truly veriﬁable voting
MSR Voting Technology Workshop
19 March 2010
- many elections are happening
on the web already, whether we like it or not.
- online elections are the least auditable of all:
you can’t even watch the ballot box.
- opportunity for a clear win:
improve auditability of elections that will
happen online no matter what.
- risk: people will think web-based voting
is okay for all eelections.
- web-based elections assume
low coercion already.
- If the voting public is a subset of the population,
there may be inherent limits to coercion.
- e.g. university voting
- Probabilistic Encryption & Threshold Decryption.
posting ciphertexts safely on a web site
- Homomorphic Tallying.
no write-ins, proofs of correct plaintext
- Benaloh Challenge.
cast or audit, authenticate only upon cast
- In-Browser Encryption.
plaintext only in user’s browser
Helios System Details
- Free/Open-Source stack
- Deployed on Google App Engine
- Deployed on Apache/Python/PostgreSQL
authentication, look-and-feel, translations
So, does it work?
- Université catholique de Louvain
25,000 eligible voters - 5000 votes
University president election
Helios 2.0, optimized
customized for UCL (French, improved UI)
- Princeton University undergraduate government
5000 eligible voters - 1500 votes
authentication integration with CAS
[de Marneffe, Pereira, Quisquater]
- additional ways of ensuring that the
same booth code is run by all.
- giving a choice to voters to do a true
interactive proof of the vote they actually cast.
- Deep Issue: is enforced privacy over?