The cyber terrain

The cyber terrain Dr Ian Brown Oxford Internet Institute University of Oxford

The Internet architecture
End systems (PCs, mobile phones)
run applications e.g. Web, e-mail
at “edge of network”
Access networks
Radio (WiFi, WiMax, 3G)
ADSL, cable, Ethernet
Tier 1/2/3 ISPs
Carry data packets between end systems
Host servers (Web, e-mail)
Jim Kurose, Keith Ross (2009) Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach client/server peer-peer

Botnets Source: Damballa, Inc.

What is “cyberwar”?
“ The ‘Korean’ cyber incidents of early July did not rise to the level of an act of war. They were annoying and for some agencies, embarrassing, but there was no violence or destruction... Cybercrime does not rise to the level of an act of war, even when there is state complicity, nor does espionage – [which] are the activities that currently dominate cyber conflict... Estonia and Georgia … came under limited cyber attack as part of larger conflicts with Russia, but in neither case were there casualties, loss of territory, destruction, or serious disruption of critical services. The ‘denial of service’ attacks used against these countries sought to create political pressure and coerce the target governments, but how to respond to such coercion remains an open question, particularly in light of the uncertain attribution and deniability” (Lewis, 2009: 2—3).
“ At best, these operations can confuse and frustrate operators of military systems, and then only temporarily. Thus, cyberwar can only be a support function for other elements of warfare” (Libicki, 2009: xiv—xv)

Deterrence and preemption
“ [W]e need to reengineer the Internet [for] attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment” –Mike McConnell, 28/2/10
“ [C]aution is necessary when contemplating cyberdeterrence. Attribution, predictable response, the ability to continue attack, and the lack of a counterforce option are all significant barriers… cyberdefense remains the Air Force’s most important activity within cyberspace.” (Libicki, 2009: xix-xx)

Reducing systemic risk
Isolate critical systems from public Internet
Enhance risk management, robustness and continuity planning in Critical National Infrastructure systems
Use Content Distribution Networks and other load balancing systems to increase performance and resilience of public-facing systems
Better align private and social incentives in securing systems, esp. on software security

References
I. Brown and P. Sommer (forthcoming) Characterising and reducing systemic cybersecurity risks , OECD, Paris
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (2007) Personal Internet Security , HL Paper 165, London
House of Lords European Union Committee (2010) Protecting Europe against large-scale cyber-attacks , HL Paper 68, London
J. A. Lewis (2009) The "Korean" Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber Conflict , Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
M. C. Libicki (2009) Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar , RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.

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The cyber terrain

by Ian Brown on Apr 20, 2010

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