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Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
Investment beliefsystems nepc
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Investment beliefsystems nepc

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  • 1. INVESTMENT BELIEF SYSTEMS1A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE John R. Minahan, CFA2 Senior Investment StrategistIntroduction  Show how a cultural perspective on be- liefs can illuminate investment behaviorInvestment management is a judgment-rich en- that otherwise seems puzzling.deavor. The major components of managing aninvestment program – determining objectives,  Offer some suggestions on how to makefinding and exploiting opportunities, and evaluat- beliefs more conscious and deliberate.ing the extent to which objectives have beenachieved – all involve judgment as much as data.  Argue that a key part of evaluating an in-Judgments in turn are framed by ones system of vestment manager is assessing the man-beliefs about how the investment world works. ager’s belief system.Given this, it seems worthwhile to ponder whereour beliefs come from, to assess their validity, andto attempt to improve them as opportunities existto do so. BELIEFS ARE COGNITIVE PHENOM-Not all beliefs are conscious. Some beliefs are ENA. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO HAVEtaken for granted and have receded into the back A CULTURAL ASPECT.of our minds until something draws our attentionto them. Unconscious beliefs can have a signifi- Section I begins with some basic concepts andcant impact on our decisions because they are definitions. Section II illustrates the centrality ofunexamined. While I doubt we can ever become beliefs and culture using two examples drawnfully conscious of our beliefs, there are things we from my consulting experience: liability-drivencan do to become more conscious of them and to investing and equity style analysis. Section III ad-refine them over time. My goal in writing this dresses the management of belief systems, in-chapter is to draw attention to the importance of cluding how beliefs can be made more consciousbeliefs in investment management and to suggest and deliberate. Section IV addresses the role ofthat active management of ones belief system beliefs systems in evaluating active investmentcan make one a better investor. Specifically, I will managers. Section V summarizes the chapter.  Illustrate by example that beliefs can be a Beliefs, Belief Systems, and Culture determining factor in investment deci- sions and strategy. A belief is a hypothesis one holds to be true. A belief system is an accumulated set of beliefs and  Discuss the unconscious aspect of beliefs, the process by which this set changes in response especially the role of culture in determin- to new information and ideas. Beliefs and belief ing unconscious beliefs.1 This paper was prepared for inclusion in Investment Management: The Noble Challenges of Global Stewardship, Ralph Rieves and Wayne Wagner, editors.2 I thank Michael Antony, Barclay Douglas, Michael Mauboussin, Larry Pohlman, Rodney Sullivan, Satish Thosar, Barton Waring, Jarrod Wilcox, and seminar par-ticipants at Boston QWAFAFEW, NEPC, Northfield Information Services Summer Seminar, and UMass-Boston for helpful comments and discussion. All opinionsexpressed are mine. August 2008
  • 2. systems are cognitive phenomena, and as such, by which our beliefs change in response to newreside within the minds of individuals. However, experiences.because beliefs tend to cluster within groups –such as organizations, occupations, or societies – Culture is a particularly important determinant ofthey can also be understood as cultural phenom- beliefs. Culture can be understood as a sharedena. 3 4 5 set of not fully conscious assumptions that shape the behavior, attitudes, and beliefs of a group ofBeliefs differ from each other in the extent to people, including beliefs about what to pay atten-which they are supported by evidence. Some be- tion to, what is “real”, and what “works”. Cultureliefs are in obvious conflict with evidence (e.g. is a property of any group that has had a suffi-housing prices only go up), and others are solidly cient history, including organizations, occupations,supported by evidence (e.g. bubbles eventually societies, ethnic groups, and sub-units of thesepop). In the middle is a vast array of potential groups. A particular culture emerges in a group because itA KEY CHALLENGE OF LEADER- serves a function for that group. Once estab-SHIP IS TO FIND A BALANCE BE- lished, culture tends to recede into the back- ground – assumptions which are shared are notTWEEN CULTURAL PRESERVATION challenged – and becomes change-resistant. TheAND CHANGE. stability of culture can be an asset if the environ- ment is stable, but may become dysfunctional if the environment is rapidly changing. In such anbeliefs which have varying degrees of plausibility environment, a key challenge of leadership is to(e.g. the expected equity risk premium is 3%, stan- find the right balance between preservation anddard deviation is a good measure of risk, active adaptation. In an investment context the chal-management is more likely to succeed in ineffi- lenge is to find the right balance between long-cient asset classes, etc.) Investment management standing, taken-for-granted practices and newprimarily operates within this "broad middle", approaches based on insights into the rapidlywhere facts do not unambiguously lead to one changing environment. This is the Noble Chal-conclusion or another, where one must make lenge, and belief systems are front and center.judgments which are framed by a belief system. Investment Belief Systems in ActionBeliefs also differ in the process by which theyare acquired. Our experiences growing up, our This section illustrates the power of culture andprofessional training and organizational affilia- belief systems in investment management usingtions, our mentors and role models, and our suc- two examples from my consulting experience,cesses and failures all influence our beliefs. In- liability-driven investing (LDI) and equity styledeed, the whole sum of our accumulated experi- analysis.6ence contributes to our beliefs and the process3 The concepts of beliefs and belief systems used in the chapter are strongly influenced by Dennett (2006) and James (1896).4 The treatment of culture is adapted from Schein (2004). Scheins concept of culture is similar to that of Ware (2004). For both Schein and Ware the less visibleaspects of culture (shared assumptions, beliefs, and values) determine the more visible aspects (behavior and artifacts), making it hard to change visible culturewithout surfacing the less visible elements. Schein is especially focused on shared unconscious assumptions as the most fundamental aspect of culture, but bothagree that surfacing the less visible is necessary to manage the visible.5 Several times I have been asked how this chapter relates to the behavioral finance literature. I don’t have a very complete answer at this point, but I do think thatthe cognitive concepts I use resemble those of Kahneman (2003), and could probably be reframed to more closely resemble Kahneman. I am not aware, however,of any strand of the behavioral finance literature that uses the cultural framework of Schein as I do. Nor am I aware of any strand of behavioral finance which isguided by the clinical methodological perspective as this paper is (see next footnote.) Ware, et al (2004, 2006) probably comes closest on both the cultural per-spective and the clinical methodology. His work is not, to my knowledge, considered part of the mainstream behavioral finance literature, though perhaps it shouldbe. I think the behavioral finance enterprise has much to gain by incorporating the cultural and clinical perspectives into its tool kit, and I hope this paper andWare’s work spark some interest in doing that.6 For the methodologically minded: the development of these examples was strongly influenced by the clinical perspective in fieldwork articulated by Schein(1987). The clinical perspective is defined in counterpoint to the ethnographic perspective. An ethnographer enters a human system as a “participant-observer”and tries very hard to not change the system being studied – the idea being that if you change it you are no longer getting clean data on the system. A clinician, onthe other hand, enters a human system specifically in order to help members of the system solve problems. Schein argues that clinicians are often in a betterposition to gather cultural data than are ethnographers – the idea being that you can never really understand how a human system works until you try to change it.Schein also points out that many real-world work situations provide opportunities to act as a clinician even when one’s role is not explicitly so defined. In myfifteen years experience in the pension consulting industry, I have often found this to be true. 2 Investment Belief Systems
  • 3. Economic and Accounting Views of Liability- ample of how clueless some money managers andDriven Investing consultants are about the objectives and prob- lems of public or Taft-Hartley fund management.When I talk about LDI7 with my fellow economists,we take it as given that the accounting rules8 for Whether or not to hedge liabilities is one of thevaluing pension liabilities are largely irrelevant to most significant decisions an investor makes. Yetassessing the merits of LDI. We have all been here we have two diametrically opposed views,trained to have a keen eye for the potential of not because of any dispute about facts, but seem-"accounting illusion" – situations where accounting ingly because of beliefs about the relative impor-fails to adequately reflect the economics one is tance of economic and accounting frames of ref-analyzing. In such situations our professional con- erence, beliefs which the holders may not evenditioning calls for decisions to be based on the be aware of.best assessment one can make of the economics, Here’s what we can learn from this:THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF LDI Beliefs matter. The outcome of major in- vestment decisions can hinge on beliefs asDOES NOT HINGE ON THE much as on facts.ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF Beliefs are not always conscious. The beliefsLIABILITIES. which determine decisions may be so in- grained that the holder of the beliefs isnt aware that he or she is acting on a belief.and not on distortions introduced by poor meas-ures of those economics. An implication of this Beliefs tend to cluster in groups (such asperspective is that the attractiveness of LDI does occupations) where they are reinforced bynot hinge on its accounting treatment. the social validation of others in the group holding the same beliefs.Accounting may make the benefit of LDI more orless transparent, but the benefits are still there The behavior and points of view of people ineven when the accounting treatment masks that a different group with different beliefs canbenefit. The fact that some plan sponsor types be quite puzzling.(public and Taft-Hartley in the US) do not mark The LDI example is fairly straightforward. In someliabilities to market has little to no bearing on the situations the role culture plays in determiningpotential benefits of LDI for those plans, in an beliefs is more nuanced, and can involve not justeconomists view. different cultures, but multiple subcultures in aA different perspective emerges if one talks to single organization, multiple cultural identities in apeople responsible for administering public or single individual (e.g. an individual can be a mem-Taft-Hartley funds. Numerous times I have heard ber of a profession, an organization, and a society,such plan sponsors express frustration with all of which have different cultures), and a chang-money managers and consultants (presumably ing mix of these things over time. The followingtrained as economists) who want to talk to them example attempts to capture some of these com-about LDI. “Don’t they know we are a public plexities.fund?” they scoff, or “Don’t they know publicfunds don’t mark liabilities to market?” The con-text of these questions is typically one where theplan sponsor is citing the LDI overture as an ex- 7 The phrase liability-driven investing means different things to different people. I use it to mean investing which treats a liability-mimicking asset portfolio as therisk-free benchmark against which all risk exposures are measured. LDI does not necessarily involve selecting the liability-mimicking portfolio, but it can. Thecommonly held view that LDI means holding a long duration bond portfolio identifies the term with a particular way of implementing LDI rather than with theapproach broadly defined.8 I use the term "accounting rules" broadly to include valuation rules for funding purposes.3 Investment Belief Systems
  • 4. A Cultural Interpretation of the Relationship be- ior consultant with whom I worked on this ac-tween Investment Managers and Consultants: count, he dismissed my interpretation. HeThe Case of Style Boxes claimed the style analyzer was "objective" whereas the managers explanation was "spin". HeMany times I have evaluated value managers told me that when I get a little more experience Iwhose strategy might be summarized as follows: will learn to be more skeptical of charming manag-purchase stocks of companies which are funda- ers who will “say whatever it takes” to win or keepmentally troubled, but where the manager be- the business.lieves a catalyst is present which will turn thesituation around and that catalyst is not yet I have seen variants of this scenario play out manypriced into the stock. Then hold such stocks until times, from both sides of the consultant-managereither the thesis has played itself out, or it be- divide. The situation looks somewhat differentcomes apparent that the thesis is unlikely to play from the managers perspective. Not only areout. these situations very frustrating, but ironically, they can lead managers to make difficult deci- sions between staying true to their investmentSTYLE BOXES CAN CREATE style or changing their style to conform to a con-PERVERSE INCENTIVES FOR sultants notion of style discipline. I know of sev- eral cases where managers product developmentMANAGERS. efforts reverse-engineered consultants’ evalua- tion criteria, and effectively said "Who are we to question what the market wants? If the marketI was new to the industry the first time I encoun- wants style boxes instead of superior returns, wetered such a manager. The manager came to my can do that."attention because she showed up in a holdings-based style analysis having migrated from value to Some comments on and lessons from this exam-growth, and this set off alarms regarding “style ple are:discipline”. The manager had very good perform-ance, and this happened during a period of time Consultants and managers can have very dif-when growth was outperforming value, so on the ferent beliefs about what is important, aboutsurface it looked like the manager had broken her what information is valid, and about whatvalue discipline because growth was where the kinds of information define a managers style.returns were. Consultants are concerned with classification of managers so that performance can be as-A closer examination of the portfolio revealed sessed relative to a benchmark or peer groupthat the manager had very little turnover during and multi-manager portfolios can be con-this period, and that the stocks which were now structed to ensure a certain spectrum of mar-plotting as growth had plotted as value when the ket coverage. "Style consistency" for the con-manager bought them. All that had really hap- sultant means having stable measures forpened was that the manager was correct with those financial ratios that define style boxes.many of these stocks: earnings were up and price Managers are primarily concerned with ex-even more, and the stocks starting plotting as ploiting their skill to find undervalued securi-growth stocks. She was able to explain the origi- ties, and the intersection of skill and opportu-nal investment thesis for any stock I asked about, nity does not necessarily produce stable fi-and for those she still held, justify that the thesis nancial ratios through time. To many manag-was still intact. This led me to suspect that the ers it is puzzling why that should be impor-style-box program I was using just wasn’t subtle tant.enough to accurately capture the manager’s style,and that the style was in fact consistent through A key mechanism by which culturally-basedthis period. belief systems sustain themselves is the so- cialization and sorting of new members ofWhen I discussed my concerns with the more sen- the cultural group. An important part of this4 Investment Belief Systems
  • 5. can be the "stripping down" of new members has to wonder if the prevalence of rigidly- who, often inadvertently, violate the norms of defined style boxes is due to their giving con- the culture. Such new members will usually sultants a sense of purpose, a "substitute either adapt to the norms or exit the group, problem" if you will, which diverts attention so that surviving members of the group share from the fact that the real problem – finding the norms, and validate them for each other. talented investment managers and building This sorting and subsequent social validation sensible portfolios of them – is in some cases is a key reason why cultures resist change. beyond the consultants reach.10 Social validation of a cultures beliefs does The balance of cultures in a money manage- not necessarily mean that such beliefs con- ment firm can be influenced by consultants tribute to the economic competitiveness of and clients. It has often been noted that the culture. In the case of style boxes, a key some investment management firms have an investing culture and others have an asset- gathering culture. I think this is an accurateCLIENTS AND CONSULTANTS CAN observation, but I would add that some in-INFLUENCE THE CULTURE OF AN vestment firms have both an investing subcul-INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT FIRM. ture and an asset-gathering subculture exist- ing in tension with each other. While one will likely dominate at any point in time given the dysfunction derives from the fact that they direction from the top, as a firms environ- encourage uneconomic buying and selling of ment changes, there may be opportunities for securities. For example, our value manager the latent subculture to assert itself. Consult- may feel pressed to sell a stock before the ants and clients, as key elements of a man- thesis has fully played out to insure that she ager’s environment, are in position to influ- still plots in her style box. This creates an in- ence the balance between subcultures. I be- centive for managers not constrained by style lieve that a rigid adherence to the style box boxes (e.g. hedge funds) to pick up the money framework on the part of consultants tips the left on the table by style-box managers. Al- balance of money manager cultures towards though there are presumably many reasons asset-gathering. for the rise of hedge funds in recent years, one reason may be the opportunity for flexi- Managing Belief Systems ble, skill-based investing left unexploited by As time proceeds, beliefs are continuously put to managers constrained by style boxes. The the test. We are constantly immersed in new poor performance of tightly constrained port- data and ideas. And, if we are fortunate, we en- folios also puts pressure on the business counter people who challenge our views. These model of consultants advocating such ap- situations present us with opportunities to re- proaches. Interestingly, many consultants evaluate and perhaps refine our beliefs. Different formerly constrained by the style box frame- belief systems respond in different ways to these work have now embraced "alternatives" due opportunities, and we can classify them accord- to their superior risk/return characteristics.9 ingly11: Holdings-based style analysis is extremely A fixed belief system is one that does not useful, but the rigid use of it can be a crutch. consider new ideas and data, either because I probably would never have come to under- it is blind to them or because it responds de- stand the value manager described above as fensively to them. well as I did if holdings-based analysis didnt raise some questions for me. However, one An adaptive belief system is one that is aware9 Unconstrained investing has its own challenges, not the least of which is the risk that managers and consultants will operate outside their skill set. Another chal-lenge is determining the appropriate benchmarks for evaluating performance.10 A possible middle-ground between rigid style boxes and unconstrained investing is discussed by Surz (2008).11 This classification is influenced by Senge (1990) and Argyris and Schon (1978).5 Investment Belief Systems
  • 6. of new ideas and data and is open to learning ity distinct from accounting measurements? from them. Do you believe style boxes are a useful way of organizing an investment program? Do you A proactive belief system is one that explic- believing in active management? If so, under itly seeks out new ideas and data with the what circumstances? purpose of improving beliefs over time. Become introspective when you are sur-Because investment management is judgment-rich prised. Our expectations are generated byand rapidly changing, there would seem to be lit- our belief systems. Every time we are sur-tle place for fixed belief systems among invest- prised by the outcome of an investment, or byment professionals. Not that stable core beliefs what happens in the markets even if it didn’tarent an asset – they most certainly are – but effect our investments, it means our beliefeven core beliefs should be open to examination system missed something, and this provides us with an opportunity to reflect on and per- haps refine our beliefs.EXPOSURE TO DIFFERENT CUL-TURES CAN DRAW ATTENTION TO Expose yourself to different cultures. Be- cause people in the same culture have similarUNCONSCIOUS BELIEFS. unconscious beliefs, they are less likely to challenge each other’s most fundamental be-and should sometimes be refined. Also, the proc- liefs than are people of a different culture,ess of building stable core beliefs may benefit especially if the different culture has its ownfrom periods of experimentation. well-developed views on a topic you care about. For example, as a financial economist IBelow I discuss three aspects investment belief find my beliefs about liability valuation aresystem management: self-awareness of ones be- challenged and refined by my discussions withliefs, the relationship between investment theory actuaries, even though I continue to disagreeand investment beliefs, and the role of evidence with them on some points.in managing beliefs. Cross referencing ones beliefs with investmentEnhancing self-awareness of ones beliefs. theory is another useful device for enhancing self- awareness. This is a big enough topic to warrantBecause our beliefs are in part unconscious, man- its own subheading.agement of them first involves becoming moreaware of them. Three ways of doing this are: Using investment theory to refine your belief system. Attempt to write your beliefs down.12 Am- bachtscheer (2007) encourages investment Investment theory is part of the professional tool professionals to write an "Investment Belief kit. Not that one should automatically “believe” Statement" and to have as a centerpiece of theory, but a professional should be aware of the statement ones views on the determina- what it can and cannot do, and use it effectively in tion of expected returns; for example, do you those situations where it is applicable. believe the equity risk premium changes over time and are these changes predictable? I It is useful to distinguish two types of theory. would add that any belief that shapes your Some theory is what one might call "bedrock the- decisions should be included. For example, ory" – theory that it would take an earthquake to do you believe there exists an economic real- move. Most bedrock theory is not open to inter- 12 It is important to distinguish between an individual writing beliefs down for the sake of clarifying them and an organization publishing a statement of beliefs. As noted earlier, beliefs are cognitive phenomena residing in the minds of individuals. The members of an organization may share beliefs or may not. Even if we assume they share beliefs – or act as if they do because of strong leadership – what is written in a statement for external consumption may or may not reflect the actual beliefs of the organization. Often these statements reflect aspirations of the organization and/or how it would like to be perceived, which can be different than the beliefs that actually exist within the minds of the members of the organization. While creating external statements is a very worthwhile exercise, as is the study of them (Slager and Koedijk (2007)), such statements serve a different purpose than that of an individual writing down beliefs as part of a process of self-discovery.6 Investment Belief Systems
  • 7. pretation by a belief system. For example, the tremely valuable as "inversions" – if you have a listidea that diversification reduces risk has a status of conditions under which something is irrelevant,close to that of fact, as do many similar princi- the inverse of these conditions constitute the rea-ples. Bedrock theory is very useful, but it does sons the item matters. For example, Porter’snot tell us specifically what to do. It can be (1980) five competitive forces are a restatementthought of as a set of guardrails which keep us of the list of conditions which imply zero profits.from going off the road should our thinking go This inversion of competitive market theory takesastray. The big decisions – where to drive, if you an unstructured problem – how to formulate awill – are still strongly influenced by judgment, strategy for a business – and narrows the focus tojudgment which derives from our belief system five key questions which must be explored andand the interpretation of all that we deem to be judged. Efficient market theory can play a similarrelevant. role in investment management, as I will discuss in section IV. The take-away at this point is that a theory doesn’t have to be “true” to be useful.INVESTMENT THEORY IS PART OF Often the mere logical structure of a theory brings focus to the issues one must judge, andTHE TOOL KIT. PROFESSIONALS using theory in this manner is a key tool of beliefSHOULD KNOW WHAT IT CAN AND system management for investment professionals.CANNOT DO. The role of evidence in managing belief systems The whole reason investment decisions must relyA different type of theory is the conceptual on beliefs is that we don’t have enough informa-framework. These theories help professionals tion to determine the best course of action unam-think a problem through, help us focus the issues biguously. So we rely on our beliefs to fill in theneeding judging, and help us identify data which gaps. Every time we experience the results ofwould be useful to gather. Of particular interest actions which were guided by beliefs, we getfor investment professionals are what economists feedback which enables us to judge how well ourcall “irrelevance propositions”. These are theories beliefs filled in those gaps. An adaptive beliefthat take the form: "if a certain set of conditions system pays attention to this data, and modifiesare satisfied, then X doesnt matter". For exam- beliefs as appropriate. For example, I suspectple: that in the last year many investment profession- als have refined their beliefs about the potential  The theory of perfect competition speci- for forced de-levering to damage the economy fies conditions under which economic and investment returns. profits for the producers in an industry are zero. While learning from experience – i.e. having an  Efficient market theory specifies condi- adaptive belief system – is an essential aspect of tions under which excess returns from belief system management, proactive data gather- active management are expected to be ing on those issues we have identified as needing zero. judging and using that data to narrow the range of uncertainty – a proactive belief system – allows  The Modigliani-Miller theorems specify for even more powerful belief system manage- conditions under which a firms capital ment. Since this is the kind of belief system man- structure and dividend policy dont mat- agement one likes to see in an active investment ter. manager, I discuss this further in the next sectionAt first blush these theories may not seem useful in the context of evaluating belief systems.for the business person or investor since they all Evaluating Belief Systems13seem to imply that the items of interest – profits,excess returns, financial policy – either dont exist When I evaluate an active investment manager, Ior dont matter. Yet all of these theories are ex- usually try to uncover what I can about the man-13 Some of the material in this section first appeared in Minahan (2006). 7 Investment Belief Systems
  • 8. agers belief system, for two reasons. First, an Evaluating belief contentactive investment process is designed to exploit amanager’s beliefs about how superior perform- Every now and then I meet a manager whose be-ance is generated, so understanding the man- liefs seem to violate bedrock theory. For exam-ager’s beliefs is central to judging the manager’s ple, some managers pursuing a high dividend yieldinvestment process. Second, I want to know how strategy cite the "compounding power of rein-proactive the manager is about using the available vested dividends" as a reason for expecting themtools to self-assess his investment process and to generate superior performance, as if dividendsbeliefs. At the very least I want to see managers somehow compounded more effectively thanwith adaptive belief systems, and if they are pro- capital gains. As Alfred Rappaport (2006) has soactive, all the better. While I dont have any hard eloquently pointed out, as a purely mathematicalevidence that adaptive or proactive belief sys- matter, it is total returns that compound; the divi- sion of returns between capital gains and divi- dends, all other things equal, has no impact on how returns compound over time.14AN ACTIVE INVESTMENT PROCESSEXPLOITS A MANAGER’S BELIEFS So when I listen to a manager making his case, one of the questions I am alert to is, does the man-ABOUT HOW GOOD PERFORM- agers case seem to rest on any violations of bed-ANCE IS GENERATED. rock theory? If it does, after making sure I havent misunderstood the manager, I usually dismiss these managers without a second thought. Oftems affect performance – perhaps some data course there is always the possibility that it isgathering is appropriate here – I have more confi- merely the marketing pitch that violates the bed-dence in managers that actively wrestle with rock, and that I may reject a good manager be-learning and improving using whatever tools they cause of poor marketing. But I am not worriedcan get their hands on, formal or improvised. about this. Having a marketing strategy that is at odds with what the manager actually does is itselfTalking about beliefs is difficult. Most managers a sign that something is wrong with the organiza-are not accustomed to doing it in a substantive tion. No point in wasting time – on to the nextway. Consequently, approaching the topic di- manager.rectly (“So, what are your investment beliefs?”)will likely generate superficial responses. It is bet- With managers that get past the "no-bedrock vio-ter to let the manager tell his story on his own lations" screen, I would like to have a sense of theterms, and then seek opportunities to ask follow- managers beliefs on the following:up questions which flow from the manager’s story,but which also serve the purpose of shedding  Where do superior opportunities comelight on the manager’s belief system. Often, sim- from? What is it about the workings ofple questions such as “why do you think that?” or capital markets that cause some opportu-“why do you expect that to continue?” can go a nities to be available for less than they arelong way to uncovering a manager’s beliefs. worth?Other times using concepts from capital market  What is it about the manager that allowstheory to frame one’s questions increases the him to pick up these opportunities beforemileage of the inquiry. someone else bids the price up?However the conversation goes, in the end I  How does the opportunity set changewould like to have a sense for the content of the over time? What are the underlyingmanagers beliefs and for the process by which causes of opportunities changing overthe manager manages his beliefs. Let me discuss time? What is the managers view on hiseach: own possible need to change in response to a changing opportunity set?14 There may indeed be reasons to like stocks with a high dividend yield, but compounding power is not one of them. 8 Investment Belief Systems
  • 9. I find efficient market theory extremely helpful in unable to credibly explain how they trade beforeguiding an interview so as to uncover answers to their perspective gets into prices. Many manag-these questions (assuming the manager has an- ers appear to not even think in these terms, butswers). More specifically, I find inverted efficient instead focus on exploiting past patterns (e.g. "lowmarket theory helpful. price-book always works in the long-run") or buy- ing “Mom and apple pie” stocks (e.g. "we only buyAlthough there are several variants of efficient the highest qualities companies, the companiesmarket theory, the basic idea is that the process that made America great"). There is nothing nec-of trading on information or a point of view essarily wrong with attempting to exploit past pat-causes that information or view to be reflected in terns or with buying quality companies, but unlessasset prices, and once reflected in prices, the in- a manager can explain why his perspective is notformation can no longer be used to generate su- reflected in the prices of what he buys and sells,perior returns. The inverse of this statement is there is no reason to expect he will outperform.18 19A MARKETING STRATEGY AT ODDS Evaluating belief managementWITH WHAT THE MANAGER ACTU- The key questions I have regarding a managersALLY DOES IS A SIGN SOMETHING belief management are:IS WRONG.  How does the manager self-evaluate his investment process? What evidencethis: “If a manager is to generate superior returns does the manager look at to do this?he must be able to trade on value-relevant infor-  Does the firm’s culture support or retardmation or perspectives before that information greater awareness of potentially uncon-becomes reflected in price.” This is the value of scious beliefs?efficient market theory as a logical construct. Itsimplifies all the possible reasons for superior I will discuss each in turn:performance into one focused question: howdoes the manager trade before his perspective or How does the manager self-evaluate? Theinformation is reflected in prices?15 fundamental problem of performance evalua- tion is that returns have a substantial randomUltimately, every coherent belief about how to element. This makes it difficult for an evalua-generate superior returns ought to be able to be tor to conclude that good performance de-translated into a reason why the manager can rives from successful execution of a soundtrade before his information or perspective is re- investment strategy. This is obviously true forflected in price. If the manager cannot make this an external evaluator such as myself, but antranslation, I am inclined to assume the manager internal evaluator faces the same problem.doesn’t have a coherent belief system. 16 17 Some managers don’t put much thought intoSadly, most traditional managers I interview are self-evaluation. If performance relative to a15 Most reasons for being able to trade before price reflects ones perspective fall into one or more of three categories: the manager has an information gatheringadvantage; the manager is able to make more accurate predictions with the same information; or the manager is able to react more quickly when circumstances arechanging rapidly and prices have not yet found an equilibrium.16 I am often challenged on this point. Critics say that it is not uncommon for talented managers to be inarticulate, so one doesn’t know what to conclude if a man-ager can’t explain himself. I think there is merit to this point of view if one is talking about an individual. However, investment management firms put enormouseffort and expense into articulating their stories. If, despite this, they can’t explain something as basic as how they view and exploit the opportunity set, I don’t seehow one can come to any conclusion other than the firm doesnt have a coherent view of how they generate value for their clients.17 Another challenge I receive is that some managers don’t wish to reveal how they generate superior returns. I think this is a legitimate issue, but it doesn’t reallycome up that much in practice. Most managers want to provide consultants with whatever it will take for the consultant to get comfortable with their process.18 It is important to note that not all managers fail this test. Some managers understand that trading ahead of price is the central issue, and are very good at ex-plaining how the opportunity arises and how they exploit it. I have had somewhat better experience with alternatives managers than traditional managers in thisregard, but in both camps there are managers who do this very well.19 Even when a manager can offer a plausible reason for superior performance, there remains the question as to whether there is any evidence that the plausiblereason is the actual reason. It can be very difficult to generate such evidence, but as an evaluator I want to see that the manager has tried. Any manager that isseriously attempting to outperform realizes that he has as much at stake as anyone in understanding whether good performance actually derived from the man-agers strategy or just good fortune.9 Investment Belief Systems
  • 10. benchmark or peer universe is good, they mark) is not sufficient to come to that stop there. If performance is poor they may conclusion. Therefore, such managers put more effort into analysis so as to craft a seek additional indicators that the proc- favorable spin on the situation. These are not ess is working. For example: the managers I want to hire.  A manager who predicts earnings can I prefer to hire a manager who is driven to track the accuracy of these predictions. make honest and careful assessments of his investment process in good times and bad,  A manager who predicts bond upgrades and who understands that good performance and downgrades can track those predic- can occur for reasons other than successful tions. execution of the investment strategy. That is,  A manager who develops a fundamental I prefer a manager with a proactive belief sys- view of the future can confirm whether the future actually plays out as pre-EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY IS EX- dicted.TREMELY HELPFUL IN GUIDING AN The key is that a manager recognizes that there is a wide variety of data that can bearINTERVIEW WITH A MANAGER. on self-evaluation, and proactively seeks out and uses the data available. If a manager tem with respect to self-evaluation of their does not do this, it seems fair to conclude investment process. There are two things that it is not important to the manager to im- such a manager can do to partially mitigate prove over time. the fundamental problem of performance evaluation: Does the firm culture support or retard greater awareness of beliefs? A strong cul- Get the benchmark right.20 This ought to ture is usually viewed as a good thing. How- go without saying. Yet the overwhelming ever, since all the members of a culture by majority of managers I review use a definition share a set of unconscious assump- benchmark that is not meaningfully con- tions, a risk of a strong culture is a weak capa- nected to either the investment process bility for surfacing beliefs. Below I give you or a reasonably specified passive alterna- two examples of how firms have dealt with tive. The simplest example of this is a this, one where culture is used to enhance manager that selects securities from a awareness and one where it seemed to re- universe materially different than the in- duce awareness. dex to which the manager is compared. Externally, a manager may have no choice Using subcultures to enhance awareness. about their benchmark. Internally, they I once reviewed a manager whose invest- can use whatever they find most useful. If ment process had two independent sub- they are not careful about this choice, processes, one quantitative and one fun- that tells me they are not serious about damental. Each sub-process was run self-assessment. separately, but then each group critiqued the other’s stock picks, and where they Supplement performance data with non- disagreed, each had to explain what they performance indicators of process suc- thought the other was missing. These de- cess. A manager with a proactive belief bates were used to identify blind spots in system wants to know if his process is both sub-process, and to improve them working, and recognizes that good per- over time. formance (even relative to a good bench-20 Benchmarks are essential. As Waring and Siegel (2006) have argued, the universal goal of all active management is to add value over a benchmark. “Benchmark-free” investing is more a matter of not being clear about what the benchmark should be than it is an actual style of investing.10 Investment Belief Systems
  • 11. Hiring practices and culture. Another 3. Beliefs are cognitive phenomena, but also manager I once reviewed emphasized that have a cultural aspect. We illustrated how they always hired inexperienced analysts differing beliefs about LDI seem to be deter- and then trained them in their way of do- mined by professional or occupational cul- ing things. All of the senior investment ture. We also showed how different beliefs people in the firm started as junior ana- about style discipline contributed to the cul- lysts. They considered this to be a posi- tural dynamics both within and between tive thing, as it ensured consistency in money management and consulting firms. their approach. However, it raised con- cerns in me about inbreeding. So I asked 4. When different cultures interact, there is for clarification: did they never hire ex- potential for both great misunderstanding perienced analysts or was it just uncom- and for great learning. The LDI and style analysis examples illustrated the potential for misunderstanding and bewilderment when observing the behavior of someone with dif-WHEN I EVALUATE A MANAGER, I ferent beliefs. Multi-cultural interaction alsoWANT TO KNOW HOW THE INVEST- provides a vehicle for surfacing the unexam-MENT FIRM EVALUATES ITSELF. ined assumptions of a culture, and is conse- quently a powerful tool of belief system man- agement. mon? They responded that a few times they hired experienced analysts but they 5. Culturally-based belief systems resist never worked out. The analysts’ thinking change. The cultural dynamics of organiza- had been too “contaminated” by the out- tions leads to social validation of conforming side world and could not adjust to the beliefs and ostracizing of deviant beliefs. This culture of this firm. So the firm “learned” makes it difficult for beliefs to change. This from this experience that they shouldn’t can be a good thing if the organization is in a hire experienced analysts. I came to a stable environment and the belief system different conclusion. “works” in that environment.Summary 6. Sometimes belief systems must change. In a rapidly changing world, adapting to and even1. Beliefs permeate the investment business. anticipating change is necessary. This means All investment decisions are framed by beliefs that some beliefs which previously helped an about appropriate objectives, about how to organization to excel may become dysfunc- assess opportunities, and about how to organ- tional. A key task of belief system manage- ize an investment program. Our beliefs can ment and of leadership more generally is bal- determine what we pay attention to and what ancing the value of cultural stability with the we consider important. need to change.2. Beliefs matter. Important decisions can hinge 7. The first step to proactively managing beliefs on beliefs as much as on facts. Beliefs may is to become more aware of them. Writing shape what options we even consider. We your beliefs down, reflecting on situations illustrated this using the example of liability- which surprise you, and exposing yourself to driven investing, where we saw that attitudes different cultures are all useful techniques for towards whether or not to consider LDI surfacing and clarifying beliefs. hinged on seemingly unconscious beliefs about the comparative relevance of account- 8. Cross referencing beliefs with investment ing and economic frames of reference. theory is also a useful belief management tool. Theory can bring focus to the issues which must be judged and can identify data which, if gathered, would narrow the range of 11 Investment Belief Systems
  • 12. uncertainty in those judgments. Of particular Philosophy in Evaluating Investment Managers: a help in investment management is "inverted" Consultants Perspective on Distinguishing Alpha efficient market theory, which simplifies all from Noise." Journal of Investing, Summer 2006 the possible reasons for superior perform- ance into a focused question: how does a Porter, Michael. (1980). Competitive Stratergy: manager trade before his point of view is re- Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competi- flected in prices? tors. The Free Press. 9. Evaluating belief systems is a key part of as- Rappaport, Alfred. (2006). “Dividend Reinvest- sessing active managers. All attempts to gen- ment, Price Appreciation, and Capital Accumula- erate superior performance are based on a tion.” Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring belief system regarding how the capital mar- 2006 kets work. If evaluators really want to know Schein, Edgar (1987). The Clinical Perspective in what drives an investment process, they need Fieldwork. Sage. to understand the belief system behind its design. Schein, Edgar (2004). Organization Culture and Leadership, 3rd edition. Jossey-Bass. 10. A manager who is serious about generating superior performance ought to be serious Senge, Peter. (1990). The Fifth Discipline: the Art about self-assessment. Such a manager and Practice of the Learning Organization. Dou- should be driven to find tools and data which bleday. will enable objective self-assessment. At the very least, they should benchmark themselves Slager, Alfred, and Kees Koedisjk (2007). right. If they don’t it is hard to take seriously "Investment Beliefs." Journal of Portfolio Man- any claims they make about how they gener- agement, Spring 2007. ate superior performance. Surz, Ron (2008). “The Attribution Challenge.” References Chapter 26 of Investment Management: The No- ble Challenges of Global Stewardship, Ralph Ambachtsheer, Keith P. (2007). Pension Revolu- Rieves and Wayne Wagner, editors. tion: a Solution to the Pensions Crisis. John Wiley and Sons. Ware, Jim, Beth Michaels, and Dale Primer. (2004). Investment Leadership: Building a Win- Argyris, Chris and Schon, Donald (1978). Organ- ning Culture for Long-Term Success. John Wiley izational Learning. Addison-Wesley And Sons. Dennett, Daniel C. (2006). Breaking the Spell: Ware, Jim, Jim Dethmer, Jamie Ziegler, and Fran Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. Viking Pen- Skinner. (2006). High Performing Investment guin. Teams. John Wiley And Sons. James, William (1896). "The Will to Believe." New Waring, M. Barton, and Laurence B. Siegel (2006). World. Reprinted in Essays in Pragmatism, Albu- “The Myth of the Absolute-Return Investor.” Fi- rey Castell, editor. Hafner Publishing Company, nancial Analysts Journal, March/April 2006. 1966. Kahneman, Daniel. “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics.” American Economic Review. December 2003. Minahan, John R (2006). "The Role of InvestmentYOU DEMAND MORE. So do we. SM ONE MAIN STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02142 | TEL: 617.374.1300 | FAX: 617.374.1313 | www.nepc.com CAMBRIDGE | ATLANTA | CHARLOTTE | DETROIT | LAS VEGAS | SAN FRANCISCO

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