Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru

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Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru

  1. 1. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional BackgroundExperimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionTurnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Perú Gianmarco León Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE 10th Trobada, Barcelona GSEGianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  2. 2. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionOutline 1 Introduction Motivation 2 Theoretical Model 3 Institutional Background 4 Experimental Design and the Data 5 Results Basic Results Testing the Model Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition 6 Summary and Discussion Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  3. 3. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionMotivation Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  4. 4. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionMotivation Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world Objective: Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented in the electoral outcome Induce voters to get involved in the political process Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  5. 5. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionMotivation Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world Objective: Democratization: everyone’s preferences are represented in the electoral outcome Induce voters to get involved in the political process However, Voting, and enforcing these institutions is costly Induce less informed, or uninterested voters into the polls Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  6. 6. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionMotivation Voting is at the core of democracy. Yet, participation in elections remain an open question for most of the economics and political science literature We need to understand not only why people vote, but also it is key to explain who votes, because it determines: 1 Who gets elected and what policies get enacted Person and Tabellini 2000; Husted and Kenny 1997; Miller 2008; Fujiwara 2011 2 To what extent elected officials are held accountable Banerjee, et al. 2010; Chong, et al. 2011; Ferraz and Finan 2008 Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  7. 7. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionIn this paper ... I explore these issues using a combination of a natural and a field experiment that effectively generates random variation in the fines for abstention in Perú. The experimental design allows me to address four specific questions: 1 How changes in the cost of (not) voting affect turnout? 2 What is the effect on the composition of the electorate? 3 How does a change in the electorate affect public choice? 4 Does mandating voting generate externalities in related markets? Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  8. 8. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Motivation Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionSpoiler Slide 1 A lower fine for abstention reduces turnout. The elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.21 2 Consistent with the theoretical model, this reduction in turnout is driven by: Voters with a lower subjective value of voting/less interested in politics The uninformed Centrist voters 3 Voters who abstain due to the reduction in the fine: (i) do not have different policy preferences, on average; (ii) do not acquire less political information; and (iii) are not more likely to sell their vote, but when they do, have to be paid a higher amount Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  9. 9. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionOutline 1 Introduction Motivation 2 Theoretical Model 3 Institutional Background 4 Experimental Design and the Data 5 Results Basic Results Testing the Model Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition 6 Summary and Discussion Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  10. 10. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionThe Voter’s Problem C (L ; yi , yL , yR Ωi ) represents the utility loss of making a “voting mistake” Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  11. 11. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionCandidate Choice The utility loss of voting for candidate L is given by: C (L ; yi , Ωi ) = E [1 {u(yi , yL ) < u(yi , yR )} · (u(yi , yR ) − u(yi , yL )) | Ωi ] 2 , where, u(yi , yj ) = − (yi − yj ) Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  12. 12. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionCandidate Choice The utility loss of voting for candidate L is given by: C (L ; yi , Ωi ) = E [1 {u(yi , yL ) < u(yi , yR )} · (u(yi , yR ) − u(yi , yL )) | Ωi ] 2 , where, u(yi , yj ) = − (yi − yj ) Optimal voting rule: L if E [u(yi , yL ) − u(yi , yR ) | Ωi ] > 0 v ∗ (yi , Ωi ) = R if E [u(yi , yL ) − u(yi , yR ) | Ωi ] < 0 Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  13. 13. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionCandidate Choice Candidate Choice Cut-off 2 2 E [yR −yL | Ωi ] τi = 2E [yR −yL | Ωi ] Optimal voting rule: L if yi < τi v ∗ (yi , Ωi ) = R if yi > τi Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  14. 14. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionTurnout 1 if C (vi∗ (yi , Ωi )) − di ≤ Mi t(yi , Ωi ) = 0 if C (vi∗ (yi , Ωi )) − di > Mi Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  15. 15. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionTurnout 1 if C (vi∗ (yi , Ωi )) − di ≤ Mi t(yi , Ωi ) = 0 if C (vi∗ (yi , Ωi )) − di > Mi A reduction in the fines for abstention (Mi ), will cause a reduction in turnout This reduction will be more important among voters who: 1 Have a lower subjective value of voting (di ) 2 Hold less information about the candidates (Ωi ) 3 Have an ideology closer to τi Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  16. 16. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionOutline 1 Introduction Motivation 2 Theoretical Model 3 Institutional Background 4 Experimental Design and the Data 5 Results Basic Results Testing the Model Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition 6 Summary and Discussion Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  17. 17. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionInstitutional Background Voting is mandatory for citizens between 18 and 70 years old Consequence of not voting → Civil disenfranchisement To get back full citizen rights, a fine has to be paid Enforcement varies in different instances of government and private offices Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  18. 18. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionInstitutional Background Before August 2006, the fine was S/.144 (~ US$50) New Law: The fine was reduced for everyone, and the decrease was steeper for voters in poorer districts: Extremely poor districts: S/.18 (~ US$6) Poor districts: S/.36 (~ US$12.5) Non-Poor: S/.72 (~ US$25) However, information about the new costs of not voting is scarce Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  19. 19. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionPerceive Fines - Baseline Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline Full Sample .008 .006 Density .004 .002 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 Perceived Fine Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  20. 20. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionOutline 1 Introduction Motivation 2 Theoretical Model 3 Institutional Background 4 Experimental Design and the Data 5 Results Basic Results Testing the Model Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition 6 Summary and Discussion Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  21. 21. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionMap of the Districts Sampled Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  22. 22. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionScript for the Treatment Group Thanks a lot for your collaboration with our study. Now, I would like to give you some information about the sanctions for not voting. In August 2006, Congress approved a reduction of the fines for not voting (Law No. 28859). According to this law, citizens who don’t vote are no longer subject to a fine of S/. 144, but the fine is lower for everyone, and its level depends of the poverty level of the district. According to the information you have provided, if you don’t vote in the October election, you will have to pay a fine of S/.[AMOUNT IN THE DISTRICT WHERE THE VOTER IS REGISTERED]. Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  23. 23. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionScript for the Control Group Thanks a lot for your collaboration with our study. Now, I would like to give you some information about the sanctions for not voting. Recall that in Perú, abstaining in any election is subject to a sanction, which entails the payment of a fine. Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  24. 24. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionMeasurement One of the advantages of my research design is that I am able to measure turnout objectively: Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  25. 25. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionOutline 1 Introduction Motivation 2 Theoretical Model 3 Institutional Background 4 Experimental Design and the Data 5 Results Basic Results Testing the Model Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition 6 Summary and Discussion Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  26. 26. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionTurnout .98 .96 Turnout .94 .92 .9 Non−poor Poor Ext. Poor Poverty Level of the District Control Treatment Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  27. 27. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionPerceived Fine (Non Poor): Baseline and Follow-up Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline Density: Perceived Fine−Follow−up Voters from Non−Poor Districts Voters from Non−Poor Districts .008 .015 .006 .01 Density Density .004 .005 .002 0 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 0 50 100 150 200 250 Perceived Fine Perceived Fine Control Treatment Control Treatment Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  28. 28. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionPerceived Fine (Poor): Baseline and Follow-up Perceived Fine−Baseline Perceived Fine−Follow−up Voters from Poor Districts Voters from Poor Districts .008 .015 .006 .01 Density Density .004 .005 .002 0 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 0 50 100 150 200 250 Perceived Fine Perceived Fine Control Treatment Control Treatment Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  29. 29. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionPerceived Fine (Extreme Poor): Baseline and Follow-up Density: Perceived Fine−Baseline Density: Perceived Fine−Follow−up Voters from Extremely Poor Districts Voters from Extremely Poor Districts .008 .015 .006 .01 Density Density .004 .005 .002 0 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 0 50 100 150 200 250 Perceived Fine Perceived Fine Control Treatment Control Treatment Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  30. 30. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionEstimation Strategy Given the imperfect compliance among the treatment group and learning in the control group, I rely on the exogenous variation in the changes in the perceived fines introduced by the treatment to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) The first stage is given by: Fine ij = β1 NonPoorij ·Treatij +β2 Poorij ·Treatij +β3 Poorij +β4 NonPoorij +γXij +δk +νij The effect of changes in the perceived fines on turnout for voters whose information set was updated by the treatment is estimated in the second stage: Voteij = β1 Fine ij + β2 Poor ij + β3 NonPoor ij + γXij + δk + εij Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  31. 31. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionEffect of the Treatment on Perceived Fine (FS) Dep. Var: Perceived Fine Non-Poor Poor All Treatment: Fine S/.72 -18.807 -19.317 (4.905)∗∗∗ (4.854)∗∗∗ Treatment: Fine S/.36 -30.465 -30.340 (4.756)∗∗∗ (4.692)∗∗∗ Controls Y Y Y Village FE Y Y Y Mean dep. var. -48.00 -64.99 -56.65 Obs. 851 882 1733 F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66 Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  32. 32. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionIV Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election Non-Poor Poor All Perceived Fine 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016 (0.0009)∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗ Controls Y Y Y Village FE Y Y Y Mean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945 Obs. 850 882 1732 F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66 Reduction in turnout for the average voter in: non-poor district 6.72pp; poor district 11.04pp. Elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.21 Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  33. 33. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionIV Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election Non-Poor Poor All Perceived Fine 0.0014 0.0017 0.0016 (0.0009)∗ (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗ Controls Y Y Y Village FE Y Y Y Mean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945 Obs. 850 882 1732 F-statistic 14.68 41.03 28.66 Point estimates for poor and non-poor are not statistically significant: constant elasticity through the income distribution Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  34. 34. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionInterest in Politics Dep. Var.: Voted in the 2010 Election (1) (2) Fine*Very interested in politics 0.0001 (0.0018) Fine*Interested in politics 0.0012 (0.0007)∗ Fine*Not interested in politics 0.0018 (0.0007)∗∗∗ Fine*Very interested in results 0.0007 (0.0006) Fine*Interested in results 0.0018 (0.0007)∗∗∗ Fine*Not interested in results 0.0039 (0.001)∗∗ The reduction in turnout due to a decrase in Mi is stronger among voters with a lower di Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  35. 35. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionInformation About the Candidates Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election (1) (2) (3) Perceived Fine 0.0024 0.0022 0.0024 (0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗ Fine*Candidate recall -.0023 (0.0012)∗∗ Fine*Party recall -.0022 (0.0011)∗ Fine*Cand. + Party recall -.0027 (0.0012)∗∗ A reduction in Mi causes a larger reduction in turnout among voters who have less informartion about the candidates (Ωi) Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  36. 36. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionIdeological Positions Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election (1) (2) Fine*Left -.0009 (0.0026) Fine*Center 0.0015 (0.0006)∗∗∗ Fine*Right 0.0009 (0.0008) Fine*Policy Extreme 1 (Pub. Goods) 0.001 (0.0013) Fine*Policy Center 0.002 (0.0007)∗∗∗ Fine*Policy Extreme 2 (Club Goods) 0.0006 (0.0009) The reduction in turnout due to a decrase in Mi is explained by centrist voters (whose yi is closer to τi ) Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  37. 37. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionPreference Aggregation and Information Acquisition Lower fines for not voting draw a lower share of the population the polls Particularly, voters who are in the center of the ideological spectrum, those who have lower subjective value of voting, and uninformed voters select out of the pool The natural question that follows regards the implications for the aggregation of citizen preferences and information acquisition Theory is mixed on mandatory voting: Krishna and Morgan (2011), Ghosal and Lockwood (2009) Information acquisition: Martinelli (2005), Oliveros (2011), Degan (2011) Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  38. 38. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionPolicy Preferences Dep. Var.: Voted in the 2010 Election Coeff. on Coeff. on Perceived Fine Perceived Fine*Policy Policy Health 0.0019 -.0005 (0.0008)∗∗ (0.0009) Education 0.0009 0.0012 (0.0005)∗ (0.001) Infrastructure 0.001 0.0007 (0.0011) (0.0012) Order and Security 0.0022 -.0012 (0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.001) Promote micro-enterprises/training 0.0016 0.0002 (0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0012) Agriculture 0.0022 -.0020 (0.0007)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗ Youth/Women 0.0013 0.0013 (0.0006)∗∗ (0.0011) Cleaning/Environment 0.0013 0.0007 (0.0005)∗∗ (0.001) Institutions 0.0018 -.0010 (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.001) Social/work programs 0.0017 -.0004 (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.001) Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  39. 39. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionInformation Acquisition Dep. Var.: Candidate Party Cand.+Party Recall Recall Recall Perceived Fine -.0002 -.0005 -.0004 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) Village FE Y Y Y Obs. 1733 1733 1733 Voters who are sensitive to the changes in Mi don’t acquire information differentially Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  40. 40. Introduction Theoretical Model Basic Results Institutional Background Testing the Model Experimental Design and the Data Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition Results Summary and DiscussionVote Buying Dep. Var: Accepted Money S/. Accepted for her vote? Directly Perceived Fine -.0010 -.0303 (0.0009) (0.0161)∗ Controls Y Y Village FE Y Y Mean dep. var. 0.287 2.20 Obs. 1733 1733 R2 -.0103 -.028 F-statistic 28.675 28.675 A reduction in Mi (increase in the opportunity cost of voting) doesn’t affect the amount of vote buying, but makes the votes more expensive Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  41. 41. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionOutline 1 Introduction Motivation 2 Theoretical Model 3 Institutional Background 4 Experimental Design and the Data 5 Results Basic Results Testing the Model Preference Agregation and Information Acquisition 6 Summary and Discussion Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  42. 42. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionSummary and Discussion 1 The elasticity of voting with respect to the cost is -0.21 2 The reduction in turnout caused by the lower fine changes the composition of the electorate Voters who are in the center of the ideological spectrum, those who have lower subjective value of voting (or who are less interested in politics), and uninformed voters select out of the pool of voters Voters who select out of the electorate do not seem to have different policy preferences than those who vote regardless of the fines Voters do not stop acquiring political information Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  43. 43. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionThanks! Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  44. 44. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionEffect of the Treatment on Turnout (RF) Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election Non-Poor Poor All Treatment: Fine S/.72 -.027 -.026 (0.015)∗ (0.015)∗ Treatment: Fine S/.36 -.052 -.053 (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ Controls Y Y Y Village FE Y Y Y Mean dep. var. 0.948 0.941 0.945 Obs. 850 882 1732 Effect of the treatment on turnout: -2.6pp. for non-poor; -5.3pp. for poor Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  45. 45. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionChange in Perceived Fine 0 −20 Change in Perceived Fine −80 −60 −40 Non−poor Poor Ext. Poor Poverty Level of the District Control Treatment Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information
  46. 46. Introduction Theoretical Model Institutional Background Experimental Design and the Data Results Summary and DiscussionTurnout Total Treatment Control T-C P-value Extreme Poor 0.935 0.930 0.940 -0.010 (0.641) Poor 0.940 0.913 0.967 -0.054 (0.001)*** Non-Poor 0.948 0.938 0.959 -0.021 (0.175) Total 0.942 0.927 0.958 -0.031 (0.002)*** Gianmarco León (UPF and BGSE) Turnout, Political Preferences and Information

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