
      • Group 3
        • “ The counter arguments” – p289
      • Grads:
        • The UK position
  • 196. Forum-Nexus International Finance Class Rhodes, Greece– (1 st class) Monday, July 27 th , 2009
  • 197. Schedule…
    • Tomorrow (Tues)
    • 9am Europe
    • 10-12 MKTG + IB
    • 12-2 Finance + CCM
    • Group Paper due BEFORE class
    • Wed
    • Exams
    • 10-11;30 Finance + CCM
    • 1130-1 Mktg + IB
    • 1-230 Europe
  • 198. Themes to cover – Martin Wolf Book “Fixing Global Finance”
    • Series of crises
      • Financial liberalization = age of crises
    • Response to crises:
      • NO current account deficits
      • “ smoke but don’t inhale” of global finance
      • USA as “borrower of last resort”
      • “ savings glut”, Flood of “cheap credit”
    • US unique position:
      • US is “in trouble”? No…
      • Reserve currency
      • Borrow in own currency
      • Can NOT face Solvency crisis
    • Fixing global finance:
      • Must borrow only in own currency
      • Need for local-currency bond markets
  • 199. National Accounts -spotlight http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dd14a46e-e72f-11dd-aef2-0000779fd2ac.html# Note the Inverse- relationship between the “Current Account Balance” and the “Reserve Accumulation”
  • 200. Review…
    • Group question:
    • China position:
      • What are the risks to China with respect to the (approx) $2 trillion US dollar “foreign-currency reserves”?
      • Discuss…
  • 201. The risk to China:
    • #1. If the US dollar were to Depreciate
    • #2. Secondary: If the US inflation were to rise
    • Who can explain these two threats?
  • 202. US Threat…
    • On the other hand, politicians like to talk about the “threat” to the US from having China and others accumulate massive foreign-currency reserves…
    • Does anyone think this is a threat to the US?
      • Why? / why not?
  • 203. Populist fears:
    • What could China do with $2 trillion USD? Buy up American companies?
    • Politically: is the US dependent? If yes, how does policy change?
    • Economically: China to get more international clout internationally/ say in global policy decisions/ increased role in IMF? World Bank?
  • 204. On the other hand…
    • Yes, China is the “banker”, and the US is the “borrower”, but…
      • “ if you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem, but if you owe a million, it has”
          • John Maynard Keynes
      • “ if you owe your bank a billion pounds, everybody has a problem”
          • The Economist
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 205. But, that assumes…
    • The assumption is that the US might “default” on its debt...
    • Is that possible?
      • Lets consider….
    • Think about this:
      • “ One trillion dollars is 7% of US GDP. And we will be running trillion-dollar deficits for a very long time.”
    “ Buddy, Can You Spare $5 Trillion?”, John Mauldin, July 10, 2009
  • 206. “ Buddy, Can You Spare $5 Trillion?”, John Mauldin, July 10, 2009
  • 207. That’s a lot of debt!
    • So, I ask again:
    • The assumption is that the US might “default” on its debt...
    • Is that a risk??
  • 208.
    • No!
    • The US does NOT face a “solvency” crisis in the foreseeable future (due to excessive borrowing from abroad)
    • Who can explain this?
      • (1 point extra credit on exam for the 1 st student who can answer correctly …)
  • 209. If devaluation of the US dollar…
    • “ US…runs no danger of adverse currency mis-matches.
    • In the US, “currency mismatches work in exactly the opposite direction; the country has assets denominated in foreign currency and liabilities denominated in domestic currency”
    • “ The more unwilling the rest of the world is to hold the dollar, the more solvent the US becomes”
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 210. If the US Balance Sheet: (just looking at external financing)
    • Assets
      • Foreign currency
        • Investment abroad
        • FDI
        • Portfolio
        • Earning foreign currency
    • Liabilities
      • Local currency
        • Foreign gov’t buy US Treasuries is US dollars!
    So, what happens if US dollar “depreciates”? (does US become more, or less “Solvent”?)
  • 211. Solvency v Liquidity
    • Insolvent: liabilities > assets (equity = 0)
      • Person: I owe more than Im worth
      • Bank: assets loose value (subprime mortgages)
      • Country : cant pay debts…default
    So, what happens if US dollar “depreciates”? (does US become more, or less “Solvent”?)
  • 212. If devaluation of the US dollar…
    • “ US liabilities that are denominated in currency units are measured in the countries own currency”
    • “ if it wishes to improve its balance sheet position (and so its solvency), all the US needs to do is allow the value of the dollar to fall against other currencies”
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 213. US Balance Sheet: with Depreciation of US currency
    • Assets
      • Foreign currency
        • Investment abroad
        • FDI
        • Portfolio
        • Earning foreign currency
    • Liabilities
      • Local currency
        • Foreign gov’t buy US Treasuries is US dollars!
    If US dollar DEPRECIATES… US becomes MORE solvent!
  • 214. Threat to China -
    • If the US were to devalue its currency…
    • “ are an elegant, painless, and entirely legal way for the US to default” (without actually defaulting)
    Martin Wolf book, “Fixing Global Finance”
  • 215. Exorbitant privilege
    • “ exorbitant”:
    • Back in 1965, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, then French finance minister, described the ability of the US to borrow cheaply and without limit in its own currency as an “exorbitant privilege”
  • 216. Real threat to the USA
    • Might loose “exorbitant privilege”
    • “ You Don’t know how luck you are, babe”
      • Able to borrow (seemingly) unlimited
      • In own currency
      • At a very low rate
      • (and invest abroad at higher returns, and run NO risk of insolvency!)
  • 217. Imagine a world where…
    • The US were to try and pay for
      • Obama stimulus
      • Economic recovery
      • Future Social Security / Health care reforms
      • Without external financing (at low rates, in own currency)
      • Ouch!!
  • 218. Demographics & the Debt By 2050; a third of the rich world’s population will be over 60 “ The demographic bill is likely to be (10x) ten times bigger than the fiscal cost of the financial crisis.” The Economist, June 2009
  • 219. Question:
    • From the US perspective:
      • Other than currency devaluation, what is the other way in which they could legally diminish their debts?
  • 220. Answer:
    • Inflation
  • 221. Inflation
      • “ A decrease in the value of money in the future … less purchasing power for $1 in future (than now)”
      • Bad for a bank (in this case, China): they will be paid back in future with dollars worth less
  • 222. Inflation
    • remember:
      • US treasury purchases = China giving US $$ today in exchange for promise to pay in future.
    • But, inflation = threat that the $$ in future is worth less in real terms!
  • 223. Risks to US
    • In reality, the US does NOT want to follow either of these paths (inflation, currency devaluation)
    • Why?
    • Group answer:
  • 224. Risks to US
    • Note:
      • If foreigners fear the threat of inflation / devaluation… they would:
        • Demand higher %
          • Compensate for RISK
          • This would add COST to US borrowing in the future (remember the ticking demographic bomb?)
  • 225. Lesson: don’t push China
    • Yes, reforms are needed, but…
    • $2 trillion in “risky” loans to US = politically difficult problem for Chinese government
    • Especially with unemployment ticking upward due to the “US-caused” global economic crisis!
  • 226. Sovereign Wealth funds
    • Search for “better” returns (than 1-3% on US Treasuries)
    • Reach for yield
    • Bad investments in US banks (lost lots of $$ at beginning of crisis ‘07-‘09)
    • Politically unpopular
    • Pressure on China domestically (doesn’t help to also have US pressure on them internationally!)
  • 227. Challenge for China
    • Unemployment = key issue
    • Some 20 million + unemployed since crisis began
    • Can not afford to appreciate currency, and lose international competitiveness of production
    • Result: government stimulus = more capacity, more production….
      • But, fear ?
  • 228. Exam extra credit – 5 points
    • Explain the difference between the “savings glut”, and “money glut” view of what caused the global economic crisis.
      • Reading Martin Wolf “Fixing Global Finance”, p 106-110
  • 229. Fixing Global Finance
    • Key:
    • Develop local – currency debt markets for emerging markets
    • Don’t borrow in foreign currencies!
  • 230. Fixing Global Finance
    • Limits to export-oriented growth
      • What worked for JPN, South Korea, might not work for China / India
    • Develop local financial markets
      • Develop local – currency debt markets for emerging markets
      • Don’t borrow in foreign currencies!
    • Reform global institutions
      • IMF – pooled insurance vs self insurance
      • Additional resources / bite.
  • 231. Rest of class…
    • Group project
    • Tomorrow:
    • Group paper due BEFORE class
    • Lecture:
      • review semester + prepare for exam!
  • 232. Group Project
    • Group project
      • Peer review
  • 233. Schedule…
    • Tomorrow (Tues)
    • 9am Europe
    • 10-12 MKTG + IB
    • 12-2 Finance + CCM
    • Group Paper due BEFORE class
    • Wed
    • Exams
    • 10-11;30 Finance + CCM
    • 1130-1 Mktg + IB
    • 1-230 Europe