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Truly Verifiable Elections
 

Truly Verifiable Elections

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talk at Microsoft Research on truly-verifiable voting

talk at Microsoft Research on truly-verifiable voting

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    Truly Verifiable Elections Truly Verifiable Elections Presentation Transcript

    • Truly Verifiable Voting Ben Adida Harvard University MSR Voting Technology Workshop 19 March 2010
    • “If you think cryptography is the solution to your problem.... 2
    • ... then you don’t understand cryptography... ... and you don’t understand your problem.” 3
    • Yet, cryptography solves problems that initially appear to be impossible. 4
    • There is a potential paradigm shift. A means of election verification far more powerful than other methods. 5
    • “But with cryptography, you’re just moving the black box. Few people really understand it or trust it.” Debra Bowen California Sec. of State, 7/30/2008 (paraphrased) 6
    • DRE code Election Results time election 7
    • Three Points 1. Voting is a unique trust problem. 2. Cryptography is not just about secrets, it enables collaboration w/o blind trust, it democratizes auditing processes. 3. Truly Verifiable Voting is closing in on practicality. 8
    • 1. Voting is a unique trust problem. 9
    • “Swing Vote” terrible movie. hilarious ending. 10
    • Wooten got the news from his wife, Roxanne, who went to City Hall on Wednesday to see the election results. "She saw my name with zero votes by it. She came home and asked me if I had voted for myself or not." 11
    • 12
    • 13
    • Bad Analogies Not just that ATMs and planes are vulnerable (they are, but that’s not the point) It’s that voting is much harder. 14
    • Bad Analogies Adversaries ➡ pilots vs. passengers (airline is on your side, I think.) ➡ banking privacy is only voluntary: you are not the enemy. Failure Detection & Recover ➡ plane crashes & statements vs. 2% election fraud ➡ Full banking receipts vs. destroying election evidence Imagine ➡ a bank where you never get a receipt. ➡ an airline where the pilot is working against you. 15
    • Ballot secrecy conflicts with auditing, cryptography can reconcile them. 16
    • http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ 17
    • /* 1 * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice Results 5 6 ..... Ballot Box Collection Black Box 18
    • Chain of Custody 19
    • 20
    • 2. Cryptography is not just about secrets, it enables collaboration w/o blind trust. 21
    • Initially, cryptographers re-created physical processes in the digital arena. 22
    • Then, a realization: cryptography enables a new voting paradigm Secrecy + Auditability. 23
    • Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Obama McCain Carol: Obama Tally Obama....2 McCain...1 Alice 24
    • Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: Ali ce Rice ta lly e hTally ver ifie ifie st s ever he on rv ote E very Obama....2 McCain...1 Alice 25
    • End-to-End Verification /* * source * code Voting */ Machine if (... Vendor Ballot Box / Results Polling Bulletin Board Location ..... 1 2 Alice Receipt 26
    • Democratizing Audits Each voter is responsible for checking their receipt (no one else can.) Anyone, a voter or a public org, can audit the tally and verify the list of cast ballots. Thus, “open-audit” or truly-verifiable voting 27
    • NO! Increased transparency when some data must remain secret. 28
    • So, yes, we encrypt, and then we work with the encrypted data in public, so everyone can see. In particular, because the vote is encrypted, it can remain labeled with voter’s name. 29
    • “Randomized” Encryption Keypair consists of a public key pk and a secret key sk . "Obama" Enc pk 8b5637 "McCain" Enc pk c5de34 "Obama" Enc pk a4b395 30
    • Threshold Decryption Secret key is shared amongst multiple parties: all (or at least a quorum) need to cooperate to decrypt. Dec sk1 b739cb Dec sk2 261ad7 8b5637 "Obama" Dec sk3 7231bc Dec sk4 8239ba 31
    • Homomorphic Encryption Enc(m1 ) × Enc(m2 ) = Enc(m1 + m2 ) g m1 ×g m2 =g m1 +m2 then we can simply add “under cover” of encryption! 32
    • Mixnets c = Encpk1 (Encpk2 (Encpk3 (m))) Each mix server “unwraps” a layer of this encryption onion. 33
    • Proving certain details while keeping others secret. Proving a ciphertext encodes a given message without revealing its random factor. 34
    • Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama This last envelope likely contains “Obama” 35
    • Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama McCain Paul Open envelopes don’t prove anything after the fact. 36
    • A little bit more math y=g x mod p S=g r mod p c t = xc + r t ? g = Sy c 37
    • does this prove anything? y=g x mod p S=g r mod p c c t = xc + r t = xc + r 38
    • what’s so special about it? y=g x mod p S=g r mod p t ? c g = Sy c t = xc + r 39
    • Electronic Experience Voter interacts with a voting machine Voting Machine Alice Obtains a freshly printed receipt that displays the encrypted ballot Encrypted Vote Takes the receipt home and uses it as a tracking number. Receipts posted for public tally. 40
    • David Adam Paper Experience Bob Charlie David _______ Adam _______ Bob _______ paper ballots with indirection between candidate and choice Charlie _______ _______ 8c3sw _______ _______ _______ 8c3sw break the indirection (tear, detach) Adam - x 8c3sw for effective encryption Bob - q Charlie - r David - m take receipt home and use it Adam - x Bob - q 8c3sw as tracking number. Charlie - r q q David - m r r m m x x 8c3sw receipts posted for public tally. q r m x 41
    • 3. Cryptography-based Voting (Truly Verifiable Voting) is closing in on practicality. 42
    • Benaloh Casting "Obama" Encrypted Ballot Alice "AUDIT" "CAST" Decrypted Signed Ballot Encrypted Ballot Alice Alice Encrypted Decrypted Ballot Ballot Signed Encrypted Ballot VERIFICATION Alice 43
    • Many more great ideas Neff ’s MarkPledge ➡ high-assurance, human-verifiable, proofs of correct encryption Prêt-à-Voter by Ryan et al. ➡ elegant, simple, paper-based STV: Ramchen, Teague, Benaloh & Moran. ➡ handling complex election styles Scantegrity I & II ➡ closely mirrors opscan voting 44
    • Deployments! Scantegrity II @ Takoma Park real municipal elections Université catholique de Louvain 25,000 voters Scratch, Click & Vote 45
    • Three Points 1. Voting is a unique trust problem. 2. Cryptography is not just about secrets, it enables collaboration w/o blind trust, it democratizes the auditing process. 3. Truly Verifiable Voting is closing in on practicality. 46
    • My Fear: computerization of voting is inevitable. without true verifiability, the situation is grim. 47
    • My Hope: public auditing proofs will soon be as common as public-key crypto is now. 48
    • Challenges Ed Felten: “you have no voter privacy, deal with it.” 49
    • Questions? 50