Security technology and democratic legitimacy

Security technology and democratic legitimacy Dr Ian Brown Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford

Sources of legitimacy
Informed, democratic consent
Do citizens and their representatives have full information on costs & benefits?
Compatibility with human rights
Continued legislative and judicial oversight and technological constraint

“ We really don't know a whole lot about the overall costs and benefits of homeland security” -senior DHS economist Gary Becker in 2006

“ Policy discussions of homeland security issues are driven not by rigorous analysis but by fear, perceptions of past mistakes, pork-barrel politics, and insistence on an invulnerability that cannot possibly be achieved.” -Jeremy Shapiro (2007)

Premises of efficacy
The number of potential terrorist targets is essentially infinite
The probability that any individual target will be attacked is essentially zero
If one potential target happens to enjoy a degree of protection, the agile terrorist usually can readily move on to another one
Most targets are "vulnerable" in that it is not very difficult to damage them, but invulnerable in that they can be rebuilt in fairly short order and at tolerable expense
It is essentially impossible to make a very wide variety of potential terrorist targets invulnerable except by completely closing them down
John Mueller (2008) The quixotic quest for invulnerability

Policy implications
Compare proposals to doing nothing, using the money saved to rebuild and to compensate any victims
Consider negative effects of protection measures: not only direct cost, but inconvenience, enhancement of fear, negative economic impacts, reduction of liberties
Any analysis that leaves out such considerations is profoundly faulty, even immoral
John Mueller (2008) The quixotic quest for invulnerability

CCTV efficacy
Effective only in limited circumstances (e.g. car parks); otherwise reduces crime by about 3% (NACRO)
Better street lighting reduces crime by 20% (Home Office)
“ It's been an utter fiasco: only 3% of crimes were solved by CCTV” -DCI Mike Neville, head of Visual Images, Identifications and Detections Office

Efficacy of facial recognition
Does it identify terrorists and serious criminals, or pickpockets and ticket touts?
How many arrests might we expect?
How accurate in typical conditions?
Do we have high-quality images of terrorist suspects?

Efficacy of “Terrorist Surveillance Programme”
~5000 Americans surveilled over 4 years; led to <10 warrants per year
“ Techniques that look at people's behavior to predict terrorist intent are so far from reaching the level of accuracy that's necessary that I see them as nothing but civil liberty infringement engines." –Jeff Jonas, Chief Scientist, IBM Entity Analytics

Strategic impact
Could systems create new community grievances, such as more racially biased police searches?
Do systems damage the values the “war on terror” is supposed to be defending, e.g. by censoring websites or undertaking warrantless wiretaps?
Fix causes of problems, not surface symptoms

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
Art. 7: Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.
Art. 8: Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
Art. 10: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Art. 11: Everyone has the right to … receive and impart information and ideas
Art. 12: Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association

Is this politically feasible? Source: Eurobarometer #225 Data Protection in the EU, Feb. 2008 p.48

European Parliament 29/6/07
Supports all security measures against terrorist risks in aviation that are realistically designed to minimise the risk and are not disproportionate;
Points out that controls of liquids in hand luggage by X-ray equipment cannot detect explosives in liquids, and calls upon the Commission and the Member States to intensify their efforts in supporting research studies to find effective tools for the detection of explosives in liquids;
Considers that the provisions of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1546/2006 have not been implemented uniformly and consistently at all airports within the European Union and asks that this implementation be carried out;
Notes the increased costs to airports and operators of implementing this regulation;
Notes in addition, whilst appreciating the need for high-quality security, the costs to aviation passengers resulting from the confiscation of private property as a result of the implementation of the regulation;
Recognises the substantial inconvenience and disruption caused to passengers, especially transit passengers, and operators by the regulation;
Is concerned that the costs engendered by the regulation may not be proportionate to the added value of the regulation in terms of additional security provisions obtained through its implementation;
Calls upon the Commission to review urgently and on an ongoing basis Regulation (EC) No 1546/2006 (introduction of liquids onto aircraft);

Conclusions
Democratic legitimacy and human rights are critical to ensure security technology supports rather than subverts European political values
Security and privacy are too important to be left to vested interests within government and industry

Security technology and democratic legitimacy

by Ian Brown on Sep 04, 2008

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