Privacy, trust and biometrics
Dr Ian Brown
Oxford Internet Institute
University of Oxford

Short-term trust
Reputation of the organising institution
•
Opinions in the mass media about
•
technologies
Attitudes & opinions of friends and family
•
Convenience system brings
•
AM Oostveen (2007) Context Matters: A Social Informatics
Perspective on the Design and Implications of Large-Scale e-
Government Systems, PhD thesis, Amsterdam University

Trust in government

Trust is fragile
“Trust is built over the long term, on

the basis not of communication but of
action. And then again, trust, once
established, can be lost in an instant”
-Neil Fitzgerald, Chairman, Unilever

Longer-term legitimacy
Informed, democratic consent
•
Do citizens and their representatives have full
•
information on costs & benefits?
Privacy Impact Assessment?
•
Compatibility with human rights (S & Marper v
•
UK, Liberty v UK, I v Finland)
Continued legislative and judicial oversight and
•
technological constraint
Privacy by Design
•

How not to do it
“We really don't know a whole lot about the overall
•
costs and benefits of homeland security” –senior DHS
economist Gary Becker (2006)
“Policy discussions of homeland security issues are
•
driven not by rigorous analysis but by fear, perceptions
of past mistakes, pork-barrel politics, and insistence on
an invulnerability that cannot possibly be achieved.” –
Jeremy Shapiro (2007)
“Finding out other people’s secrets is going to involve
•
breaking everyday moral rules.” –David Omand (2009)

Credible impact assessment
Risk must be quantified to be meaningful, even for
•
low-probability high-impact events
How strong is evidence that “solution” will work?
•
How widely do stakeholders agree that cost <
•
benefit? Include direct
cost, inconvenience, enhancement of fear, negative
economic impacts, reduction of liberties
“Any analysis that leaves out such considerations is
•
profoundly faulty, even immoral”
John Mueller (2009) The quixotic quest for invulnerability,
International Studies Association, New York

CCTV efficacy
Effective only in limited
•
circumstances (e.g. car
parks); otherwise reduces
crime by about 3% (NACRO)
Better street lighting reduces
•
crime by 20% (Home Office)
“It's been an utter fiasco:
•
only 3% of crimes were
solved by CCTV” -DCI Mike
Neville, head of Visual
Images, Identifications and
Detections Office

Efficacy of facial recognition
Does it identify terrorists
•
and serious criminals, or
pickpockets and ticket
touts?
How many arrests might
•
we expect?
How accurate in typical
•
conditions?
Do we have high-quality
•
images of terrorist
suspects?

What we need for biometrics
Strong evidence base for any biometric proposed for public use
1.
A careful threat analysis and cost/benefit assessment for each
2.
proposed use, including damage caused to privacy and other
human rights and a comparison with alternative
mechanisms, with independent scrutiny
The strict technological limit of the use of biometrics to the
3.
minimum required to achieve the security goals of each use
Wherever possible, full consumer choice in the decision to use
4.
biometrics at all and then in the issuer (eg Crosby-style private
sector leadership and consumer choice with govt playing a
minimal standards-setting role)
Full transparency and strict oversight and enforcement of DPA
5.
and ECHR principles in the design and operation of systems

Conclusions
Democratic legitimacy and human rights
•
are critical to ensure security technology
supports rather than subverts liberal
political values
Meaningful transparency, ECHR
•
compliance and oversight are critical
Slap-dash risk assessment and spin are
•
extremely corrosive to trust in long term