Secure Voting

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A short and sweet version of my voting talk for the Harvard College Fund meeting. The talk started with Stuart Shieber and ended with Greg Morrisett. I haven't included their slides here, as I'm not sure what license they'd like to use.

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Secure Voting

  1. 1. Voters, Computers, and Trust: Designing Verifiable Elections Stuart M. Shieber Ben Adida Greg Morrisett Center for Research on Computation and Society October 18, 2008 School of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University
  2. 2. Secure Voting
  3. 3. • Voting is particularly challenging: requires secrecy and public auditability. • Computer science enables qualitatively novel solutions. • Cryptography can reconcile seemingly contradictory requirements.
  4. 4. quot;That's for me and a button to know.quot; Joe, the plumber.
  5. 5. 6
  6. 6. 6
  7. 7. 6
  8. 8. 6
  9. 9. 6
  10. 10. 6
  11. 11. 6
  12. 12. 7
  13. 13. 7
  14. 14. “When I finally saw the results of our tests, I thought I was going to throw up.” Sec. of State, Ohio, last week.
  15. 15. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  16. 16. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  17. 17. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  18. 18. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  19. 19. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  20. 20. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  21. 21. Fashionable Voting http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/9
  22. 22. Fashionable Voting 10
  23. 23. Voting is a fundamentally difficult problem. 11
  24. 24. 14 12
  25. 25. 14 12 1 person, 1 vote
  26. 26. Enforced Privacy to ensure each voter votes in his/her own interest 13
  27. 27. http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ 14
  28. 28. 1892 - Australian Ballot http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/ 15
  29. 29. The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
  30. 30. The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
  31. 31. The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
  32. 32. The Ballot Handoff McCain Alice the Voter 16
  33. 33. The Ballot Handoff McCain Obama Obama Obama McCain McCain McCain Alice the Voter 16
  34. 34. The Ballot Handoff McCain Obama Obama Obama McCain McCain McCain Alice the Voter Black Box 16
  35. 35. Chain of Custody 19
  36. 36. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code */ if (... Vendor 19
  37. 37. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Voting */ 2 Machine if (... Vendor 19
  38. 38. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 19
  39. 39. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice 19
  40. 40. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice 19
  41. 41. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice 5 Ballot Box Collection 19
  42. 42. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice Results 5 6 ..... Ballot Box Collection 19
  43. 43. Chain of Custody 1 /* * source * code Polling Voting */ 3 2 Location Machine if (... Vendor 4 Alice Results 5 6 ..... Ballot Box Collection Black Box 19
  44. 44. Computers have only obscured the process. 20
  45. 45. Computers have only obscured the process. What about computer science? 20
  46. 46. Cryptography solving problems that initially appear to have conflicting requirements. 21
  47. 47. Public-Key Encryption Customer 22
  48. 48. Public-Key Encryption public key Customer 22
  49. 49. Public-Key Encryption public key enc(cc number) Customer 22
  50. 50. Public Ballots Bulletin Board Bob: McCain Carol: Obama 23
  51. 51. Public Ballots Bulletin Board Bob: McCain Carol: Obama Alice 23
  52. 52. Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Obama McCain Carol: Obama Alice 23
  53. 53. Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Obama McCain Carol: Obama Tally Obama....2 McCain....1 Alice 23
  54. 54. Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: Rice Tally Obama....2 McCain....1 Alice 24
  55. 55. Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: Ali Rice ce ver Tally ifies he rv Obama....2 ote McCain....1 Alice 24
  56. 56. Encrypted Public Ballots Bulletin Board Alice: Bob: Rice Clinton Carol: lly Ali ta Rice ce e thTally ver es rifi ifies e ve he n ryo rv ve Obama....2 E ote McCain....1 Alice 24
  57. 57. How can we verify operations on encrypted data? Mathematical Proofs. 25
  58. 58. Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama 26
  59. 59. Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama 26
  60. 60. Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse President: Mickey Mouse Vote For: Mickey Mouse Obama Vote For: Obama This last envelope likely contains “Obama” 26
  61. 61. Zero-Knowledge Proof President: President: President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse President: President: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse Vote For: Vote For: Mickey Mouse Mickey Mouse McCain Paul Obama Open envelopes don’t prove anything after the fact. 27

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